LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF.

JARDELEZA
CAYETANO V MONSOD to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
PARAS; September 3, 1991
instruments of all kinds, and giving all legal advice to clients
- Land Title Abstract and Trust Co v Dworken
NATURE
> one who in representative capacity engages in business of advising clients as
Petition to review decision of Commission on Appointments
to their rights under law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court
FACTS
- UP Law Center
- April 25, 1991 – Atty. Christian Monsod was appointed by Pres. Aquino as
> advocacy, counseling, public service
Chairman of COMELEC
- Alexander SyCip
- Rene Cayetano opposed such appointment as citizen and taxpayer because
> appearance of lawyer in litigation is most publicly familiar role of lawyers as
Monsod allegedly does not possess the required qualification of having been
well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer
engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years
> more legal work is transacted in law offices that in the courtrooms
- June 18, 1991 – Monsod took his oath of office
> business counseling than trying cases; as planner, diagnostician, trial lawyer,
- Monsod’s credentials
surgeon
> member of Philippine Bar since 1960
- article on Business Star
> after bar, worked in law office of his father
> emerging trends in corporate law
> 1963-1970 – in World Bank Group as operations officer in Costa Rica and
Panama involves getting acquainted with laws of member-countries, negotiating
SEPARATE OPINION
loans and coordinating legal, economic and project work
> 1970 – in Meralco Group as CEO of investment bank
NARVASA [concur]
> since 1986 – rendered service to various companiesas legal and economic - concur only in the result
consultant or CEO
> 1986-1987 – secretary-general and national chairman of NAMFREL
(election law)
> co-chairman of Bishop’s Businessmen’s Conference for Human Development
PADILLA [dissent]
- Practice refers to actual performance of application of knowledge as
> 1990 - Davide Commission – quasi-judicial body
distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes active, habitual,
> 1986-1987 – member of Constitutional Commission as Chairman on
repeated or customary action TF lawyer employed as business executive or
Accountability of Public Officers
corporate manager, other than head of Legal Department cannot be said to be
- AIX-C Sec1(1) - … Commission on Elections chairman shall be members of
in the practice of law
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10
- People v Villanueva
years
> Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
- no jurisprudence on what constitutes the practice of law
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind
- Commission on Appointments memorandum
ISSUE
> practice of law requires habituality, compensation, application of law, legal
WON Monsod is qualified as Chairman of COMELEC in fulfilling the requirement
principle, practice or procedure, and attorney-client relationship
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years

HELD
YES. Practice of Law means any activity, in or out of court which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
Monsod as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, lawyer-
negotiator, and lawyer-negotiator is proof he is engaged in practice of law for
more than 1- years
- Black’s Law Dictionary
> Rendition of service requiring the knowledge and application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent
CRUZ [dissent]
- sweeping definition of practice of law as to render the qualification practically
toothless
- there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe
- “performance of any acts… in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law” which tells us absolutely nothing
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
- practice is envisioned as active and regular, not isolated, occasional,

> not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal or extemporaneous

litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident - nothing in the bio-data even remotely indicates Monsod has given the law
enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- difficult if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes
the practice of law HELD
- Monsod was asked if he ever prepared contracts for parties in real-estate 1. Yes.
transaction; he answered very seldom Ratio The alleged forged signature was different from Hidalgo’s signatures in
- Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such is other documents submitted during the investigation.
incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the Reasoning Santuyos did not state that they personally appeared before
denominations of practice of law respondent. They were also not sure if he signed the document; only that his
signature appeared on it. They had no personal knowledge as to who actually
SANTUYO V HIDALGO
CORONA; January 17, 2005 affixed the signature.
2. Yes.
NATURE Ratio He was negligent for having wholly entrusted the preparation and other
Administrative case in SC for Serious Misconduct and Dishonesty mechanics of the document for notarization to the office secretaries, including
safekeeping of dry seal and making entries in notarial register.
FACTS Reasoning Responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive, and
- Petitioners Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. respondent should have been more discreet and cautious.
Edwin Hidalgo of serious misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyer’s Disposition Atty. Hidalgo is suspended from his commission as notary public
oath and notarial law for two (2) years for negligence in the performance of duties as notary public.
- In Dec 1991, couple purchased parcel of land covered by deed of sale
- It was allegedly notarized by Hidalgo and entered in his notarial register SICAT V ARIOLA, JR.
- Six years later, couple had dispute with Danilo German over ownership of said
PER CURIAM; April 15, 2005
land; German presented an affidavit executed by Hidalgo denying authenticity of
NATURE
his signature on deed of sale
Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of Professional
Petitioners' Claim
Responsibility
- Hidalgo overlooked the fact that deed of sale contained ALL the legal
formalities of a duly notarized document (including impression of his notarial dry
FACTS
seal)
- In an affidavit-complaint, complainat Arturo Sicat, a Board Member of the
- Santuyos could not have forged the signature, not being learned in
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio Ariola,
technicalities surrounding notarial act
the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal with violation of the Code of
- They had no access to his notarial seal and notarial register, and they could
Professional Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his
not have made any imprint of his seal or signature.
dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special Power of Attorney(SPA)
Respondents' Comments
purportedly executed by one Juanito C. Benitez According to complainant,
- He denied having notarized any deed of sale for disputed property.
respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the said document on January
- He once worked as junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office;
4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000.
and admitted that he notarized several documents in that office.
- He alleged that prior to notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered
- As a matter of procedure, documents were scrutinized by senior lawyers, and
into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management,
only with their approval could notarization be done.
represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost houses(project
- In some occasions, secretaries (by themselves) would affix dry seal of junior
worth=11M). For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta
associates on documents relating to cases handled by the law firm.
issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of 3.7M, payable to J.C.
- He normally required parties to exhibit community tax certificates and to
Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check
personally acknowledge documents before him as notary public.
was received and cashed by the the latter by virtue of the SPA notarized by
- He knew Editha, but only met Benjamin in Nov 1997 (Meeting was arranged
Ariola.
by Editha so as to personally acknowledge another document)
Respondents' Comments
- His alleged signature on deed of sale was forged (strokes of a lady)
- Respondent explained that as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already
- At time it was supposedly notarized, he was on vacation.
signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4,
2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him
ISSUES
on January 4, 2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a
1. WON the signature of respondent on the deed of sale was forged
similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000.
2. WON respondent is guilty of negligence
Therefore, the SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized it.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Moreover, the suit should be dismissed for forum shopping since similar
charges had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Which complaints were dismissed because the
assailed act referred to violation of the IRR of the Commission on Audit.
- The Court, in its resolution dated March 12, 2003, referred the complaint to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
recommendation. The IBP recommended that respondent's notarial commission
be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
ISSUES
WON acts of respondent amounted to a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD
Ratio The act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed by the
Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
prohibits engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct..
Reasoning The undisputed facts show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000.
The notarial acknowledgment of respondent declared that Benitez “appeared
before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his clear and voluntary
act.” Clearly respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful
statement.
- Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous
and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His
assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most
cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the
truthfulness of every notarial act.
Disposition WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found
guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and
entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the immediate attention of
the Ombudsman.
UI V BONIFACIO
DE LEON; June 8, 2000
NATURE
Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
Mrs. Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Bonifacio
on the ground of immorality, for allegedly carrying on an illicit relationship with
her husband Mr. Ui. In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, Atty. Bonifacio attached a photocopy of a marriage certificate that
said that she and Mr. Ui got married in 1985, but according to the certificate of
marriage obtained from the Hawaii State Department of Health, they were
married in 1987. She claims that she entered the relationship with Mr. Ui in
good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or
shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Mr. Ui
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil
status, she parted ways with him.
ISSUE
WON Atty. Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she
and deserves to be barred from the practice of law
HELD
- No. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right
to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar
examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of
due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics.
One of the conditions prior to the admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good character
must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice. Otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege.
- A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, which has been
defined as the conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community. Lawyers, as keepers of the public faith, are burdened with a higher
degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their affairs with great
caution. Atty. Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that her relationship with Mr. Ui, clothed as it was
with what she believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral.
Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of
society. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same
must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.
- A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships but must also behave himself so as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards. Atty. Bonifacio’s act of immediately distancing herself from Mr. Ui
upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference
and proves that she fad no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral
standard of the legal profession. On the matter of the falsified certificate of
marriage, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable that she did
not know the year of her marriage or that she failed to check that the
information in the document which she attached to her Answer were correct.
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the bar, free from
misdeeds and acts of malpractice.
FIGUEROA V BARRANCO, JR.
ROMERO; July 31, 1997
FACTS
LEGAL PROFESSION
- In 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal profession. Barranco passed the 1970 bar exams on the
fourth attempt.
- Figueroa avers that she and Barranco had been sweethearts, that a child was
born to them out of wedlock and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated
promises to marry her.
- Figueroa and Barranco were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo and were steadies
since 1953. Figueroa first acceded to sexual congress in 1960. A son, Rafael
Barranco, was born on Dec 11, 1964. Barranco promised to marry Figueroa
after he passes the bar exams. Their relationship continued, with more than 20
or 30 promises of marriage. Barranco gave only P10 for the child on Rafael’s
birthdays. In 1971, Figueroa learned Barranco married another woman.
- From 1972 to 1988, several motions to dismiss and comments were filed.
- On Sept 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to
allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer’s oath.
- Nov 17, 1988, the Court, in response to Figueroa’s opposition, resolved to
cancel Barranco’s scheduled oath-taking.
- June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the IBP. On May 17, 1997, IBP
recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take
the lawyer’s oath
ISSUE
WON the facts constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion
of Barranco from the legal profession
HELD
No. To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to
be reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless acts
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.
- Barranco’s engaging in premarital sexual relations with Figueroa and promises
to marry suggest a doubtful moral character on his part but it does not constitute
grossly immoral conduct.
- Barranco and Figueroa were sweethearts whose sexual relations were
evidently consensual.
- Respondent, at the time of this decision, is already 62.
Disposition Petition is dismissed. Simeon Barranco, Jr. is allowed to take his
oath as a lawyer upon payment of proper fees.
BARRIOS V MARTINEZ
PER CURIAM; November 12, 2004
FACTS
- Atty. Martinez was convicted of a violation of BP 22
- Complainant submitted Resolution dated March 13, 1996, and the Entry of
judgment dated March 20, 1996 in an action for disbarment against Martinez
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- July 3, 1996 – the Court required respondent to comment on said petition
within 10 days from notice
- February 17, 1997 – a second resolution was issued requiring respondent to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for failure to
comply with the earlier Resolution and to submit Comment
- July 7, 1997 – the Court imposed a fine of P1000 for respondent’s failure to
comply with previous resolution within 10 days
- April 27, 1998 – the Court fined the respondent an additional P2000 and
required him to comply with the resolution under pain of imprisonment and
arrest for a period of 5 days or until his compliance
- February 3, 1999 – the Court declared respondent Martinez guilty of
Contempt under Rule 71, Sec 3(b) of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and
ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid resolution
- April 5, 1999 – NBI reported that respondent was arrested in Tacloban City
on March 26, 1999 but was subsequently released after having shown proof of
compliance with the resolutions of February 17, 1997 and April 27, 1998 by
remitting the amount of P2000 and submitting his overdue Comment:
1. He failed to respond to the Resolution dated February 17, 1997 as he
was at that time undergoing medical treatment at Camp Ruperto
Kangleon in Palo, Leyte
2. Complainant passed away sometime in June 1997
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was
decided in respondent’s favor. Respondent avers that as a result of his
moving for the execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the
family of complainant, the latter filed the present administrative case
- September 11, 1997 – Robert Visbal of the Provincial Prosecution Office of
Tacloban City submitted a letter to the First Division Clerk of Court alleging that
respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case before the RTC
of Tacloban City, as well as a civil case involving the victims of the Dona Paz
tragedy in 1987 for which the RTC of Basey, Samar rendered a decision
against him, his appeal thereto having been dismissed by the CA.
- June 16, 1999 – the Court referred the present case to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation
- The report of IBP stated:
1. Respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground
that the complainant died and that dismissal is warranted because the
case filed by him does not survive due to his demise as a matter of
fact, it is extinguished upon his death. The IBP disagrees, pursuant to
Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the SC or the IBP
may initiate the proceedings when they perceive acts of lawyers which
deserve sanctions or when their attention is called by any one and a
probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer
which requires disciplinary sanctions.
2. Propensity to disregard orders of the SC, as shown by respondent, is
an utter lack of good moral character
3. Respondent’s conviction of a crime of moral turpitude clearly shows his
unfitness to protect the administration of justice and therefore justifies
the imposition of sanctions against him
LEGAL PROFESSION
4. It is recommended that respondent be disbarred and his name stricken
out from the Roll of Attorneys immediately
- September 27, 2003 – the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution
adopting and approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating
Commissioner
- December 3, 2003 – Atty. Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation
- January 14, 2004 – the Court required the complainant to file a comment
within 10 days
- February 16, 2004 – complainant’s daughter sent a Manifestation and Motion
alleging they have not been furnished with a copy of respondent’s Motion
ISSUE
WON the crime respondent was convicted of is one involving moral turpitude
HELD
Yes. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between
man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.
- The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law is also untenable. The
practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.
- Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministrations of persons unfit to practice them.
- The court is also disinclined to take respondent’s old age and the fact that he
served in the judiciary in various capacities in his favor. If at all, the respondent
was held to a higher standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence, and his conduct should be above
reproach.
- The Court based the determination of the penalty from previously decided
cases, holding that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment for a crime of moral turpitude.
Disposition Respondent was disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
PIMENTEL, HR V LLORENTE
MENDOZA; August 29, 2000
(edel cruz)
NATURE
Administrative Matter. Disbarment
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
FACTS
- Senator Aquilino Pimentel filed this disbarment case against Attys. Antonio
Llorente (election officer of COMELEC and chairman of the Board) and Ligaya
Salayon (ex officio vice- chairman) for gross misconduct, serious breach of
trust and violation of the lawyer’s oath in connection with the discharge of their
duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995
elections.
- Pimentel alleges that respondents:
 Respondents tampered with the votes he received
 Statement of votes show that other candidates were credited with votes
which were above the number of votes they actually received and his
votes were reduced (dagdag-bawas =p)
 In 101 precints, Enrile’s votes were in excess of the total number of
voters who actually voted therein
 The votes from 22 precints were twice recorded in 18 statements of
votes.
- PIMENTEL: The respondents committed a serious breach of public trust and
of their lawyers’ oath by signing the statements of votes (SoVs) despite their
knowledge that some of the entries were false.
- RESPONDENTS: The errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to
honest mistake, oversight and /or fatigue.
- IBP recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.
- Pimentel also filed criminal charges against the two before the COMELEC
which dismissed said charges for insufficiency of evidence.
- The SC, upon Pimentel’s petition for certiorari, directed the COMELEC to file
appropriate charges against respondents.
ISSUE
1. WON a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139 –
B, section 12 C (within 15 day period) since the petition was filed late
2. WON the respondents are guilty of misconduct
HELD
1. NO
Reasoning
- In Halimao v. Villanueva: Although Rule 139-B, sec 12(c) makes no mention
of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that
such motion is prohibited.
- It appears that the petition was filed on time because a copy of the resolution
personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of the SC was received. It
is the burden of the respondent to show that the complainant filed the petition
was filed beyond the 15-day period for filing it.
- Even if Pimentel received the IBP resolution in question was filed 2 days late,
the delay may be overlooked.
- Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole
question for determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be allowed
the privileges as such or not.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- The complainant or the person who called the attention of the Court to the
attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no
interest, in the outcome except as all citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy or
prescription or with procedure like verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions have no application to disbarment proceedings.
2. YES
Reasoning
- In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clearly
preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability.
- SC: What is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the
tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the
subsequent entry of erroneous figures in or two statements of votes but a
systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the
expense of the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the
election returns.
- Despite the fact that these discrepancies were apparent on the face of these
documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes,
respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. This constitutes
misconduct.
- Only the respondents had access to the SoVs and the CoC and thus had the
opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies therein so it is
irrelevant that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by
numerous individuals.
- A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for misconduct in the discharged of his duties as a
government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency
on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such
misconduct.
- By certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, the respondents
committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code , which stipulates that a lawyer
shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By
lawyers express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the
government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as to
“do no falsehood.”
- As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater
obligation to observe the basic tenet of the profession (to behave at all times in
a manner consistent with truth and honor) because a public office is a public
trust.
Disposition Respondents’ participation in the irregularities reflects on the legal
profession. This merits a suspension but since this is their first transgression, a
fine is sufficient.
Fine of 10,000 Php for each for misconduct.
CORDOVA V CORDOVA
PER CURIAM; November 29, 1989
(giulia pineda)
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
NATURE
Administrative case in the SC for Immorality of a member of the Bar
FACTS
- Savacion Delizo Cordova sent an unsworn letter-complaint to then CJ
Teehankee charging her husband Atty. Laurence Cordova with immorality and
acts unbecoming of a member of the Bar. The complaint was forwarded to the
IBP, Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and investigation.
- The Commission required the complainant to submit a verified complain to
which she complied and submitted on Sept 27, 1988 a revised and verified
version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband.
- On Dec 16, she was required to submit before the Commission her evidence
ex parte. She requested for the rescheduling several times. The hearings never
took place as she failed to appear.
- The respondent never moved to set aside the order of default, even though
notices were sent to him.
- In a telegraphic message dated Apr 6, the complainant informed the
commission that she and her husband have already reconciled.
- In an order dated Apr 17, 1989, the Commission required the parties to
appear before it for the confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message
and to file formal motion to dismiss the complaint. Neither responded and
nothing was heard from either party since then.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors:
- Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out
of this marriage, two (2) children were born.
- In 1985, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk
of RTC of Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado.
- Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to
stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together
in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the
public as his wife, using the name Fely Cordova.
- Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-
sari store in the public market at Bislig, while failing to support his legitimate
family.
- On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an
apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely
Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig
- Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or
cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate family.
- In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila that
respondent Cordova was no longer living with her children in their conjugal
home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, Luisita
Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter along with him
- Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complainants,
compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas
corpus. The RTC of Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Notwithstanding respondent's promise to reform, he continued to live with
Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his
legitimate family.
ISSUE
WON the recent reconciliation of the Cordovas and the failure of the
complainant to pursue the case have dismissed the case.
HELD
The most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming
the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and
immoral behavior of the respondent earn carried out in public, and necessarily
adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine
Bar itself.
Ratio
- An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that
he possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and
dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar.
- The lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to
good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities
of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from
the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court. The Court
will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof
satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to
provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the
immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
SORIANO V DIZON
PER CURIAM; January 25, 2006
(romy ramirez)
NATURE
Administrative case for disbarment
FACTS
- Respondent, Atty. Manuel Dizon, was convicted by final judgment by the RTC
of Baguio City for frustrated murder. He applied and was granted probation by
the said court based on several conditions which included among others the
satisfaction of the civil liabilities imposed in favor of the offended party, Roberto
Soriano, the taxi driver who was rendered paralyzed on the left side of the body
as a result of his being shot by the defendant.
- The defendant despite the condition that he pay the civil liabilities imposed on
him as a condition for the probation, appealed said civil liability to the Court of
Appeals.
- From the records of the trial court, it appears that defendant was drunk at the
time of the incident and that the case arose out of the apparent resentment of
the defendant from having been overtaken by the victim who was then driving a
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taxi. From the testimony of a witness, it further appears that the taxi driver was
merely defending himself and that defendant was the aggressor during said
incident.
- Upon the complaint for the disbarment filed by Soriano against Dizon, the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines rendered
its report and recommendation which was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors. The Commssion recommended the disbarment of the
defendant for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and for
exhibiting an obvious lack of good moral character.
ISSUES
1. WON Dizon’s crime of frustrated murder involves moral turpitude and that his
guilt warrants disbarment
HELD
Ratio
- The totality of the facts of the case unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral
turpitude. Given that membership in the legal profession demands a high degree
of good moral character not only as a condition to admission but also a
continuing requirement for the practice of law, the defendant has shown in all
his actuations that he lacks the fitness to remain in the law profession.
Reasoning
- Not all cases involving homicide involves moral turpitude. The question as to
what may be a crime involving moral turpitude would depend on the individual
facts surrounding the case and the surrounding circumstances.
- In the case at bar, it was shown that Dizon was the aggressor as he pursued
and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The actuations of the
victim in this case can be considered as reasonable actions clearly intended to
fend off the attack of Dizon.
- The defendant’s use of an unlicensed firearm and his refusal to satisfy his civil
liability to the victim is a serious transgression of Canon 1 of the code of
Professional Responsibility.
- Defendant has continuously display his dishonest and duplicitous behavior by
first seeking to arrive at an out of court settlement with the family and when the
same failed, making it appear that it was the family would sought a conference
with him. He also lied to the court by claiming that he incident was the result of
the mauling he got at the hands of the victim and two other persons. This story
was belied by the physical evidence as testified to by no less than three
doctors.
Disposition Manuel Dizon is disbarred and his name is stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES V VILLALUZ
REGALADO; June 19, 1997
(cha mendoza)
NATURE
Petition for the disbarment on the grounds of grossly immoral and grave
misconduct
LEGAL PROFESSION
FACTS
-Complainant is the presiding judge of Branch 108 of the RTC of Pasay City
while respondent is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime Commission, and
a retired justice of the Court of Appeals
-Complainant was widowed by the presumption of death of her 1 st husband,
upon a decree of presumption of death after 16-year absence
-Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1977when respondent was the
presiding judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig for the murder case
involving the death of the complainant’s son. Since then, the respondent
became a close family friend.
-On January 7, 1994, the complainant and the respondent got married in a civil
wedding, with all the essential and formal requisites present.
-On the afternoon of their wedding day, the respondent fetched the complainant
from her house in QC to stay in the respondent’s condo unit. There was a
phone call and when the complainant answered, a woman was on the other end
of the line offending the complainant with insulting remarks. The complainant
confronted the respondent about the caller and the confrontation ended up in a
heated exchange of words, to the point where the respondent said to the
complainant, “Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, 'yong sumusunod
sa bawa't gusto ko'. Get that marriage contract and have it burned." With that,
the complainant left the respondent and after that, they never contacted each
other again.
-Several months after, in a bible study session, the complainant learned from
Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the bible group, that he
(Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage between the respondent and a
certain Lydia Geraldez. After hearing that, on June 6, 1995 the complainant
filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").
-On August 7, 1995, when complainant discovered that the respondent falsified
his marriage contract (Exh C.) dated May 10, 1994 by stating that he is
“single”, the complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental
Complaint Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1"). The complainant
also presented the Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B"),
the Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead
(Exh. "E"); and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the
marriage between her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1").
Respondent’s claim The respondent claimed that he only voluntarily signed the
Marriage Contract bet. Him and the complainant in an effort to help the
complainant in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her
legal researcher in 1993 and that their marriage was just a “sham marriage”
-Also, he claims that when he got married to the complainant, his first marriage
with Librada Peña was still subsisting because the decision declaring its
annulment had not yet become final and executory (required publication not yet
done), as certified by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of
Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4").
ISSUE
WON the respondent is guilty of gross immorality and grave misconduct?
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HELD
YES, respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
Ratio The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a
person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law
Reasoning The respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. A former Judge of the Circuit Criminal
Court, and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of Appeals is surely conversant
with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong, if
granted that he was just helping the complainant in the administrative case filed
against her.
-The respondent gave his voluntary consent to the marriage, and with all the
legal requisites for the marriage present, he should have known that his
marriage with the complainant was valid.
-the respondent stated under oath that his marriage with Librada Peña had
been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia
Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the
principle of estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his
wife by second marriage, his first marriage with Librada Peña was subsisting
and unannulled.
Disposition WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A.
Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a
more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar
offense hereafter.
SO ORDERED.
ESTRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN
PER CURIAM; November 25, 2003
(boots tirol)
NATURE
RESOLUTION of the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
FACTS
-Joseph Estrada, through Atty Alan Paguia, filed a Petition for Certiorari under
the Rules of Court against Sandiganbayan, which prayed – “1. That Chief
Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify
themselves from hearing and deciding the petition; 2. That the assailed
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and 3.That Criminal
Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the
Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
-Atty Paguia, speaking for Estrada, asserted that the inhibition of the members
of the SC from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan
LEGAL PROFESSION
political activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated
by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contended that the justices have thereby prejudged a
case that would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The
subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo is, according to petitioner,
a patent mockery of justice and due process.
-The SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit (Sandiganbayan committed no
grave abuse of discretion) and the SC warned Atty Paguia of his conduct -- his
attacks on the Court and making public statements on the case (violating Rule
13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility). He was given 10 days
SHOW CAUSE why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a
lawyer and an officer of the Court.
- On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-
cause order. In a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of
defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against the members
of the Court (for discussion on political partisanship please see original case),
and continued to make public statements about Estrada’s case.
ISSUES
WON Atty Paguia should be suspended from the practice of law
HELD
YES.
-Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer
should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers
and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing
sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and
authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in
seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
-The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism
made by anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have
constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any
wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of the people’s faith in the judicial system, let
alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.
-The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule
13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the
bar from making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse
public opinion for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in
ignoring the Court’s well-meant admonition. The Court has already warned Atty.
Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has
chosen not to at all take heed.
Disposition Atty Paguia indefinitely suspended from the practice of law
ZALDIVAR V GONZALES
PER CURIAM; October 7, 1988
(joey capones)
NATURE
Petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan
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FACTS
Enrique A. Zaldivar had a pending case for graft and corruption in the
Sandiganbayan initiated by Tanodbayan Gonzalez. Zaldivar filed a petition in
the SC alleging that Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the
1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently
to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against
public officials and employees, and hence the information filed in his criminal
cases were all null and void. The SC issued a temporary restraining order.
Petitioner later filed another petition because Gonzalez filed additional criminal
charges against petitioner and five other individuals. Gonzalez instituted another
criminal case in the Sandiganbayan. Four days later, the SC issued another
TRO. Zaldivar then filed a petition to cite in contempt Special Prosecutor
Gonzalez for filing new information before the Sandiganbayan and for making
contemptuous statements to the media. In a news art in the Phil Daily Globe,
Gonzalez made the ff. statements: (1) while the rich and influential persons get
favorable actions from the SC, it’s difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his
petition to be given due course, (2) while Pres. Aquino had been prodding him
to prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high and mighty, the SC had
been restraining him, (3) while he doesn’t wish to discuss the merits of the
Zaldivar petition before the SC, He was disturbed that the order can aggravate
the thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a
trial. The SC ordered the nullification of the criminal cases and for Gonzalez to
cease and desist from further acting on Zaldivar’s case In the motion for
reconsideration, Gonzales claimed that 3 handwritten notes, sent by some
members of the SC interceding for cases pending before his office, were in his
possession. He said that he doubts whether the judges will remain impartial to
him, there being at least 4 members who definitely won’t, and prayed that these
4 inhibit themselves in the deliberation. When this was denied, he filed a motion
to transfer administrative proceedings to the IBP. He also released statements
to the press saying, in effect, that the SC deliberately rendered an erroneous
decision, that members of the SC have improperly pressured him to render
decisions favorable to their friends and colleagues, and that the Sc dismisses
judges without rhyme or reason and disbars lawyers without due process.
Gonzalez didn’t deny he said/wrote those statements. His defense is that he
was just exercising his freedom of speech.
ISSUES
1. WON the SC should punish Gonzalez for contempt of court and give
administrative sanctions
2. WON Gonzales is not liable because he was just using his constitutional right
of freedom of speech.
HELD
1. YES
Ratio Statements which constitute gross disrespect of the Court, and degrade
the SC and the entire system of justice are clearly contemptuous. The SC
should exercise its disciplinary authority over the source.
LEGAL PROFESSION
Reasoning The SC cited several cases wherein the Court held that the
statements were contemptuous and warranting the exercise of the court’s
authority. These are:
(1). Monteciollo v. Gica – Atty del Mar moved to reconsider a decision of the
CA with a veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the
President. He said the court knowingly rendered an unjust judgment thru
negotiations. He was convicted of contempt of court.
(2) Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel – counsel asked CJ
Concepcion and J Castro to inhibit themselves from judging the case since the
brother of Castro was the VP of favored party and CJ’s son was the Secretary
of the Board of Investments. He even threatened that if he didn’t get a favorable
decision, he’d bring the case to the World Court and invoke the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid to the Philippines.
3. In re Almacen – the SC committed a great unjust to his client; justice
administered by the SC wasn’t only blind, but also deaf and dumb; he’ll argue
the cause of his client in the people’s forum (published in Manilla Times).
Almacen was suspended from the practice of law because he exceeded the
boundaries of fair criticism.
4. Paragas v. Cruz – counsel alleged that the SC violated the Constitution,
which was a ground for impeachment; hoped that an incident wherein 2 SC
employees were killed wouldn’t happen again (covert threat upon the members
of the Court)
5. In re Sotto – a newspaper reporter refused to divulge his source and was
sent to jail. Atty. Sotto published in a newspaper that the SC erroneously
interpreted the law, they’re narrow-minded, and that the members of the SC
should be changed. He was held in contempt of Court.
6. Salcedo v. Hernandez – Atty Francisco: the Court’s resolution is erroneous
and is a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls.
2. NO
Ratio A lawyer’s right of free expression may have to be more limited than that
of a layman.
Reasoning The freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that the freedom of expression needs on occasion
to be adjusted and accommodated with the requirements of equally important
public interests. One of the fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. The lawyer’s
duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice.
[Discussion on the SC’s power to discipline its lawyers]
The SC, as the regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary auth over attorneys. This stems from the Court’s Constitutional
mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well
authority to regulate the practice itself. This is an inherent power incidental to
the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of
judicial functions. It also has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control
in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the court
including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case
before the Court. This is necessary for its own protection against improper
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interference with the due administration of justice and not dependent upon the
complaint of the litigant. There are two related powers here: (1) Court’s inherent
power to discipline attorneys – broader than contempt power; lawyer doesn’t
need to be in contempt of court to be punished under this; (2) contempt power
- may be committed by both lawyers and non-lawyers, in and out of court; if this
is done by a lawyer, it’s usually accompanied with professional misconduct.
A lawyer is not just a professional but also an officer of the court and as such,
is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and
resolving disputes in society. Any act which tends to obstruct the administration
of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him and conduct warranting application of the
contempt power.
Disposition Atty. Raul M. Gonzales was found guilty of contempt of court in
facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of
the Bar. He was suspended from the practice of law indefinitely.
CASTANEDA V AGO
CASTRO; July 30, 1975
(glaisa po)
NATURE
- Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- 1955 – Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of
Manila to recover certain machineries.
-1957 – judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson
- 1961 – SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution; Ago’s
motion denied, levy was made on Ago’s house and lots; sheriff advertised the
sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC affirmed
dismissal
- Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff
from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions were denied
- 1963 – sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed
to redeem
- 1964 – sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to
the properties
- 1964 – Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the
replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and that his wife ½ share in
their conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of QC
issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda the Registed of
Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the battle on the
matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued
- 1966 – Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from
enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with
the CA which also dismissed the petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed
the petition
- Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave
due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.
LEGAL PROFESSION
ISSUE
WON the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy
HELD
- No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment
of the sheriff’s sale, justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits
of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents
Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies and
prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the
extended prejudice of the petitioners.
- Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted
position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become
an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for
concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice.
- A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC does not and
cannot countenance is a lawyer’s insistence despite the patent futility of his
client’s position.
It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack of his case.
If he finds his client’s cause as defenseless, then he is his duty to advice the
latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A
lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client’s
propensity to litigate.
LEDESMA V CLIMACO
FERNANDO; June 28, 1974
(mini bernardo)
NATURE
Original action in the SC, Certiorari
FACTS
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case
pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma
was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros
Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to
withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied
him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On
November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio, because the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him
from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma
instituted this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE
WON a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to
appointment as Election Registrar
HELD
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No.
1. The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to continue as
counsel de oficio because: the case has been postponed at least 8 times at the
defense's instance; there was no incompatibility between duty of petitioner to
defend the accused, and his task as an election registrar.
2. Ledesma's withdrawal would be an an act showing his lack of fidelity to the
duty rqeuired of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership
in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the
ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The
fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the
lawyer's zeal.
3. The Constitution provides that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel. "Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel..." ---manifest
the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused.
The right to be assisted by counsel is so important that it is not enough for the
Court to apprise the accused of his right to an atty, but is essential that the
court assign on de oficio for him if he desires/ is poor.
Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase
doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing.
Disposition Petition for certiorari dismissed.
IN RE: TAGORDA
MALCOLM; March 23, 1929
(boots tirol)
FACTS
Luis Tagorda, a practicing lawyer and a member of the Provincial Board of
Isabela admits that the previous election he used a card which states what he
can do for the people as a lawyer and a notary public (he can execute deed of
sales, etc). He also admits that he wrote a letter to a lieutenant of his barrio
asking him to inform the people in any town meetings that despite his election
as member of the Board, he will still exercise his profession as a lawyer and
notary public, even adding that he will only charge three pesos for registration of
their land titles.
ISSUES
1. WON Tagorda is guilty of malpractice for soliciting employment
2. WON Tagorda should be disbarred
HELD
1. YES.
Sec 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by Act 2828) states that
"The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
LEGAL PROFESSION
personally, or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." Canons
27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27- The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a
matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not
per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or
by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations,
is unprofessional... Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of
the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.
28 -It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit,
except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to
do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other
causes of action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit, or to
breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those
having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients… A duty
to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar
having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner
immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.
- The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or
obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be
unprofessional.
- With the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited
cases in defiance of the law and those canons.
2. NO. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent
elimination from the bar. But as mitigating circumstances working in favor of the
respondent there are: first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety
of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and third, his
promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future.
ULEP V LEGAL CLINIC
REGALADO; June 17, 1993
(dahls salamat)
FACTS
- Petitioner prays that respondent cease and desist from issuing ads similar to
annexes A and B and to prohibit them from making ads pertaining to the
exercise of the law professions other than those allowed by law
- Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560 for a valid marriage
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Pls call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041
8:30am-6pm
7F Victoria Bldg, UN Ave, Mla
- Annex B
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GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An Atty in Guam, is giving FREE BKS on Guam Divorce thru the Leg Clinic beg
Mon-Fri during office hours
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Probs, Visa ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res and Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Sp/Shil. Call Marivic
THE LEGAL CLINIC, etc
Petitioner’s Claim:
-Ads are unethical and demeaning of the law profession and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar.
-As a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the ads
Respondent’s Comment:
-They are not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of leg support
services thru paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines
- Even if they are leg services, the act of advertising them should be allowed
under Bates v. State bar of Arizona
ISSUES
1. WON the services offered by The Legal Clinic constitutes practice of law?
2. WON their services can be advertised?
HELD
1. Yes. The Practice of law involves any activity, in or out of the court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
expertise
- To engage in the practice is to perform those acts which are characteristic of
the profession; to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge/skill
- Not limited to the conduct of cases in court; includes legal advice and counsel
and preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are
secured regardless of WON they’re pending in court
3 types of legal profession activity:
1. legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations
2. preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles
not possessed by ordinary layman
3. appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and
authority to determine rights of life, liberty and property according to law, in
order to assist in proper inter and enforcement of law
Respondent’s description of its services shows it falls within the practice of law:
Giving info by paralegals to laymen and lawyers thru the use of comps and
modern info tech
LEGAL PROFESSION
- computerized legal research, document search, evidence gathering, locating
parties/witnesses to a case, fact finding investigations, assistance to laymen in
need of services from agencies like birth, marriage, prop, bus registrations, etc.
*even if some of the services offered merely involve mechanical and technical
know how like installing computer system for law offices, this doesn’t make it an
exception to the general rule
- gives out leg info to laymen and lawyersnot non-advisory and non-
diagnostic
ex. foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption – have to explain to client
the intricacies of the law and advise him on the proper course of action
- what its ads represent and what it will be paid for
- It doesn’t matter that they don’t represent clients in court since practice of law
isn’t limited to ct appearances but also leg research, leg advice and drafting
contracts
Phil Star Art – Rx for Leg Probs, int by proprietor Atty Nogales:
- Takes care of probs as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic sit
- lawyers, who like drs, are specialists in various fields and can take care of it
(taxation, crim law, medico-leg probs, labor, litigation, fam law)
- backed up by paralegals, counselors and attys
- caters to clients who can’t afford big firms
- can prepare a simple deed of sale or affidavit of loss and also those w/ more
extensive treatment
-The fact that they employ paralegals to carry out its services doesn’t matter;
what’s important is that it’s engaged in the practice of law ‘cause of the nature
of the services it renders, which brings it within the statutory prohibitions against
ads
only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who’s in good and
regular standing is entitled to the practice of law
- public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals
found duly qualified in education and character to protect the public, court, client
and bar from incompetence/dishonesty of those unlicensed to the practice and
not subject to the discipline of court
2.No. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in making
known his legal services, shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
info/statement of facts
- not supposed to use any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement re his qualifications/legal services
- not supposed to pay representatives of the mass media in return for publicity
to attract legal business
Canons of professional Ethics (before CPR) provides that lawyers shouldn’t
resort to indirect ads for professional employment like furnishing newspaper
comments, publishing his pictures with causes the lawyer’s been engaged in,
importance of his position and other self-laudation
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
Stands of legal profession condemn lawyer’s advertisement of his talents like a
merchant does of his goods because of the fact that law is a profession.
The canons of profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is
a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct
Good and efficient service to a client and the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention; this shouldn’t be done thru
propaganda
EXCEPTIONS:
1. expressly allowed – publication in reputable law lists of informative data that’s
not misleading and may include only: name, professional assoc, adds, nos,
branches of law practiced, date and place of birth and admission to the bar,
schools attended w/ dates of grad, degrees , public offices, posts of honor,
legal authorships, legal teaching positions, membership and offices in bar
association, legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities, listings in other
reputable law lists, names and adds of references with written consent and
clients regularly represented
- can’t be mere supplemental feature of paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical that’s published for other purposes
- never in a law list that are calculated or likely to deceive/injure the public/the
bar or lower the dignity/standing of the profession
- ordinary simple professional card allowed – name, law firm, add, no and
special branch of law practiced
- publication of simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or change in
partnership, assoc, firm name or office add, for the convenience of the
profession
- have name listed in phone directory but not under designation of special
branch of law
2. necessarily implied from the restrictions
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: allowed lawyer to publish a statement of leg fees
for an initial consultation or give, upon request, a written schedule of fees or
estimate for spec servicess as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers
- none expressly/impliedly provided for in the Canons of Professional Ethics or
Code of Professional Responsibility
*survey conducted by the American Bar Assoc on the attitude of the public
about lawyers after viewing TC commercials – pub opinion dropped significantly:
Trustworthy – 71-14%
Professional – 71-14%
Honest – 65-14%
Dignified – 45-14%
With the present situation of our legal and judicial system, to allow the
publication of like advertisements would aggravate what’s already a
deteriorating pub of the legal profession whose integrity’s been under attack by
media and the community in general
LEGAL PROFESSION
- all efforts should be made to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the
leg profession
Atty Nograles (prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of the Leg
Clinic) is REPRIMANDED w/ a warning that a repetition will be dealt w/ more
severely for misbehavior in advertising his servIces and aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law
KHAN, JR. V SIMBILLO
YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 19, 2003
(apple maramba)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court and SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
FACTS
- Atty. Rizalino Simbillo publicized his legal services in the July 5, 2000 issue
of the Philippine Daily Inquirer via a paid advertisement which read: “Annulment
of Marriage Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.”
- A staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court took
notice and called the number posing as an interested party. She spoke to Mrs.
Simbillo, who said that her husband was an expert in handling annulment cases
and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, and that the fee
was P48,000.
- Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public
Information Office revealed that similar ads were published in the August 2 and
6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of the
Philippine Star.
- Atty. Ismael Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief of the Public Information Office filed an administrative complaint against
Atty. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation in violation of Rule 2.03
and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section
27 of the Rules of Court.
- The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation.
- IBP found respondent guilty
- Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
- Hence, this petition for certiorari
ISSUE
WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court
HELD
Yes. Petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for one year and was
sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
Ratio The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money is the primary consideration.
Reasoning
- Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
- Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
- Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court states: Disbarment and suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.—A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a
party without authority to do so.
- The following elements distinguish legal profession from business:
1. A duty of public service
2. A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness,
and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising
and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
- Respondent advertised himself as an “Annulment Specialist,” and by this he
undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage—encouraging people who
might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained form dissolving
their marriage bonds, to do so.
- Solicitation of legal business sis not altogether proscribed, however, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession.
DACANAY V BAKER & MCKENZIE
AQUINO; May 10, 1985
(ice baguilat)
NATURE
Administrative Case
FACTS
Dacanay seeks to enjoin Torres and 9 other lawyers from practicing law under
Baker & McKenzie (a law firm organized in Illinois, USA). Torres used the
letterhead of Baker & McKenzie on a letter to Rosie Clurman that asks her to
release 87 shares of Cathay Products Int’l. Inc. to HE Gabriel (a client).
Dacanay denied any liability of Clurman and asked whether she is being
represented by Baker & McKenzie as counsel as well as the purpose of the
letterhead. No reply coming from Clurman thus this Administrative Case.
ISSUE
LEGAL PROFESSION
WON the lawyers should be enjoined from practicing law under Baker &
McKenzie
HELD
Yes, they should be enjoined. Baker & McKenzie is an alien law firm and
cannot practice law in the country. Using the name constitutes representation of
being associated with the firm which is deemed to be unethical. Respondents
are enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
SAMONTE V GATDULA
GONZAGA-REYES; February 26, 1999
(athe odi)
NATURE
Administrative matter. Grave Misconduct.
FACTS
- The complainant, Julieta Borromeo Samonte charged Rolando R. Gatdula with
grave misconduct consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of
law which is in conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court.
- The complainant represents her sister as plaintiff in a civil case for ejectment.
Contrary to their expectation that execution will proceed, they instead received a
temporary restraining order. Santos contends that the order was hasty and
irregular as she was never notified of the application for preliminary injunction.
- Gatdula, when asked by the complainant of the reason of the decision,
blamed Santos’ lawyer for writing the address in the complaint for ejectment and
told her that if she wanted the execution to proceed, she should change her
lawyer and retain the law office of respondent, at the same time giving his
calling card with the name “Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera.”
- The decision of the Court continued not to be favorable to Samonte, which
cause her to file administrative complaint against Gatdula.
ISSUE
WON Gatdula is guilty of infraction
HELD
Yes. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an
act of solicitation which violates Section 7, sub-par. (b)(2) of RA 6713 (Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which
declares it unlawful for a public official or employees to, among others:
“(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constituion or law, provided that such practice will not conflict
with official functions.”
Disposition Respondent is reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of
law. He is further ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name
of any office engaged in the private practice of law.
CRUZ V SALVA
MONTEMAYOR; July 25, 1959
(chris capul)
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
NATURE
Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction.
FACTS
- A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found Castelo, de
Jesus, Bonifacio, Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder. They all appealed
and Castelo sought new trial. Castelo was again found guilty.
- Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine Constabulary questioned
people and got confessions pointing to persons other than those convicted.
- Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation on basis of new
confessions. Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the Justice Sec decided to have
the results of investigation made available to counsel for appellants.
- Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and
confessions. Salva organized a committee for reinvestigation and subpoenaed
Timoteo Cruz, who was implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new
affidavits and confessions. Cruz’ counsel questioned jurisdiction of the
committee and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation bec the case was
pending appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this present petition.
- Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz’ oral and personal request to
allow him to appear at the investigation.
- SC issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the prelim investigation.
ISSUES
1. WON Salva and his committee can push through with the investigation
2. WON Cruz can be compelled to appear and testify before Salva
3. WON Salva conducted the investigation property
HELD
1. Yes.
- SC believed Salva that it was Cruz who personally reqested to allow him to
appear at the investigation.
- Normally, when a criminal case handled by fiscal is tried and decided and
appealed to a higher court, functions of fiscal have terminated. However, Salva
has justified his reinvestigation bec in the orig case, one of the defendants
(Salvador Realista y de Guzman) was not included in the trial.
- The duty of a prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure
conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
- Writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. Investigation may continue.
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted in part, denied in part.
2. No
- Under the law, Cruz had right to be present at the investigation but he need
not be present. His presence is more of a right than a legal obligation.
3. No
- Salva shld have done investigation privately in his office and not publicly in
the session hall of Municipal Court of Pasay where microphones were installed
and media people were present. He should also not have made the media
LEGAL PROFESSION
people ask questions. SC was disturbed and annoyed by such publicity.
- Salva is publicly reprehended and censured.
COLLANTES V RENOMERON
PER CURIAM; August 16, 1991
(aida villanueva)
FACTS
- A complaint of disbarment is filed with a related administrative case against
Renomeron of the Registrar of Deeds in Tacloban.
- Collantes was the house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision and
filed the case with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro
forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision in Jan
1987.
- Feb 16, 1987 – no action was made by Renomeron despite follow-ups made
by Collantes. Renomeron requested Collantes to submit additional requirements
which Collantes complied with.
- Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance
of V&G with certain special agreement between then that V&G would provide
Renomeron with a weekly Tacloban-Manil round trip ticket with P2,000 pocket
money. He said he would act favorably on their application if that agreement
would be fulfilled.
- Collantes sent plane fare (P800) to Renomeron through his niece. But
pocket money was not given.
- Renomeron then imposed additional requirements which angered Collantes,
leading the latter to challenge Renomeron to act on the 163 pending
applications by V&G within 24 hours.
- May 22, 1987 – Renomeron denied the application for ambiguity of the
subject matter.
- Collantes appealed for a reconsideration and elevated the matter to the
Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration.
- The NLTDRA ruled that the documents were registrable.
- The NLTDRA recommended Renomeron’s case to the DOJ and the Secretary
of Justice found him guilty. The president then dismissed Renomeron from
public service.
- A disbarment case was then filed by Collantes against Renomeron.
ISSUE
WON the disbarment case against Renomeron would prosper given the
administrative case
HELD
- Yes, the administrative complaint has to do with his position in public service.
The disbarment case has to do with his status as member of the Integrated Bar.
- Renomeron violated the lawyer’s oath.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- The Code of Professional Responsibility 1.01 forbids a lawyer from engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
PEOPLE V PINEDA
SANCHEZ; July 21, 1967
(jojo mendoza)
FACTS
- On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses
Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan,
were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade
gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell
dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered
therein, and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, — all minor
children of the couple — and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.
- Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres were indicted before the
CFI of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases for murder.
The five informations were based on facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney
from his investigation.
- Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases (Tomas Narbasa and
Tambak Alindo) moved for a consolidation thereof into one (1) criminal case.
Their plea is that said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by
one impulse. The respondent Judge approved the motion and directed the City
Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information and
drop the other four cases. The City Fiscal sought reconsideration thereof. The
respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position that the
acts complained of stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the
accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and
should therefore be treated as one crime though the series of shots killed more
than one victim; and that only one information for multiple murder should be
filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one.
Hence, this appeal to the Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.
ISSUE
WON the City Fiscal shall file only one information
HELD
- YES, ruling Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single
penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other ( delito complejo). It is to be borne in
mind, at this point, that apply the first half of Article 48, there must be
singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the
law.
The respondent Judge reasons out that consolidation of the five cases into one
would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases
instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute
LEGAL PROFESSION
confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the
fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied.
Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly
presented the five separate informations — four for murder and one for
frustrated murder. A rule of presumption long familiar is that official duty has
been regularly performed. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is
under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not
convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the
evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the
possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we
must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly
compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him
the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily
swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due
process — the sporting idea of fair play — may be transgressed. So it is, that in
People vs. Sope, the Court made the pronouncement that "it is very logical that
the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of
offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled
by the off ended party."
- The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be
substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed
in court. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the
sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court
must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It
stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did
not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended
party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this
regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not to be understood
as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A
relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal
law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional or was held invalid." Nothing in the record would as much as
intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just recited.
Disposition The writ of certiorari is granted.
MISAMIN V SAN JUAN
FERNANDO; August 31, 1976
(bry san juan)
FACTS
- It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain. in the Metro Manila Police force
and a member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with
being the legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by
Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee,
complainant Jose Misamin to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his
employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter
was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and
recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart on the
part of complainant. That could very well be the explanation for the non-
appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The
efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at
naught.
- Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be expected.
For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and
adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the
recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed. This is one of
those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent
cannot be found guilty of malpractice. Respondent, as noted in the Report of the
Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's
Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the
Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not prohibit
him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his
appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the
grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of
attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant
Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into
signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the
respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese
community in Sta. Cruz, Manila."
ISSUE
WON a lawyer-public officer may represent a private client during his tenure
HELD
NO, but since evidence is lacking to discipline Atty. Miguel San Juan, the case
is dismissed. The Court noted that the Report of the Solicitor-General did not
take into account respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding his
being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or
removal of an attorney.
- The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot
prosper is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko,
decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in
this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should
follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges
preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance
with his oath." The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to.
- This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever
violations there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent
practicing his profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro
Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the administrative
proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General.
LEGAL PROFESSION
Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be
inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of
impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far
from living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did
make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the
influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to
frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but
also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a
matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a
member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and
misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for
membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable
profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied
VITRIOLO V DASIG
PER CURIAM; April 1, 2003
(lora alamin)
NATURE
Administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, an official
of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).
FACTS
- Almost all complainants are high-ranking officers of the CHED. They allege
that while respondent was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts
that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court
- During her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from
Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N.
Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending
applications or requests before her office
- Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as
attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded
suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were
subsequently dismissed.
- Complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22),
Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just
debts owing to “Borela Tire Supply” and “Nova’s Lining Brake & Clutch” as
evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued, the complaint sheet, and the
subpoena issued to respondent.
- Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime
against complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr.,
when she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the
Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a
complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son, was lodged
- Complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President
Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names
and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of
securing an appointment for herself.
- The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline concluded that respondent
unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher
Education. It was recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with
a further warning that similar action in the future will be a ground for
disbarment of respondent.
- The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393,
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and Respondent was SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years.
ISSUE
WON respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal
Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance,
considering that her position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was “Chief
Education Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards, CHED.”
HELD
YES.
Ratio Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties
as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official
also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined
by this Court as a member of the Bar.
The Attorney’s Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer
and any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other
disciplinary action. The Attorney’s Oath imposes upon every member of the bar
the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in
Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Reasoning Respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a
character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer,
she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to
demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and
requests awaiting action by her office.
- Respondent’s demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of
pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs
afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run
contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
- A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, was
not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers
including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code.
- Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications or
requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
LEGAL PROFESSION
Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging
or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts
constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests
includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction
requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of
his office. Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good
moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high
public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from
any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession
at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Disposition Respondent was found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty
in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and was ordered DISBARRED.
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
PUNO; April 12, 2005
(marge alias)
NATURE
Special civil action in the SC. Certiorari and prohibition.
FACTS
-1976: General Bank and Trust Co. (Genbank) encountered financial
difficulties, prompting the Central Bank to extend to it emergency loans reaching
a total of P310 million. Despite this, Genbank failed to recover and the following
year Central Bank had to issue a resolution declaring Genbank insolvent and
ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of Genbank’s assets was held; Lucio
Tan Group submitted the winning bid.
-Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza field a petition with CFI praying
for the court’s assistance and supervision in the liquidation as mandated by RA
265, section 29.
-After EDSA I, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-
gotten wealth of Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate,
PCGG filed a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting, and
damages against respondents Lucio Tan Group and the Marcos family. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the 2nd division of the Sandiganbayan
(SB). In connection with this, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
the properties of the Lucio Tan Group.
-Lucio Tan Group questioned the writs through petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and injunction with the SC. The latter referred the cases to the SB
for proper disposition. In these cases docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-
0099 Lucio Tan Group was represented by their counsel, former SolGen
Estelito Mendoza who has then resumed private practice.
-05 Feb 1991: PCGG, invoking Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), filed motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0005 & 0096-0099. The motions allege that
Atty. Mendoza “intervened” in the acquisition of Genbank by the Lucio Tan
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Group when, in his capacity as then SolGen, he advised the Central Bank’s
officials on the procedure to bring about Genbank’s liquidation& appeared as
counsel for the central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the
liquidation.
-22 April 1991: SB denied the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case
No. 0005 for PCGG’s failure to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group; it also ruled that Mendoza’s appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period
under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor
General in the year 1986. PCGG did not file a MFR.
-When Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the SB’s 2nd
Division to the 5th Division, the latter also denied the motion to disqualify.
PCGG’s MFR was denied. Hence this petition.
KEY ISSUE
WON Rule 6.03 of the CPR applies to Atty. Mendoza.
Rule 6.03: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service.
Obiter
The History of Rule 6.03
-17th and 18th centuries: ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England
and other parts of Europe; the principal thrust of the standards was directed
towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth
and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client.
-colonial and early post-revolutionary America: The forms of lawyer regulation
did not differ markedly from those in England. Only three of the traditional core
duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the
colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness,
competency and reasonable fees.
-19th century: the “dark ages” of legal ethics in the United States.
-mid 19th century: American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways:
(1) David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York “Field
Code,” introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers; (2)
legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many
other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties.
-As in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were
isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties.
-end of 19th century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in
their practice — the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were
detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. 2 primary sources
of ethical guidance: academic discourses & the bar association codes
LEGAL PROFESSION
-1887: Alabama - the 1st state with a comprehensive bar association code of
ethics. 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes,
and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908
Canons of Ethics.
-1917: Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
-1924: some ABA members start to question the form and function of the
canons. Among their concerns was the “revolving door” or “the process by which
lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and
then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit
information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.”
(a) Adverse-interest conflicts - exist where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially
related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the
government and the interests of the current and former are adverse.
(b) Congruent-interest representation conflicts are unique to government
lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers.
-ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons,
individual amendments and interpretative opinions. To deal with problems
peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted to disqualify such
lawyers both for “adverse-interest conflicts” and “congruent-interest
representation conflicts.”
Canon 36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the
merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ
should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
-1946: the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to
47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
th
-mid 20 century: growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more
meaningful revision. 1964: ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the
creation of a committee to study the “adequacy and effectiveness” of the ABA
Canons. The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it with Canon 9
in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 9 states:
“A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.”
-The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility which was approved by the ABA House of Delegates
in August 1969. Canon 9 was supplemented by Disciplinary Rule 9-101(b):
“A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had
substantial responsibility while he was a public employee.
-Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the
results and indefinite standards.
-August 1983: ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility,
doing away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of
impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s
indefinite nature.
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-1980: Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility which it submitted to SC for approval. The Code
was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and
to conform with new realities.
-21 June 1988: SC promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility. CPR
Rule 6.03 which deals particularly with former government lawyers retained the
general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase “investigated and passed upon” with
the word “intervened.” It is, therefore, properly applicable to both “adverse-
interest conflicts” and “congruent-interest conflicts.”
SUB-ISSUES
1. WON this case involves the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03
2. WON there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing the Lucio Tan Group.
2a. WON Atty. Mendoza’s act of advising the Central Bank on the legal
procedure to liquidate Genbank is included within the concept of “matter” under
Rule 6.03
2b. WON the intervention of Atty. Mendoza in the liquidation of Genbank is
significant and substantial
HELD
2a. NO. Ratio American Bar Association Formal Opinion 342’s definition of
“matter” : any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or
conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act
of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Reasoning Based on PCGG’s case for disqualification, the “matter” or the act of
Atty. Mendoza as Solicitor General involved here is “advising the Central Bank,
on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition
for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.”
-The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No.
265, sec. 29. Said legal provision provides for the role of the SolGen in
proceedings upon insolvency.
-Also, CPR Rule 6.03 cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his
alleged intervention while a SolGen in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 (liquidation of
Genbank) is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in
Civil Case No. 0096 (sequestration of the stocks in Allied Bank, the successor
of Genbank, on the ground that they are ill-gotten).
2b. NO. Ratio in light of the history of CPR Rule 6.03, the 2nd meaning is
more appropriate to give to the word “intervention.” The intervention cannot be
insubstantial and insignificant.
Reasoning 2 interpretations of the “intervene” (basis: Webster):
(a) “intervene” includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is
irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.
(b) “intervene” only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence
the subject proceedings.
LEGAL PROFESSION
-The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to
be signed by Atty. Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. The record is
arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent
proceedings.
-The principal role of the court in this proceeding for dissolution is to assist the
Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the Genbank. The role
of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the
Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the
participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court
litigator protecting the interest of government.
Obiter
Balancing Policy Considerations
-CPR Rule 6.03 represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to
upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. It should not be
interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal
talent.
-At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered
by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse
that situation. It is true that the only card that the government may play to recruit
lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and
contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. “To
make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing
to enter.”
-In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a
litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of
competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to
bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork.
-Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the
prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be
doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only
the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has
confidence.
-The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated
reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government
service.
-No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government
lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our
law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all
members of his law firm.
-As well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly
speculative exercise at best which can lead to untoward results. Notably, the
appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.
-Also the “switching sides” concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar.
The danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not
inexistent. There are no inconsistent “sides” to be bothered about in the case at
bar. In lawyering for the Lucio Tan Group, Atty. Mendoza is indirectly defending
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the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating Genbank and selling it
later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding.
Disposition Petition denied. No costs.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN [dismiss]
-The petition should be dismissed on two grounds: (1) res judicata, specifically,
conclusiveness of judgment; and (2) prescription.
-The material issue in the present controversy is whether Atty. Mendoza may
still be barred from representing these respondents despite (1) a final Order in
another case resolving the very same ground for disqualification involving the
same parties and the same subject matter as the present case; and (2) the
passage of a sufficient period of time from the date he ceased to be solicitor
general to the date when the supposed disqualification (for violation of the
CPR) was raised.
-There is no need to delve into the question of whether Rule 6.03 has been
transgressed; there is no need to discuss the merits of the questioned
Sandiganbayan Resolutions allowing Atty. Mendoza to represent private
respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. After all, a Resolution issued by
the same court resolving the very same issue on the “disqualification” of Atty.
Mendoza in a case involving the same parties and the same subject matter has
already become final and immutable. It can no longer be altered or changed.
-CPR Rule 6.03 does not expressly specify the period of its applicability or
enforceability. But it cannot be inferred that the prohibition is absolute,
perpetual and permanent. All civil actions have a prescriptive period. Unless a
law makes an action imprescriptible or lays down no other period, the action is
subject to a bar by prescription five years after the right of action accrued. (Arts.
1140-1149, Civil Code; Tolentino v CA)
SANDOVAL-GUTTIERREZ [dismiss]
-In evaluating motions to disqualify a lawyer, our minds are not bound by
stringent rules. There is room for consideration of the combined effect of a
party’s right to counsel of his own choice, an attorney’s interest in representing
a client, the financial burden on a client of replacing disqualified counsel, and
any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification proceeding.
-An order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is final and, therefore,
appealable. The issue of whether or not Atty. Mendoza should be disqualified
from representing Tan et al. is separable from, independent of and collateral to
the main issues in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099. In short, it is separable from
the merits. Clearly, the present petition for certiorari is dismissible.
-The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 constitutes a bar
to similar motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the doctrine of res judicata.
The PCGG may not relitigate such issue of disqualification as it was actually
litigated and finally decided in G.R. Nos. 112707-09.
-Atty. Mendoza’s participation in the liquidation of GENBANK does not
constitute intervention. CPR Rule 6.03 cannot apply to Atty. Mendoza because
his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Special Proceedings No.
LEGAL PROFESSION
107812 is an intervention in a matter different from the matter involved in Civil
Case No. 0096.
CARPIO-MORALES [grant]
-The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply since in the case at
bar, the question of whether the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza should be
granted is undoubtedly a legal question. Also, this is the first time that the issue
to disqualify Atty. Mendoza has been elevated before the SC.
-We cannot characterize the denial of PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as a final order. It is only interlocutory since it does not finally dispose
of the case.
-the prohibition in Rule 6.03 is perpetual. It does not prescribe in 5 yrs.
-Atty. Mendoza’s lack of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to
liquidate GENBANK is immaterial. What is material is his role in facilitating the
liquidation of GENBANK through his legal expertise. In advising the Central
Bank, Atty. Mendoza did not just mechanically point to section 29 of Republic
265. As then Solicitor General, and as a lawyer known for his keen legal
acumen, Atty. Mendoza synthesized facts, which by reason of his position he
was privy to, and law with a view to successfully liquidate the bank.
-While it is desirable to recruit competent lawyers into government service, this
does not justify the disturbance of our mores. The canons and rules of the Code
of Professional Responsibility must be strictly construed.
-While financial considerations are important, they are not the sole factor
affecting recruitment of lawyers to the government sector. I would like to think
that serving in government is its own reward. One needs only to look at all of us
members of this Court to know that money is not everything. All of us have, at
one point in our legal careers, been tempted by the promise of financial success
that private practice usually brings. But in the end, we decided to take the road
less traveled and serve in government. And I would like to believe that each
and everyone of us has made a difference. There is more to this mortal coil
than the pursuit of material wealth.
CALLEJO, SR. [partially grant]
-The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes’ proverbial
“bad man” who wants to know just how many corners he may cut, how close to
the line he may play, without running into trouble with the law. Rather, it is
drawn for the “good man” as a beacon to assist him in navigating an ethical
course through the sometimes murky waters of professional conduct. (General
Motors Corp. v City of New York)
-CPR establishes the norms of conduct and ethical standards in the legal
profession and the Court must not shirk from its duty to ensure that all lawyers
live up to its provisions. The Court must not tolerate any departure from the
“straight and narrow” path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession.
-The Resolution denying PCGG’s similar motion to disqualify Mendoza was an
interlocutory order as it did not terminate or finally dispose of the said case. It
merely settled an incidental or collateral matter arising therein. As such, it
cannot operate to bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in
the other cases.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
-Atty. Mendoza’s present engagement as counsel for Lucio Tan Group in Civil
Case No. 0096 violates the ethical precept embodied in Rule 6.03.
-The subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with or related to a
“matter,” i.e. the liquidation of Genbank, in which Atty. Mendoza had intervened
as the Solicitor General
-Rule 6.03 applies even if Atty. Mendoza did not “switch sides” or did not take
inconsistent sides. Rule 6.03 applies even if no conflict of interest exists
between Atty. Mendoza’s former government client (Central Bank) and his
present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.)
-Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit temporal limitation since
cases have to be resolved based on their peculiar circumstances. The peculiar
circumstances of this case justify the strict application of said rule.
TINGA [partially grant]
-Section 6.03 cannot be made applicable in the present case to Atty. Mendoza,
as to do so would be violative of his right to due process. Whether it be at the
time then Solicitor General Mendoza participated in the process of the
dissolution of General Bank in 1977, or at sometime in 1987 when he agreed
to represent the respondents, the Code of Professional Responsibility had not
yet been promulgated.
-The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the Supreme
Court on 21 June 1988. Prior to its official adoption, there was no similar official
body of rules or guidelines enacted by the Supreme Court other than the
provisions on Legal Ethics in the Rules of Court.
-Atty. Mendoza may have violated Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics, which some authorities deemed as a source of legal ethics prior to the
Code of Professional Responsibility. But the prohibition under Canon 36 was
not prescribed by this Court or by statute as a norm until the enactment of the
Code of Professional Responsibility in 21 June 1988. Accordingly, when Atty.
Mendoza agreed to represent the respondents, there was no definitive binding
rule proscribing him from such engagement or penalizing him for such
representation.
LIM-SANTIAGO V SAGUCIO
CARPIO; March 31, 2006
(maia reiza)
NATURE
Disbarment case
FACTS
- Ruthie Lim-Santiago is the daughter and administratrix of the property of
Alfonso Lim, the former president of Taggat Industries. After his death, Lim-
Santiago took over the management of the company. Respondent Carlos
Sagucio was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
Industries, until he was appointed Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.
- Some employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint against Lim-Santiago for
withholding payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause for 1 year
and 3 months (1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997). Sagucio, as the asst. Prov.
LEGAL PROFESSION
Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He
recommended the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Art288 of the labor
code of the Philippines.
- Lim-Santiago alleges that Sagucio is guilty of representing conflicting interests,
a violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and
of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor, which is expressly prohibited in RA6713.
Sagucio defends himself by saying that he accepted payment from Taggat even
after his appointment as government prosecutor but said that such payments
were not for representation but for consultancy services. Also, he contends that
5 years have passed since he was connected with the company, thus there was
no conflict of interest.
ISSUES
1. WON there are conflicting interests in this case
2. WON the “private practice of law” includes consultancy services
3. WON disbarment is the appropriate penalty
HELD
- There are no conflicting interests. Sagucio is not guilty of representing
conflicting interests as prohibited in Rule 15.03 of CPR. He left Taggat in 1992,
and the non-payment of wages occurred in 1996-1997, years after the relation
to Taggat has been terminated. In a charge for representing conflicting interests,
evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against the former
client any CONFIDENTIAL information acquired through his previous
employment. Although a lawyer owes a former client to maintain inviolate of the
client’s confidence, this responsibility does not cover transactions that occurred
beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. That he was a former
personnel manager and the case is labor-related is not sufficient basis to
charge Sagucio of representing conflicting interests.
- The payment for consultancy services conducted by Sagucio falls under the
“private practice of law” which is specifically prohibited by RA6713 (the court
applies the liberal definition of the practice of law as given in Cayetano v
Monson). However, Sagucio cannot be punished for this violation under the
CPR, for such violations are not subject to disciplinary action under the CPR.
On the other hand, this violation is also a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 (a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful … conduct), thus he can be punished for
violating canon 1.
The penalty is a suspension of 6 months and 1 day to 1 year (basis is the Civil
Service Law and Rules).
RE: 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES
PER CURIAM; October 6, 1989
(anton arcilla)
NATURE
An inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the integrated bar of the Philippines. The
Supreme Court, en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated
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Bar, resolvd to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers=elect and to inquire
into the veracity of the reports.
FACTS
- June 3, 1989, the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) was held at the Philippine International Convention Center
(PICC).The newly elected officers were set to take their oath of office on July 4,
1989, before the Supreme Court. However, because of widespread reports
about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, the
Supreme Court resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect to
investigate.
- the elections were led by the main candidates for the office of IBP President,
namely Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon.
- Among the allegations were the use of government planes, and the officious
intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were
done in violation of the IBP By-Laws. (“poured heart, soul, money and influence
to win over the 120 IBP delegates.”)
- Emil Jurado (Manila Standard) reported that there was rampant vote-buying
by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity as well as by some lawyers
of ACCRA, and that government positions were promised to others by the office
of the Labor Secretary.
- There was also the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where
they were reportedly “wined and dined continuously, womened, and subjected to
endless haggling over the price of their votes xxx which ranged from P15K to
P20K, and on election day, to as much as P50K.
- In a resolution calling for investigations, the Court “called to mind that a basic
postulate of the IBP xxx is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and
that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the
Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates and of the IBP officers.
- Article I, Section 4 of IBP By-Laws emphasizes the “strictly non-political”
character of the IBP:
SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. – the IBP is strictly non-political, and every
activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be
penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or
prosecutory office in the government xxx shall be eligible for election or
appointment to any position in the IBP or any chapter thereof.
- Section 14 of By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP
elections:
o Distribution of election campaign material;
o Distribution of campaign material other that a statement of the
biodata of candidate not more than one page of legal paper;
o Campaigning for or against any candidate, whle holding an elective,
judicial, quasi-judicial, prosecutory office in Gov’t;
o Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as
well as the advertisement thereof;
o For purpose of influencing a member, by payment of dues or other
indebtedness of the member; giving of food, drink, entertainment,
LEGAL PROFESSION
transpo, any article of value; making a promise or causing an
expenditure to be made.
- Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes the sanctions:
o “Violation of the by-laws of the IBP shall be a ground for the
disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected,
without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring
member xxx”
- Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250K during his three weeks of
campaigning; Atty. Nisce’s hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216K ++, not
including previous expenses for his campaign; Atty . Drilon’s campaign rang up
over P600K in hotel bills (Westin).
ISSUE
WON the candidates are guilty of massive electioneering, inappropriate use of
government resources, and vote-buying during the IBP national elections.
HELD
Ratio
- IBP elections should be as they are annulled.
- The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for direct election by the House Delegates
of officers, IBP President, and exec. VP be repealed.
- Former sstem of IBP President and Exec. VP elected by Board of Governors
from among themselves should be restored.
- At the end of President’s 2-year term, the EVP shall automatically succeed to
the office of the president. The incoming board of governors shall elect an EVP
from among themselves.
Reasoning
- It is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national
positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the
elections violated Sec. 14 of the IBP By-laws and made a travesty of the idea of
a “strictly non-political” IBP shrined in Sec. 4.
- The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated
the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which
imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to:
- Obey and uphold the constitutionand the laws;
- Duty to promote respect for law and legal processes;
- Abstain from activities aimed at defiance of law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
- It is speculated that the IBP ticket to the Judicial and Bar Council as provided
in Art. VIII Sec. 8 may be the reason why the position of IBP president has
attracted so much interest among the lawyers.
- The decision is meant to impress upon participant the seriousness of their
misconduct, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP.
SANTOS V LLAMAS
MENDOZA; January 20, 2000
(dahls salamat)
FACTS
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
Petitioner’s Claim:
-Llamas has not indicated proper PTR and IBP OR No and data in his
pleadings, he merely indicates IBP Rizal 259060 as his PTS and IBP OR No
for 3 years as shown in various court pleadings.
-Llamas’ last payment of IBP dues, as certified by IBP pres, was in 1991
--in the context of Rule 138 section 1 that only a duly admitted member of the
bar “who is in good and regular stnding is entitled to practice law” and Rule
139-A,Section 10 which provides that “default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the integrated bar,and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys
-respondent’s track record shows that he was once dismissed as Pasay City
Judge, and was convicted of estafa.
Respondent’s Comment:
-SC has already dismissed the case for his dismissal as well as the criminal
case, and he was in fact promoted as RTC Judge,
-Respondent is engaged only in a limited practice of law,his principal occupation
being a farmer
-Being a senior citizen he is exempt from payment of taxes,and he honestly
believes that his dues with the IBP is covered by such exemption
-in fact he does not exercise his rights to vote as an IBP member
-he is willing to pay his dues should he be in fact not exempt from payment
thereof
ISSUES
1.WON RA 7432 (Senior Citizen) exempts respondent from payment of his
dues with the IBP
2.WON respondent is guilty of misleading the court of his standing with the IBP
for using the same IBP OR number for at least six years
HELD
1.RA 7432 exempts him only from payment of taxes but not from payment of
his association dues such as IBP dues. Since he openly admitted that he was
still engaged in the practice of law eventhough his practice is already limited he
is still subject to the payment of IBP dues and failure to do so would warrant his
suspension under Sec 10 of Rule 139-A. He can only engage in the practice of
law by paying his dues and it doesn’t matter if his practice is limited.
2.By Indicationg IBP Rizal 259060 in his pleadings, he is guilty of
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he has paid his dues to IBP
Rizal Chapter and of violating Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
Rule 1.01-A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest,immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession,and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
CANON 10 – A Lawyer owes candor,fairness nd goodfaith to the court.
Rule 10.01- A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,nor consent to the doing of an
court;nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
LEGAL PROFESSION
Disposition Because of his old age, respondent was only suspended from
practice of law for one year or until he pays his dues.
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
PER CURIAM; February 4, 2004
(chris lao)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Bar Scandal.
FACTS
- On September 22, 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile
Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations
Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on the
subject. He then reported to Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and to the other
members of the Court, recommending that the examination on the subject be
nullified and that an investigation be conducted forthwith.
- On September 2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug
and resolved to nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another
exam on the said subject against which petitions were filed. The petitions voiced
out the support to nullifying the exam on the said subject and not to take
another exam due to the emotional, physical and financial burdens it will cause
the barristers. Alternative proposals were submitted to the Court. The Court
moved to nullify and to spread out the weight of the Mercantile Law among the
remaining seven bar subjects.
- The Court resolved also to create a Committee composed of three retired
members of the Court that would conduct a thorough investigation of the
incident subject of the September 23, 2003 resolution. The Investigating
Committee found that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the
questions which the examinee, Atty. Balgos had prepared and submitted to
Justice Jose Vitug. His questions constituted 82% of the questions asked in the
examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday,
in some cases with slight changes which were not substantial and in other
cases exactly as Atty. Balgos, 71 years old, proposed.
- The circumstances that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test
questions prepared by Atty. Balgos proves conclusively that the leakage
originated from his office, not from the Office of Justice Vitug. Atty. Balgos
claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his computer.
Without any doubt, the source of the leaked test questions was Atty. Balgos’
computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos’
computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to
other persons, was Atty. Balgos’ legal assistant, Atty. Danilo De Guzman, who
voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman
revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the help of his secretary Villasis
to his frat brods in Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, namely, Garvida, Arlan, and
Erwin Tan. In turn, Garvida faxed the test questions to Iñigo and Bugain. Iñigo
passed a copy or copies to other Betan Guiapal who gave a copy to the MLQU-
Beta Sigma’s Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald Collado who ordered the printing
and distribution of 30 copies to the MLQU’s 30 bar candidates.
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- Atty De Guzman’s act of downloading Balgos’ test questions in mercantile law
from the latter’s computer, without his knowledge and permission, was a
criminal act of larceny. It was theft of intellectual property.
- Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Balgos’
right to privacy of communication and to security of his papers and effects
against unauthorized search and seizure—rights zealously protected by the Bill
of Rights of our Constitution. He transgressed the very first canon of the
lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law
and legal processes.
- De Guzman also violated rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar, which provide:
Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7—A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
- He is guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. Also, the
Investigating committee does not believe that he acted alone. Palma, secretary
of Atty. Balgos and Atienza knew of the password. Certain brods should also be
investigated. The committee does not believe De Guzman did this out of love for
the fraternity. There must have been an ulterior material consideration for his
breaking the law and tearing the shroud of secrecy that, he very well knows,
covers the bar examinations.
- Atty. Balgos is also negligent.He could have just used the typewriter
considering his lack of adeptness with the computer.
ISSUE
WON Danilo De Guzman should be disbarred
HELD
YES. He should be disbarred plus he ought to make a public apology and pay
damages to the Supreme Court
- Atty. Balgos should be reprimanded by the Court and make a written apology
as a result of his negligence. He is not entitled to receive any honorarium as
examiner for that subject.
- Further examination of the others should be held to show accountability and
also to find out how De Guzman was able to secure a copy of the Supreme
Court’s CALR database without the court’s permission.
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR.,
REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP
DUES
CHICO-NAZARIO; May 9, 2005
(keefe dela cruz)
NATURE
Bar Matter in the Supreme Court. Request for Exemption from Payment of IBP
Dues.
FACTS
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Petitioner, Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., is being assessed P12,035 in IBP
dues for the years 1977-2005
- After admittance to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Phil
Civil Service from 1962 to 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the US from
1986 to his retirement in 2003.
ISSUES
WON Petitioner’s inactivity in the practice of law that is, when he was in the
Civil Service and when working abroad, entitles him to exemption from payment
of IBP dues.
HELD
Ratio No.
Reasoning
- The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
law population. This requires membership and financial support of every
attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the SC. This is toward defraying the expenses
of regulation of the profession to which they themselves belong.
- Membership in the bar is a privilege (as opposed to a property right)
burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues.
Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity
thereof warrants.
Disposition Wherefore, petitioner’s request for exemption from payment of IBP
dues for the years 1977-2005 is Denied within 10 days from receipt of this
decision, failure to do so will merit suspension from the practice of law.
ZAGUIRRE V CASTILLO
PER CURIAM; MARCH 6, 2003
(sarah Cabrera)
NATURE
Petition for Disbarment on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct (Adulterous
Relationship).
FACTS
- Complainant and respondent met while working in the NBI. Respondent
courted complainant and promised to marry her while representing himself to be
single. Soon they had an intimate relationship that started sometime in 1996
and lasted until 1997. During their affair, respondent was preparing for the
bar examinations which he passed . On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
- It was only around the first week of May 1997 that complainant first learned
that respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and
confronted her about her relationship with respondent.
- On September 10, 1997, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with
the complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his.
- On December 09, 1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa.
By this time however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child
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and giving her any form of support.
- Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired
between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never represented
himself as single since it was known in the NBI that he was already married and
with children.; complainant is almost 10 years older than him and knew
beforehand that he is already married; the child borne by complainant is not his,
because the complainant was seeing other men at the time they were having an
affair. He admits that he signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but
explains that he only did so to save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he
did not know at the time that complainant was seeing other men.
- The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Castillo guilty of gross
immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUES
1. WON respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct
2. WON it is relevant to this case if the complainant knew he was married
3. WON the respondent should be disbarred
HELD
1. YES
- The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The Code of Professional Responsibility:
“Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
“CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.”
“Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.”
Immoral conduct has been defined as:
“xxx that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to
show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members
of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.”
*Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the
standards of morality required of every lawyer. Moreover, the attempt of
respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to
support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his
part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession,
tantamount to self-stultification.
- This Court has repeatedly held: “as officers of the court, lawyers must not only
in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of
LEGAL PROFESSION
the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public
by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.”
*Complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that “men by
nature are polygamous, and that what happened between them was “nothing
but mutual lust and desire.” The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at
the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.
2. NO
*That complainant entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his
marital status does not absolve him of gross immorality for what is in question in
a case like this is respondent’s fitness to be a member of the legal profession.
It is not dependent whether or not the other party knowingly engaged in an
immoral relationship with him. In Mortel vs. Aspiras: “In a disbarment
proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto because
this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge
the law profession of unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts.”
*The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was
preparing to take the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is
unknown to him that an applicant for admission to membership in the bar
must show that he is possessed of good moral character, a requirement
which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar.
This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain
one’s good standing in the profession.
3. NO
Clearly therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality required of the
legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
*As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a
lesser punishment could be given. Records show that from the time he took
his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and now lives with
his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not perceive this
fact as an indication of respondent’s effort to mend his ways or that he
recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of law.
Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances
that indefinite suspension should be meted out than disbarment. The
suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to show, to the full
satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of
maintaining moral integrity and uprightness required of every member of the
profession.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Disposition Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and
ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.
TAN V SABANDAL
MELENCIO-HERRERA; February 24, 1992
(jat tabamo)
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FACTS
- Nov. 29, 1983 - Court sustained charge of unauthorized practice of law filed
against respondent Sabandal and denied the latter’s petition to be allowed to
take oath as member of the Phil. Bar and to sign the roll of attorneys.
- From 1984-1988 - Sabandal filed motions for reconsideration all of which
either denied or noted without action.
- Feb. 10, 1989 – Court finally allowed Sabandal to take the lawyer’s oath after
consideration of his plea for mercy and forgiveness, willingness to reform and
several testimonies attesting to his good moral character and civic
consciousness. However, before a date could be set for Sabandal’s oath taking,
complainants Dagpin, Tan and Boquia each filed motions for reconsideration of
the Resolution of Feb, 10, 1989.
- Complainant Tan contests the testimonial of IBP Zamboanga Del Norte
Chapter (ZDN) certifying that respondent was acting with morality and has been
careful in his actuations in the community. Tan claims that said testimonial was
signed only by the then President of that IBP chapter, without authorization from
its Board of Officers. Attached to her motion was a certification signed by the
current IBP ZDN Chapter President Atty. Nuevas, stating that the present Board
of Officers had not issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character
and civic consciousness of Sabandal. Tan later on desisted and informed the
Court that her relationship with Sabandal “has already been restored,” as he
had asked her forgiveness and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case
against him, even recommending his admission to the legal profession.
- Complainants Boquia and Dagpin submitted their own comments vehemently
contesting the Court’s Resolution setting the date for respondent’s oath-taking
and filed a separate comment as regards complainant Tan’s personal
disposition, questioning whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to
exculpate and obliterate their cases
- The Executive Judge of ZBN RTC, Judge Pelagio Lachica, in a separate
comment stated that he is not well acquainted personally with the respondent
and unaware of any acts committed by him so as to disqualify him from
admission to the Bar. Said Judge also mentioned that there is a Civil Case,
Rep. of the Phil. v. Sabandal which was pending in the Supreme Court. The IBP
ZBN chapter also submitted a certification that Sabandal has not been convicted
of any crime and that there is no pending criminal case against him, therefore
finding no reason to disqualify him from admission to the Bar.
- The Court then deferred setting the date of the oath-taking of respondent
Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform the Court of the outcome of the
case Republic v. Sabandal. Judge Pacifico Garcia, who succeeded Judge
Lachica, informed the Court on Dec. 12, 1990, that Sabandal’s case was
already considered closed and terminated, and that the principal parties have
reached an amicable settlement approved by the trial court. Judge Garcia’s
letter was noted in the Resolution of Jan. 29, 1991, where complainants Tan,
Boquia and Dagpin were required to comment on said Judge’s letter.
- On Dec. 20, 1990, a certification was sent by Exec. Judge Jesus Angeles of
RTC of ZDN upon request of Sabandal, certifying that he has no pending case
with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Bar.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath in a motion dated June 8, 1991. The Court again deferred action on the
motion pending the complainants’ compliance with the Jan. 29, 1991
resolution.
- Only complainant Tan complied, and stated in a comment dated Aug. 29,
1991, that the termination of Sabandal’s civil case is proof of his sincere
reformation, and repentance.
- Finally, in a Manifestation, dated Dec. 6, 1991, Sabandal reiterated his plea
to be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
ISSUE
WON Respondent Sabandal should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath
HELD
Ratio The practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character. Although the term “good moral character” admits
of broad dimensions, it has been defined as “including at least common
honesty.” It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar membership is
more important than truthfulness or candor.
No. The Resolution of Feb. 10, 1989, allowing Sabandal to take the oath 10
years after passing the Bar, was prior to the Court receiving the objections by
complainants, and before it had become aware of the gravity of the civil case
against him.
- As it turned out, the case of Republic v. Sabandal was brought about when
Sabandal, by way of his employment as Land Investigator at the Bureau of
Lands procured a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to
public domain (which he could not but have known to be public land), which he
used as security for mortgage in order to obtain a loan. The Case was
eventually settled when respondent surrendered the bogus certificate of title to
the government and paid-off the mortgagor. The Solicitor General did not object
to the approval of the settlement and even stated that, “the amicable settlement
may amount to a confession by the defendant.” The Court found it manipulative
on his part to take advantage of his employment to facilitate such an act and a
manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which cannot be
cannot be erased by termination of his case where no determination of his guilt
or innocence was made because the suit had been compromised.
- The Court also noted that at the time the case was instituted, Sabandal had
already been filing motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character
without mentioning the pendency of the civil case against him. His failure to
reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against
him during the period that he was submitting several motions for reconsideration
reveals his lack of candor and truthfulness.
- As to the testimonials attesting to his good moral character, they were
confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him
and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case instituted by the Government against him. Those
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testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and
lack of good moral character.
- That complainants, namely, Boquia and Dagpin have not submitted any
opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already
expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has
withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his
favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject matter.
Disposition Respondent Sabandal found to be unfit to become a member of
the BAR, Court’s Resolution of Feb. 10, 1989 is recalled and his prayer to be
allowed to take the lawyer’s oath is denied.
TAPUCAR V TAPUCAR
PER CURIAM; July 30, 1998
(terry ridon)
FACTS
- Complainant Remedios Tapucar seeks the disbarment of husband, Atty. Lauro
Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting
with Elena Pena under scandalous circumstances.
- Prior to complaint, he has already been charged four times for conduct
unbecoming of an officer, and has already been suspended, and dismissed from
being a CFI judge
- The suspension and dismissal on immorality did not stop him from continue
living with Elena and leaving Remedios and her 11 children. He and Elena even
moved back to Antipolo from GenSan, where they got married despite the
subsistence of a previous marriage
- His lawyer-daughter filed the disbarment proceedings, represented her
mother, from which the IBP recommended his disbarment
ISSUE
WON the recommendation for disbarment is justified
HELD
- The recommendation by the IBP is sufficient to justify his disbarment as a
good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal
profession but must remain intact in order to maintain good standing in the
profession. It is essential that we have a high-toned sense of morality
- CPR Rule 7.03 is clear – that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
of private life behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession
- Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency and morality,
especially Tapucar as he was once a member of the bench who must be free
from impropriety; like judges, lawyers are invested with public trust, that faith
and confidence by the public to the law is ensured
- As such, the court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct whether in
his professional or personal capacity, but this is only exercised if there is a clear
case of misconduct
LEGAL PROFESSION
- In case at bar, despite the previous sanctions, he still persisted in his illicit
relations and arrogant even, in the face of charges against him. All of these are
violative of the lawyer’s oath and in great disregard of the law
BUGARING V ESPANOL
DE LEON; January 19, 2001
(ricky cantre)
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in
direct contempt of court.
FACTS
- The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on
December 5, 1996 of Royal Becthel Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran
and Beatriz Alvaran, et al., for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title,
Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent judge Dolores
S. Español of the RTC of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.
- Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders,
Inc., the trial court issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register
of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates
of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on April
15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner,
the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition
to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel
lis pendens was granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On November 5,
1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996,
filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and a Motion for Contempt of Court.
- During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5,
1996, the following incident transpired (pls see case for full stenographic
record of incident):
[discussing Deputy Reg of Deed’s manifestation that the receiving clerk did
not inform him of the court order]
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to
be specific because we will be [filing] a case against this receiving clerk
who did not [inform] him your Honor please, with this manifestation of the
Deputy of the Register of Deeds that is irregularity in the performance of
the official duty of the clerk not to inform the parties concerned.
COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking
the video recording at this proceedings. There is no permission from this
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Court that such proceedings should be taken.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a
video he just accompanied me this morning.
COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should
secure the permission of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.
COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go
signal that shots should be done.
ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we
just came from an occasion last night and I am not yet come home, your
Honor please. I could prove your Honor please, that the contents of that
tape is other matters your Honor please. I was just surprised why he took
video tape your Honor please, that we ask the apology of this Court if that
offend this Court your Honor please.
COURT: It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the
necessary authority or permission should be secured.
ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.
COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem
your Honor please, that is personal to that guy your Honor please if this
representation is being ….
COURT: That is very shallow, don’t give that alibi.
ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our
documentary evidence as part of our motion for contempt, your Honor
please.
COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?
ATTY. CONCEPCION (Deputy Reg of Deeds): Well as I have said before, I
have not received any motion regarding this contempt you are talking. I
am willing now to testify.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet
the defense. This is a criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings is a
criminal.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from
the Fiscal.
COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a
counsel for the Register of Deeds.
....................
ATTY. CONCEPCION: As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if
he is willing
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.
ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my
witness but I will just mark our documentary exhibits which are part of the
record of the case and thereafter your Honor please….
COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being
done by newly appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is
considered as the privately hired counsel of the register of deeds and the
respondent of this contempt proceedings. How much time do you need to
go over the record of this case so that we can call the other case in the
LEGAL PROFESSION
meanwhile.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor.
------------------
COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing
the record of the case your Honor, I noticed… [quite a long
manifestation followed but irrelevant to this case]
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first
mark our documentary evidence.
COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay.
The counsel has just made manifestation, he has not prayed for anything.
So let us wait until he is finished and then wait for the direction of this
Court what to do to have an orderly proceedings in this case.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little
bit complicated… [continued manifestation… Judge Español making
intermittent comments]
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation
your Honor please, that we will be marking first our documentary evidence
because this is set for hearing for today, your Honor please.
COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their
comment yet what are we going to receive as evidence.
ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please…
COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after
the submission of the comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show
that the motion for contempt was copy furnished with the Register of
Deeds and Diosdado Concepcion.
COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would
want to do. This should be an orderly proceedings and considering that
this is a Court of record the comment has to be in first then in your reply
you can submit your evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be put
up by the respondent and so we will be able to hear the case smoothly.
ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent
had been long time furnished of this contempt proceedings. With a copy
of the motion they should have filed it in due time in accordance with the
rules and because it is scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our
evidence and present to this Court, your Honor.
COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen!
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor.
COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor
please, we are all officers of the Court, your Honor, please, we have also
---- and we know also our procedure, your Honor.
COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court
first and then do whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the
antagonistic approach of the Court to this representation ever since I
appeared your Honor please and I put on record that I will be filing an
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
inhibition to this Hon. Court.
COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)
ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.
COURT: Do that right away.
ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to
present our witness.
COURT: You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was
presented.
ATTY. BUGARING: I did not.
COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to
file his comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point in time I don’t want
to comment on anything but I reserve my right to inhibit this Honorable
Court before trying this case.
COURT: You can do whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.
COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.
COURT: Yes, you know your rules that’s why you are putting the cart ahead of
the horse.
ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, I’ve been challenged by this Court that I
know better than this Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, I’ve
been winning in many certiorari cases, your Honor.
COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of
Court. (Banging the gavel) You call the police and I am going to send
this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)
ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client
your Honor please.
COURT: You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the
discretion of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the
Court but this is one way I am protecting my client, your Honor.
COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the
discretion of this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) “Will you see to it that
this guy is put in jail.”
- Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence and
paid the fine of P3,000. The CA found that it was obvious that the petitioner
was indeed arrogant, at times impertinent too argumentative to the extent of
being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards the court. It affirmed the
order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine of P3,000 exceeded the
limit of P2,000 prescribed by the ROC and ordered the excess of P1,000
returned to petitioner.
ISSUE
WON the contempt order by Judge Español had factual basis
HELD
Yes
LEGAL PROFESSION
Ratio The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential
to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge and can be punished summarily without hearing.
Reasoning Petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of
respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without
giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate
reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court
during the hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion
for reconsideration of the contempt order on the same day. Petitioner’s alleged
deference to the trial court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as
“your Honor please” throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior
therein:
1. The veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court is
contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which mandates that “a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts”.
2. The hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in
favor of the other party is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge
“motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case”.
3. Behaving without due regard to the trial court’s order to maintain order in the
proceedings is in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which makes it a lawyer’s duty to “maintain towards the courts (1)
respectful attitude” in order to maintain its importance in the administration of
justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates lawyers to “observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others”.
4. Behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the
time he was making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely
interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in
edgewise is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and
5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province
of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard is against Section 1
of Article III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an
adverse witness “with fairness and due consideration,” and Canon 12 of Code of
Professional Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to “exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.”
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner’s use of
the phrase “your honor please.” For, after using said phrase he manifested
utter disrespect to the court in his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior
from an officer of the Court cannot and should not be countenanced, if proper
decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client’s cause. He should
not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort and
placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice
pursuant to Canon 12, Canons of Professional Responsibility. He should not,
therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule
10.03, Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay
a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in
accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons. Lawyers should
be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration
of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyer’s duty.
Disposition Decision of the CA affirmed. RTC ordered to return to the
petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000 out of the original fine
of P3,000.
CAMACHO V PANGULAYAN
VITUG; March 22, 2000
(kiyo miura)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of
Professional Ethics
FACTS
- 9 students from the AMA Computer College (AMACC), all members of the
Editorial Board of DATALINE, allegedly published certain objectionable features
- the Student Disciplinary Tribunal found them guilty and the students were
expelled
- the 9 students appealed but were denied by the AMACC President giving rise
to a civil case calling for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction with Camacho as their counsel and Pangulayan and associates
representing the defendant, AMACC
- while the case was pending, letters of apology and re-admission agreements
were separately executed by and/or in behalf of the students by their parents
- following this, the Pangulayan Law Offices filed a Manifestation stating, among
other things, that 4 of the students had acknowledged their guilt and agreed to
terminate all proceedings
- apparently, Pangulayan procured and effected the re-admission agreements
through negotiations with said students and their parents without communicating
with Camacho
ISSUE
WON Pangulayan is guilty of disregarding professional ethics
HELD
YES, this action violates Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which
states:
“A lawyer should not in anyway communicate upon the subject of controversy
with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to
LEGAL PROFESSION
negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his
counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything
that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not
undertake to advise him as to law.”
- respondent violated professional ethics and disregarded a duty owing to his
colleague
- the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution suspending
Pangulayan for 6 months and dismissed the case against the other respondents
since they took no part in it
- the court concurred with IBP’s findings but reduced the suspension to 3
months
SUAREZ V SALAZAR
RESOLUTION; September 29, 1999
(rean balisi)
NATURE
Motion to Expunge All Pleading Filed by Atty. Filemon A. Manangan with Motion
to Hold Him in Contempt of Court or to Dismiss Petion
FACTS
At the hearing on the same date, Atty. Filemon A. Manangan admitted that he is
not a lawyer entitled to practice law in the Philippines. He is also the same
“Filemon A. Manangan” who was found by the Court in Filemon Manangan v.
CFI Nueva Vizcaya, Br.28, decided on August 30, 1999, to be in reality
Andres Culanag who is not a member of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE
WON Filemon Manangan / Andres Culanag should be held in indirect contempt
of the Court
HELD
Yes. Despite the facts as found by the Court, he has continued to misrepresent
himself to be an attorney-at-law and has appeared as counsel for petitioners in
this case. Atty. Filemon A. Manangan, who is in reality Andres Culanag, is
hereby declared in indirect contempt of this Court. Wherefore, he is hereby
sentenced to 3 months imprisonment to be served at the Headquarters of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Taft Ave., Manila, until further orders of this
Court.
AGUIRRE V RANA
CARPIO; June 10, 2003
(monch bacani)
NATURE
Administrative matter on unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law and grave misrepresentation
FACTS
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- On May 21, 2001, one day before respondent Edwin Rana participated the
oath-taking of successful bar examinees as member of the Philippine bar,
complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial
of Admission to the Bar on the ground of unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
- The Court allowed respondent to take the oath, but did not allow him to sign
the Roll of Attorneys.
- The complainant charges him with unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct since she claims that he already appeared as counsel for and in
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate of Mandaon, Masbate, George Bunan before
the Municipal Board of Canvassers. She also claims that he signed the pleading
dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor as counsel
for the said candidate.
- On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that the respondent is a
municipal government employee and as such, he is not allowed by law to act as
counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
- On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel George Bunan without the latter
engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the
pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty
candidate.
- Respondent claims though George Bunan sought his specific assistance, “he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law.” He also admitted signing the pleading, but not as a lawyer.
- In reply to the charge of violation of law, he claims that he already resigned
from the said government post May 11, 2001. He further claims that the
complaint is politically charged since the complainant is the daughter of the
losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
- In the complainant’s reply to the respondent’s comments, she further alleges
that on May 19, Emily Estipona-Hao filed a petition for proclamation as the
winning candidate for mayor wherein the respondent signed as counsel for her.
- On July 17, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confident
(OBC). The OBC found that the respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC
as counsel for Bunan, as seen in the minutes of the MBEC proceedings. The
OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to
deny his admission to the practice of law.
ISSUE
WON the respondent should be denied admission to the Philippine Bar
HELD
Yes. Records show that he indeed appeared as lawyer for Bunan. He also
signed the pleading as his lawyer. In the first paragraph of the same pleading
respondent stated that he was the “(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf
of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN .” Bunan himself also wrote
to the MBEC that he had “authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to
represent him” before the MBEC and similar bodies.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Emily Estipona-Hao also wrote to the MBEC that the respondent will be the
legal counsel for her party. The respondent also signed the pleading as their
lawyer.
- All these happened before he took his lawyer’s oath. It is clear that he
engaged in the practice of law.
- It is also irrelevant the respondent has already passed the bar and taken his
oath, for it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys which makes one a full-fledged
lawyer.
- As for the charge of violation of law, it is clear that the respondent has already
resigned from the said position before appearing as counsel.
- On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows
that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before
the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation,
respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
Disposition Respondent is denied admission to the Philippine Bar
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V 1. No. “Private practice” of a profession, specifically the law profession, does not
LADAGA
KAPUNAN; January 26, 2001
(jonas azura)
NATURE
This is an administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Respondent is charged
under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the
practice of their profession.
FACTS
Respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Makati, represented his cousin Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga as pro bono counsel in
a criminal case for falsification of public document. The Court denied
respondent’s request for authorization to appear as counsel and directed the
Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing
in court without the required authorization. In his Comment, respondent
explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are “close blood cousins” who belong to a
“powerless family” from an impoverished town in Surigao del Norte. Ms. Ladaga
had supported and guided respondent from childhood until he finished his law
degree. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondent’s
help and advice when she was charged in a criminal case by Lisa Payoyo
Andres. Respondent claims that Ms. Andres’ only purpose in filing the case was
to “seek vengeance” on Ms. Ladaga. He explains that the discord between his
cousin and Ms. Andres started when the latter’s husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres,
left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their
illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot 3 children. The birth certificate
of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga.
Respondent stated that he felt it was his duty to accept Ms. Ladaga’s plea to be
her counsel as she could not pay for the services of a lawyer and he was the
only lawyer in the family. Respondent also pointed out that in 7 years of
government service he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
it was only in this particular case that he had been administratively charged for
helping a close relative by giving free legal assistance for a “humanitarian
purpose”. He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since
the questioned appearances were made in the MTC of Quezon City and not in
Makati where he is holding office. Respondent also stressed that during his
court appearances, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave
applications.
ISSUES
1. WON respondent violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees by appearing as counsel
2. WON respondent obtained written permission from the head of the
department as required by Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules
HELD
refer to an isolated court appearance. It contemplates a succession of acts of
the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a
lawyer. The isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel
for his cousin does not constitute the “private practice” of the law profession as
contemplated by law.
2. No. It is true that respondent filed leave applications corresponding to the
dates he appeared in court, which were approved. However, the presiding judge
of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law.
Disposition Respondent is REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any
repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.
HALILI V COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
MAKASIAR; April 30, 1985
(eva sison)
FACTS
- initial cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than 500
bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit; litigation initially commenced with
the filing of a complaint for the overtime with the defunct CIR on August 1958;
disputes were eventually settled when the contending parties reached an
agreement on Dec. 1974
- under the agreement: the Administratrix would transfer to the employees title
to the tract of land containing an area of 33,952 sq.m. in San Bartolome,
Caloocan and pay in addition the cash amount of P25,000 in full and final
satisfaction of all the claims and causes of action of all of the employees against
the estate of Fortunato Halili; the union shall withdraw and dismiss the case; the
transfer of title and the cash release and quitclaim Halili Enterprises, Halili
Transit, Fortunato Halili, his estate, his heirs and successors
- a Deed of Conveyance of Real Property was executed
LEGAL PROFESSION
- on Aug. 1982, the Union, through Atty. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment requesting for authority to sell and dispose of
the property—motion was granted
- prospective buyer, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, however, had
apprehensions regarding the authority of the Union to sell. So, Atty. Pineda filed
a motion with the SC on Dec. 1982
- but, in an order dated Feb. 1983 Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela granted
the motion; so the sale was consummated on June 1983 and the purchase
price was deposited with the Manila Bank-Cubao
- When Atty. Jose Espinas, the principal counsel, learned of the sale and
apportionment of the proceeds, he requested Labor Arbiter Valenzuela to allow
him to look into the records. He was told, however, that the records were
missing; it was located for him by Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC
- Atty. Espinas filed the urgent motion with prayer for a temporary mandatory
restraining order on August 1983—questions the legality of the orders dated
Sept. 1982 and Feb. 1983 issued by Labor Arbiter Valenzuela which authorized
the sale of the awarded property and the distribution of the proceeds
- Movants Union and Espinas prayed for the court to: require Atty. Pineda to
deposit with NLRC the amount paid to him representing 35% attorney’s fees;
require the Halili Drivers and Conductors Union through Domingo Cabading or
any of his reps to deposit with the NLRC the 6% union expenses paid to them;
implead the Manila Bank-Cubao to require it to prevent further withdrawals of
amount deposited in the name of Pineda and the Union; that the order of
Valenzuela be nullified insofar as it allows Pineda 35% attorney’s fees; NLRC
to equitably dispose 20% as fees to all lawyers who participated and any
excess amounts to be distributed to the workers
- Aug. 1983 Espinas filed a supplement to urgent motion praying for the
nullification of Valenzuela’s order
- the court issued a temporary mandatory restraining order: enjoined Pineda to
deposit with NLRC the amount representing 35% attorney’s fees (P712,992);
directed the Union to deposit with the NLRC 6% union expenses; ordered
NLRC and Manila Bank not to allow withdrawals
-Union, through Pineda said that the subject matter sought to be enjoined or
mandated by the restraining order is moot and academic
- Espinas filed a manifestation and motion to require Atty. Pineda and the union
to comply with the temporary mandatory restraining order
- Solicitor General filed his comment with the recommendations that the orders
of Valenzuela be nullified, that the case must be remanded to the NLRC, and
that the TRO issued by the court on Sept.1983 be maintained pending final
resolution by NLRC
- on the mandatory restraining order, Pineda claims that as of Oct. 1983 he
had a balance of P2,000 in his account with Manila Bank
- resolution of court dated Oct. 1983, the court set aside as null and void the
orders of Valenzuela, directed the Manila Bank, Pineda and the Union to comply
with the temporary mandatory restraining order issued on Sept. 1983, and
remanded cases to NLRC
- Oct. 1983 motion was filed to cite Pineda, Union and Bank in contempt
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- Dec. 1983- rejoinder reiterating plea to declare Pineda and Capuno of the
union in contempt of court and to mere out the proper penalty
- crucial facts which have surfaced:
> then Union President Amado Lopez informed JC Espinas and Associates
that the general membership of the said Union had authorized a 20%
contingent fee for the law firm
> Espinas, the original counsel, established the award of 897 workers’ claim—
notice of judgment in 1968 was served on JC Espinas & Associates; and a
notice of judgment in 1970 was sent to Atty. BC Pineda and Associates under
the same address as the Espinas firm
> when Pineda appeared for the Union, still an associate of the law firm, his
appearance carried the firm name “BC Pineda and Associates”, giving the
impression that he was the principal lawyer in the cases
> Pineda did not reveal to his partners that he had a retainer’s contract
entered into on Jan. 1967; he did not divulge, only the Union officers knew of
the contract
> the retainer’s contract between Pineda and the Union appears anomalous
and even illegal: only 14% of the total membership was represented which is a
violation of Art.242 of the Labor Code; contingent fees worked to the prejudice
of those who were no longer working (Pineda knew that all the workers would
be out of work because Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro
Manila); contract was not notarized
> the decision of Manila Memorial Park cemetery to stop questioning the
Union’s authority to sell and the expeditious manner by which Valenzuela
granted motion for such authority make the entire transaction dubious and
irregular
ISSUE
WON Atty. Benjamin Pineda, Ricardo Capuno and Manila Bank-Cubao should
be cited in contempt for the alleged failure to comply with the temporary
mandatory order and the resolution issued by the SC
HELD
Ratio
a. Atty. Pineda: Atty. Pineda should be cited for indirect contempt. Disobedience
of or resistance to a lawful order of a court, any abuse of or any interference
with the proceedings of a court, and any improper conduct tending to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice shall be punished as indirect
contempts in order to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to enforce
judgments, orders and mandates of the court.
Atty. Pineda should likewise be subject to disbarment proceedings. The Court
may suspend or debar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a
member of the Bar.
b. Manila Banking Corporation: Manila Banking Corporation is not liable for
contempt. When there is a sufficient compliance with the court’s order, a party
can no longer be liable for contempt of court.
c. The Union and its officers are dropped from the within contempt charge.
Reasoning
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
a. –the court already nullified the orders of the labor arbiter as violative of the Lopez for which reason the 35% increased fees was approved by the Union’s
due process clause board in good faith
- the act of Pineda of filing a motion in the SC for authority to sell property in - Union was aware that Espinas was the principal counsel
question was by itself an admission on his part that he did not possess the - they knew of the original contract for 20% attorney’s fees
authority to sell the property and that the SC was the proper body which had the Disposition Atty. Pineda is found guilty of INDIRECT CONTEMPT of court. He
power to grant such authority is sentenced to imprisonment until the orders of the court are complied with. He
- he did not wait for such valid authority but instead previously obtained the is also directed to show cause why he should not be disbarred.
same from the labor arbiter whom he knew was not empowered to so authorize
TING-DUMALI V TORRES
- the 45% attorney’s lien on award of those union members who were no PER CURIAM; April 14, 2004
longer working and the 30% lien on the benefits of those who were still working (eva sison)
as provided for in the retainer’s contract are very exorbitant and unconscionable
NATURE
(under sec.11 rule VIII of Book III, attorney’s fees should not exceed 10% of the
Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Presentation of false testimony,
amount awarded)
participation in, consent to, and failure to adduce against, the forgery of
- the pleadings show a deceitful pattern on the part of Pineda
complainant’s signature, and gross misrepresentation.
- contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court;
such conduct as tends to bring the authority and admin of the law into
FACTS
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses
- complainant-affidavit filed on Oct. 22, 1999 where complainant Isidra Ting-
during litigation
Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando Torres with presentation of false
- the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts
testimony, participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery
- exercise of this power has a twofold aspect: the proper punishment of the
of complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, and
guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order, and to compel his
gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from it, thereby
performance of some act or duty required of him by the court which he refuses
violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.
to perform---> due to this twofold aspect, contempts are classified as civil or
- complainant is one of six children of late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente
criminal
Ting.
- civil: failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the
- siblings involved are Miriam Saria, Marcelina Rivera and Felicisima Torres
benefit of the opposing party
who is married to respondent
-criminal: conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a
- parents died intestate, leaving 3 parcels of land
judge, as in lawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of a court or
Complainant’s Claim
of a judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act
- respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers and
- where the punishment imposed is wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate the
used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them
dignity and power of the court, either by fine or by imprisonment or both, it is
- Felicisima and Miriam executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
deemed a judgment in a criminal case
where they made it appear that they were the sole heirs; respondent
- if made before final decree, contempt judgment will be treated as in the nature
participated in, consented to and failed to advise against this act; he presented
of an interlocutory order; if made after the final decree, as remedial in nature,
said document to the Register of Deeds for the transfer of the title in the names
and may be reviewed only on appeal from the final decree
of his wife and Miriam (involving lot 1586)
- whether civil or criminal does not affect the power of a court to punish it
- complainant’s signature was forged in another Deed of Extrajudicial
- On Disbarment
Settlement involving a different lot to enable Felicisima and Miriam to transfer
sec.27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court: attorneys may be removed
the title in their names, thus enabling them to sell the land (which they did, to
or suspended for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
Antel Holdings, Inc); respondent, again, consented to and participated in this act
office, for any violation of the lawyer’s oath, for a willful disobedience of a lawful
(involving lot 1603)
order of a superior court...
- respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the
- a lawyer may be criminally liable for breach of professional duty, and under
effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of
the Anti-Graft Act for knowingly inducing a public official to commit an offense
deceased spouses in the petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy
b. – the bank had transmitted to the NLRC the remaining balance which was a
of a title covering the last parcel of land (lot 1605)
sufficient compliance
- made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom
c. Mr. Capuno clarified that with regard to attorney’s fees, Pineda made the
when he requested the buyer of the last parcel of land to release the full
Union officers believe that he would be the one to pay the fees of Espinas and
payment under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released
within a month when he knew that it would be impossible because he presented
LEGAL PROFESSION
evidence in the reconstitution case only on August 1997 (he said this to buyer
on Nov. 1996)
Respondent’s Comment
- denies the allegations
- lot 1586: his wife and Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely profit
the sale; he had no part in the execution of the document; he believed in good
faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the lot; if
ever complainant’s signature was affixed on that document, it was done in good
faith
- admits he was counsel in the reconstitution case; the false testimony of
Marcelina could not be faulted on him because it was a clear oversight
- regarding gross and false misrepresentation that the reconstitution order would
be released within a month, assurance was made by the Clerk of Court
-believes the complainant intends to harass him
Complainant’s Reply
-denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her mother
because her mom met a sudden death, when she died four siblings were still
minors, and on Feb 2000 Eliseo wrote his siblings, denying the existence of a
toka
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
- on june 2000, SC referred the case to IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation or decision
- on Jan 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros San Juan of the
Commission on Bar Discipline found the actuations of the respondent to be
violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.1 of Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
- recommended the disbarment of respondent
- in its resolution, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted San
Juan’s report, but reduced the penalty to a 6-year suspension
ISSUES
1. WON respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally
unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession
2. WON disbarment is the imposable disciplinary sanction
HELD
1. Yes, respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally
unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession.
A lawyer is a servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society
has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. Thus, he
should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and he should not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Reasoning
– the lawyers’ oath is a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep
inviolable at all times
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- the oath is reflected in CPR (Canon 1, 7, 10); they underscore the role of a
lawyer as a vanguard of our legal system—in this covenant, respondent
miserably failed
- respondent knew of his wife’s siblings, yet he presented the document stating
that his wife and Miriam are the only children to the Register of Deeds
- the falsification of complainant’s signature in the document which contains a
waiver by the complainant of her right over the property, a matter consulted to
respondent, is tantamount to falsification of a public document; he presented
such document, therefore, he himself may also be held liable for knowingly
using a falsified document to the damage of the complainant
- respondent did not advise his wife from doing acts which are contrary to law;
he must have kept in mind that it is his duty to uphold the Consti and obey the
laws of the land
- regarding respondent’s argument that the non-declaration of other siblings
was an oversight does not deserve credence because the petition clearly names
only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners and because during the hearing
when respondent asked Marcelina WON she has bros and sis, latter said none
- he allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony in court and
he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony
- under canon 10, lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court; this
was openly violated by respondent
- respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring
intolerable dishonor to the legal profession
2. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the bar.
Reasoning
- In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring
lawyer, we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings,
which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men
in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
- given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, it is found that
respondent’s gross misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to
practice law for life
Disposition We find respondent guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the
lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the CPR, thereby rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law.
MASINSIN V ALBANO
VITUG; May 31, 1994
(javi bautista)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition.
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
FACTS money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of
This case emerged from an ejectment suit filed by Vicente Caneda against my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
Miguel and Thelma Masinsin. As a result of the case, the trial court ordered the my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without any
spouses to vacate the premises and to remove their house/apartment an mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
surrender possession of the subject land; to pay the sum of P100 a month from In no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the
January 1987 as compensation for the use of the premises until the land is court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the
actually vacated. No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became administration of justice is contumacious calling for both an exercise of
final and executory. On August 22 1985, the Masinsins filed a petition for disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt power.
certiorari before the RTC of Manila seeking the annulment of the decision of the Disposition Petition is dismissed. Petitioner’s counsel of record is strongly
ejectment case and to set aside the order of its execution. Petition was CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyer’s oath in the
dismissed. On October 7 1985, petitioners filed a complaint for “Annulment of future will be dealt with mot severely.
the judgment, Lease Contract and Damages” was filed by the Masinsins asking
for the nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was YOUNG V BATUEGAS
YNARES-SANTIAGO; May 9, 2003
dismissed due to res judicata. Petitioners appealed to the CA but the CA
(owen ricalde)
affirmed the decision of the trial court. When petitioners refused to remove their
house, a demolition order was issued. But before the completion of the
NATURE
demolition, a restraining order was issued by the RTC following a petition for
Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
certiorari, with preliminary injunction and for declaratory relief. Petition again was
denied. Petitioners again filed the same suit before a different branch of the
FACTS
Manila RTC. Petition was ultimately dismissed on August 23 1990.
- On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young, private prosecutor in
In this present petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila has lost
“People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr.”, pending in RTC Manila,
jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment suit, when the property in
filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G.
question was proclaimed an area for priority development by the National
Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino for allegedly committing deliberate
Housing Authority on December 1 1987 by authority of PD 2016.
falsehood in court and violating the lawyer’s oath.
- On December 13, 2000, Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed
ISSUE
a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the “accused has voluntarily
WON MTC of Manila lost its jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment
surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention.”
suit due to PD 2016
Upon personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where
accused Arana allegedly surrendered, Young learned that he surrendered only
HELD
on December 14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate of Detention
No. according to a report by manager of the Metro Manila Project Department of
- Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, calendared the motion on
the National Housing Authority, pursuant to PD No. 1967 (which after
December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects,
amendments became PD No. 2016), the disputed lot is not for acquisition by
namely
the NHA. It is located outside of the NHA projects under the Zonal Improvement
> lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant
Project. The NHA is definitely not acquiring the said land and therefore is not
> violation of the three-day notice rule
part of PD 2016. Thus the MTC of Manila has jurisdiction to enforce its decision
> failure to attach the Certificate of Detention
in the ejectment case.
- According to respondents on December 13, 2000, upon learning that a
- What immediately catches one’s attention to this case is the evident
warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they immediately fetched the
predilection of petitioners, through different counsel, to file pleadings, one after
accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender but due to
another, from which not even this court has been spared. The utter lack of merit
heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the
of the complainants and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of
certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered on December 14,
petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has
2000 TF there was neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject
long become final and executory. The petitioners through different counsels tried
pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the NBI.
to nullify the same MTC decision before different branches of the court. The
- WRT the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that Young was not entitled to
lawyer’s oath is a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable. The
any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies
pertinent part of the lawyer’s oath involved in this case:
of the motion with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court.
suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any man’s cause for
LEGAL PROFESSION
- In August 13, 2001, referred to IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision.
- On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner Villanueva-Maala
submitted a report and recommended Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty.
Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of their
profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for a period of six (6) months
ISSUE
WON Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood
HELD
YES.
Ratio To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when
they resorted to deception.
Reasoning
- Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that
it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the
truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in
authority and was under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate
ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to injustice.
- A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar
that he will “do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court” and he
shall “conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.”
- a lawyer should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is
to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it
in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion
- courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them
- while a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client’s rights and is
expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client’s cause, his conduct
must never be at the expense of truth.
- Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.
- In Comia vs. Antona, we held:
It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police
authorities on the same date “tentatively” scheduled for the hearing of the
application for bail. To our mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and
immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from administrative liability
considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the application for
bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were devoid of personality to
ask such specific affirmative relief from the court.
- In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the
motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled date. Although a motion may be
heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
non-observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are
obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
Disposition Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are
found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.,
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU V THE INSULAR
LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.
CASTRO; January 30, 1971
(rach mayuga)
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari to review a decision and resolution of the Court of Industrial
Relations dismissing the Unions’ complaint
FACTS
- The following UNIONS (Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd, Employees Ass’n-
NATU; FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Ass’n-NATU; Insular Life
Bldg Employees Ass’n-NATU) while still members of the Federation of Free
Workers, entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with these
COMPANIES (Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd; FGU Insurance Group)
- Lawyers of the Unions include Enaje and Garcia (Sec-treasurer of FFW).
When they left FFW, the Companies then hired them and Garcia became Asst.
Corporate Sec and Legal Asst in the Legal Dept, and Enaje became personnel
manager of the Companies. He was also made chairman of the negotiating
panel for the Co. in the CBA with the Unions.
- Sept 16, 1957 – Unions jointly submitted proposals for a modified renewal of
their respective CBA contracts w/c were due to expire on 9/30
- Sept/Oct 1957 - negotiations were conducted but snagged by deadlock on
issue of union shop; Unions then filed on 01/27/1958 notice of strike for
”deadlock on collective bargaining”
- April 15, 1958 – Unions dropped their demands regarding security but the
Companies still refused to negotiate
- Apr 25 to May 6 – They tried negotiating but with no satisfactory results
- May 15, 1958 – Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they
considered as unfair labor practices
- May 20, 1958 – Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of Insular Life
Bldg
- May 21, 1958 – Companies through the Acting Manager Olbes sent to each
of the strikers a letter specifying incentives should they decide to go back to
work
- Garcia and Abella (Chief of Personnel Records Section) tried to penetrate the
picket lines. When Garcia approached the picket line, he engaged into a fight
with one of the strikers and both of them suffered injuries.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Companies organized 3 bus-loads of employees, including a photographer
who succeeded in penetrating the picket lines causing injuries to picketers.
- Alleging that some non-strikers were injured, the Companies filed criminal
charges against strikers and they also filed a petition for injunction.
- May 31, 1958 – CFI Mla granted injunction. Companies sent individually to
the strikers another letter which states “If you are still interested in continuing in
the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal charges
against you, we are giving you until June 2 to report for work at the home office.
Otherwise, we may be forced to obtain your replacement.”
- All of the more than 120 crim charges, except for 3, were dismissed. But
employees decided to call of the strike and to report back to work on June 2.
- Before readmitting, Companies required them to secure clearances from the
City Fiscal’s Office and to be screened by a management committee
- July 29, 1958 – CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
- Aug 17, 1965 – CIR dismissed the complaint
Relevant to the assigned topic (read pages 277-280!)
- Martinez, the Presiding Judge of the CIR, misquoted a SC decision in the
case of Lopez Sr v. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass’n:
(1) 60 words of the paragraph quoted by Martinez do NOT appear in the
original;
(2) Martinez used “For it is settled that...”; the original reads, “For it must be
remembered...”
(3) Last sentence in the quoted paragraph of Martinez is actually part of the
immediately succeeding paragraph in the SC decision.
- In the respondents’ brief, counsels for respondents quoted the CIR’s decision
ISSUES
1. WON the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice -
a) In sending out letters individually directed to the strikers
b) For discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the
matter of readmitting employees after the strike
c) For dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving
them the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their
side
2. WON the officials and members of the Unions are to be reinstated with full
back wages, from June 2, 1958 to date of actual reinstatement
3. WON Presiding Judge Martinez and counsels of respondents are to be cited
for contempt for misquoting a Supreme Court decision
HELD
1.a) YES.
Ratio It is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective
bargaining agreement to negotiate with his employees individually, in connection
with the changes in the agreement. Although the union is on strike, the
employer is still under the obligation to bargain with the union as the
employees’ bargaining representative.
Reasoning It is an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all
employees notifying them to return to work at a specific time, otherwise new
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. The first letter contains
promises of benefits to employees; the second letter contains threats to obtain
replacements. Free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable
where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a
promise of benefit, or threats or reprisal.
- The circumstance that strikers later decided to return to work on account of
injunction cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters which tended to interfere
with the employees’ right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of
strike.
- Totality of Conduct Doctrine: Expressions of opinion by an employer, though
innocent in themselves, were held to be culpable because of the circumstances
under which they were uttered. (1) Before Unions’ submission of proposals for
renewal of CBAs, respondents hired former legal counsels of petitioners; (2)
After notice to strike was served on the Companies, they reclassified 87
employees as supervisors, compelling them to resign from unions; (3) During
negotiations in Dept of Labor, they refused to answer the Unions’ demands en
toto; (4) Strikers were individually sent letters inducing them to return to work
with promises of special privileges; (5) Three truckloads of non-strikers crashed
through the picket line, which resulted in injuries on the part of picketers; (6)
Criminal charges were brought upon picketers; (7) An injunction was obtained
from CFI; (8) Another letter was sent individually and by registered special
delivery mail threatening them with dismissal if they didn’t report for work on
June 2; (9) When they did report for work, a screening committee refused to
admit 63 members of the Unions on ground of pending criminal charges; (10)
When almost all were cleared by fiscal’s office, they were still refused
admission; but all non-strikers were readmitted immediately. It is clear that the
main reason for the strike was “when it became clear that management will not
negotiate in good faith.”
1.b) YES.
Ratio The companies are guilty of discrimination in their process of rehiring.
They refused to readmit strikers with pending criminal charges, even after these
employees have secured the required clearances. At the same time, the
Companies readily readmitted non-strikers who also had criminal charges,
without requiring clearances. They even separated active from the less active
unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines.
Reasoning There are 3 conditions for readmission of the strikers: (1) he must
be interested in continuing his work with the companies; (2) no criminal charges
against him; (3) report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be
replaced. All employees are considered to have complied with first and third
condition.
- In an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination
in rehiring, they even delegated the power to readmit to a committee composed
of Abella and Garcia. Both were involved in unpleasant incidents with the
picketers during the strike, and the mere act of placing the power of
reinstatement in their hands is a form of discrimination.
1.c) YES.
Ratio The Companies refused to take the employees back on account of their
“acts of misconduct” even if all, except three, were able to secure the required
LEGAL PROFESSION
clearances. Record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the
opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges.
2. YES.
Ratio The members and officials of the Unions went on strike because of the
unfair labor practices committed by the Companies. They are now entitled to
reinstatement with back pay because when they reported back for work, upon
the invitation of their employers, they were discriminatorily dismissed.
3. NO.
Ratio The misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate
attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. Counsels of
respondents have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in
the Judge’s decision, to copy it verbatim and to incorporate it in their brief.
Import of sentences in the quotation is substantially the same as the cited
decision.
Impt: In citing SC’s decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts,
judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and
punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. This is because “only the decisions of
this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction.”
(Miiranda v. Imperial)
- Ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the
decisions and rulings of SC may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the
detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled.
Also, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, and be
saved precious time in finding out whether citations are correct.
Disposition Decision of the CIR is reversed and set aside. Respondents are
ordered to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their
former or comparatively similar positions with back wages.
IN RE SOTTO
FERIA; January 21, 1949
(bri bauza)
NATURE
Original action in Supreme Court. Contempt
FACTS
- On December 7, 1948, Respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto was required by this
Court to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court for
having issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this Court
in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as published in
the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows:
“As author of the Press Freedom Law (RA 53), interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who has
now to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the souce of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake
of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the
first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will
have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is
now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constituted a constant peril to
liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf
may hear: the Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable
bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino
Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of
the Philippine Judiciary.”
- Respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat and
intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme
Court. But he contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, “this Court has no power to
impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can
only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and a law has to be
promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive.”
- He also alleges in his answer that “in the exercise of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press
with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority
of the members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided
the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, nor intended to attack the honesty or
integrity of anyone.”
ISSUES
WON the Supreme Court may hold respondent guilty for contempt of court.
HELD
Ratio Any publication; pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the parties, the
officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to
influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. The summary power
to commit and punish for contempt tending to obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of
their powers and to the maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the
land. (In re Kelly)
Reasoning In re Kelly lays down the doctrine of the power of courts to hold
contempt proceedings.
- Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith
may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court. But in his
above-quoted statement, he not only intends to intimidate the members of this
Court with a presentation of a bill in the next congressional session,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from
eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the
Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow-
minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and
thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also
LEGAL PROFESSION
attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of
bringing the Justices of this Court into the disrepute and degrading the
administration of justice.
- The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last
bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be
driven to take the law in their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos may
be the result.
- As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like
any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and
not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
- As Justice Holmes very appropriately said in U.S. v Sullens: “The
administration of justice and freedom of the press, though separate and distinct,
are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and
courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the
constitution and laws, form which the former receives its prerogative and the
latter its jurisdiction… This Court must be permitted to proceed with the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference
obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital
to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of
self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.”
Disposition In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente
Sotto guilty of contempt of this Court by virtue of the above-quoted publication,
and he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the
promulgation of this judgment, a fine P1000, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and
show cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred from practicing as an
attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this Republic, for said publication and the
following statements made by him during the pendency of the case against
Angel Parazo for contempt of Court.
The respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the charge against him
for contempt of court. He says that the cause for criticizing the decision of this
Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the press, when in truth
and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere and influence the final
disposition of said case through intimidation and false accusations against this
Supreme Court.
GUERRERO V VILLAMOR
FERNAN; NOVEMBER 13, 1989
(jaja estoy)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of
Subprovince of Biliran, Leyte, Br. 16.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
FACTS
- Consequent to the dismissal of five criminal cases for qualified theft against
Naval by respondent Judge Villamor, the offended party, petitioner Carlos,
through his lawyer and co-petitioner Guerrero filed before the RTC Br. 21 of
Cebu City an action for damages against respondent Judge for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment in the aforesaid consolidated criminal cases.
Consequently, respondent Judge issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989-0993
an Order of Direct Contempt of Court against petitioners, finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of direct contempt and sentencing them both to
imprisonment of five days and a fine of P500 for degrading the respect and
dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language
before the court.
- The derogatory and contemptuous language adverted to by respondent judge
are the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 reading:
"12. That the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. 0989, 0990, 0991,
0992 and 0993 for qualified theft was arrived at certainly without
circumspection-without any moral or legal basis-a case of knowingly rendering
unjust judgment since the dismissal was tantamount to acquittal of the accused
Gloria P. Naval who is now beyond the reach of criminal and civil liability-all
because the defendant Hon. Adriano R. Villamor was bent backwards with his
eyes and mind wilfully closed under these circumstances which demanded the
scrutiny of the judicial mind and discretion free from bias x x x;"
"xxx xxx xxx
"14. By the standard of a public official and a private person the conduct of
defendant Honorable Judge-not only shocking, but appalling-in giving the
plaintiff before his court the run-around is at the very least distasteful,
distressing and mortifying and moral damages therefore would warrant on this
kind of reprehensible behaviour x x x
"15. That the aforecited manifestly malicious actuations, defendant judge should
also visit upon him x x x for reducing plaintiff his agonizing victim of his disdain
and contempt for the former who not only torn asunder and spurned but also
humiliated and spitefully scorned.”
- Petitioners assert that no direct contempt could have been committed against
respondent Judge in the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 6478
because whatever was mentioned therein was not made "before" respondent
Judge while in session or in recess from judicial proceedings or in any matter
involving the exercise of judicial function of the Court while it is at work on a
case before it. Furthermore, petitioners contend that the words used in the
subject complaint were
ISSUE
WON petitioners committed direct contempt of court through the use of
derogatory and contemptuous language before the court justifying the award of
damages being sought
HELD
1. No. Direct contempt could not have been committed against respondent
Judge in the complaint for damages because whatever was mentioned therein
LEGAL PROFESSION
was not made before respondent judge while in session or in recess from
judicial proceedings or in any matter involving the exercise of judicial function of
the court while it is at work on a case before it. Furthermore, the words they
used In the subject complaint were merely words descriptive of the plaintiff’s
cause of action based on his reaction and remorse and the willful infliction of
injury on him and that the same are all privileged communications made in the
course of judicial proceedings because they are relevant to the issue and
therefore cannot be contemptuous. Strong words were used to lay stress on the
gravity and degree of moral anguish suffered by petitioner as a result of the
dismissal of the subject criminal merely words descriptive of plaintiffs cause of
action based on his reaction and remorse and the wilfull infliction of the injury on
him and that the same are all privileged communications made in the course of
judicial proceedings because they are relevant to the issue and therefore cannot
be contemptuous.
- In his Comment, respondent Judge maintains that petitioners harp too much
on the fact that the five criminal cases are closed cases and therefore the
language or words employed to describe, opine, criticize or condemn the
dismissal of said criminal cases in no way obstruct or hamper, ruin or disturb
the dignity and authority of the court presided over by respondent judge, as said
court was no longer functioning as such in the dispensation of justice. This,
according to respondent Judge, is a very dangerous perception for then the
court becomes vulnerable to all forms of verbal assaults, which would shake the
foundation of judicial authority and even of democratic stability, so that the
absence of such proceedings should not be made a shield to sully the court's
prestige.
- The Court sustains petitioner’s contention that the alleged derogatory
language employed in the complaint in the civil case did not constitute direct
contempt but may only, if at all, constitute indirect contempt subject to defenses
that may be raised by said petitioners in the proper proceedings. Stress must be
placed on the fact that the subject pleading was not submitted to respondent
Judge nor in the criminal cases from which the contempt order was issued but
was filed in another court presided by another judge and involving a separate
action: the civil case for damages against respondent Judge. Although the
allegations in the complaint for damages criticized the wisdom of respondent
Judge’s act of dismissing the criminal cases, such criticism was directed to him
when he was no longer in the process of performing judicial functions in
connection with the subject criminal cases so as to constitute such criticisms as
direct contempt of court.
- The power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, so much so that
judges should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for
contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, the power being
intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that
they exercise. Any abuse of the contempt citation powers will therefore be
curtailed and corrected.
- Be that as it may, lawyers, on the other hand, should bear in mind their basic
duty "to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers and x x x (to) insist on similar conduct by others." This
respectful attitude towards the court is to be observed, "not for the sake of the
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temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance." And it is "through a scrupulous preference for respectful
language that a lawyer best demonstrates his observance of the respect due to
the courts and judicial officers x x x."
IN RE ALMACEN
RUIZ CASTRO; Feb 18, 1970
(kooky talon)
NATURE
Proceedings For Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen
FACTS
- Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant in the civil case entitled Virginia
Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero. The trial court tendered judgment against
his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision,
and on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the
adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time
and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff
moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial
court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a
copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17,
1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required
registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was
ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of
Atty. Almacen himself, who, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the
appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal
and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
- CA, citing Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co.
dismissed the appeal, “for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated
July 5, 1966 does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and
is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. Inc. vs.
Bain Construction At Co.), which did not interrupt the running of the period to
appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time."
- Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest
decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing
Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, as the applicable case.
Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
- Atty. Almacen then appealed to the SC by certiorari. SC refused to take the
case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was
his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was
made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration
filed by him after the said date was ordered expunged from the records.
- Atty. Almacen then filed his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of
Title," a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks, against the Court
as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is
LEGAL PROFESSION
unprofessional. The petition was filed on September 25, 1967, in protest
against what he asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this
Supreme Court." He indicts the Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "people
by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violation of the Constitution
with impunity." His client, he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this
Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the'
altar of hypocrisy.'' In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of
justice, he ridicules the members of the Court, saying "that justice as
administered by the present members, of the Supreme Court is not only blind,
but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed
by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
". . . . a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of
the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that
at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we
may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession."
- Sept 28, 1967, SC resolved to withhold action on his petition until he shall
have actually surrendered his certificate. When nothing came from him, Atty.
Almacen was reminded to turn over his certificate so that the Court could act on
his petition.
- To said reminder Atty. Almacen manifested "that he has no pending petition in
connection with Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory";
that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either
a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose
to 'pursue the negative act’."
- Nov 17, 1967 SC resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained
in the Nov 17 resolution, Atty. Almacen asked for permission to give reasons
and cause in an open and public hearing. The Court required Atty. Almacen to
state his reasons for such request, to which he manifested that since the Court
is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to
answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that the
Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a
written explanation "in the event this Court has no, time to hear him in person."
He was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral
argument.
- Atty. Almacen’s written answer offered no apology. Far from being contrite,
Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeated his jeremiad of lamentations, abundant
1
with sarcasm and innuendo .
ISSUE
WON the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are
properly the object of disciplinary sanctions
1
Refer to the case for Atty. Almacen’s written answer. The way he addressed the Court and how he laid down his
points should be a matter of interest. As the court said, this is a matter “unprecedented and unprofessional”. One
paragraph reads: “Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the
violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the
attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.”
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HELD
- Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the
courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and
thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their
integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate
disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives
inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the
legal fraternity.
- CA had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of Atty. Almacen’s appeal
in light of the law and applicable decisions of the SC. As a law practitioner who
was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew - or ought to
have known - that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the
period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the
adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and
place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). Atty. Almacen’s own negligence
caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter
of right. There is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
- Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed
at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially
recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the
court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.
- As citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings
and indiscretions of courts and judges. It is his right to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
- By constitutional mandate, it is the SC’s solemn duty, amongst others, to
determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the
practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued
membership in the Bar.
- A critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high
function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy
criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and
disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to
attain them. The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition,
answer and oral argumentation far transcend the permissible bounds of
legitimate criticism.
- NOTE: disciplinary proceedings like the present are Sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of
an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. It may be initiated by the Court motu proptio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls 1. while still a law practitioner and politician, he was a frequent customer of the
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the restaurant of the spouses and was a good friend of his
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and 2. he was also a good friend of the attorney of the spouses
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of - TC denied motion to inhibit
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to - On April 17, 1989, Deogracias and Rosalina filed a motion to admit attached
be entrusted with duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an supplemental complaint which pleaded that they have already paid their debt to
attorney. Socorro but the latter refused to accept said payment without just cause thus
Disposition Accordingly, it is the sense of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul was a clear move on her part to let the 3 year period provided in their MOA
Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further elapse
orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. - TC admitted the supplemental complaint
- Socorro moved to dismiss supplemental complaint
SORIANO V COURT OF APPEALS - TC denied motion to dismiss supplemental complaint
PARDO; August 28, 2001
- TC ordered Deogracias and Rosalina to pay a deficiency in the docket fees
(yella bautista)
- Socorro moved for an extension to file a responsive pleading to the
supplemental complaint and to reset pre-trial
FACTS
- Deogracias and Rosalina complied with the order and paid additional filing
- Deogracias and Rosalina Reyes pleaded that they were employed by Socorro
fees
as manager and administrative assistant of her property and real estate in
- TC granted Socorro’s motion for an extension
1968.
- Socorro again moved for another extension and resetting of the pre-trial
- As payment for their services, in 1973, Socorro gave them one apartment
- The TC granted the second motion
unit to use as their dwelling for the duration of their lifetime and a token monthly
- Socorro again moved for another extension on which the TC did not act upon
rental on P150 was imposed.
- Socorro’s counsel Atty. Padilla filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration of
- In the same building, another unit was occupied by the spouses which was
various orders of the respondent court
improved and converted by them into a pub and restaurant. For the use of the
- Deogracias and Rosalina filed an opposition
premises, the token amount of P1500 monthly was imposed.
- The TC denied Socorro’s motion
- On October 17, 1988, Socorro gave Deogracias and Rosalina notice to
- The TC directed Atty. Padilla to show cause whey he should not be cited for
vacate the said two units
contempt of court. He consequently failed to do so and the court declared
- Deogracias and Rosalina owned two commercial lots with improvements. On
Socorro in default and Atty. Padilla was sentenced to 5 days imprisonment with
May 28, 1968, they became indebted to Socorro in the amount of
a P100 fine for direct contempt of court.
P638,635.36. The parties agreed to pay for the debt by selling the two lots
- Socorro and Atty. Padilla filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and
for P2.5M. While looking for a buyer, Deogracias and Rosalina conveyed the
mandamus with temporary restraining order assailing the orders of Judge Naval.
property to Socorro by way of first mortgage. A deed of absolute sale was
executed in place of a real estate mortgage.
ISSUES
- Action was initiated by the spouses but the court released the two lots in
1. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to restrain or to remedy
favor of Socorro having presented the deed of absolute sale in her name.
the forcible seizure by the plaintiffs of the property subject of the litigation
- On October 28, 1988, the spouses paid the filing fee and legal research.
2. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to order the payment of
- On November 29, 1988, Socorro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the correct fling fee upon failure to pay the same, to dismiss the case
two grounds:
3. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to inhibit
1. the first cause of action was barred by the pendency of an ejectment case
4. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in admitting the supplemental
between the same parties over the same parties
complaint with a theory directly contrary to the original complaint and in not
2. the second cause of action was premature
dismissing it upon motion of defendant.
- On December 8, 1988, the Carmelite Sisters on behalf of their benefactress
5. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction
filed with the trial court an urgent ex-parte motion for restraining order. They
in finding Atty. Padilla, Jr. guilty of direct contempt
talked to respondent judge Naval in his chambers and requested him to
6. WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in sanctioning the orders
immediately act on Socorro’s urgent ex-parte motion for a restraining order. On
of the TC except the Order admitting the supplemental complaint
December 16, 1988, the TC denied the motion.
- On January 16, 1989, Socorro through counsel Atty. Padilla filed a motion to
HELD
inhibit Judge Naval
LEGAL PROFESSION
1. No. The issue has already become moot and academic since the parties had
already entered the premises in question.
2. No. There was no intention on the part of Deogracias and Rosalina to
degraud the government. They were in good faith and relied on the assessment
of the Clerk of Court.
3. No. Rule 137, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides only the
following grounds for the disqualification of judges- No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he
has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest signed by them and
entered upon the record. A judge may, in his exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.
4. Yes. The supplemental complaint contains matters directly different from and
even contrary to the cause of action stated in the original complaint. The rule
allowing amendments to a pleading is subject to the general limitation that the
cause of action shall not be substantially changed or that the theory of the case
shall not be altered.
5. The CA erred when it stated that a certiorari proceeding assailing the
judgment of direct contempt was not proper as Atty. Padilla may have appealed
therefrom. Rule 71, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: A such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but
may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The court also
erred when it affirmed the trial court’s finding of direct contempt of court against
Atty. Padilla (see comments made by Atty. Padilla in the original text of the
case) Atty. Padilla’s innuendoes are not necessarily disrespectful to the court.
The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on
the preservative, not vindictive principle and on the corrective and not retaliatory
idea of punishment.
MACEDA V VASQUEZ
NOCON; April 22, 1993
(edel cruz)
NATURE
Petition for Certiorari of the order of the ombudsman
FACTS
- This is a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order
for the Office of the Ombudsman to stop it from entertaining a criminal complaint
regarding the alleged falsification of a judge’s certification submitted to the SC.
- Petitioner Judge Maceda was accused of falsification of Certificate of Service,
and now seeks to review orders of the Ombudsman
- Napoleon Abiera of PAO alleged that the petitioner had falsified his Certificate
of Service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been
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submitted for decisions have been determined and decided on or before Jan 31
1989 when in truth 15 cases were still to be determined. (Abiera alleges
Maceda lied that he finished the cases but he hasn’t yet.)
ISSUES
1. WON Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case despite the Court’s ruling in
Orap v. Sandiganbayan
2. WON the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into
the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all the inferior courts
HELD
1. NO. There is nothing in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed
by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of
Service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and
inefficiency. And criminally liable to the state under the RPC for his felonious
act.
2. YES. In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation of the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision
over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
- ART VIII, sec 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests on the SC administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel. The Ombudsman cannot justify
its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution for
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the SC.
- The Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner’s certificates of
service to the SC for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true
status of his pending case load. (SO admin case first before criminal.)
Disposition Petition granted. Ombudsman is directed to dismiss the complaint
filed by the public respondent.2
MALONSO V PRINCIPE
TINGA; December 16, 2004
(giulia pineda)
NATURE
Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
In the early part of 1997, Napocor instituted expropriation proceedings against
several lot owners in Bulacan including the complainant in this case.
- April 1, 1997, a “Contract of Legal Services” was entered into between the
law firm “Principe Villano and Clemente Law Offices” and SANDAMA, Inc.
represented by its President Danilo V. Elfa. SANDAMA is the organization of lot
2
NOTE: Lawyer has a duty to defend a judge from unfounded criticism or groundless personal attack, irrespective of
whether he loses or wins a case in a judge’s sala. But a lawyer can file admin complaints against erring judges.
SC- ADMIN CASES (THROUGH COURT ADMINISTRATOR)
OMBUDSMAN – CRIMINAL CASE
LEGAL PROFESSION
owners affected by the expropriation proceedings. Complainant is a member of
this organization.
- November 27, 1997, complainant executed a “Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay
Kapangyarihan” in favor of Danilo Elfa appointing the latter as the attorney-in-
fact of the complainant on the matter of negotiation with the NPC.
- December 21, 1999, NPC’s Board of Directors approved the amicable
settlement of the expropriation cases by paying all the lot owners the total of
One Hundred Three Million Four Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred
Pesos (P103,413,200.00).
- More that two (2) years after the expropriation cases were instituted and while
complainant was represented therein by Atty. Benjamin Mendoza, or on January
18, 2000, respondent filed an “Ex-Parte Motion to Separate Legal Fees From
Selling Price Between Plaintiffs and Defendants.”
- About ten days after respondent filed his motion to separate legal fees,
respondent filed his “Notice of Entry of Appearance” (dated January 28, 2000)
claiming that respondent is the legal counsel of the complainant, a defendant in
said case.
- February 12, 2000, (69) lot owners including the complainant wrote a letter
to NPC informing the latter that they have never authorized Mr. Danilo Elfa to
hire the services of the respondent’s law firm to represent them in the
expropriation cases.
- February 17, 2000, complainant filed an “Opposition” to respondent’s entry of
appearance and motion to separate legal fees.
- March 7, 2000, respondent filed a “Notice of Attorney’s Lien” claiming 40%
of the selling price of the properties being expropriated by NPC.
- April 10, 2000, respondent filed a “Notice of Adverse Claim” before the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan claiming 40% of the rights, title and interest of the
lot owners over their lots being expropriated including that of complainant.
- November 20, 2000, respondent herein filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene
in the expropriation case claiming to be a co-owner of the property being
expropriated.
- February 26, 2001, respondent filed an Opposition to the Compromise
Agreement submitted by the lot owners and NPC for court approval.
Because of the actions taken by the respondent, the execution of the decision
approving the compromise agreement between the lot owners and the NPC was
delayed
- June 6, 2001 - a complaint for disbarment was filed before the IBP. Julian
Malonso claimed that Atty Principe, without authority entered his appearance as
Malonso’s counsel in the expropriation proceedings initiated by Napocor. After
illegally representing him, Pincipe claimed 40% of the selling price of his land
by way of attorney’s fees and in a Motion to Intervene, claimed to be a co-
owner of Malonso’s property.
- In the respondet’s anawer, he claims that the services of his law office was
engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR
(SANDAMA) through its president, Danilo Elfa, as embodied in the Contract of
Legal Services executed on April 1, 1997 3. Respondent claims that Malonso is
3 ii.) His representation expenses and commitment expenses;
The Contract states in part:
The parties mutually agree one with the other as follows:
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a member of SANDAMA and that the said member executed an SPA in favor of
Elfa which served as Elfa’s authority to act in behalf of Malonso
- In Malonso’s reply, he claimed that he did not authorize Elfa as the SPA was
executed after the Contract of Legal Services. He also claims that he also had
his own lawyer, Atty. Benjamin Mendoza.
- Principe counters this argument saying that the agreement is a continuing one,
hence Malonso was within the coverage of the contract.
- According to the findings of the IBP investigator, the Contract of Legal
Services is between SANDAMA as a corporate being and the respondent’s law
firm. SANDAMA is not a party in all of the expropriation proceedings instituted
by Napocor, neither does it claim co-ownership of the properties being
expropriated. It was also found that the SPA was executed by Malonso in favor
of Elfa after the Contract of Legal Services, and the right of co-ownership
cannot be derived from the said documents. A contract of legal services
between a lawyer and his client is personal and cannot be performed through
intermediaries. From the evidence presented by both parties, the Investigating
Commissioner found Principe guilty of misrepresentation. He was found to have
violated Canon3, Rule 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 12.04. the report
recommended the penalty of a 2 year suspension.
- October 25, 2003 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors suspended him
for 1 year
- In his Appeal Memorandum, respondent claims that the Resolution has no
factual and legal basis, the complaint having been motivated by pure selfishness
and greed, and the Resolution itself invalid for having failed to comply with Rule
139-B of the RoC. According to the respondent, the Investigating Commissioner
continued to investigate the instant case despite the lapse of three months
provided under Section 8 of Rule 139-B, without any extension granted by the
SC. Moreover, in the subsequent review made by the IBP Board of Governors,
no actual voting took place but a mere consensus, and the required number of
votes provided by the Rules was not secured considering that there were only
five (5) governors present. Respondent opines that the actions of the IBP Board
were aimed at preventing him from pursuing his known intention to run for IBP
National President.
ISSUES
1. WON Atty. Principe’s suspension in the practice of law properly arrived at
2. WON Principe illegally represented the petitioners
HELD
I. SECOND PARTY engages the services of the FIRST PARTY as their lawyer of the collection,
claim, and/ or payment of just compensation of its members with the NAPOCOR;
II. FIRST PARTY accepts the engagement; both parties further agree on the following conditions:
A. Scope of Work - negotiation, legal documentation, attendance to court proceedings and other related
activities;
B. Payment of Fees is on contingent basis. No acceptance fees, appearance and liaison fees;
C. The legal fees or payment to FIRST PARTY:
1. Forty (40%) Percent of the selling price between NAPOCOR and the
SANDAMA members; this forty (40%) [percent] is the maximum rate and may be
negotiated depending on the volume of work involved;
2. Legal Fees as stated above shall cover:
i.) Attorney’s Fees of FIRST PARTY;
iii.) Miscellaneous Expenses, etc.
D. Both parties agree to exert their best efforts to increase or secure the best price from NAPOCOR.
LEGAL PROFESSION
1. Ratio
Before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of law by the IBP, there
should be (1) a review of the investigator’s report; (2) a formal voting; and (3)
a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board. The rationale for this rule is
simple: a decision reached by the Board in compliance with the procedure is the
official decision of the Board as a body and not merely as the collective view of
the individual members thereof. Without a vote having been taken, the
Resolution is void and has no effect.
- Normally, non-compliance with the procedural rules would result in the remand
of the case. However, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice
would not be subserved by the remand of the case, or when public interest
demands an early disposition of the case, or where the trial court had already
received all the evidence of the parties. In view of the delay in resolving the
instant complaint against the respondent, the Court opts to resolve the same
based on the records before it.
2. Ratio
- The duty of the courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and
lawful manner; it is also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and
lawful fees.
- It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a lawyer accounts for his
behavior towards the court, his client, his peers in the profession and the
public. However, the duty of the Court is not limited to disciplining those guilty
of misconduct, but also to protecting the reputation of those wrongfully charged,
much more, those wrongfully found guilty.
- On the other hand, the IBP is aimed towards the elevation of the standards of
the law profession, the improvement of the administration of justice, and the
enabling of the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. Despite
its duty to police the ranks, the IBP is not exempt from the duty to “promote
respect for the law and legal processes” and “to abstain from activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Respect for
law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be
minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the
very rules formulated for their observance.
Reasoning
- There are two stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned
with the determination by the courts of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of
the facts involved in the suit. The second phase is concerned with the
determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken which relates to the valuation thereof. But as it frequently happens, the
public purpose dimension is not as fiercely contested. Moreover, in their quest
to secure what they believe to be the fair compensation of their property, the
owners seek inroads to the leverages of executive power where compensation
compromises are commenced and given imprimatur. In this dimension, the
services of lawyers different from the ordinary litigator may prove to be handy or
even necessary. Negotiations are mostly out of court and reliant on the
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
sagacity, persuasion, patience, persistence and resourcefulness of the
negotiator.
- In the instant case, the trial court had already ruled on the valuation of the
properties subject of the expropriation, the same order which is subject of the
appeal filed by the NAPOCOR. Aware that it might take a long time before the
said appeal is finally resolved, and in view of the delay in the adjudication of the
case, the landowners and NAPOCOR negotiated for a compromise agreement.
To assist them, the landowners, through SANDAMA and its president, Danilo
Elfa, engaged the services of a lawyer in the person of respondent. It is clear
that respondent was hired precisely for the negotiation phase of the case.
- As a legal entity, a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its
individual stockholders or members and from that of its officers who manage
and run its affairs. The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting
through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. Thus,
property belonging to a corporation cannot be attached to satisfy the debt of a
stockholder and vice versa, the latter having only an indirect interest in the
assets and business of the former. Thus, as summed by the IBP investigator,
respondent is the lawyer of SANDAMA, but SANDAMA is not a party litigant in
all of the expropriation cases; thus respondent had no basis to interfere in the
court proceedings involving the members. But things are not as simple as that.
- A review of the records reveals that respondent had grounds to believe that he
can intervene and claim from the individual landowners. For one, the
incorporation of the landowners into SANDAMA was made and initiated by
respondent’s firm so as to make negotiations with NAPOCOR easier and more
organized. SANDAMA was a non-stock, non-profit corporation aimed towards
the promotion of the landowners’ common interest. It presented a unified front
which was far easier to manage and represent than the individual owners. In
effect, respondent still dealt with the members, albeit in a collective manner.
- Second, respondent relied on the representation of Danilo Elfa, former
SANDAMA president and attorney-in-fact of the members, with whom he
entered into a contract for legal services. Respondent could not have doubted
the authority of Elfa to contract his firm’s services. After all, Elfa was armed with
a Board Resolution from SANDAMA, and more importantly, individual grants of
authority from the SANDAMA members, including Malonso.
- Third, the contract for legal services clearly indicated a contingent fee of forty
percent (40%) of the selling price of the lands to be expropriated, the same
amount which was reflected in the deed of assignment made by the individual
members of SANDAMA. Respondent could have easily and naturally assumed
that the same figure assigned to SANDAMA was the same amount earmarked
for its legal services as indicated in their service contract. Being a non-stock,
non-profit corporation, where else would SANDAMA get the funds to pay for the
legal fees due to respondent and his firm but from the contribution of its
members.
- Lastly, respondent’s legal services were disengaged by SANDAMA’s new
President Yolanda Bautista around the same time when the SANDAMA
members abandoned and disauthorized former SANDAMA president Elfa, just
when the negotiations bore fruit. With all these circumstances, respondent,
rightly or wrongly, perceived that he was also about to be deprived of his lawful
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
compensation for the services he and his firm rendered to SANDAMA and its
members. With the prevailing attitude of the SANDAMA officers and members,
respondent saw the immediate need to protect his interests in the individual
properties of the landowners.
- The Court cannot hold respondent guilty of censurable conduct or practice PNB V UY TENG PIAO
VICKERS; 1932
justifying the penalty recommended. While filing the claim for attorney’s fees
(romy ramirez)
against the individual members may not be the proper remedy for respondent,
the Court believes that he instituted the same out of his honest belief that it was
NATURE
the best way to protect his interests. After all, SANDAMA procured his firm’s
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
services and was led to believe that he would be paid for the same. There is
evidence which tend to show that respondent and his firm rendered legal and
FACTS
even extra-legal services in order to assist the landowners get a favorable
- Defendant-appellant, Uy Teng Piao, was sued by PNB for non payment of
valuation of their properties. They facilitated the incorporation of the landowners
obligations at the CFI of Manila and said court rendered judgment in favor of
to expedite the negotiations between the owners, the appraisers, and
PNB on September 9, 1934 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest of seven
NAPOCOR. They sought the assistance of several political personalities to get
percent per annum from June 1, 1924. The court ordered the defendant
some leverage in their bargaining with NAPOCOR. Suddenly, just after
appellant to deposit the money due with the clerk of the court within three
concluding the compromise price with NAPOCOR and before the presentation of
months from the date of judgment. In case of failure to pay, the mortgage
the compromise agreement for the court’s approval, SANDAMA disengaged the
properties should be sold at auction in accordance with law and the proceeds to
services of respondent’s law firm.
be applied to the payment of the judgment.
- With the validity of its contract for services and its authority disputed, and
- The defendant failed to comply with the payment order and the properties
having rendered legal service for years without having received anything in
were auctioned by the sheriff of Manila for a total of P1,300 with PNB as the
return, and with the prospect of not getting any compensation for all the services
buyer.
it has rendered to SANDAMA and its members, respondent and his law firm
- On February 11, 1925, PNB secured from defendant a waiver of the latter’s
auspiciously moved to protect their interests. They may have been mistaken in
right to redeem one of the properties described as TCT no. 8274 and thereafter
the remedy they sought, but the mistake was made in good faith. Indeed, while
sold the same to one Mariano Santos for P8,600.
the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to
- The other property, TCT No. 7264 was likewise resold and the proceeds was
be duly compensated for professional services rendered. It is but natural that he
credited to the account of Uy. The total amount generated with the resale of the
protects his interest, most especially when his fee is on a contingent basis.
lots amonted to P 11, 300.
- Respondent was disengaged by SANDAMA after a compromise agreement
- On August 1, 1930, PNB instituted another court action for the recover of the
was entered into by the lot owners and NAPOCOR. Its motions for separate
balance of the judgment amounting to P11,574.38 with interest at seven
legal fees as well as for intervention were dismissed by the trial court. Presiding
percent per annum.
from the ultimate outcome of an independent action to recover attorney’s fees,
- The defendant claimed that in exchange for his waiver of his right to redeem
the Court does not see any obstacle to respondent filing such action against
the first property resold by PNB, the bank would not collect from him the
SANDAMA or any of its members.
balance of the judgment.
- The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty percent (40%)
- The CFI ruled that there was in fact a condonation made by the bank through
contingent fees does not make the contract illegal or unacceptable. Contingent
one of its officer, a certain Mr. Pecson.
fees are not per se prohibited by law. Its validity depends, in large measure,
- Hence this appeal
upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent fee under the
circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, when it is shown that a contract for a
ISSUES
contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon
1. WON PNB condoned the balance of the judgment
his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly
2. WON a lawyer can appear as both counsel and witness in the same case
excessive, the Court must, and will protect the aggrieved party.
Disposition WHEREFORE, this case is DISMISSED and considered
HELD
CLOSED. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines is enjoined to comply with the
1. No. There was no evidence presented except the uncertain testimony of the
procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in all cases involving the disbarment and
defendant, that the bank did in fact agree to the condonation. Even if the SC
discipline of attorneys.
grants that Mr. Pecson did agree to the condonation, there is not evidence
presented that Mr. Pecson was authorized by the bank through its board of
LEGAL PROFESSION
directors or persons authorized by the said board to bind the bank to the
agreement.
2. Yes (No). The SC held that the appearance of a lawyer as both counsel and
witness in a trial is not strictly prohibited. The SC however stated that it would
be preferable if the lawyer in this case can appear only as one or the other. In
other words, if they are to testify as required by the case, they should withdraw
from the active management of the case. This is embodied in Canon 19 of the
Code of Legal Ethics.
Disposition The decision of the CFI is reversed and the defendant is ordered to
pay PNB the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of seven
percent per annum to be reckoned from August 1, 1930. Costs for the
defendant.
NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC. VS. SANCHEZ
PER CURIAM; SEPTEMBER 30, 1987
(cha mendoza)
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer
such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. He, however,
prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually
spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mang. gagawa as Timog
Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-
five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of
Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor union.
- Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any
delay in the resolution of their cam is usually for causes beyond the control of
the Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role
as the guardian of the Constitution.
- To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood
the reason for the citation and that they win abide by their promise that said
incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a
written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on July 17,
1987

NATURE
ISSUE
Resolution
WON the respondents and Atty. Espinas should be held in direct contempt of
Court
FACTS
- During the period July 8-10, 1987, members of the respondent labor unions
HELD
(Union of Filipino Employees and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for
NO. Contempt charges dismissed.
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia) intensified the intermittent pickets
Ratio The respondents who are nonlawyers are not knowledgeable in her
they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as
of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in
the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any
front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress
attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either
from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They
right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional
constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and
protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of
littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper
justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising
hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with
them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of
slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of
record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did
loudspeakers.
his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture.
- These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices
It is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters
Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fenian as Chairmen of the Divisions where their
of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of
cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro
the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.
Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the
Reasoning The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full
demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt
force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the
of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the
Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it.
pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a
Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through
resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and
appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due
requiring the leaders of the respondent union leaders to appear before the Court
to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the
on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference
should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.
justice.
- On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared
- courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune
before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, apologizing for their
from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
actions described and assuring that the acts would not be repeated. Atty.
Espinas likewise manifested to the Court that he had explained to the picketers
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be in the 16th Regional Governors elections will automatically become the
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. EVP. The EVP will automatically succeed the President in the next term]
Disposition WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents  De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude. He was sanctioned by the
are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices
or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases during the deliberations on the aconstitutionality of the plunder law. He
shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts. also could have been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating
SO ORDERED. his client’s funds had he not surrendered his California license to practice
law.
IN RE DE VERA  De Vera actively campaigned for the position of Eastern Mindanao
TINGA; December 11, 2003
Governor during the IBP National Convention, a prohibited act under the
(joey capones)
IBP By-Laws
Respondent’s Comments
NATURE
 Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy: the election of the
Administrative case for disqualification
Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those
who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter
FACTS
 Petitioners have no legal standing because there is no disqualification in
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors was set on April 26, 2003, a
the by laws. Only election protests are provided for but only qualified
month prior to the IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003 in
nominees can file protest. Petitioners are not among qualified nominees.
compliance with IBP by laws. Later on, the outgoing IBP Board reset the
 An IBP member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter
elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention. Respondent
membership. It was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the
De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP
Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter that he transferred his IBP membership. It is
Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago,
unfair and unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer
President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a letterrequesting the IBP Board to
was done for convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the
reconsider its Resolution. Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1)
Eastern Mindanao governorship
IBP By Laws require the holding of the election of Regional Governors at least
 He denies exhibiting disrespect to the Court or to any of its members
one month prior to the national convention of the IBP to prevent it from being
during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law
politicized since post-convention elections may otherwise lure the candidates
 As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients
into engaging in unacceptable political practices, and; (2) holding the election
when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to
on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board from
surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot
resolving protests in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as
serve as basis for determining his moral qualification to run for the position
expressed in the IBP By Laws. Motion was denied. After the IBP national
as there is no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge
convention had been adjourned, Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel
 On the alleged politicking he committed during the IBP National
Ravanera and Tony Velez filed a Petition before the IBP Board seeking (1) the
Convention, he states that it is baseless to assume that he was
postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or third
campaigning simply because he declared that he had 10 votes to support
week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera “from
his candidacy for governorship in the Eastern Mindanao Region and that
being elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region.” IBP denied
the petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their claim that
petition stating that there was no compelling justification for the postponement of
he or his handlers had billeted the delegates from his region at the Century
the elections and that the petition for disqualification was premature. Petitioners
Park Hotel
filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as those
sought in their Petition before the IBP. The SC issued a TRO, directing the IBP
ISSUES
Board, its agents, representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to
1. WON this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy
cease and desist from proceeding with the election for the IBP Regional
2. WON petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the
Governor in Eastern Mindanao.
determination of which in turn requires the resolution of two sub-issues, namely:
Petitioner’s Claim
a. WON the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper remedy
 De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay, Paranaque,
under the IBP By-Laws
Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter
b. WON the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;
because he coveted the IBP presidency. [Following the rotation rule,
3. WON the present Petition is premature
whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region
LEGAL PROFESSION
4. Assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition
is not premature, WON respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of
the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region
HELD
1. Ratio As there exists a clear constitutional grant of power to the SC to
promulgate rules affecting the IBP, the SC has jurisdiction over the present
controversy.
Reasoning Sec. 5, Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution confers power to SC to
supervise all activities of the IBP. The IBP by-laws also recognize the full range
of the power of supervision of the SC over the IBP.
2A. Ratio Since the IBP By-laws do not provide for disqualification of
candidates for IBP governor, petition to disqualify is not the proper remedy.
Reasoning Petition has no firm ground to stand on. Changes previously
adopted by the Court simplified the election process and made it less
controversial. The grounds for disqualification were thus removed in the present
by-laws.
2B. Ratio With the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the
present petition, petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit.
Reasoning As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can file with
the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds therefore.
only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to
be nominated and elected at the election for the 16th Regional Governor of
Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in the
aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from
Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from
the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the petitioners are not even
qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election.
3. Ratio Petition to seek disqualification of a person is premature when the
person has not yet even been nominated.
Reasoning Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first
for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the
post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members
of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming
that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the
nomination.
4. Ratio As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided
in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred.
Reasoning The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected governor
for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good standing of the IBP, 2)
he is included in the voter’s list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by the
Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the
Chapter to which he belongs, (3) he does not belong to a chapter from which a
regional governor has already been elected, unless the election is the start of a
new season or cycle, and (4) he is not in the government service. With regards
to his transfer of membership the same is valid having been made 17 months
prior election, The only condition required under the rules is that the transfer
must be made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer. There is nothing in the By-Laws
which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP
governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a
candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of
Delegates. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving
lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense
which involves moral turpitude. The contempt ruling cannot serve as a basis to
consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of
indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude (“an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule
of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals.”) On the administrative complaint in California, no
final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty
of the charge. On the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had
housed the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get
their support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to
substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of
Court
Disposition Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for
the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the
IBP Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued by this Court on 30 May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the
election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED.
PEREZ V ESTRADA
VITUG; June 29, 2001
(glaisa po)
FACTS
- KBP, an association representing duly franchised and authorized television
and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting this Court to
allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other
criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the
proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history."
- The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter to the Chief
Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo
Romulo.
- The Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant
petition; public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in
mind the right of the public to vital information affecting the nation.
- In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991
resolution of this Court in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon C.
Aquino: “Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to
prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last
analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHlBIT live
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court - The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great
hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated." dimensions so involving as they do a former President of the Republic. It is
undeniable that these cases have twice become the nation's focal points in the
ISSUE two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the
WON live radio and television coverage of the trial of the plunder and other events has left a still divided nation.
criminal cases filed against Pres. Estrada should be allowed - The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to turn a blind eye to
yet another possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now
HELD creep into even the business of the courts in the dispensation of justice under a
- NO. The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the rule of law. At the very least, a change in the standing rule of the court
weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be propitious.
right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the
accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to MAGLASANG V PEOPLE
PER CURIAM; November 4, 1990
control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.
(boots tirol)
- Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor
NATURE
made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are
Resolution of the Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of the San Carlos
induced not by any outside force or influence 10 but only by evidence and
City Court
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded.
FACTS
- An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
- a petition for certiorari entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance.
Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court)
A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
Negros Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the SC. Due to
condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of
noncompliance with the requirements, specifically the nonpayment of the legal
long ago.
fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true
- A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the
copies of the questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge, the SC
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
dismissed the petition.
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
-On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the
- The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and
petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition.
the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to
This time, the amount of P316.50 was remitted and the Court was furnished
provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the
with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision, and also the IBP O.R.
proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process
No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for
in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still
reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of
the paramount right of the accused to due process17 which must never be
the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion
allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.
for reconsideration was denied with finality.
- The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 Apri1 2001,
- On January 22, 1990 the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a
expressed its own concern on the live television and radio coverage of the
strongly-worded complaint filed with the Office of the President of the
criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television and radio coverage
Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty.
can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to
Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second
assure a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of
Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust
the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system, and
judgments or resolution."
live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the "hooting throng" to
- Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished
arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that
for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct by reason of the
the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular; and live television and
strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the
radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but will only
Office of the President, which has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more,
pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
remove, Justices of the Supreme Court.
- Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do
-On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed his "Opposition." In his
not allow live television and radio coverage of their proceedings.
"Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive
criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices
LEGAL PROFESSION
of the Justices concerned. Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and
jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause
inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as
Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to give such order." Thus,
according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of the law
and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will not
be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao."
ISSUE
WON Atty Castellano is guilty of improper conduct and be punished for
contempt
HELD
YES.
In filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division with
the Office of the President, even the most basic tenet of our government
system-the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the
legislative branches-has been lost on Atty. Castellano. The Supreme Court is
supreme-the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the
judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and
private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare
them 'unjust.' Not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may
pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.
-Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism
intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the
Justices" is but an effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible
accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has
no jurisdiction to question his act of having complained before the Office of the
President, and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a weapon by judges
and justices against practicing lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he
was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Atty. Castellano's complaint is a
vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the
Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.
Disposition Atty. Castellano found guilty of improper conduct and contempt of
court and fined P1,000.00 and suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months
HORNILLA V SALUNAT
SANTIAGO; July 1, 2003
(dahls salamat)
FACTS
-Complainant : Benedicto Hornilla, Atty. FedericoRicafort (members of PPSTA)
-Respondent : Atty. Erneto Salunat (member of ASSA Law Firm-> Retained
counsel of Philippine Public School Teachers Association)
-Complainants filed an intracorpoate case against members of the Board of
Directors for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 for unlawful spending and
undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA.
-Respondent appeared as counsel for PPSTA Board Members in the said case.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
-Respondent in PPSTS v 1992-1995 Board of Directors of PPSTA, appeared
as counsel for respondent despite being part of ASSA Law Firm the retained
counsel of PPSTA
Petitioner’s Claim
-respondent is guilty of conflict of interest because he was engaged by PPSTA
and was being paid out of its corporate funds to which they have contributed.
-respondent violated rule 15.06 of the code of professional responsibility when
he assured PPSTA Board Members in a meeting that he will win the PPSTA
case
Respondent’s Comment
-He entered his appearance as counsel or the PPSTA Board members for and
in behalf of ASSA Law and Associates.
-His relationship with Aurelio Salunat is immaterial
-He denies assuring victory of the PPSTA Board in the case but merely assured
them the truth will come out.
-Averred by way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that
Atty. Ricafort himself was guilty of gross violation of his oath amounting to gross
misconduct ,malpractice and unethical conduct for filing trumped up charges
against him, and prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed and
complainant be disciplined or disbarred.
IBP Commission on Bar and Discipline recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six months. Board of Governors
approved the report and recommendation.
ISSUE
WON a lawyer engaged by a corporation can defend members of the board of
the same corporation in a derivative suit
HELD
No. A Lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members
of the same corporation’s board of directors in a derivative suit brought against
them. To do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests which
is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
-Pertinent rule of the CPR: Rule 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.
-There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties.
-TESTS FOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST:
1. WON in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for a issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for another client.
2. Whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.
LEGAL PROFESSION
Derivative suit: Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust
either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation is
unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a stockholder may sue
on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation
and indirectly to the stockholders.
-Respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests and was
ADMONISHED to observe higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his
profession.
ILUSORIO V LOKIN,JR.
CARPIO MORALES; December 14, 2005
(apple maramba)
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors
FACTS
On July 15, 1991, Potenciano Ilusorio, engaged the services of the law office of
Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin to represent him in the
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0009, of which Ilusorio was one of the
defendants
-In that civil case, the Republic was claiming shareholdings in Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) 99% of the shares of
which appeared to be owned by POTC. Atty Luis Lokin, Jr., together with
Attorneys Demaree Raval and Salvador Hizon, actively handled the case for
Ilusorio
-While the case was pending, Ilusorio, with the assistance of the law firm of
Raval and Lokin (successor to Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin),
entered into a Compromise Agreement with the Republic, where it was settled
that the Republic was to get 4,727 POTC shares while Ilusorio was to get 673
POTC shares.
-During the special stockholders’ meeting of PHILCOMSAT held on August 27,
1998, which was supposed to be a mere informal gathering to introduce the
newly appointed government nominees for PHILCOMSAT to the private
stockholders of POTC, the gathering, through the “high-handed and
deceitful maneuvers” of respondent, was suddenly and without notice
transformed into a Special Stockholders Meeting at which directors and officers
of PHILCOMSAT were elected.
-Ilusorio then contested the validity of the meeting by filing before the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) a complaint, against Manuel Nieto, et al.
who were purportedly elected directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT, in which
SEC case respondent Lokin, Jr. appeared as the counsel of Nieto, et al.,
contrary to his oath not to represent conflicting interests.
-However, on account of the death of Ilusorio and the failure of his children,
namely, Maximo Ilusorio, Sylvia Ilusorio, and Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner (herein
petitioner), to establish their qualification to substitute for him, his complaint was
dismissed
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
-Petitioner filed a new complaint against respondent
-After hearing both parties, IBP Investigating Commissioner San Juan found
merit in petitioner’s complaint and recommended that respondent be suspended
for three months.
-The IBP Board of Governors set aside the recommendation of Commissioner
San Juan and dismissed the complaint
-No copy of the notice of resolution was served upon petitioner. Petitioner,
nonetheless, learned about the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and
the setting aside thereof by the Board of Governors
- On March 10, 2004 petitioner wrote a letter to the Board in her own name
requesting “that the Board take up the matter once more” and asking for “the
remanding of the case against Atty. Luis Lokin to the Board of Governors.”
- By letter of April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors said that it “constrained to
deny [petitioner’s] request for a remanding or a reconsideration of the case” as
there was no provision for a reconsideration of any such case either in Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court or in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Bar Discipline.
-Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Samuel Divina, then wrote a letter of July 19,
2004 to Atty. Jose Anselmo Cadiz, Chairman of the IBP Board of Governors
and concurrently National President of the IBP, informing him that petitioner had
not been notified of any final action on her complaint
- Replying, the Board Chairman, by letter dated August 11, 2004, stated that
the Board could no longer act on petitioner’s July 19, 2004 letter, otherwise it
would, in effect, be considering the letter as a motion for reconsideration which
is not provided for by the rules of procedure for cases of the kind.
- Petitioner thus filed the present petition on September 2, 2004
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the petition was filed within the 15-day reglamentary period
2. WON the case should be dismissed for being inappropriate and improper, it
being based not on a resolution of the IBP Board
3. WON personal knowledge of the petitioner of the facts alleged in the
complaint is required to pursue the complaint
Substantive
WON the respondent is guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
HELD
Procedural
Reasoning
1. Respondent contends that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period, as petitioner should be deemed to have received notice of
the challenged IBP resolution, not on August 17, 2004 when her counsel
received the August 11, 2004 letter of the IBP Board Chairman, but on March
10, 2004 when she wrote the Board admitting having acquired knowledge of
the reversal of Commissioner San Juan’s recommendation. Hence, respondent
claims, petitioner had only until March 25, 2004 to file a petition for review.
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which states: Sandiganbayan of the disputed shares. It would in fact affirm the ownership by
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction the Petitioners of the said shares subject of the Sandiganbayan case. This
imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, Petition is a premature action to enforce the Compromise Agreement entered
reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing into by Mr. Ilusorio. Clearly, this is beyond the jurisdiction of this Honorable
such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of Commission. Any right to be derived from the Compromise Agreement is
the complaint or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen clearly inchoate at this point in time.”
(15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders -Plainly, when respondent represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was
otherwise. advocating an interest hostile to the implementation of the same Compromise
- The notice of resolution referred to in said paragraph (c) refers not to an Agreement that he had priorly negotiated for Ilusorio
unofficial information that may be gathered by the parties, nor to any letter from Disposition The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated February 27,
the IBP Board Chairman or even of the Board, but to the official notice of 2004 is SET ASIDE. Respondent Luis K. Lokin, Jr. is found guilty of violating
resolution that is supposed to be issued by the Board, copy of which is given to Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
all parties and transmitted to this Court. SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Three (3) Months, with
- Respondent IBP admits that no such notice has been sent to petitioner WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
- Since no notice has been sent to petitioner, at least at the time this petition more severely.
was filed, as the August 11, 2004 letter from the IBP Board Chairman cannot
be deemed a notice of resolution, the present petition has been timely filed. GONZALES V CABUCANA, JR.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; 2006
2. While, generally, a party who desires to appeal from the IBP’s dismissal of a
(ice baguilat)
disciplinary case should await the notice of resolution, it bears noting in this
instance that the Board, despite issuing a resolution on the subject complaint on
NATURE
February 27, 2004, failed to send a notice of resolution to petitioner.
Administrative Case
-The IBP has given no reason for the delay other than the nebulous explanation
that records were still being completed.
FACTS
-In view thereof, petitioner, who had already confirmed that her complaint was
Gonzales being counseled by the law firm Cabucana, Cabucana, De Guzman
dismissed through a letter coming from the IBP Board Chairman, cannot be
and Cabucana Law Office, filed a civil case that was awarded to them in a
faulted for appealing to this Court notwithstanding the absence of an official
judicial ruling and asked Gatcheco to execute such however Gatcheco failed to
notice of resolution
do so and Gonzales filed a complaint. Gatcheco harassed Gonzales and
3. Section 1, Rule 139-B states:
subsequently Gonzales filed a criminal case. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.,
SECTION 1. How instituted. – Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or
represented Gatcheco. Gonzales filed an administrative case saying that
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by
Cabucana violated the lawyer-client relationship due to conflict of interest.
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any
person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of
ISSUE
and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of
WON there is a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for conflict
the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said
of interest
facts.
-Personal knowledge is not a requisite for filing a disbarment complaint. Clearly,
HELD
personal knowledge is required, not of the complainant, but of her witnesses, if
Yes, the rule is that the lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests
there are any.
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
Substantive
facts. Even the fact of appearing to be treacherous and double-dealing is
Reasoning
discouraged because people are expected to entrust their secrets to their
Respondent denies representing conflicting interests on the ground that SB
lawyers. Acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the
Case No. 009 and SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 are totally distinct from each
lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
other
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.
-Nowhere is the conflict of interest clearer than in respondent’s Memorandum
Although the firm was the one who represented the civil case the person is still
dated September 28, 1998 filed with the SEC wherein he argued in behalf of
in representation of the firm. It at the least invite suspicion of double-dealing.
Nieto, et al. as follows:
It is however mitigated by the fact that the case was done in good faith and with
“A continued exercise of jurisdiction and a subsequent disposition of the instant
no malice as supported by the findings of IBP Commissioner Reyes and
Petition by this Honorable Commission would pre-empt the resolution by the
Gonzales move of withdrawing the case.
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
Disposition Respondent fined and given a stern warning Petition for certiorari

DE GUZMAN V DE DIOS FACTS

PARDO; January 26, 2001
- This is an offshoot of the complaint before the Sandiganbayan through the
(athe odi)
PCGG against Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth
including shares of stocks in certain corporations.
NATURE
- ACCRA Law Firm performs legal svcs incl. organization and acquisition of
Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. De Dios on the ground of violation of
business associations/orgs. Sometimes, members of the firm act as
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
incorporators or stockholders. They acquire info relative to assets of clients and
representing conflicting interests.
their personal/biz circumstances. In this case, ACCRA lawyers acted as
nominees-stockholders of said corps involved in sequestration proceedings.
FACTS
- PCGG filed Third Amended Complaint w/c excluded pvt respondent Raul
- De Guzman sought the assistance of Atty De Dios in forming a corporation
Roco bec he promised to reveal identity of principal/s for whom he acted as
engaged in hotel and restaurant business. They were able to have Suzuki
nominee-stockholder
Beach Hotel Incorporated (SBHI) registered with the Securities and Exchange
- ACCRA lawyers said it was in furtherance of legit lawyering and they became
Commission. Atty. De Dios was retained by De Guzman.
holders of shares of stock only as incorporating or acquiring stockholders, and
- De Guzman was the majority stockholder. She subscribed to 29,800 shares,
as such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in said shares.
she paid up P745,000.00 during the stage of incorporation. However, the
- Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who separated fr ACCRA, filed a separate
remaining 22,250 shares amounting to P2,235,000.00 was left unpaid.
answer.
- The corporation, upon the advice of Atty. De Dios required De Guzman to pay
- ACCRA lawyers filed a counter-motion that PCGG also exclude them as
the unliquidated shares. Later, they were auctioned and acquired by Ramon del
parties-defendant as it did to Roco. PCGG set conditions for exclusion of the
Rosario, one of the incorporators of SBHI. Because of this, De Guzman was
petitioners:
ousted from the corporation completely. While Atty. De Dios rose to be the
- disclosure of identity of clients
president of the corporation.
- submission of docs substantiating lawyer-client relationship
- In defense, Atty. De Dios argued that she represents the corporation, not De
- submission of deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its
Guzman in her personal capacity. Moreover, what she did was for the best
clients covering their respective shareholdings.
interest of the corporation, which was on the verge of bankruptcy then.
- PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco of the
said conditions.
ISSUE
- Sandiganbayan denied exclusion of petitioners fr the PCGG case. That
WON Atty. De Dios is guilty of representing conflicting interest.
denial is now being questioned.

HELD
ISSUES
Yes.
1. WON lawyer-client confidentiality applies in this case
Reasoning
2. WON Roco and the ACCRA lawyers are similarly situated, thus, making the
1. Granting that the sale of her delinquent shares was valid, De Guzman still
denial of the ACCRA lawyers’ exclusion from the PCGG case a violation of
has original shares of P745,00.00, enough for her not to be ousted from the
equal protection clause.
corporation.
2. There was an atty-client relationship between De Dios and De Guzman. The
HELD
latter was the one who retained her as counsel not the corporation.
1. Yes
3. There was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and
- PCGG is not really after the petitioners but the “bigger fish”. This is clear fr
respondent. De Dios became the president – a clear case of conflict of
the PCGG’s willingness to cut a deal w/ petitioners – the names of clients in
interest of the respondent.
exchange for exclusion fr complaint.
Disposition Atty. De Dios was SUSPENDED for 6 months.
- Lawyer-client relationship is based on contract of lease of svcs and contract
of agency. But it is more than relationship of principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
REGALA V SANDIGANBAYAN
KAPUNAN; September 20, 1996 An atty possesses special powers of trust given by client. He also occupies

(chris capul) quasi-judicial ofc since he is an officer of the court.

- Old Code of Civil Procedure forbids counsel w/o authority of client to reveal
communication or advise given in course of professional employment. This was
NATURE
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
passed on into the Rules of Court. ACCRA lawyers on basis of classification w/c made substantial distinctions
- Canon 17 of Code of Professional Responsibility says that a lawyer owes based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist.
fidelity to cause of his client. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics RESOLUTIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ARE ANNULLED AND SET
also speaks of the devotion of a lawyer to the interest of the client. ASIDE.
- The right to counsel of an accused is also involved in this issue. If client
were made to choose bet legal representation w/o effective communication and SEPARATE OPINION
disclosure and legal representation w/ all his secrets revealed then he might be
compelled to stay away fr judicial system or lose right to counsel. VITUG
- GENERAL RULE: - I find it unreasonable for Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach the
- Court has right to know that client whose privileged info is sought to be trust reposed on them and succumb to a thinly disguised threat of incrimination.
protected is flesh and blood.
- Privilege exists only after atty-client relationship has been established. DAVIDE [dissent]
- The prerogative to determine who shall be made defendants in a civil case is
It does not attach until there is a client.
initially vested in plaintiff (PCGG in this case). There has been an
- Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of the relationship.
agreement/compromise settlement bet PCGG and Roco. If Roco’s revelation
- Due process requires that the opposing party should, as a general rule,
violated confidentiality of lawyer-client, he would be solely answerable to his
know his adversary.
principals/clients and probably to the Court.
- For ACCRA lawyers to be excluded, they must perform certain obligations as
- EXCEPTIONS
Roco did.
- Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
- Confidentiality is not a cause to exclude a party. It is merely a ground for
revealing client’s name would implicate that client in the very activity for
disqualification of a witness and may be invoked at an appropriate time. None
w/c he sought the lawyer’s advice.
of the lawyers in this case is being required to testify.
- It is also privileged where disclosure would open the client to civil
- State has right to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
liability.
officials/employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees.
- It is also privileged when govt’s lawyers have no case against an atty’s
- Rules of Court requires that complaint be against all persons who appear to
client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish
be responsible.
the only link that would be necessary to convict an individual of a crime.
- Privilege does not extend to further criminal conduct.
- Apart fr the exceptions above, other situations could qualify as exceptions.
- Disclosure of client’s identity is necessary proof of existence of lawyer-client
Info relating to the identity of client may fall w/in privilege when client’s name
relationship and is not privileged info.
itself has independent significance such that disclosure would reveal client
confidence.
PUNO [dissent]
- The instant case FALLS UNDER AT LEAST 2 EXCEPTIONS. First,
- Person claiming atty-client privilege must present underlying facts. Without
disclosure would lead to establish the client’s connection w/ the very fact in
proofs, Court has no factual basis to determine whether petitioners fall w/in
issue. Also, the link bet the offense and the legal advice/svc was duly
exception to the general rule.
established by no less than the PCGG itself. Petitioners have a legitimate fear
that identifying their clients would implicate them. Revelation of the name would
provide the link for prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.
- It is diff when the client consults atty for illicit purposes, seeking advice on
how to around the law. In this case, a client thinks he might have previously PEOPLE V SANDIGANBAYAN
REGALADO; July 16, 1997
committed something illegal and consults atty abt it.
(aida villanueva)
- Court is trying to avoid fishing expedition by the prosecution. After all, there
are alternative sources of info available to prosecutor w/c does not depend on
NATURE
utilizing a defendant’s counsel as convenient and readily available source of
Special civil action in the SC
info.
- Lawyer-client confidentiality and loyalty exists not only during relationship but
FACTS
even after termination of the relationship.
- The annulment of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan is being sought, with the
2. Yes
Sandiganbayan denying the motion to utilize Atty. Sansaet as state witness.
- Respondents failed to show that Roco actually revealed the identity of his
clients. PCGG shld show that Roco was treated as a species apart fr the
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Honrada was a clerk of court in a municipality in Agusan del Sur. Paredes
was the provincial attorney of Agusan del Sur who later became governor and
congressman.
- Sansaet was a lawyer who served as counsel for Parades in several instances
petinent to the criminal charges involved in the present recourse.
- 1976 – Paredes applied for a free patent over a piece of land.
application was approved and a title was issued to him.
- 1985 – Director of Lands cancelled the patent of Paredes, saying that the
land had already been designated and reserved as a school site.
- It was also discovered that Paredes got the lot through fraudulent means.
- An information for perjury was filed against Paredes. Another allegation was
that he had used his position to get what he wanted. Sansaet was still
Paredes’ counsel.
- Gelacio, a taxpayer, wrote the Ombudsman and asked for the investigation of
Sansaet, Honrada and Paredes. According to him, he conspired with the other
two.
ISSUES
1. WON projected testimony of Sansaet is barred by the atty-client relationship
2. WON Sansaet qualified as particeps criminis (accomplice to the crime) for
discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to testify for the State
HELD
1. NO
Ratio If a client seeks his lawyers’ advice with respect to a crime he
committed, it is given the virtual confessional seal. This does not apply to a
crime which a client intends to commit.
Reasoning A distinction must be made between confidential communications
relating to past crimes already crimes and future crimes intended to be
committed.
- The period is the date when the privileged communication was made by the
client to the attorney.
- Paredes was planning to commit the crime of falsification.
- But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to
be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the
client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with
respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future.
- The testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the
communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of
Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the
documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated
in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan
- Sansaet himself was a conspirator and it is settled that for the atty-client
privilege to apply in communication, it must be for a lawful purpose.
existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the attachment of the privilege.
2. YES
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Ratio Despite his involvement in the crime, Sansaet fulfills all the requirements
needed for his discharge as state witness.
Reasoning Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification and in a
conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. One of the requirements for state
witness is that he does not appear to be the most guilty (not that he is the least
His guilty as to what has been erroneously interpreted in some instances).
- It is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant
consideration and warrants an imposition of the same penalty.
- In the case of People v Ocemar: “ And by ‘most guilty’ we mean the highest
degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense
and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed . While all the accused
may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be
considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in the
perpetration of the offense.
- The other requisites for the discharge of Sansaet as state witness are present.
- Sansaet is the only cooperative witness to the actual commission of the
crime of falsification.
- There is absolute necessity for Sansaet’s testimony because the
prosecution has no direct evidence available.
- He does not appear to be the most guilty.
- His testimony can be corroborated by reputable witnesses.
- Sansaet has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
CASTILLO V SANDIGANBAYAN
BUENA; February 21, 2002
(jojo mendoza)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
FACTS
On July 23, 1987, the Republic of the Philipines Filed with the Sandiganbayan
a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages
against several persons, one of which is petitioner. The complaint alleges that-
defendant Gregorio Castilo acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent of
defendants Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, et al in establishing Hotel
Properties, Inc. in order to acquire beneficial interest and control, and conceal
ownership, of Silahis Hotel; defendant Gregorio Castillo signed all pertinent
documents as attorney-in-fact of the defendants Enriquezes and Panlilio.
- On October 1992, petitioner died.
- On October 15, 1996, petitioner, represented by his heirs, filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the complaint against him is violative of the lawyer-
client confidentiality privilege and must be dismissed pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Regala v Sandiganbayan.
- On November 26, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to dismiss.
The
Respondent contends that the ruling in Regala does not apply to the present
case, because in said case, there was a clear finding that the ACCRA lawyers
were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the
identity of their clients as shown by PCGG’s willingness to cut a deal with the
LEGAL PROFESSION
ACCRA lawyers – the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the
complaint. In this case, the petitioner is being sued as a principal defendant for
being in conspiracy with other defendants in the commission of the acts
complained of and he is not being required to name his clients.
ISSUE
WON petitioner’s inclusion in the complaint violates the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege
HELD
YES. While it is true that unlike in Regala, petitioner in not being required to
name his clients, the case of Regala is still applicable in the present case
because the two cases are the same in more important aspects.
- The fact of the lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and defendants
Enriquezes and Panlilios was immediately raised by petitioner as one of his
affirmative defenses. In the same vein, in Regala, the professional relationship
was raised merely as a defense by defendant lawyers and was not yet proven
during the trial. This not withstanding, the court struck out the complaint against
the lawyers.
- Similar to the petitioners in Regala, petitioner is not a mere witness. He is a
co-principal in the case for recovery of ill-gotten wealth. He has made his
position clear from the very beginning that he is not willing to testify and he
cannot be compelled to testify in view of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination and of his fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege
of attorney-client confidentiality.
- Since the doctrine of adherence to judicial precedents or stare decisis is
provided in Art. 8 of the Civil Code, Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude
petitioner Gregorio Castillo as party defendant in the case RP v Enriquez.
DALISAY V MAURICIO
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; January 23, 2006
(bry san juan)
NATURE
Motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding Atty.
Melanio “Batas” Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross
misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months.
FACTS
- On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged
respondent’s services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled “ Lucio De
Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent,” pending
before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal.
Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorney’s fees in the total amount
of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services
for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and
demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent refused.
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- On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that
“for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action
had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent.” She
recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount of
P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be
dismissed. On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVI-2004-121, adopting and approving in toto Commissioner
Navarro’s Report and Recommendation. On April 22, 2005, we rendered the
assailed Decision. Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went
to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No.
00-044. There, he learned of the trial court’s Decision dated December 6,
2001 holding that “the tax declarations and title” submitted by complainant “are
not official records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed.”
Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against complainant
charging her with violations of Article 171 and 172 and/or Article 182 of the
Revised Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence.
- In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments.
First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No.
00-044. She hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition
for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree. Second,
Civil Case No. 00-044 was “considered submitted for decision” as early as
August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date
he was engaged as counsel, hence, “he could not have done anything
anymore” about it. Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents
related to the case, preventing him from doing his job. And fourth, complainant
offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file
falsification cases against her.
- In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that:: (1) respondent
violated the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he
filed falsification charges against her; (2) respondent should have returned her
money; (3) respondent should have verified the authenticity of her documents
earlier if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return
her money despite this Court’s directive constitutes contempt.
ISSUE
WON respondent lawyer should be disciplined for failing to render services
despite payment of his client
HELD
YES. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or
advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right
to decline employment. But once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-
client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s
cause. From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted devotion.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of
P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-
044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the performance of his duties.
As we have ruled earlier, “there is nothing in the records to show
that he (respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of record for
complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044.” Neither is there any evidence nor
pleading submitted to show that he initiated new petitions.
- Undoubtedly, respondent’s present version is a flagrant departure from his
previous pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party should decide early
what version he is going to advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of
the proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural
rules, but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process.
The present administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of
respondent’s previous admission that complainant engaged his legal services in
Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now unbind himself from such admission
and its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has been achieved by
respondent’s inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to this Court.
- At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged
respondent’s services in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case
No. 00-044, still, his liability is unmistakable. There is nothing in the records
to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that,
in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In
Pariñas v. Paguinto,[10] we held that “a lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the
case must immediately be returned to the client on demand.” Per records,
complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the
money.
- Neither do we find merit in respondent’s second argument. The fact that Civil
Case No. 00-044 was already “submitted for decision” does not justify his
inaction. After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and
foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple task.
He should have returned complainant’s money. Surely, he cannot expect to
be paid for doing nothing.
- In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting
the blame to complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with
documents vital to the case. This is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a
case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the
requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. As a lawyer,
respondent knew where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter
of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the
authenticity of complainant’s title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not
take any action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is
tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue
advantage of his client.
- Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of
complainant. In his fourth argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified
documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file
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falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal
services to complainant. Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified
documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to
exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines the
procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal
proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon
specifically provides:
Rule 19.02 – A lawyer who has received information that
his clients has, in the course of the representation,
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall
promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and
failing which he shall terminate the relationship with
such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
- As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he
should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent
representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship
with her.
Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is
because there is no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to
complainant because she falsified the documentary evidence in Civil Case
No.00-044. This brings us to the second reason why we cannot sustain his
fourth argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged
falsification long after complainant had terminated their attorney-client
relationship. It was a result of his active search for a justification of his
negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044.
In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or her
retainer. It gives rise to a relationship between an attorney and a client that is
highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential
character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to
the bar, and to the public.
DEE V COURT OF APPEALS
REGALADO; August 24, 1983
(lora alamin)
NATURE
Petition for a writ of certiorari to overturn Court of Appeals’ resolution, dated
February 12, 1987, reinstating the decision of May 9, 1986.
FACTS
- Petitioner and his father went to the residence of private respondent,
accompanied by the latter's cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of
the alleged indebtedness of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar's
Palace, a well-known gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A.
Petitioner's father was apprehensive over the safety of his son, Dewey, having
LEGAL PROFESSION
heard of a link between the mafia and Caesar's Palace and the possibility that
his son may be harmed at the instance of the latter.
- Private respondent assured petitioner and his father that he would inquire into
the matter, after which his services were reportedly contracted for
P100,000.00. From his residence, private respondent called up Caesar's
Palace and, thereafter, several long distance telephone calls and two trips to
Las Vegas by him elicited the information that Dewey Dee's outstanding account
was around $1,000,000.00. Further investigations, however, revealed that
said account had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey Dee merely
signing for the chits.
- In June, 1981, private respondent personally talked with the president of
Caesar's Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He advised the president that for the
sake and in the interest of the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy
answer for the indebtedness. The president told him that if he could convince
Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would be exculpated from
liability for the account. Upon private respondent's return to Manila, he conferred
with Ramon Sy and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness.
- In August, 1981, private respondent brought to Caesar's Palace the letter of
Ramon Sy owning the debt and asking for a discount. Thereafter, the account of
Dewey Dee was cleared and the casino never bothered him.
- Having thus settled the account of petitioner's brother, private respondent
sent several demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Petitioner, however, ignored said letters.
Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for the collection of
attorney's fees and refund of transport fare and other expenses.
- Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally engaged his services for a
fee of P100,000.00 and that the services he rendered were professional
services which a lawyer renders to a client.
- Petitioner, however, denied the existence of any professional relationship of
attorney and client between him and private respondent. He admits that he and
his father visited private respondent for advice on the matter of Dewey Dee's
gambling account. However, he insists that such visit was merely an informal
one and that private respondent had not been specifically contracted to handle
the problem. On the contrary, respondent Mutuc had allegedly volunteered his
services "as a friend of defendant's family" to see what he could do about the
situation. As for the P50,000.00 inceptively given to private respondent,
petitioner claims that it was not in the nature of attorney's fees but merely
"pocket money" solicited by the former for his trips to Las Vegas and the said
amount of P50,000.00 was already sufficient remuneraion for his strictly
voluntary services.
- After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering herein petitioner to pay
private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 with interest thereon.
- On appeal, said judgment was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate
Court on May 9, 1986.
- Petitioner, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the Appellate
Court overlooked two important and decisive factors, to wit: (1) At the time
private respondent was ostensibly rendering services to petitioner and his father,
he was actually working "in the interest" and "to the advantage" of Caesar's
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Palace of which he was an agent and a consultant, hence the interests of the
casino and private respondent were united in their objective to collect from the
debtor; and (2) Private respondent is not justified in claiming that he rendered
legal services to petitioner and his father in view of the conflicting interests
involved.
- In its resolution of July 31, 1986, respondent court reconsidered its decision
and held that the sum of P50,000.00 already paid by petitioner to private
respondent was commensurate to the services he rendered, considering that at
the time he was acting as counsel for petitioner he was also acting as the
collecting agent and consultant of, and receiving compensation from, Caesar's
Palace.
- However, upon a motion for reconsideration thereafter filed by private
respondent, the present respondent Court of Appeals issued another resolution,
dated February 12, 1987, reinstating the aforesaid decision of May 9, 1986.
ISSUE
WON there was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and private
respondent
HELD
YES. Both the lower court and the appellate court concur in their findings that
there was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and private respondent
Mutuc. The Court found no reason to interfere with the factual finding. There
may be instances when there is doubt as to whether an attorney-client
relationship has been created. The issue may be raised in the trial court, but
once the trial court and the Court of Appeals have found that there was such a
relationship the Supreme Court cannot disturb such finding of fact, absent
cogent reasons therefor.
Ratio The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there
was a professional relationship which merits attorney's fees for professional
services rendered. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish
the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is
sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of
the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his
client in pursuance of a request from the latter.
Reasoning There is no question that professional services were actually
rendered by private respondent to petitioner and his family. Through his efforts,
the account of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, with Caesars Palace was
assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his family were further freed from the
apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by the so-called
mafia. For such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to receive a
reasonable compensation and this right cannot be occluded by petitioner's
pretension that at the time private respondent rendered such services to
petitioner and his family, the former was also the Philippine consultant of
Caesar's Palace.
- On the first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the services of
respondent Mutuc were engaged by the petitioner for the purposes hereinbefore
LEGAL PROFESSION
discussed. The previous partial payments totaling P50,000.00 made by
petitioner to respondent Mutuc and the tenor of the demand letters sent by said
private respondent to petitioner, the receipt thereof being acknowledged by
petitioner, ineluctably prove three facts, viz: that petitioner hired the services of
private respondent Mutuc; that there was a prior agreement as to the amount of
attorney's fees to be given to the latter; and there was still a balance due and
payable on said fees.
- On the second objection, aside from the facts stated in the resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals, it is also not completely accurate to judge private
respondent's position by petitioner's assumption that the interests of Caesar's
Palace were adverse to those of Dewey Dee. True, the casino was a creditor
but that fact was not contested or opposed by Dewey Dee, since the latter, as
verifications revealed, was not the debtor. Hence, private respondent's
representations in behalf of petitioner were not in resistance to the casino's
claim but were actually geared toward proving that fact by establishing the
liability of the true debtor, Ramon Sy, from whom payment was ultimately and
correctly exacted.
- Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained, private
respondent's role therein was not ethically or legally indefensible. Generally, an
attorney is prohibited from representing parties with contending positions.
However, at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches the court, a
lawyer may represent conflicting interests with the consent of the parties. A
common representation may work to the advantage of said parties since a
mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially cognizant of the
parties' disparate positions, may well be better situated to work out an
acceptable settlement of their differences, being free of partisan inclinations
and acting with the cooperation and confidence of said parties.
- Even indulging petitioner in his theory that private respondent was during the
period in question an agent of Caesar's Palace, petitioner was not unaware
thereof, hence he actually consented to and cannot now decry the dual
representation that he postulates. A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the
just and reasonable compensation for services rendered at the special instance
and request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good faith trying
to serve and represent the interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his
just feeds.
Disposition The resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated February 12,
1987, reinstating its original decision of May 9, 1986 was AFFIRMED, with
costs against petitioner.
NAKPIL V VALDES
PUNO; March 4, 1998
(marge alias)
NATURE
-Administrative case in the SC. Misconduct.
-This case involves the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his
accounting profession and law practice in connection with the property of his
client.
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FACTS
-1965: Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in
Moran Street, Baguio City. For lack of funds, he requested long time friend
(family business consultant, lawyer and accountant) Atty. Carlos J. Valdes to
purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that Atty. Valdes would keep
the property in trust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to
their agreement, respondent obtained 2 loans from a bank amounting to P140k
which he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was issued in Atty.
Valdes’ name but it was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house.
-When Jose Nakpil died, Atty. Valdes acted as the legal counsel and accountant
of his widow Imelda Nakpil whom the Court appointed as the estate
administratix. Respondent’s law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled
the proceeding for the settlement of Jose’s estate.
-The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate
proceedings when Atty. Valdes excluded the Moran property from the inventory.
He even transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval
Realty Corporation.
-March 29, 1979: Imelda sought to recover the Moran property by filing with
the Baguio City CFI an action for reconveyance with damages against Atty.
Valdes (&his corporation) who claimed absolute ownership over the property
and denied that a trust was created over it.
-During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, Imelda filed this
administrative case to disbar the respondent.
Petitioner’s Claim
Atty. Valdes violated professional ethics when he:
1. assigned to his family corporation the Moran property which belonged to the
estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
2. excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate properties he
prepared for a client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to
purchase the said excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the
purpose of transferring the title to the said property to his family corporation.
3. prepared & defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as
its counsel and auditor.
Preliminaries
- CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. CA reversed.
- OSG relying on CA decision recommended dismissal of admin charge.
- CA decision in reconveyance case has been reversed by SC.
Factual Issues (as settled in the reconveyance case)
1. Ownership of the Moran property: Atty. Valdes and the late Jose Nakpil
agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust
for the latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute
ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to complainant after
the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the reach of Imelda and
the intestate court, Atty. Valdes later transferred it to his corporation.
2. Loan of P140k: Atty. Valdes, through his accounting firm, charged the two
loans as liability of the estate, after obtaining said loans for the purchase and
renovation of the property he claimed for himself. It is clear that the information
available to the accounting firm as to how these two loans should be treated
LEGAL PROFESSION
could have only come from Atty. Valdes himself as the said loans were in his
name.
3. Resignation from law firm not supported by any documentary proof
4. Resignation from accounting firm in 1972 and 1974 is proven. But when
Atty. Valdes transferred the Moran property to his corporation, the intestate
proceedings was still pending in court. He could not have been totally ignorant
of the proceedings in the intestate case.
ISSUES
1. WON Atty, Valdes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
2. WON Atty. Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting interests
3. WON Atty. Valdes can be administratively charged before SC given that his
alleged “misconduct” pertains to his accounting practice
HELD
1. YES. When he subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary
gain, he clearly violated CPR Canon 17 which provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to his client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.
-A lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction
must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. No presumption of
innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s favor.
Atty. Valdes’ misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran
property is clearly unethical.
2. YES. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which
stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants (Angel Nakpil and ENORN,
Inc) who are creditors of the estate.
-The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application
where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter and
is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. Representation of
conflicting interests may be allowed only after full disclosure of facts and
informed consent of the clients. There is nothing in the records to show that
Atty. Valdes or his law firm explained the legal situation and its consequences to
Imelda.
-When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se adverse to
the estate. The relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate
the conflict of interest.
-The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the
representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondent’s duty to
inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict
of interest.
3. YES. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if
it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
-Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to
the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. Respondent
exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty
in his dealings/transactions with his clients.
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Disposition Atty. Carlos J. Valdes found guilty of misconduct and suspended
from the practice of law for one year with a warning that a similar infraction shall
be dealt with more severely in the future.
QUIAMBAO V BAMBA
DAVIDE; August 25, 2005
(maia rieza)
NATURE
RESOLUTION on administrative case for disbarment
FACTS
Felicitas Quiambao used to be the president of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc.
(AIB), a family-owned security and investigation agency. She procured the
services of respondent Atty. Nestor Bamba for the corporate affairs of AIB, but
also used his services for a personal case (an ejectment case wherein
respondent is the counsel of record). After, Quiambao resigned as president.
Six months later, AIB, through Bamba, filed a complaint for replevin and
damages against Quiambao to recover a car assigned to Quiambao as a
service vehicle by AIB. Bamba filed this latter complaint without withdrawing as
counsel in the ejectment case, which was still pending. Quiambao then filed for
disbarment and charged Bamba with acts of disloyalty and double-dealing.
Complainant’s arguments
-that she resigned as president because Bamba proposed that she organize her
own security agency, and that he will assist in its organization.
-that such security agency was organized and Bamba was a “silent partner”
-that while serving as a silent partner, Bamba convinced Quiambao’s brother to
organize another security agency (yes, hobby nilang gumawa ng security
agencies) where respondent served as incorporator, stockholder, and president.
Respondent’s arguments
-although he admits representing Quiambao in the ejectment case, he claims
that he was made to believe that it was part of his function as counsel for AIB to
handle even the “personal cases” of its officers
-that the ejectment case and replevin case were unrelated cases, thus
privileged information that may have been gathered from one case would have
no use in the other
-that he was never a silent partner in the security agency organized by
Quiambao
-that he serves AIB and the agency organized with Quiambao’s brother in
different capacities: in AIB, as legal counsel, while in the latter, as president
ISSUE
WON respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests
(WON there was representation of conflicting interests)
HELD
Yes, respondent is guilty
Ratio Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of
one client, it is their duty to contend for something which duty to another client
LEGAL PROFESSION
requires them to oppose. There are various tests in determining conflicting
interests, few of which are:
 whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one
client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client
 whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of
the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty
 whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a
former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment
- While the respondent may assert that the complainant expressly consented to
his continued representation in the ejectment case, the respondent failed to
show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his clients and he failed to present
any written consent of the complainant and AIB as required under Rule 15.03,
Canon 15.
- That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest
intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative.
Moreover, lawyers are not obliged to act either as an adviser or advocate for
every person who may wish to become their client. They have the right to
decline such employment.
- That he served in different capacities in two competing agencies does not
justify the involvement in conflicting interests. In the process of determining
whether there is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is probability, not
certainty, of conflict. Loyalty to AIB becomes dubious with his interest as the
president in another security agency.
- The nature of a lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree. It requires lawyers to remain inviolate of the client’s confidence
and to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing.
- Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: “A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.”
Disposition Guilty for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15. Suspended for 1
year.
BERBANO V BARCELONA
PER CURIAM; September 23, 2003
(anton arcilla)
NATURE
Administrative matter in the Supreme Court re: Disbarment.
FACTS
- A case was pending regarding a 244-hectare lot situated at Alabang,
Muntinlupa, owned by Rufino Estaban Hilapo. Petitioner Felicitas Berbano is
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one of the heirs of REH, and the heirs chose Atty. Porfiro Daen as their
attorney-in-fact.
- January 26, 1999: Mr. Daen was arrested by Muntinlupa police, and
subsequently detained at Muntinlupa City Jail until his release on February 18,
1999.
- Mr. Daen needed the assistance of a lawyer for his release. The heirs
(including petitioner) approached Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona to assist them. Mr.
Daen has engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona to facilitate Daen’s release.
- Barcelona asked for P50K to cause the release of Daen from prison the
following day. Barcelona declared that he was going to see a justice from the
Supreme Court who could help the release of Daen.
- At a meeting in Max’s restaurant, Barcelona reported that he just came from
the Supreme Court where he “fixed” the case of Daen, but did not show any
documents supporting the claim.
- Barcelona continued to asked for money on several occasions. Petitioner gave
him P10K and P15K on different times. Petitioner also gave Barcelona P1000
for gasoline.
- February 18, 1999 petitioner and Barcelona met at Putatan, Muntinlupa.
There Barcelona promised that he will return entire amount of P64 on February
18, 1999. Petitioner never saw Barcelona since then.
- Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP required respondent to submit his
answer to the complaint, but despite due notice respondent fail to file his
answer. Upon a motion to declare respondent in default, Investigating
Commissioner again required respondent to answer. Barcelona failed to appear
despite due receipt of notice.
- IBP Board of Governors found Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious
breach of the Code of Professional responsibility, but reduced the penalty to
suspension from practice of law for 6 years.
ISSUE
WON Barcelona should be disbarred or merely suspended
HELD
Ratio Wenceslao C. Barcelona is barred from the practice of law for gross
misconduct.
Reasoning The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the
individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court,
and to remove from the profession persons unfit to continue discharging the
trust reposed in them.
- Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are neither purely civil nor purely
criminal.
- Respondent is guilty of culpable violations of the following Canons:
 CANON 1—a lawyer shall xxx promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
 CANON 7—a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession.
LEGAL PROFESSION
 CANON 11—a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers xxx.
 CANON 16—a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client that ma come into his possession.
 Rule 16.01—a lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received fro or from the client.
- Barcelona was previously charged with and found guilty of conduct
unbecoming a lawyer, when he misrepresented to the complainant that eh could
secure the restructuring of the complainant’s loan with PNB through his
connection with a certain Mericullo (who did not really exist).
- In addition, the Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of
corruption and malpractice. A member of the legal profession who invites
mistrust on the judicial system with irresponsible representations
reprehensible and cannot be tolerated.
LICUANAN V MELO
PER CURIAM; February 9, 1989
(apple maramba)
NATURE
Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
Melo (respondent) was hired as counsel by Licuanan (petitioner) in an
ejectment case filed against her tenant, Aida Pineda
-On August 8, 1979, respondent, as Licuanan's attorney, obtained judgment in
Licuanan's favor against Pineda whereby the latter was directed by the City
Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals from October, 1978 and
succeeding months thereafter.
- When several months had elapsed without them hearing a word from Pineda,
respondent decided to send her a letter demanding that she pay the monthly
rental of her apartment otherwise he will be constrained to take the necessary
legal action against her to protect the interest of his client
- Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo. She went to respondent's office and
paid him P3,060.00 for rental payments for October, 1978 to February, 1980
at the rate of P180.00 per month.
-Pineda continued paying her obligations religiously to Melo, covering the period
between March 1980-January 1981.
-During the entire twelve-month period that respondent had been receiving the
said rental payments of Pineda, he did not bother to inform or report to
complainant about the said payments and instead unnecessarily retained the
money
-On April 27, 1981, complainant, not knowing that respondent had been
receiving the rental payments of Pineda, instituted an administrative case
against her (Aida Pineda) before the Chief of the Philippine Tuberculosis
Society accusing her of "moral turpitude" arising from her alleged failure to pay
the rent of her apartment as ordered by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case
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No. 037276 and claiming that she has ignored and refused to pay her just
obligation
-Pineda brought an action against Licuanan for damages before the then Court
of First Instance of Manila, for she allegedly suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation arising from the
unfounded administrative case filed against her since as borne out by the
records, she had been paying her obligation religiously to the lawyer of
Licuanan
- It was only when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel retained by
complainant, wrote respondent a letter on May 4, 1981, advising him to
surrender the money to complainant, that he accounted for it
-Respondent admitted having received the payment of rentals from
is complainant's tenant, but explained that he kept this matter from the
complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the
rentals
ISSUE
WON the respondent is guilty of violating paragraph 11 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics and breaching the Lawyer’s Oath
HELD
Reasoning
The actuations of respondent in retaining for his personal benefit over a one-
year period, the amount of P5,220.00 received by him on behalf of his client,
the complainant herein, depriving her of its use, and withholding information on
the same despite inquiries made by her, is glaringly a breach of the Lawyer's
Oath to which he swore observance, and an evident transgression of the
Canons of Professional Ethics particularly:
“11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or
gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client
Money the client or collected for the client of other trust property coming into the
possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and
should not under any circumstance be commingled with his own or be used by
him. “
- By his professional misconduct, respondent has breached the trust reposed in
him by his client. He has shown himself unfit for the confidence and trust which
should characterize an attorney-client relationship and the practice of law. By
reason thereof complainant was compelled to file a groundless suit against her
tenant for non-payment of rentals thereby exposing her to jeopardy by becoming
a defendant in a damage suit filed by said tenant against her by force of
circumstances, complainant was further compelled to engage the services of
another counsel in order to recover the amount rightfully due her but which
respondent withheld from her.
- The court is constrained to find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral
character. He has violated his oath not to delay any man for money or malice,
LEGAL PROFESSION
besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven himself
unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He
deserves the severest punishment.
Disposition Consistent with the crying need to maintain the high traditions and
standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in
attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent, Atty. Manuel L.
Melo, from the practice of law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys.
(Paragraph 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics referred to is reiterated in
Rules 16.01. 16.02 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
promulgated by the Supreme Court on 21 June 1988).
HERNANDEZ V GO
PER CURIAM; January 31, 2005
(chris lao)
NATURE
Resolution of the verified letter-complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose C.
Go dated June 23, 1975 filed by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now deceased)
FACTS
- Both parties are from Zamboanga City.
- The allegations in the letter-complaint are:
Sometime in 1961, complainant’s husband abandoned her and her son,
Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr. Shortly thereafter, her husband’s numerous creditors
demanded payments of his loans. Fearful that the various mortgage contracts
involving her properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending suits for
sums of money against her, complainant engaged the legal services of Atty.
Jose C. Go, herein respondent.
- Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness, fear,
embarrassment, and social humiliation. He advised her to give him her land
titles covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P at Zamboanga City so he could
sell them to enable her to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to execute
deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable consideration.
Complainant agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and from the
proceeds pay her creditors.
- Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A, likewise located in
Zamboanga City, which were mortgaged to her creditors. When the mortgages
fell due, respondent redeemed the lots. Again, he convinced her to execute
deeds of sale involving those lots in his favor. As a result, respondent became
the registered owner of all the lots belonging to complainant.
- Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that respondent did not sell her
lots as agreed upon. Instead, he paid her creditors with his own funds and had
her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of her real properties worth
millions.
- In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975, respondent was required to file
his comment on the complaint.
- Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint is premature since there is pending before the then
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Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City Civil Case No. 1781 for recovery of
ownership and declaration of nullity of deeds of sale filed by complainant
against him involving the subject lots.
- On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying respondent’s motion
and requiring him to submit his answer.
- In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent denied the allegations in
the instant complaint. He averred that he sold, in good faith, complainant’s lots
to various buyers, including himself, for valuable consideration. On several
occasions, he extended financial assistance to complainant and even invited her
to live with his family. His children used to call her “Lola” due to her frequent
visits to his residence. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action.
- On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
- It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month and 26 days that
the OSG filed a motion to refer the instant case to the IBP for the retaking of the
testimonies of complainant’s witnesses and the submission of its report and
recommendation.
- On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
- The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004 of Atty. Lydia A.
Navarro, Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, is quoted as
follows:
“A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties
showed that all the properties of the complainant are presently owned by the
respondent by virtue of several deeds of sale executed by the complainant in
favor of the respondent without monetary consideration except Lot 849-D
situated in Tomas Claudio which was returned by the respondent to the
complainant on September 5, 1974.
- It is evident from the records that respondent was the one who notarized the
documents involving the said properties redeemed or repurchased by the
complainant from her creditors which ended up in respondent’s name like in the
deed of sale executed by Victoriano Dejerano in favor of Nazaria Hernandez
over Lots 1141-A-3-A and 1141-A-3-B; deed of sale executed by Antonio
Masrahon on September 3, 1961regarding Lot No. 1141-A; deed of absolute
sale executed by Francisco Esperat over the Curuan properties on November 9,
1971 and the cancellation of the mortgage executed by Alfonso Enriquez on
July 18, 1964 over the Tomas Claudio properties.
- The foregoing legal activities and operations of the respondent in addition to
his having discussed, advised and gave solutions to complainant’s legal
problems and liabilities to her creditors and even requested her creditors for
extension of time to pay complainant’s accounts constitute practice of law as
legal counsel for consultation aside from representing complainant in other
cases; a mute proof of a lawyer-client relations between them, a fact also
admitted by the respondent.
- It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a detailed report to the
complainant on how he paid complainant’s creditors without selling her
properties. Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid them out of his
LEGAL PROFESSION
own funds; then later on admitted that he was one of the purchasers of
complainant’s properties in utter disregard of their agreement and no evidence
was submitted by the respondent concerning the value of the said sale of
complainant’s properties.
- As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his obligation
and duty as complainant’s legal adviser and counsel when he took advantage of
the trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant in ultimately putting
complainant’s properties in his name and possession in violation of Canon 17
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that respondent Atty. Jose C. Go be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months from receipt hereof and the IBP Chapter
where he is a registered member be furnished a copy of the same for
implementation hereof, subject to the approval of the Honorable Members of the
Board of Governors.”
- On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-
2004-39 adopting and approving the Report of Commissioner Navarro with
modification in the sense that the recommended penalty of suspension from the
practice of law was increased from six (6) months to three (3) years.
ISSUE
WON the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility be sustained
HELD
Yes. However, we have to modify its recommended penalty.
- Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the principal source of
ethical rules for lawyers in this jurisdiction, provides:
“A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.”
- Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for himself
complainant’s lots entrusted to him are, by any standard, acts constituting gross
misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. Such
conduct on the part of respondent degrades not only himself but also the name
and honor of the legal profession. He violated this Court’s mandate that
lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealing with
their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach.
- Canon 17 of the same Code states:
“A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.”
- The records show that complainant reposed such high degree of trust and
confidence in herein respondent, that when she engaged his services, she
entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to sell her lots, believing that
the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her creditors. Respondent,
however, abused her trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to
others but to himself and spent his own money to pay her obligations. As
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correctly observed by Investigating IBP Commissioner Lydia Navarro,
respondent is duty-bound to render a detailed report to the complainant on how
much he sold the latter’s lots and the amounts paid to her creditors. Obviously,
had he sold the lots to other buyers, complainant could have earned more.
Records show that she did not receive any amount from respondent. Clearly,
respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his duty as complainant’s
counsel.
- Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral
conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
- In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, we ordered the disbarment of lawyer when he
deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting him with all her money and later
refused to return the same despite demand. In Navarro vs. Meneses III, we
disbarred a member of the Bar for his refusal or failure to account for the
P50,000.00 he received from a client to settle a case. In Docena vs.
Limson, we expelled from the brotherhood of lawyers, an attorney who extorted
money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation. In Busiños vs.
Ricafort, an attorney was stripped of his license to practice law for
misappropriating his client’s money.
- Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP too light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes
advantage of his client’s financial plight to acquire the latter’s properties for his
own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty,
and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon
17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross
misconduct, and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the
Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent
deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood
of lawyers.
Disposition Respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross misconduct and
is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.
BUSINOS V RICAFORT
PER CURIAM; December 22, 1997
(keefe dela cruz)
NATURE
Complaint for disbarment against Atty. Francisco Ricafort
FACTS
- Respondent Atty. Ricafort was entrusted P30,000 by complainant Businos to
deposit in the bank account of complainant’s husband, which amount
respondent used for himself and delayed in payment.
- Respondent required a bond of P2,000 from Businos supposedly for one of
her Civil Cases when no such bond was required.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Hence, Businos filed a complaint for disbarment against Ricafort
- The court required respondent to comment on the complaint time and again.
But respondent failed to comply. As such, the court considered his right
waived, and referred the complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant.
- The Office ordered respondent suspended for 1 year.
ISSUE
WON the 1-year suspension is commensurate sanction for the offenses
committed by respondent Atty. Ricafort
HELD
NO.
Ratio
With dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior, and palpable
disregard of:
- Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court - unlawful retention of
client’s funds
- Code of Professional Responsibility
- Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
- Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that may come into his possession
- Canon 11 - Respect due to courts
respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyer's oath, he became a
guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair
an impartial administration of justice — a vital function of democracy a failure of
which is disastrous to society. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must
follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this
Court as the disciplining authority.
Reasoning Respondent's transgressions caused dishonor, not merely to
respondent, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be
denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.
Disposition Consistent with the urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions
and high standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public
faith in the members of the Philippine Bar, the Court resolves to DISBAR
respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the practice of law. His name
is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
QUILBAN V ROBINOL
PER CURIAM; April 10, 1989
(sarah cabrera)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
- The Colegio de San Jose, through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler,
sold a land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City
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General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square meters as a possible
development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966.
In 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman
Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved site a house for his residence and a
training center for the Christian Social Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties
of squatters, Congressman Taruc suggested to Father Escaler the idea of
donating or selling the land cheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then
advised the squatters to form an organization and choose a leader authorized to
negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the squatters formed the
"Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala", with Bernabe Martin as President.
- But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one
Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the sale to the
exclusion of the other Samaban members. The land was ultimately sold to
Rivera at a cheap price of PI5 per square meter or a total consideration of
P41,961.65. The prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P1 00 to
P1 20 per square meter. Father Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera
represented the squatters on the property.
- In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed the case against
Rivera, et. al. The CFI, however, dismissed the case.
- To prosecute the appea in the CAl, the Samahan members hired as their
counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees on. Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part of
the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to
each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing was
confirmed in writing.
- On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision and
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
- To raise the amount of P41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of Appeals,
plus expenses for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying the property,
conveyance, documentation, transfer of title etc., the five officers of the
Samahan collected, little by little, P2,500.00 from each head of family. The
Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol.
- On 18 May 1979, the sum of P68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol
by the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P1,030.00 and P2,500.00
respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P2,500.00, or a total of
P75,000.00.
- After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been
made to Rivers. When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an
intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution bad not yet been
issued by the CFI of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for
intervention had already been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with
that fact, the latter gave other excuses, which the officers discovered to have no
basis at all.
- On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first consensus" to
change their counsel, Atty. Robinol. The officers of the Samahan thereafter
approached Atty. AnacIeto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel,
after he was shown the document containing the consensus of the Samahan
members to change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's
LEGAL PROFESSION
advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter informing the latter of their
decision to terminate his services and demanding the return of the P75,000.00
deposited with him. Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent
letter of the same tenor was similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol.
- On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in a
civil case as counsel for the plaintiffs, vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of the
authority given him by plaintiffs in said civil case through the five officers. Atty.
Montemayor then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for Execution praying that
the defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a deed of
conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs. At the hearing of the Motion for Execution,
Atty. Robinol manifested that he had no objection to the appearance of and his
substitution by Atty. Montemayor.
- Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first consensus, another
document labelled the a second consensus" was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a
meeting held for the purpose on 24 November 1980 to the effect that they had
decided to change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had delayed
paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
their favor.
- Administrative Case No. 2144: On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed
this Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting the investigation of
Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P75,000.00 and praying that the Court
exercise its power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to practice
law.
- Administrative Case No. 2180: Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment
against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case
without his (Robinol's) formal withdrawal and conformity and knowing fully well
that there was no consensus of all the plaintiffs to discharge him as their
counsel.
- Court referred administrative cases to the Sol. Gen. who recommended: 1.
That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three months for refusing to
deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the warning that a more
severe penalty will be imposed for a repetition of the same or similar act, and
that he be ordered to return to the plaintiffs, the sum of P75,000.00. 2. That
the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, be dismissed, since he has not
committed any misconduct imputed to him by Atty. Robinol.
ISSUES
1. WON Atty. Robinol should be suspended
2. WON Atty. Montemayor should be disbarred
HELD
1. YES
Reasoning Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and
grave misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of the
profession. After the CA had rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he
had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided
to convert the payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of
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each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary
value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally
appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound by a written
agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for
him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out
an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of
P2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the
same by one who, after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took
advantage of them.
- Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his
clients he had the legal right to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there
was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost
confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the
detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound to pro. tect. Secondly,
even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his
clients' funds intended for a specific purpose-the purchase of land. He stands
obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners.
- The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence on
this is the more credible. And that he had, in fact, received the total sum of
P75,000-00. Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has
rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He has not only
violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself
with all good fidelity to his clients . He has also brought the profession into
disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for the
fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own.
2. NO
Reasoning In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the
findings of the Solicitor General that he has not exposed himself to any
plausible charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of his profession when he
agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs.There is no doubt that clients are
free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule
138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter
his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to
change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was
well within their prerogative. In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by
Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor is concerned, therefore, the same is
absolutely without merit.
Disposition
- Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his
lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between
lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice of
law. By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby declared to have
forfeited his rights to attorney's fees and is ordered to return the amount of
P75,000.00 to the plaintiffs.
- Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for
disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
BARNACHEA V QUIOCHO
CALLEJO; March 11, 2003
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
(jat tabamo)
ISSUE

NATURE WON the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors corresponds to the

Administrative matter. Breach of Lawyer-Client Relations gravity of the wrong committed by respondent

FACTS HELD

- Complainant Ruby Barnachea sought the services of respondent Atty. Edwin No. The Court finds that the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors is

Quiocho, a lawyer who has stopped practicing for some time and was only in not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong committed by respondent.

the second month of resuming practice, to cause the transfer under her name Ratio 1: Respondent’s claim that complainant did not retain his legal services

the title over a property previously owned by her sister. She paid P 41, 280 for flies in the face of his letter to complainant. Even if it were true that no

the expenses for said transfer and for respondent’s legal services. attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it that an

- Respondent failed to cause the transfer and consequently, complainant attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and

demanded that she be refunded and that the documents she entrusted to dishonesty in the profession but also for gross misconduct not connected with

respondent to cause the transfer be returned to her. Respondent failed to his professional duties

comply with the demands. Reasoning In this case, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking for

- On Nov. 1, 2001, Respondent wrote complainant a letter saying he failed and almost two months. Worse, despite demands of complainant, he failed to refund

that he would return the documents and the title entrusted to him as well as the amount of P 41, 280 and to return to complainant the deed of absolute sale

refund the P 41, 280 through a personal check. He however failed to fund the and title over the property. Respondent’s claim that complainant could not

check despite the demands of complainant. contact him because he did not have any landline at his residence and that his

- In his answer to the complaint, respondent: mobile phone was stolen in October 2001, is hard to believe. He failed to

1. Denied that complainant contracted his legal services. Received the P 41, adduce a morsel of evidence to prove that his telephone at the business center

280 payment but claimed they were for actual and incidental expenses and not was cut or that his mobile phone had been stolen. Even then, respondent could

for legal services have easily contacted the complainant at her residence or could have written

2. Asserted that he acted in good faith as shown by the fact that he returned her a letter informing her that the original copy of TCT No. 324411 in the

the documents with an explanatory letter and refunded complainant by issuing a custody of the Register of Deeds was burned when the Quezon City Hall was

personal check. gutted by fire and that there was a need for the reconstitution of said title.

3. Alleged that his failure was caused by his difficulty in making good the Neither did respondent adduce evidence that he had been sick with diabetes

claimed amount, along with the fact that he was afflicted with diabetes and loss and had lost his sight in his right eye. Respondent simply refused to adduce

of sight of his right eye. evidence to prove his allegations in his Answer to the complaint.

4. Claimed that he only agreed to help complainant with the condition that his Ratio 2: A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that

task was merely to go through the regular process of presenting available may come to his possession. He is a trustee to said funds and property. He is

documents, paying taxes and fees, and following up on the transfer, a task that to keep the funds of his client separate and apart from his own and those of

a non-lawyer familiar with the procedure can perform. 5. Claimed to have others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as

discovered that the original copy of the transfer certificate of title had been for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and

burned and that complainant’s copy therefore needed to be reconstituted before fees for the transfer of title over real property under the name of his client if not

it can be cancelled and transferred. During this time, communication between utilized, must be returned immediately to his client upon demand therefor.

both parties broke down, as respondent’s mobile phone was stolen, he has no Reasoning The lawyer’s failure to return the money of his client upon demand

home phone and that phone calls between him and complainant at his work gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated said money in violation

place had been cute due to souring relationship with his co-workers. of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to

- A formal investigation was conducted by IBP thereafter and it found that the him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of

complainant engaged the legal services of the respondent as admitted by public confidence in the legal profession.

respondent himself in his letter to the complainant; that respondent was not able Ratio 3: The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of

to meet his financial obligations due to financial difficulties and that he was in a very delicate, exacting and confidential character. A lawyer is duty-bound to

good faith in his failure. The IBP Investigation Commissioner also recommended observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his

that he be ordered to repay his client within 90 days from receipt of notice and clients. The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney an absolute

warned that a repetition would be dealt with more severely. abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or

- The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating indirectly, with the interest of his client.

Commissioner’s recommendations with an additional sanction of reprimand.

LEGAL PROFESSION
Reasoning In this case, respondent miserably failed to measure up to the
exacting standard expected of him. Although the Court is led to believe that
respondent’s failure to cause the transfer of the title of the property under the
name of complainant was due to a financial problem that beset him shortly after
he received the checks from complainant. It can easily be inferred from
respondent’s letter that he used complainant’s money to alleviate if not solve
his financial woes. What compounded respondent’s unethical conduct was his
drawing of a personal check and delivering the same to complainant without
sufficient funds in his bank account to cover the check. Even as he promised to
fund his account with the drawee bank, respondent failed to do so when the
check became due. In this case, respondent intransigently refused to return to
the complainant the amount of P 41,280 which he received for the expenses for
the transfer to her of the title of the property and for his professional fees. His
dishonest conduct was compounded by his interjection of flimsy excuses for his
obstinate refusal to refund the amount to complainant
Disposition Respondent Atty. Quiocho is found guilty of violating Canons 15
and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the
practice of law for 1 year with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be
dealt with more severely. He is also directed to restitute the complainant the full
amount of 41,280 within 10 days from notice.
- If respondent fails to restitute the said amount within the aforesaid period, he
shall be meted an additional suspension of 3 months for every month or fraction
thereof of delay until he shall have paid the said amount in full. In case a
subsidiary penalty of suspension for his failure to restitute the said amount shall
be necessary, respondent shall serve successively the penalty of his one year
suspension and the subsidiary penalty.
RUBIAS V BATILLER
TEEHANKEE; May 29, 1973
FACTS
- On August 31, 1964, plaintiff Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer, filed a suit to
recover the ownership and possession of certain portions of lot located in
Barotac Viejo, Iloilo which he bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante
in 1956 against its present occupant defendant, Isaias Batiller, who illegally
entered said portions of the lot on two occasions — in 1945 and in 1959. In his
answer with counter-claim defendant claims that he and his predecessors-in-
interest have always been in actual, open and continuous possession since time
immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question.
Unfortunately, his title
- Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in the Barrio
of General Luna, municipality of Barotac Viejo province of Iloilo, which he
caused to be surveyed on July 18-31, 1934
- Before WWII, Francisco Militante filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
an application for the registration of the title of the land but was opposed by the
Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and other oppositors. During WWII,
the record of the case was lost. After the war, Francisco Militante petitioned this
court to reconstitute the record of the case but in the end, the registration was
denied.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- He appealed but pending the decision (which was denied in the end),
Francisco Militante sold to the plaintiff, Domingo Rubias the land, and was
registered in the Registry of Deeds
- Soon after, both Rubias and Militante were declaring the land for taxation
purposes
- On April 22, 1960, the plaintiff filed forcible Entry and Detainer case against
Isaias Batiller in the Justice of the Peace Court of Barotac Viejo Province of
Iloilo
- During the trial of this case on the merit, the plaintiff will prove by competent
evidence the following:
> That the land he purchased from Francisco Militante under Exh. "A"
was formerly owned and possessed by Liberato Demontaño but that on
September 6, 1919 the land was sold at public auction by virtue of a
judgment in a Civil Case entitled "Edw J. Pflieder plaintiff vs. Liberato
Demontaño Francisco Balladeros and Gregorio Yulo, defendants", of
which Yap Pongco was the purchaser (Exh. "1-3"). The sale was
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo on August 4,
1920, under Primary Entry No. 69 (Exh. "1"), and a definite Deed of
Sale was executed by Constantino A. Canto, provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, on
Jan. 19, 1934 in favor of Yap Pongco (Exh. "I"), the sale having been
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo on February 10,
1934 (Exh. "1-1").
> On September 22, 1934, Yap Pongco sold this land to Francisco
Militante as evidenced by a notarial deed (Exh. "J") which was registered
in the Registry of Deeds on May 13, 1940 (Exh. "J-1").
- Defendants, on the other hand will prove by competent evidence during the
trial of this case the following facts:
> That lot No. 2 of the Psu-1552 it (Exh. '5') was originally owned and
possessed by Felipe Batiller, grandfather of the defendant Basilio Batiller,
on the death of the former in 1920, as his sole heir. Isaias Batiller
succeeded his father , Basilio Batiller, in the ownership and possession of
the land in the year 1930, and since then up to the present, the land
remains in the possession of the defendant, his possession being actual,
open, public, peaceful and continuous in the concept of an owner,
exclusive of any other rights and adverse to all other claimants.
> That the alleged predecessors in interest of the plaintiff have never
been in the actual possession of the land and that they never had any title
thereto.
> That Lot No. 2, Psu 155241, the subject of Free Patent application of
the defendant has been approved.
- On August 17, 1965, defendant's counsel manifested in open court that
before any trial on the merit of the case could proceed he would file a motion to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint which he did, alleging that plaintiff does not have
cause of action against him because the property in dispute which he (plaintiff)
allegedly bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante was the subject
matter of LRC No. 695 filed in the CFI of Iloilo, which case was brought on
appeal to this Court and docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13497-R in which aforesaid
case plaintiff was the counsel on record of his father-in-law, Francisco Militante.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Invoking Arts. 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code which reads:
> Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning: (7) Those expressly prohibited by law.
> ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire any purchase, even
at a public auction, either in person of through the mediation of another: .
+ (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights of in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring an assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.
- Defendant claims that plaintiff could not have acquired any interest in the
property in dispute as the contract he (plaintiff) had with Francisco Militante was
inexistent and void. (See pp. 22-31, Record on Appeal). Plaintiff strongly
opposed defendant's motion to dismiss claiming that defendant can not invoke
Articles 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code as Article 1422 of the same Code
provides that 'The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third
persons whose interests are not directly affected' (See pp. 32-35 Record on
Appeal).
- On October 18, 1965, the lower court issued an order disclaiming plaintiffs
complaint (pp. 42-49, Record on Appeal.) In the aforesaid order of dismissal
the lower court practically agreed with defendant's contention that the contract
(Exh. A) between plaintiff and Francism Militante was null and void.
ISSUES
WON the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law, the late
Francisco Militante over the property subject of Plan Psu-99791 was void
because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a land
registration case involving the property in dispute
HELD
YES.
- The purchase by a lawyer of the property in litigation from his client is
categorically prohibited by Article 1491 paragraph (5) of the Philippine Civil
Code, reproduced supra; 6 and that consequently, plaintiff's purchase of the
property in litigation from his client (assuming that his client could sell the same
since as already shown above, his client's claim to the property was defeated
and rejected) was void and could produce no legal effect, by virtue of Article
1409, paragraph (7) of our Civil Code which provides that contracts "expressly
prohibited or declared void by law' are "inexistent and that "(T)hese contracts
cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be
waived."
- In a case, the Court ordered the issuance of a writ of possession for the return
of the land by the lawyer to the adverse parties without reimbursement of the
price paid by him and other expenses, and ruled that counsel is a lawyer and is
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
presumed to know the law. He must, therefore, from the beginning, have been
well aware of the defect in his title and is, consequently, a possessor in bad
faith."
- Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code)
prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust
or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring such property in their
trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial
auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public
officers and employees; judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys,
and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law.
- New Civil Code recognizes absolute nullity of contracts "whose cause, object,
or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy" or which are "expressly prohibited or declared void by law" and declares
such contracts "inexistent and void from the beginning."
- nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be
cured by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and
do not permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the permanent
disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public
policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators
(Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined that
they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new contact, in which
cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time the
execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to
exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was
illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already become lawful at the
time of the ratification or second contract; or the service which was impossible
may have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained may
have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then
be valid from its execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first
contract."
- As applied to the case at bar, the lower court therefore properly acted upon
defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of nullity of plaintiff's
alleged purchase of the land, since its juridical effects and plaintiff's alleged
cause of action founded thereon were being asserted against defendant-
appellant.
CANTILLER V POTENCIANO
PER CURIAM; December 18, 1989
(ricky cantre)
NATURE
Administrative complaint versus Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano.
FACTS
- Subject of this administrative complaint is Humberto V. Potenciano, a
practicing lawyer and a member of the Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862. He
is charged with deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation, and also with gross
misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an officer of the court.
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Complainant is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller, defendant in an action for
"ejectment" before the MTC of Manila, Branch 57, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Another action, likewise involving Peregrina but this time as plaintiff, was then
pending before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig, Metro Manila for "reconveyance
with damages." Both actions involve the apartment unit being rented by Cantiller
and her sister. When the two cases were concluded, Peregrina came out the
losing party. The civil case for reconveyance was ordered dismissed by the RTC
on June 9, 1987 while the civil case for ejectment was decided by the MTC
against her.
- On October 8, 1987 pursuant to the writ of execution issued in the civil case
for ejectment, Cantiller and Peregrina were served a notice to vacate the rented
premises within four (4) days from receipt of notice. Desperate and at a loss on
what to do, they consulted a certain Sheriff Pagalunan on the matter.
Pagalunan, in turn, introduced them to Potenciano. After such introduction, the
parties "impliedly agreed" that Potenciano would handle their case.
- A petition entitled "Annulment of Judgment, Annulment of Sale and Damages
with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Order, etc." was
prepared by Potenciano to forestall the execution of the order to vacate. In the
afternoon of October 9, 1987, Cantiller was made to sign by Potenciano what
she described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly
composed" petition for annulment of judgment. Cantiller alleges that Potenciano
promised her that the necessary restraining order would be secured if only
because the judge who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran" (close
friend). Potenciano demanded from Cantiller P1,000 as attorney's fee which
the latter paid that same afternoon. However, when the case was raffled and
assigned to Branch 153, the presiding judge asked Potenciano to withdraw as
counsel in the case on the ground of their friendship.
- On October 11, 1987, Potenciano went to the house of Cantiller and asked
her to be ready with P2,000 to be given to another judge who will issue the
restraining order in the ejectment case. Cantiller and her sister were only able to
raise the amount of P1,000 which they immediately gave to Potenciano. Later
Potenciano informed Cantiller and her sister that he could not locate the judge
who would issue the restraining order. The parties, then, instead went to the
Max's Restaurant where Potenciano ordered some food-including two plastic
bags of food allegedly to be given to the judge who would issue the restraining
order. At this juncture, Potenciano asked for the remaining balance of the
P2,000 which he earlier demanded. Cantiller gave her last money-a ten dollar
($10.00) bill.
- Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, Potenciano informed
complainant and Peregrina that there was a need to file another case with the
RTC to enable them to retain possession of the apartment. For this purpose,
Potenciano told complainant to prepare the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to
be deposited with the Treasurer's Office of Pasig as purchase price of the
apartment and another P1,000 to cover the expenses of the suit. Potenciano
stressed to the complainant the need and urgency of filing the new complaint.
Complainant and Peregrina raised the said amounts through the kindness of
some friends and relatives. On October 26, 1987, the money was handed over
to the respondent.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 on
October 30, 1987, Potenciano, contrary to his promise that he would secure a
restraining order, withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant.
Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Thus, no
restraining order or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a consequence, the
order to vacate was eventually enforced and executed.
- Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that there was really
no need to make a deposit of P10,000 relative to Civil Case No. 55210. After
another inquiry, she found out that in fact there was no such deposit made.
Thus, on December 23, 1987, complainant sent a demand letter to Potenciano
asking for the return of the total amount of P11,000 which the former earlier
gave to the latter. However, this letter was never answered and the money was
never returned. Hence, complainant lodged this administrative complaint against
herein respondent.
- Potenciano in his answer contends that the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 55118
and 55210 was done in good faith and that the allegations of complainant
relative to the administrative charge against him are all lies, product of one's
imagination and only intended to harrass him.
ISSUE
WON Potenciano is guilty if the charges against him
HELD
Yes.
Ratio When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he thereby covenants that he will
exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise
due diligence or the abandonment of a client's cause makes such lawyer
unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him. Reasoning The acts
of Potenciano in this case violate the most elementary principles of professional
ethics. Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability
in the prosecution or defense of his client's cause. A lawyer who performs that
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he
also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to
the client but also to the court, to the bar or to the public. That circumstance
explains the public concern for the maintenance of an untarnished standard of
conduct by every attorney towards his client. The Court finds that Potenciano
failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's interests. Potenciano
had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge in
Civil Case No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their
friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, Potenciano took no steps to find a
replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact. Even assuming that
Potenciano had no previous knowledge that he would be asked to withdraw, the
record is quite clear that four (4) days prior to the hearing of the preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 Potenciano already filed a motion therein
withdrawing as complainant's counsel interposing as reason therefore his
frequent attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void, Potenciano failed
LEGAL PROFESSION
to find a replacement. He did not even ask complainant to hire another lawyer in
his stead. This Court agrees that the petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and
55210 appear to be poorly prepared and written. Having represented himself
capable of picking up the cudgels for the apparently lost cause of complainant
Potenciano should have carefully prepared the pleadings if only to establish the
justness of his representation. The little time involved is no excuse. Complainant
reposed full faith in him. His first duty was to file the best pleading within his
capability. Apparently Potenciano was more interested in getting the most out of
the complainant who was in a hopeless situation. He bragged about his
closeness to the judge concerned in one case and talked about the need to
"buy" the restraining order in the other. Worse still he got P10,000.00 as
alleged deposit in court which he never deposited. Instead he pocketed the
same. The pattern to milk the complainant dry is obvious. The allegation of
Potenciano that the P10,000 was given to him as fee for his services, is simply
incredible. Indeed, such amount is grossly disproportionate with the service he
actually rendered. And his failure to return even a portion of the amount upon
demand of complainant all the more bolsters the protestation of complainant that
Potenciano does not deserve to remain as an officer of the court.
Disposition Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano be guilty of the charges
against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for an
indefinite period until such time he can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated
himself as to deserve to resume the practice of law. Respondent is ordered to
return to complainant herein the sum of P11,000 with legal interest from the
date of this resolution until it is actually returned.
ALISBO V JALINDOON
GRINO-AQUINO; July 18, 1991
(kiyo miura)
FACTS
- 3/16/70: Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Atty. Jalandoon as his counsel
in an action to recover his share of the estate of the deceased sps Catalina
Sales and Restituto Gozuma w/c had been adjudicated to him under the
judgment of CC No. 4963 because Alisbo failed to file a motion for execution of
judgment in his favor w/in the reglementary 5-year period. The salient
provisions of the Contract for Professional Services (Exhibit A) between Alisbo
and Attorney Jalandoon were the following:
1. That respondent will decide whether or not to file a suit for the recovery of
Ramon Alisbo's share
2. That respondent will shoulder all expenses of litigation; and
3. As attorney's fees, respondent will be paid 50% of the value of the
property recovered.
- 4/18/70: respondent prepared a complaint w/ Ramon, Teotimo, and
Pacifico Alisbo as plaintiffs and Carlito Sales as defendant signed by him alone
(CC No. 9559); on the same day, he withdrew it and replaced it with a
complaint w/ Ramon as sole plaintiff and Teotimo and Pacifico impleaded as
defendants w/c respondent and Atty. Pablo signed as counsel
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- 12/8/71: an amended complaint was filed w/ Ramon, his judicial guardian
Norberto, and eight others as plaintiffs, signed by Atty. Pablo alone (10 years
after final judgment)
- 8/21/73: defendant Sales filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
action had prescribed
- 10/3/73: the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription
(though Ramon filed the complaint w/in the ten-year prescriptive period, it was
null and void since Ramon was insane and hence w/o capacity to sue)
- 1/2/74: complainants charged Jalandoon w/ having deliberately caused the
dismissal of CC No. 9559 and concealing the fact that he had been the former
legal counsel of Sales
- Jalandoon claims he only discovered his previous professional relationship
with Sales during the pre-trial on Oct. 6, 1972
ISSUE
WON Jalandoon is guilty of non-disclosure to client of adverse or conflicting
interest
HELD
- YES because:
1. Before filing the complaint, he had several interviews w/ Ramon and Norberto re:
CC No. 4963
2. He must have done research on the court records of CC No. 4963
3. For CC No. 9559, he had to inform himself of the personal circumstances
of defendant Sales
-w/ this knowledge, he should have declined employment by Alisbo due to
conflict of interest
- The actuations of respondent attorney violated Paragraphs 1 and 2, No. 6 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics which provide:
6. ADVERSE INFLUENCE AND CONFLICTING INTEREST
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the
circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection
with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of
this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him
to oppose. (pp. 14-15, Solicitor General's Report.)
-Jalandoon had delayed the filing of CC No. 9559, instead asking the court to
resolve the pending incidents in CC No. 4963. The first complaint w/ Ramon
and his brothers was only partially defective due to Ramon’s insanity; by making
Ramon the sole plaintiff in the second complaint, it was rendered wholly
defective and ineffectual in stopping the prescriptive period
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- Jalandoon alleges to have only found out about Ramon’s incapacity on July WON Atty. Tugade violation of subparagraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule
17, 1971, he only amended the complaint impleading his guardian as plaintiff 5 138 of the Rules of Court.4 Simply put, whether he failed to uphold the trust and
months . later when it had prescribed confidence conferred to him by his clients
Disposition It was more than simple negligence; the Court found respondent
guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity and was suspended for a period of 2 HELD
years. YES. [a] Respondent's act of executing and submitting an affidavit as exhibit
for Robert Leonido and Rowena Soriano advancing facts prejudicial to the case
NGAYAN V TUGADE
PER CURIAM; February 7, 1991 of his former clients demonstrates clearly an act of offensive personality against

(rean balisi) complainants, violative of the first part of paragraph (f), Section 20, Rate 138,
Rules of Court. Likewise, respondent's act of joining the adverse parties in

NATURE celebrating their victory over the dismissal of the case against them shows not

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Violation of subparagraphs (e) only his bias against the complainants but also constitutes a degrading act on

and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court the part of a lawyer. It was meant only to titillate the anger of complainants.
[b] Respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to

FACTS appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful

- Respondent, Atty. Faustino Tugade, had been complainants’ (Fulgencio, order, of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation

Tomasa and Bella Aurora Ngayan) counsel for a number of cases prior to this of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

complaint. Complainants asked Atty. Tugade to prepare an affidavit to be used IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF
as basis for a complaint to be filed against Mrs. Rowena Soriano and Robert LAW
Leonido as a consequence of the latter's unauthorized entry into complainants'
TINGA; July 30, 2004
(monch bacani)
dwelling. Without thoroughly reading the same, Mrs. Tomasa A. Ngayan
allegedly signed it because she was rushed to do the same. After signing, Mrs.
FACTS
Ngayan noted a paragraph which did not mention Leonido was with Soriano
- On August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain Castro,
when both suddenly barged into complainants' residence. Mrs. Ngayan allegedly
obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as Castro’s
told respondent about his omission and in front of her, Atty Tugade crossed out
counsel in said case. Castro’s property subject of the case, a parcel of land,
the paragraph she complained about and promised to make another affidavit.
was to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente.
Respondent was subsequently discharged by complainants as counsel. After
Castro, however, retained the right of redemption over the property for one
discharging respondent they found out that the name of Robert Leonido was not
year. The right of redemption could be exercised by paying the amount of the
included in the charge. This omission was however remedied by their new
judgment debt within the aforesaid period.
counsel. When the adverse parties Soriano and Leonido filed a motion for
- At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castro’s property for $500.00, the
reinvestigation of their case against herein complainants, Soriano and Leonido
amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him.
presented Ngayans’ first affidavit which contained herein respondent’s omission.
- On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maquera’s legal services
This was allegedly made by Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, a former classmate of
in the civil case involving Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with
respondent. It appears then that Atty. Tugade submitted an affidavit to the Court
Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter.
favorable to the cause of Soriano and Leonido. Further, it was found out that
- On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro’s right of redemption by
herein respondent attorney was also a lawyer of the brother of Robert Leonido
paying Benavente $525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter,
in an insurance company.
Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his name.
- On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C.
Chang for $320,000.00
- The Superior Court of Guam suspended Atty. Mosquera from the practice of
law for 2 years as he acquired his client’s property as payment for his legal
services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee

ISSUE

4
Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: "(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
"(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witnesses, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged"
LEGAL PROFESSION
for handling his client’s case. It was in violation of Rules 1.5 and 1.8(a) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in Guam.
- The IBP on the other hand, concluded that although the said court found
Maquera liable for misconduct, “there is no evidence to establish that he
committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines.” However, they suspended him
indefinitely for failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP.
ISSUE
WON Maquera’s acts in Guam constitute as grounds for suspension in the
Philippines
HELD
Yes.
- Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
“The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he
has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency
shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension”
- The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his client’s property
by exercising the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client in
payment of his legal services. Such transaction falls squarely under Article
1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 prohibits the lawyer’s acquisition by
assignment of the client’s property which is the subject of the litigation handled
by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, the prohibition extends to sales in legal
redemption.
- The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is
founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily
take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich
himself at the expense of his client.
- Mosquera’s acts are violative of a lawyer’s sworn duty to act with fidelity
toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 and Rule 1.01.
Disposition Atty. Mosquera is required to show cause within 15 days why he
should not be suspended or disbarred. For the meantime, he is suspended from
the practice of law for 1 year or until he shall have paid his membership dues,
whichever comes later.
SOLATAN V INOCENTES
TINGA; August 9, 2005
(jonas azura)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court
FACTS
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar Inocentes.
The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses
Genito, owners of an apartment complex when the Genito Apartments were
placed under sequestration by the PCGG. They represented the spouses Genito
before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment cases against non-
paying tenants occupying the Genito Apartments.
- Complainant’s sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. It appears that
she left for the States and her apartment was used by members of her family. A
complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed against her and a
decision was rendered in a judgment by default ordering her to vacate the
premises.
- Complainant was occupying said apartment when he learned of the judgment.
He informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange the execution of a new
lease contract by virtue of which he would be the new lessee of the apartment.
Atty. Inocentes referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of
ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito Apartments. During the meeting
with Atty. Camano, an verbal agreement was made in which complainant
agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his sister, including awarded
attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Complainant issued a check in the name of
Atty. Camano representing half of the attorney’s fees.
- Complainant failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in coordination
with Atty. Camano enforced the writ of execution and levied the properties found
in the subject apartment. Complainant renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to
release the levied properties and allow complainant to remain at the apartment.
Acting on Atty. Camano’s advice, complainant presented an affidavit of
ownership to the sheriff who released the levied items. However, a gas stove
was not returned to the complainant but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of
the Genito Apartments where he was temporarily staying.
- complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty.
Camano and Atty. Inocentes. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to suspend
Atty. Camano from the practice of law for 1 year and to reprimand Atty.
Inocentes for exercising command responsibility.
ISSUES
1. WON Atty. Camano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
2. WON Atty. Inocentes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD
1. YES
Ratio An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal representative for a
person without being retained. No employment relation was offered or accepted
in the instant case.
Reasoning Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires all
lawyers to observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their clients.
Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest
LEGAL PROFESSION
conflicting with that of his client may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, the
advice given by Atty. Camano in the context where the complainant was the
rightful owner of the incorrectly levied properties was in consonance with his
duty as an officer of the court. It should not be construed as being in conflict
with the interest of the spouses Genito as they have no interest over the
properties. The act of informing complainant that his properties would be
returned upon showing proof of his ownership may hint at infidelity to his clients
but lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal.
2. YES
Ratio His failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the
charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. As name practitioner of the
law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to make reasonable
efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in conformity to the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Reasoning Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the
latter’s dealings with complainant. This is the linchpin of his supervisory capacity
over Atty. Camano and liability by virtue thereof. Partners and practitioners who
hold supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in
apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by
persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting
necessary efforts to foreclose violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by persons under their charge.
Disposition Petition granted. Sanction on Atty. Camano is affirmed. Atty.
Inocentes is admonished with the warning that repetition of the same or similar
omission will be dealt with more severely.
LEGARDA V COURT OF APPEALS
PER CURIAM; June 10, 1992
(ajang pineda)
FACTS
- Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint for a specific performance
with damages filed by private respondent New Cathay House Inc (NCHI). The
complaint is aimed at compelling Victoria Legarda to sign a lease contract
involving her house and lot which Cathay House Inc. intended to use in
operating a restaurant. As prayed for in the complaint, the lower court issued a
TRO enjoining Victoria Legarda and her agents from stopping the renovation of
the property.
- Thereafter, Antonio Coronel of the Coronel Law office entered his appearance
as counsel for Legarda.
- He filed an urgent motion for extension of 10 days which was granted by the
court. However, Legarda was not able to file her answer within the 10 days
given so she was declared in default, thereby paving way for the presentation of
evidence ex parte
- The lower court then rendered a decision by default leaving Legarda on the
losing end. Upon appeal, the CA found the petition unmeritorious and
dismissed it. It said, “It is our belief that this case is one of pure and simple
negligence on the part of the defendant’s counsel, who simply failed to file the
answer in behalf of the defendant.”
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- But inspite of the CA’s tirade on his professional competence, Atty. Coronel
did not lift a finger to file a motion for reconsideration, neither did he initiate
moves towards an appeal on the decision which was adverse and prejudicial to
his client. Thus the CA decision became final.
- Victoria Legarda then got a new lawyer and won the case.
- The court then required Atty. Coronel to show cause w/in 10 days from
notice why he should not be held administratively liable for his acts and
omissions w/c resulted in grave injustice to petitioner.
- He filed for another 30-day extension. Then another 30-day extension. Not
filed in time, the 2nd motion was denied
ISSUE
WON Atty. Colorado was negligent thus violating Canon 18 of the Professional
Code of Responsibility
HELD
Yes.
- Atty. Colorado violated Canon 18 which states that “A lawyer shall serve his
client w/ competence and diligence” specifically Canon 18.03, “a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.”
- This is not the only case wherein in dealing w/ the court’s orders, Atty.
Coronel appears to exhibit a pattern of negligence, inattention to his obligations
as counsel, sloppiness and superciliousness. In Imelda Marcos vs PCGG, the
court imposed a fine on him after he was found guilty of negligence
Ratio
- Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice
in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong disturbing criticisms are being hurled
at the legal profession, strict compliance w/ one’s oath of office and the canons
of professional ethics is an imperative.
- Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond
reproach in dealing w/ their clients. The profession is not synonymous w. an
ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest.
ENDAYA V OCA
TINGA; September 3, 2003
(ajang pineda)
NATURE
A complaint filed by Artemio Andaya against Atty. Wilfredo Oca for violation of
the lawer’s oath and for professional delinquency or infidelity
FACTS
- Nov. 7, 1991 - a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against Endaya
and his spouse, Patrosenia Endaya. The complaint was filed by Apolonia
Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez and Dominador Hernandez
- Dec. 13, 1991 – the Endaya couple filed their answer which was prepared by
a certain Isaias Ramirez. A preliminary conference was conducted w/c the
couple attended w/o counsel. During the conference, complainant categorically
LEGAL PROFESSION
admitted that plaintiffs were the declared owners for taxation purposes of the
land involved in the case
- Thereafter, the complainant couple sought services of the public attorney’s
office in Batangas City wherein the respondent attorney was assigned to handle
the case
- At the continuation of the preliminary conference, respondent appeared as
counsel; he also moved for the amendment of the answer previously filed by the
couple, but his motion was denied
- the court thereafter ordered the parties to submit their affidavits and position
papers w/in 10 days from receipt of order – but the respondent failed to do so.
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs
were not the real parties in interest
- The plaintiffs appealed the decision. The RTC directed the parties to file
their memoranda. Once again, the respondent failed to do so. The courts
original decision was reversed and set aside.
Petitioners' Claim
- Having lost the case, the complainant filed this administrative issue for
professional delinquency consisting of his failure to file the required pleadings.
The complainants contend that due to respondent’s inaction, he lost the
opportunity to present his cause and ultimately, the case itself
Respondents' Comments
- respondent denies this and stresses that he was not the original counsel of
the couple
- he avers that when he agreed to represent complainant at the continuation of
the preliminary conference in the main case, it was for the sole purpose of
asking leave of court to file an amended answer bec, he was made to believe
that it was made by a non-lawyer. When found out that it was actually made
by lawyer, he asked the court to relieve him as the couple’s counsel, but he
was denied.
- He also asserts that he purposely did not file a rejoinder believing in good
faith that it wasn’t anymore necessary
ISSUE
WON Atty. Oca (respondent) violated the lawyer’s oath through his professional
deliquency
HELD
Yes.
- His failure to file the affidavits did not prejudice his clients for the court
nevertheless rendered a decision favorable to them. But failure to do so per se
is a violation of Rule 18.03
- The respondent did not submit the affidavits and position paper when
required by the MCTC. With his resolution not to file the pleadings already
firmed up, he did not bother to inform the MCTC of his resolution in mockery of
the authority of the court
- Respondent’s stubborn and uncaring demeanor surfaced again when he did
not file a rejoinder to complainant’s reply
Ratio
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- The lawyer’s oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every
member of the legal fraternity. From it springs the lawyer’s duties and
responsibilities that any infringement thereof can cause his disbarment,
suspension or other preliminary action
- Canon 18: A lawyer shall serve his client w/ competence and diligence
- Much is demanded from those who engage in the practice of law because
they have a duty not only to their clients but also to the court, to the bar and to
the public. The lawyer’s diligence and dedication to his work and profession not
only promote the interest of his client, it likewise help attain the ends of justice
by contributing to the proper and speedy administration of cases, maintain
respect to the legal profession.
- The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show respondent’s
failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer
BLANZA V ARCANGEL
BENGZON; September 5, 1967
(javi bautista)
NATURE
Original Proceeding in the Supreme Court. Disciplinary action.
FACTS
- On April, 1955, Atty. Arcangel volunteered to help them in their respective
pension claims in connection with the death of their husbands, both P.C.
soldiers. They handed Arcangel pertinent documents and also affixed their
signatures on blank papers. After which, they noticed that respondent lost
interest and no progress was made. After 6 years they finally asked respondent
to return the said documents but the latter refused. Upon questioning by Fiscal
Rana to whom the case was referred by the Solicitor General respondent
admitted having received the documents but explained that it was for
photostating purposes only. His failure to immediately return them was due to
complainants’ refusal to hand him money to pay for the photostating costs which
prevented him from withdrawing the documents. Anyway, he had already
advanced the expenses himself and turned over the documents to the fiscal.
- Fiscal found respondents explanation satisfactory and recommended the
respondents exoneration. However, Sol Gen feels that respondent deserves at
least a severe reprimand considering 1) his failure to attend to complainants
pension claims for 6 years; 2) his failure to immediately return the documents
despite repeated demands upon him, and 3) his failure to return to complainant
Pasion, allegedly all of her documents.
ISSUE
WON Atty. Arcangel is guilty of professional non-feasance
HELD
No. Respondent’s explanation for the delay in filing the claims in returning the
documents has not been controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they
admitted that respondent asked them to shoulder the photostating expenses but
they did not give him any money. Hence, complainants are partly to blame.
LEGAL PROFESSION
Moreover, the documents and their photostats were actually returned by
respondent during the fiscal’s investigation with him paying for the photostating
costs himself. As for the alleged failure of the respondent to all her documents
to complainant Pasion, the former denies this. the affidavit of Mrs. Blanza
pardoning respondent cannot prejudice complainant Pasion because res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Complainant Pasion had another opportunity
to substantiate her charges in a hearing but she let it go. Neither she nor her
counsel of record appeared. Thus, the Curt refused to take disciplinary action
against respondent due to lack of clear preponderance of evidence
substantiating the accusations against him.
- Nevertheless the Court also stated that “we cannot but counsel against his
actuations as a member of the bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive
role in the community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of
the statute. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community looked
up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence,
especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional services.
Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to
have complainants wait and hope, for 6 long years in their pension claims.
Upon their refusal to co-operate, he should have terminated their professional
relationship rather than keep them hanging. And although we voted that he not
be reprimanded, in a legal sense, let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of
what the high standards of his chosen profession require of him.”
ABAY V MONTESINO
PANGANIBAN; December 4, 2003
NATURE
Original Proceeding in the Supreme Court. Disciplinary action.
FACTS
- June 21, 2002 - Eduardo T. Abay charges Atty. Raul T. Montesino with gross
negligence, gross incompetence and evident bad faith, in violation of his oath as
a member of the Philippine bar
- Negros Institute of Technology (NIT), of which Abay is a stockholder, hired
Montesino as counsel in an action for “Cancellation of Title of Ownership,
Recovery of Ownership and Possession and Damages with Preliminary
Injunction” against the estate of Vicente T. Galo
- April 27, 1995 - RTC dismissed the civil case.
- November 3, 1995 - Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment of dismissal
was denied by the trial court
- Although Montesino filed a Notice of Appeal with CA, he failed to submit an
appellant’s brief and in March 19, 1999, CA dismissed the appeal with the
following admonition:
“We made a warning in our Resolution dated as early as October 20,
1998 that no further extension will be entertained. Precisely because of
non-submission of the Brief, we directed, on January 8, 1998, the
dismissal of the appeal. This is not to mention the fact that a total of 120
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
days extension, over and above the 45-day reglementary period, had
already been granted …We cannot see any reason why the court’s
admonishing for a limited time to do compliance does not apply to this
case now before Us.”
- Abay attributes the failure of Montesino to submit the brief to the latter’s gross
negligence and evident bad faith
- Montesino allegedly abandoned the appeal without the knowledge and consent
of the NIT and supposedly never told NIT that its appeal had already been
dismissed thus the complaint
- Montesino answered (October 29, 2002) that
1. pending appeal, he discovered that the property that it was seeking to
recover had been the subject of another case which was a result of the
overlapping transfers of rights effected by the heirs of Vicente Galo
2. he felt that to pursue the appeal would be “dilatory, expensive, frivolous
and taxing to the precious time of the CA and it was wise to advise the
stockholders of the NIT to abandon the appeal and instead file appropriate
Complaints against Grandea, et al to recover NIT’s claimed properties
3. complainant was unjustly adamant in his demand to continue with the
appeal despite legal advice and since he sincerely felt that the best way to
protect the rights of NIT was to file appropriate complaints, he allowed the
period to submit NIT’s Appellant’s Brief to lapse
4. although NIT did not pay his legal fees or reimburse him for his
expenses, he still faithfully performed his duty during the entire time he
served as its counsel
- April 24, 2003 – IBP Report by San Juan found respondent guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility because:
1. not able to justify his failure to file the brief.
> if respondent actually believed it was futile to pursue the appeal, why
did he request from CA numerous extensions of time to file
2. Montesino admits that after he advised NIT and herein complainant on
the futility of pursuing the appeal, the latter expressed the wish to continue
the appeal
> should have given due importance to the decision of his client to avail of
a legal remedy available to it under the legal system
3. recommended suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
months, with a warning that a harsher penalty would be meted out for a
similar infraction in the future
ISSUE
WON pursuing methods not according to the client’s wish and consent deserves
sanction
HELD
YES and SC agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Reasoning
- The legal profession is invested with public trust. Its goal is to render public
service and secure justice for those who seek its aid. They must perform their
four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients in
LEGAL PROFESSION
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession, as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Any conduct found wanting in these
considerations, whether in their professional or private capacity, shall subject
them to disciplinary action.
Failure of respondent to file the appellant’s brief was a clear violation of his
professional duty to his client
- The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their
clients with competence and diligence. Rules 18.03 and 18.04 specifically
provide:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.
- Client and lawyer disagreed on the legal course to be taken regarding the
appealed case. The lawyer advised the client to abandon the appeal and to
consider the other available remedies but the client wanted to pursue it. Feeling
that he was “unjustly adamant” in wanting to do so, the lawyer contrary to the
desire of the client deemed it wise to abandon the appeal without informing his
client and not filing an appellant’s brief is prejudicial because such failure could
result in the dismissal of the appeal.
- The conduct of shows that he failed to exercise due diligence, and that he had
a cavalier attitude towards the cause of his client. The abandonment by the
former of the latter’s cause made him unworthy of the trust that his client
reposed in him. Even if respondent was “honestly and sincerely” protecting the
interests of complainant, the former still had no right to waive the appeal without
the latter’s knowledge and consent.
- If indeed respondent felt unable or unwilling to continue his retainership, he
should have properly withdrawn his appearance and allowed the client to
appoint another lawyer.
- Moreover, the appellate court noted that respondent failed to file the
appellant’s brief despite being granted several extensions of time to file it. He
therefore violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates that
lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so
- We emphasize that all lawyers owe fidelity to their client’s cause. Regardless
of their personal views, they must present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law in support of that cause.
Disposition Atty. Raul T. Montesino is found guilty of negligence and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of
this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
QUIRANTE V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
REGALADO; January 31, 1989
NATURE
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
Appeal by certiorari to review the judgment of the IAC
FACTS
- Atty. John QUIRANTE is the counsel of Dr. Indalecio CASASOLA in a case
involving a contract with a building contractor named Norman GUERRERO, who
failed to perform his part of the contract within the period specified. Dr.
Casasola also sued PHILAMGEN, (The Philippine American General Insurance
Co. Inc.) which acted as bondsman for Guerrero.
- Oct 16, 1981 – RTC Manila ruled in favor of CASASOLA by rescinding the
contract. It ordered Guerrero and Philamgen to pay actual damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages, liquidated damages, amount of surety bond,
and attorney’s fees (P30T). It also denied MFR filed by Philamgen on Nov 4,
1982.
(During this period, Dr. CASASOLA died, leaving his widow and several
children as survivors.)
- Philamgen brought the case to the appellate court, and the IAC, on May 4,
1983, dismissed petition for quashal of the writ of execution. The case was
then elevated to SC and is now still pending.
- June 18, 1983 – QUIRANTE filed a motion for the confirmation of his
attorney’s fees, which was granted by the RTC. RTC also denied MFR filed by
the opposing party. But the IAC reversed the decision of RTC (IAC granted
petition for certiorari filed CASASOLA heirs.) Hence, QUIRANTE filed this
appeal by certiorari in the SC.
Petitioners’ Claims
- There was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with
regard to his attorney's fees, which agreement was allegedly confirmed in
writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. de Casasola, and the two daughters of the
deceased, Mely Garcia and Virginia Nazareno.
- The attorney's fees would then be computed as follows:
(A). In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees
of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.
(B). In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the
P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I.
Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
IAC’s ruling
- “Firstly, there is still pending in the Supreme Court a petition which may or
may not ultimately result in the granting to the Casasola family of the total
amount of damages given by RTC. Hence the award of damages may be
premature. Secondly, assuming that the grant of damages to the family is
eventually ratified, the alleged confirmation of attorney's fees will not and should
not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto.”
ISSUES
1. WON confirmation of attorney’s fees is premature
2. WON IAC correctly ruled that the alleged confirmation of attorney's fees
would not be binding on all heirs
HELD
LEGAL PROFESSION
1. YES
Ratio An attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has
been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The
issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from
which the fee is to be paid.
Reasoning Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees
may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety and
amount of attorney’s fees should be held in abeyance. This is especially true
given the subsequent developments in the civil case against Guerrero and
PHILAMGEN: On May 21, 1987, the SC rendered judgment setting aside the
May 1983 decision of IAC.
- Also, the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis for their fees
provides that the recovery of the amounts claimed is subject to certain
contingencies.
Obiter Counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very
action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate
action. If the first alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim,
even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for the
jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees
is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been
rendered. Also, there is the assumption that the court trying the case is to a
certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's
services.
- However, what is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is
different from attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under Article
2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not
of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who
may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution. Here, the petitioner's
claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services, with them as
the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors.
- In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to
assert their claims in the same action. This is also a proper remedy under our
jurisprudence.
2. NO
Reasoning This decision is also pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary
matters that may be presented for consideration by the trial court. “The orderly
administration of justice dictates that such issue be likewise determined by the
trial court inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same contingencies in
determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorney's
fees.”
Disposition Decision of IAC is affirmed except for the portion which holds that
the alleged confirmation to attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-
signatories thereto.
TANHUECO V DE DUMO
PER CURIAM; April 25, 1989
NATURE
Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
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FACTS
- On February 24, 1975, complainant Hilaria Tanhueco filed before the Court a
petition for Disbarment against respondent Justininao G. de Dumo for having
violated the Canons of Professional Ethics by his a0 refusal to remit her money
collected by him from debtors of the complainant; and b) refusal to return
documents entrusted to him as counsel of complainant in certain collection
cases.
SOLICITOR-GENERAL’S REPORT:
Evidence for Complainant
- Complainant secured the legal services of respondent to collect indebtedness
from her different debtors. Although she offered to execute a document
evidencing their lawyer-client relationship, respondent told her that it was not
necessary. She nonetheless offered to give him 15% of what he may be able to
collect from the debtors.
- Complainant also declared that respondent borrowed from her P2,000.00,
P1,300.00 and P3,000.00 on three separate occasions, but she could not
remember when she gave those amounts. Respondent did not pay those loans.
- Respondent filed cases against her debtors and that one of them, Constancia
Manosca, paid P12,500.00 to respondent. Informed of such payment by
Manosca herself, complainant confronted respondent but the latter denied
having received payment from any of her debtors. Complainant then brought the
matter to the attention of Malacanang which referred her to Camp Crame.
Notwithstanding subsequent demands of complainant for the money, respondent
had refused to give her the amount.
Evidence for Respondent
- Complainant indeed secured services of respondent to collect from her
debtors, with the agreement that he gets 50% of what he may be able to
collect. He thus filed cases against Tipace, Manosca, Morena, Jr., and others,
and was able to obtain favorable judgment in the cases against Manosca,
Tipace and Leonila Mendoza. The initial payments made by these judgment-
debtors were all given to complainant. With respect to Manosca, respondent
obtained a judgment for P19,000.00 although the debt was only P12,000.00.
- Respondent also declared that complainant was influenced by her debtors,
who were also her friends, into distrusting him. Ultimately, because comlainant
filed a complaint against him, he terminated his relationship with complainant
and demanded his attorney’s fees equivalent to 50% of what he had collected.
Complainant refused to pay him, hence, he did not also turn over to her the
P12,000.00 initial payment of Manosca, which he considered, or applied, as
part payment of his attorney’s fee. Respondent estimated his attorney’s fee due
from complainant in the amount of P17,000.00
- Respondent denied having borrowed the amounts of P2,000.00, P1,300.00,
P3,000.00 and P1,000.00, pointing out that complainant did not even have
money to pay him so that he handled the cases for her on contingent basis. He
also denied having received documentary evidence from the complainant. What
evidence he had were all gathered by him on his initiative.
Findings and Recommendation
LEGAL PROFESSION
- Both respondent and complainant admit of an attorney-client relationship
between them.
- Respondent also admitted having received P12,000.00 from judgment-debtor
Constancia Manosca, without turning over the amount to his client, complainant
herein, and applying it instead as part of his attorney’s fees.
- Undoubtedly, respondent’s failure to account for the P12,000.00,
representing payment of the judgment-debt of Manosca constitutes
unprofessional conduct and subjects him to disciplinary action.
- As regards the charges that respondent received documents evidencing the
debts to complainant and had refused to return them to the latter, and that
respondent also borrowed some amounts from her, there is no competent,
conclusive evidence to support them. Perforce, such allegations have no factual
basis.
- It is recommended that respondent be severely reprimanded and admonished
that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
(To this recommendation, the Court does not agree)
ISSUES
1. WON respondent violated Canon 11 (now Canon 16) regarding trust of
client’s moneys
2. WON respondent violated Canon 13 (now Canon 20) regarding attorney’s
fees.
HELD
1) Ratio Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his
client, constitute trust funds and must be immediately paid over to the client.
Reasoning When respondent withheld and refused to deliver the money
received by him for his client, the deceased complainant Hilaria Tanhueco, he
breached the trust reposed upon him. The fact that a lawyer ahs a lien for fees
on moneys in his hands collected for his client, does not relieve him from his
duty to promptly account for the moneys received; his failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct.
In the present case, what respondent could have properly done was to make an
accounting with his client, the complainant, deduct his attorney’s fees due in
respect of the amount actually collected by him, and turn over the remaining
balance to the complainant.
2) Ratio Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. But when it is shown
that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised
by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the
compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved
party.
Reasoning Respondent claimed that he charged complainant, his client, a
contingent fee of 1) 50% of the sum of principal and interest collected from
different debtors; and 2) attorney’s fees charged to the defendant and “not to
be included in the computation.”
Under this scheme, respondent was actually collecting as attorney’s fees more
than half of the total amount due from defendant debtors. The contingent fee
here is grossly excessive.
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And there is reason to believe that fraud was committed –complainant was an
old and sickly woman and, in respondent’s words, “penniless.” She was already
76 yrs. old when she filed the complaint. In her circumstance, and given her
desire to realize debts owed to her before death took over, she would easily
succumb to the demands of respondent attorney regarding his attorney’s fees.
In Mambulao Lumber Company v PNB, it was explained that the principle that
courts should reduce stipulated attorney’s fees whenever it is found under the
circumstances of the case that the same is unreasonable is deeply rooted in this
jurisdiction.
A lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of assisting the court
in administering impartial justice between the parties, and hence, the fees
should be subject to judicial control.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved that:
1. respondent is guilty of violation of the attorneys’ oath and of
serious professional misconduct and shall be SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six months and WARNED that repetition of the same or
similar offense will be more severely dealt with;
2. the attorney’s fees that respondent is entitled to in respect of
collection cases here involved shall be an amount equivalent to fifteen
percent of the total amount collected by respondent from the debtors in
those cases;
3. respondent shall return forthwith to the estate of complainant
Hilaria Tanhueco, the P12,000.00 respondent received on behalf of his
client less attorney’s fees due to him in respect of that amount
(P12,000.00 less fifteen percent thereof) or a net amount of
P10,200.00; and
4. respondent shall return to the estate of complainant Hilaria
Tanhueco any documents and papers received by him from the deceased
complainant in connection with the collection cases for which he was
retained. If he has in fact made any other collections from deceased
complainant’s debtors, he shall promptly account therefore to
complainant’s estate and shall be entitled to receive in respect thereof the
fifteen percent attorney’s fees provided for herein.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished each to the Bar Confidant and
spread on the personal record of respondent attorney, and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
ALBANO V COLOMA
FERNANDO; OCTOBER 11, 1967
NATURE
Original Action in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
Coloma was the counsel of Albano and his mother during the Japanese
occupation. Albano alleged that after liberation and long after the courts had
been reorganized Coloma failed to expedite the hearing and termination of their
civil case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another
lawyer. He also claimed that Coloma intervened in the case to collect her
LEGAL PROFESSION
attorney’s fees. Coloma denied that she did nothing to expedite the hearing and
termination of the civil case as the record would show that she filed “more than
20 papers and pleadings; went to trial for several days and, with the assistance
of her sister who was also a lawyer, obtained a favorable judgment in the Court
of First Instance for the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs; and filed with the Court
of Appeals a 35-page brief, finished after careful, conscientious, and exhaustive
study and preparation.” She likewise denied that she could have been removed
for her failure to comply with the obligations as counsel as she served “faithfully,
efficiently, continuously, and to the best of her knowledge and capacity.” Her
dismissal then, according to her, was made without just cause and without her
consent and only when she had already won the case for them in the Court of
First Instance and in the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
WON Coloma may recover attorney’s fees
HELD
Yes. Any counsel who is worthy of his hire is entitled to be fully recompensated
for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill,
acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time
and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any
attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic
if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he
represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is
determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every effort of those
benefited by counsel’s services to deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium.
Such an attitude deserves condemnation.
METROBANK V CA
REGALADO; January 23, 1990
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari impugning the decision of CA affirming order of
RTC, fixing attorney’s fees and directing petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (Metrobank) to pay its attorneys, private respondent Arturo Alafriz and
Associates, the amount of P936,000 as attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit5
basis.
FACTS
- Private respondent handled civil cases for the declaration of nullity of certain
deeds of sale, with damages, in behalf of Metrobank from March 1974 to
September 1983.
- Celedenio Javier bought 7 parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et
al. These were mortgaged by Javier with Metrobank to secure a loan obligation
of Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. Obligors
defaulted and Metrobank foreclosed the mortgages.
51
quantum meruit - (lit. “so much as he deserved”) cause of action for reasonable value of services rendered, or
occasionally of goods or materials provided, under circumstances in which there was no enforceable contract to pay for
them but it would be unfair to leave plaintiff uncompensated.
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- Alejandro brought suit against Javier and included Metrobank as defendant,
alleging deceit, fraud and misrepresentation committed against him by Javier.
- it was during the pendency of these suits that the lands were sold by
Metrobank to its sister corporation, Service Leasing Corporation, for
P600,000. On same day, properties were resold to Herby Commercial and
Construction Corporation for P2.5M. Herby then mortgaged the same properties
to Banco de Oro for P9.2M. Private respondent did not have knowledge of such
transactions.
- Aug 16, 1983 private respondent then filed a motion to enter the charging
lien6 in the records of the civil cases, pursuant to Sec 37, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, equivalent to 25% of the actual and current market values of the
litigated properties, as attorney’s fees.
- Alejandro et al filed a motion to dismiss their complaints, which lower court
granted.
- May 28, 1984, private respondent filed motion to fix its attorney’s fees, based
on quantum meruit. Metrobank manifested it had fully paid private respondent.
Private respondent, however, countered that the P50,000 given by petitioner
could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance, including
P14000 paid on Dec 15, 1980. It also appears that private respondent
attempted to arrange a compromise with Metrobank in order to avoid suit,
offering a compromise amount of P600,000 but negotiations were
unsuccessful.
- Oct 15, 1984, RTC issued an order granting payment of attorney’s fees,
P936,000, to private respondent. Respondent CA affirmed trial court’s order.
ISSUES
1. WON private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for
payment of its attorney’s fees.
2. WON a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien
3. WON private respondent is entitled to 25% of the actual and current market
values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.
HELD
1. NO. A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the payment of
attorney’s fees requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and
execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the
attorney in favor of his client.
- in this case, the dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor
made any monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of petitioner.
Private respondent’s supposed charging lien is thus without legal basis.
- an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon money due his
client form the adverse party in nay action or proceeding in which the attorney is
employed, but such lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of
the litigation. An attorney merely defeating recovery against his client as e
defendant is not entitled to a lien on the property involved in litigation for fees
6
Charging lien or attorney’s lien – a lien on money, papers, and property of a client in the hands of an attorney, or a lien
that an attorney may request from a court on a fund or judgment obtained for the client by the attorney’s efforts, to
secure payment of attorney’s fees.
LEGAL PROFESSION
and the court has no power to fix the fee of an attorney defending the client’s
title to property already in the client’s possession.
2. NO. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as
an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when
something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid.
- an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the
court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled.
This, however, applies only where the charging lien is valid and enforceable.
3. The Court refrained from resolving the third issue so as not to preempt or
interfere with the authority and adjudicative facility of the proper court to hear
and decide the controversy in a proper proceeding which may be brought by
private respondent.
NOTE: in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a
lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are
generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy (2) extent of
services rendered (3) professional standing of lawyer .
Disposition Petition for review is granted, decision of CA is reversed and set
aside, without prejudice to appropriate proceedings as may be brought by
private respondent to establish its right to attorney’s fees and the amount
thereof.
ROXAS V DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.
CHICO-NAZARIO: January 31, 2006
FACTS
- 1977, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation proceedings
against the Zuzuarreguis for parcels of land belonging to them situated in
Antipolo, Rizal with a total land area of 1, 790, 570.36
- The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and
Santiago N. Pastor
- They executed a Letter-Agreement dated April 22, 1983 which indicated that
the contingent fees that the lawyers will receive at P11 or more per square
meter is thirty percent of the just compensation
- The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued and on October 29, 1984, a
Partial Decision was rendered fixing the just compensation to be paid to the
Zuzuarreguis at P30 per square meter
- The NHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration for the lowering of the amount of
just compensation in accordance with applicable laws
- Pending the resolution of the MFR filed by the NHA, a joint special power of
attorney was executed by the Zuzuarreguis in favor of Attys. Roxas and Pastor
- On December 10, 1985, a Letter-Agreement was executed by and between
the Zuzuarreguis and Attys. Roxas and Pastor which fixed the just
compensation due the Zuzuarreguis at P17, and anything in excess of that shall
be the contingent fees of Attys. Roxas and Pastor for their legal services
- Resolution No. 1174 dated December 16, 1985, issued by the NHA, stated
that the property would be acquired at a cost of P19.50 per square meter and
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that it will be paid in NHA Bonds which the yield would be based on the Central
Bank rate at the time of the payment
- As a result of the NHA Resolution, a Compromise Agreement was executed
and it was approved by the Court in a Decision dated December 20, 1985.
- Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the property of the Zuzuarreguis was
expropriated at a total price of P34, 916, 122. The total amount released by
the NHA was P54, 500, 00. The difference of P19, 583, 878 is,
undoubtedly, the yield of the bonds.
- The amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to P30,
520, 000 in NHA bonds
- On August 25, 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel to
Attys. Roxas and Pastor demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis
the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days
from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action
- Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered stating that the amount that they go seems
huge from the surface but it just actually passed their hands.
- On September 29, 1987, a letter was again sent to Attys. Roxas and Pastor
formally terminating their services
- The Zuzuarreguis then filed a civil action for Sum of Money and Damages,
they demanded that the yield on the NHA bonds be turned over to them
- The RTC dismissed the complaint
- The Zuzuarreguis filed a Notice of Appeal
- The Court of Appeals ordered Attys. Roxas and Pastor to return to the
plaintiffs the amount of P12, 596, 425, already deducting the reasonable
attorney’s fees in the amount of P4,4 76,426.275
- Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a MFR
- The Zuzuarreguis also filed a MFR
- The NHA and Pedrosa also filed a MFR
- All MFRs were denied for lack of merit
- Attys. Roxas and Pastor then filed a petition for certiorari
ISSUES
1. WON the letter-agreement executed by the parties should stand as law
between them
2. WON the contingent fees were reasonable
HELD
1. Yes. A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one
binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service. The Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully gave
their consent thereto. In fact, it was them who sent the said letter to Attys.
Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming all matters which they had
agreed upon previously. There is absolutely no evidence to show that anybody
was forced into entering into the Letter-Agreement. It is basic that a contract is
the law between the parties.
2. No. Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive
contingent fees for their professional services.
LEGAL PROFESSION
Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states: a contract for
contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all
the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject t o the supervision of a court,
as to its reasonableness
Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
the guidelines by which a lawyer should determine his fees (see original)
- Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees is
the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is
excessive and unconscionable (Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice,
decency or reasonableness. Therefore, the power to determine the
reasonableness of attorney’s fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling
within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.
- In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which is
equal to 44% of the just compensation paid by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis.
Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case,
ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is undeniably excessive.
In the opinion of the Court, 87.17% of the yields of the bond should go to the
Zuzuarreguis computing from the amounts stipulated in the Letter-Agreement.
The remaining amount is what is due to Attys. Roxas and Pastor. The SC
affirms the decision of CA with modification in the computation of the attorneys’
contingent fees.
URBAN BANK, INC. V A TTY. MAGDALENO M.
PEÑA
PUNO; September 7, 2001
NATURE
Administrative Matter. Disbarment
FACTS
- Complainant charges that respondent is guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct in violation of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of Court.
- 1 December 1994, Complainant bought a parcel of land located along Roxas
Boulevard from the Isabela Sugar Company (“ISC” for brevity).
- One of the conditions of the sale was for ISC to cause the eviction of all the
occupants found in said property. This condition was incorporated in the
Contract to Sell and adopted in the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by and between ISC and Complainant.
- ISC hired Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña. He proceeded to take the necessary
steps to evict the occupants of the property subject of the sale.
- During the eviction process, Complainant was informed by ISC and Peña
about the necessity of a letter of authority in favor of the latter, granting him the
authority to represent the bank in maintaining possession of the aforesaid
property and to represent the bank in any court action that may be instituted in
connection with the exercise of said duty.
- Complainant acceded to the request and issued a letter-authority dated 15
December 1994, but only after making it very clear to Peña. that it was ISC
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which contracted his services and not Complainant.
- Peña then requested for a modification of said letter of authority by furnishing
Complainant with a draft containing the desired wordings (including the date,
i.e., 19 December 1994) and asking Complainant to modify the previous letter
by issuing a new one similarly worded as his draft.
- If only to expedite and facilitate matters, Complainant willingly obliged and re-
issued a new letter of authority to Respondent, this time incorporating some of
Peña’ s suggestions.
- Eventually, the eviction of the occupants of the property in question was
successfully carried out.
- After the lapse of more than thirteen (13) months, Peña filed a collection suit
against herein Complainant and its senior officers “for recovery of agent’s
compensation and expenses, damages and attorney’s fees” on the basis of the
letter given to him for the purposes of evicting the occupants.
- According to Complainant: Peña, knowing fully well the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of said letter of authority, constitutes deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Said provision enumerates the grounds for the suspension and
disbarment of lawyers, namely:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court, on
what grounds, - A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath of which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without any authority
to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)”
- Peña denied all the allegations and moved to dismiss the complaint.
- He added that there was no reason for him to deceive complainant into writing
a letter of authority because he knew very well that the verbal agreement was
sufficient to constitute an attorney-client relationship.
- We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation.
- The IBP decided in favor of Peña and recommended that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE
WON Peña should be disbarred on the ground of deceit, malpractice and
gross misconduct
HELD
NO.
Reasoning
***Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest, undertaken for public
LEGAL PROFESSION
welfare and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of the persons unfit to practice them.
- Complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show that respondent
really induced it, through machination or other deceitful means, to issue the
December 19 letter of authority ostensibly for the purpose of evicting illegal
occupants, then using the very same letter for demanding agent’s
compensation.
- No evidence in respect of the supposed deceit, malpractice or gross
misconduct was adduced by the complainant. It is one thing to allege deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct, and another to demonstrate by evidence the
specific acts constituting the same.
- The letter, from respondent’s own admission, just served to officially confirm
a done deal. It was, hence, utilized solely as documentary evidence to buttress
respondent’s assertion regarding the existence of the agency agreement.
(Respondent here is not suing by virtue of the letter of authority as what the
Complainant is saying, but grounded on the oral contract of agency the two
purportedly entered into.
- Indeed, respondent, with or without the letter, could have instituted a suit
against the complainant. There is no gainsaying that a verbal engagement is
sufficient to create an attorney-client relationship.
- Respondent can hardly be faulted and accused of deceit, malpractice and
gross misconduct for invoking the aid of the court in recovering recompense for
legal services which he claims he undertook for the complainant, and which the
latter does not deny to have benefited from. Indeed, what he did was a lawful
exercise of a right.
Disposition The disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Magdaleno M.
Peña is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
CORPUZ V CA
DAVIDE; January 26, 1998
NATURE
Petition to set aside the decision of CA which reversed the resolution of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), the latter declaring that petitioner’s separation from
the service as Atty V in the MTRCB was not in order and directed that he be
automatically restored to his position.
FACTS
- Atty Corpuz was appointed MTRCB’s legal counsel – Prosecutor and
Investigation Services (Supervising Legal Staff Officer). The appointment was
approved by the Asst Regional Director of the CSC-NCR. Subsequently, he was
designated Attorney V under the Salary Standardization Law.
- August 1991, the MTRCB passed MTRCB Resolution No. 8-1-91 5 entitled
"An Act To Declare The Appointments Of The Administrative And Subordinate
Employees Of This Board As Null And Void." This undated resolution noted that
the past and present Chairmen of the MTRCB had failed to submit for approval
the appointments of administrative and subordinate employees to the MTRCB
before forwarding them to the CSC, in violation of Section 5 of P.D. No. 876-A,
and later, P.D. No. 1986.
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- CORPUZ was unaware of the promulgation of Resolution No. 8-1-91 as he
was then on leave. The Resolution was likewise kept secret and it was only on
12 March 1993 that an announcement 8 of its contents was posted by an Ad
Hoc Committee on the MTRCB bulletin board. This announcement invited the
submission of any information concerning the appointments involved therein to
the Committee. It appears, however, that nothing was immediately done to
implement Resolution No. 8-1-91.
- At the MTRCB meeting of 19 January 1993, MTRCB Chair Mendez was
informed about Resolution No. 8-1-91. An Ad Hoc Committee composed of
MTRCB members was then constituted to look into the appointments extended
by former Chairman Morato, as well as the qualifications of the appointees.
- The Committee resolved to recommend to the MTRCB the approval of the
appointments, except that of Corpuz and seven others
- On 27 July 1993, Corpuz and one Larry Rigor filed a complaint with the CSC
requesting a formal investigation and hearing. In her comment to the complaint,
Mendez stated that she discovered that the appointments extended by Morato
were not submitted to the MTRCB for approval pursuant to Section 5(c) of P.D.
No. 1986; hence to cure the defect, she submitted the appointments to the
MTRCB.
- On 31 August 1993, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 93-3509 granting
the MTRCB authority to fill up positions vacated in the agency due to
appointments, which were not submitted to the MTRCB for approval. In the
Resolution of the CSC dated December 23, 1993, they ruled that: The
appointment of Atty. Corpuz, if defective, could have been the subject of a direct
action for revocation or recall which may be brought to the Commission within a
reasonable period of time after its approval. . . Since no such action was filed
with the Commission, we can safely state that Corpuz had already acquired
security of tenure in the said position. Hence, the Commission can not allow the
current Board's disapproval of the said appointment to produce any effect. Atty.
Corpuz can no longer be separated from the service except for cause and after
observing the requirements of due process.
- The MTRCB filed with us a special civil action for certiorari, which we referred
to the CA in view of Republic Act No. 7902. In its decision, the CA declared
null and void Resolution No. 93-5964 of the CSC, ruling that since the
appointment of Corpuz was not approved by the MTRCB, the appointment was
invalid and he could not invoke security of tenure. The record shows that the
appointment of Corpuz was not approved by the Board, as mandated by PD
1986 Sec16. As such, he cannot invoke the security of tenure, even if he has
rendered service for a number of years.
- Corpuz filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed an
instant petition under Rule 45 RoC and asked the Court to reverse the decision
of CA on the ground that: “THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF PETITIONER ATTY. DAVID B. CORPUZ DID
NOT HAVE THE APPROVAL OF THE MTRCB BOARD WHICH IF NOT
CORRECTED, IS TANTAMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO SECURITY OF TENURE”
- In his memorandum, he declared that he is no longer seeking reinstatement
but for the continuity of his government service from the time he was illegally
LEGAL PROFESSION
dismissed up to the time he was permanently employed with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
ISSUE
WON Corpuz can invoke security of tenure
HELD
Ratio
No, he cannot invoke security of tenure.
Reasoning
- There are two stages in the process of appointing MTRCB personnel, other
than its Secretary, namely: (a) recommendation by the Chairman which is
accomplished by the signing of the appointment paper, which is among his
powers under Section 5(d); and (b) approval or disapproval by the MTRCB of
the appointment.
- It is long settled in the law of public offices and officers that where the power
of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon, no
further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the
appointment, the commission, may issue at once. Where, however, the assent
or confirmation of some other officer or body is required, the commission can
issue or the appointment may be complete only when such assent or
confirmation is obtained. In either case, the appointment becomes complete
when the last act required of the appointing power is performed. Until the
process is completed, the appointee can claim no vested right in the office nor
invoke security of tenure.
- A public official or employee who assumed office under an incomplete
appointment is merely a de facto officer for the duration of his occupancy of the
office for the reason that he assumed office under color of a known appointment
which is void by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise.
Undeniably, under the facts here, CORPUZ was such a de facto officer.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision of 13 October 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP-No.
37694 is AFFIRMED.
HILADO V DAVID
TUASON;1949
NATURE
Original action. Certiorari
FACTS
- Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action Against Selim Jacob Assad to
annul the sale of several houses and lot executed by her now deceased
husband during the Japanese occupation.
- In the course of the case, Hilado consulted respondent Vicente J. Francisco
with regard the case filed against Assad despite the fact that she had previously
retained a different set of lawyers to act on her behalf. Francisco claims that at
the time, he already advised her that her case cannot prosper on the basis of
what was told him by her.
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- In any case, Hilado brought to his office documents related to the case.
Francisco claims that these documents were received by his assistant. Atty
Agrava. When advised of the same, he instructed Atty. Agrava to return the
documents as the firm will not handle her case against Assad.
- Atty Agrava thought that in returning the documents a proper explanation be
made as to why the firm is not taking her case. Atty. Francisco signed the letter
to Hilado without reading the same.
- On January 28, 1946, Atty Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of
record for Assad in the case instituted by Hilado.
- On May 29, 1946, the lawyers of Hilado wrote Francisco urging him to
discontinue representing Assad on the grounds that he was consulted by Hilado
with regard to her case. and that during the consultation, certain documents
were turned over to him.
- When Francisco did not reply, Hilado’s lawyers, on her behalf, filed this
original action.
ISSUE
WON Francisco should be disqualified from representing his clients against
Hilado
HELD
Ratio
- Yes. Based on the facts, a relationship of attorney and client between
Francisco and Hilado ensued when he issued the written opinion to Hilado. The
letter binds and estops him in acting for others against Hilado.
Reasoning
- The SC noted that it is in the interest in the administration of justice that
lawyers are viewed without reproach in their actuations. Hence, even if it were
true that what was given to Francisco were facts that were already public
knowledge, there is no way of knowing if this was in fact the case.
- In citing jurisprudence on the matter, the court held that a lawyer is engaged
professionally when he is just in fact listening to a client’s preliminary statement
of his case or when he is giving advice thereon. That formality is not the
essence of employment.
- The fact that the action against Francisco was brought four months after he
filed in appearing in the case does not operate as a waiver of Hilado’s right to
ask for his disqualification. The confidence once reposed cannot be divested by
expiration of professional employment. The Court also stated that in matters of
the practice of law the jurisdiction of the court is pervasive. This flows from the
fact that lawyers are officers of the court where they practice, forming a part of
the machinery of the law for the administration of justice and as such are
subject to the disciplinary authority of the court.
- The Court then expounded on the nature of the “retaining fee” as a means of
compensating the lawyer who was asked to give professional advise to the
detriment of the lawyer not being able to act as counsel for the other side, even
if he has declined to perform the services required by the original client. The
fee is separate from the fee that a client is obligated to pay the lawyer for the
services which he was retained to perform.
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
- the complainant then filed this complaint for disbarment, praying also that an
GENATO V SILAPAN administrative sanction be meted against respondent for his issuance of a
PUNO, July 14, 2003
bouncing check
Respondent’s Side
NATURE
- It was complainant who offered him an office space in his building and
Complaint for disbarment
retained him as counsel as the latter was impressed with the way he handled a
B.P. 22 case filed against complainant.
FACTS
- There was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest business practices
Complainant’s Side
to complainant and his revelation of complainant’s desire to bribe government
- July 1992, respondent allegedly asked the complainant if he could rent a
officials in relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made
small office space in complainant’s building in Quezon City for his law practice.
these statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and
Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay,
discredit complainant’s credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to
complainant’s retained lawyer, who accommodated respondent in the building
commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty of
and made him handle some of complainant’s cases.
breaking his confidential lawyer-client relationship with complainant as he made
- Respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from
the disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.
complainant which he intended to use as down payment for the purchase of a
- Respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage in favor of
new car. In return, respondent issued to complainant a postdated check in the
complainant without consideration and only as a “formal requirement” so he
amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan.
could obtain the P200,000.00 loan and for this reason, he did not surrender
He likewise mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did
his title over the mortgaged property to complainant.
not surrender its title claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution
- Respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not for account or for
proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
value, but only: (a) to serve as “some kind of acknowledgment” that he already
- The respondent bought the car but the document of sale was issued in the
received in advance a portion of his attorney’s fees from the complainant for the
complainant’s name and financed through City Trust Company.
legal services he rendered, and (b) as a form of assurance that he will not
- January 1993: respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel
abandon the cases he was handling for complainant.
Romero who wanted to borrow money from complainant. Complainant lent
- Respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from
Romero the money and, from this transaction, respondent earned commission in
Romero’s loan which he allegedly helped facilitate, alleging that the amount
the amount of P52,289.90. Complainant used the commission to pay
paid to him was for attorney’s fees. He used this amount to pay his arrears with
respondent’s arrears with the car financing firm.
the car financing firm. On January 29, 1993, before paying the next
- Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the
amortization on the car, he asked complainant to execute a deed of sale
financing firm sent demand letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash
transferring ownership of the car to him. Complainant refused and insisted that
respondent’s postdated check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored as
he would transfer ownership of the car only after the termination of his criminal
respondent’s account therein was already closed.
case which respondent was handling as his defense lawyer. Consequently,
- Respondent failed to heed complainant’s repeated demands for payment.
respondent stopped paying the amortization on the car. Respondent also
Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas
alleged that he filed a perjury case against complainant who, in turn, filed a
Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate
complaint for libel against him.
mortgage.
- October 27, 1993: the Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated
- In the foreclosure case, the respondent alleged that the complainant is
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
engaged in buy and sell of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and
- August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report of
shady deals, and has many cases pending in court, which the complainant
the investigating commissioner finding the respondent guilty as charged and
denied, adding that the allegations were libelous and were irrelevant to the
recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
foreclosure case. A particular allegation states that in one case, the complainant
would only give the respondent the document of sale of the car if the latter
ISSUES
would bribe the review committee of the DOJ for a case of the complainant.
1. WON the court has the jurisdiction to sanction respondent for his issuance of
According to the complainant, the allegation was, aside from being false,
the bouncing check
immaterial to the foreclosure case and maliciously designed to defame him, the
2. WON the respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing
respondent was also guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client
to complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainant’s alleged intention to
relationship and should be held administratively liable.
bribe government officials in connection with a pending case, and thus would be
sanctioned
LEGAL PROFESSION
HELD
1. NO, it is not for the Court to sanction respondent for his issuance of a
bouncing check, which would be determined by the trial court.
Ratio We shall not delve into the merits of the various criminal and civil cases
pending between the parties. It is for the trial courts handling these cases to
ascertain the truth or falsity of the allegations made therein.
2. YES, respondent’s allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure case
amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary
sanction against him.
Ratio A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients,
with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his
clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.
Reasoning Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is
not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional
character by a client, unless the latter consents.
-The obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the
inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and
does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the
party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other
change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
-However, the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or
information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly
within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to
those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. If the
unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant’s alleged intention
to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not
covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer
professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to
how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the
attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional
employment in the strict sense.
-The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not
pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it
against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter
of litigation therein and respondent’s professional competence and legal advice
were not being attacked in said case.
Disposition IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon
receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court
Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
DOMINGO V AQUINO
TEEHANKEE; April 29, 1971
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
NATURE
An original action for certiorari challenging a judgment of the Court of Appeals
as null and void for having been allegedly entered in excess of jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS
Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria and Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. were appointed co-
special administrators of the estate of Luis Domingo, Sr. Pedro Aquino filed a
money claim on the estate. CFI approved the money claim of Aquino. Both
parties appealed to the CA. CA affirmed CFI judgment with modifications in
favor of Aquino (allowed compounded interest). The estate's counsel in the CA,
Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the notice and copy of the judgment sent to
him by registered mail; but the estate's attorneys in the intestate proceedings
pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg, were
verbally informed by respondent's counsel of the judgment. Consuelo Domingo
de Lopez filed on March 9, 1967, with the CA an "Appearance with Motions for
Substitution and to be served with a copy of the Judgment," stating that
Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria had long resigned as special administratrix with
the permission of the intestate court, that Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. (who had
caused the prosecution of the appeal) was removed from his trust by the
intestate court, for having squandered cash funds of the estate, that, as a
consequence, she was appointed judicial administratrix and has since been
administering the estate alone; that as judicial administratrix, she wished to file
a motion for reconsideration and that the clerk of court be directed to serve copy
of said judgment on her counsel instead of on Atty. Unson and praying that as
present judicial administratrix, she be substituted in lieu of the former joint
administrators and that her counsel be served with copy of the CA’s decision.
CA denied motion for reconsideration. After almost 5 mos. and after respondent
had filed in the intestate court a motion for execution of the judgment, petitioner
filed this petition alleging that CA decision was entered in excess of jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion. This was opposed by Aquino on the
ground of finality.
ISSUE
WON CA’s decision has become final
HELD
YES
Ratio CA decision has become final and executory in accordance with the Rules
of Court and since no appeal was filed.
Reasoning Motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and delay was
without legal basis. Petitioner’s motion for substitution filed with the appellate
court after its decision recognized the fact that the appellate court had already
duly handed down its adverse decision and petitioner merely expressed her
wish to belatedly file a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the petitioner
estate. She was apparently resigned to the futility of filing any such motion, in
view of the finality of the appellate court's decision — for such motion was never
LEGAL PROFESSION
filed. She cannot use as an excuse the substitution of administrators/counsels.
The records at bar amply show that Atty. Jose A. Unson was the counsel on
record of the petitioner estate in the appellate court and never filed any
withdrawal as such counsel. He was representing the estate and not the
administrator, Luis Domingo, Jr., so that even after latter’s removal, the former
remains to be counsel of estate. No withdrawal as counsel or petition for change
of counsel was filed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Notice and copy of
the CA's decision were duly served by registered mail on the estate's counsel of
record at his address of record in accordance with Rule 13, section 8 of the
Rules of Court. And in accordance with said Rule, service by registered mail of
the appellate court's decision upon the petitioner's counsel of record was
deemed completed and effected upon the addressee's failure to claim his mail
on the fifth day after the first notice of the postmaster. The present administratrix
gives no satisfactory explanation as to her failure to substitute herself vice Luis
Domingo, Jr., since the latter's removal or to then engage new counsel vice
Atty. Unson in the appellate court.
Disposition Petition dismissed; petitioner’s counsel shall pay treble costs for
falsely representing to the SC that the CA had granted “new and further relief” to
Aquino when, in fact, he had duly prayed for the relief awarded and for filing
unmeritorious cases that clog the court dockets; writ of preliminary injunction
issued on Nov. 7, 1967 is dissolved.
MONTANO V IBP
KAPUNAN, May 21, 2001
FACTS
- Montano hired the services of Atty. Dealca as his counsel in
collaboration with Atty. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of Appeals
wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant.
- The parties agreed upon attorney’s fees in the amount of P15,000,
50% of which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining
balance upon the termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid
respondent the amount of P7,500
- Even before Atty. Dealca had prepared the appellant’s brief and
contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the
termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from
complainant.
- Complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.
- Prior to the filing of the appellant’s brief, Atty. Dealca again demand
payment of the remaining balance of 3,500.
- When complainant was unable to do so, lawyer withdrew his
appearance as complainant’s counsel without his prior knowledge and/or
conformity.
- Montano claimed that such conduct exceeded the ethical standards
of the law profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt with
administratively. Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition
of the maximum penalty of disbarment.
- IBP conducted investigation, report and recommendation. It found
respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional conduct and recommended that
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
he be “severely reprimanded.”
- IBP Board of Governors resolved that the penalty be amended to 3
months suspension from the practice of law.
- Atty. Dealca sought reconsideration saying:
> Complainant went to him just to prepare and submit complainant’s
appellant’s brief on time at the agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50%
down and 50% upon its completion
> He was able to finish the appellant’s brief ahead of its deadline,
so he advised the complainant about its completion with the request
that the remaining balance of P7,500.00 be paid.
> Complainant paid P4,000.00 only, promising to pay the
P3,500.00 “tomorrow” or on “later particular date.” This promise-
non-payment cycle went on repeatedly until the last day of the filing
of the brief.
> Even without being paid completely, he, of his own free will and
accord, filed complainant’s brief on time; Such P3,500.00 remains
unpaid until now
ISSUE
WON Atty. Dealca’s conduct just and proper
HELD
No. We find Atty. Dealca’s conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal
profession.
- Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyer shall
withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances.
- Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to
pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case,
Atty. Dealca’s withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately
fail to pay him the attorney’s fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts
to fulfill his obligation.
- Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies
with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action
only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
- Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end
desired. Reprimand is deemed sufficient.
OBANDO V FIGUERAS
NARVASA; 1990
NATURE
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the RoC, seeking to annul a Decision of
the CA which affirmed dismissal, without prejudice, of Petitioner Felizardo
Obando’s action for annulment of contract and reconveyance earlier ordered by
the RTC of QC.
LEGAL PROFESSION
FACTS
- 1964: Alegria Figueras and her stepsons Eduardo and Francisco filed a
Petition for settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased husband Jose
Figueras.
- pending settlement of the estate, Alegria died. Eduardo assumed
administration of the joint estates of Jose and Alegria.
- Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate of what purported to be Alegria’s
Last Will and Testament, filed by Felizardo Obando, Alegria’s nephew (herein
petitioner)
- the alleged Will bequeathed to Obando properties left by the Figueras couple,
including 2 parcels of land in Quezon City.
- Probate case was consolidated with the intestate proceedings, and Obando
was appointed as Eduardo’s co-administrator of the joint estates.
- upon investigation, the NBI found the Will was a forgery, which led to the
conviction of Obando for estafa through falsification of a public document
- 1990: probate court denied Eduardo’s Motion for authority to sell the parcels
of land. Despite denial, he sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation, on the
strength of an Order issued by the probate court in 1991. New titles were
issued in the name of Amigo Realty.
- 1992: Petitioner Obando, as co-administrator and universal heir of Alegria,
filed Complaint against Eduardo and Amigo Realty (respondents), for the
nullification of the sale.
- 1997: the probate court removed Obando from his office as co-administrator.
- Consequently, respondents filed Motion to Dismiss, based on Obando’s loss
of his legal standing to pursue the case.
- 1993: Trial Court granted the Motion and dismissed the civil case
- Petitioner Obando filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Denied.
- CA dismissed Obando’s Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
- rejected Obando’s contention: that he did not lose his legal personality
to prosecute the civil case, since there was no categorical statement that
the purported will was a forgery, and its probate was still pending
- affirmed the dismissal of the action because the probate court’s Order
alluded to the fact that the Will was a forgery.
- that the probate of the Will had not been decided on the merits did
not change the fact that the probate court had removed Petitioner
Obando as co-administrator.
Petitioners' Claim
-Assignment of Errors:
Simply stated, the following issues are raised by the petitioners: (1) whether the
trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer who was allegedly no longer
Eduardo's counsel of record; (2) whether a motion to dismiss filed after the
responsive pleadings were already made can still be granted; (3) whether the
conviction of Petitioner Obando for estafa through falsification and the
revocation of his appointment as administrator, both of which are on appeal,
constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss the civil case; and (4) whether there
was a conflict between the Order dismissing the civil case and the previous
actions of the trial court.
A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
ISSUES
1. WON the trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer who was
allegedly no longer Eduardo's counsel of record
2. WON a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings were already
made can still be granted
3. WON that it was premature for the trial court to dismiss the civil case
because Obando's conviction for estafa through falsification was still on appeal
4. WON trial court whimsically and capriciously departed from its previous
rulings when, in its Resolution dated February 11, 1993, it granted Eduardo's
later Motion to Dismiss
HELD
1. the lawyer was still Eduardo’s counsel of record.
Ratio Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of
counsel in accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of RoC. Counsel may be
substituted only with the ff requisites: (1) new counsel files a written application
for Substitution; (2) the client’s written consent is obtained; (3) the written
consent of the lawyer to be substituted is secured
Reasoning Eduardo did not dismiss his Atty (Yuseco). The Motion to Dismiss
was beneficial to respondent Eduardo, he had no reason to complain. At the
discretion of the court, an atty. who has been dismissed by a client is allowed to
intervene in a case in order to protect the client’s rights. In this case, any
irregularity should have been raised by respondent Eduardo, and not the
petitioners.
2. YES
Ratio if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the case,
as in the present controversy, the defendant should be allowed to file a motion
to dismiss, even after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a responsive
pleading.
Reasoning The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the
circumstances of the case. Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires
that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed within the reglementary
period for filing a responsive pleading.
However, even after an answer has been filed, the Court has allowed a
defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of
jurisdiction,22 (2) litis pendentia,23 (3) lack of cause of action,24 and (4)
discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal. 25
Except for lack of cause of action or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under
Section 1 of Rule 16 may be waived. If a particular ground for dismissal is not
raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed at all within the reglementary period, it
is generally considered waived under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules.26
- the respondents did not waive their right to move for the dismissal of the civil
case based Petitioner Obando's lack of legal capacity. It was only after he had
been convicted of estafa through falsification that the probate court divested him
of his representation of the Figueras estates. It was only then that this ground
became available to the respondents. Hence, it could not be said that they
LEGAL PROFESSION A2010 PROF. JARDELEZA
waived it by raising it in a Motion to Dismiss filed after their Answer was
submitted. Verily, if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of
the case, as in the present controversy, the defendant should be allowed to file
a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a
responsive pleading.
3. NO.
Ratio When an appointment as co-administrator of an estate is revoked by a
probate court, a final conviction in a criminal case has nothing to do with such
revocation.
Reasoning This argument has no bearing at all on the dismissal of the civil
case. Petitioner Obando derived his power to represent the estate of the
deceased couple from his appointment as co-administrator. 27 When the probate
court removed him from office, he lost that authority. Since he lacked the legal
capacity to sue on behalf of the Figueras estates, he could not continue
prosecuting the civil case.28 Thus the trial court properly granted the Motion to
Dismiss on this ground.29 Whether a final conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is necessary to remove him from his administration is not a proper
issue in this Petition. He should raise the matter in his appeal of the Decision
removing him from administration of the Figueras estates.
4. NO. There is no conflict between these court rulings.
Reasoning they were based on different grounds. The first Motion to Dismiss
was denied because, at the time, Petitioner Obando still had legal capacity to
sue as co-administrator of the Figueras estates. The second Motion was
granted because the probate court had already removed him from his office as
co-administrator. The change in his legal capacity accounts for the difference in
the adjudication of the trial court.
Disposition the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.