Topic Vices of Consent > Violence or Intimidation
Case No. G.R. No. 90423 | September 6, 1991
Case Name LEE v. Court of Appeals
Full Case FRANCIS LEE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Name PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PELAGIA
PANLINO DE CHIN, respondents.
Ponente MEDIALDEA., J.
Doctrine
Nature
RELEVANT FACTS
PRIVATE RESPONDENT (COMPLAINANT). Maria Pelagia Panlino De
Chin, 23, was fetched from her house upon the instructions of Petitioner
Branch Manager Francis Lee of Pacific Banking Corporation. Upon arriving at
the office of the bank, Lee did not atten to her immediately. After an hour, Lee
confronted Chin about a forged check which was allegedly deposited in the
account of Honorio Carpio. During said confrontation, Lee was shouting at her
and threatened to file charges against her unless she return the money
equivalent to the subject check. Accordingly she was caused to sign a
withdrawal slip and an affidavit prepared by the bank’s lawyer, where she was
made to admit that she had swindled the bank and had return the money
equivalent of the spurious check.
PETITIONER. Lee denied the allegations. After having been informed that
the check was dishonored for being spurious, he examined the records and
discovered that Chin was instrumental in inducing the bank to accept the
subject check and was also the one who withdrew the proceeds thereof, by
utiliing the withdrawal slip purportedly signed by Carpio. Petitioner then
invitedChin to his office. Chin was merely informed that the subject check was
fake and that it was deposited out of her assruance that it was genuine. And that
the complainant was not compelled into signing the withdrawal slip, but she
acted voluntarily and freely in executing her affidavit and in returning the
money equivalent of the subject check.
The Metropolitan City Court found the petitioner guilty of grave coercion uner
Article 286 of the RPC. RTC found petitioner guilty of light coercion.CA on
the other hand set aside RTC’s decision and affirmed MTC.
ISSUE & RATIO DECIDENDI
1. WON the shouting at the complainant with piercing looks constitute
violence or intimidation.
No.
The SC interpreted “joint obligation” using Tolentino’s definition:
“A joint obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable only for a
proportionate part of the debt, and each creditor is entitled only to a
proportionate part of the credit. A solidary obligation is one in which
each debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled
to demand the whole obligation. Hence, in the former, each creditor can
recover only his share of the obligation, and each debtor can be made to
pay only his part; whereas, in the latter, each creditor may enforce the
entire obligation, and each debtor may be obliged to pay it in full.”
Likewise, Tolentino was cited to define “active solidarity”:
“The essence of active solidarity consists in the authority of each creditor
to claim and enforce the rights of all, with the resulting obligation of
paying every one what belongs to him; there is no merger, much less a
renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation.”
Full satisfaction of a judgment obtained against them by Quiombing
would discharge their obligation to Biscocho, and vice versa; hence, it
was not necessary for both Quiombing and Biscocho to file the
complaint. Inclusion of Biscocho as a co-plaintiff, when Quiombing was
competent to sue by himself alone, would be a useless formality.
Interpreting Art. 1212 of the New Civil Code which provides that: “Each
one of the solidary creditors may do whatever may be useful to the others,
but not anything which may be prejudice to the latter.”
The SC interpreted that Quiombing’s act of “suing for recovery of the
contract price” as “useful” to Biscocho.
1. Is the defendant entitled to the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of non-joinder of the second creditor as an indispensable party?
No, a solidary debtor may by himself alone be held liable for any possible
breach of contract that may be proved.
Although the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the second
agreement, which was concluded alone by Quiombing with the spouses,
was based on the original Construction and Service Agreement as well as
the promissory note later signed. However, this matter is not really that
important now in view of the conclusion that the complaint could have
been filed alone by Quiombing.
2. Is the second solidary creditor an indispensable party?
No, because the participation of Biscocho is not at all necessary for
complete relief to be obtained by either him or Quiombing.

The Supreme Court defined “indispensable party” using the definition of

Justice Feria: "where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either one
of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even necessary (now
proper) because complete relief may be obtained from either."

DISPOSITIVE

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent

court dated March 27, 1990, is SET ASIDE, and the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, is directed to REINSTATE Civil Case No. 913-A. Costs against
the private respondents.