Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A Thesis Presented
By
Mahmoodreza Arefi
to
Master of Science
in
Electrical Engineering
in the field of
Power Systems
Northeastern University
Boston, Massachusetts
August 2014
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………………...………… i
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………….…….……...iv
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………………....v
List of Tables………………………………………………………………………………..……………..vi
List of Figures…………………………………….…………………………………………………..…..viii
1.Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………….1
i
3.7 Coordination for protective devices……………………………………………………..…………….30
3.8 Motor contribution to short circuit current……………………………………………………………37
ii
6. Conclusion and future work………………………………………………………………………...…113
6.1 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………………..113
References…………………………………………………………………………………………….….117
Appendix B: Result of arc flash study (worst case) for 271 bus system………………………………...122
iii
Abstract
Technicians working with low voltage power systems face a high risk of being exposed to arc
flashes due to their inadvertence. Reducing arc flash energy level can provide increased safety
To avoid injury, the energy source must be completely shut-down when working on some
electrical equipment. Nonetheless, power distribution systems in mission critical facilities such
as commercial buildings and data centers must occasionally remain energized while being
maintained. In recent years the arc flash analysis has become an important safety tool that
provides skilled technicians with useful information on the energy level at the equipment to be
standards and historically acceptable design methods, the estimated arc flash energy level is
This thesis presents different scenarios and employs alternative strategies to be implemented at
the design stage of a 600 volt power distribution system facility in order to reduce the arc flash
energy level. A 271-bus power system is used as an example to illustrate how simulation based
analysis of arc flash energy level can be carried out by using typical mainstream code acceptable
methods. In order to show the implementation of arc flash optimization techniques at the system
design level, the system model (271 bus) will be changed. Use of optimization techniques
facilitates significant reductions in arc flash energy level as verified by computer simulations. A
cost analysis which compares the cost of the required protective relays and related safety
equipment against arc flash with and without applying optimization methods is also carried out.
The results show that applying these techniques may lead to significant cost savings.
iv
Acknowledgments
First, I would like to thank my advisor Prof. Ali Abur for his guidance. It was a great experience
to work with Prof. Abur, who advised me through the course of the work. I would like to express
I am grateful to my committee members Prof. Brad Lehman and Prof. Bahram Shafai for their
I would like to express my thanks to Mr. Bruce Swanton, Electrical Manager, at AHA consulting
Engineers that provided helpful comments about ETAP software and also provided necessary
Finally I would like to thank my parents and my wife ‘Ronak’. I could not have completed this
v
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.2 Conditions for which the IEEE 1584 equations are applicable………………………………..24
Table 3.3 Distance factor (x) for various voltages and enclosure types………………………………….26
Table 4.16 Arc flash result for five bus network ………………………………………………………...60
Table 4.17 Adjusted minimum arc current as a percentage of bolted fault currents……………………..62
Table 4.18 Final clearing time and source protection device ……………………………………………63
Table 4.23 Configuration of breakers at normal, emergency, normal ties closed and EMTC……………72
Table 5.4 without single main circuit breaker for building shutdown …………………………………...87
Table 5.5 with single main circuit breaker for building shutdown ………………………………………89
Table 5.6 Fuse disconnect for panel entrance before reduced arc ……………………………………….91
Table 5.7 Low voltage circuit breaker for panel entrance after reduced arc……………………………...92
Table 5.8 Low voltage circuit breaker for transformers rated above 125 KVA………………………….95
Table 5.9 Low voltage circuit breaker for transformers rated above 125 KVA with LSI………………..97
Table 5.12 Energy level before and after applying optimization methods..……………………………105
Table 5.16 List of circuit breakers connected to transformers rated above 125 KVA…………………..111
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.3 Time current curve for molded case circuit breaker…………………………………………..12
Figure 2.4 Time current curve for low voltage power circuit breakers…………………………………..14
Figure 3.3 Time current curves for a circuit breaker and a fuse………………………………………….33
Figure 3.4 Time current curves for a selectively coordinated circuit breakers…………………………...34
viii
Figure 4.13 Current transformer editor page……………………………………………………………..53
Figure 4.17 Short current result for five bus network (one line)…………………………………………58
Figure 4.18 Arc flash result for five bus network(one line)……………………………………………...60
Figure 5.3 Building without single main circuit breaker for shutdown (one line)…………………….…86
Figure 5.4 Building with single main circuit breaker for shutdown (one line)…………………………...89
Figure 5.6 Low voltage circuit breaker for panel entrance (one line)…………………………………….92
Figure 5.7 Low voltage circuit breaker for transformers rated above 125 KVA (one line)……………...94
Figure 5.9 TCC showing LSI breaker and arcing current at primary and secondary of T2………………98
Figure 5.11 Time current curve arc flash Hazard at panel D10…………………………………………101
Figure 5.12 One – line diagram showing two 125 KVA transformer…………………………………...102
Figure 5.13 Time current curve arc flash hazard at panel M1 and M2…………………………………..104
ix
1. Introduction
In the domain of electrical system design, operation and maintenance, the greatest concern
must be the safety and security of workers who operate and maintain the system. Electrical
systems’ designers must not only take necessary precautions to protect systems and equipment,
but also they must assess personnel safety for a given level of arc flash energy due to arcing
The issue of secure work practices and methods for staff working on energized electrical
equipment is therefore very significant and has widespread recognition. On the other hand,
shutdown of a segment of the distribution system may have an extensive influence on the
processes continuity, and widespread power loss can interrupt production and also may lead to
loss of revenues.
When working on an energized line, it is not possible to remove arc fault hazard, however it is
possible to decrease the amount of energy dissipated from an arc and the risk of injury or fatality
to the workers.
This study focuses on applying a variety of methods for low voltage distribution systems to
restrict the level of arc flash energy using the standard IEEE 1584. By diminishing the incident
energy, the arc flash energy level will also be reduced. Also, cost analysis to evaluate
1
1.1 Arc Flash
Arc flash is product of fast release of energy which is caused by arcing fault between two phases
or phase and ground. Arc fault happens when there is a path of conduction and it could be
An arc flash happens in the case of a fault, or short circuit, which passes through this arc gap.
The arc flash can be the result of unintended contact, negligence, use of equipment which is not
Reducing the risk of injury to humans and improve safety of workers are the main objectives for
studying arc flashes and applying optimization techniques. Electric arcs create temperatures up
to 35.000 degrees Fahrenheit [1], some of the highest recorded temperatures on earth.
It is estimated that five to ten arc flash explosions occur across the US on a daily basis [2], and
80% of electricity-related accidents and casualties involving “skilled workers” are caused due to
Thus the main motivation of this work was to apply optimization method for a large power
This dissertation consists of 6 chapters, with the first chapter introducing arc flash and
importance of arc flash. The objectives of this research are briefly discussed and outlines are
described.
2
Chapter 2 will present literature review and development of arc flash regulation and standards.
Chapter 3 presents an overview of electrical power system studies for 480 volt power systems.
The process of a fault current calculation will be conceptually described to show the purpose of
Chapter 4 will explore practical steps for arc flash calculation, the procedure explains step by
step from data collection to documentation of arc flash study results and also the software
implementation. Arc flash calculation for a low voltage system which has 271 buses will be
implemented.
Chapter 5 will highlight applicable methods to help mitigate arc flash energy level. A low
voltage system with 271 buses that is in compliance with the NEC and acceptable for an
electrical building permit will be analyzed for reduction of arc flash energy level. Cost analysis
will be performed to compare cost before and after applying the optimization methods for the
case study.
Chapter 6 will discuss the conclusions and future work. The results of implementing the
recommended design techniques will be reviewed. Guidelines for future work will be discussed.
3
2 Background and protection of low voltage systems
In 1982, a comprehensive paper entitled “The Other Electrical Hazard: Electrical Arc Blast
Burns” was published by Mr. Ralph Lee [1]. The contributions of this paper is regarded as one of
the most significant research improvements about arc in a non-closure equipment by many
researchers, since it quantified the potential burn hazards while training staff about the
significance of safety. Lee found that the “curable burn threshold for the human body is 1.2
cal/cm2”. He also published another related paper in 1987 [4] in which the pressure property of
The paper by Doughty, Neal, Dear, and Bingham, titled “Testing Update on Protective Clothing
and Equipment for Electric Arc Exposure” [5] that was published in 1997, described in detail the
incident energy levels correlated with low voltage arc flash occurrence. The paper was the first to
define how a situation would be escalated when the arc started in panelboards as well as
switchgears.
“Predicting Incident Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600 V Power
Distribution Systems” [6], by Doughty, Floyd, and Neal, which was published in 2000, semi-
experimentally evaluated the incident energy computation for low voltage systems. The paper is
considered as the derivation of the incident energy computation and is applied in the NFPA 70E
standard.
Jamil, and Saporita: published “Staged Tests to Increase Awareness of Arc-Flash Hazards in
4
Electrical Equipment” [7]. Experimental studies were conducted by applying manikins to better
“IEEE Standard 1584” That is the first copy of “IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard
Calculations” [8] was issued in 2002. This standard employed considerable test data to establish
experimental equations resulted from analytical analysis. Tests data was made accessible from
different sources and are covered as an Appendix to the standard. A paper written by Gammon
and Matthews named “IEEE 1584-2002, Incident Energy Factors and Simple 480-V Incident
Energy Equations” [9] contains comprehensive statistical analysis and a brief explanation of the
Stokes and Sweeting published “Electric Arcing Burn Hazards” [10] in 2006, which critically
evaluates the testing methodology, specially the electrode orientation, applied to evaluate the arc
flash hazard for the IEEE 1584 standard development. Additionally, this paper encompassed a
comprehensive tabulation of arc flash history. The authors proposed that this information has
generally been ignored at the time the current IEEE 1584 standard development. A number of
discussion papers were printed which provided further analysis of the issues being discussed.
Further, Stokes and Sweeting published “Closure to Discussions of “Electric Arcing Burn
“Effect of Insulating Barriers in arc flash Testing” [12] by Wilkins, Lang, and Allison was also
printed in 2006. As their testing methodology, the authors employed vertical conductors ended in
insulating barriers. The character of arc was analogous to horizontally oriented electrodes;
Curtis Thomas Latzo: “Approaches to arc flash Hazard Mitigation in 600 volt power systems”
[38] was published in 2011. The author of this paper suggested design techniques to reduce arc
5
flash in low voltage systems and result showed significant lowering of the arc flash Hazard
Exposure.
‘The Occupational Safety and Health Act’ was approved on December 29, 1970, based on
which every employer “shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which was in charge of providing
safety for workers, started to develop Federal regulations, including those that addressed
detecting the electrical dangers and achieving procedures for safe work. In order to have a basis
for electrical regulations, OSHA mainly used the National Electrical Code (NEC), however,
since it generally does not address employee safety, the need for a new standard was felt.
Consequently, a new NFPA committee was formed in 1976. The committee was assigned to
Arc flash recognized as an electrical hazard in 1991 by OSHA. The first edition of NFPA 70E
was published in 1979 and later in 1995 fifth edition of NFPA is published and used as the first
standard precisely indication arc flash hazard. The following two revisions emphasized on
analyzing arc flash hazard in details; and offered more technical information respecting the arc
flash protection boundaries and incident energy calculations. NFPA 70E-2004 provides sample
70E-98 of the standard: “This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but
6
Besides the NFPA 70E standard and the OSHA , the NEC emphasized on the use of labels to
warn workers about probable arc flash hazards in 2002. At the same year, the standard IEEE
1584-2002, “Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations”, was published by an IEEE
working group. The new standard provided a number of models to estimate incident energy
levels based on a large pool of data. As the above brief summary shows, till a while ago, the arc
flash hazard has not been widely acknowledged. The recent comprehensive research and vast
An arc is defined as “the flow of current through a path containing the vapor of the terminal
material, which is initiated by flashover or from the introduction of some conductive material.
This vapor’s resistance is considerably higher than that of the solid metal, to the degree that
voltage drop in the arc ranges between 75 and 100 V/in, that is several thousand times its drop in
a solid conductor. Since the inductance of the arc path is not significantly different from that of a
solid conductor of the equal length, the arc current path is largely resistive in nature, resulting
unity power factor. (Voltage drop in a faulted large solid or stranded conductor is about 0.5 to 1
When the arc length is more than 4 inches, the arc current becomes stabilized for 277/480 volt
circuits. The reason is that in low voltage systems arc consumes a considerable fraction of
existing voltage (75 to 100 V/in). Hence, the fault current passes through the impedance of
system and arc appearing between supply voltage and arc voltage [1].
7
Figure 2.1: Circuit for source and arc resistance
A fault takes place when the system operation is disrupted unexpectedly due to a sudden
disturbance which results in unusually high currents and/or voltages. Some sources of faults can
include weather, insulation failure, wildlife, vehicle accidents, and destruction. When such an
unpremeditated electrical path is formed, the system produces undesirable current paths that
must be accounted for. It results in a failure in voltage and an extreme inrush of current toward
the fault location. When a fault occurs, the current from all sections of the electrical system is
This fault current level can range from 6.5kA amps at a 13.2kV substation, to around 100kA at a
480 volt system. It is found that the distance from the source reduces fault levels as a result of
system impedance [13]. It is essential to protect the system against possible negative impacts of
large scale currents. Faults in power systems can be classified into these four types: single line-
Nearly 87% of three-phase fault currents are composed of Line-to-line faults. Line-to-ground
faults can range from a few percent to probably 125% of the three-phase value, while line-to-
ground fault currents with higher than three-phase value are unusual in industrial systems. [15].
It is generally acknowledged that in equipment or cables, line-to-line faults rapidly escalate into
8
three-phase faults [16]. In an industrial system, the three-phase fault condition is often the only
one regarded, since it mostly results in maximum current [15]. All testing applied in arc flash
modeling has been three-phase tested, for three-phase arcs yield the utmost possible arc-flash in
equipment. As a result, this project will focus only on three-phase balanced faults.
waveform has an original peak value several times higher than the pre-fault conditions and is
asymmetrically formed from the x-axis. The peak value appearing during the first half cycle of
the fault is known as the Available Fault Current (AFC), the graphical representation of which
9
idc(t) = DC component of the fault
When a fault happens, the fault current i(t) includes two major components which are original
sine wave iac(t) and the DC element idc(t). The peak magnitude of i(t) can be several times
higher than the original current, which depends to different factors as well as system condition.
The magnitude declines as a consequence of the DC exponential, which follows the system
Low voltage circuit breakers include Molded Case Circuit Breakers, Low-Voltage Power Circuit
Breakers, and insulated Case Circuit Breakers [18]. A circuit breaker is an equipment designed to
protect load and cables. All circuit breakers mainly protect the circuit conductors by detecting
The opening of circuit breaker is a reaction to transient current situations, such as short circuit or
fault in the electrical system. Circuit breakers are rated based on available interrupting capacity
and rated continuous current. The interrupting capacity of a circuit breaker is the maximum
short-circuit current that circuit breaker can interrupt safely at a definite voltage. This short
circuit current described by current magnitude and its value is in rms symmetrical amperes [20].
The amount of current a circuit breaker can transmit until it achieves overload conditions and
The magnetic trip element is often referred to as the instantaneous trip time and responds
quickly in reaction to high level short circuit currents. The thermal element is normally some sort
10
of bi-metal that enlarges as a result of the heat in a circuit triggered by current at overload that is
less than the magnetic pickup threshold. The element then trips the Molded Case Circuit Breaker
It is necessary to mention that all time current curve for circuit breakers are from Cutler-Hammer
manufacturer and this information obtained through the library of ETAP software.
Graphical illustration of Circuit breaker trip curves helps better understand the time versus
current application of the device. When demonstrated as follows, the plot is referred to ‘a time
current curve (TCC)’. Figure 2.3 shows a common TCC for a 480 volt, 110 amp, non-adjustable
thermal magnetic MCCB. Here it is observable that the thermal element is 110 amps at 1000
seconds and the instantaneous sensor is at less than 0.03 seconds for short circuit currents greater
than 2000 amps. The interrupting time for a fault current level in the range of 300-350 amps is
11
Figure 2.3: Time current curve for molded case circuit breaker
12
2.5.2 Low voltage power circuit breakers
Low voltage power circuit breakers (LVPSBs) were the subsequent accessible circuit breakers
made in the late 1960s. These circuit breakers which were designed to be rack mounted in
switchgear enjoys larger frame sizes and higher current ratings compared to MCCBs.
Maintenance for these circuit breakers can be performed by replacing parts such as contacts,
The LVPCBs possess thermal-magnetic trip units which react to overloads in the same way as
MCCBs; however, LVPCBs had a 30-cycle short time current rating in accordance with ANSI
standards [21]. This short time current rating makes a second breaker adjustment possible
between the magnetic pickup and the long time sensor. These situations are generally referred to
as Long-Time (L), Short-Time (S) and Instantaneous (I), thus calling the breaker an LSI
protective device. A TCC for a LVPCB is presented in Figure 2.4. In this figure, the long time
setting is 2500 Amps (1), the short time is 6250 Amps (2.5) and Instantaneous setting is 15000
(6) Amps.
13
Figure 2.4: Time current curve for low voltage power circuit breakers
14
2.5.3 Insulated case circuit breaker
These devices were particularly designed molded case circuit breakers which encompassed a
number of low-voltage power circuit breaker features [20]. These features involved short time
current duty cycles and a stored energy mechanism [19]. The ICCB possessed an instantaneous
trip component that could be set at a much higher trip level than the MCCB, which made it
A brief definition of different types of trip units [22] mentioned in this study can be found
below, and also this definitions are based on circuit breaker manufacturers.
Thermal magnetic trip units trip under short circuit circumstances immediately, without any
intended delays. They have a long time delay under the instantaneous trip current, created to
protect conductors while allowing temporary current flows, as for motor starting and transformer
inrush. In a lot of cases, their instantaneous trip current conditions can be adjusted.
The magnetic trip units have no long time characteristic and will not trip below the
instantaneous trip current. These units are only applied for short circuit protection and usually
Three characteristics are found in electronic trip units that might be used individually or in
combination: (L) long time,(S) short time, and (I) instantaneous. A trip unit might be designated
as LI type when it includes both long time and instantaneous features. Other common
15
• L— The long-time feature relates to lower overcurrent conditions to allow for temporary
current surges. It generally includes a current pickup adjustment and a time-delay adjustment.
• S—The short-time feature is applied for coordination purposes via the overload and short
circuit current levels. It typically includes a current pickup and a time-delay adjustment.
• I—The instantaneous feature determines a current level above which tripping occurs without
any premeditated delays. When using the short-time function, it is normally not present, or
turned off.
Based on the NEC definition, “a fuse is an overcurrent protective device with a circuit-opening
fusible element which is heated and severed when an overcurrent passes through it”.[23]
The aim of using fuses in 480 volt electrical systems is to protect the system against over-loads
and short circuits. A fuse basically functions through a simple thermal process; the flow of
excess currents through specifically designed fuse elements causes them to melt, and so cut off
the faulty circuit [24]. The interrupting capability is changed by the fuse element and the filler
The fuses with current limiting capability open expedite within ½ cycle when a fault with high
current occurs. As a result, they are able to offer very good protection for electrical equipment
such as circuit breakers, static and dynamic loads. Fuses can be employed in switchboards, motor
control centers,etc.[25]
Since the fuse does not include any moving parts, it can act swiftly in the case of high fault
currents. A fuse actuation indicates the end of its useful life, hence the reliability and accuracy is
16
maintained when new fuses are embedded into the circuit. Due to lack of moving parts, it is not
possible to adjust the time domains of the fuse, which can be costly when attempting to protect a
system against fault currents. Figure 2.5 illustrates the TCC for a fuse. The fuse curve
demonstrates the interrupting times for different levels of overcurrent. These interruptions can
take place over a short period of time, as indicated by the minimum melt characteristic, i.e. the
time the fuse starts to melt, and the total clearing characteristic, i.e. the thorough interruption of
the current.
17
Figure 2.5: Time current curve for low voltage fuse
The inverse time characteristics of the TCC for the 60 ampere fuse are the same as those of the
circuit breakers. This specific device is revealed to have 60 amperes of over-load protection
beyond 100 seconds, and for a short circuit of 800 amperes, it interrupts at nearly 0.02 seconds.
18
3. ARC flash calculation method and analysis
Conducting a fault current analysis and a protective device coordination study makes it possible
for us to proceed with the arc-flash analysis, which should be accomplished together with or
following the coordination protective devices and short circuit study [25]. The outcomes of the
short-circuit study help us find out the available fault current at electrical equipment locations
and hence properly specify equipment withstand ratings and interrupting capabilities. Besides,
the results of the protective-device coordination study provide us with information on the time
the system needs to isolate overload or fault conditions. Further, the outcomes of both the short-
circuit study and protective device evaluation jointly offer the necessary information needed to
implement an arc-flash analysis. Finally, the results of the arc-flash analysis are employed to
determine the incident energy and flash protection boundary at specified ranges all over positions
Fault current analysis on a theoretical basis is conducted by examining the reaction of the series
19
Figure 3.1: Series RL Circuit
When the switch SW closes at time t=0, the circuit’s reaction will be the same as that of a
balanced three phase fault with zero impedance between the phases [26]. Writing Kirchhoff’s
√
i(t)= sin sin
i(t)=iac(t)-idc(t)
Z=
tan . tan .
20
T=
/
i(t)=√2 Iac[sin( )+ ]
The main objective of the short circuit study is to identify the available fault current (AFC) at
different points throughout the system under fault conditions. Afterwards, the AFC is compared
to equipment withstand ratings and available interrupting capacity (AIC) of protective devices.
Equipment with a withstand rating do not interrupt fault current but must “ride through” a fault
without damage imposed by the magnetic forces caused by the large currents. Consequently,
withstand rating of each panel-board must be greater than the AFC calculated at its bus and the
AIC of each protective device must be greater than the AFC so that it can interrupt the maximum
fault current seen at its contacts. If a breaker or fuse is not rated to handle the maximum
available fault current it might meet, the device might not function appropriately and its internal
components might fuse together or buckle under the destructive stresses of a fault condition,
The AFC observed at any locations in an electrical system is a product of the fault contributions
imposed on the system and the impedances in their path to the fault location. The contributions
toward the system include the utility, generators, and motors. Besides, the impedances
The real process of fault current calculation has been admirably documented in the IEEE
standard. Nevertheless, the reduction of fault current can be valued through a point to point
21
F= (1.732*L*AFC)/(C*N*V) where
L: Length of conductor
AFC: Available fault current at beginning of run
C: Constant representing conductor type
n: number of conductor parallel runs
V: Voltage line to line
The AFC at the service entrance is a crucial item in the calculation and is easily provided by the
local electrical utility. Traditionally, this figure is an overly conservative large one whose
intention is to assess the system during a worst case high fault current scenario. As a result, the
AFC is usually provided as an infinite bus calculation dependent on the service transformer size
and impedance. This brings about the highest possible fault current on the service transformer
secondary terminals. The simplified form of this calculation on the basis of infinite bus theory is
1. Step One: Calculate the full load current at the secondary of the transformer:
FLA (secondary)=
√
2. Step Two: Calculate the Available Fault Current at the secondary of transformer
∗
AFC (secondary) =
%
For a 15kV-480V , 2000 KVA transformer with impedance (Z)= 4.5 %, the resulting infinite bus
The peak value of the first cycle is the product of the DC exponential decay value. The rate of
DC exponential decay ensues from the system impedance properties when looking from the fault
back to the short circuit contribution. In most power systems, the DC component of the current
generally decays quickly and reaches a non-significant value within 0.1 second [26]. The
conductor and transformer properties of resistance (R) and reactance (X) in calculation with the
22
utility source system properties are the reasons for this value which is recognized as the X/R
ratio and varies throughout the system in accordance with inherent properties. The protective
Once a fault occurs, the current is no longer a sine wave, so the wave form must now be
The X/R value of the electrical system is crucial, since it presents the value of the fault current at
3-5 cycles after the fault that corresponds to the moment when the protective device activates to
isolate the fault. The higher the X/R ratio , the longer the DC component will exist [31]. System
X/R ratio should be compared to the X/R ratio associated with the tested protective device . In
case the system X/R ratio is larger than the equipment X/R ratio then additional research will be
If the resulting de-rated AIC is greater than the AFC, it means that the device is appropriately
rated for installation in the system at the determined location. All low voltage protective devices
are tested at previously planned X/R ratios as shown in table 3.1 [30].
Molded Case Circuit Breakers rated less than 10k AIC 1.7
Molded Case Circuit Breakers rated between than 10k & 20k AIC 3.2
Fuses, Insulated Case Circuit Breakers,Molded Case Circuit Breakers rated 4.9
23
The short circuit study qualifies the equipment through its evaluation against two parameters:
1. The AIC rating of the equipment against the calculated system AFC.
2. The X/R ratio at which the device was tested against the calculated X/R ratio of the system.
IEEE Standard 1584-2002 recommends the following procedures for the evaluation of arc flash
hazard. An IEEE working group on arc flash has developed the empirically derived equations
Table 3.2: Conditions for which the IEEE 1584 equations are applicable
Frequencies (Hz) 50 or 60 Hz
For electrical distribution systems which voltage is less than 1000 V, the arc current is specified
by equation (3.1).
24
{K+0.622 log (I )+0.0966V+0.000526G+0.5588V*log(I )-0.00304G*log(I )} (equation 3.1)
Ia=10 bf bf bf
Ibf= bolted fault current for three phase faults (symmetrical RMS) (KA)
For medium voltage systems (>1 kV), the arc current is given by equation
The normalized incident energy is calculated by the following equation and formed on arc
duration for 0.2 second and distance from arc that is 610 mm.
En=10{K1+K2+1.081*log(Ia)+0.0011G}
The normalized incident energy is employed to calculate the incident energy at a normal surface
E= 4.184 Cf En (t/0.2)(610/D)x
25
Where E=incident energy (J/ cm2)
=1.5; voltage<1kV
Table 3.3: Distance factor (x) for various voltages and enclosure types
Open air 2 2
Cable 2 2
The flash protection boundary is defined by NFPA as the distance at which a person with no
personal protective equipment (PPE) may get a second degree burn which is treatable. For the
DB= [ 2.142*106*V*Ibf*(t/EB)]1/x
Where DB= distance of the boundary from the arcing point (mm)
EB= incident energy at the boundary distance (J/cm2); EB can be set at 5.0 J/cm2 (1.2 Cal/cm2) for bare
skin.
V=system voltage, kV
Severe injuries are probable to occur within this area as a result of arc flash burns unless proper
PPE is used and everyone within this area must use appropriate PPE despite the activity he/she is
doing.
The distance from the arc source at which one set of a second degree burn happens 2
Cal/cm2>0.1 sec. is regarded as a second degree burn threshold.If bare skin is exposed to this
level of flash, medical treatment might still be necessary, while complete recovery is expected.
Describes a boundary near energized parts that only qualified person can cross it. Might be closer
than flash boundary and defined exclusively on the basis of the nominal voltage. Limited
Approach Boundary according to NFPA is defined as "a shock protection boundary to be crossed
by only qualified persons (at a distance from a live part) which is not to be crossed by
27
3.4.3 Restricted approach boundary
Boundary near exposed live parts that might be crossed merely by “qualified” people who apply
suitable shock prevention techniques and equipment. A shock hazard is the main concern.
Defined exclusively on the basis of the nominal voltage. Restricted Approach Boundary
persons (at a distance from a live part) which, due to its proximity to a shock hazard, requires the
A shock protection boundary which is merely crossed by “qualified” people who use the same
protection in such a way that it seems direct contact with live part is prearranged. It is defined
This pressure is noteworthy since it can throw workers away from the arc and makes them fall
and injure more severely than they might in the case of burn occurrence. In his 1987 paper
“Pressures Developed by Arcs”, Ralph Lee [4] mentions several real cases. In one of these
cases, with available system three phase short circuit 100 kA and estimated arc flash current 42
kA for a low voltage system (480 V), hurled by arc flash pressure about 25 feet. Forcing the
electricians away from the arc decreases their hazard to the heat transfer and smelted copper, but
might put the workers at the risk of falls or impact injuries. As specified by following equation,
Pressure= (11.58*Iarc)/D0.9
In addition to studies and research on incident energy prediction, some other studies are devoted
to ways of protecting workers in the event of an arc-flash. In 1997 and 1998, two papers were
published on the testing of personal protective equipment (PPE) for arc-flash analysis [32,33]. In
this project, the flammability of clothing was tested when disclosed to arc flashes with varying
incident energy magnitudes. Ultimately, the paper suggested protective clothing classes based on
incident energy ranges in line with a fire rated clothing system and description. Moreover, this
project incorporated the function of safety glasses, face shields, and work gloves when exposed
to an arc flash. Finally, this research offered the ground work for a standardized system with the
The arc flash analysis provides the energy level at a definite working range from the arc’s point
of supply. This allows us to select a personal protective equipment (PPE) that is rated above the
incident energy. Although the concept of using the PPE that matches the task seems simple, the
different incident energy levels can be extensive. For this reason, the application of energy level
According to NFPA, there are five energy levels of 0,1,2,3 and 4 which associate with the
maximum incident energy levels (cal/cm2) of 1.2, 4, 8, 25, and 40. This makes it possible for an
electrical device to be labeled per category, and consequently the selection of PPE can be
matched likewise, as shown by Table 3.4. In this thesis “hazard risk category” and “energy level”
29
Table 3.4: Protective clothing characteristics
Protective device selective coordination is the reaction of circuit breakers and fuses throughout a
transient, aiming at isolating the faulted part of the system from service. The objective is to
minimize the damage to equipment and personnel located nearby, while preserving electrical
service in parallel branches. This is essentially important in mission critical systems which are
the basis of this thesis. According to IEEE Buff Book, “Coordination is a fundamental ingredient
This coordination is necessary from the sources of energy such as utility to the loads for all
protection devices which are in series. When circuit breakers are appropriately adjusted and
installed, a fault at any location has minimal influence on close panels and feeders. Figure 3.2
shows a one line diagram of an electrical system. If a fault occurred at Motor-1, appropriate
selective coordination would happen if circuit breaker CB154 is opened before CB153 or any
30
Figure 3.2: One line diagram of a three motor distribution system
The protective devices causing system selective coordination comprise fuses and circuit
breakers. These devices enjoy a time versus current profile, called time-current curve (TCC), that
they will allow to pass before activating. Figure 3.3 illustrates a TCC for circuit breaker CB150
31
Figure 3.3: Time current curves for a circuit breaker and a fuse
Because the reference voltage is 480 volt and the current is presented at times 10, a 3kA fault
current would be cleared at less than 0.03 seconds by this circuit breaker and at 0.45 seconds by
this fuse.
Figure 3.4 shows the TCCs for the system with proper selective coordination. This plot
demonstrates all circuit breaker curves which are in series from Utility source to Motor-1.
32
Figure 3.4 Time current curves for a selectively coordinated circuit breakers
33
It is apparent that the breaker curves do not touch or overlap each other and as a result
appropriate selective coordination exists. Figure 3.5 illustrates the TCC for the above system
34
The overlap of breaker curves CB-150 and CB-153 suggests that selective coordination does not
exist. If a fault of 2000 amps were to take place on Panel B, then CB-150 would open before CB-
153. This would result in the power loss of the feeder to Motor-2 and Motor-3 , and therefore our
goal of isolating the fault without disturbing close devices would not be achieved. Selective
fact, all electrical systems carry some level of coordination, since the overcurrent protective
devices which are closer to the utility or generators have higher ratings in comparison to
This project explores the coordination with circuit breakers, since they can encompass adjustable
settings, where fuses cannot. The adjustable features in a circuit breaker are divided by time
segments. The Long Time (LT) is the setting of the breaker for overload circumstances which is
also called the amperage rating. This is generally in the time period beyond 60 seconds and has a
similar reaction to a thermal element. The Short Time (ST) is the setting for the breaker which is
normally 0.5 seconds until the long time segment. This transitional period is vital for identifying
low level faults that might occur as a result of system impedances. The Instantaneous (I) element
is the setting for the initial transient of a fault which is frequently adjusted very high to
incorporate motor and transformer inrush currents in the first few cycles of start-up, however not
35
3.8 Motor contribution to short circuit current
When studying short circuit, motor contribution should be considered in analysis. Load such as
motors convert to generators and create current, this current adds up to short circuit which flows
to fault location.
Same as contribution from a generator, motor gives the full load ampere (FLA) of nameplate
divided by its per unit subtransient reactance. Meanwhile, at upstream panel board, related
impedance of the motor branch circuit conductors decreases the motor contribution current to
short circuit.
The results which illustrate the highest short circuit current to related devices should include
36
4. Feasible steps to arc flash calculations
A detailed arc flash study includes the following steps. A detailed engineering analysis is
preferred for large power systems with several sources and different mode of operation such as
normal, emergency and maintenance. Since it can determine the probable worst case situations
To illustrate the steps using an example, data and model from a ETAP workshop were used after
Arc flash hazard evaluation is only necessary for the places where workers are vulnerable by
risk. Hence, the assessment may not be required for every bus and equipment in the power
system. In case that the service transformer is less than 125 KVA, panels and switchboards with
voltages 208 volts or under this can usually be overlooked. The arc might not be viable for
lower voltages and lower available fault currents. Whenever a potential significant arc flash
injury is perceived, all electrical panels with circuit breakers and fuses should be considered in
the evaluation. Incidents are probable when circuit breakers or fuses are under operation and they
connects or disconnects, even though the panel door is closed. In the example below, all buses
are faulted.
Although arc flash hazard evaluation may not be necessary for some equipment, data regarding
the equipment may be needed in a short circuit analysis. Table 4.1 shows typical data needed for
37
the study. Data on utility, generators, transformers, circuit breakers,cables, transmission lines,
motors, and etc. is required in short circuit analysis, however, most of the necessary data can be
obtained using the name plate of the equipment. Additionally, typical data can be collected from
handbooks and product manual data sheet. Power system software such as ETAP includes a
available today. The following data for utility, buses, transformers, loads and motors has been
The one line diagram in figure 4.1 illustrates utility, protection relay, step down transformer,
The rated voltage for utility is 13.8 kV, three phase and one phase short circuit is 150 MVA and
38
Figure 4.1: One line diagram of 13.8kV/480V distribution system
Information regarding bus 01 can be found in table 4.2. The Nominal voltage for bus 01 is 13.8
kV since it is connected to utility. The gap between conductors is 150 mm. The following
information is recorded in the rating tab of bus editor in Figure 4.2. Limited approach exp. mov.
cond is 12 feet, limited approach FCP is 8 feet, restricted approach boundary is 4.16 feet,
prohibited approch boundary is 1 feet, distance X factor is 2 and working distance is 24 inches.
The Limited Approach Boundary (LAB) is defined according to NFPA 70E-2009 “as the
approach limit at a distance from an exposed live part within which a shock hazard exists”. The
LAB for movable conductors is the distance, that persons who are not trained can not come
nearer to conductor which is not braced in fixed position. The limited approach boundary for
39
fixed circuit parts is the distance, persons who are not trained can not come nearer to a not
40
Information regarding Switchgear A can be found in table 4.3. The nominal voltage for
gap between conductors is 32 mm. The following information is recorded in the rating tab of bus
editor in Figure 4.3: limited approach exp. mov. cond is 12 feet, limited approach FCP is 4 feet,
restricted approach boundaryis 1.5 feet, prohibited approch boundary is 0.2 feet, distance X
41
Figure 4.3: Switchgear A (0.48 kV) editor page
The information regarding bus 2 is recorded in table 4.4. The nominal voltage for bus 2 is 0.48
kV since it is connected to Switchgar A. The gap between conductors is 20 mm. The following
information is recorded in the rating tab of bus editor in Figure 4.4: limited approach exp. mov.
cond is 12 feet, limited approach FCP is 5 feet, restricted approach boundary is 2 feet, prohibited
approch boundary is 0.2 feet, distance X factor is 2 and working distance is 24 inches.
42
Figure 4.4: Bus 2 (0.48 kV) editor page
The information regarding bus 3 can be found in table 4.5. The nominal voltage for bus 3 is 0.208 kV
since it is connected to step down transformer 2 (0.480/0.208kV). The gap between conductors is 25 mm.
the following information is recorder in the rating tab of bus editor in Figure 4.5. Limited approach exp.
mov. cond is 12 feet, limited approach FCP is 5 feet, restricted approach boundary is 2 feet, prohibited
approch boundary is 0.2 feet, distance X factor is 2 and working distance is 18 inches.
43
Figure 4.5: Bus 3 (0.208 kV) editor page
The information regarding bus 4 can be found in table 4.6. The nominal voltage for bus 4 is
0.480 kV since it is connected to switchboard A. The gap between conductors is 20 mm. The
following information is recorded in the rating tab of bus editor in Figure 4.6. Limited approach
exp. mov. cond is 12 feet, limited approach FCP is 5 feet, restricted approach boundary is 2 feet,
prohibited approch boundary is 0.2 feet, distance X factor is 2 and working distance is 24 inches.
44
Figure 4.6: Bus 4 (0.480 kV) editor page
Transformer one and two data can be found in table 4.7. Both transformers are step down.
Transformer one (T1) is 5 MVA and decreases the voltage from 13.8 kV to 0.480 kV. Also its
positive sequence Z is 5.4% and X/R for both Positive sequence and Zero sequence is 10.21%
Transformer 2 (T2) is 0.5 MVA and reduces the voltage from 0.480 kV to 0.208 kV. Besides, its
positive sequence Z is 5.4% and X/R for both Positive sequence and Zero sequence is 3.51%.
Grounding for transformer 2 (T2) is the same as that of transformer1 (T1), which is Delta-Y
45
Table 4.7. Transformer 1&2 parameters
46
Motors data can be found in table 4.8. The bus bar 2 is connected with four motors. The first two
motors are 120 HP with rated voltage of 0.460 kV, power factor of 91.49% and efficiency of
82.06%. The other two motors are 150 HP with rated voltage of 0.460 kV, power factor of
91.59% and efficiency of 85.16%. The data is recorded in induction machine editor figure 4.8.
47
Load 1 data can be found in table 4.9. The value of load is 0.4 MVA and its rated voltage is
0.208 kV. The power factor is 95%. This data is recorded in static load editor figure 4.9.
Load 2 (Lump 1) data can be found in table 4.10. The value of the load is 0.3 MVA and its rated
voltage is 0.480 kV. The power factor is 85%. This data is recorded in lumped load editor figure
4.10.
48
Table 4.10. Lump load parameters
As table 4.11 shows, for high voltage circuit breaker, the rated max voltage is 15 kV while the
continuous current is 1200 Amps. This data is recorded in high voltage circuit breaker in figure
4.11. Cycle and CPT is necessary to determine the fault clearing time for HVCB.
As it can be seen in table 4.12, the rated max voltage for fuse 1 (high voltage fuse) is 15 kV,
continuous current is 200 amps and test PF is 3.95. This data is recorded in fuse parameter page
in figure 4.12.
50
Figure 4.12: Fuse editor page
Current transformer (CT9) is connected to over current protection relay as indicated in table
4.13. The primary turns’ value is 150 and secondary turns’ value is 5. This data is recorded in
current Transformer (CT) editor page in figure 4.13.
51
Figure 4.13: Current transformer editor page
The input of relay 1 is connected to CT9 and its output is connected to high voltage circuit
breaker (HVCB1), as it is observable in table 4.14. The other values are recorded in over current
52
Figure 4.14: Over current relay editor page
The nominal voltage for low voltage circuit breaker (LVCB1) is 0.480 kV, while the continuous
current is 4000 Amps. Circuit breaker is supplied with a solid state trip unit which is
characterized by Long time, short time and instantaneous trip features. The associated
information can be found at circuit breaker editor page in Figure 4.15. Considering the four
circuit breakers in this one line, the same procedures are followed for each of the other three
circuit breakers.
53
Figure 4.15: Low voltage circuit breaker (LVCB1) editor
Single line diagrams are regarded as robust tools to document and communicate information
regarding power systems. They are not only easily readable and understandable, but also express
the way that equipment are connected and also shows the status of equipment, for instance circuit
breaker could be open or close. The results of analyses like short circuit studies and arc flash
evaluation can effortlessly be placed on the diagrams. The model illustrated in figure 4.16 below
54
Figure 4.16: One line diagram for five bus network
The step down transformer (T01) reduces the voltage from 13.8 kV to 480 V. Together, there
are six loads which include four motors, one static load and one lumped load. Additionally,
transformer (T02) decreases voltage from 480 V to 208 V. Switchgear A is protected by circuit
breaker LVCB1, while motors 1 &2 are protected by circuit breaker LVCB2. Moreover, Load1
and Lump1 are protected by circuit breakers LVCB3 & LVCB4, and transformer T1 is protected
by high voltage circuit breaker. The major upstream device to protect faults probable in Bus 01
Performing arc flash hazard (AFH), merely three phase faults are considered. It might seem odd;
55
several causes. First, three phase faults typically provide the highest probable short circuit energy
and specify the worst case. Second, it is indicated by experience that arcing faults happens in air
or equipment , which initiate as line to ground faults, can intensify instantaneously into three
phase faults, as the air ionizes through phases. Such an evolution from single phase to three
phase fault normally occurs within a few cycles. As a result, the majority of analyses done so far
IEEE 1584 recommends that the calculations for single phase systems are performed for a
corresponding three phase system. It declares that this will lead to conservative outcomes. Table
4.15 demonstrates the result for three phase bolted short circuit.
Switchgear A 73.6
Bus 01 6.4
Bus 02 73.6
Bus 03 22.4
Bus 04 73.6
56
Figure 4.17: Short current result for five bus network (one line)
Figure 4.17 illustrates the short current outcome for each bus. The short circuit current at
switchgear A is 73.6 kA, and since there is no impedance between switchgear A and bus 02, the
short circuit current at bus 02 is identical with Switchgear A. The short circuit current at bus 03
is 22.4 kA, which is less than that of switchgear A due to Impedance transformer T02. To
identify maximum short circuit current, highly conservative estimates and assumptions are
breaker or equipment duties. Nevertheless, employing excessively conservative short circuit data
for arc flash hazard AFH might produce non-conservative outcomes. This is because a very high
fault current might result in notably short arc duration caused by the operation of immediate trip
elements. The highest fault current does not essentially mean the highest probable arc flash
57
hazard, since the incident energy is a function of arcing time, which can be an inversely
In this stage we calculate the arc fault current using IEEE formulas described in chapter 3. IEEE
procedure recommends the following steps to include the variance probable in arcs:
2. Determining the minimum expected bolted fault condition, which can be a light load
condition with numerous motor loads or generators that are not running.
3. Computing the arcing current at 100% of IEEE 1584 estimate for the above two
conditions.
4. Calculating the arcing current at 85% of IEEE 1584 estimate for the two above
conditions.
When evaluating these four arcing currents, determine the arc flash incident energy and choose
PPE base on highest incident energies. The minimum fault current in comparison with the
maximum fault current condition might need more time to clear and might lead to a higher level
of arc flash incident energy level. It is recommended main fault current source (Utility or
Generator) to be calculated, as its current can conclude the fault clearing time for the large part
of the arc flash incident energy level. The result of arc flash calculation on one line diagram is
58
Figure 4.18: Arc flash result for five bus network (one line)
The result of the arc flash analysis is illustrated in table 4.16 and figure 4.19. The total released
energy at bus 02 is 10.81 cal/cm2, that is classified as level 3 and is considered dangerous. Arc
flash boundary is 4.5, final clearing time (FCT) is 0.05 seconds, and the arcing current at FCT is
41.573 kA. Circuit breaker LVCB2 is the primary protection device for clearing the fault at bus
02.
Figure 4.19: Arc flash report analyzer for five bus system.
Having calculated the range of possible arc current, you must examine whether the computed
values are within the feasible range. To do so, following items should be checked:
Upper limit: The arc current cannot be larger than the bolted fault current. It is due to the
additional impedance of the arc. Hence, if the upper limit of the range of arc current is larger
than the bolted fault current, you must remove it and consider the bolted fault current as the
upper limit.
Lower Limit: According to the test data included in IEEE standard 1584, arc sustains for a
current which is 21% of bolted fault current at 208 volt for 0.2 seconds. Table 4.17 displays the
minimum arc current as a percentage of bolted fault current found as a result of the tests. The
60
lower limit of arc current is not clearly identified yet. Thus it might make sense to use table 4.17
Table 4.17: Adjusted minimum arc current as a percentage of bolted fault currents.
The trip time of a protective device is found using its time current characteristics (TCC). The
In general, the trip time for lower fault currents might be high. This is as a result of the reverse
relationship between the time and the current of the TCC. For higher currents, it is possible for
the arcing fault current to be greater than the instantaneous pickup of the protective device, and
Protective devices can withstand the defined trip time. Lots of low voltage breakers and fuses
determine the upper and lower limits of the trip time for various current values. In these cases,
the time current curve is similar to a wide band rather than a narrow line. Relays normally
display a narrow line for the TCC curve and determine specified tolerance.
The final clearing time for various buses (measured in seconds) in addition to the related
upstream protection device is illustrated in table 4.18 below. The fault at bus 01 will be cleared
61
by Fuse 1 at 0.067 second, while the fault at switchgear A will be cleared by high voltage CB at
1.044 second.
ID Final Source PD ID
FCT
(Second)
Bus01 0.067 Fuse1
Bus02 0.05 LVCB2
Bus03 38.052 LVCB3
Bus04 0.07 LVCB4
Switchgear A 1.044 High Voltage CB
The incident energy for the equipment must be evaluated at the specified working distances. The
equations needed to calculate the arc flash incident energy are presented in chapter 3. The
incident energy value depends on several factors such as arcing time, arc current, the distance
from arc and enclosure type. In addition, IEEE 1584 considers the gap between electrodes as a
variable.
ID kV Total Energy
(cal/cm2)
62
It is observable in table 4.19 that bus 01’s maximum incident energy is 0.9638 cal/cm2.
Comparing the low voltage buses, the highest incident energy belongs to bus 3 (i.e. 1233.16
cal/cm2 ). This is due to its maximum fault clearing time which is 38.052 seconds.
Energy level (hazard risk category) is stated in the form of a number which shows the level of
danger. This level depends on the incident energy. Level 0 signifies little or no risk, while level 4
indicates the maximum danger. The categorizing guide for numbering the risk levels is provided
in table 4.20.
0 1.2 cal/cm2
1 4 cal/cm2
2 8 cal/cm2
3 25 cal/cm2
4 40 cal/cm2
As it can be seen in table 4.21, bus 01 is located in category Level 0 which means little or no
risk. Bus 02 and bus 04 belong to category level 3 which means being dangerous, while bus 3
and Switchgear A are shown to be the most dangerous ones. It is typically tried to decrease level
3 and 4 energy levels to zero, one and two categories by applying optimization techniques which
63
Table 4.21: Result of risk category number
ID kV Energy
Levels
Bus01 13.8 Level 0
Bus02 0.48 Level 3
Bus03 0.208 Level 4
Bus04 0.48 Level 3
Switchgear 0.48 Level 4
A
It is recommended that workers first make provisions based on the energy level (risk category)
and then begin working or inspection close to unprotected, live conductors. It is also necessary to
use documentation and warning stickers. Although the energy level alone can offer an accurate
representation of the risk, the scale of 0 to 4 for the level of risk may provide workers with more
useful information. Thus it is necessary for the employers to completely assess the level of
The flash protection boundary by NFPA is defined “as the distance at which those endangered by arc
flash without proper PPE will receive second degree burns which are treatable.” The flash protection
boundary is a function of the arc flash incident energy in a way that as the arc flash energy increases, the
boundary distance will increases consequently. The flash protection boundary is calculated employing the
equation recommended by the standard as below. To determine the flash protection boundary, use the
following equation.
/
/
Where,
64
D= working distance
For instance, considering table 4.22, the incident energy for bus 04 at a working distance of 18
inches is calculated to be 15.14 cal/cm2 based on the proposed NFPA 70E (2004) method. Then
the flash protection boundary for arcing time greater than 0.1 second is:
The recommended documentations by NFPA for arc flash hazard assessment results to be placed
1. Warning labels showing arc flash values: These are stickers on which a warning sign of
acceptable size is printed. The stickers must be pasted in such a way to be easily
noticeable and readable from a specified distance. They must include clear prints of the
incident energy at the determined working distance and its related risk energy level
65
2. Arc flash evaluation outcomes: it is recommended that these results are placed on the
equipment like table formats and one line diagram as explained in the preceding section,
In this section of the research, a power distribution system is analyzed which is located in a
commercial building in Boston. The building was constructed before 1990. Several years later,
the owner made up his mind to perform an arc flash hazard analysis in order to meet the terms of
NFPA. They intended to obtain a hazard risk of level 2 or below at all electrical breaker panels in
the system.
The plant’s power system includes a 15 KV system formed by the utility feed and six step down
transformers each 2500 KVA. These transformers stepdown the 15 KV system to 480 Volt
networks. The plant’s maximum load is 9000 KVA and the network has 271 buses. The 480 Volt
system is located throughout the plant and includes two Main Tie Main (M-T-M) breaker
The emergency power to supply the loads is provided by three diesel generators with the
capacity of 1000 KVA (each) connected via two tie breakers for maintenance mode. Figure 4.20
illustrates the one line and annex A includes the related details.
The computer model, the short circuit requirements and the TCC curves were developed on the
basis of manufacturer’s printed equipment data together with the information given by client.
66
There are three electrical operating modes in a commercial building: normal mode, maintenance
mode and emergency mode. These three scenarios form the basis for the content of this
Normal mode: The normal operating mode is the situation where the power system is energized
and the power is being fed to loads without any human interactions. In case that a non-arcing
fault takes place, the protective devices such as circuit breaker will identify the fault and will
disconnect the faulted equipment rapidly and securely since there is no arc to
67
0 MVAsc
401.559 MVAsc
A 13.8 kV
BM1
D50 D65
0.48 kV 0.48 kV
CBL-190
CBL-204
BM2
Cable2 D52 0.48 kV
D61 CBL-187
CBL-196 0.208 kV
CBL-1 CBL-2
CBL-197
CBL-205
TRANS 11 Fuse15
FIRE PUMP TRANS 9 TRANS 10 45 kVA
50 HP 30 kVA
45 kVA
B D63
C 0.208 kV
D53 kV
0.48D59 L13
13.8 kV 13.8 kV 80 kVA
0.208 kV
FUSE3 FUSE4 D55 D58 D62
0.208 kV 0.208 kV CBL-213
0.208 kV
TRANS 2 CBL-195
TRANS 1 2500 kVA
2500 kVA
CBL-193 TRANS 12 D64
D54 45 kVA 0.208 kV
CBL-60
0.208 kV Lump1
Lump4 0 MVA
0 MVA Lump2
0 MVA
D56
0.208 kV
D60
Lump6 0.208 kV
0 MVA
CBL-3
D 0.48 kV E 0.48 kV Lump5
0 MVA
Open
Lump3
FUSE5 0 MVA
CBL-5 CBL-8
CBL-4 CBL-50 CBL-54
CBL-9
CBL-53 CBL-56 CBL-57 CBL-58 CBL-59
D5
0.48 kV E1
0.48 kV
0.48D4kV
0.48
D6 kV E3
0.48 kV E5 E6 E8
L2 0.48 kV 0.48 kV 0.48
E7 kV 0.48 kV
145 kVA
L5
L1
CBL-6 122 kVA Lump34 CBL-10 50 kVA E2
0 MVA 0.48 kV
68
L3 60 kVA
275 kVA D32 0.48 kV
D3 0.48 kV
Lump9
Lump8 0 MVA
0 MVA
Lump31
0 MVA
D33 0.208 kV
Lump32
0 MVA
D10 0.208 kV
CBL-15 CBL-21
CBL-16 CBL-19 CBL-17 CBL-20 CBL-18
D16A Lump16
0 MVA Lump15
0 MVA Lump14 Lump13
0 MVA 0 MVA Lump12 Lump11
D43 0.48 kV 0 MVA 0 MVA Lump10
Lump33 Lump41 Lump40 Lump39 Lump38 Lump37 Lump36 Lump35 0 MVA
0 MVA 0 MVA 0 MVA 0 MVA 0 MVA 0 MVA 0 MVA 0 MVA
FUSE14
RL2-FS02
D19 0.48 kV CBL-28
FUSE 8 TRANS 8
FUSE9 113 kVA D44
CBL-46 0.48 kV
CBL-37
D20 TRANS 4
0.48 kV 225 kVA
CBL-45 0.208
D48kV
CBL-41 0.208 kV D46 Lump19 Lump21
0.208 kV 0 MVA 0 MVA
CBL-49
CBL-48
D29
D23 D25 0.208 kV
Lump28 Lump29
0.208 kV 0 MVA 0.208 kV
0 MVA Lump25
0 MVA D28 Lump18
0.208 kV 0 MVA Lump20
0 MVA
Lump23
0 MVA
Lump27 Lump22
0 MVA Lump26 0 MVA
0 MVA
cause equipment failure. On the contrary, whenever an arcing fault happens, the protective
relaying and other protective device would spot the fault, however the current value will not be
as much as the non-arcing fault and it could take longer to clear the fault depending on the
estimated settings and the equipment installed. The setting of protection relays of circuit breakers
and low voltage fuses must be adjusted to reduce the incident energy level to the minimum
Emergency Mode: Diesel generators supply electricity in the case of utility failure. This can be
considered as a perfect way to protect against all potential interruptions of the main supply. In
the case studied here, three generators with output of 3000 KVA (each 1000 KVA) provide
electricity for the critical loads; e.g. water pumps and elevators.
loads or to recover power to previously disconnected equipment which was being maintained or
repaired, it is said that the equipment is in switching operation mode, during which setting
protection relays of low voltage breakers and fuses merge to define the fault clearing time and
the level of incident energy produced in the case of an arcing fault occurrence. In the course of
switching processes of the power system, there are risks of an arcing fault for the workers; hence
the workers’ safety and protection is superior to the selectivity of the protection device. The
protective device must be adjusted to assure the decline of incident energy levels by rapidly
tripping the up-stream breakers in order to decrease the fault clearing time.
Having defined the operating modes, it is crucial to know what operating condition is supposed
to be normal for a power system. The following situations were considered as being normal for
69
1. The tie circuit breakers are normally open in the power system, except for the
maintenance operation, during which the tie breakers are closed to create a higher arc
flash level.
2. In the case that the normal power does not exists (emergency), diesel generators supply
all buses and panels. Throughout maintenance operation, the tie breakers are closed to
Four configurations are defined in ETAP software: A) Normal, B) Emergency Ties Closed
In the normal mode, the automatic transfer switches (ATS) are in position A. But in the case of
utility failure, they switch to position B and the loads are supplied by emergency generators.
At both normal and emergency modes when the tie breakers are open, the main breakers are
closed. At EMTC and “normal ties closed modes” when the ties are closed, the main circuit
breakers are open. The summary of circuit breakers configurations which are defined for arc
70
Table 4.23: Configuration of breakers at normal, emergency, normal ties closed and EMTC
The existing three-phase fault current at the 13.8 kV service entrance is 16800 amps with an
X/R=3.0. It is 5700 amps for a single phase with an X/R=1.0. The utility information was
The highest fault current does not essentially mean the highest probable arc flash energy level,
since the incident energy is a function of arcing time, which can be an inversely proportional
function of the arcing current. The three-phase bolted fault current is calculated in RMS
symmetrical amperes for each bus and all operating mode such as normal, emergency and
maintenance.
71
Four case studies are defined in order to determine the worst one:
1) Arc flash Least, with the pre-fault voltage of 95% and a three-phase fault current decay.
2) Arc flash Min, with the pre-fault voltage of 100% and a three-phase fault current decay.
3) Short circuit, with the pre-fault voltage of 100% and a three-phase symmetrical ½ cycle.
4) Arc flash Max, with the pre-fault voltage of 104% and a three-phase symmetrical ½ cycle.
The above mentioned short circuit scenarios are listed briefly in table 4.24.
A short circuit/arc flash case is established for each operating mode. ETAP scenario manager
offers an easy method for documentation and analysis of each operating mode to be used for
rapid repeatable studies. Sixteen scenarios were developed to find out the worst case arc flash for
For example, in scenario 1 the arc flash current is calculated based on the normal configuration
(ties open) where the utility supplies the loads. The case type for the short circuit study is “AF
MAX” with the pre-fault voltage of 104% and the bus fault current of three-phase symmetrical ½
cycle. As another example, in scenario 16 the arc flash current is calculated based on the
situation where the utility does not exist and the electricity is supplied by the emergency diesel
generators (ties open). The case study type for the short circuit study is “AF Least” with the pre-
fault voltage of 95% and the bus fault current of three-phase fault current decay.
72
Table 4.25: Definition of scenarios for worst case arc flash
All 271 devices locations were assessed in terms of capability to interrupt or withstand the
maximum three-phase. Annex C includes the summary of short circuit study for the pre-fault
voltage of 100 volt with a three-phase symmetrical ½ cycle. The short circuit analysis shows
that the interruption rate of 37 circuit breaker is less than that of the short circuit current, the
reason is that these circuit breakers are series rated [45] protection. When a short circuit happens
73
it will be designated to connection of two or more circuit breakers that are series. Available fault
current for downstream device is more than interrupting rating of that circuit breaker and
available fault current is less than interrupting rating of upstream circuit breaker.
A protective device coordination study is conducted with the purpose of attaining the most
effective and consistent coordination for the existing equipment. The aim of the study is to
describe the best device settings to achieve selective coordination, in a way that the nearest
device to the fault tries to operate first, and interrupt the fault current and clear the downstream
fault. Additionally, these protective devices must operate in the least probable time to avoid or
reduce damages to equipment, cables, or other protective devices, and also the interruption of
Besides, the setting has been examined for the case study. The coordination of the main circuit
breaker for the equipment with main circuit breakers has been evaluated with the biggest branch
feeder circuit breaker to the upstream feeder breaker in the upstream switchgear.
The coordination study demonstrates that on the whole, the appropriate coordination between the
various circuit breakers is achievable. Annex D displays the coordination curves for five buses of
D3, F55, F76A, I21 and F70A together with their upstream and downstream equipment as an
example. Coordination for three circuit breakers CB-200, CB-201 and CB-211 are shown in
figure 4.21.
74
Figure 4.21: Coordination curve for bus D3
Two hundred and seventy one (271) buses were studied to calculate the worst arc flash incident
energy level that might endanger a worker during an arc flash event. The premier category for
applying the personal protective equipment is category 4. Working live for equipment with the
75
‘Over 40 cal./cm2 is not recommended. Figure 4.22 illustrates the arc flash energy level
occurrence.
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level>4
Table 4.26 includes the worst case study for arc flash energy levels based on the sixteen (16)
scenarios defined previously in section 4.11.2. Note the following dimensions of the analysis for
each configuration as an instance. The results for buses E to F9 are displayed in the following
76
Table 4.26: Result of worst case analysis
kV
Output Configura Total Energy AFB Energy Final FCT Ia at FCT Source
ID (kV
Rpt. tion (cal/cm2) (ft) Levels (sec) (kA) PD ID
)
0.4 TCAFM Ties
E 75.25 11.9 > Level 4 0.657 29.366 CB-2
8 AX Closed
0.4 TCAFM Ties
E2 9.29 5.2 Level 3 0.2 13.639 CB-77
8 AX Closed
0.4 EMAFM CB-
F EM 1392.24 51.1 > Level 4 57.882 6.935
8 AX GEN1
0.4 NAFMI
F1 Normal 56.07 10.3 > Level 4 0.668 21.64 CB115A
8 N
F1 0.4 EMAFM
EM 221.94 20.4 > Level 4 31.79 2.195 CB-107
E 8 IN
0.4 EMAFM
F2 EM 115.91 14.7 > Level 4 17.132 2.084 CB-102
8 IN
0.4 EMAFM
F4 EM 129.98 15.6 > Level 4 22.107 1.848 CB-102
8 IN
0.4 EMAFM
F5 EM 218.53 35.8 > Level 4 36.025 2.064 CB-107
8 IN
0.4 EMAFM
F6 EM 29.93 10.6 Level 4 6.136 1.664 CB-119
8 IN
0.2 EMAFM
F7 EM 24.85 9.5 Level 3 7.674 1.157 CB-116
08 IN
0.4 EMAFM
F8 EM 30.87 10.9 Level 4 6.614 1.602 CB-119
8 IN
0.2 EMAFM
F9 EM 18.12 7.8 Level 3 8.86 0.758 CB-120
08 IN
Emergency Mode (EM): The total energy and the arc flash boundary for Bus “F8” at the
emergency configuration are 30.87 cal/cm2 and 10.9 feet respectively. According to NFPA, its
energy level is 4, which is considered a dangerous category. Here, the fault clearing time is 6.614
seconds, the arc flash current at the fault clearing time (FCT) is 1.602 kA, and the main protection
Normal with closed ties: The total energy and the arc flash boundary for bus “E” at the normal
configuration with closed ties are 75.25 cal/cm2 and 11.9 feet respectively. Based on NFPA, the
energy level is greater than 4, i.e. dangerous. Here, the fault clearing time is 0.657 seconds, the
arc flash current is 29.366 kA, and the main protection device affects FCT is CB-2.
77
Normal with open ties: The total energy and the arc flash boundary for Bus “F1” at normal
configuration with open ties are 56.07 cal/cm2 and 10.3 feet respectively. As reported by to
NFPA, the energy level is regarded dangerous. Fault clearing time is 0.688 seconds and the arc
flash current is 21.64 kA, while the main protection device affects FCT is CB115A.
Emergency with closed ties (EMTC): The total energy and the arc flash boundary for Bus “I50”
(Annex B) at emergency configuration with closed ties are 54.24 cal/cm2 and 10.1 feet
respectively. According to NFPA, the energy level is considered dangerous. The fault clearing
time is 0.529 seconds, the arc flash current is 26.536 kA, and the main protection device affects
FCT is CB-247. In next chapter different optimization techniques will be investigated to reduce
arc flash energy level and also related cost analysis will be considered.
78
5. Arc flash optimization methods and cost analysis
Arc flash accidents can be decreased by following the procedures in an appropriate manner,
using suitable tools, applying proper preventive maintenance, coordinating protection devices as
well as developing skills and practical experience. Additionally, the mental and physical status of
the workers is equally important, so that the events like dropping the tools, accidental touch, and
etc. can be avoided. The key strategy to avoid exposure is to watch for the sources or reasons of
arc flash.
The approach of changing work methods for optimizing arc flash energy level is based on the
current calculations and modifications of the environment to reduce arc flash energy level.
Approaches that decrease incident energy level by changing work methods include changing
work procedures, adjusting existing settings, and increasing work distances [35].
There are numerous work procedures that can be applied to decrease arc flash energy level, the
best of which is to work in the de-energized state [36]. A complete section of NFPA 70E is
Nonetheless, this is not normally possible in mission critical facilities, since in these places, life
support equipment depends on a continuous power supply. Energized work might be acceptable
in the case the employer is convinced that deenergizing leads to additional or greater hazards,
such as the disruption of life support equipment, deactivation of emergency alarms, and power
In spite of precautions taken to avoid hazards, accidents are probable to happen. Therefore, it is
logical to keep the incident energy level in the lowest level possible, and to equip the workers for
methods presented in sections 5.5 to 5.8 are proposed by Curtis Thomas Latzo in 2011 [38].
These methods are applied for a low voltage power system with 271 buses. Moreover, an
analysis is conducted to compare the cost of using optimization techniques to decrease the arc
flash energy level with the general costs of damage to equipment, injury of workers and down
The purpose of protective device coordination is to separate the faulted section of the electrical
system and to prevent the interruption of proximate or parallel feeders. To this end, protective
devices are organized as illustrated in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, while protecting the system for
arc flash, the faulted section must be separated immediately in order to avoid any harm to
electrical equipment and maintenance workers. In case that a protective device system is
selectively coordinated with the aim of isolating faults, the optimal arc flash protection might not
exist.
If it is made possible for the electrical system to operate with a lack of selective coordination, the
arcing current interruption time and consequently the incident energy level might also be
reduced.
One of the most prevailing and straightforward arc flash optimization techniques is to
temporarily modify the existing settings of the first upstream protective device. To do this, we
can lower the instantaneous setting of the circuit breaker which is protecting the equipment that
we are going to work on. Figure 5.1 illustrates an example by the partial one-line diagrams.
80
Figure 5.1: Lowering the instantaneous setting of LVCB3 (one line)
As it is also displayed in table 5.1 and table 5.2, lowering the instantaneous setting of circuit
breaker LVCB3 from 5 (3200A) to 1.5 (960A) results in the reduction of incident energy from
318.62 cal/cm2 to 1.16 cal/cm2 and the reduction of the energy level from dangerous to level 0.
Description LVCB3
LT PICKUP 640 AMPS (0.8) 640 AMPS (0.8)
LT BAND FIXED FIXED
INST. PICK UP 3200 AMPS (5) 960 AMPS (1.5)
Description BUS03
Incident Energy (IE) 318.62 cal/cm2 1.16 cal/cm2
PPE DANGEROUS LEVEL 0
AFB 24.44 ft 1.47 ft
Arcing Current 8.45 kA 8.45 kA
81
This solution must be applied cautiously, since protective device coordination may be influenced
by decreasing the clearing time of protective devices [36]. Besides, no devices must be
downstream, needing sudden in-rush of current that could trip the lowered instantaneous setting.
Starting a motor or energizing a transformer may possibly draw up to six times the operating
amps for that device and consequently lead to a circuit breaker trip in the instantaneous time
domain.
Arc flash hazard properties can be included when selecting and specifying the electrical
equipment. Nonetheless, purchasing the equipment requires careful revision of the design and
manufacturing specifications. Low voltage switchgear and control gear assemblies are examined
for short time and short circuit withstand based on IEEE C.37.20 [39]. Manufacturers produce
various new designs to decrease the arc flash energy level [40]. One of the new manufacturing
procedures to optimize incident energy level is arc flash resistant switchgear. In this method, the
arc resistant switchgear is examined in terms of withstanding an internal arc to ensure the safety
of the person operating the switch or working on the equipment against hazard [41]. To do so,
the energy is usually ventilated out of the top of the switchgear or some direction away from the
worker. While it is an excellent way to protect personnel when the equipment is closed, the
The calculations from IEEE-1584 for incident energy include a number of unknowns which
need to be collected to attain an accurate result. But the most important variables are the distance
82
from the arc and the time to interrupt the fault. As the incident energy is proportional to the
square of the distance (in open air), increasing the working distance will considerably decrease
the incident energy [42]. However, this solution must be implemented cautiously and carefully,
as increasing the distance might hamper a person’s ability to work on the equipment [36]. The
ways to easily increase working distance include using devices which have remote racking
capability, remote operating equipment, and extension tools. If possible, depending on the
equipment design, it will be favorable to accomplish all switching operations remotely; i.e. away
from the switch gear [37]. Racking and switching of a low voltage power circuit breaker can be
assumed as the highest exposure which can happen in industrial facilities [43]. One solution for
decreasing the exposure is to extend the tool which is used to rack the breaker, or to apply
suppliers [43]. The effectiveness of increasing the working distance is illustrated in one-line
83
Figure 5.2: Increasing the working distance at bus03 (one Line)
Table 5.3 shows that the working distance increase from 18 inches to 13.3 feet through the use
of a remote racking device at bus03 results in the incident energy reduction from 381.36 cal/cm2
Description BUS03
Incident Energy (IE) 381.364 cal/cm^2 4.827 cal/cm^2
PPE DANGEROUS LEVEL 2
AFB 26.73 ft 26.73 ft
Arcing Current 7.18 kA 7.18 kA
Working Distance 18 160
84
5.5 Applying a single main circuit breaker for building shutdown
The main distribution panel in mission critical facilities must be appropriately maintained, since
arc flash energy level at these locations is important. According to the national electrical code, an
electrical service may shut down using a maximum of six grouped devices, which can include
main panel with no main circuit breaker and a maximum of six feeder breakers. Figure 5.3
illustrates one line diagram of this scenario. This installation is acceptable by the NEC and is
Figure 5.3: Building without single main circuit breaker for shutdown (one line)
The simulation displays a utility serving a main distribution panel ‘Panel A’. Panel A is
constructed without any main circuit breakers and four feeder breakers represented as CB1-4. In
85
this situation, the four feeder breakers are acceptable for being applied as the building
As it is indicated in the simulation in figure 5.3, the fault current of the panel A is calculated
38.9kA, which can be considered a moderate level. The arcing current is illustrated to be 10.8 kA
Nevertheless, the arc flash energy level for this kind of installation is particularly high, since the
only device to protect panel A is the utility fuse located on the primary side of the transformer.
As it can be seen in table 5.4, the incident energy at panel A is 5656.32 cal/cm2, which
The service entrance can be studied from the time current analysis viewpoint. Table 5.4
demonstrates the utility fuse which interrupts the arcing current beyond at 145.635 seconds, and
Table 5.4: without single main circuit breaker for building shutdown
This is regarded as an unacceptable scenario in a mission critical facility, since the incident
energy is above 40 cal/cm2 and consequently the energy level is located in dangerous category.
Based on NFPA-70E, energized electrical work is not allowed on this device, as a result, periodic
86
maintenance or facility changes including this panel cannot be accomplished with an electrical
shutdown. The electrical shutdown is normally not feasible in a mission critical facility;
Here, the aim is to decrease arc flash level and it can be achieved by installing a low voltage
This low voltage power circuit breaker should be detailed with modifiable settings in the long
time, short time, and instantaneous time domains. Modifying the main breaker settings to
optimize the arc flash energy level will generate a safer working environment at the panel A.
Having implemented the recommended circuit breaker installation, the case study was simulated
again. The one-line diagram in figure 5.4 illustrates the result of the simulation. Here, the new
2000 amp main panel circuit breaker is positioned before Panel A, which is referred to as CB6.
The available fault current, the arcing fault and incident energy are specified for each panel. The
available fault current and the arcing current level at the panel A are still almost the same.
Nonetheless, the new main breaker placed before the panel A results in an incident energy lower
than 5656.32 cal/cm2, and changes the energy level of dangerous to level 1 (1.39 cal/cm2). It is
considered as a significant change which would make technicians able to implement energized
87
Figure 5.4: Building with single main circuit breaker for shutdown (one line)
The consequences of this change can be further validated by analyzing the results shown in table
Table 5.5: with single main circuit breaker for building shutdown
Total
AFB Final FCT Ia at FCT Source PD % Ia
ID kV (kV) Energy
(ft) (sec) (kA) ID Variation
(cal/cm²)
Bus1 13.8 0 6.195
Fuse-
Bus2 0.208 5121.47 98 129.609 10.977 15%
Utility
Panel A 0.208 1.39 1.6 0.03 12.71 CB6
Panel A1 0.208 1.08 1.4 0.026 11.41 CB1
Panel A2 0.208 1.07 1.4 0.026 11.395 CB2
Panel A3 0.208 1.08 1.4 0.026 11.41 CB3
Panel A4 0.208 1.07 1.4 0.026 11.395 CB4
88
The table shows the arcing current interruption by CB6 at 0.03 seconds with total energy of 1.39
cal/ cm2, which is in energy level 1. Now the panel A can be maintained while it is energized and
The National Electrical Code, Article 230 is allocated to building main shutdown and proper
disconnecting methods. Every facility requires an easily reached device for disconnecting the
electrical service.
This device is often a main fused disconnect switch which is located at the service entrance
usually close to the electrical meter. Figure 5.5 illustrates a one-line diagram of this scenario.
89
This electrical system involves a utility 800 KVA transformer which serves a main disconnect
fused at 3000 amps. The fuse is protecting a main distribution panel (Panel B) that includes two
feeders and two fuses. The arc flash energy level for this form of installation can be high or low
depending on the available fault current and the resultant arcing current. Table 5.6 displays an
incident energy of 31.43 cal/ cm2 at the panel B, which results in a energy level of dangerous.
This is unacceptable for a mission critical facility, since the electrical system must continue to be
energized, and based on NFPA 70E , energized work is not permitted where an arc flash energy
Table 5.6: Fuse disconnect circuit breaker for panel entrance before reduced Arc
In this research, a low voltage power circuit breaker with LSI adjustments is applied instead of
the fused disconnect switch to minimize the energy level. It results in forming the protection
curve based on the available fault current and arcing current. The one line diagram in figure 5.6
90
Figure 5.6: Low voltage circuit breaker for panel entrance (one line)
As expected, the simulation of the revised circuit demonstrates that the arcing current stayed at
12.73 kA. But the incident energy dropped to 1.39 cal/ cm2, leading to energy level 1.
Table 5.7: Low voltage circuit breaker for panel entrance after reduced arc
ID kV (kV) Total Energy (cal/cm²) AFB (ft) Final FCT (sec) Source PD ID
Bus2 13.8 0.05915 0.3 0.004 Fuse1
Bus3 0.208 1.41 1.6 0.03 CB-PANELB
Panel B 0.208 1.39 1.6 0.03 CB-PANELB
Panel B1 0.208 0.875634 1.3 0.021 CB1
Panel B2 0.208 1.26 1.5 0.029 CB2
panel B3 0.208 0.329746 0.8 0.008 Fuse3
Panel B4 0.208 0.34426 0.8 0.008 Fuse4
91
Table 5.7 demonstrates an instantaneous interruption of the arcing current at 0.03 seconds and
consequently a quicker extinguish of the arc compared to using the fuse. The table shows it
5.7 Apply LSI low voltage circuit breakers for step down transformers rated above 125 KVA
The service voltage in the facilities being investigated is 480 volt, three-phase. However, there
are numerous loads in a building which need 120/208 volt service; for instance, air conditioning
equipment, service receptacles and lighting. Therefore, 480 volt service is required to be
transformed down to 120/208 volts. To do so, a lower voltage leg in the system is created by
putting in a large step down transformer which is fed by the main panel to serve 120/208 volt
loads downstream. Figure 5.7 includes a one line diagram of this situation in which a thermal
magnetic breaker (CB4) protects a 300 KVA transformer that feeds bus 2.
92
Figure 5.7: Low voltage circuit breaker for transformers rated above 125 KVA (one line)
The challenge with this setup is the reduction of fault current and arcing current occurring across
the transformer. Considering the amount of impedance which is represented by the transformer
in this circuit, which is predictable. Figure 5.7 displays the simulation of the available arc fault
current on the primary side of the 300 KVA transformer at 23.87 kA and the available arc fault
current at the secondary side at 5.75 kA. The decrease in the arcing current at the secondary side
will result in the increase in the time of an arc flash interruption by the primary side breaker.
The time required to interrupt the arc has a direct relationship with the arc flash incident energy.
Table 5.8 demonstrates an increase in incident energy from 1.68 cal/ cm2 on the primary side
(bus6) of transformer to 1209 cal/cm2 on the secondary side (bus 2), and the resultant change in
the energy level from 1 to 4. This is a noteworthy increase in the protection equipment essential
ID kV (kV) Total Energy (cal/cm²) AFB (ft) Final FCT (sec) Ia at FCT (kA) Source PD ID
Bus1 0.48 2.8 2.3 0.03 24.272 CB1
Bus2 0.208 1209.32 47.6 61.609 5.746 CB1
Bus3 0.208 0.41635 0.9 0.018 6.689 CB2
Bus4 13.8 0.310415 0.8 0.004 28.717 Fuse1
Bus5 0.48 2.83 2.3 0.03 24.531 CB1
Bus6 0.48 1.68 1.7 0.018 23.865 CB4
It is revealed that the circuit breaker CB4 interrupts the arc at nearly 61.609 seconds, which
exceeds all energy levels and thus considered hazardous for energized work. Nevertheless, IEEE
1584 limits the maximum exposure time for computing incident energy at 2 seconds and
therefore it also limits the calculations in the simulation report at 1209 cal/cm2 which
corresponds to energy level 4. Although personal protective equipment for energy level 4 is
minimize the potential hazard of the operators. We concluded through this analysis to use a low
voltage power circuit breaker containing adjustable LSI instead of standard thermal magnetic
circuit breaker to protect these transformers. Although the thermal magnetic breaker includes
instantaneous adjustment, it is indicated that the change in arcing current potentially attenuates
the short time region and delays the interrupt time. The low voltage power circuit breakers with
LSI are adjustable in the short time and consequently can optimize the arc flash energy level by
quicker interruption of the arc. Figure 5.8 illustrates the simulation one line diagram of this
optimized system.
94
Figure 5.8: Arc flash mitigation across 300 KVA transformer
The simulation of the new system demonstrates that the available fault currents on the primary
and secondary sides of the transformer have not changed; thereby the arcing currents on the
primary and secondary sides of the transformer have not changed either. Yet, as a result of the
quicker interrupting time of the LSI circuit breaker, the results shown in table 5.9 indicate
decreased incident energy of 1.65 cal/ cm2 on the primary side (bus6) and 0.42 cal/ cm2 on the
secondary side (bus 2) of the transformer. The primary side of the transformer is lowered to
95
Table 5.9: Low voltage circuit breaker for transformers rated above 125 KVA with LSI
ID kV (kV) Total Energy (cal/cm²) AFB (ft) Final FCT (sec) Ia at FCT (kA) Source PD ID
Bus1 0.48 2.8 2.3 0.03 24.272 CB1
Bus2 0.208 0.421182 0.9 0.018 6.76 CB4
Bus3 0.208 0.41635 0.9 0.018 6.689 CB2
Bus4 13.8 0.310415 0.8 0.004 28.717 Fuse1
Bus5 0.48 2.83 2.3 0.03 24.531 CB1
Bus6 0.48 1.65 1.8 0.018 23.865 CB4
The new LSI circuit breaker CB4 and the arcing current on the primary and secondary sides of
the transformer are illustrated in figure 5.9. The breaker curve demonstrates instantaneous
interruption of the arcing current and consequently a quicker extinguish of the arc than that of the
thermal magnetic breaker. The result of incident energy simulation at 0.018 second is in
96
Figure 5.9: TCC showing LSI breaker and arcing current at primary and secondary of T2.
Figure 5.9 above displays the reduction of fault current and thus the reduction of arcing
interrupting current across the transformer T2. This makes the arcing current level to move
inside the adjustable instant time range of the LSI breaker. Setting the short time inside the
arcing current makes short exposure time and low arc flash energy level possible. It is found that
97
circuit breaker CB4 interrupts the arcing current at approximately 0.018 seconds; hence low
incident energy is calculated and the secondary side of the transformer is located in energy level
0. This is in line with the incident energy simulation which is calculated 0.42 cal/ cm2 at the
5.8. For transformers larger than 125 KVA applying two or more smaller transformers
As stated in previous section when the 120/208 volt load is significant, the stepdown
transformer can be 150 KVA and larger. Transformers larger than 125 KVA can be replaced by
two or smaller transformers. In this case fault and arcing current decreases because of higher
impedance of smaller transformers and cables. The smaller rated circuit breaker can stay lower
than this arcing value. Figure 5.10 illustrates a one line diagram of this situation including a 250
98
Figure 5.10: One line diagram with 250 KVA transformer
The computer simulation of the circuit in figure 5.10 indicates an incident energy of 31.46
The time current curve for this configuration is illustrated in figure 5.11 which shows the circuit
breaker CB-12 interrupts the arcing current beyond 2 seconds, which confirms the high level of
energy.
99
Figure 5.11: Time current curve arc flash hazard at panel D10.
To minimize level of energy, it is recommended to replace one large step down transformer with
multiple smaller transformers which are less than 125 KVA. The increase of impedance of the
smaller conductors and transformers results in the decrease of fault current and arcing current.
100
The smaller rated circuit breaker is able to stay lower than this arcing value. This also allows for
application of NFPA 70E option of reporting energy level 0 for any bus served by a transformer
less than 125 KVA and 240 volts. Figure 5.12 represents the one line diagram of this system.
Here, the 250 KVA transformer feeding panel D is replaced by two 125 KVA transformers
Figure 5.12: One – line diagram showing two 125 KVA transformer
The result is an incident energy of 0.2722 cal /cm2 and energy level 0. The final clearing time
decreases from above 2 seconds to 0.018 second. Table 5.11 illustrates the results.
101
Table 5.11: Arc flash for trans 3 & 43 (125 KVA)
ID kV (kV) Total Energy (cal/cm²) AFB (ft) Final FCT (sec) Ia at FCT (kA) Source PD ID
M1 0.208 0.272278 0.7 0.018 3.985 CB-37
M2 0.208 0.272278 0.7 0.018 3.985 CB-12
The time current curve for this pattern is demonstrated in figure 5.13. It shows that the circuit
breaker CB-12 interrupts the arcing current at 0.018 seconds; therefore, the incident energy and
102
Figure 5.13 Time current curve arc flash hazard at panel M1 and M2.
103
Table 5.12 illustrates the collective results of optimization methods and sums up the reduction of
the arc flash energy level for methods described in sections 5.2 to 5.8 as well as the case study
(271 bus). For eleven buses, the setting of trip unit changed, so the arc flash energy level
decreased from level 4 to less than 2. For instance, for bus F76B after changing the setting of trip
unit the total energy is reduced from 688.52 cal/cm2 to 5.19 cal/cm2 which means that energy
Table 5.12: Energy level before and after applying optimization methods
Total Energy
ID Status Category
(cal/cm²)
Temporarily Modifying Existing Not Reduced 318.62 > Level 4
Protective Device Settings Reduced arc flash 1.16 Level 0
Not Reduced 381.364 > Level 4
Increasing the Working Distance
Reduced arc flash 4.827 Level 2
Applying single circuit breaker for Not Reduced 5656.32 > Level 4
building shutdown Reduced arc flash 1.39 Level 1
Not Reduced 31.43 Level 3
Applying LVCB before panels
Reduced arc flash 1.39 Level 1
Applying LVCB before for Not Reduced 1209 > Level 4
transformers rated above 125 KVA Reduced arc flash 0.42 Level 0
Applying two or more smaller Not Reduced 31.46 Level 3
transformers for transformers larger
than 125 KVA Reduced arc flash 0.2722 Level 0
Case Study (271 Bus)
Total Energy
BUS ID Status Category
(cal/cm²)
Not Reduced 685.12 > Level 4
F70
Reduced arc flash 2.96 Level 1
Not Reduced 681.86 > Level 4
F70B
Reduced arc flash 3.5 Level 1
Not Reduced 65.42 > Level 4
F71
Reduced arc flash 0.1366 Level 0
Not Reduced 105.67 > Level 4
F73
Reduced arc flash 0.206 Level 0
Not Reduced 691.39 >Level 4
F76
Reduced arc flash 4.39 Level 2
Not Reduced 688.52 > Level 4
F76B
Reduced arc flash 5.19 Level 2
Not Reduced 62.65 > Level 4
I51
Reduced arc flash 0.129 Level 0
I52 Not Reduced 49.43 > Level 4
104
Reduced arc flash 0.142 Level 0
Not Reduced 191.45 > Level 4
I54
Reduced arc flash 0.214 Level 0
Not Reduced 144.82 > Level 4
I56
Reduced arc flash 0.262 Level 0
Not Reduced 149.44 > Level 4
I58
Reduced arc flash 0.273 Level 0
Transformer Replacement
Not Reduced 31.46 Level 4
Trans 3 (D10)
Reduced arc flash 0.263 Level 0
Not Reduced 50.92 > Level 4
Trans 6 (D33)
Reduced arc flash 20.42 Level 3
Not Reduced 31.52 Level 4
Trans 4 (D21)
Reduced arc flash 0.262 Level 0
Not Reduced 203.02 > Level 4
Trans 24 (F27)
Reduced arc flash 155.28 > Level 4
Not Reduced 2224.39 > Level 4
Trans 29 (F46)
Reduced arc flash 1.27 Level 1
Not Reduced 577.42 > Level 4
Trans 30 (F54)
Reduced arc flash 0.260 Level 0
Not Reduced 685.12 > Level 4
Trans 31 (F70)
Reduced arc flash 1.04 Level 0
Not Reduced 691.39 > Level 4
Trans 32 (F76)
Reduced arc flash 20.42 Level 3
Not Reduced 223.37 > Level 4
Trans 39 (I36)
Reduced arc flash 0.76 Level 0
Not Reduced 1868.38 > Level 4
Trans 34 (I11)
Reduced arc flash 1.34 Level 1
Not Reduced 1142.84 > Level 4
Trans 36 (I61)
Reduced arc flash 1.33 Level 1
Not Reduced 400.46 > Level 4
Trans 37 (I62)
Reduced arc flash 0.261 Level 0
Not Reduced 983.28 > Level 4
Trans 40 (I60)
Reduced arc flash 1.23 Level 1
Transformers shown in table 5.12 are larger than 125 KVA and according to section 5.8 are
replaced by two or more smaller transformers. For example, transformer 40 is 750 KVA and
replaced by three 225 KVA transformers, result of analysis shows that the incident energy is
reduced from 983.28 cal/cm2 to 1.23 cal/cm2 which means energy level is reduced from level 4
to level 1.
105
Also, it is necessary to mention that for bus F70 arc flash level reduces from Level 4 to Level 1
when setting of trip unit is changed and in case that transformer replacement method is used arc
For bus F76 energy level changes from level 4 to level 2 when setting trip unit is changed and
for transformer substitution method arc flash level changes from level 4 to level 3.
It is necessary to mention that for both buses F70 and F76, applying trip unit method instead of
replacing transformers is better because energy level is reduced to acceptable level and also it
Studies indicate that [43] an average electrical accident costs $750k. According to the National
Safety Council estimates, work-related harm can cost businesses well over $30M. The expenses
include fines, medical costs, legal processes, lost business and equipment expenditures.
Information provided by NFPA and IEEE reveals that during years 1992-2002 more than 2000
workers each year (at least 6 workers a day) injured by arc flash.
Alternatively, an OSHA assessment may actually help reveal problems. A study conducted in
May 2012 on over 800 California companies [43] shows that all were entitled for inspection, but
just half of them went under investigation. The companies which were inspected experienced a
decline of 9.4% in injuries. The average company saved $350,000 during period of five years
after the OSHA assessment. Thus despite the fact that OSHA obliges companies to work in a
safer environment, it’s best not to wait for an inspection much less a fine. The downtime costs
106
estimated based on the US Department of Energy office of Industrial Technologies (1996) are
In order to examine the cost of replacing above 125 KVA transformers (optimization technique
used in section 5.8), cost analysis is conducted for low voltage systems (271 buses). As it is
shown in table 5.14, thirteen transformers are above 125 KVA. The cost data and definitions are
extracted from “RSMeans Electrical Cost Data”, 37th annual edition [44].
Material costs: The costs of fasteners for a normal installation are included within material costs.
The manufacturer’s warranty is also considered. However, extended warranties are not included
Labor Costs: Labor costs demonstrate productivity based on actual working conditions. Besides
actual installation, these costs include time spent during a normal weekday on responsibilities
such as material receiving and handling, mobilization at site and clean up.
107
Equipment Costs: These costs include the renting cost as well as the operating costs of the
equipment under normal use. Equipment costs do not include operators’ wages or the cost of
As it is shown in table 5.14, for item 1, the total unit bare costs for a 150 KVA transformer is
5,115 dollar which includes material, labor and equipment costs. Moreover, since there are 3
transformers of this type, the total price is $15345. Also, the total amount for thirteen
transformers is $107,055.
To reduce arc flash, each 150 KVA transformer will be replaced with two 75 KVA transformers,
each 225 KVA transformer will be replaced with two 112.5 KVA transformers, each 300 KVA
transformer will be replaced with two 150 KVA transformers and each 750 KVA transformer
will be replaced with three 225 kVA transformers. Table 5.15 illustrates the price of transformers
which are required for reducing the arc flash energy level:
108
Table 5.15: Cost of suggested transformers after reduced arc flash
If the total costs of existing transformers are subtracted from the cost of suggested transformers,
the difference would be $17,963 dollar, which seems cost effective for taking preventive action
In sum, there are 13 circuit breakers which are linked to transformers rated above 125 KVA
(optimization technique used in section 5.7) and the price will be discussed here for adding trip
units (Long, short and instantaneous). Three 200 ampere circuit breakers are connected to 150
KVA transformers, four 300 ampere circuit breakers are connected to 225 KVA transformer,
Five 400 ampere circuit breakers are connected to 300 KVA transformers and one 1000 ampere
circuit breaker are connected to 750 KVA transformers. This circuit breaker (1000 A) is
equipped to LSI trip unit. Table 5.16 demonstrates the list of related breakers.
109
Table 5.16: List of circuit breakers connected to transformers rated above 125 KVA
The LSI trip unit costs are estimated roughly. They are obtained from different sources on the
Internet. Since twelve trip units are needed, the total cost would be $ 7800.
Comparing the result of optimization to the cost of downtimes estimates from table 5.13, it is
observed that the cost of optimization of transformers is 17,963 dollar, while the cost of
optimization of circuit breakers is 7,800 dollar, so the total cost would be 25763 dollars. It is a
reasonable investment for both optimization methods, since the arc flash level is reduced and
therefore it is safer for technicians to work on panels when they are energized. Furthermore, the
probability of downtime is reduced. Meanwhile, it is cost effective, as the minimum four hours
(lowest) downtime from table 5.13 is more than the cost of replacing transformers and circuit
breakers.
This chapter has emphasized on introducing and implementing some techniques to optimize the
arc flash energy level at specific locations in a 480 volt electrical distribution system. The last
four techniques [38] were described and simulated in locations of an electrical system where a
110
high arc flash energy level is normally present as a result of intrinsic properties of the system
design. As it can be seen in this chapter, the application of these methods made it possible to
significantly decrease the arc flash energy level. Thus electrical design engineers can use these
techniques in planning commercial buildings to develop systems with lower arc flash energy
level.
Besides, the cost analysis is accomplished for replacing the transformers and circuit breakers.
The result indicates that it is reasonable to both consider optimization techniques for reducing arc
flash energy level and to invest more at the design stage of low voltage systems, since the cost of
implementing optimization techniques is much less than the cost of retrofitting damage to
111
6. Conclusion and future work
The thesis has focused on optimization techniques to decrease arc flash energy level in electrical
systems operating at 600 V or below. The procedures for calculating fault current, coordinating
protective devices and analyzing arc flash have been presented. A number of mainstream arc
flash optimization products and techniques have been described. A 271-bus existing facility was
used for arc flash studies involving different scenarios. Results of applying optimization
The study conducted on short circuit shows that to achieve maximum fault currents from three
phase faults, the interrupting ratings of existing equipment are sufficient, with the exceptions
(shown in red) found in Annex C. These circuit breakers are series rated protection [45]. The
results of the study on protective device coordination demonstrate that there is a satisfactory
The study compared the cost of applying optimization methods with that of the arc flash
consequences. The results indicate that the cost of implementing the techniques to reduce arc
flash energy level at the design stage is much less than the downtime costs.
6.1 Conclusions
The impact of using four optimization techniques to reduce the arc flash energy level at specific
The first technique is applied at the electrical service entrance whose aim was lowering the arc
flash energy level at the main distribution panel. The simulations showed that when multiple
112
electrical disconnects are applied as allowed by NEC, the arc flash energy level can be
enormously high. When the system is designed using one main circuit breaker, the main
distribution panel needs an interrupting device to reduce the energy level of an arc flash.
Applying this optimization technique for this particular case resulted in the arc flash energy level
reduction from 5656.32 cal/cm2 to 1.39 cal/cm2. This improved the PPE category from a
The second technique is applied at the electrical service entrance whose aim was reducing the arc
flash energy level at the main distribution panel. The simulation revealed that when fused
disconnects are applied as allowed by NEC, the arc flash energy level can at times be particularly
high at the main distribution panel. However, when the system is designed with a low voltage
power circuit breaker with LSI modifications as the main circuit breaker, the energy level of an
Applying this optimization technique for this particular case analyzed, caused reduction in the
arc flash energy level from 31.43 cal /cm2 to 1.39 cal /cm2. This altered the PPE category from a
dangerous level down to a category 1. Now it is possible for a qualified technician to accomplish
The third technique is used at a feeder circuit from the main distribution panel which is serving a
step down transformer. The simulation revealed that when a transformer that is larger than 125
KVA is protected by a thermal magnetic breaker, the secondary side arc flash energy level can
be exceedingly high. However, when the feeder is designed with a low voltage circuit breaker
with LSI modifications, the arc flash energy level can be optimized to a safer (lower) level.
113
Applying this technique for this particular case caused the arc flash energy level reduction from
1209.32 cal /cm2 to 0.42 cal/cm2. This made the PPE category to change from energy level 4
down to level 0. It is now possible for a qualified technician to do maintenance on this device
The fourth technique is applied at a feeder circuit from the main distribution panel which is
serving a step down transformer. The simulation indicated that when a transformer which is
larger than 125 KVA is protected by a thermal magnetic breaker, the secondary side arc flash
energy level can be tremendously high. Nonetheless, when the feeder is designed with two
smaller circuits with reduced KVA transformers, the arc flash energy level decreases
significantly.
Using this optimization technique for this case study resulted in the arc flash incident energy
reduction from 31.46 cal /cm2 to 0.27 cal/cm2. This made the PPE category to change from level
4 level down to 0. Thus a qualified technician can implement maintenance on this device with
minimal arc-flash energy level. In all four cases, the application of the recommended design
For the case study, the settings of 11 circuit breakers which were connected to transformers
above 125 KVA has changed. The result demonstrates that arc flash energy has changed from
Level 4 to Levels 0, 1 and 2. This makes it possible for the technicians to work on energized
panels.
Moreover, cost analysis is conducted for replacement of transformers and circuit breakers. The
result reveals that it is reasonable to apply optimization techniques for reducing arc flash energy
level and to invest more at design stage of low voltage systems, since the cost of executing
114
optimization techniques is much less than that of retrofitting, damage to equipment, injury of
The result of optimization of case study is compared to the cost of downtimes estimations from
table 5.13. It is found that the optimization of transformers costs 17,963 dollar and the
optimization of circuit breakers costs 7,800 dollar and total cost is 25,763 dollars. It is a
reasonable investment for both optimization methods, since the cost of investment is less than
that of the downtime and the arc flash energy level is reduced, so it is safer for technicians to
work on panels when they are energized, while the probability of downtime is also reduced. As it
Future efforts on arc flash analysis should focus on additional development of time domain
models of system faults. New models should yield better estimates of incident energy values,
which will offer better protection to workers, without needing excessive PPE.
Designing industrial power systems for arc flash safety is the least costly method of following
current safety standards. Constant development of innovative low cost protective devices results
in less expensive alternatives for retrofitting existing systems to comply with the standards. So,
Additional detailed cost analyses should be conducted for various low voltage systems and for
the related optimization methods using different alternatives, so that the most cost effective
115
116
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Commercial Power Systems, IEEE Std. 1015-2005 (IEE Blue Book) Recognized as an American
National Standard (ANSI).
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119
Annex A
FIRE PUMP1
50 HP
GEN 2 BUS
GEN 1 BUS
0.48 kV 0.48 kV GEN 3 BUS
0.48 kV
CBL-199 CBL-200
CBL-198
~Bot1
F G H
0.48 kV 0.48 kV
0.48 kV
CBL-215
Open
CBL-189
Open
B C
CBL-210
CBL-211
CBL-208 CBL-209
CBL-203
F87 F88
CBL-191
CBL-60 CBL-188 13.8 kV 13.8 kV
BM1-ATSF01
F970.48 kV
FUSE16 Open
CBL-40
CBL-7 CBL-42
CBL-43 CBL-207
F100 CBL-206
CBL-180
0.48 kV
0.48 F2
kV CBL-154
F3 CBL-118
0.48 kV F67 F68
CBL-111 0.48 kV 0.48 kV
F66 TRANS 31
0.48 kV F69
0.48 kV 300 kVA BM1-ATSS01
F1E
0.48 kV CBL-156 BM2-ATSS01
CBL-161
F4 CBL-165
0.48 kV Lump95 CBL-114 L17
0 MVA 75 kVA CBL-181
CBL-184
30 kVA F58 0.48 kV CBL-169
F6 0.48 kV F59 F61
TRANS 21 0.48 kV 0.48 kV
TRANS 19 TRANS 20 L14
45 kVA L20
CBL-123 45 kVA 45 kVA 60 kVA
155 kVA L21 Lump58
Lump60 220 kVA 0 MVA F71 F72 F75
F62 F74
TRANS 22 0 MVA Lump61 0.208 kV 0.208 kV F73 0.208 kV 0.208 kV
0 MVA 0.48 kV 0.208 kV
45 kVA F21 CBL-120 L15 L16
F8 F16 F18 0.208 kV 69.9 kVA 60 kVA L18 Lump55 Lump56
F14 112 kVA 0 MVA
TRANS 15 0.48 kV 0.208 kV 0.208 kV 0.208 kV 0 MVA
45 kVA Lump62
0 MVA
CBL-124 F20 F35 0.48 kV
120
CBL-131 Lump57
CBL-129 0.208 kV 0 MVA
FUSE25 FUSE26 Lump52 Lump54
F7 CBL-127 FUSE24 Lump53 0 MVA
0.208 kV L19 0 MVA 0 MVA
Lump86 TRANS 28 Lump59 115 kVA
TRANS 16 F17 0 MVA CBL-139 113 kVA 0 MVA
0.208 kV F19 CBL-117 CBL-144
30 kVA F15
0.208 kV TRANS 27
0.208 kV 113 kVA F36 F76 0.208 kV
Lump87 F37
F9 0 MVA 0.48 kV 0.48 kV F38
Lump94 0.208 kV
0 MVA 0.208 kV
0.48
F10 kV Lump88
Lump90 Lump89 0 MVA
0 MVA 0 MVA F24 0.48 kV
Lump65
Lump63 Lump64 0 MVA
Lump93 CBL-125 FUSE17 FUSE18 0 MVA 0 MVA CBL-178 CBL-177 CBL-176 CBL-175 CBL-172 CBL-171 CBL-170 CBL-179
0 MVA FUSE19 F39 0.208 kV CBL-174 CBL-173
TRANS 17
45 kVA
CBL-133 TRANS 24
F77 F79 F81 F82 F84 F85
F12 CBL-116 150 kVA F78 F80 F83 0.208 kV
0.208 kV 0.208 kV 0.208 kV 0.208 kV 0.208 kV 0.208 kV 0.208 kV 0.208 kV
0.48 kV
F11 CBL-115
CBL-141 F86
0.208 kV 0.48
F26 kV CBL-142 CBL-143 0.208 kV
F25 CBL-140
0.48 kV
Lump51
TRANS 18 F27 0.208 kV 0 MVA
30 kVA F41
F40 0.208 kV F42 F43
0.208 kV
F13 0.208 kV 0.208 kV
Lump92 Lump48 Lump49 Lump50
0 MVA 0.208 kV Lump84 Lump42 Lump43 Lump44 Lump45 Lump46 Lump47 0 MVA
0 MVA Lump85 CBL-135 0 MVA 0 MVA 0 MVA 0 MVA
CBL-134 0 MVA 0 MVA 0 MVA 0 MVA
0 MVA
Lump69 Lump66
0 MVA Lump68 Lump67 0 MVA
F44 0.48 kV 0 MVA 0 MVA
F28 F29
Lump91 0.208 kV 0.208 kV FUSE27 FUSE28
0 MVA FUSE29
CBL-148
CBL-149
Lump83 Lump82
F27A
0 MVA 0.48 0kVMVA
F45
0.48 kV TRANS 30
FUSE20
225 kVA
TRANS 29
FUSE21 300 kVA
CBL-136 TRANS 25
75 kVA Lump70
0 MVA F54
CBL-137 F46 0.208 kV 0.208 kV
F30
0.48 kV F31
0.208 kV
Lump77
Lump81 0 MVA F50 F53
0 MVA F51 F52
0.208 kV 0.208 kV 0.208 kV
F32 0.48 kV F47 0.208 kV
F48
0.208 kV 0.208 kV F49
0.208 kV
FUSE23 Lump74
FUSE22 0 MVA Lump73
0 MVA Lump72
0 MVA
CBL-138
Lump71
0 MVA
Lump78 Lump79
F34 Lump75 0 MVA 0 MVA
0.48 kV 0 MVA
AL3-T02
30 kVA
F33
0.208 kV
Lump76
0 MVA
Lump80
0 MVA
~Rt3 ~Top1
F87 F88
~Bot1
CBL-210
~Left2 CBL-211
I1
Open
13.8 kV I2
13.8 kV
FUSE30
FUSE31
TRANS 41
2500 kVA TRANS 42 Cable1
2500 kVA
I44
0.48 kV
BM1-ATSF01
I3 0.48 kV CBL-61
I50 0.48 kV
Open
FUSE 32
CBL-89 CBL-96
CBL-99 CBL-97
CBL-65
CBL-100
I46 CBL-98
CBL-95
0.48 kV
I45 I47
0.48 kV 0.48 kV
0.48
I4 kV TRANS 39
150 kVA L24
40 kVA 0.48 kV I49
CBL-66 L23
I36 0.208 kV 380 kVA 0.48 kV I48
TRANS 40
L25 L28 750 kVA
40 kVA
0.48
I5kV Lump97 405 kVA
0 MVA
L26 L27
CBL-90 40 kVA 40 kVA Lump96
CBL-67 CBL-68 CBL-94 0 MVA
CBL-204 CBL-101
I35 I38
I8 I34 0.48 kV 0.208 kV I42 I58
I7 0.208 kV 0.208 kV 0.208 kV
0.48 kV 0.208 kV I52
I56 0.208 kV CBL-110
CBL-102 Lump105 CBL-104 0.208 kV I54
0 MVA 0.208 kV CBL-108 Lump99
Lump103 CBL-106
CBL-92 0 MVA
0 MVA Lump101
CBL-96A
Lump111 Lump110 0 MVA I51
Lump113 Lump112 0 MVA 0 MVA 0.208 kV
Lump114 0 MVA 0 MVA I59 I57 I53
0 MVA 0.48 kV 0.208 kV I55
I9 0.208 kV 0.208 kV 0.208 kV Lump98
I39 I43 0 MVA
0.208 kV 0.208 kV Lump106 Lump104 Lump100
FUSE35 FUSE36 0 MVA 0 MVA Lump102 0 MVA
0 MVA
CBL-70
I10 CBL-93
TRANS 34
0.48 kV 300 kVA Lump109
0 MVA Lump107
0 MVA
I40
I11 0.208 kV Lump115 0.208 kV
0 MVA
121
CBL-69
I18 TRANS 35
0.48 kV 113 kVA
CBL-79
Lump121
I19 0 MVA 0.208 kV
CBL-78 CBL-77
I20 I21
0.208 kV 0.208 kV
Lump122
I22 0.48Lump123
kV 0 MVA
0 MVA
CBL-83
CBL-88
TRANS 36
300 kVA TRANS 37
I23 225 kVA
I32
0.48 kV 0.48 kV
0.208 kV
I61 Lump125
0 MVA I62 Lump124 0.208 kV
0 MVA
CBL-84 CBL-85
CBL-80
CBL-81 CBL-82
I26
I24 0.208 kV
0.208 kV CBL-86
CBL-87
Lump126 I29 I30 I31
0 MVA 0.208 kV 0.208 kV 0.208 kV
I25 I27
0.208 kV 0.208 kV
Lump128
0 MVA
Lump127
0 MVA
Lump130 Lump131 Lump132
0 MVA 0 MVA 0 MVA
Lump129
0 MVA
Annex B Result of arc flash study (worst case) for 271 bus system
Total Final Ia at
kV Output Config AFB Energy Source PD
ID Energy FCT FCT
(kV) Rpt. uration (ft) Levels ID
(cal/cm²) (sec) (kA)
NAFMA NORM
A 13.8 Normal 5.26 3.1 Level 2 0.12 17.556
X SERV
NAFMA
B 13.8 Normal 3.37 2.5 Level 1 0.077 17.529 FUSE1
X
BM2 EMAF
0.48 EM 1.79 1.8 Level 1 0.15 3.618 CB-104
D52 MAX
TCAFM Ties
C 13.8 3.43 2.5 Level 1 0.079 17.483 FUSE2
AX Closed
NAFMA > Level
D 0.48 Normal 58.28 10.5 0.625 24.271 CB-1
X 4
EMAF > Level
D1 0.48 EM 867.6 82.9 162.127 1.842 CB-101
MIN 4
EMAF > Level
D1A 0.48 EM 874.32 40.5 140.571 1.978 CB-101
MIN 4
TCAFM Ties
D1B 0.48 3.36 2.5 Level 1 0.026 33.398 CB-3
AX Closed
EMAF > Level
D1C 0.48 EM 874.32 40.5 140.571 1.978 CB-101
MIN 4
TCAFM Ties
D2 0.48 0.489097 1 Level 0 0.012 11.203 CB-7
AX Closed
TCAFM Ties
D3 0.48 0.303614 0.6 Level 0 0.011 8.615 CB-8
AX Closed
TCAFM Ties
D4 0.48 0.801793 1.2 Level 0 0.008 26.582 CB-4
AX Closed
EMAF
D5 0.48 EM 0.275931 0.6 Level 0 0.015 5.735 CB-5
MIN
EMTCA
D6 0.48 EMTC 8.46 4 Level 3 30.279 FUSE5
FMIN
EMTCA
D7 0.48 EMTC 10.12 4.4 Level 3 24.952 FUSE5
FMIN
EMTCA
D8 0.48 EMTC 10.4 4.4 Level 3 24.822 FUSE5
FMIN
EMTCA
D9 0.48 EMTC 0.25 0.6 Level 0 21.754 FUSE 6
FMAX
0.20 EMTCA
D10 EMTC 31.46 7.7 Level 4 3.319 FUSE7
8 FMIN
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D11 24.56 9.4 Level 3 2.772 2.94 CB-28
8 IN Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D12 0.144963 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.793 CB-26
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D13 0.148789 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.89 CB-24
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D14 0.171397 0.5 Level 0 0.016 3.536 CB-22
8 AX Closed
122
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D15 32.24 11.1 Level 4 5.362 2.057 CB-20
8 IN Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D16 0.136216 0.4 Level 0 0.018 2.513 CB-18
8 AX Closed
D16 0.20 TCAFM Ties
32.24 11.1 Level 4 5.362 2.057 CB-13
A 8 IN Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D17 0.123088 0.4 Level 0 0.02 2.109 CB-16
8 AX Closed
EMTCA
D19 0.48 EMTC 10.95 4.5 Level 3 24.562 FUSE5
FMIN
TCAFM Ties
D20 0.48 0.25 0.6 Level 0 20.869 FUSE 8
AX Closed
0.20 EMTCA
D21 EMTC 31.52 11 Level 4 3.119 FUSE9
8 FMIN
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D22 0.173073 0.5 Level 0 0.016 3.534 CB-32
8 AX Closed
0.20 EMAF
D23 EM 0.135164 0.4 Level 0 0.027 1.736 CB-34
8 MIN
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D24 0.123071 0.4 Level 0 0.02 2.108 CB-36
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D25 32.25 11.1 Level 4 5.366 2.056 CB-38
8 IN Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D26 32.25 11.1 Level 4 5.366 2.056 CB-41
8 IN Closed
EMTCA
D27 0.48 EMTC 11.5 4.6 Level 3 24.305 FUSE5
FMIN
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D28 0.041196 0.2 Level 0 0.008 1.724 CB-46
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D29 0.024183 0.1 Level 0 0.008 1.053 CB-47
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D30 27.12 10 Level 4 6.185 1.536 FUSE10
8 IN Closed
EMTCA
D31 0.48 EMTC 22.23 8.9 Level 3 15.248 FUSE5
FMIN
EMTCA
D32 0.48 EMTC 10.67 4.5 Level 3 24.692 FUSE5
FMIN
0.20 TCAFM Ties > Level
D33 50.92 14.7 6.135 2.771 FUSE11
8 IN Closed 4
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D34 0.157773 0.4 Level 0 0.017 3.147 CB-51
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D35 0.157773 0.4 Level 0 0.017 3.147 CB-52
8 AX Closed
0.20 EMAF
D36 EM 0.242876 0.6 Level 0 0.06 1.425 CB-53
8 MIN
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D37 0.121254 0.4 Level 0 0.021 2.022 CB-54
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D38 4.39 3.3 Level 2 1.582 1.006 CB-55
8 IN Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D39 0.110472 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.187 CB-56
8 AX Closed
123
0.20 EMAF
D40 EM 0.141175 0.4 Level 0 0.034 1.455 CB-57
8 MIN
TCAFM Ties
D41 0.48 0.327483 0.7 Level 0 0.004 22.19 FUSE12
AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties > Level
D42 117.37 14.8 16.162 2.29 FUSE13
8 IN Closed 4
EMTCA
D43 0.48 EMTC 11.22 4.6 Level 3 24.433 FUSE5
FMIN
TCAFM Ties
D44 0.48 0.230074 0.5 Level 0 0.004 16.007 FUSE14
AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties > Level
D45 77.25 19 11.994 2.193 RL2-FS02
8 IN Closed 4
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D46 26.77 7.1 Level 4 3.879 2.183 CB-67
8 IN Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D47 0.123604 0.4 Level 0 0.018 2.388 CB-69
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D48 0.123604 0.4 Level 0 0.018 2.388 CB-71
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D49 0.123604 0.4 Level 0 0.018 2.388 CB-73
8 AX Closed
FIRE
TCAFM Ties > Level
D50 0.48 138.71 16.1 24.991 1.786 PUMP
AX Closed 4
BKR N
FIRE
TCAFM Ties > Level
D51 0.48 141.9 16.3 26.196 1.746 PUMP
AX Closed 4
BKR N
EMAF
D52 0.48 EM 1.54 1.7 Level 1 0.15 3.384 CB-104
MAX
0.20 EMAF
D53 EM 22.23 8.9 Level 3 6.37 1.238 CB-85
8 MIN
D53 TCAFM Ties
0.48 0.182417 0.6 Level 0 0.016 3.46 CB-85
A AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
D54 0.041958 0.2 Level 0 0.008 1.753 CB-87
8 AX Closed
0.20 EMAF
D55 EM 17.37 7.6 Level 3 8.181 0.784 CB-89
8 MIN
D55 TCAFM Ties
0.48 0.212192 0.6 Level 0 0.015 4.164 CB-89
A AX Closed
0.20 EMAF
D56 EM 8.07 4.8 Level 3 3.883 0.767 CB91
8 MIN
EMAF
D57 0.48 EM 1.51 1.7 Level 1 0.15 3.318 CB-104
MAX
0.20 EMAF
D58 EM 24.34 9.4 Level 3 7.414 1.171 CB-94
8 MIN
EMAF
D59 0.48 EM 1.45 1.7 Level 1 0.15 3.194 CB-104
MAX
0.20 EMAF
D60 EM 24.6 9.4 Level 3 7.546 1.164 CB-97
8 MIN
0.20 NAFMI > Level
D61 Normal 59.39 16.2 19.508 1.097 CB-290
8 N 4
124
0.20 NAFMI > Level
D62 Normal 60.28 16.3 20.064 1.083 CB-290
8 N 4
0.20 NAFMI > Level
D63 Normal 60.28 16.3 20.064 1.083 CB-290
8 N 4
0.20 NAFMI > Level
D64 Normal 61.17 16.5 20.627 1.07 CB-290
8 N 4
EMAF
D65 0.48 EM 1.89 1.9 Level 1 0.15 3.816 CB-106
MAX
EMAF
D66 0.48 EM 1.57 1.8 Level 1 0.15 3.432 CB-106
MAX
TCAFM Ties > Level
E 0.48 75.25 11.9 0.657 29.366 CB-2
AX Closed 4
TCAFM Ties
E1 0.48 0.602785 1 Level 0 0.008 21.846 CB-75
AX Closed
TCAFM Ties
E2 0.48 9.29 5.2 Level 3 0.2 13.639 CB-77
AX Closed
TCAFM Ties
E3 0.48 5.41 3.2 Level 2 0.1 14.688 CB-79
AX Closed
TCAFM Ties
E4 0.48 0.619691 1.1 Level 0 0.013 12.768 CB-80
AX Closed
TCAFM Ties
E5 0.48 2.88 2.3 Level 1 0.051 15.275 CB-81
AX Closed
TCAFM Ties
E6 0.48 2.78 2.3 Level 1 0.051 14.794 CB-82
AX Closed
TCAFM Ties
E7 0.48 2.78 2.3 Level 1 0.051 14.794 CB-83
AX Closed
TCAFM Ties
E8 0.48 0.834716 1.3 Level 0 0.053 4.687 CB-84
AX Closed
EMAF > Level
F 0.48 EM 1392.24 51.1 57.882 6.935 CB-GEN1
MAX 4
NAFMI > Level
F1 0.48 Normal 56.07 10.3 0.668 21.64 CB115A
N 4
TCAFM Ties
F1B 0.48 5.95 3.3 Level 2 0.1 16.031 CB-115
AX Closed
EMAF > Level
F1E 0.48 EM 221.94 20.4 31.79 2.195 CB-107
MIN 4
EMAF > Level
F2 0.48 EM 115.91 14.7 17.132 2.084 CB-102
MIN 4
TCAFM Ties
F3 0.48 0.990049 1.4 Level 0 0.008 32.308 CB-113
AX Closed
EMAF > Level
F4 0.48 EM 129.98 15.6 22.107 1.848 CB-102
MIN 4
EMAF > Level
F5 0.48 EM 218.53 35.8 36.025 2.064 CB-107
MIN 4
EMAF
F6 0.48 EM 29.93 10.6 Level 4 6.136 1.664 CB-119
MIN
0.20 EMAF
F7 EM 24.85 9.5 Level 3 7.674 1.157 CB-116
8 MIN
EMAF
F8 0.48 EM 30.87 10.9 Level 4 6.614 1.602 CB-119
MIN
125
0.20 EMAF
F9 EM 18.12 7.8 Level 3 8.86 0.758 CB-120
8 MIN
TCAFM Ties
F10 0.48 0.387487 0.8 Level 0 0.016 7.573 CB-123
AX Closed
0.20 EMAF
F11 EM 23.09 9.1 Level 3 6.791 1.209 CB-123A
8 MIN
TCAFM Ties
F12 0.48 0.334838 0.7 Level 0 0.016 6.343 CB-123
AX Closed
0.20 EMAF
F13 EM 17.54 7.7 Level 3 8.334 0.778 CB-127
8 MIN
0.20 EMAF
F14 EM 18.87 8 Level 3 4.731 1.398 CB-130
8 MIN
F14 TCAFM Ties
0.48 0.313544 0.8 Level 0 0.014 6.306 CB-130
A AX Closed
0.20 EMAF
F15 EM 15.66 7.2 Level 3 4.075 1.35 CB-131
8 MIN
0.20 EMAF
F16 EM 24.56 9.4 Level 3 7.526 1.165 CB-134
8 MIN
F16 EMAF
0.48 EM 0.13312 0.5 Level 0 0.029 1.511 CB-134
A MIN
0.20 EMAF
F17 EM 19.94 8.3 Level 3 6.287 1.134 CB-135
8 MIN
0.20 EMAF
F18 EM 20.37 8.4 Level 3 5.426 1.322 CB-138
8 MIN
F18 TCAFM Ties
0.48 0.258585 0.7 Level 0 0.015 5.115 CB-138
A AX Closed
0.20 EMAF
F19 EM 18.6 8 Level 3 5.557 1.191 CB-139
8 MIN
0.20 EMAF
F20 EM 20.72 8.5 Level 3 5.596 1.306 CB-142
8 MIN
F20 TCAFM Ties
0.48 0.217701 0.6 Level 0 0.015 4.219 CB-142
A AX Closed
0.20 EMAF
F21 EM 17.03 7.6 Level 3 7.883 0.797 CB-145
8 MIN
EMAF
F22 0.48 EM 10.02 4.3 Level 3 20.364 FUSE16
MIN
EMAF
F23 0.48 EM 11.98 4.7 Level 3 19.782 FUSE16
MIN
EMAF
F24 0.48 EM 12.62 4.9 Level 3 19.593 FUSE16
MIN
TCAFM Ties
F25 0.48 0.332715 0.8 Level 0 0.004 21.044 FUSE17
AX Closed
TCAFM Ties
F26 0.48 0.336009 0.7 Level 0 0.004 22.724 FUSE18
AX Closed
0.20 NAFMI > Level
F27 Normal 203.02 34.2 24.453 2.774 FUSE19
8 N 4
F27 EMAF
0.48 EM 13.24 5 Level 3 19.406 FUSE16
A MIN
0.20 NAFMI
F28 Normal 37.92 12.3 Level 4 7.904 1.67 CB-151
8 N
126
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F29 0.153015 0.4 Level 0 0.017 3.009 CB-153
8 AX Closed
TCAFM Ties
F30 0.48 0.289513 0.6 Level 0 0.004 19.799 FUSE20
AX Closed
0.20 NAFMI
F31 Normal 28.5 10.3 Level 4 4.471 2.172 FUSE21
8 N
EMAF
F32 0.48 EM 13.86 5.1 Level 3 19.222 FUSE16
MIN
0.20 NAFMI
F33 Normal 13.93 6.7 Level 3 5.848 0.874 FUSE22
8 N
TCAFM Ties
F34 0.48 0.234352 0.6 Level 0 0.004 16.283 FUSE23
AX Closed
EMAF
F35 0.48 EM 12.93 4.9 Level 3 19.499 FUSE16
MIN
TCAFM Ties
F36 0.48 0.269098 0.6 Level 0 0.004 18.504 FUSE25
AX Closed
TCAFM Ties
F37 0.48 0.184283 0.5 Level 0 0.004 13.037 FUSE26
AX Closed
0.20 NAFMI > Level
F39 Normal 86.84 20.4 11.677 2.505 FUSE24
8 N 4
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F40 0.150815 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.947 CB-165
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F41 0.145415 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.796 CB-166
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F42 0.120826 0.4 Level 0 0.021 2.002 CB-167
8 AX Closed
0.20 NAFMI
F43 Normal 24.33 6.8 Level 3 3.064 2.487 CB-168
8 N
EMAF
F44 0.48 EM 13.86 5.1 Level 3 19.222 FUSE16
MIN
TCAFM Ties
F45 0.48 0.154084 0.4 Level 0 0.004 11.047 FUSE27
AX Closed
0.20 NAFMI 147. > Level
F46 Normal 2224.39 194.529 3.73 FUSE28
8 N 1 4
F46 NAFMI
0.48 Normal 0.488862 1 Level 0 0.008 15.821 FUSE28
A N
0.20 NAFMI
F47 Normal 26.69 7.1 Level 4 3.85 2.194 CB-171
8 N
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F48 0.245393 0.6 Level 0 0.019 4.086 CB-172
8 AX Closed
0.20 EMAF
F49 EM 0.264776 0.7 Level 0 0.024 3.313 CB-173
8 MIN
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F50 0.195124 0.5 Level 0 0.015 4.11 CB-174
8 AX Closed
0.20 NAFMI
F51 Normal 24.94 9.5 Level 3 2.864 2.899 CB-177
8 N
0.20 NAFMI
F52 Normal 23.87 9.3 Level 3 2.613 3.029 CB-179
8 N
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F53 0.128589 0.4 Level 0 0.019 2.278 CB-181
8 AX Closed
127
0.20 NAFMI > Level
F54 Normal 577.42 64.6 61.2 3.122 FUSE29
8 N 4
TCAFM Ties > Level
F55 0.48 56.86 10.3 0.532 27.563 CB-115B
AX Closed 4
F55 TCAFM Ties
0.48 0.270585 0.7 Level 0 0.01 7.674 CB-214
A AX Closed
F55 TCAFM Ties
0.48 0.281695 0.7 Level 0 0.01 8.172 CB-213
B AX Closed
F55 TCAFM Ties
0.48 0.524466 1 Level 0 0.008 17.949 CB-184
D AX Closed
F55 TCAFM Ties
0.48 12.22 4.8 Level 3 0.2 16.425 CB-191
E AX Closed
F55 EMTCA
0.48 EMTC 4.07 2.8 Level 2 0.066 16.451 C-196
G FMIN
EMAF > Level
F56 0.48 EM 115.29 24.2 20.135 1.92 CB-103
MIN 4
EMAF
F57 0.48 EM 30.7 10.8 Level 4 6.528 1.579 CB-185
MIN
EMAF
F58 0.48 EM 29.99 10.7 Level 4 6.177 1.618 CB-187
MIN
NAFMI
F59 0.48 Normal 0.289446 0.6 Level 0 0.017 5.349 CB-184
N
EMAF > Level
F60 0.48 EM 374.79 49.7 63.701 2.007 CB-109
MIN 4
EMAF
F61 0.48 EM 29.91 10.6 Level 4 6.038 1.662 CB-192
MIN
EMAF > Level
F62 0.48 EM 185.29 32.3 40.974 1.573 CB-194
MIN 4
EMAF > Level
F63 0.48 EM 501.16 59.3 85.299 2.007 CB-110
MIN 4
EMAF > Level
F64 0.48 EM 165.83 30.2 33.261 1.718 CB-197
MIN 4
EMAF > Level
F65 0.48 EM 282.11 23 43.893 2.032 CB-198
MIN 4
EMAF
F66 0.48 EM 0.298296 0.7 Level 0 0.022 4.051 CB-108
MAX
EMAF
F67 0.48 EM 1.01 1.4 Level 0 0.045 6.457 CB-103
MIN
EMAF > Level
F68 0.48 EM 211.25 19.9 30.766 2.152 CB-109
MIN 4
EMAF > Level
F69 0.48 EM 506.14 30.8 74.302 2.149 CB-110
MIN 4
0.20 TCAFM Ties > Level
F70 685.12 71.7 57.544 3.872 CB-200
8 IN Closed 4
F70 TCAFM Ties
0.48 3.05 2.4 Level 1 0.028 28.44 CB-200
A AX Closed
F70 0.20 TCAFM Ties > Level
681.86 35.7 48.564 4.215 CB-200
B 8 IN Closed 4
0.20 TCAFM Ties > Level
F71 65.42 17.1 12.91 1.757 CB202
8 IN Closed 4
128
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F72 0.075707 0.3 Level 0 0.018 1.504 CB-205
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties > Level
F73 105.67 23 10.111 3.432 CB-208
8 IN Closed 4
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F74 0.197234 0.6 Level 0 0.018 3.435 CB-211
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F75 0.214888 0.6 Level 0 0.016 4.012 CB-212
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties > Level
F76 691.39 72.1 58.697 3.834 CB-215
8 IN Closed 4
F76 EMTCA
0.48 EMTC 3.13 2.4 Level 1 0.044 19.056 CB-215
A FMIN
F76 0.20 TCAFM Ties > Level
688.52 35.9 49.604 4.17 CB-215
B 8 IN Closed 4
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F77 17.34 7.6 Level 3 5.835 1.072 CB-243
8 IN Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F78 14.27 6.8 Level 3 4.292 1.19 CB-240
8 IN Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F79 16.44 7.4 Level 3 5.366 1.103 CB-237
8 IN Closed
0.20 EMTCA
F80 EMTC 0.128094 0.4 Level 0 0.024 1.814 CB-234
8 FMIN
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F81 13.43 6.5 Level 3 3.897 1.229 CB-231
8 IN Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F82 0.14387 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.765 CB-228
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F83 13.01 6.4 Level 3 3.708 1.25 CB-225
8 IN Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F84 38.5 12.4 Level 4 8.149 1.646 CB-222
8 IN Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F85 31.31 10.9 Level 4 4.991 2.14 CB-218
8 IN Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
F86 37.75 8.4 Level 4 6.6 1.836 CB-217
8 IN Closed
NAFMA
F87 13.8 Normal 3.28 2.5 Level 1 0.08 16.573 FUSE1
X
TCAFM Ties
F88 13.8 3.34 2.5 Level 1 0.082 16.434 FUSE2
AX Closed
EMAF > Level
F89 0.48 EM 115.91 14.7 17.132 2.084 CB-102
MIN 4
EMAF > Level
F90 0.48 EM 221.94 20.4 31.79 2.195 CB-107
MIN 4
EMAF
F91 0.48 EM 0.371097 0.8 Level 0 0.021 5.201 CB-108
MAX
NAFMI > Level
F92 0.48 Normal 109.91 14.4 15.562 2.214 CB-103
N 4
NAFMI > Level
F93 0.48 Normal 365.18 26.2 51.394 2.239 CB-109
N 4
EMAF > Level
F94 0.48 EM 506.14 30.8 74.302 2.149 CB-110
MIN 4
129
EMAF
F95 0.48 EM 1.79 1.8 Level 1 0.15 3.618 CB-104
MAX
EMAF
F96 0.48 EM 1.89 1.9 Level 1 0.15 3.816 CB-106
MAX
EMAF
F97 0.48 EM 0.762621 1.2 Level 0 0.15 1.647 CB-105
MAX
TCAFM Ties
F100 0.48 0.866543 1.3 Level 0 0.007 32.427 CB-183
AX Closed
EMAF > Level
G 0.48 EM 1173.31 46.9 168.059 2.206 CB-GEN2
MIN 4
EMAF > Level
H 0.48 EM 1198.27 47.4 175.658 2.158 CB-GEN3
MIN 4
NAFMA
I1 13.8 Normal 3.28 2.5 Level 1 0.08 16.495 FUSE1
X
TCAFM Ties
I2 13.8 3.33 2.5 Level 1 0.082 16.359 FUSE2
AX Closed
EMAF > Level
I3 0.48 EM 54.52 10.1 0.654 21.878 CB-246
MIN 4
EMAF
I4 0.48 EM 6.31 3.4 Level 2 21.46 FUSE 32
MIN
EMAF
I5 0.48 EM 8.05 3.9 Level 3 20.945 FUSE 32
MIN
EMAF
I6 0.48 EM 8.63 4 Level 3 20.774 FUSE 32
MIN
TCAFM Ties
I7 0.48 0.259416 0.6 Level 0 0.004 17.887 FUSE 33
AX Closed
0.20 NAFMI
I8 Normal 13.81 6.6 Level 3 5.788 0.876 FUSE34
8 N
EMAF
I9 0.48 EM 9.21 4.2 Level 3 20.603 FUSE 32
MIN
TCAFM Ties
I10 0.48 0.313653 0.7 Level 0 0.004 21.322 FUSE35
AX Closed
0.20 NAFMI 132. > Level
I11 Normal 1868.38 154.796 3.921 FUSE36
8 N 2 4
0.20 TCAFM Ties
I12 0.251368 0.6 Level 0 0.019 4.267 CB-257
8 AX Closed
0.20 NAFMI
I13 Normal 29.58 10.6 Level 4 4.339 2.312 CB-258
8 N
0.20 EMAF
I14 EM 1.71 1.9 Level 1 0.467 1.301 CB-259
8 MIN
0.20 NAFMI
I15 Normal 29.58 10.6 Level 4 4.339 2.312 CB-260
8 N
0.20 TCAFM Ties
I16 0.130967 0.4 Level 0 0.019 2.352 CB-261
8 AX Closed
EMAF
I17 0.48 EM 9.79 4.3 Level 3 20.432 FUSE 32
MIN
EMAF
I18 0.48 EM 22.74 9 Level 3 13.369 FUSE 32
MIN
0.20 NAFMI > Level
I19 Normal 85.55 20.2 11.448 2.517 FUSE37
8 N 4
130
0.20 EMAF
I20 EM 0.149084 0.4 Level 0 0.036 1.45 CB-264
8 MIN
0.20 TCAFM Ties
I21 0.14362 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.758 CB-266
8 AX Closed
EMAF
I22 0.48 EM 10.36 4.4 Level 3 20.262 FUSE 32
MIN
TCAFM Ties
I23 0.48 0.273997 0.6 Level 0 0.004 18.816 FUSE38
AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
I24 0.251125 0.6 Level 0 0.019 4.26 CB-275
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
I25 0.251125 0.6 Level 0 0.019 4.26 CB-274
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
I26 0.213309 0.5 Level 0 0.015 4.54 CB-272
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
I27 0.149376 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.907 CB-270
8 AX Closed
0.20 NAFMI
I29 Normal 25.19 9.6 Level 4 2.923 2.871 CB-277
8 N
0.20 NAFMI
I30 Normal 38.87 12.5 Level 4 8.308 1.632 CB-279
8 N
0.20 NAFMI
I31 Normal 25.19 9.6 Level 4 2.923 2.871 CB-282
8 N
TCAFM Ties
I32 0.48 0.288542 0.6 Level 0 0.004 19.738 FUSE41
AX Closed
EMAF
I33 0.48 EM 8.92 4.1 Level 3 20.688 FUSE 32
MIN
0.20 NAFMI
I34 Normal 13.82 6.6 Level 3 5.79 0.876 FUSE42
8 N
TCAFM Ties
I35 0.48 0.258115 0.6 Level 0 0.004 17.804 FUSE43
AX Closed
0.20 NAFMI > Level
I36 Normal 223.37 36.2 25.639 2.9 CB-287
8 N 4
TCAFM Ties
I36A 0.48 0.300625 0.8 Level 0 0.009 9.603 CB-287
AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
I37 0.167476 0.5 Level 0 0.016 3.388 CB-291
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
I38 0.157456 0.4 Level 0 0.017 3.12 CB-291
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
I39 0.148566 0.4 Level 0 0.017 2.886 CB-291
8 AX Closed
0.20 TCAFM Ties
I40 0.140999 0.4 Level 0 0.018 2.684 CB-291
8 AX Closed
0.20 NAFMI
I41 Normal 4.32 3.3 Level 2 1.546 1.013 CB-296
8 N
0.20 NAFMI
I42 Normal 4.5 3.4 Level 2 1.643 0.994 CB-296
8 N
0.20 NAFMI
I43 Normal 4.74 3.5 Level 2 1.778 0.97 CB-296
8 N
TCAFM Ties > Level
I44 0.48 160.93 17.4 1.559 26.693 FUSE31
AX Closed 4
131
FIRE
TCAFM Ties > Level
I44A 0.48 138.71 16.1 24.991 1.786 PUMP
AX Closed 4
BKR N
NAFMA
I45 0.48 Normal 4.87 3.5 Level 2 0.1 14.247 CB-298
X
NAFMA
I46 0.48 Normal 0.642312 1.1 Level 0 0.053 3.678 CB-300
X
NAFMA
I47 0.48 Normal 0.775128 1.2 Level 0 0.053 4.377 CB-301
X
NAFMA
I48 0.48 Normal 0.406563 0.8 Level 0 0.008 15.122 CB-302
X
NAFMA
I49 0.48 Normal 3.24 2.7 Level 1 0.1 9.783 CB-303
X
EMTCA > Level
I50 0.48 EMTC 54.24 10.1 0.529 26.536 CB-247
FMAX 4
0.20 NAFMI > Level
I51 Normal 62.65 10.8 13.171 1.548 CB-307
8 N 4
0.20 NAFMI > Level
I52 Normal 49.43 9.6 8.5 1.865 CB-308
8 N 4
0.20 NAFMI > Level
I53 Normal 191.45 18.9 20.705 2.864 CB-309
8 N 4
0.20 NAFMI > Level
I54 Normal 191.45 18.9 20.705 2.864 CB-310
8 N 4
0.20 NAFMA
I55 Normal 0.171799 0.6 Level 0 0.018 2.99 CB-311
8 X
0.20 NAFMI > Level
I56 Normal 144.82 16.5 12.116 3.631 CB-312
8 N 4
0.20 NAFMA
I57 Normal 0.169491 0.6 Level 0 0.018 2.902 CB-313
8 X
0.20 NAFMI > Level
I58 Normal 149.44 16.7 12.843 3.542 CB-314
8 N 4
0.20 NAFMI > Level
I59 Normal 150.66 28.5 14.932 3.322 CB-315
8 N 4
0.20 NAFMI 190. > Level
I60 Normal 983.28 75.431 6.411 CB-305
8 N 1 4
NAFMA
I60A 0.48 Normal 5.27 3.1 Level 2 0.051 26.92 CB-305
X
0.20 NAFMI > Level
I60B Normal 1423.97 51.7 53.554 7.608 CB-305
8 N 4
0.20 NAFMI > Level
I61 Normal 1142.84 98 94.851 3.915 FUSE39
8 N 4
0.20 NAFMI > Level
I62 Normal 400.46 51.7 42.234 3.137 FUSE40
8 N 4
132
Appendix C: Result of short circuit study for 271 bus system
133
Project: ETAP Page: 1
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
D12 0.208 D12 Panelboard 5.075 1.7 1.025 5.201 8.315 18.000 22.400
D13 0.208 D13 Panelboard 5.329 1.4 1.010 5.384 8.305 18.000 22.400
D14 0.208 D14 Panelboard 7.075 2.3 1.061 7.506 12.512 18.000 22.400
D15 0.208 D15 Panelboard 4.372 1.5 1.015 4.440 6.955 18.000 22.400
D16 0.208 D16 Panelboard 4.372 1.5 1.015 4.440 6.955 18.000 22.400
D16A 0.208 D16A Panelboard 4.372 1.5 1.015 4.440 6.955 18.000 22.400
D17 0.208 D17 Panelboard 3.415 0.9 1.001 3.418 4.980 18.000 22.400
D19 0.480 D19 Bus 42.135 5.0 1.250 52.687 91.220
D20 0.480 D20 Panelboard 32.736 1.9 1.039 34.014 55.531 14.000 * 17.500 *
D21 0.208 D21 Panelboard 7.960 3.4 1.144 9.106 15.678 18.000 22.400
D22 0.208 D22 Panelboard 7.069 2.3 1.061 7.497 12.494 18.000 22.400
D23 0.208 D23 Panelboard 3.413 0.9 1.001 3.416 4.977 18.000 22.400
D24 0.208 D24 Panelboard 3.413 0.9 1.001 3.416 4.977 18.000 22.400
D25 0.208 D25 Panelboard 4.369 1.5 1.015 4.437 6.950 18.000 22.400
D26 0.208 D26 Panelboard 4.369 1.5 1.015 4.437 6.950 18.000 22.400
Project: ETAP Page: 2
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
D40 0.208 D40 Panelboard 2.652 0.8 1.000 2.653 3.823 10.000 12.500
D41 0.480 D41 Panelboard 34.659 2.6 1.086 37.635 63.683 14.000 * 17.500 *
D42 0.208 D42 Bus 4.797 2.0 1.042 4.998 8.187
D43 0.480 D43 Bus 41.926 4.8 1.242 52.053 90.142
D44 0.480 D44 Panelboard 25.254 1.0 1.002 25.300 37.234 14.000 * 17.500 *
D45 0.208 D45 Panelboard 4.794 2.0 1.042 4.994 8.180 14.000 17.500
D46 0.208 D46 Bus 4.495 1.8 1.031 4.635 7.491
D47 0.208 D47 Panelboard 4.068 1.3 1.009 4.105 6.304 10.000 12.500
D48 0.208 D48 Panelboard 4.068 1.3 1.009 4.105 6.304 10.000 12.500
D49 0.208 D49 Panelboard 4.068 1.3 1.009 4.105 6.304 10.000 12.500
D52 0.480 D52 Panelboard 9.809 1.0 1.002 9.830 14.517 65.000 81.100
D53 0.208 D53 Panelboard 2.874 1.1 1.004 2.884 4.314 10.000 12.500
D55 0.208 D55 Panelboard 1.276 1.3 1.007 1.285 1.952 10.000 12.500
D55A 0.480 D55A Bus 5.331 0.6 1.000 5.331 7.565
D56 0.208 D56 Panelboard 1.228 1.2 1.005 1.235 1.864 10.000 12.500
D57 0.480 D57 Panelboard 9.281 1.0 1.002 9.299 13.708 65.000 81.100
D58 0.208 D58 Panelboard 2.600 1.2 1.006 2.616 3.971 10.000 12.500
D59 0.480 D59 Panelboard 8.378 1.0 1.002 8.393 12.335 65.000 81.100
D60 0.208 D60 Panelboard 2.567 1.2 1.006 2.583 3.916 10.000 12.500
Project: ETAP Page: 3
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
D61 0.208 D61 Panelboard 1.772 1.1 1.003 1.778 2.649 10.000 12.500
D62 0.208 D62 Panelboard 1.741 1.1 1.003 1.747 2.600 10.000 12.500
D63 0.208 D63 Panelboard 1.741 1.1 1.003 1.747 2.600 10.000 12.500
D64 0.208 D64 Panelboard 1.711 1.1 1.003 1.717 2.554 10.000 12.500
D65 0.480 D65 Bus 11.323 1.1 1.004 11.370 17.053
D66 0.480 D66 Panelboard 9.312 1.1 1.004 9.345 13.954 200.000 0.000 *
E 0.480 E Bus 53.889 9.0 1.413 76.169 130.041
E1 0.480 E1 Panelboard 37.688 3.4 1.148 43.269 74.556 65.000 81.100
E2 0.480 E2 Panelboard 22.197 2.8 1.099 24.401 41.525 65.000 81.100
E3 0.480 E3 Bus 21.549 2.3 1.065 22.954 38.381
E4 0.480 E4 Bus 18.491 1.7 1.026 18.965 30.367
E5 0.480 E5 Bus 22.500 4.2 1.202 27.041 46.819
E6 0.480 E6 Bus 21.727 4.2 1.203 26.138 45.257
F10 0.480 F10 Panelboard 11.046 1.1 1.003 11.084 16.541 65.000 81.100
F11 0.208 F11 Panelboard 2.650 1.3 1.007 2.668 4.058 10.000 12.500
F12 0.480 F12 Panelboard 9.035 1.0 1.002 9.052 13.339 65.000 81.100
F13 0.208 F13 Panelboard 1.224 1.1 1.003 1.228 1.821 10.000 12.500
F14 0.208 F14 Panelboard 3.250 0.7 1.000 3.250 4.637 10.000 0.000 *
F14A 0.480 F14A Bus 8.378 0.6 1.000 8.378 11.920
F15 0.208 F15 Panelboard 3.026 0.6 1.000 3.026 4.312 10.000 12.500
F16 0.208 F16 Panelboard 2.394 0.9 1.001 2.396 3.480 10.000 12.500
F16A 0.480 F16A Bus 2.382 0.4 1.000 2.382 3.370
Project: ETAP Page: 4
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
F17 0.208 F17 Panelboard 2.274 0.9 1.001 2.275 3.296 10.000 12.500
F18 0.208 F18 Panelboard 3.150 1.3 1.007 3.171 4.822 10.000 12.500
F18A 0.480 F18A Bus 6.639 0.7 1.000 6.639 9.476
F19 0.208 F19 Panelboard 2.526 1.0 1.002 2.532 3.736 10.000 12.500
F20 0.208 F20 Panelboard 3.045 1.1 1.004 3.058 4.585 10.000 12.500
F20A 0.480 F20A Bus 5.374 0.5 1.000 5.374 7.612
F21 0.208 F21 Panelboard 1.274 1.1 1.003 1.278 1.900 10.000 12.500
F22 0.480 F22 Bus 41.236 2.7 1.094 45.132 76.659
F23 0.480 F23 Bus 39.848 2.5 1.077 42.903 72.253
F24 0.480 F24 Bus 39.399 2.4 1.072 42.221 70.895
F25 0.480 F25 Bus 30.047 1.4 1.013 30.431 47.309
F26 0.480 F26 Panelboard 36.301 2.3 1.062 38.533 64.263 14.000 * 17.500 *
F27 0.208 F27 Panelboard 6.670 2.2 1.054 7.032 11.660 14.000 17.500
F37 0.480 F37 Panelboard 20.561 0.8 1.000 20.566 29.525 14.000 * 17.500 *
F38 0.208 F38 Bus 5.766 2.0 1.040 5.998 9.806
F39 0.208 F39 Panelboard 5.766 2.0 1.040 5.998 9.806 65.000 81.100
F40 0.208 F40 Panelboard 5.482 1.8 1.029 5.641 9.083 10.000 12.500
F41 0.208 F41 Panelboard 5.091 1.6 1.018 5.185 8.181 10.000 12.500
F42 0.208 F42 Panelboard 3.174 1.0 1.001 3.179 4.657 10.000 12.500
F45 0.480 F45 Panelboard 16.888 1.2 1.005 16.974 25.586 14.000 * 17.500
F46 0.208 F46 Panelboard 10.194 3.4 1.146 11.679 20.116 18.000 22.400
F46A 0.480 F46A Bus 24.863 1.8 1.032 25.661 41.510
F47 0.208 F47 Bus 4.502 1.3 1.008 4.540 6.952
F48 0.208 F48 Panelboard 8.685 2.4 1.073 9.318 15.658 18.000 22.400
Project: ETAP Page: 5
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
F57 0.480 F57 Panelboard 5.681 0.9 1.001 5.686 8.263 65.000 81.100
F58 0.480 F58 Panelboard 6.298 0.8 1.001 6.302 9.121 65.000 81.100
F59 0.480 F59 Panelboard 9.529 0.9 1.001 9.541 13.950 65.000 81.100
F60 0.480 F60 Panelboard 27.733 2.6 1.083 30.033 50.748 65.000 81.100
F61 0.480 F61 Panelboard 6.833 1.1 1.004 6.859 10.257 65.000 81.100
F62 0.480 F62 Panelboard 6.631 1.8 1.030 6.828 11.005 65.000 81.100
F63 0.480 F63 Panelboard 32.480 2.7 1.096 35.603 60.514 65.000 81.100
F64 0.480 F64 Panelboard 9.878 1.8 1.030 10.177 16.417 65.000 81.100
F65 0.480 F65 Bus 17.654 1.5 1.014 17.899 27.913
F66 0.480 F66 Bus 12.334 1.0 1.002 12.359 18.242
F71 0.208 F71 Panelboard 3.478 1.2 1.004 3.493 5.248 18.000 22.400
F72 0.208 F72 Panelboard 2.119 0.6 1.000 2.119 3.016 10.000 12.500
F73 0.208 F73 Panelboard 9.095 3.3 1.137 10.343 17.788 22.000 27.400
F74 0.208 F74 Bus 6.347 1.7 1.023 6.492 10.343
F75 0.208 F75 Bus 7.828 2.9 1.107 8.665 14.787
F76 0.208 F76 Panelboard 10.672 3.9 1.184 12.632 21.850 18.000 22.400
F76A 0.480 F76A Bus 39.368 3.8 1.177 46.342 80.124
Project: ETAP Page: 6
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
GEN 2 BUS 0.480 GEN 2 BUS Bus 6.335 19.0 1.561 9.888 16.551
GEN 3 BUS 0.480 GEN 3 BUS Bus 6.335 19.0 1.561 9.888 16.551
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
I35 0.480 I35 Panelboard 28.305 1.3 1.007 28.508 43.428 14.000 * 17.500 *
I36 0.208 I36 Panelboard 7.080 2.2 1.056 7.477 12.417 14.000 0.000 *
I38 0.208 I38 Panelboard 5.938 1.6 1.018 6.046 9.537 10.000 12.500
I39 0.208 I39 Panelboard 5.322 1.4 1.010 5.373 8.265 10.000 12.500
I40 0.208 I40 Panelboard 4.805 1.2 1.005 4.831 7.294 10.000 12.500
I41 0.208 I41 Panelboard 1.583 0.6 1.000 1.583 2.252 10.000 0.000 *
I42 0.208 I42 Panelboard 1.541 0.6 1.000 1.541 2.192 10.000 12.500
I43 0.208 I43 Panelboard 1.489 0.6 1.000 1.489 2.117 10.000 12.500
I44 0.480 I44 Bus 51.629 8.3 1.391 71.838 122.966
Project: ETAP Page: 8
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
A 13.800 NORM SERV Fuse 17.572 3.2 1.000 17.572 17.000 3.33 40.000 40.000
FUSE1 Fuse 17.572 3.2 1.000 17.572 17.000 3.33 40.000 40.000
FUSE2 Fuse 17.572 3.2 1.000 17.572 17.000 3.33 40.000 40.000
B 13.800 FUSE3 Fuse 17.544 3.2 1.000 17.544 15.500 6.65 29.400 29.400
C 13.800 FUSE4 Fuse 17.546 3.2 1.000 17.546 15.500 6.65 29.400 29.400
D 0.480 CB-3 Molded Case 46.391 8.8 1.128 52.342 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-4 Molded Case 46.391 8.8 1.128 52.342 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
FUSE5 Fuse 46.391 8.8 1.128 52.342 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
CB-5 Molded Case 46.391 8.8 1.128 52.342 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-1 InsulUnfuse 46.391 8.8 1.057 49.042 0.480 15.00 100.000 100.000
D1 0.480 CB-6 Molded Case 43.954 6.5 1.065 46.806 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-7 Molded Case 43.954 6.5 1.065 46.806 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
D2 0.480 CB-8 Molded Case 15.519 1.4 1.000 15.519 0.480 20.00 35.000 35.000
D3 0.480 CB-9 Molded Case 12.797 1.1 1.000 12.797 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
D5 0.480 CB-10 Molded Case 10.441 1.8 1.000 10.441 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
D8 0.480 FUSE7 Fuse 42.556 5.3 1.018 43.321 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE 6 Fuse 42.556 5.3 1.018 43.321 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
D9 0.480 CB-11 Molded Case 34.828 2.6 1.000 34.828 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
D10 0.208 CB-12 Molded Case 7.967 3.4 1.000 7.967 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-28 Molded Case 7.967 3.4 1.000 7.967 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-26 Molded Case 7.967 3.4 1.000 7.967 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-22 Molded Case 7.967 3.4 1.013 8.070 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-20 Molded Case 7.967 3.4 1.000 7.967 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-18 Molded Case 7.967 3.4 1.013 8.070 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-24 Molded Case 7.967 3.4 1.013 8.070 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
Project: ETAP Page: 10
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
D10 CB-16 Molded Case 7.967 3.4 1.013 8.070 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-13 Molded Case 7.967 3.4 1.000 7.967 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
D11 0.208 CB-29 Molded Case 7.315 2.8 1.000 7.315 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D12 0.208 CB-27 Molded Case 5.075 1.7 1.000 5.075 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D13 0.208 CB-25 Molded Case 5.329 1.4 1.000 5.329 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D14 0.208 CB-23 Molded Case 7.075 2.3 1.000 7.075 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D15 0.208 CB-21 Molded Case 4.372 1.5 1.000 4.372 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D16 0.208 CB-19 Molded Case 4.372 1.5 1.000 4.372 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D16A 0.208 CB-14 Molded Case 4.372 1.5 1.000 4.372 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-16A Molded Case 4.372 1.5 1.000 4.372 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D17 0.208 CB-17 Molded Case 3.415 0.9 1.000 3.415 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D19 0.480 FUSE9 Fuse 42.135 5.0 1.003 42.256 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE 8 Fuse 42.135 5.0 1.003 42.256 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
D20 0.480 CB-30 Molded Case 32.736 1.9 1.000 32.736 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
D21 0.208 CB-31 Molded Case 7.960 3.4 1.000 7.960 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-41 Molded Case 7.960 3.4 1.000 7.960 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-32 Molded Case 7.960 3.4 1.000 7.960 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-34 Molded Case 7.960 3.4 1.000 7.960 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-36 Molded Case 7.960 3.4 1.012 8.057 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-38 Molded Case 7.960 3.4 1.000 7.960 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
D22 0.208 CB-33 Molded Case 7.069 2.3 1.000 7.069 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D23 0.208 CB-35 Molded Case 3.413 0.9 1.000 3.413 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D24 0.208 CB-36A Molded Case 3.413 0.9 1.000 3.413 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D25 0.208 CB-39 Molded Case 4.369 1.5 1.000 4.369 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-40 Molded Case 4.369 1.5 1.000 4.369 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D26 0.208 CB-42 Molded Case 4.369 1.5 1.000 4.369 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-43 Molded Case 4.369 1.5 1.000 4.369 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D27 0.480 FUSE10 Fuse 41.716 4.7 1.000 41.716 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
D29 0.208 CB-48 Molded Case 1.274 0.5 1.000 1.274 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D30 0.208 CB-44 Molded Case 2.877 1.3 1.000 2.877 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-46 Molded Case 2.877 1.3 1.000 2.877 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
CB-47 Molded Case 2.877 1.3 1.000 2.877 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
D31 0.480 CB-45 Molded Case 32.411 1.9 1.000 32.411 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
Project: ETAP Page: 11
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
D32 0.480 FUSE11 Fuse 42.345 5.1 1.010 42.780 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE13 Fuse 42.345 5.1 1.010 42.780 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE12 Fuse 42.345 5.1 1.010 42.780 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
D33 0.208 CB-49 Molded Case 6.716 2.3 1.000 6.716 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-51 Molded Case 6.716 2.3 1.000 6.716 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-52 Molded Case 6.716 2.3 1.000 6.716 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-54 Molded Case 6.716 2.3 1.000 6.716 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-56 Molded Case 6.716 2.3 1.000 6.716 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-57 Molded Case 6.716 2.3 1.000 6.716 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-55 Molded Case 6.716 2.3 1.000 6.716 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-53 Molded Case 6.716 2.3 1.000 6.716 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
D34 0.208 CB-58 Molded Case 6.005 1.8 1.002 6.020 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D35 0.208 CB-59 Molded Case 6.005 1.8 1.002 6.020 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D36 0.208 CB-60 Molded Case 2.576 0.8 1.000 2.576 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D37 0.208 CB15 Molded Case 3.217 0.9 1.000 3.217 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-61 Molded Case 3.217 0.9 1.000 3.217 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D38 0.208 CB-62 Molded Case 1.569 0.6 1.000 1.569 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D39 0.208 CB-63 Molded Case 3.594 1.0 1.000 3.594 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D40 0.208 CB-64 Molded Case 2.652 0.8 1.000 2.652 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D41 0.480 CB-50 Molded Case 34.659 2.6 1.000 34.659 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
D43 0.480 FUSE14 Fuse 41.926 4.8 1.000 41.926 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
RL2-FS02 Fuse 41.926 4.8 1.000 41.926 0.600 20.00 200.000 200.000
D44 0.480 CB-66 Molded Case 25.254 1.0 1.000 25.254 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
D45 0.208 CB-67 Molded Case 4.794 2.0 1.000 4.794 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-65 Molded Case 4.794 2.0 1.000 4.794 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-69 Molded Case 4.794 2.0 1.000 4.794 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-71 Molded Case 4.794 2.0 1.000 4.794 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-73 Molded Case 4.794 2.0 1.000 4.794 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
D46 0.208 CB-68 Molded Case 4.495 1.8 1.005 4.517 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D47 0.208 CB-70 Molded Case 4.068 1.3 1.000 4.068 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D48 0.208 CB-72 Molded Case 4.068 1.3 1.000 4.068 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D49 0.208 CB-74 Molded Case 4.068 1.3 1.000 4.068 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
D52 0.480 CB-85 Molded Case 9.809 1.0 1.000 9.809 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-89 Molded Case 9.809 1.0 1.000 9.809 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
D53 0.208 CB-86 Molded Case 2.874 1.1 1.000 2.874 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-87 Molded Case 2.874 1.1 1.000 2.874 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D54 0.208 CB-88 Molded Case 2.634 1.0 1.000 2.634 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D55 0.208 CB-90 Molded Case 1.276 1.3 1.000 1.276 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB91 Molded Case 1.276 1.3 1.000 1.276 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D56 0.208 CB-92 Molded Case 1.228 1.2 1.000 1.228 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-93 Molded Case 1.228 1.2 1.000 1.228 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D57 0.480 CB-94 Molded Case 9.281 1.0 1.000 9.281 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
D58 0.208 CB-95 Molded Case 2.600 1.2 1.000 2.600 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-96 Molded Case 2.600 1.2 1.000 2.600 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D59 0.480 CB-97 Molded Case 8.378 1.0 1.000 8.378 0.480 20.00 100.000 100.000
D60 0.208 CB-98 Molded Case 2.567 1.2 1.000 2.567 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-99 Molded Case 2.567 1.2 1.000 2.567 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
D62 0.208 CB-100 Molded Case 1.741 1.1 1.000 1.741 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
E 0.480 CB-75 Molded Case 53.889 9.0 1.134 61.089 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-77 Molded Case 53.889 9.0 1.134 61.089 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-79 Molded Case 53.889 9.0 1.134 61.089 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-81 Molded Case 53.889 9.0 1.134 61.089 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-82 Molded Case 53.889 9.0 1.134 61.089 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-83 Molded Case 53.889 9.0 1.134 61.089 0.480 20.00 100.000 100.000
CB-84 Molded Case 53.889 9.0 1.134 61.089 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-2 InsulUnfuse 53.889 9.0 1.062 57.237 0.480 15.00 100.000 100.000
E1 0.480 CB-76 Molded Case 37.688 3.4 1.000 37.688 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
E2 0.480 CB-78 Molded Case 22.197 2.8 1.000 22.197 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
Project: ETAP Page: 13
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
E3 0.480 CB-80 Molded Case 21.549 2.3 1.000 21.549 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F 0.480 GEN 1 MAIN InsulUnfuse 6.190 14.9 1.142 7.072 0.480 15.00 65.000 65.000
CB-102 Molded Case 6.190 14.9 1.219 7.548 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-103 Molded Case 6.190 14.9 1.219 7.548 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-101 Molded Case 6.190 14.9 1.219 7.548 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F1 0.480 FUSE16 Fuse 44.756 8.8 1.129 50.521 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
CB-111 Molded Case 44.756 8.8 1.129 50.521 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-113 Molded Case 44.756 8.8 1.129 50.521 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-115 Molded Case 44.756 8.8 1.129 50.521 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB115A InsulUnfuse 44.756 8.8 1.058 47.335 0.480 15.00 100.000 100.000
F3 0.480 CB-113 Molded Case 44.756 8.8 1.129 50.521 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-114 Molded Case 44.756 8.8 1.129 50.521 0.480 20.00 35.000 35.000 *
F4 0.480 CB-112 Molded Case 13.161 2.1 1.000 13.161 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F5 0.480 CB-119 Molded Case 25.089 2.6 1.000 25.089 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-123 Molded Case 25.089 2.6 1.000 25.089 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-130 Molded Case 25.089 2.6 1.000 25.089 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-134 Molded Case 25.089 2.6 1.000 25.089 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-138 Molded Case 25.089 2.6 1.000 25.089 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-142 Molded Case 25.089 2.6 1.000 25.089 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-145 Molded Case 25.089 2.6 1.000 25.089 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F6 0.480 CB-116 Molded Case 5.815 0.9 1.000 5.815 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F7 0.208 CB-117 Molded Case 2.430 1.2 1.000 2.430 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-118 Molded Case 2.430 1.2 1.000 2.430 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F8 0.480 CB-120 Molded Case 5.103 0.8 1.000 5.103 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F9 0.208 CB-121 Molded Case 1.172 1.0 1.000 1.172 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-121A Molded Case 1.172 1.0 1.000 1.172 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
Project: ETAP Page: 14
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
F10 0.480 CB-123A Molded Case 11.046 1.1 1.000 11.046 0.480 20.00 100.000 100.000
F11 0.208 CB-125 Molded Case 2.650 1.3 1.000 2.650 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-126 Molded Case 2.650 1.3 1.000 2.650 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F12 0.480 CB-127 Molded Case 9.035 1.0 1.000 9.035 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F13 0.208 CB-128 Molded Case 1.224 1.1 1.000 1.224 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-129 Molded Case 1.224 1.1 1.000 1.224 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F14 0.208 CB-131 Molded Case 3.250 0.7 1.000 3.250 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
F15 0.208 CB-132 Molded Case 3.026 0.6 1.000 3.026 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-133 Molded Case 3.026 0.6 1.000 3.026 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F16 0.208 CB-135 Molded Case 2.394 0.9 1.000 2.394 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
F17 0.208 CB-136 Molded Case 2.274 0.9 1.000 2.274 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-137 Molded Case 2.274 0.9 1.000 2.274 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F18 0.208 CB-139 Molded Case 3.150 1.3 1.000 3.150 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
F19 0.208 CB-140 Molded Case 2.526 1.0 1.000 2.526 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-141 Molded Case 2.526 1.0 1.000 2.526 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F20 0.208 CB-143 Molded Case 3.045 1.1 1.000 3.045 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-144 Molded Case 3.045 1.1 1.000 3.045 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F21 0.208 CB-146 Molded Case 1.274 1.1 1.000 1.274 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-147 Molded Case 1.274 1.1 1.000 1.274 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F24 0.480 FUSE18 Fuse 39.399 2.4 1.000 39.399 0.600 20.00 200.000 200.000
FUSE17 Fuse 39.399 2.4 1.000 39.399 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE19 Fuse 39.399 2.4 1.000 39.399 0.600 20.00 200.000 200.000
F25 0.480 CB-148 Molded Case 30.047 1.4 1.000 30.047 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
F26 0.480 CB-149 Molded Case 36.301 2.3 1.000 36.301 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
F27 0.208 CB-153 Molded Case 6.670 2.2 1.000 6.670 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-150 Molded Case 6.670 2.2 1.000 6.670 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-151 Molded Case 6.670 2.2 1.000 6.670 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
F27A 0.480 FUSE20 Fuse 38.956 2.4 1.000 38.956 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
Project: ETAP Page: 15
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
F27A FUSE21 Fuse 38.956 2.4 1.000 38.956 0.600 20.00 200.000 200.000
F28 0.208 CB-152 Molded Case 3.231 1.2 1.000 3.231 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F29 0.208 CB-154 Molded Case 5.647 1.6 1.000 5.647 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F30 0.480 CB-155 Molded Case 31.730 1.6 1.000 31.730 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
F31 0.208 CB12 Molded Case 4.701 1.6 1.000 4.701 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-156 Molded Case 4.701 1.6 1.000 4.701 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F32 0.480 FUSE22 Fuse 38.519 2.3 1.000 38.519 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE23 Fuse 38.519 2.3 1.000 38.519 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
F33 0.208 CB-157 Molded Case 1.283 1.0 1.000 1.283 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
CB18 Molded Case 1.283 1.0 1.000 1.283 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
F34 0.480 CB-158 Molded Case 26.080 1.0 1.000 26.080 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
F35 0.480 FUSE24 Fuse 39.176 2.4 1.000 39.176 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE25 Fuse 39.176 2.4 1.000 39.176 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE26 Fuse 39.176 2.4 1.000 39.176 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
F36 0.480 CB-160 Molded Case 29.774 1.2 1.000 29.774 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
F37 0.480 CB-161 Molded Case 20.561 0.8 1.000 20.561 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
F39 0.208 CB-159 Molded Case 5.766 2.0 1.000 5.766 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-165 Molded Case 5.766 2.0 1.000 5.766 0.240 20.00 100.000 100.000
CB-166 Molded Case 5.766 2.0 1.000 5.766 0.240 20.00 100.000 100.000
CB-167 Molded Case 5.766 2.0 1.000 5.766 0.240 20.00 100.000 100.000
CB-168 Molded Case 5.766 2.0 1.000 5.766 0.240 20.00 100.000 100.000
F40 0.208 CB-162 Molded Case 5.482 1.8 1.003 5.497 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F41 0.208 CB-163 Molded Case 5.091 1.6 1.000 5.091 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F42 0.208 CB8 Molded Case 3.174 1.0 1.000 3.174 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-164 Molded Case 3.174 1.0 1.000 3.174 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F44 0.480 FUSE27 Fuse 38.519 2.3 1.000 38.519 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE29 Fuse 38.519 2.3 1.000 38.519 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE28 Fuse 38.519 2.3 1.000 38.519 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
F45 0.480 CB-169 Molded Case 16.888 1.2 1.000 16.888 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
F46 0.208 CB-170 Molded Case 10.194 3.4 1.000 10.194 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-174 Molded Case 10.194 3.4 1.000 10.194 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-173 Molded Case 10.194 3.4 1.000 10.194 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
Project: ETAP Page: 16
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
F46 CB-171 Molded Case 10.194 3.4 1.000 10.194 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-172 Molded Case 10.194 3.4 1.000 10.194 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
F50 0.208 CB-175 Molded Case 8.758 2.1 1.000 8.758 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F51 0.208 CB-178 Molded Case 7.103 2.5 1.053 7.481 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F52 0.208 CB-180 Molded Case 7.566 2.9 1.000 7.566 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F53 0.208 CB-182 Molded Case 3.811 1.0 1.000 3.811 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F54 0.208 CB-176 Molded Case 7.901 3.2 1.000 7.901 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-181 Molded Case 7.901 3.2 1.000 7.901 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-179 Molded Case 7.901 3.2 1.000 7.901 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-177 Molded Case 7.901 3.2 1.000 7.901 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
F55 0.480 CB-183 Molded Case 51.587 8.2 1.115 57.526 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-184 Molded Case 51.587 8.2 1.115 57.526 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-191 Molded Case 51.587 8.2 1.115 57.526 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
C-196 Molded Case 51.587 8.2 1.115 57.526 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-200 Molded Case 51.587 8.2 1.115 57.526 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-215 Molded Case 51.587 8.2 1.115 57.526 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-214 Molded Case 51.587 8.2 1.115 57.526 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-213 Molded Case 51.587 8.2 1.115 57.526 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-115B InsulUnfuse 51.587 8.2 1.045 53.899 0.480 15.00 100.000 100.000
F56 0.480 CB-185 Molded Case 25.101 1.5 1.000 25.101 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-187 Molded Case 25.101 1.5 1.000 25.101 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-189 Molded Case 25.101 1.5 1.000 25.101 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F57 0.480 CB-186 Molded Case 5.681 0.9 1.000 5.681 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F58 0.480 CB-188 Molded Case 6.298 0.8 1.000 6.298 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F59 0.480 CB-190 Molded Case 9.529 0.9 1.000 9.529 0.480 20.00 100.000 100.000
Project: ETAP Page: 17
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
F60 0.480 CB-194 Molded Case 27.733 2.6 1.000 27.733 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-192 Molded Case 27.733 2.6 1.000 27.733 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F61 0.480 CB-193 Molded Case 6.833 1.1 1.000 6.833 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F62 0.480 CB-195 Molded Case 6.631 1.8 1.000 6.631 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F63 0.480 CB-197 Molded Case 32.480 2.7 1.000 32.480 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-198 Molded Case 32.480 2.7 1.000 32.480 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F65 0.480 CB-199 Molded Case 17.654 1.5 1.000 17.654 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
F70 0.208 CB-201 Molded Case 10.826 4.0 1.000 10.826 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-205 Molded Case 10.826 4.0 1.000 10.826 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-208 Molded Case 10.826 4.0 1.000 10.826 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-211 Molded Case 10.826 4.0 1.000 10.826 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-212 Molded Case 10.826 4.0 1.000 10.826 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB202 Molded Case 10.826 4.0 1.000 10.826 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
F71 0.208 CB-203 Molded Case 3.478 1.2 1.000 3.478 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-204 Molded Case 3.478 1.2 1.000 3.478 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F72 0.208 CB-206 Molded Case 2.119 0.6 1.000 2.119 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-207 Molded Case 2.119 0.6 1.000 2.119 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
F73 0.208 CB-209 Molded Case 9.095 3.3 1.000 9.095 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-210 Molded Case 9.095 3.3 1.000 9.095 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F76 0.208 CB-243 Molded Case 10.672 3.9 1.000 10.672 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-240 Molded Case 10.672 3.9 1.000 10.672 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-237 Molded Case 10.672 3.9 1.000 10.672 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-234 Molded Case 10.672 3.9 1.000 10.672 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-231 Molded Case 10.672 3.9 1.000 10.672 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-228 Molded Case 10.672 3.9 1.000 10.672 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
Project: ETAP Page: 18
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
F76 CB-225 Molded Case 10.672 3.9 1.000 10.672 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-222 Molded Case 10.672 3.9 1.000 10.672 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-218 Molded Case 10.672 3.9 1.000 10.672 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-217 Molded Case 10.672 3.9 1.000 10.672 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-216 Molded Case 10.672 3.9 1.000 10.672 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
F77 0.208 CB-244 Molded Case 1.718 0.6 1.000 1.718 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-245 Molded Case 1.718 0.6 1.000 1.718 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F78 0.208 CB-241 Molded Case 1.992 0.6 1.000 1.992 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-242 Molded Case 1.992 0.6 1.000 1.992 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F79 0.208 CB-238 Molded Case 1.788 0.6 1.000 1.788 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-239 Molded Case 1.788 0.6 1.000 1.788 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F80 0.208 CB-235 Molded Case 3.633 0.8 1.000 3.633 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-236 Molded Case 3.633 0.8 1.000 3.633 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F81 0.208 CB-232 Molded Case 2.088 0.6 1.000 2.088 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-233 Molded Case 2.088 0.6 1.000 2.088 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F82 0.208 CB-229 Molded Case 5.037 1.0 1.000 5.037 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-230 Molded Case 5.037 1.0 1.000 5.037 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F83 0.208 CB-226 Molded Case 2.139 0.6 1.000 2.139 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-227 Molded Case 2.139 0.6 1.000 2.139 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F84 0.208 CB-223 Molded Case 3.170 1.1 1.000 3.170 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-224 Molded Case 3.170 1.1 1.000 3.170 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F85 0.208 CB219 Molded Case 4.614 1.3 1.000 4.614 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-220 Molded Case 4.614 1.3 1.000 4.614 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
F87 13.800 AL1 HV FUSE A Fuse 16.571 3.1 1.000 16.571 15.500 6.65 29.400 29.400
F88 13.800 AL1 HV FUSE B Fuse 16.466 3.1 1.000 16.466 15.500 6.65 29.400 29.400
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
G 0.480 CB-107 Molded Case 6.204 15.2 1.222 7.585 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-108 Molded Case 6.204 15.2 1.222 7.585 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-106 Molded Case 6.204 15.2 1.222 7.585 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-104 Molded Case 6.204 15.2 1.222 7.585 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
GEN 2 MAIN InsulUnfuse 6.204 15.2 1.145 7.106 0.480 15.00 65.000 65.000
CB-105 Molded Case 6.204 15.2 1.222 7.585 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
GEN 1 BUS 0.480 CB-GEN1 Molded Case 6.335 19.0 1.252 7.931 0.480 20.00 85.000 85.000
GEN 2 BUS 0.480 CB-GEN2 Molded Case 6.335 19.0 1.252 7.931 0.480 20.00 85.000 85.000
GEN 3 BUS 0.480 CB-GEN3 Molded Case 6.335 19.0 1.252 7.931 0.480 20.00 85.000 85.000
H 0.480 CB-109 Molded Case 6.219 15.6 1.226 7.622 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-110 Molded Case 6.219 15.6 1.226 7.622 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
GEN 3 MAIN InsulUnfuse 6.219 15.6 1.148 7.141 0.480 15.00 65.000 65.000
I1 13.800 FUSE30 Fuse 16.493 3.1 1.000 16.493 15.500 6.65 29.400 29.400
I2 13.800 FUSE31 Fuse 16.390 3.1 1.000 16.390 15.500 6.65 29.400 29.400
I3 0.480 FUSE 32 Fuse 43.112 9.0 1.133 48.842 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
CB-287 Molded Case 43.112 9.0 1.133 48.842 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-246 InsulUnfuse 43.112 9.0 1.061 45.762 0.480 15.00 100.000 100.000
I6 0.480 FUSE34 Fuse 40.568 5.7 1.034 41.955 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE 33 Fuse 40.568 5.7 1.034 41.955 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
I7 0.480 CB-248 Molded Case 28.442 1.3 1.000 28.442 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
I8 0.208 CB25 Molded Case 1.286 1.1 1.000 1.286 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-249 Molded Case 1.286 1.1 1.000 1.286 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
I9 0.480 FUSE35 Fuse 40.193 5.3 1.019 40.944 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE36 Fuse 40.193 5.3 1.019 40.944 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
I10 0.480 CB-250 Molded Case 33.663 2.4 1.000 33.663 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
I11 0.208 CB-251 Molded Case 10.880 4.2 1.000 10.880 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-257 Molded Case 10.880 4.2 1.000 10.880 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-258 Molded Case 10.880 4.2 1.000 10.880 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
Project: ETAP Page: 20
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
I11 CB-259 Molded Case 10.880 4.2 1.000 10.880 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-260 Molded Case 10.880 4.2 1.000 10.880 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-261 Molded Case 10.880 4.2 1.000 10.880 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
I12 0.208 CB-256 Molded Case 9.220 2.7 1.000 9.220 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
I13 0.208 CB-255 Molded Case 5.125 1.4 1.000 5.125 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
I14 0.208 CB-254 Molded Case 2.260 0.6 1.000 2.260 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
I15 0.208 CB-253 Molded Case 5.125 1.4 1.000 5.125 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
I16 0.208 CB21 Molded Case 3.988 0.8 1.000 3.988 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-252 Molded Case 3.988 0.8 1.000 3.988 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
I17 0.480 FUSE37 Fuse 39.819 5.0 1.004 39.993 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
I18 0.480 CB-262 Molded Case 27.900 1.3 1.000 27.900 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
I19 0.208 CB-264 Molded Case 5.784 2.0 1.000 5.784 0.240 20.00 100.000 100.000
CB-263 Molded Case 5.784 2.0 1.000 5.784 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-266 Molded Case 5.784 2.0 1.000 5.784 0.240 20.00 100.000 100.000
I20 0.208 CB-265 Molded Case 2.636 0.8 1.000 2.636 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
I21 0.208 CB-267 Molded Case 4.989 1.6 1.000 4.989 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
I22 0.480 FUSE41 Fuse 39.447 4.7 1.000 39.447 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE38 Fuse 39.447 4.7 1.000 39.447 0.600 20.00 200.000 200.000
FUSE39 Fuse 39.447 4.7 1.000 39.447 0.600 20.00 200.000 200.000
FUSE40 Fuse 39.447 4.7 1.000 39.447 0.600 20.00 200.000 200.000
I23 0.480 CB-268 Molded Case 29.565 2.3 1.000 29.565 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
I26 0.208 CB-273 Molded Case 10.056 2.9 1.000 10.056 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
I27 0.208 CB-271 Molded Case 5.379 1.0 1.000 5.379 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
I29 0.208 CB-278 Molded Case 6.979 2.6 1.055 7.364 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
I30 0.208 CB-280 Molded Case 3.120 1.2 1.000 3.120 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-281 Molded Case 3.120 1.2 1.000 3.120 0.240 20.00 22.000 22.000
I31 0.208 CB-283 Molded Case 6.979 2.6 1.055 7.364 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
I32 0.480 CB-276A Molded Case 31.351 1.6 1.000 31.351 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
I33 0.480 FUSE42 Fuse 40.380 5.5 1.026 41.442 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
FUSE43 Fuse 40.380 5.5 1.026 41.442 0.600 20.00 300.000 300.000
I34 0.208 CB284 Molded Case 1.286 1.1 1.000 1.286 0.240 30.00 18.000 18.000
CB-285 Molded Case 1.286 1.1 1.000 1.286 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
Project: ETAP Page: 21
12.0.0C
Location: Date:
Contract: SN:
Engineer: Revision: Base
Study Case: SC
Filename: Config.: Normal
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
I35 0.480 CB-286 Molded Case 28.305 1.3 1.000 28.305 0.480 30.00 14.000 14.000 *
I36 0.208 CB-291 Molded Case 7.080 2.2 1.000 7.080 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-296 Molded Case 7.080 2.2 1.000 7.080 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-289 Molded Case 7.080 2.2 1.000 7.080 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-290 Molded Case 7.080 2.2 1.000 7.080 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
I36A 0.480 CB-288 Molded Case 13.040 1.8 1.000 13.040 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
I37 0.208 CB-292 Molded Case 6.669 1.9 1.011 6.743 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
I38 0.208 CB-293 Molded Case 5.938 1.6 1.000 5.938 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
I39 0.208 CB-294 Molded Case 5.322 1.4 1.000 5.322 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
I40 0.208 CB-295 Molded Case 4.805 1.2 1.000 4.805 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
I43 0.208 CB-297 Molded Case 1.489 0.6 1.000 1.489 0.240 50.00 10.000 10.000
I44 0.480 CB-247 InsulUnfuse 51.629 8.3 1.046 53.982 0.480 15.00 100.000 100.000
FIRE PUMP BKR N Molded Case 51.629 8.3 1.116 57.615 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
I45 0.480 CB-299 Molded Case 23.847 2.5 1.000 23.847 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
I49 0.480 CB-304 Molded Case 15.358 2.2 1.000 15.358 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
I50 0.480 CB-303 Molded Case 51.629 8.3 1.116 57.615 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-302 Molded Case 51.629 8.3 1.116 57.615 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-301 Molded Case 51.629 8.3 1.116 57.615 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-300 Molded Case 51.629 8.3 1.116 57.615 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-298 Molded Case 51.629 8.3 1.116 57.615 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-305 Molded Case 51.629 8.3 1.116 57.615 0.480 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-247 InsulUnfuse 51.629 8.3 1.046 53.982 0.480 15.00 100.000 100.000
3-Phase Fault Currents: (Prefault Voltage = 100 % of the Bus Nominal Voltage)
I60 0.208 CB-307 Molded Case 24.527 5.5 1.025 25.151 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-314 Molded Case 24.527 5.5 1.025 25.151 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-312 Molded Case 24.527 5.5 1.025 25.151 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-315 Molded Case 24.527 5.5 1.025 25.151 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-313 Molded Case 24.527 5.5 1.025 25.151 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-311 Molded Case 24.527 5.5 1.025 25.151 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-309 Molded Case 24.527 5.5 1.025 25.151 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-310 Molded Case 24.527 5.5 1.025 25.151 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-308 Molded Case 24.527 5.5 1.025 25.151 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-306 InsulUnfuse 24.527 5.5 1.000 24.527 0.240 15.00 100.000 100.000
I61 0.208 CB-269 Molded Case 10.855 4.1 1.000 10.855 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-272 Molded Case 10.855 4.1 1.000 10.855 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-274 Molded Case 10.855 4.1 1.000 10.855 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-275 Molded Case 10.855 4.1 1.000 10.855 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-270 Molded Case 10.855 4.1 1.000 10.855 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
I62 0.208 CB-279 Molded Case 7.916 3.4 1.000 7.916 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-282 Molded Case 7.916 3.4 1.000 7.916 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-276 Molded Case 7.916 3.4 1.000 7.916 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
CB-277 Molded Case 7.916 3.4 1.000 7.916 0.240 20.00 65.000 65.000
134
Amps X 10 D3 (Nom. kV=0.48, Plot Ref. kV=0.48)
.5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 500 1K 3K 5K 10K
1K 1K
500
D3 D1 500
CB-6
300 Cutler-Hammer 300
HMDL
Size = 800 Amps
Thermal Trip = Fixed
Magnetic Trip = 5
100 100
50 50
30 30
CB-8 CB-7
Cutler-Hammer Cutler-Hammer
JD HKD
Size = 150 Amps Size = 400 Amps
Thermal Trip = Fixed Thermal Trip = Fixed
10 Magnetic Trip = 10 Magnetic Trip = 6.25 10
5 5
Seconds
Seconds
CB-9
Cutler-Hammer
3 3
HFD (2,3,4P)
Size = 30 Amps
Thermal Trip = Fixed
1 ATS-D1 1
CBL-6 - P
CBL-6
.5 9-1/C 300 .5
CBL-52 - P
CB-6
.3 D1 .3
CBL-51 - P
CB-7
CBL-51
6-1/C 3/0
.1 D2 .1
CB-8 - 3P
CB-8
.05 .05
CBL-52
CB-7 - 3P
3-1/C 1/0
D3
.03 CB-6 - 3P .03
CB-9 - 3P
CB-9
.01 .01
.5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 500 1K 3K 5K 10K
300 300
F55
100 100
C-196
C-196
50 Cutler-Hammer RMS 310 N (LSIG) 50
Seconds
ST Band = .3 (I^x)t = IN
3 Override = 65000 Amps 3
1 1
.5 .5
.3 .3
.1 .1
.05 .05
.03 .03
CB-115B
C-196 - 3P
- 3P
.01 .01
.5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 500 1K 3K 5K 10K
TRANS 32
CB-215
FLA F76
500 Cutler-Hammer RMS 310 N (LSIG) 500
Frame = 800 Plug = 600 Amps
LT Pickup = Fixed (600 Amps) F55
300 300
LT Band = Fixed
ST Pickup = 8X (4800 Amps) CB-215
ST Band = 200
Override = 14000 Amps
100 100
CB-216
Cutler-Hammer RMS 310 N (LSG)
Frame = 1250 Plug = 1000 Amps
50 LT Pickup = Fixed (1000 Amps) 50
LT Band = Fixed CBL-168
3-1/C 350
ST Pickup = 5X (5000 Amps)
30 30
ST Band = Fixed (I^x)t = IN TRANS 32
300 kVA
Override = 14000 Amps
TRANS 32
CBL-169
9-1/C 400
10 10
5 5
CB-216
Seconds
Seconds
3 3
F76
CB-217
1 1
CB-217 CBL-168 - P
.5 Cutler-Hammer .5
FD (2,3,4P)
Size = 225 Amps
.3 Thermal Trip = Fixed .3
CBL-169 - P
Magnetic Trip = Fixed
TRANS 32
Inrush
.1 .1
.05 .05
.03 .03
CB-216 - 3P
CB-217 CB-215 - 3P
.01 .01
.5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 500 1K 3K 5K 10K
500
I21
TRANS 35 I19 FUSE37 500
FLA CB-263
Cutler-Hammer
300 LD TRANS 35 300
113 kVA
Size = 350 Amps
Thermal Trip = Fixed
Magnetic Trip = 6.25
CB-263
CB-266
50 50
CBL-77
3-1/C 1/0
30 30
TRANS 35 I21
CB-266
Cutler-Hammer CB-267
HFD (2,3,4P)
10 10
Size = 150 Amps
Thermal Trip = Fixed
5 5
Seconds
Seconds
3 3
FUSE37
1 CB-267 1
Cutler-Hammer
Quicklag LowMag (1P)
.5 Size = 20 Amps .5
Thermal Trip = Fixed
Magnetic Trip = Fixed
.3 .3
CBL-77 - P
.1 .1
TRANS 35
Inrush
CB-266 - 3P
.05 .05
.03 .03
CB-263 - 3P
CB-267 - 3P FUSE37 - 3P
.01 .01
.5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 500 1K 3K 5K 10K
500
TRANS F70
31 500
FLA CB-200
CB-200
CBL-180
300 300
Cutler-Hammer RMS 310 N (LSIG) 6-1/C 350
CB-201
50 F70 50
CB-201
30
Cutler-Hammer CB-211
30
LD
Size = 500 Amps TRANS 31 CBL-184
3-1/C 4/0
Thermal Trip = Fixed
Magnetic Trip = 10
F74
10 10
5 5
CB-211
Seconds
Seconds
Cutler-Hammer
3 JD 3
1 1
.5 CBL-180 - P .5
CBL-184 - P
.3 .3
CBL-181 - P
.1 .1
TRANS 31
Inrush
.05 .05
CB-211 - 3P
.03 .03
CB-201 - 3P CB-200 - 3P
.01 .01
.5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 500 1K 3K 5K 10K
Amps X 100 F70A (Nom. kV=0.48, Plot Ref. kV=0.48) ETAP Star 12.0.0C