Summons
Velayo- The actions for damages is an action in personam.
Fong v.  EXTRAJUDICIAL SERVICE apply only when the action is in rem or quasi in
Velayo rem
510  The rationale for this is that in such actions, jurisdiction over the
SCRA person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
320 the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
(2006)  Defendant was subsequently found physically present in the Phils and
personal service of summons was effected on her.
Process Servers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties. To overcome this, the evidence must be clear and convincing.
 It should be in favour of the sheriff bet the claim of non receipt of
summons by the party against the assertion of sheriff.
When a party files a motion to lift order of default, she must also show that she
has a MERITORIOUS DEFENSE or that something would be gained by having the order
of default set aside.
*MERITORIOUS DEFENSE implies that the applicant has the burden of proving such
a defense in order to have the judgment set aside.
TEST EMPLOYED: whether there is enough evidence to present an issue
for submission to the trier of fact.
Motion must be accompanied by a statement of the evidence which she
intends to present if the motion is granted and which is such as to
warrant a reasonable belief that the result of the case would probably
be otherwise if a new trial is granted.
Santos SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. In
vs. PNOC any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like,
or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the
court may order.
Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent
efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of
court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by
publication.
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that SUBSITUTED
SERVICE applies in any action (in rem/ in personam) where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts
are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Thus, it now
applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
Wong vs WON Summons was validly served to ONG? No. Sheriff did not exert
Factor extraordinary efforts to locate Ong.
Koyoma The Return failed to relay if sufficient efforts were exerted by Sheriff Baloloy to
locate Wong, as well as the impossibility of personal service of summons upon
Wong within a reasonable time. Sheriff Baloloys three visits to Wongs
residence hardly constitute effort on his part to locate Wong; and Wongs
absence from his residence during Sheriff Baloloys visits, since Wong was at
the office or out-of-town, does not connote impossibility of personal service of
summons upon him. It must be stressed that, before resorting to substituted
service, a sheriff is enjoined to try his best efforts to accomplish personal
service on the defendant. And since the defendant is expected to try to avoid
and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering,
canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant.
Nevertheless, even without valid service of summons, a court may still
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter
voluntarily appears before it. Section 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of
Court recognizes that:
Section 20. Voluntary Appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong by virtue of his voluntary appearance
before it in Civil Case No. C-21860. The Court is not referring to Wongs filing of
his Motion to Dismiss, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over his
person, because that clearly does not constitute voluntary appearance. The
Court, instead, calls attention to the RTC Order dated 20 November 2008
allowing Wong to cross-examine Koyama. By actively participating in the 23
January 2009 hearing, he effectively acknowledged full control of the RTC over
Civil Case No. C-21860 and over his person as the defendant therein; he is,
thus, deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of said
trial court.
NM Since the action involved in the case at bar is in personam and since the
Rothschi defendant, petitioner Rothschild/Investec, does not reside and is not found in
ld vs the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case against it because of
Lepanto the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over its person unless it voluntarily
appears in court. (NM Rothschild voluntarily appeared when pit prayed for and
availed modes of discovery against respondent, written interrogatories, requests
for admission, deposition, and motions for production of documents.)
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (referring to
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES)
The new second sentence merely mentions other grounds in a Motion to
Dismiss aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. This
clearly refers to affirmative defenses (which would not amount to acceptance
of the jurisdiction of the court), rather than affirmative reliefs (which would be
considered acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the court).
Seeking affirmative relief in a court is tantamount to voluntary
appearance Petitioner, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, is
deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
 opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. The Trial court properly denied the MTD.
Ong vc The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts to personally
Co. serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement
that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same
personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to
perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the time the attempts
were made; and reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either
if there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner. The server’s return did
not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of
petitioner. It simply stated that the summons was received “by Mr. Roly
Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.” It did
not expound on the competence of the security officer to receive the summons.
Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the Court is
not inclined to uphold the CA’s denial of the petition for annulment of
judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because there
was an invalid substituted service of summons.
Motions
Corpus An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate
vs. children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
Corpus relatives inherit in the same manner from the legitimate child. TOMAS CORPUS
(Petitioner) had no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed
hereditary share of his mother, JUANITA CORPUS, as legal heir in YANGCO’s
estate.
Yap vs. Is a motion for extension of time to file record on appeal, a litigated and
CA contentious motion which requires a notice of hearing before it may be acted
upon by the trial court or is it one that may be heard ex-parte and therefore
does not need a notice of hearing? NO.
Section 4. Notice.-Notice of a motion shag be served by the applicant to all parties
concerned at least three days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of
the motion, and other papers accompanying it. The Court, however, for good
cause may hear a motion on shorter notice, specially on matters which the Court
may dispose of on its own motion.
 What is required is mere notice, but not notice of hearing.
 The Motion in question does not affect the substantive rights of private
respondents as it merely seeks to extend the period to file the Record on
Appeal, which extension may be granted by the Trial Court upon
application made prior to the expiration of the original period.
 Motion requesting an extension within which to file Record on Appeal may
be considered as one which may be heard ex-parte
 The Trial Court has the power and authority to act on an ex-parte Motion
for extension of time to file the Record on Appeal, since the said Motion
did not appear to be a litigated or a contentious Motion and may be acted
upon even without proof of service on adverse party.
Azajar 1. The law explicitly requires that notice of motion shall be served by
vs. CA the appellant to all parties concerned at least 3 days before the hearing,
together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers
accompanying it; and that notices shall be directed to the parties concerned
stating the time and place for the hearing of the motion. Failure to comply with
the requirement is a fatal flaw.
2. Such notice is required to avoid surprises upon the opposite party
and give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion as well
as to determine or make determinable the time of submission of the motion for
resolution.
4. The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant and not on the
court.
KKK vs. Motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
Calderon the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of
argas Court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon.
Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of
hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants
to comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally defective.
However, there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These
exceptions are:
(1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the
questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the
recitals contained therein;
(2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
(3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and
judicious discretion of the court; and
(4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
WON Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution should be granted although
it lacked the requisite notice of hearing? YES.
Records show that while Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution contained a
notice of hearing, it did not particularly state the date and time of the hearing.
SC find that petitioner was not denied procedural due process. TC issued an
order giving petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment. The trial court ruled
on the motion only after the reglementary period to file comment lapsed.
Clearly, petitioner was given time to study and comment on the motion for
which reason, the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been achieved.
Procedural rules are liberally construed to promote their objective and to
assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action
and proceeding
Santos WON the trial court erred in granting the motion for bill of particulars filed by
vs. Liwag.
Liwag HELD/RATIO: 1. NO. • BILL OF PARTICULARS ARE DISCRETIONARY UPON
THE COURTS o The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill
of particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court.
Complaint was indeed drawn and suffers from vagueness and generalization to
enable the defendant properly to prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify
 issues and aid the court in an orderly and expeditious disposition in the case.
• RULES ON BILL OF PARTICULARS ON THE GROUND OF VAGUE
COMPLAINT o If an action (like this case) is one for the annulment of
documents that have been allegedly executed by reason of deceit, machination,
false pretenses, misrepresentation, threats, and other fraudulent means. o
Deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats,
however, are largely conclusions of law and mere allegations thereof
without a statement of the facts to which such terms have reference are
not sufficient.
Agcanas Whether or not upon denial of a defendants' motion to dismiss the
vs. reglementary period within which to file an answer resumes running even
Mercado though the motion for a bill of particulars of the same defendants is still
pending and unresolved? NO.
Held:
Both a motion to dismiss and a motion for a bill of particulars interrupt the
time to file a responsive pleading. In the case of a motion to dismiss, the
period starts running again as soon as the movant receives a copy of the
order of denial. In the case of a motion for a bill of particulars, the suspended
period shall continue to run upon service on the movant of the bill of
particulars, if the motion is granted, or of the notice of its denial, but in any
event he shall have not less than five days within which to file his responsive
pleading.
When appellants filed a motion to dismiss they requested that resolution of
their previous motion for a bill of particulars be held in abeyance. Resolution of
the motion for the purpose was necessary only in the event that court should
deny the motion to dismiss, in which case the period to file an answer
remained suspended until the motion for a bill of particulars is denied or,
if it is granted, until the bill is served on the moving party.
No action having been taken on the motion for bill of particulars until the
present, the period to answer has not yet expired. The lower court,
therefore, erred in declaring appellants in defaults and in taking all the
subsequent actions it did in the case.
Salita vs. A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the
Magtolis plaintiff’s cause or causes of action."
Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the expected
evidence will support." - refers to "the facts which the evidence on the trial
will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence
of those facts."
And a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint,
while not very definite, nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of
action.
In the case, the Bill of Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to
state a cause of action, and to require more details from private respondent
would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. Petitioner has already
been adequately apprised of private respondent’s cause of action against her. (
case about the woman being psychologically incapacitated for not
understanding the demands of the work of her husband doctor.)
Motion to Dismiss
Ramos FIRST, Ramos filed before the CFI of Manila the Civil Case No. 103647, against
vs. Resps P. R. Roman, Inc. for consignation of the sum of P70,000.00 representing
Peralta advance rentals on the fishpond.
SECOND, P.R. Roman instituted an action to quiet title with the CFI of Bataan
over the Salgado fishpond against Ramos. (Civil Case no. 4102)
P. R. Roman, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss. Granted.
GRANT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PROPER - SC
Issue: Whether the subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 4102 before the CFI of
Bataan is a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 103647.
Held: Yes; (Bataan Court in the better position)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, for litis pendentia to be invoked as a
ground for the dismissal of an action, the concurrence of the following
requisites is necessary: (a) Identity of parties or at least such as
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) Identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may
be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other.
These requisites are present in the case at bar.
 Same issue involved in Civil Case No. 4102. Although an action for quieting
of title refers to ownership, P. R. Roman, Inc. in its
complaint in Civil Case No. 4102 claimed its right of possession over the
fishpond.
 That whatever decision may be handed down in Civil Case No. 4102
would constitute res judicata in Civil Case No. 103647 is beyond cavil.
Should the Bataan court rule that the lease contract is valid and effective
against P. R. Roman, Inc., Ramos can compel it to accept his proffered
payment of rentals; otherwise, he may not do so.
TAKE NOTE: Finally, the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the
later case should yield to the earlier case. What is required merely is that
there be another pending action, not a prior pending action. Considering
the broader scope of inquiry involved in Civil Case No. 4102 and the
location of the property involved, no error was committed by the lower
court in deferring to the Bataan court's jurisdiction.
Lee Bun Held: Affirmative. The decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-5996, "Rafael
Ting vs. Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al." constitutes a bar to Civil Case No. V-
Aligaen 3064 before the respondent court. Said Civil case, therefore, should have been
dismissed because it is a mere relitigation of the same issues previously
adjudged with finality, way back in 1956, between the same parties or their
privies and concerning the same subject matter. We have consistently held
that the doctrine of res judicata applies where, between a pending action
and one which has been finally and definitely settled, there is Identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of action.
PNB vs. In a motion to dismiss defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the
Hipolito allegations of fact contained in the complaint.
 Offer of payment hypothetically admitted in the motion, worked as a
renewal of the obligation. An offer of payment works as a renewal of the
obligation and prevents prescription from setting in.
  It is true that defendants attached to the motion a joint affidavit of merit
wherein they deny having made an offer of a plan of payment. The denial,
being a contrary averment of fact, would be proper in the answer to the
complaint but not in a motion for dismissal, for the contradictory
allegations would require presentation of evidence. Denial of allegations in
a complaint is not proper in a motion to dismiss.
 A denial of an allegation of a complaint, as for example the denial of an offer
of payment which would prevent prescription from setting in, would be
proper in the answer to the complaint but not in a motion for dismissal, for
the contradictory allegations would require presentation of evidence
Guerrer MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON "[f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts
o vs. RTC towards a compromise is jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same the
Ilocos court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case."
 Considering that Art. 151 starts with the negative word "No", the
requirement is mandatory that the complaint or petition, which must be
verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have
been made but that the same failed, so that "[i]f it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed."
 The enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as members of the same family
does not comprehend “sister-in-law”/ “brothers-in-law” are not listed in
Art 217 of the NCC as members of the same family and since Art 150
repeats the same “members of the family” court finds no reason to alter
the existing jurisprudence
Continen The motion to dismiss was filed seasonably, within the period of the second
tal vs CA extension granted by the trial court (not a responsive pleading).
Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that "within the time for
pleading, a motion to dismiss the action may be made" on the grounds therein
enumerated, including the grounds invoked by the petitioner.
Sec. 4. Time to plead. — If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination
thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed
by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of denial or deferment,
unless the court provides a different period.
The Court recapitulates the rules as to the filing of a Motion to dismiss by the
defendant as follows:
1. The trial court may in its discretion and on proper motion extend the 15-day
reglementary period for the filing of responsive pleadings.
2. During the original reglementary 15-day period, or any extension of such
period, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss the complaint.
3. If the motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant is allowed another fifteen
days from notice of the denial to file the responsive pleading. The full 15-day
reglementary period starts all over again.
Borje vs. 1. The dismissal of an actions on grounds not alleged in the motion to
CFI dismiss is improper for in so doing, a court in effect dismiss an action
motu propio w/out giving Borje a chance to argue ithe point w/out
receiving any arguments or evidence in question.
2. The only instance in which the court may dismiss upon a court’s own
motion on action is, when the “plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the
trial or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or to
comply w/ the Rules or any order of the Court.
3. The dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial of
due process, if from a consideration of the pleading it appears that there
are issues of fact which cannot be decided w/out the trial of the case on
the merits.
Tribiana I. Certiorari is not a remedy to correct errors of procedure. The proper
vs. remedy against an order denying a motion to dismiss is to file an answer and
Tribiana interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to
dismiss.
II. In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent
is not a jurisdictional defect.
If a party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed
waived. Such defect is curable by amendment as a matter of right without leave
of court, if made before the filing of a responsive pleading.
A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.
More importantly, an amendment alleging compliance with a condition
precedent is not a jurisdictional matter.
III. In this CASE, the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege
that she resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the petition.
However, in her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss, Lourdes attached
a Barangay Certification to File Action.
Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the
Family Code. A dismissal Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure to
comply with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere
failure to allege compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is
not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section
1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Danfoss “In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action, the
vs. insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint. And the test of the
Continen sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is
tal whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid
Cement judgment thereon in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For this
purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint.”
-No cause of action since Danfoss had not yet breached his obligation to deliver
the order of CCC, aside from the fact that the obligation was already negated
when CCC cancelled the order before the prestation became due and
demandable? Thus, there was no breach and there was no damage caused by
Danfoss.
Lu Ym An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither
vs. terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by
Nabua the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.
As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to
correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial
of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final
 judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must
have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
There are three (3) courses of action which the trial court may take in
resolving a motion to dismiss, i.e., to grant, to deny, or to allow amendment of
the pleading.
In this CASE, SC granted the petition for certiorari, considering that the order
of the trial court is a patent nullity for failure to comply with a mandatory
provision of the Rules, petitioner was correct in directly assailing the order on
certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The questioned order of the trial court
denying the motion to dismiss with a mere statement that there are justiciable
questions which require a full blown trial falls short of the requirement of Rule
16 set forth above.
Aquino Failure to resort to barangay conciliation DOES NOT make the action for
vs. Aure ejectment premature and dismissible.
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the
requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government Code on barangay
conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No.
1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and
the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement,
so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the
court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person
of the defendant.
In the case at bar, Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the
MeTC after having submitted herself voluntarily thereto.
The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in
her Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse to
barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.
Heirs of Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu
Dr. Favis proprio dismiss the claim, namely:
vs. (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
Gonzales (b) litis pendentia
(c) res judicata
(d) prescription of action.
A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise among family
members is not a jurisdictional defect, but merely a defect in the statement of
cause of action. Also, there was no MTD based on failed earnest efforts was
filed, thus, waived.
Dismissal of Action
Go vs What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of the action
Cruz by mere notice is not the filing of the defendant's answer with the Court (either
personally or by mail) but the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a
motion for summary judgment.
"The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers
with the court, "according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, means the
delivery thereof to the clerk of the court either personally or by registered mail.
Service, on the other hand, signifies delivery of the pleading or other paper to the
parties affected thereby through their counsel of record, unless delivery to the
party himself is ordered by the court, by any of the modes set forth in the Rules,
i.e., by personal service, service by mail, or substituted service.
Section 1 Rule 17 mandates that notice of dismissal must be filed any time before
service of answer.
California filed its notice of dismissal in CFI manila after Go’s filing of answer
but before service thereof. Thus, its notice ipso facto brought about the
dismissal of the action pending in Manila court, without need of any order or
action by the presiding judge therein.
Jalover In this case, respondents failed to appear but have already presented evidence
vs earlier, still, TC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute, which the SC held
Ytoriaga improper.
Private respondents could not have possibly failed to prosecute as they were
already past the stage of presenting their evidence. Their absence during the
time the case was re-called for trial was a mere waiver of their right to
cross-examine the witnesses.
The dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute when in truth they have
already presented their evidence and rested their case would, in effect, mean a
total disregard of the court of the evidence presented by them in the regular
course of trial.
Further, said dismissal never attained finality as the notice thereof was not
served upon their counsel of record.
Mina vs - Case 1: The Minas are claiming to be the illegitimate children of Joaquin
Pacson Mina while married to Pacson. They are claiming that the DOS allegedly
signed by Joaquin when he was ill was fraudulently obtained. They pray
for the annulment of the DOS and their recognition as illegitimate
children.
- Court in Case 1 ordered that Pacson be impleaded. The Minas failed to
comply with said order, thus, it was dismissed.
- Case 2: The Minas filed another case, this time impleading Pacson but with
the same cause of action and including Medina and Cresencia.
- Defendants filed a MTD on the ground of res judicata.
[issue] Whether or not CC 3015 (case 1) effectively bars the present case
[ruling] Partially. Failure to comply with a court order has the effect of
adjudication upon the merits (Sec 3 Rule 17). Thus, failure to comply with the
court order in CC 3015 justifies the dismissal on the issue of annulment of DOS.
However, present case is not deemed dismissed as to the issue of filiation and
Pacson, as she is not impleaded in the prior case.

FAILURE TO PROSECUTE; FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ORDER TO

IMPLEAD INDISPENSABLE PARTY. — Appellants' contention that the
dismissal of the complaint in the previous action was "at the indirect instance
of the plaintiffs through inaction or omission," is not supported by the facts of
the case, because the order of the court dismissing the complaint in the first
case contained the warning that should the plaintiffs fail to comply with its
order to implead the surviving widow of the deceased and other necessary
parties, the case would be dismissed, and it was because of plaintiffs' refusal
to comply with this express mandate that the dismissal was ordered. The
dismissal was, therefore, justified under Rule 30, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
RES JUDICATA; COMPLETE IDENTITY NECESSARY; PARTIES NOT
INCLUDED AND MATTERS NOT RAISED IN PREVIOUS CASE NOT BARRED.
— The previous order of dismissal bars the present complaint only as to
matters already presented in the previous care, like the action for annulment of
the deeds of sale as regards the defendants named therein, but matters not
raised and parties not included in the previous case are not barred, like the
action for the recognition of the filiation of the plaintiffs against the defendant
widow of the deceased alleged father