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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 201100, February 04, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MHODS USMAN Y GOGO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Assailed in the present notice of appeal is the Decision1 dated 30 June 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03942, which affirmed in toto the Decision2 dated 13 August 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila,
Branch 23 in Criminal Case No. 03-222096, finding accused-appellant Mhods Usman y Gogo (accused-appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under Sec. 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R. A. No. 9165) or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering
him to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

In an Information dated 22 December 2003,3 accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Art. II of R. A. No.
9165, as follows:chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary

That on or about December 17, 2003 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to
sell, trade, deliver or give away any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell zero point
zero six eight (0.068) grams of white crystalline substance containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride known as
“shabu,” a dangerous drug.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.4 chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

During pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following: (1) the identity of accused-appellant, (2) the jurisdiction of the
court, (3) the qualification of the expert witness, and (4) the genuineness of the documentary evidence submitted by the
prosecution.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

As culled from the records, the prosecution’s version of the facts was a combination of the testimonies of the officers: PO1
Joel Sta. Maria (PO1 Sta. Maria), PO2 Elymar Garcia, Irene Vidal, and PSI Judycel Macapagal (PSI Macapagal): chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

PO1 JOEL STA. MARIA testified in gist as follows: On December 17, 2003, he was assigned at the Anti Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Unit of Police Station No. 2. At around 11:00 o’clock in the morning of said date, while on duty at PS 2, a
male confidential informant came to their office and informed SPO3 Rolando del Rosario, their team leader, of the illegal
selling of shabu by a certain Mhods, a muslim at Isla Puting Bato. He heard them conversing as he was not far from
them. SPO3 del Rosario relayed the information to SAID Chief Nathaniel Capitanea who instructed the former to form a
team and to conduct a possible buy bust operation against the subject. A five-member team was at once formed
consisting of PO2 Elymar Garcia, SPO3 Rolando del Rosario, PO3 Ricardo Manansala, PO1 Erick Barias and the herein
witness. They agreed that they will buy P200.00 worth of shabu from the subject, who was later identified as the herein
accused. SPO3 del Rosario prepared the buy bust money consisting of two P100.00 bills with marking “RR”. He was
designated to act as poseur buyer so the marked bills were delivered to him by the team leader, SPO3 del Rosario. They
agreed likewise that the witness will immediately arrest the subject if the sale is consummated. A pre-operation report
was also prepared (Exh. “A”). Apart from the identity and the location of the subject Mhods, the confidential informant
described the former as wearing a skin head hair, well built body, fair complexion and wearing fatigue either pants or t-
shirt. They left the station at 3:15 p.m. and conveyed to the Isla Puting Bato on board an owner type jeep and scooter.
He rode in the owner type jeep with SPO3 del Rosario, PO3 Manansala, and the confidential informant arriving in the target
place at 3:35 p.m., as the jeep cannot passed (sic) through, he and the confidential informant rode a side car going to Isla
Puting Bato, thereafter they alighted from the pedicab and entered a small alley where they saw MHODS. Accused
approached the Confidential Informant and asked him if he is going to get, meaning if he is going to buy shabu. Instead of
answering, the confidential informant pointed to him who was beside him at that time. The herein witness showed the
marked money and the accused took them. Accused turned his back a little and got something from his right pocket and
passed to him a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. Upon receipt he grabbed the
accused and introduced himself as a police officer. He informed the accused of his constitutional rights and the law he
violated (Sec. 5 of RA 9165). Accused resisted but other policemen rushed to assist him. He kept possession of the
evidence from place of arrest and upon arriving in the police station, he marked the same with the accused’s initials “MUG”
(Exh. “B-1”). Thereafter, he turned over the stuff to the investigator Elymar Garcia, who in turn prepared a request for
laboratory examination (Exhibit “C”) and brought the same together to the crime laboratory for examination. After lab
test, the specimen was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride as borne in the Chemistry Report No. D2858-03
(Exhibit “D”). The arresting team executed an Affidavit of Apprehension (Exhibits “E” to “E-4”) and a Booking Sheet and
Arrest Report (Exhibit “F”). Subsequently, the case was referred for inquest proceedings on December 18, 2003 (Exhibit
“G”) for the filing of appropriate proceedings (TSNs dated August 30, 2005).

On cross-examination, witness said that it was the accused who actually initiated the buy bust operation by offering him
and the confidential informant to buy illegal drugs. After arrest, he did not mark the evidence in the area because the
accused was resisting and they do not know his name yet. They also did not prepare an inventory of seized items. On re-
cross, the witness said it was the investigator’s duty to prepare the inventory of seized item (TSNs dated February 2,
2006).

PO2 Elymar Garcia next took the witness stand and he corroborated the testimony of PO1 Joel Sta. Maria on material
points. He added that he acted merely as security perimeter and admitted that they did not follow the confidential
informant and the poseur buyer in Isla Puting Bato and just waited for the arrest of the accused. Thus, he did not see the
conduct of the buy bust operation. The poseur buyer handed the evidence to him at the police station after he marked the
same. He immediately prepared a request for laboratory examination and brought the same and the specimen at the
crime laboratory (TSNs dated Sept. 27, 2006).

The prosecution presented Irene Vidal, Records Custodian of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Her tesitmony
was dispensed with after the defense agreed to stipulate on the following material points, to wit: that she is in charge of
safekeeping records and evidence submitted to their office; that she has brought with her the two pieces 100 peso marked
bills with Serial Nos. BT670067 and EX15103, respectively (Exhibits “I” and “J”), subject matter of this case, and that she
has no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused.

On June 26, 2007, the testimony of PSI Judycel A. Macapagal was stipulated on by the prosecution and the defense
specifically the qualification and expertise of the forensic chemist, the authenticity and due execution of the letter request
for laboratory examination dated December 18, 2003 (Exh. “C”) and the Chemistry Report (Exhibit “D”). The defense
admitted the existence of small brown envelop (Exhibit “B”) and the specimen contained thereat which is one heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet marked “MUG” (Exh. “B-1”). It was also admitted that the laboratory examination on the
specimen yielded positive result for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drugs; that the Forensic Chemist has
brought the documents and specimen to Court. The prosecution in turn admitted that the Forensic Chemist has no
personal knowledge as to the source of the specimen as well as the person who caused the markings on the specimen. 6

In defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was a victim of frame-up by the arresting officers, to wit:7 chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

For his part, accused denied the allegations of the police officers and countered as a defense that he was framed up by the
arresting officers. He testified that he was, in fact, arrested between 2 to 3 PM on December 17, 2003 and not at 4PM of
said day. He was then inside the comfort room in his house when the policemen in civillian clothes entered and kicked the
door of the CR. The policemen ransacked his house and took his money which he borrowed from Uphill which was
intended for use in his business. When he got out of the restroom, he was handcuffed and taken to Police Station No. 2
where he was forced to admit selling shabu. He showed them his identification card to prove that he was engaged in a
legal trade, but the police did not heed his pleas. The team leader SPO1 del Rosario demanded P400,000.00 from him in
exchange of his freedom which he was not able to give. On cross, he said that he did not know the police officers prior to
his arrest and therefore there is no established motive for them to charge him falsely of such a grave offense. He
admitted that he is not a good subject of extortion.

Finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant, the RTC rendered a judgment
of conviction, viz.:8
chanroble svirtuallaw lib rary

WHEREFORE, with all the foregoing facts and conclusions, accused MHODS USMAN Y GOGO, is hereby found GUILTY of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in the manner stated in the Information and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The shabu, subject matter of this case, is hereby forfeited in favor of the STATE and is ordered turned over to the PDEA for
their appropriate destruction pursuant to existing Rules.

Accused-appellant appealed before the CA, assigning the following errors: chanRoblesvirtua lLaw lib rary

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SUBSEQUENT ARREST AS
ILLEGAL.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS’ RIGHTS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS
WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE VIOLATED.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS. 9

After a thorough review of the records, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision. The appellate court ruled that accused-
appellant’s arrest was valid because he was caught in flagrante delicto selling dangerous drugs, that all the elements of
illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs are present in the case at bar, that there was substantial compliance with the
legal requirements on the handling of the seized item, and that there was no proof to support accused-appelllant’s
allegation of frame-up. Thus, the CA held: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 13, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 23, Manila, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.10

Accused-appellant is now before the Court, re-pleading the arguments he raised before the CA. In particular, accused-
appellant claims that his warrantless arrest was illegal;11 that he was not apprised of his rights under Sections 2 and 3 of
R. A. No. 7438;12 and that there were serious lapses in the procedure mandated by R. A. No. 9165 in the handling of the
seized shabu, as well as non-compliance with the chain of custody rule, resulting in the prosecution’s failure to properly
identify the shabu offered in court as the same drugs seized from accused-appellant.13 chanroblesvi rtual lawlib rary

We dismiss the appeal.

To begin with, we hold that accused-appellant can no longer question the legality of his arrest. In People v. Vasquez,14 we
reiterated the rule that any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters
his plea on arraignment, and having failed to move for the quashal of the Information before arraignment, accused-
appellant is now estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Moreover, any irregularity was cured upon his
voluntary submission to the RTC’s jurisdiction.

In the same vein, the claim of accused-appellant that he was not apprised of the rights of a person taken into custody
under R. A. No. 7438, which claim was raised only during appeal and not before he was arraigned, is deemed waived. 15 chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary

Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs
to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful.16 chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

In People v. Loks,17 we acknowledged that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by
law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. Since accused-appellant was caught by the buy-bust team in
flagrante delicto, his immediate arrest was also validly made. The accused was caught in the act and had to be
apprehended on the spot.

Accused-appellant’s arrest being valid, we also hold that the subsequent warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from his
person is equally valid. The legitimate warrantless arrest also cloaks the arresting police officer with the authority to
validly search and seize from the offender those that may be used to prove the commission of the offense.18 chanroblesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

As to whether accused-appellant’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt, we rule in the affirmative.

In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the essential elements to be duly established for a successful prosecution of
offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like shabu, under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and payment therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked
money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the
transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.19 chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

The concurrence of said elements can be gleaned from the testimony of PO1 Sta. Maria: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry

xxxx
Q When the confidential informant saw Mhods Usman, what happened
next?
A He was approached by Mhods Usman and asked if we are going to
get.
Q At the time that Mhods Usman approached the confidential informant
and asked him “kung kukuha,” where were you then?
A I stood beside the confidential informant.
Q When Mhods Usman uttered the word (sic) “kung kukuha,” what did
you understand those words (sic)?
A This is the term used in buying shabu ma’am.
Q What is the answer of the confidential informant when asked by
Mhods Usman?
A I was pointed to and said HIM.
Q So when you were pointed to by the confidential informant, what
was the reaction of Mhods Usman?
A I showed him the marked money and he took it.
Q Once he took the money, what did he do next?
A He turned slightly and get (sic) something from his pocket and he
passed the plastic sachet containing undetermined amount of white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu.
Q What portion of the pocket of Mhods Usman did he take the plastic
sachet?
A Right pocket, ma’am.
Q After the plastic sachet was handed to you by Usman what did you
do next?
A When he passed to me the plastic sachet containing undetermined
amount of white crystalline substance, I immediately grabbed him
and introduced myself as police officer.
Q After you grabbed him and introduced yourself as police officer, what
did you tell him?
A I informed him of his constitutional rights and his possible
violation. 20
xxxx
Verily, all the elements for a conviction of illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs were proven by the prosecution:
PO1 Sta. Maria proved that a buy-bust operation actually took place, and that on such an occasion, accused-appellant was
apprehended delivering a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance to him, the poseur-buyer, in exchange of
P200.00. PO1 Sta. Maria retained possession of the seized substance until he was able to mark it in the police station with
accused-appellant’s initials (“MUG”), then turned it over to PO2 Garcia who prepared the request for laboratory
examination and brought the same to the crime laboratory, where PSI Macapagal later on confirmed that the substance
was methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. In open court, PO1 Sta. Maria positively identified accused-appellant as
the one who sold him the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, and he was also able to identify said sachet
as the same object sold to him by accused-appellant because of the initials (“MUG”) inscribed therein.

Accused-appellant raises the claim that no inventory was prepared, nor was a photograph taken of the small plastic sachet
allegedly recovered from him, and that, moreover, there was no representative from the media and the Department of
Justice, nor any elected public official who signed the copies of the inventory.21
chanroblesv irtuallaw lib rary

Indeed, as we held in People v. Torres,22 equally important in every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited
drugs is the presentation of evidence of the seized drug as the corpus delicti. The identity of the prohibited drug must be
proved with moral certainty. It must also be established with the same degree of certitude that the substance bought or
seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit. In this regard, paragraph 1, Section 21,
Article II of R. A. No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule) provides for safeguards for the protection of the identity and
integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:chanRoblesvirtua lLawl ib rary

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.

However, this Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not,
“as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.” The most important factor is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Hence, the prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs
as required under Article 21 of R. A. No. 9165, will not render the accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized from him
inadmissible.23chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary

The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of
the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R. A. No. 9165
on the handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary

Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. 24 (Italics, emphasis and underscoring omitted)

In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, PO1 Sta. Maria retained possession of the seized sachet until he was
able to properly mark it, then turned it over to PO2 Garcia who prepared the request for laboratory examination and
brought the same to the crime laboratory, where PSI Macapagal later on confirmed that the substance was
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The same sachet was positively identified by PO1 Sta. Maria in open court to
be the same item he confiscated from accused-appellant.

As to the fact that PO1 Sta. Maria was able to mark the seized sachet only at the police station, in People v. Loks,25 we
held that the marking of the seized substance immediately upon arrival at the police station qualified as a compliance with
the marking requirement. Such can also be said here in light of the fact that the reason why PO1 Sta. Maria was unable to
immediately mark the seized sachet was due to accused-appellant’s resistance to arrest and, as at that time, he did not
know accused-appellant’s name yet.

It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some
material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts and
the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during
trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on
this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable
error.26 In the case at bar, we see no justification for overturning the findings of fact of the RTC and CA.

Lastly, as to accused-appellant’s claim of frame-up, suffice it to say that in People v. Bartolome,27 we held that the fact
that frame-up and extortion could be easily concocted renders such defenses hard to believe. Thus, although drug-related
violators have commonly tendered such defenses to fend off or refute valid prosecutions of their drug-related violations,
the Court has required that such defenses, to be credited at all, must be established with clear and convincing evidence.

In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to ascribe, much less prove, any ill will or improper motive on the part of the
apprehending police officers. The accused-appellant admitted that he does not know said police officers prior to his arrest,
and that he is not aware of any established motive for them to charge him falsely of a grave offense. Moreover, accused-
appellant acknowledged that he is not a good subject for extortion. Thus, in the absence of any evidence of ill will or
improper motive, none is presumed to exist.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 149723


PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, Present:

PANGANIBAN, CJ., Chairperson,


- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR. and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
VICTOR KEITH
FITZGERALD, Promulgated:
Respondent. October 27, 2006

x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is the August 31, 2001 Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20431 which granted the Motion for Bail[2] of accused-appellant,
herein respondent Victor Keith Fitzgerald, (Fitzgerald).

The facts are of record.


An Information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
75, Olongapo City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 422-94, charged Fitzgerald,
an Australian citizen, with Violation of Art. III, Section 5, paragraph (a),
subparagraph (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610,[3] allegedly committed as
follows:

That sometime in the month of September 1993, in the City of Olongapo,


Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD, actuated by lust, and by the use of
laced drugs (vitamins) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induced complainant
AAA,[4] a minor, 13 years of age, to engage in prostitution by then and there
showering said AAA with gifts, clothes and food and thereafter having carnal
knowledge of her in violation of the aforesaid law and to her damage and
prejudice.[5]

After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a Decision dated May 7, 1996, the
decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Victor Keith Fitzgerald GUILTY beyond


reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Paragraph (a) sub-
paragraph 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, with all the accessory penalties attached therewith; and to
indemnify the private complainant AAA the amounts of P30,000.00 as moral
damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The Lingap Center of the Department of Social Welfare and Development


(DSWD) in Olongapo City shall hold in trust the said awards and dispose the
same solely for the rehabilitation and education of AAA, to the exclusion of her
mother and her other relatives.

The accused under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code shall be credited in full
of his preventive imprisonment if he has agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise to only
4/5 thereof.

Upon completion of the service of his sentence, the accused shall be deported
immediately and forever barred from entry to the Philippines.

In Criminal Case No. 419-94 for Rape, the accused is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.[6]
Fitzgerald applied for bail which the RTC denied in an Order dated August 1,
1996, which reads:

xxxx

In fine, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the Prosecution during the
hearing on the bail petition, the Court is of the considered view that the
circumstances of the accused indicate probability of flight and that there is undue
risk that the accused may commit a similar offense, if released on bail pending
appeal.

WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Petition for
Bail pending appeal is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[7]

Fitzgerald appealed to the CA which, in a Decision[8] dated September 27,


1999, affirmed the RTC Decision, thus:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, with the modification that the penalty imposed on the
accused-appellant is imprisonment of Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and
One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day of
Reclusion Perpetua, the decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[9]
Fitzgerald filed a Motion for New Trial[10] and a Supplemental to Accuseds
Motion for New Trial[11] on the ground that new and material evidence not
previously available had surfaced. The CA granted the Motion for New Trial in a
Resolution dated August 25, 2000, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appellants Motion for New Trial dated October 14, 1999 is
GRANTED. The original records of this case is hereby REMANDED to the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City Branch 75 who
is DIRECTED to receive the new evidence material to appellants defense within
sixty days from receipt and thereafter to submit to this Court the said evidence
together with the transcript of stenographic notes together with the records of
the case within ten (10) days after the reception of evidence. The Motion to
Transfer appellant to the National Penitentiary is DENIED.[12] (Emphasis ours)

The People (petitioner) filed a Motion for Reconsideration[13] from the August 25,
2000 CA Resolution while Fitzgerald filed a Motion to Fix Bail with
Manifestation.[14] Both Motions were denied by the CA in its November 13,
2000 Resolution.[15] In denying Fitzgeralds bail application, the CA held:

[T]his Court hereby RESOLVES to:

xxxx

2. DENY accused-appellants Motion to Fix Bail with Manifestation,


pursuant to the provisions of Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which
provides:

Sec. 7. Capital Offense or an offense punishable by


reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is
strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
criminal procecution.

In the case at bar, the maximum imposable penalty in accordance with Republic
Act 7610 otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act is reclusion perpetua. As it is, the
evidence of guilt is strong, hence, We hold that his motion for bail cannot be
granted at this point.

With regard to his alleged physical condition, let it be stressed that accused-
appellant is not precluded from seeking medical attention if the need arises
provided the necessary representations with the proper authorities are made.

SO ORDERED.[16] (Emphasis ours)

The People filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari[17] docketed as
G.R. No. 146008 questioning the August 25, 2000 and November 13, 2000 CA
Resolutions. The petition was dismissed in a Resolution[18] dated January 15, 2001,
which became final and executory on May 2, 2001.[19]

Meanwhile, on December 3, 2000, Fitzgerald filed with the CA a Motion for Early
Transmittal of the Records and for the Re-Examination of the Penalty Imposed,
and a Motion for Bail.[20] The People filed its Comment[21] to both Motions.

On August 31, 2001, the CA issued the herein assailed Resolution[22] granting
Fitzgeralds bail application, thus:

xxxx

Be that as it may, while We maintain that, as it is, the evidence of guilt is


strong, We have taken a second look at appellants plea for temporary liberty
considering primarily the fact that appellant is already of old age[23] and is not in
the best of health. Thus, it is this Courts view that appellant be GRANTED
temporary liberty premised not on the grounds stated in his Motion for Bail but
in the higher interest of substantial justice and considering the new trial granted in
this case. Accordingly, appellant is hereby DIRECTED to post a bail bond in the
amount of P100,000.00 for his temporary liberty provided he will appear in any
court and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof if and when required
to do so. The appellant is likewise refrained from leaving the country now or in
the future until this case is terminated. Accordingly, the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation is ORDERED to include appellant in its hold departure list xxx.

xxxx
SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis ours)

Thereafter, the RTC ordered Fitzgeralds temporary release on


September 4, 2001 upon his filing a cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00.[25]

Hence, the People filed this Petition to have the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution
annulled and set aside. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting respondent
Fitzgeralds Motion for Bail despite the fact that the latter was charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of his guilt is strong.[26] It also
questions the jurisdiction of the CA to act on said Motion, considering that the case
had been remanded to the RTC for new trial.[27]

In his Comment and Memorandum, respondent counters that the grant of new trial
negated the previous findings of the existence of strong evidence of his
guilt;[28] and justifies his provisional release on humanitarian grounds, citing as an
extraordinary circumstance his advanced age and deteriorating health.[29]

The petition is meritorious.

We resolve first the preliminary question of whether the CA, after issuing
its August 25, 2000 Resolution granting a new trial, still had jurisdiction to act on
respondents Motion to Post Bail. Our ruling on this matter, however, shall be
limitted to the effect of the August 25, 2000 CA Resolution on the latters
jurisdiction; it shall have no bearing on the merits of said Resolution as this has
been decided with finality in G.R. No. 146008.

According to petitioner, considering that the August 25, 2000 CA Resolution,


referring the case to the RTC for new trial, had become final and executory on
May 2, 2001 when this Court denied its petition for review in G.R. No. 146008,
then, when the CA issued the August 31, 2001 Resolution granting respondent bail,
it had been stripped of jurisdiction over the case.[30]

Petitioner is mistaken.
When this Court grants a new trial, it vacates both the judgment of the trial court
convicting the accused[31] and the judgment of the CA affirming it,[32] and remands
the case to the trial court for reception of newly-discovered evidence and
promulgation of a new judgment,[33] at times with instruction to the trial court to
promptly report the outcome.[34] The Court itself does not conduct the new trial for
it is no trier of facts.[35]

However, when the CA grants a new trial, its disposition of the case may differ,
notwithstanding Sec. 1,[36] Rule 125 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides for uniformity in appellate criminal procedure between this Court
and the CA. Unlike this Court, the CA may decide questions of fact and mixed
questions of fact and law.[37] Thus, when it grants a new trial under Sec. 14, Rule
124, it may either (a) directly receive the purported newly-discovered evidence
under Sec. 12,[38] or (b) refer the case to the court of origin for reception of such
evidence under Sec. 15.[39] In either case, it does not relinquish to the trial court
jurisdiction over the case; it retains sufficient authority to resolve incidents in the
case and decide its merits.

Now then, the CA, in its August 25, 2000 Resolution, ordered: first, the remand of
the original records of the case to the RTC; second, that the RTC receive the new
evidence material to appellants defense within 60 days from receipt of the original
records; and third, that the RTC submit to it the said evidence together with the
transcript of the case within 10 days after reception of evidence.[40] From the
foregoing dispostion, it is evident that the CA retained appellate jurisdiction over
the case, even as it delegated to the RTC the function of receiving the respondents
newly-discovered evidence. The CA therefore retained its authority to act on
respondents bail application. Moreso that the the original records of the case had
yet to be transmitted to the RTC when respondent filed his bail application and the
CA acted on it.

With that procedural matter out of the way, we now focus on the substantive
issue of whether the CA erred when it allowed respondent to bail.

The right to bail emenates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is


accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the
presumption of innocence he enjoys,[41] be allowed provisional liberty upon filing
of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required under
specified conditions.[42]

Implementing Sec. 13,[43] Article III of the 1987 Constitution, Sections


4[44] and 5, Rule 114 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth substantive
and procedural rules on the disposition of bail applications. Sec. 4 provides
that bail is a matter of right to an accused person in custody for an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,[45] but a matter of
discretion on the part of the court, concerning one facing an accusation for an
offense punishable by death,reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the
evidence of his guilt is strong.[46] As for an accused already convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or
revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the
circumstances under Sec. 5, paragraphs (a) to (e), to wit:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary Upon conviction by the Regional Trial


Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be
filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However,
if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed
with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same
bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six


(6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other
similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That
he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during
the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review
the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in
either case. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be recalled that herein respondent was charged with violation of
Section 5, par. (a), sub-paragraph (5), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a crime which
carries the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was later convicted by the
RTC for a lesser crime which carried a sentence of imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

These circumstances are not altered when the CA granted a new trial.[47] As
already discussed, the CA retained appellate jurisdiction over the case even as it
ordered the remand of the original records thereof to the RTC for reception of
evidence. In retaining appellate jurisdiction, it set aside only its own September 27,
1999 Decision but left unaltered the May 7, 1996 RTC Decision. In fact, in
its August 31, 2001 Resolution, the CA emphasized:

As we have pointed out earlier, the propriety of appellants conviction of the


offense charged as well as the penalty imposed thereto should be resolved during
the appreciation of the new trial after considering the new evidence which
appellant insist would prove his innocence.[48]

The May 7, 1996 RTC Decision, therefore, remained operative. And under
said Decision, respondent stood sentenced to an imprisonment term exceeding six
years.

Moreover, both the RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of the
existence of strong evidence of the guilt of respondent.[49] These findings were not
overturned when the CA granted a new trial. Under Section 6 (b), Rule 121, the
grant of a new trial allows for reception of newly-discovered evidence but
maintains evidence already presented or on record. And if there has been a finding
that evidence is strong and sufficient to bar bail, that too subsists unless, upon
another motion and hearing, the prosecution fails to prove that the evidence against
the accused has remained strong.[50] In the present case, no new evidence had since
been introduced, nor hearing conducted as would diminish the earlier findings of
the RTC and CA on the existence of strong evidenc against respondent.

In sum, the circumstances of the case are such, that for respondent, bail was
not a matter of right but a mere privilege subject to the discretion of the CA to be
exercised in accordance with the stringent requirements of Sec. 5, Rule
114. And Sec. 5 directs the denial or revocation of bail upon evidence of the
existence of any of the circumstances enumerated therein [51] such as
those indicating probability of flight if released on bail or undue risk that the
accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

As it is, however, the CA, in its August 31, 2001 Resolution, admitted
respondent to bail based, xxx not on the grounds stated in his Motion for Bail xxx,
but xxx primarily [on] the fact that [he] is already of old age and is not in the best
of health xxx, and notwithstanding its finding that xxx as it is, the evidence of guilt
is strong xxx.[52] The Resolution disregarded substantive and procedural
requirements on bail.

It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated
in the Motion filed by respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim
of the latters illness. Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or
prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is
not a ground for bail.[53] It may be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail for
prisoners who are seriously sick.[54] There may also be an existing proposition for
the selective decarceration of older prisoners based on findings that recidivism
rates decrease as age increases.[55] But, in this particular case, the CA made no
specific finding that respondent suffers from an ailment of such gravity that his
continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his
life in danger. It merely declared respondent not in the best of health even when
the only evidence on record as to the latters state of health is an unverified medical
certificate stating that, as of August 30, 2000, respondents condition required him
to xxx be confined in a more sterile area xxx.[56] That medical recommendation
was even rebuffed by the CA itself when, in its November 13, 2000 Resolution, it
held that the physical condition of respondent does not prevent him from seeking
medical attention while confined in prison.[57]

Moreover, there is a finding of record on the potential risk of respondent


committing a similar offense. In its August 1, 1996 Order, the RTC noted that
the circumstances of respondent indicate an undue risk that he would commit a
similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal.[58] The RTC explained its
findings thus:
Dr. Aida Muncada, a highly competent Psychiatrist, testified that
phedophilia is a state of sexual disorder and sexual dysfunction. It is intense and
recurrent. The possibility of the commission of a similar offense for which the
accused was convicted is great if the accused will be exposed to stress and if an
opportunity to commit it lurks.[59]

The foregoing finding was not traversed or overturned by the CA in its questioned
Resolution. Such finding, therefore, remains controlling. It warranted the outright
denial of respondents bail application. The CA, therefore, erred when it granted
respondents Motion for Bail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 31, 2001 CA


Resolution ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The bail bond posted by respondent
is CANCELLED. Let an ORDER OF ARREST ISSUE against the person of the
accused, Victor Keith Fitzgerald.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified


that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola with Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino, Bienvenido L. Reyes,
and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring and Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, dissenting.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 31-33.
[3]
Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not
limited to, the following:
xxxx
(5) Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with the intent to engage
such child in prostitution.
[4]
Per People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006 and Resolution dated September 19, 2006 in
A.M. No. 04-11-09-SC.
[5]
Records I, pp. 1-2.
[6]
Id. at 603-604.
[7]
Id. at 692.
[8]
Penned by Associate Justice Eubolo G. Verzola with Associate Justices Artemio G. Tuquero and Elvi John S.
Asuncion, concurring.
[9]
Records II, p. 806.
[10]
Rollo, p. 85.
[11]
Id. at 89.
[12]
Id. at 111.
[13]
Id. at 112.
[14]
Id. at 119.
[15]
Id. at 129.
[16]
Id. at 130-131.
[17]
Id. at 246.
[18]
Id. at 264.
[19]
Id. at 268.
[20]
Id. at 134.
[21]
Id. at 139.
[22]
See note 2.
[23]
70 years old, per Medical Certificate dated August 30, 2000, rollo, p. 124.
[24]
Id. at 32-33.
[25]
Id. at 144.
[26]
Id. at 16-24.
[27]
Id. at 25.
[28]
Id. at 152-153; 230-233.
[29]
Id. at 234-235.
[30]
Id. at 16-25.
[31]
Callagan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 153414, June 27, 2006.
[32]
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 206 (1997).
[33]
People of the Philippines v. Almendras; 449 Phil. 587, 611 (2003); People of the Philippines v. Del Mundo, 330
Phil. 824 (1996).
[34]
People of the Philippines v. Datu, 445 Phil. 754, 769 (2003).
[35]
Ruiz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 160893, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 476, 484.
[36]
Sec. 1. Uniform procedure. Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution and by law, the procedure in the
Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court of Appeals.
[37]
Suarez v. Judge Martin S. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 124512, June 27, 2006.
[38]
Sec. 12. Power to receive evidence. The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases (a) falling
within its original jurisdiction; (b) involving claims for damages arising from provisional remedies, or (c)
where the court grants a new trial only on the ground of newly-discovered evidence.
[39]
Sec. 15. Where new trial conducted. When a new trial is granted, the Court of Appeals may conduct the hearing
and receive evidence as provided in Section 12 of this Rules or refer the trial to the court of origin.
[40]
Supra note 12.
[41]
THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 643- 644 (1927).
[42]
Obosa v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 254, 269 (1997); People of the Philippines v. Presiding Judge, RTC
of Muntinlupa City (Branch 276), G.R. No. 151005, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 319, 324.
[43]
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
[44]
Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right,
with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after
conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
[45]
Catiis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153979, February 9, 2006, 482 SCRA 71, 84; People of the Philippines v.
Presiding Judge, RTC of Muntinlupa City (Branch 276), supra note 42.
[46]
Section 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Sec. 7, Rule 114.
[47]
People of the Philippines v. Bocar, 97 Phil. 398 (1955).
[48]
See note 2.
[49]
See notes 3, 7 and 16.
[50]
Obosa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 42, at 268, citing Dela Camara v. Enage, 148-B Phil. 502, 506-507
(1971).
[51]
Alva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157331, April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA 146, 161-162.
[52]
See note 2.
[53]
Re: Release of accused by Judge Muro, in a Non-Bailable Offense, 419 Phil. 567, 581 (2001); People of the
Philippines v. Hon. Ireneo Gako, 401 Phil. 514, 541 (2000).
[54]
Ernesto Pineda, The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, p. 193 (2003), citing Dela Rama v. Peoples Court, 77
Phil. 461, 465 (1946); Archers case, 6 Gratt 705; and Ex parte Smith, 2 Okla. Crim. Rep. 24, 99 Pfc. 893.
[55]
Max Rothman, Burton Dunlop and Pamela Entzel, Elders, Crime and the Criminal Justice System, pp. 233-234
(2000).
[56]
Records II, p. 897.
[57]
See note 15.
[58]
See note 7.
[59]
Id.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; In People v. Vasquez, 714 SCRA 78 (2014), the Supreme
Court (SC) reiterated the rule that any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea on arraignment, and having failed to move for the quashal of the
Information before arraignment, accused-appellant is now estopped from questioning the legality of his
arrest.—To begin with, we hold that accused-appellant can no longer question the legality of his arrest.
In People v. Vasquez, 714 SCRA 78 (2014), we reiterated the rule that any objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment, and
having failed to move for the quashal of the Information before arraignment, accused-appellant is now
estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Moreover, any irregularity was cured upon his
voluntary submission to the RTC’s jurisdiction. In the same vein, the claim of accused-appellant that he
was not apprised of the rights of a person taken into custody under R.A. No. 7438, which claim was
raised only during appeal and not before he was arraigned, is deemed waived.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Shabu; Elements of.—In a catena of cases, this Court
laid down the essential elements to be duly established for a successful prosecution of offenses
involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like shabu, under Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the
illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction or
sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. People vs. Usman, 749 SCRA
680, G.R. No. 201100 February 4, 2015

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked
or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Supreme Court (SC)
will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during
trial.—It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or
misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the
trial court’s assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better
position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual
findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there
is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error. In
the case at bar, we see no justification for overturning the findings of fact of the RTC and CA.

People vs. Usman, 749 SCRA 680, G.R. No. 201100 February 4, 2015

Criminal Procedure; Bail; The right to bail emanates from the right to be presumed innocent. It is
accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he
enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any
court, as required under specified conditions.—The right to bail emanates from the right to be
presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the
presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee
his appearance before any court, as required under specified conditions.

Same; Same; If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist,
quasirecidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.—If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist,
quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.

Same; Same; Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care
outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is
for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick.—Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged
detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a
ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously
sick. There may also be an existing proposition for the “selective decarceration of older prisoners” based
on findings that recidivism rates decrease as age increases. People vs. Fitzgerald, 505 SCRA 573, G.R. No.
149723 October 27, 2006

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