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DEAD MAN’S STATUTE – CAN BE WAIVED settlement of his personal interest and that of said George

Inestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, represented by JOSEFA Icard in the Antamok Central Group of mining claims.
TONGCO, administratrix vs. ANASTACIA VIANZON (1927) o The order directed that said amount be divided between
 July 5, 1894 - Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted Joseph K. Icard and the estate of the deceased George M.
marriage. Icard in the manner and proportion to be determined by the
 When Marcelino died in 1925, the court appointed his niece as probate court.
administratix (Josefa)  Joseph Icard filed a claim against the estate of his deceased father
 Before the death of Marcelino, he had presented claims in a cadastral George for services rendered in connection with the development and
case in which he had asked for titles to certain properties in the name location of certain mining claims.
of the conjugal partnership consisting of himself and his wife, and that  The commissioner of claims allowed the claim of Joseph.
corresponding decrees for these lots were issued in the name of the  The administrator appealed to the allowance of Joseph’s claim which
conjugal partnership not long after his death. appeal was also allowed.
 In the cadastral case, the widow began action in 1926, when she
presented a motion for a revision of certain decrees within the 1-year ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in allowing the claimant to testify to the
period provided by the Land Registration Law. Issue was joined by the services rendered by him in favor of his father, because the action being one
administratrix of the estate. against the administrator of a deceased person, plaintiff cannot be allowed to
o The court awarded new certificates of title to Anastacia, as testify as to any matter of fact, which occurred before the death of such
the exclusive property of her, free from all encumbrances deceased person.
and liens
o MNT - Denied HELD: NO.
 The administratrix of the estate began action against Anastacia for the Section 383, par. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is now Rule 123,
recovery of specified property and for damages – Same as the section 26, paragraph (c), of the Rules of Court, is designed to close the lips
cadastral case of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in
o The court declared that ½ of the value of the shares in the order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the
Sociedad Cooperativa de Credito Rural de Orani , to the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.
amount of P10, belonging to the intestate estate of
Marcelino, which one-half interest must appear in the Here, the purpose of the oral testimony is to prove a lesser claim than what
inventory of the property of the estate of the deceased might be warranted by clear written evidence, to avoid prejudice to the estate
Marcelino of the deceased, the law has certainly no reason for its application. Ratione
o MNT- Denied cessante, cessat ipsa lex.
 Administratix appealed on both cases. – Joined
FELIX ASTURIAS, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NICOLAS
ISSUE: WON the testimony of the widow must be discarded. MIRAS (1963)
 In order to pay his debt to PNB, Nicolas Miras obtained a loan of
HELD: No. Witness was competent. P500.00 at 3% interest per month from the spouses Asturias. The loan
The object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the temptation to was secured by a mortgage in a private document of the land in
give false testimony in regard to the transaction is question on the part of the question.
surviving party. However, he has neglected the equally important rule that the  After 2 years, Miras, having paid only P30 while his total indebtedness
law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to reached P830, executed a written document of sale with the right to
suppress the truth. repurchase within 7 years covering the same property for the amount of
his debt. Although not expressed in the contract, the parties agreed that
The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought the spouses were to be permitted to gather and benefit by the fruits of
"against" the administratrix of the estate, nor were they brought upon claims the coconut trees planted and growing on the land (for the payment of
"against" the estate. In the first case at bar, the action is one by the Miras debt), while Miras remained in possession of the land, cultivating
administratrix to enforce demand "by" the estate. In the second case at bar, the portion not occupied by the coconuts and raising therein other
the same analogy holds true for the claim was presented in cadastral plants.
proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff and there is no  After Laureano Asturias died in 1934, and before the death of his widow
defendant. in 1937, Miras offered to redeem the property but the latter requested
him to postpone the same to a later date as she had not yet sufficiently
In the matter of the estate of George M. Icard, deceased, JOSEPH K. benefited from the capital invested, as the price of copra unexpectedly
ICARD vs. CLARO MASIGAN, as special administrator of the estate went down after 1930. Upon the widow's death, Miras made the same
of George M. Icard; and EFFIE CARLAND ICARD (1941) offer to redeem the property from petitioners herein, successors-in-
 Antamok Central Group of mining claims were originally owned in interest of the spouses, who made the same request as their deceased
common by Fred M. Harden, the deceased George M. Icard, and mother, and to which request Miras once more agreed.
Joseph K. Icard. These mining claims were later sold to the Big Wedge  1 year after the widow's death, petitioners (Spouses’ children)
Mining Company, the deed of sale having been executed jointly by the discovered a document and noting that it was in the form of a sale, they
common owners, Fred M. Harden, George M. Icard, and Joseph K. agreed to partition the land among themselves notwithstanding the fact
Icard, the latter represented by his attorney-in-fact, George M. Icard. that their father did not include said property in his will and Miras
 A dispute having arisen as to the price still due under the contract of continued in possession thereof, paying the land taxes thereon.
sale, the Big Wedge Mining Company filed an action for rescission  In 1943, grandchildren of the creditor spouses reconveyed to Nicolas
against the vendors, Fred M. Harden, George M. Icard, and Joseph K. Miras their 1/5 portion of the property in question, upon receipt from
Icard, the latter in his personal capacity and as executor of the him of the sum of P210.00, their share of the credit against Miras.
deceased George M. Icard.  After several years, petitioner attempted to enter the property and tried
o Dispute = Settled between parties to fence the same in order to exclude Miras therefrom.
o Compromise Agreement was approved by the court  This prompted Miras to file an action for forcible entry.
o Pursuant to the compromise, an order was issued decreeing
that the sum of P39,478.16 be paid to Joseph Icard in full TC: Declared that the contract of sale with right of redemption executed by
Nicolas Miras on November 1, 1930 in favor of the spouses Laureano
Asturias and Julia Orozco (petitioners' predecessors-in-interest) covering the husband, and as he is dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that
land in question was one of mortgage with usurious interest and therefore this witness is disqualified from testifying in this case in which her husband is
null and void. the injured party. Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was
competent, arguing that the disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in
CA: Affirmed. mind relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of one of the parties to
a proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a
ISSUE: WON the TC erred in admitting and giving credence to the oral criminal case are the Government and the accused; that, furthermore the
testimony of Miras tending to vary the terms of the pacto de retro sale, marriage of Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the death of her
contrary to the survivorship disqualification rule [Sec. 26(c), Rule 123, ROC] husband, she is no longer his wife, and therefore not subject to any
in not holding that the action of plaintiff has already prescribed and that disqualification arising from the status of marriage. These propositions were
defendants-petitioners acquired title to the land by prescription, and in rejected by the trial judge, and the objection of the fiscal as to the testimony
ordering them to refund the alleged usurious interest and the fruits of the of the woman Ezpeleta was sustained. To this objection counsel took
land since 1930. exception and made an offer to prove by the excluded witness the facts
which he expected to establish by her testimony. Concerning these facts it is
HELD: Yes. The testimony of Miras is admissible. sufficient at this time to say that some of them would be both material and
relevant, to such a degree that if proven to the satisfaction of the court, they
The contention that under the rule of survivorship disqualification, the might have lead to the acquittal of the accused, as they purported to relate to
testimony of Miras is inadmissible to vary the terms of the pacto de retro sale the dying declarations of the deceased, concerning the cause of his death,
is untenable because no timely objection has been made against the the general purport being that his injuries were due to fall and not to the acts
admission of such evidence. Also, one of the petitioners (Fell Asturias) was imputed to the accused.
made to testify on such prohibited matters covered by the exclusion rule. In ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in excluding the testimony of the
view of this, petitioners are correctly deemed to have waived the benefit and witness Susana Ezpeleta, and that by reason of such exclusion, the accused
protection of the rule. was deprived of one of his essential rights.
Article 4 of the Civil Code (the Provision applicable to this transaction) HELD: YES. On grounds of public policy the wife can not testify against
provides that "Acts Performed contrary to law are void, except in cases in her husband as to what came to her from him confidentially or by reason of
which the law itself gives validity to such acts". A contract designed to hide a the marriage relation, but this rule does not apply to a dying communication
usurious agreement not only violates the law but contravenes public policy. made by the husband to the wife on the trial of the one who killed him. The
Such a contract cannot be countenanced and is therefore illegal and void declaration of the deceased made in extremes in such cases is a thing to be
from its inception. Such being the case, the prayer for the declaration of its proven, and this proof may be made by any competent witness who heard
nullity is imprescriptible under Article 1410 of the New Civil Code. It is true the statement. The wife may testify for the state in cases of this character as
that this is a new provision, but its principle is equally applicable to the case to any other fact known to her. . . . It can not be contended that the dying
at bar, as was held in the case of Eugenio v. Perdido (G.R. No. L-7083, May declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential communication
19, 1955) where, deciding that an action to annul a sale made in 1932, in made to her; on the contrary, it was evidently made in the furtherance of
violation of the Homestead Act, had not prescribed, this Court said: justice for the express purpose that it should be testified to in the prosecution
Under the existing classification, such a contract would be inexistent and the of the defendant. Decision Set Aside. New trial is granted at which the
"action or defense for the declaration" of such inexistence "does not testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta will be admitted.
prescribe" (Article 1410, New Civil Code). While it is true that this is a new
provision, it is nevertheless a principle recognized since Tipton v. Velasco People vs. Carlos
that "mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are null and FACTS: The victim of the alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar, in Mary
void." Chiles Hospital, performed a surgical operation upon the defendant's wife for
appendicitis and certain other ailments. She remained in the hospital until the
Neither did petitioners acquire title to the land by acquisitive prescription 18th of the same month, but after her release therefrom she was required to
since it appears from the facts found by the Court of Appeals, that go several times to the clinic of Doctor Sityar for the purpose of dressing the
possession of the property was obtained by the petitioners only in 1946 and wounds caused by the operation. On these occasions she was accompanied
the original complaint was filed in 1948. Their claim that their possession by her husband, the defendant. The defendant admits that he killed the
dates back from 1930 when they started gathering the coconuts from the deceased but maintains that he did so in selfdefense. He explains that he
land in the form of payment of the usurious interest on the loan is went to Doctor Sityar's office to protest against the amount of the fee
groundless. The mere fact that from 1930 they were permitted to enter the charged by the doctor and, in any event, to ask for an extension of the time
land for the purpose of gathering the fruits of the coconuts did not make them of payment; that during the conversation upon that subject the deceased
possessors of the property in the concept of owners to entitle them to claim insulted him by telling him that inasmuch as he could not pay the amount
prescription. Such possession, which was sporadic and by mere tolerance of demanded he could send his wife to the office as she was the one treated,
the owners and actual possessors of the land cannot be the basis of a claim and that she could then talk the matter over with the decease; that this
of ownership by prescription. statement was made in such an insolent and contemptuous manner that the
defendant became greatly incensed and remembering the outrage
US vs. Antipolo committed upon his wife, he assumed a threatening attitude and challenged
(By reason of privileged communication) March 6, 1918 Fisher, J. the deceased to go downstairs with him and there settle the matter; that the
FACTS: The appellant was prosecuted in the CFI of Batangas, charged deceased thereupon took a pocket-knife from the center drawer of his desk
with the murder of one Fortunato Dinal. The trial court convicted him of and attacked the defendant, endeavoring to force him out of the office; that
homicide and from that decision he was appealed. One of the errors the defendant, making use of his knowledge of fencing, succeeded in taking
assigned is based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana the knife away from the deceased and blinded by fury stabbed him first in the
Ezpeleta, the widow of the man whom the appellant is accused of having right side of the breast and then in the epigastric region, and fearing that the
murdered, to testify as a witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain deceased might secure some other weapon or receive assistance from the
alleged dying declarations. The witness was called to the stand and having people in the adjoining room, he again stabbed him, this time in the back.
stated that she is the widow of Fortunato Dinal was asked: "On what The court below found that the crime was committed with premeditation and
occasion did your husband die?" To this question the fiscal objected upon the therefore constituted murder. This finding can only be sustained by taking
following ground: I object to the testimony of this witness. She has just into consideration Exhibit L, a letter written to the defendant by his wife and
testified that she is the widow of the deceased, Fortunato Dinal, and that siezed by the police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest. Counsel
being so I believe that she is not competent to testify under the rules and for the defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged
procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with the consent of her communication and therefore not admissible in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter was a privileged communication and HELD: NO. The nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making
therefore not admissible in evidence. within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has
HELD: NO. The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded for gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the
reasons not discussed in the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards
defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness- alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers.
stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations.
defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
such is not the case here; the fact that he had the letter in his possession is proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
them. In this respect there can be no difference between an ordinary They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
communication and one originally privileged. The question is radically with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the witness. law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
conversation in which both spouses took part and on the further ground that drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made to him in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
apply where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter. The customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
Defendant is Guilty of Simple Homicide. learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
Cayetano vs. Monsod
(Can be Waived — Attorney-Client Privilege) Sept. 3, 1991 Paras, J. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan Sept. 20, 1996 Kapunan, J.
FACTS: Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino FACTS: The PCGG filed its third amended complaint, stating that the
to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C.
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments. Petitioner opposed the Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed.
years. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and CIC, and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its institutionalization
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious
void. After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm,
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital
about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting stock of UCPB. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44
acquainted with the laws of membercountries negotiating loans and among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name
to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares. The
chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business Sandiganbayan held that the ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e. their
as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients,
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of
the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has the client.
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client
use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.
of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the HELD: NO. As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege
public accountability and the party-list system for the House of and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The reasons
Representative. advanced for the general rule are well established. First, the court has a right
to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected
ISSUE: Whether or not the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the
cases in court. attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client. Third, the privilege generally
pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Notwithstanding these
considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions. 1. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists Issues:
that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity (1) whether the projected testimony of Sansaet, as proposed state
for which he sought the lawyers advice. 2. Where disclosure would open the witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege, and
client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3. Where the governments (2) whether he is eligible for discharge as a particeps criminis.
lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the
clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the Held: Yes to both.
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients A distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to
name is privileged. It is clear then that the case against petitioners should past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed,
never be allowed to take its full course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners by the client. The Sandiganbayan believes that in the instant case it is
should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious dealing with a past crime, and that Sansaet is set to testify on alleged
that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been
relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the identities of committed and consummated.
their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them when this
Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, the period to be
sanction an unjust situation which we should not here countenance. The considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the
case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with
over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer. respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words, the
privileged confidentiality applies only to a crime already committed, but does
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE not attach to a crime which a client intends to commit in the future, for
SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's advice.
PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.
Doctrine: The testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the
1. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard communications made to him by Paredes at the time he and Honrada were
to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for about to falsify the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by
purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's advice. Sansaet. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission
2. PRIVILEGE MUST BE FOR A LAWFUL PURPOSE of the crime of falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada foisted upon the
3. ACCUSED MUST NOT APPEAR TO BE THE MOST GUILTY; IN authorities. It is well settled that in order that a communication between a
CONSPIRACY, THE ACTUAL AND INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION OF lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in
ACCUSED SERVES AS CRITERIA. furtherance of a lawful end.
4. GRANT OR DENIAL THEREOF MUST BE BASED NOT SOLELY ON
THE ISSUE OF APPLICABILITY OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE The Court is reasonably convinced that the requisites for the discharge of
5. FUTURE CRIMES, NOT COVERED Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been favorably
6. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION BETWEEN LAWYER AND CLIENT; appreciated by the Sandiganbayan. Sansaet is the only cooperative
NOT CONFINED TO VERBAL OR WRITTEN COMMUNICATION. eyewitness to the actual commission of the falsification charge, and the
prosecution is faced with the task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-
Respondent Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their
the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey in 1976. His application was innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available for the
approved and an original certificate of title was issued in his favor. In 1985, prosecution of the case; hence there is absolute necessity for the testimony
however, the Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of Paredes' of Sansaet.
patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated as a school
site. The trial court nullified said patent and title after finding that Paredes The Sandiganbayan should have taken a holistic view of all facts and issues
had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his herein in disposing of the matter of whether to allow Sansaet to testify as a
application. Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that case. state witness, and not merely on the sole issue of the applicability of the
The Tanodbayan recommended the criminal prosecution of Paredes for attorney-client privilege.
violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 in that he used his former
position as Provincial Attorney to influence the Bureau of Lands officials to ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO,
favorably act on his application for free patent. Again, Sansaet was Paredes' respondent.
counsel of record therein. A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Doctrine: Confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of
Sandiganbayan. the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not
enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. 37 The burden of
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, sent a letter to the Ombudsman proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the
seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein for falsification of privilege.
public documents, claiming that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his
co-respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents 1. Complainant's husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled "Ruben G.
purporting to be a notice of arraignment and transcripts of stenographic Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco," for annulment of their marriage with the
notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case had been
charge. dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and executory on
July 15, 1992.
To evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, Sansaet 2. Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. Respondent
claimed that he filed falsified documents upon the inducement of Paredes. entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for
This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government complainant.
witness in the consolidated cases. The proposal for the discharge of Sansaet 3. Subsequently, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant
as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman, reasoning that the before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled "Atty. Julito
confession of Sansaet falls under the privileged communication between him Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado," for violation of Articles 171 and
and his client, Paredes, which may be objected to if presented in the trial. 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, the three criminal cases were filed in the Sandiganbayan. A motion Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of
was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of Sansaet as a Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically,
state witness. complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is
married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. 37 The
solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting
G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978. the privilege.
4. This prompted complainant Rosa Mercado to bring this action against
respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, NELLY LIM, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer- MANUEL D. VICTORIO, as Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales,
client relationship, and should be disbarred. Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN SIM, respondents
5. On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of Doctrine: When, a doctor’s expert opinion excluded whatever information or
investigating commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating knowledge she had about her client which was acquired by reason of the
the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client, and physician-patient relationship existing between them, she may be allowed to
recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. testify in the case involving her client. Also, there is authority to the effect
that information elicited during consultation with a physician in the presence
Issue: Whether respondent violated the rule on privileged of third parties removes such information from the mantle of the privilege.
communication between attorney and client when he filed a criminal
case for falsification of public document against his former client 1. On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such
Held: No, he did not. marriage on the ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a
Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the existence of the mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage
privilege, viz: and until the present."
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought 2. Private respondent's counsel announced that he would present as his next
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr.
(3) the communications relating to that purpose, Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry.
(4) made in confidence 3. Petitioner's counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony
(5) by the client, sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter had
(6) are at his instance permanently protected examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the be suffering from schizophrenia. Movant argued that having seen and
protection be waived. examined the petitioner in a professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is barred
from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-patient
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the relationship.
rule on privileged communication even if the prospective client does not 4. Counsel for private respondent contended, however, that Dr. Acampado
thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. On the would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any
other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional
purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is capacity.
not privileged. 5. The trial court, per respondent Judge, denied the motion and allowed the
witness to testify.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of 6. On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic) questions to
confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. A qualify her as an expert in psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as
confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act to what kind of illness (sic) are stelazine tablets applied to; she was asked to
of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, render an opinion on a (sic) hypothetical facts respecting certain behaviours
so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person of a person; and finally she admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim but she
other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information never revealed what illness she examined and treated her (sic); nor (sic) the
or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given. result of her examination of Nelly Lim, nor (sic) the medicines she
prescribed.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for 7. Petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a petition 2 for
mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his certiorari and prohibition.
attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have been 8. The Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution 3 denying due course to
transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice. the petition on the ground that "the petitioner failed in establishing the
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, confidential nature of the testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado
36 and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication when she testified on January 25, 1989.
disclosed for such purpose.
Issue: Whether or not Dr Acampado should be barred from testifying
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on as a witness.
record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations. We note that
complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence Held: No, she is not.
disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following
lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on requisites must concur:
privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for 1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed 2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of 3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient
her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the in his professional capacity;
existence of facts which the complainant must prove. 4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential information
allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary
impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain
communication. Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing communications, to wit:
a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be 5. On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his
disclosed. marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial court.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory 6. At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to
maintenance of the relation between the parties. testify on the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged
be sedulously fostered communication between physician and patient.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 7. She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the the psychiatric evaluation report "will set a very bad and dangerous
correct disposal of litigation precedent because it abets circumvention of the rule's intent in preserving
the sanctity, security and confidence to the relation of physician and his
Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other patient.
course of action but to agree with the respondent Court's observation that the 8. Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are
petitioner failed to discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr. Acampado very explicit: the prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus . . . . the legal
was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As correctly held by the prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar where the person
Court of Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the
examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts husband and not the physician of the petitioner.
and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had Private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived by
no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while the person entitled thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave
attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado's her unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation report.
answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical Private respondent further argues that petitioner also gave her implied
problem were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. consent when she failed to specifically object to the admissibility of the report
Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever information or in her Answer where she merely described the evaluation report as "either
knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the unfounded or irrelevant."
physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, 9. The trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric
her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded. Evaluation Report in evidence.
10. The appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado's testimony that the petitioner
was never interviewed alone. Said interviews were always conducted in the Issue: WON, the contents of the psychiatric report can be used as
presence of a third party. There is authority to the effect that information documentary evidence in court.
elicited during consultation with a physician in the presence of third parties
removes such information from the mantle of the privilege. Held: Yes, it can.

Thirdly, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that indeed, the In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not
information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the former's one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery obstetrics. He is simply the
"character" (or "reputation"). Dr. Acampado never disclosed any information patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical
obtained from the petitioner regarding the latter's ailment and the treatment practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed
recommended therefore. prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the
prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the
Finally the petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the
had objected to any question asked of the witness on the ground that it report.
elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial court's
advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony "once it Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private
becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the respondent on the ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before
privileged communication rule. the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged
communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a
fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it
MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and,
and EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
Doctrine: A psychiatric report may be used in court by a person not a party to
the physician- patient relationship against the patient in the case. [G.R. No. 169777 * . April 20, 2006.]

1. A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M.
before the trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in
psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the husband his capacity as SenatePresident Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N.
who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q.
report. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS
2. Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married. Their blessings RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO,
notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple developed into a stormy JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA,
one. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M.
effort to ease the martial strain. In 1973, they finally separated in fact. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMEÑA III,
3. In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in
report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria
Baltazar Reyes. He obtained a decree from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of
Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the the President of the Philippines
ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due
discretion existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter." The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various
4. Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29,
Regional Trial Court) of Pasig, Br. II, issued an order granting the voluntary 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership. North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and
Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was Gicana, and those from the Department of Budget and Management having
sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging invoked E.O. 464.
the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful
provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondents from implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued 464.
invitations to the certain officials of the AFP for them to attend as resource
persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the ISSUE: Whether the executive privilege may be invoked by the officials
following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., entitled subject of investigation pursuant to E.O 464
"Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that
Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) HELD: The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3
Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada entitled "The Philippines as of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "ENSURING OBSERVANCE
the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO
Rodolfo Biazon entitled "Clear and Present Danger"; (4) Senate Resolution THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE
No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal — Resolution RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES
Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER
Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the PURPOSES," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.
Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No.
295 filed by Senator Biazon — Resolution Directing the Committee on Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to
National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on withhold information from the public, the courts, and the
the Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines. Congress." Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and
high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress,
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "ENSURING the courts, and ultimately the public."
OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS,
ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers,
FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the
INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the
FOR OTHER PURPOSES," . The salient provisions of the Order are as discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in
follows: maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress . — In to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an
accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement appropriate exercise of the executive' domestic decisional and policy making
the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary
branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress. That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however,
necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For
Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be
E.O. 464, and another letter informing him "that officials of the Executive asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the
Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a
will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, given procedural setting.
pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required
consent from the President." Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the
public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept,
Gen. Senga, the investigation scheduled by the Committee on National a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to
Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any
Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
Three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the
for certiorari and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor
constitutionality of E.O. 464. of disclosure.

Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to
resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress
imminent and material injury, as it has already sustained the same with its that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has
continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and impedes the valid determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the
exercise of theSenate's powers and functions and conceals information of President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however,
great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and even without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch,
declared unconstitutional. by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there
is an implied claim of privilege.
In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on
Agriculture and Food and the Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by
mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang the mere fact that it sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must
Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to
Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings but most of them failed to determine whether it is valid.
attend, DA Undersecretary Belinda Gonzales, DA Assistant Secretary Felix
Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority Executive Director Norlito R. While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case
basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the particular
circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a In the course of its inquiry, the House Committee requested herein
defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated respondent Undersecretary Tomas Aquino (Usec. Aquino), Chairman of the
by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied Philippine Coordinating Committee to study and negotiate the proposed
claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any JPEPA, and to furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the
specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information JPEPA. Usec. Aquino did not heed the request, however.
demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet
meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that Congressman Aguja later requested for the same document, but Usec.
are covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to Aquino, by letter, replied that the Congressman shall be provided with a copy
speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive. The thereof "once the negotiations are completed and as soon as a thorough
enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere legal review of the proposed agreement has been conducted."
statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or classified
information between the President and the public officers covered by this In a separate move, the House Committee, through Congressman Herminio
executive order." G. Teves, requested Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita to furnish it with
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the "all documents on the subject including the latest draft of the proposed
requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that agreement, the requests and offers etc." Acting on the request, Secretary
the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, Ermita, by letter, wrote Congressman Teves that the Committee's request
and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such to be furnished all documents on the JPEPA may be difficult to
declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information accomplish at this time, since the proposed Agreement has been a
could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, work in progress for about three years. A copy of the draft JPEPA will
on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more however be forwarded to the Committee as soon as the text thereof is settled
pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why and complete.
the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has
requested. ETAICc In its third hearing conducted, the House Committee resolved to issue a
A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose subpoena for the most recent draft of the JPEPA, but the same was not
information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. pursued because by Committee Chairman Congressman Teves' information,
then House Speaker Jose de Venecia had requested him to hold in
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive abeyance the issuance of the subpoena until the President gives her consent
privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the to the disclosure of the documents.
traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made,
it should be respected. Petitioners assert, first, that the refusal of the government to disclose the
documents bearing on the JPEPA negotiations violates their right to
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) information on matters of public concern and contravenes other constitutional
is thus invalid per se . It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of provisions on transparency, such as that on the policy of full public disclosure
providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. of all transactions involving public interest. Second, they contend that non-
464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and
consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the reasonable participation in all levels of social, political, and economic
withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. decision-making.
It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive privilege may be invoked by the
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. respondents.

No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides HELD: Yes. The petition is DISMISSED.
guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on
what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive It is well-established in jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor
on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere the policy of full public disclosure is absolute, there being matters which,
expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of albeit of public concern or public interest, are recognized as privileged in
executive privilege. nature.

It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on Whether a claim of executive privilege is valid depends on the ground
a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. In the present case,
privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the the ground for respondents' claim of privilege is set forth in
Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is their Comment, viz.:
necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with . . . The categories of information that may be considered privileged includes
fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of matters of diplomatic character and under negotiation and review. In this
executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the case, the privileged character of the diplomatic negotiations has been
President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no categorically invoked and clearly explained by respondents particularly
longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress respondent DTI Senior Undersecretary.
and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his
appearance. The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is subject
to negotiations and legal review by the parties fall under the exceptions to
AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY ET. AL. vs . THOMAS G. the right of access to information on matters of public concern and policy of
AQUINO ET. AL. public disclosure. They come within the coverage of executive privilege. At
Petitioners Congressman Lorenzo R. Tañada III and Mario Joyo Aguja filed the time when the Committee was requesting for copies of such documents,
House Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade the negotiations were ongoing as they are still now and the text of the
agreements then being negotiated by the Philippine government, particularly proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change. Considering the
the JPEPA. The Resolution became the basis of an inquiry subsequently status and nature of such documents then and now, these are evidently
conducted by the House Special Committee on Globalization (the House covered by executive privilege consistent with existing legal provisions and
Committee) into the negotiations of the JPEPA. settled jurisprudence.
Practical and strategic considerations likewise counsel against the disclosure the Court. Moreover, petitioners — both private citizens and members of the
of the "rolling texts" which may undergo radical change or portions of which House of Representatives — have failed to present a "sufficient showing of
may be totally abandoned. Furthermore, the negotiations of the need" to overcome the claim of privilege in this case.
representatives of the Philippines as well as of Japan must be
allowed to explore alternatives in the course of the negotiations in This Decision shall not be interpreted as departing from the ruling in Senate
the same manner as judicial deliberations and working drafts of v. Ermita that executive privilege should be invoked by the President or
opinions are accorded strict confidentiality. through the Executive Secretary "by order of the President".

The ground relied upon by respondents is thus not simply that the IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF
information sought involves a diplomatic matter, but that it pertains ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH, EMMA K. LEE vs . COURT OF
to diplomatic negotiations then in progress. APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG,
JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO
the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential — since K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, as
there should be "ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is Attorney-in-Fact
approved" — the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the
to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children, the
understanding that "historic confidentiality" would govern the same. Lee-Keh children.
Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not
only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly
to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and had
public scrutiny would discourage future Philippine representatives from a relation with him.
frankly expressing their views during negotiations. While, on first impression,
it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering into Shortly after Keh die, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu's children with
compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for Lee (collectively, the Lee's other children) claimed that they, too, were
that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the
negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After
lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report: [I]t is very
of greater national interest. Apropos are the following observations of obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH
Benjamin S. Duval, Jr.: SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU
. . . [T]hose involved in the practice of negotiations appear to be in CHUAN. The NBI further found, among others, by the hospital records of the
agreement that publicity leads to "grandstanding", tends to freeze Lee's other children, Keh's declared age did not coincide with her actual age
negotiating positions, and inhibits the give-and-take essential to when she supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering eight.
successful negotiation. As Sissela Bok points out, if "negotiators have
more to gain from being approved by their own sides than by making a On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two
reasoned agreement with competitors or adversaries, then they are inclined separate petitionsf or the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the
to 'play to the gallery . . .'' In fact, the public reaction may leave them petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee's other children, the name Keh and replace
little option. It would be a brave, or foolish, Arab leader who expressed the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother's name.
publicly a willingness for peace with Israel that did not involve the return of
the entire West Bank, or Israeli leader who stated publicly a willingness to Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a
remove Israel's existing settlements from Judea and Samaria in return for subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee's presumed mother, to
peace. testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the
subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130
Indeed, by hampering the ability of our representatives to compromise, we of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee's
may be jeopardizing higher national goals for the sake of securing less stepmother.
critical ones.
RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this considering that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious object of the
jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lee's
emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate mother.
v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not
mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a CA rendered a decision, 4 setting aside the RTC
consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined
if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel
information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children
filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to
To recapitulate, petitioners' demand to be furnished with a copy of the full show that she is not Keh's daughter.
text of the JPEPA has become moot and academic, it having been made
accessible to the public since September 11, 2006. As for their demand for HELD: No. Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the JPEPA
negotiations, the same must be denied, respondents' claim of executive “SECTION 25.Parental and filial privilege. — No person may be compelled to
privilege being valid. testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct
descendants.”
Diplomatic negotiations have, since the Court promulgated its Resolution
in PMPF v. Manglapus on September 13, 1988, been recognized as The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil
privileged in this jurisdiction and the reasons proffered by petitioners against Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of
the application of the ruling therein to the present case have not persuaded Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions,
whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct opened to public scrutiny, it will stand to lose the backbone on which its
ascendants or descendants. business is founded. This would result in nothing less than the probable
demise of respondent's business. Respondent's proprietary interest over the
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the ingredients which it had developed and expended money and effort on is
stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them incontrovertible. Our conclusion is that the detailed ingredients sought to be
because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a revealed have a commercial value to respondent. Not only do we
family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common acknowledge the fact that the information grants it a competitive advantage;
ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides: we also find that there is clearly a glaring intent on the part of respondent to
keep the information confidential and not available to the prying public.
Art. 965.The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites
the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of
person with those from whom he descends. privileged communication, to wit: (a) communication between husband and
wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) communication
AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION vs . PENNSWELL, INC. between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and
penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. There are, however,
Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130 . Among
the business of air transportation services. On the other hand, respondent them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the
Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for
and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants. On various whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census
dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. returns; and (d) bank deposits.
Under the contracts, petitioner's total outstanding obligation amounted to
P449,864.98. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under We, thus, rule against the petitioner. We affirm the ruling of the Court of
said contracts, respondent filed a Complaint or a Sum of Money. In its Appeals which upheld the finding of the RTC that there is substantial basis
Answer, petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights over the
justifiable reasons. In particular, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in detailed chemical composition of its products.
the amount of P592,000.00 by respondent Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery,
because they derive economic value from being generally unknown
During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to and not readily ascertainable by the public .To the mind of this Court,
Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical petitioner was not able to show a compelling reason for us to lift the veil of
components of the following products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease and confidentiality which shields respondent's trade secrets.
Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-Electric Strength
Protective Coating; and (c) Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound.

RTC rendered an Order directing [herein respondent] Pennswell, Inc. to give


[herein petitioner] Air Philippines Corporation[,] a detailed list of the
ingredients or chemical components of the abovementioned chemical
products:

Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it


cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical components sought because
the matter is confidential. It argued that what petitioner endeavored to inquire
upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to
divulge.

RTC gave credence to respondent's reasoning, and reversed itself.

Court of Appeals ruled that to compel respondent to reveal in detail the list of
ingredients of its lubricants is to disregard respondent's rights over its trade
secrets.

ISSUE:
Whether or n the ot CHEMICAL COMPONENTS OR INGREDIENTS OF
RESPONDENT'S PRODUCTS ARE TRADE SECRETS OR INDUSTRIAL
SECRETS THAT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE.

HELD:
SC ruled in favor of the respondent..

The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent's


special lubricants are trade secrets within the contemplation of the law. In the
creation of its lubricants, respondent expended efforts, skills, research, and
resources. What it had achieved by virtue of its investments may not be
wrested from respondent on the mere pretext that it is necessary for
petitioner's defense against a collection for a sum of money. By and large,
the value of the information to respondent is crystal clear. The ingredients
constitute the very fabric of respondent's production and business. No doubt,
the information is also valuable to respondent's competitors. To compel its
disclosure is to cripple respondent's business, and to place it at an undue
disadvantage. If the chemical composition of respondent's lubricants are

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