1) COSCO PHILIPPINES SHIPPING V. KEMPER INSURANCE COMPANY, G.R. NO.
COSCO filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the same was filed by one Atty. Rodolfo A.
179488, APRIL 23, 2012 - DE LA PAZ
COSCO PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC., Petitioner, vs. KEMPER INSURANCE
COMPANY, Respondent.
EMERGENCY DIGEST: Kemper filed a case against Cosco for Insurance Loss and
Damages. Cosco filed a MTD on the ground that Atty Lat was not properly authorized to bring
suit on behalf of Kemper (not authorized to sign the CNFS). The RTC granted the MTD and
dismissed the case without prejudice. The CA set aside and reversed the RTC stating the
circumstances warranted a liberal application of the rules. The SC decided that Atty Lat was not
properly authorized to bring suit because there was no board resolution giving him capacity to
represent the corporation.
Doctrine: A corporation has no power, except those expressly conferred on it by the
Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation
exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and
agents. Thus, it has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in
any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. In
turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed
only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a
specific act of the board of directors.
COMPLETE DIGEST
Facts: Kemper Insurance Company is a foreign insurance company based in Illinois, United
States of America (USA) with no license to engage in business in the Philippines, as it is not
doing business in the Philippines, except in isolated transactions; while Cosco Philippines is a
domestic shipping company organized in accordance with Philippine laws.
In 1998, Kemper insured the shipment of imported frozen boneless beef (owned by Genosi,
Inc.), which was loaded at a port in Brisbane, Australia, for shipment to Genosi, Inc. (the
importer-consignee) in the Philippines. However, upon arrival at the Manila port, a portion of
the shipment was rejected by Genosi, Inc. by reason of spoilage arising from the alleged
temperature fluctuations of petitioner's reefer containers. Kemper paid the claim of Genosi.
Kemper then made demands upon Cosco for satisfaction of the subrogated claim. Cosco failed
and refused to pay the said amount.
RTC: KEMPER filed a Complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages against COSCO.
Respondent alleged that despite repeated demands to pay and settle the total amount of
US$64,492.58, representing the value of the loss, COSCO failed and refused to pay the same,
thereby causing damage and prejudice in the amount of US$64,492.58.
COSCO in its Answer insisted, among others, that KEMPER had no capacity to sue since it was
doing business in the Philippines without the required license; that the complaint has prescribed
and/or is barred by laches; that no timely claim was filed; that the loss or damage sustained by
the shipments, if any, was due to causes beyond the carrier's control and was due to the inherent
nature or insufficient packing of the shipments and/or fault of the consignee or the hired
stevedores or arrastre operator or the fault of persons whose acts or omissions cannot be the
basis of liability of the carrier; and that the subject shipment was discharged under required
temperature and was complete, sealed, and in good order condition.
Page 1 of 22
Lat, who failed to show his authority to sue and sign the corresponding certification against
forum shopping. It argued that Atty. Lat's act of signing the certification against forum shopping
was a clear violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
RTC granted the MTD and dismissed the case without prejudice, ruling that it is mandatory that
the certification must be executed by the petitioner himself, and not by counsel. Since
respondent's counsel did not have a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to act on its behalf, hence,
the certification against forum shopping executed by said counsel was fatally defective and
constituted a valid cause for dismissal of the complaint. RTC denied the MR.
CA reversed and set aside the trial court's order. The CA ruled that the required certificate of
non-forum shopping is mandatory and that the same must be signed by the plaintiff or principal
party concerned and not by counsel; and in case of corporations, the physical act of signing
may be performed in behalf of the corporate entity by specifically authorized individuals.
However, the CA pointed out that the factual circumstances of the case warranted the
liberal application of the rules and, as such, ordered the remand of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings. CA denied the MR.
Hence, the case to this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
Issue (pleadings): WON Atty Rodolfo Lat was properly authorized to sign the Certificate
against Forum Shopping? NO.
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, dated March 23, 2007 and September 3, 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
75895 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, dated March
22, 2002 and July 9, 2002, respectively, in Civil Case No. 99-95561, are REINSTATED.SO
ORDERED.
Ratio: The petition is meritorious.
We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the
principal parties. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing
on his behalf must have been duly authorized. With respect to a corporation, the certification
against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer
who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document. A
corporation has no power, except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and
those that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers
through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, it has been
observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with
the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the
corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons
duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of
directors.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines
(FASAP): only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of a corporation. We also required proof of such
authority to be presented. The petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted
unaccompanied by proof of the signatory's authority.
In the present case, since respondent is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an
officer or member of the board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of
the board of directors; otherwise, the complaint will have to be dismissed. The lack of
certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the
complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. The same rule
applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation
which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file the complaint on
behalf of the corporation.
There is no proof that respondent, a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat, through a
board resolution, to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping on its
behalf. Accordingly, the certification against forum shopping appended to the complaint is
fatally defective, and warrants the dismissal of respondent's complaint for Insurance Loss
and Damages (Civil Case No. 99-95561) against petitioner.
Contrary to the CA's finding, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case do not
necessitate the relaxation of the rules. There was no proof of authority submitted, even
belatedly, to show subsequent compliance with the requirement of the law. Neither was
there a copy of the board resolution or secretary's certificate subsequently submitted to
the trial court that would attest to the fact that Atty. Lat was indeed authorized to file said
complaint and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, nor did
respondent satisfactorily explain why it failed to comply with the rules. Thus, there exists
no cogent reason for the relaxation of the rule on this matter. Obedience to the
requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom, and
utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of
liberal construction.
Moreover, the SPA dated May 11, 2000, submitted by respondent allegedly authorizing Atty.
Lat to appear on behalf of the corporation, in the pre-trial and all stages of the proceedings,
signed by Brent Healy, was fatally defective and had no evidentiary value. It failed to establish
Healy's authority to act in behalf of respondent, in view of the absence of a resolution from
respondent's board of directors or secretary's certificate proving the same. Like any other
corporate act, the power of Healy to name, constitute, and appoint Atty. Lat as
respondent's attorney-in-fact, with full powers to represent respondent in the proceedings,
should have been evidenced by a board resolution or secretary's certificate.
Respondent's allegation that petitioner is estopped by laches from raising the defect in
respondent's certificate of non-forum shopping does not hold water.
In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, we held that if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the
plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized
complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff. Accordingly, since
Atty. Lat was not duly authorized by respondent to file the complaint and sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping, the complaint is considered not filed
and ineffectual, and, as a necessary consequence, is dismissable due to lack of jurisdiction.
Page 2 of 22
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice; that is, for
hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the
merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a
party should first be subjected to the court's jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint
was ever filed with the RTC, Branch 8, Manila, the same did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of respondent. Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and
respondent, petitioner is not estopped from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction, even at the
pre-trial stage of the proceedings. This is so because the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
The factual setting attendant in Sibonghanoy is not similar to that of the present case so as to
make it fall under the doctrine of estoppel by laches. Here, the trial court's jurisdiction was
questioned by the petitioner during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, and it cannot be said
that considerable length of time had elapsed for laches to attach.
2) IGLESIA NI KRISTO V. PONFERRADA, G.R. NO. 168943, OCTOBER 27, 2006 –
GERALDEZ
Emergency: SANTOS HEIRS filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and/or Accion
Reinvindicatoria against Iglesia ni Cristo (INC). They allege that their father owned it since
1961 up to his death in 1970, at which point, they continued to possess the property. Enrique G.
Santos alone, in behalf of his family, signed the verification and CNFS. INC filed an MTD
wherein they argue that all plaintiffs should have signed and that Enrique has no proof of
authorization. Santos Heirs argue that a co-ownership is fiduciary in character, and as such, any
co-owner can sue in behalf of the others without express authorization.
HELD: RTC, CA, SC all rule for Santos Heirs. The verification requirement is deemed
substantially complied with when, as in the present case, only one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who
has sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition
(complaint), signed the verification attached to it. The same liberality applies to the sole signing
of a CNFS. In a line of cases, the Court applied the rule on substantial compliance because of
the commonality of interest of all the parties with respect to the subject of the controversy.
Anent the issue of authority, it need not be express when a co-owner institutes a suit for the
benefit of all. (There is also an allegation of prescription, but all courts also held that there was
no prescription yet).
Facts:
1. On October 24, 2001, Alicia, Alfredo, Roberto, Enrique and Susan, all surnamed
Santos, and Sonia Santos-Wallin, represented by Enrique G. Santos (SANTOS
HEIRS), filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and/or Accion Reinvindicatoria
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City against the Iglesia Ni Cristo
(INC).
2. SANTOS HEIRS allege that their father owned the 936 sq.m. property located in
Tandang Sora, QC. It was covered by a TCT issued by the RD on July 27, 1961. He
had been in continuous, open, adverse, and peaceful possession until his death in
1970. He was survived by his wife and children, petitioners herein, and they
continued such possession.
3. In 1988, the RD of QC burned. SANTOS HEIRS had the title reconstituted based on
the duplicate.
 4. Sometime in 1996, SANTOS HEIRS that INC was claiming ownership of the
property. INC had its own TCT, issued in 1984.
5. In 1996, SANTOS HEIRS fenced the property. Ultimately, however, INC deprived of
the final use and enjoyment of their property.
6. In the complaint filed in 2001, only Enrique G. Santos, representing his family
members, signed the Verification and the Certification of non-forum shopping.
7. INC moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
a. Failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
i. Only Enrique Santos signed the Verification and the CNFS. Even
assuming he represented his co-plaintiffs, there is no showing that
he was expressly authorized.
b. the action (either Quieting of Title or Accion Reinvindicatoria) had
prescribed
i. The action was filed in 2001, and INC argues that it should’ve
been filed within 10 years from 1984, the date appearing in their
title.
8. SANTOS HEIRS commented that the relation of a co-owner to the other co-owners is
fiduciary; thus, anyone could effectively act for the other without any authorization.
Also, they argue prescription should be reckoned from 1996, when their possession of
the property was disturbed.
9. RTC denied INC’s motion to dismiss. It ruled for SANTOS HEIRS, saying that the
certification signed by one with respect to a property over which he shares a common
interest with the rest of the plaintiffs (respondents herein) substantially complied with
the Rules.
10. INC files Certiorari with CA. CA affirms RTC.
11. INC files Petition for Review on Certiorari with SC.
Issues and Held:
1. w/n the CNFS signed by Enrique G. Santos alone is a substantial compliance with
Sec. 5, Rule 7. – YES.
2. w/n the action had already prescribed. – NOPE. (*irrelevant).
CA Affirmed.
Ratio:
The purpose of verification is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition
(or complaint) have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative.
This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance
therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal,
not a jurisdictional requirement.
The issue in the present case is not the lack of verification but the sufficiency of one executed
by only one of plaintiffs. This Court held in Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, that the
verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the present case,
only one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who has sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the petition (complaint), signed the verification attached to it. Such
verification is deemed sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative.
The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum shopping. The
general rule is that the certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of
only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed in a number of cases that
Page 3 of 22
the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with
respect to the contents of the certification.
The substantial compliance rule has been applied by this Court in a number of cases. [xxx] It is
noteworthy that in all of the above cases, the Court applied the rule on substantial compliance
because of the commonality of interest of all the parties with respect to the subject of the
controversy.
Applying the doctrines laid down in the above cases, we find and so hold that the CA did not
err in affirming the application of the rule on substantial compliance. In the instant case, the
property involved is a 936-square-meter real property. Both parties have their respective TCTs
over the property. Respondents herein who are plaintiffs in the case below have a common
interest over the property being the heirs of the late Enrique Santos, the alleged registered
owner of the subject property as shown in one of the TCTs. As such heirs, they are considered
co-owners pro indiviso of the whole property since no specific portion yet has been adjudicated
to any of the heirs. Consequently, as one of the heirs and principal party, the lone signature of
Enrique G. Santos in the verification and certification is sufficient for the RTC to take
cognizance of the case. The commonality of their interest gave Enrique G. Santos the authority
to inform the RTC on behalf of the other plaintiffs therein that they have not commenced any
action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, and that there is no other
pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Hence, the RTC
correctly denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner.
Considering that at stake in the present case is the ownership and possession over a prime
property in Quezon City, the apparent merit of the substantive aspects of the case should be
deemed as a special circumstance or compelling reason to allow the relaxation of the rule.
Anent the issue of the authority of Enrique G. Santos to represent his co-heirs/co-plaintiffs, we
find no necessity to show such authority. As such co-owners, each of the heirs may properly
bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery
of possession of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even
without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.
We uphold the validity of the complaint because of the following circumstances: (1) the caption
of the instant case is Heirs of Enrique Santos v. Iglesia ni Cristo, (2) the opening statement of
the complaint states that plaintiffs are the heirs of Enrique Santos and likewise names the
particular heirs of the latter who instituted the complaint below; (3) the case involves a property
owned by the predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs therein; and (4) the verification signed by
Enrique G. Santos clearly states that he is one of the children of the late Enrique Santos and that
he represents the heirs of said Enrique Santos.
On the issue of prescription of action (irrelevant)
The owner of a real property, as plaintiff, is entitled to the relief of quieting of title even if, at
the time of the commencement of his action, he was not in actual possession of real property.
After all, under Article 477 of the New Civil Code, the owner need not be in possession of the
property.
Admittedly, Santos Heirs interposed the alternative reinvindicatory action against INC. An
accion reinvindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that the actual and material possession
of the property is on defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery of such possession from
defendant. It bears stressing that an accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking the recovery of
ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as well. It is an action
whereby a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full
possession. Thus, the owner of real property in actual and material possession thereof may file
an accion reinvindicatoria against another seeking ownership over a parcel of land including
jus vindicandi, or the right to exclude defendants from the possession thereof. In this case,
respondents filed an alternative reinvindicatory action claiming ownership over the property
and the cancellation of TCT No. 321744 under the name of petitioner. In fine, they sought to
enforce their jus utendi and jus vindicandi when petitioner claimed ownership and prevented
them from fencing the property.
Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property when they filed their
complaint against petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive period for the reinvindicatory
action had not even commenced to run, even if petitioner was able to secure TCT No. 321744
over the property in 1984.
3) NARCISO V. PACIFIC TRADERS, G.R. NO. 194176, SEPTEMBER 10, 2014 – VADA!
Facts:
Who are the parties?
Petitioners were the employees of Pacific Traders Manufacturing Corporation (PTMC), a
domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing furniture and fixtures for
export.
They were hired on different dates from 1999 to 2002 and in various capacities such as framer,
attacher, finisher, assembler, etc.
Tabok Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TWMPC) is a cooperative duly registered with the
Cooperative Development Authority among the purposes of which is "to engage in job out
works of rattan and wood companies to the Pacific Rattan Manufacturing Corporation and other
manufacturing companies."
Source
The present controversy arose when the petitioners filed in 2004, complaints for illegal
dismissal with money claims against PTMC and TWMPC before the Regional Arbitration
Branch,
Narciso et al’s allegations
The petitioners alleged that they were regular employees of PTMC. Sometime in 2000, PTMC
referred them to TWMPC in view of PTMC's refusal to sign a casual or probationary
employment contract with them.
- They claimed to have been treated indifferently by TWMPC and were not given the proper
labor benefits.
- When they reported the matter to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
TWMPC terminated them from employment without just or authorized cause.
PTMC’s denials
PTMC denied that the petitioners were its regular employees and instead claimed that they were
hired on a contractual or casual basis to meet the volume of orders from its foreign buyers
which can no longer be accommodated by its regular employees.
- The petitioners were assigned to PTMC by TWMPC, one of its] legitimate job contractors.
Page 4 of 22
- PTMC asserted that the petitioners were paid all the salaries and benefits due them under the
law and when their contracts expired, they voluntarily executed "Releases and Quitclaims."
- PTMC also averred that when it found out about the petitioners' illegal dismissal complaint,
it had long terminated its relations with them.
Tabok’s side
TWMPC confirmed that the petitioners were its bonafide members.
- They agreed to work on specific works on particular job orders contracted by TWMPC with
different companies.
- Sometime in 2004, TWMPC's Board of Directors contemplated to try a "pakyaw system"
instead of the per hour system of compensation.
- After being informed of such plan, the petitioners disagreed.
The disagreement was eventually settled when the petitioners verbally acquiesced to withdraw
their membership from TWMPC provided they will be paid separation pay and other amounts
they were entitled to receive as cooperative members.
- Despite this verbal agreement, however, the petitioners filed complaints before the DOLE
and the NLRC RAB-VII.
- The DOLE case was later on dismissed upon an amicable settlement between the petitioners
and TWMPC.
LA Ruling
The complaints before the NLRC RAB-VII were consolidated and jointly resolved by the
Labor Arbiter13 (LA) in its Decision dated July 21, 2005.
- The LA ruled that the petitioners were not illegally dismissed.
- However, TWMPC was directed to pay their separation pay as well as the amount of
benefits due them as members of the cooperative.
The LA declared that the petitioners were not employees of PTMC which was accordingly
discharged from any liability. The LA dismissed the petitioners' money claims for lack of
factual basis.
NLRC Ruling
The petitioners and TWMPC appealed to the NLRC.
- The NLRC dismissed both appeals outright for failure to attach the requisite
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.
- The NLRC reasoned that appeal is a mere statutory privilege and the period and manner for
its perfection are not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.
NLRC Ruling on MR
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing order.
They also submitted a Motion to Admit Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping pleading for a
liberal application of procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice. The NLRC denied
reconsideration.
The petitioners persisted in their cause and elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC.
CA Decision (assailed)
The CA dismissed the petition upon finding that the petitioners failed to file the certificate of
non-forum shopping within the reglementary period of filing a Memorandum of Appeal.
- Instead, they belatedly submitted the same in their motion for reconsideration of the NLRC
resolution dismissing their appeal.
- The CA also ruled that the petitioners failed to cite any compelling reason which will
warrant a relaxation of procedural rules.
- The CA stressed that the petitioners were not denied their right to appeal because it is
actually a mere statutory privilege which must be perfected in the manner provided by law.
- The CA reiterated the NLRC's ruling that rules on perfection of appeal are not only
mandatory but jurisdictional as well.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied in the CA Resolution
dated September 30, 2010.
Hence, the present appeal arguing, in the main, that the CA erred in "strictly applying the
requirement of certificate of non-forum shopping despite the presence of highly exceptional
situation.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that "the findings of the NLRC are generally binding and
should be treated with finality.
- The CA only looks at the facts to determine if a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions acted
- without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
- with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in appreciating
the facts."
Hence, in ruling on the correctness of the CA's review of the NLRC decision, this Court is
confined to a review of the case solely on pure questions of law.
We are tasked to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled
upon was presented;
- we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the
basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct.
In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a
review on appeal, of the challenged NLRC decision.
In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?
Grave abuse of discretion connotes utter absence of any basis for the NLRC ruling.
The attendant facts and records on hand show otherwise.
Page 5 of 22
A certificate of non-forum shopping is a requisite for the perfection of an appeal.
This is clearly enunciated in Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC (2005 NLRC Rules), thus:
Sec. 4. Requisites For Perfection Of Appeal. - a) The appeal shall be:
1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule;
2) verified by the appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, as amended;
3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the
arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the
appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order;
4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and
5) accompanied by i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; ii) posting of a cash or
surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; iii) a certificate of non-forum shopping;
and iv) proof of service upon the other parties. (Emphasis, italics and underscore ours)
The petitioners aver that the CA should have granted their petition for certiorari and relaxed the
NLRC Rules of Procedure because on page 53 of their memorandum on appeal is the caption
"Verification and Certification."
- However, the counsel for the petitioners inadvertently deleted the paragraphs intended
for the certification of non-forum shopping.
- They assert that they were in a hurry in preparing the memorandum due to the very
limited time of 10 days to file the same.
They proffer these as justifiable causes for their non-compliance with the NLRC Rules of
Procedure and submit that their belated filing of the certificate in their motion for
reconsideration was substantial compliance.
They further aver that the outright dismissal of their appeal on a mere technicality would
seriously impair the orderly administration of justice.
The petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit.
The subsequent compliance with the requirement does not excuse a party's failure to comply
therewith in the first instance.
- While the Court, in certain cases, has excused non-compliance with the requirement to
submit a certificate of non-forum shopping, such liberal posture has always been grounded
on special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict application of the rule
clearly unjustified or inequitable.
Here, the reasons cited by the petitioners for their failure to attach the certificate in their appeal
memorandum can hardly be considered as special circumstances or compelling reasons to
warrant a liberal application of the rules of procedure.
- Moreover, based on the facts of the case, a strict application of a technical rule will not
prejudice the administration of justice in view of the petitioners' unmeritorious claims.
It is true that in labor cases, technical rules are not necessarily fatal and they can be liberally
applied.
However, this principle can only operate if, all things being equal, any doubt or ambiguity
would be resolved in favor of labor.
Should the case be substantively unmeritorious, technicalities and limitations in procedural
rules must be fully enforced.
The claims advanced by the petitioners failed to yield substantive merit.
First, their money claims have already been amicably settled and paid in the concurrent labor
case they filed before the DOLE.
The Quitclaim and Release signed by the petitioners show that they already received payment
for their claims from TWMPC and PTMC.
The quitclaims were duly attested by Atty. Joy Lily Elumir-Tan, Chief of the Labor Relations
Division of the DOLE, Region VII, Cebu City.
Second, the LA correctly ruled that the petitioners' allegations did not bear out a case for illegal
dismissal.
- The alleged termination from employment was merely presumed by the petitioners from
their disagreement with TWMPC when the latter announced its plans to shift to a "pakyaw
system" of compensation instead of the per hour scheme.
- We defer to the factual findings of the LA considering its expertise on labor matters and its
inimitable opportunity to assess the parties' claims first-hand.
As observed by the LA, the petitioners verbally agreed to settle the disagreement by
withdrawing their membership and monetary interests from the cooperative.
- They later on filed the illegal dismissal suit just to obtain more monetary consideration from
TWMPC in the form of a separation pay.
- Meanwhile, PTMC was not the employer of the petitioners and it hired them long before the
present controversy arose.
- They were hired as casual or contractual employees through their job contractor TWMPC.
In fine, in the absence of justifiable and compelling reasons, a liberal application of procedural
rules is not warranted in this case. The Court thus agrees with the CA that no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the NLRC when it found no justification to excuse the absence of a
certificate of non-forum shopping in the petitioners' memorandum on appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March
25, 2010 and Resolution dated September 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-
SP. No. 02021 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 dismissed the charges for there was no negligence, not even contributory, on Cabanilla’s part.
Page 6 of 22
4) VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC. V. JOCELYN CATUBIG, G.R. NO. 175512, MAY 30, 2011 –
KING
ER: Vallacar’s bus Ceres Bulilit collided with the motorcycle of Catubig and Emperado. The
motorcycle overtook during a curve by going to the opposite lane. The bus was on the opposite
lane. The persons in the motorcycle died.
The wife of Catubig, respondent, filed with RTC a claim for damages for the death of her
husband. The complaint had a certification against forum shopping.
One of the defenses of Vallacar was that the complaint was not verified (as distinguished from a
certification).
SC:
The complaint for damages need not be verified.
The 1997 Rules of Court, even prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 00-2-10, clearly
provides that a pleading lacking proper verification is to be treated as an unsigned
pleading which produces no legal effect. However, it also just as clearly states that
“[e]xcept when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.” No such law or rule specifically requires that
respondent’s complaint for damages should have been verified.
Catubig, the motorcycle driver, was negligent in overtaking during a cruve. Hence, no damages
were awarded.
Quickie: Bus collided with a motorcycle. Motorcyle passengers died. Heir filed with the RTC a
claim for damages. The defense was that it was not verified. – unmeritorious! Rules of court do
not provide that a complaint for damages needs to be verified.
Facts:
Vallacar Transit Inc engaged in transporation owning a Ceres Bulilit bus. Cabanilla was the
driver.
The bus collided with a motorcycle, the driver of which was Quintin Catubig, husband of
respondent, and the passenger, Emperado.
On their way home from Dumaguete City, at a curve, the motorcycle sought to overtake a slow
moving ten-wheeler cargo truck by crossing the opposite lane. The opposite lane was being
traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus. The bus and the motorcycle collided. Catubig immediately
died while Emperado died while he was being rushed to the hospital.
Driver Cabanilla was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide. MCTC
Jocelyn Catubig, husband of the motorcycle driver, then filed with the RTC a complaint for
damages against Vallacar Transit in the amount of P484,000 for the death of her husband based
on Art. 2180 in relation to Art. 2176 of the Civil Code. She alleged recklessness and negligence.
Vallacar answered that it was not negligent and that the sole cause of the death was the
negligence of the motorcycle driver himself when he overtook the curve. It also alleged as
special and affirmative defenses that the complaint was not verified and failed to state a cause
of action as there was no allegation of negligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
RTC ruled in favor petitioner. It found that there was no negligence on the part of the bus driver
of Vallacar.
CA reversed. It held both were negligent. Catubig (motorcycle), on one hand, failed to use
reasonable care for his own safety and ignored the hazard when he tried to overtake a truck at a
curve. Cabanilla (bus), on the other hand, was running his vehicle at a high speed of 100
kilometers per hour.
It ordered Petitioner to pay Respondent P250,000.
Pet. Rev. with the SC.
Petitioner asserts that respondent’s complaint for damages should be dismissed for the latter’s
failure to verify the same. The certification against forum shopping attached to the complaint,
signed by respondent, is not a valid substitute for respondent’s verification that she “has read
the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of her personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.” A pleading lacking proper verification is treated as an unsigned
pleading, which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint for damages needs t be verified? No.
Ratio: We find no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of
respondent’s complaint.
Respondent filed her complaint for damages against petitioner on July 19, 1995, when the 1964
Rules of Court was still in effect.1
On July 1, 1997, the new rules on civil procedure took effect. The foregoing provision was
carried on, with a few amendments, as Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The same provision was again amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10, which became
effective on May 1, 2000. It now reads:
SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,
pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification
based on “information and belief” or upon “knowledge, information and
belief,” or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.
The 1997 Rules of Court, even prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 00-2-10, clearly
provides that a pleading lacking proper verification is to be treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect. However, it also just as clearly states that “[e]xcept when
otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified
or accompanied by affidavit.” No such law or rule specifically requires that respondent’s
complaint for damages should have been verified.
Discussion of difference between Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping
Although parties would often submit a joint verification and certificate against forum
shopping, the two are different.
A party’s failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the
party’s failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping must
be signed by the party, and not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the petition
defective.
On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a
jurisdictional requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation,
and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The party need not sign the verification. A party’s

1 Rule 7, Section 6 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided:

SEC. 6. Verification.—A pleading is verified only by an affidavit stating that the person verifying has read the pleading and that the allegations thereof are
true of his own knowledge.

Verifications based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," shall be deemed insufficient.

Page 7 of 22
representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the
pleading may sign the verification.
In the case before us, we stress that as a general rule, a pleading need not be verified,
unless there is a law or rule specifically requiring the same.2
In contrast, all complaints, petitions, applications, and other initiatory pleadings must
be accompanied by a certificate against forum shopping, first prescribed by Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, which took effect on April 1, 1994, then later on by Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Court. It is not disputed herein that respondent’s complaint for damages was
accompanied by such a certificate.
In addition, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a
formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters
which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere
speculation. When circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the
ends of justice may thereby be served.
Nevertheless, SC denied the claim for damages. There was no clear proof of negligence on the
part of the bus (that is was driving at the speed of 100km/h). The proximate cause of death was
the reckless overtaking of the motorcycle at the curve.
5) KOREAN TECHNOLOGIES V. ALBERTO LERMA, G.R. NO. 143581, JANUARY 7,
2008 – LAGOS
Korean Technologies vs. Albert Lerma
(some facts taken from our legforms digest)
Emergency Recit:
• KOGIES entered into a contract with Pacific General Steel Manufacturing (PGSMC)
for the supply and installation by KOGIES of LPG Cylinder manufacturing plants in
favor of PGSMC. PGSMC subsequently informed KOGIES that it was canceling the
contract due to altered quantity and lowered quality of the machinery.
• KOGIES contended that PGSMC cannot unilaterally rescind the contract and filed a
complaint for specific performance. PGSMC filed its Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim. Kogies motioned to dismiss the answer with counterclaim for non-
payment of docket fees and absence of certificate of non-forum shopping.
• WON docket fees and cert. of non-forum shopping are required for compulsory
counterclaims?
• HELD: In this case, no. At the time of the filing of the counterclaim, filing fees were
not yet required for compulsory counterclaims. However, after Aug. 16, 2004, when
Rule 141 of ROC was amended, filing fees are now required. As to the certificate of
non-forum shopping, it is also not required as an answer is not an initiatory pleading
but a responsive pleading.
Facts:
• Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. (“KOGIES”) is a Korean corporation which is engaged
in the supply and installation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Cylinder
manufacturing plants, while Pacific General Steel Manufacturing Corp. (“PGSMC”)
is a domestic corporation.
• PGSMC and KOGIES executed a Contract whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG
Cylinder Manufacturing Plant in Cavite. The contract was executed in the
Philippines.
• The parties executed in Korea an Amendment for Contract amending the terms of
payment. It stipulated that KOGIES will ship the machinery and facilities necessary
for manufacturing LPG cylinders, and would install and initiate the operation of the
plant for which PGSMC bound itself to pay upon the plant’s production of the 11-kg.
LPG cylinder samples.
• Subsequently, the machineries for the manufacture of LPG cylinders were shipped,
delivered, and installed in the Carmona plant. PGSMC paid KOGIES.
• However, the initial operation could not be conducted as PGSMC encountered
financial difficulties affecting the supply of materials, thus forcing the parties to agree
that KOGIES would be deemed to have completely complied with the terms and
conditions of the contract.
• For the remaining balance for the installation and initial operation of the plant,
PGSMC issued two postdated checks, which were dishonored for the reason
"PAYMENT STOPPED." Thus, KOGIES sent a demand letter threatening criminal
action for violation of B.P. 22 in case of nonpayment.
• PGSMC replied that the two checks it issued KOGIES were fully funded but the
payments were stopped for reasons previously made known to KOGIES.

2 Examples of pleadings that require verification are: (1) all pleadings filed in civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; (2) petition for review from the
Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court raising only questions of law under Rule 41, Section 2; (3) petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 42, Section 1; (4) petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, Section 5; (5) petition for review before the Supreme
Court under Rule 45, Section 1; (6) petition for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions under Rule 47, Section 4; (7) complaint for injunction under Rule 58, Section
4; (8) application for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 58, Section 4; (9) application for appointment of a receiver under Rule 59, Section 1; (10)
application for support pendente lite under Rule 61, Section 1; (11) petition for certiorari against the judgments, final orders or resolutions of constitutional commissions under Rule
64, Section 2; (12) petition for certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus under Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3; (13) petition forquo warranto under Rule 66, Section 1; (14) complaint for
expropriation under Rule 67, Section 1; (15) petition for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 4, all from the 1997 Rules of Court; (16) all complaints or petitions involving intra-
corporate controversies under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies; (17) complaint or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment under the
Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation; and (18) petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages as well as petition for
summary proceedings under the Family Code.
Page 8 of 22
 • PGSMC informed KOGIES that PGSMC was canceling their Contract on the ground
that KOGIES had altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the machineries and
equipment, and that PGSMC would dismantle and transfer the machineries,
equipment installed in the Carmona plant. PGSMC then filed an Affidavit-Complaint
for Estafa against the President of KOGIES.
• KOGIES wrote PGSMC informing the latter that PGSMC could not unilaterally
rescind their contract nor dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment on
mere imagined violations by KOGIES. It also insisted that their disputes should be
settled by arbitration as agreed upon in Article 15, the arbitration clause10 of their
contract.
• KOGIES instituted an Application for Arbitration before the Korean Commercial
Arbitration Board (KCAB) in Seoul, Korea pursuant to the Amended Contract.
• KOGIES filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against PGSMC before the
RTC. The RTC granted a TRO.
• KOGIES averred that PGSMC violated Art. 15 of their Contract, as amended, by
unilaterally rescinding the contract without resorting to arbitration. It also asked that
PGSMC be restrained from dismantling and transferring the machinery and
equipment installed in the plant.
• PGSMC filed an opposition to the TRO arguing that KOGIES was not entitled to the
TRO since Art. 15, the arbitration clause, was null and void for being against public
policy as it ousts the local courts of jurisdiction over the instant controversy.
• PGSMC filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim asserting that it had the full
right to dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment because it had paid
for them in full as stipulated in the contract
• the RTC held that Art. 15 of the Contract as amended was invalid as it tended to oust
the trial court or any other court jurisdiction over any dispute that may arise between
the parties. KOGIES’ prayer for an injunctive writ was denied.
• KOGIES filed its Reply to Answer and Answer to Counterclaim. KOGIES denied it
had altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the machinery, equipment, and
facilities it delivered to the plant. It also motioned to dismiss PGSMC’s compulsory
counterclaim. RTC denied the dismissal of the counterclaim.
• CA upheld the RTC and reasoned that the counterclaims of PGSMC were compulsory
ones and payment of docket fees was not required since the Answer with
counterclaim was not an initiatory pleading
• Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the payment of docket fees and the attachment of the certificate of non-forum
shopping are required in a compulsory counterclaim?
HELD: SC disagrees with KOGIES
Ratio:
As aptly ruled by the CA, the counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim dated July 17, 1998 in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with
Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, “A compulsory
Page 9 of 22
counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be
contained therein.”
On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against
KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in
nature. We stress, however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as
amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory
counterclaim or cross-claims.
As to the failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMC’s Answer is not an
initiatory pleading which requires a certification against forum shopping under Sec. 5 of
Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the
courts a quo did not commit reversible error in denying KOGIES’ motion to dismiss
PGSMC’s compulsory counterclaims
6) FILIPINAS TEXTILE V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 119800, NOVEMBER 12, 2003
– LIBONGCO
Filipinas Textile Mills, Inc. v CA
ER:
Sihi sued Filtex and Villanueva for collection of sum of money based on several documents.
Filtex and Villanueva failed to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution
of the said documents.
The answer with counterclaim and answer of Filtex and Villanueva, respectively, did not
contain any specific denial under oath of the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and
comprehensive surety agreement upon which Sihi’s complain was based, thus giving rise to the
implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of these documents.
The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the trial court need not, and ordinarily will not, be considered by a
reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Facts:
- State Investment House Inc. (SIHI) instituted a complaint for collection of the sum of
Php 3.1 M with interest, penalties, damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit against
Filipinas Textile (Filtex) and Villanueva.
- Sihi alleged that Filtex applied for domestic letters of credit to finance the purchase
of various raw materials for its business. Sihi issued the LOC authorizing Indo-Phil
Textile, Texfiber and Polyamide “to value on Sihi such drafts as may be drawn
against Filtex for an aggregate amount not exceeding Php 3.7 M.
- Filtex issued the LOCs to the 3 companies. The companies issued sight drafts upon
sale and delivery of the merchandise. The drafts were acquired by SIHI which paid
the value thereof for the account of Filtex.
- Villanueva executed a comprehensive surety agreement whereby he guaranteed,
jointly and severally with Filtex, the full and punctual payment to Sihi of all the
indebtedness of Filtex. It was a continuing surety agreement until the total obligation
has been fully settled.
- Filtex issued trust receipts to Sihi covering the merchandise sold.
- Because of Filtex’s failure to pay its obligation despite demand, Sihi filed a
complaint praying that the Filtex and Villanueva be ordered to pay, jointly and
severally.
 - In an answer with counterclaim, Filtex interposed special and affirmative defenses
(documents do not reflect the true will and intention of the parties). Villanueva
interposed the same and added that the surety agreement is void. The both, however,
failed to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
documents the complaint was based on.
- RTC ruled in favor of Sihi. On appeal, Filtex and Villanueva argued that the letters of
credits, sight drafts, trust receipts and surety agreement are admissible in evidence
despite the absence of documentary stamps theron as required by law, and as suchm
inadmissible. CA ruled in favor of Sihi.
Issue:
WON the letters of credits, sight drafts, trust receipts and surety agreement are admissible in
evidence despite the absence of documentary stamps thereon as required by law (YES)
Held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals concurring with the decision of the trial court are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Ratio:
- The answer with counterclaim and answer of Filtex and Villanueva, respectively, did
not contain any specific denial under oath of the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust
receipts and comprehensive surety agreement upon which Sihi’s complain was based,
thus giving rise to the implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of
these documents.
- Rules of Court state that when an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and
sets forth what he claims to be the facts.
Filtex and Villanueva questioned the admissibility of these documents rather belatedly, at the
appeal stage even. Their respective answer to Sihi’s complaint were silent on this point. The
rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to
the attention of the trial court need not, and ordinarily will not, be considered by a reviewing
court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
6) SY TIONG V. SY CHIM, G.R. NO. 174168, MARCH 30, 2009 – LOPA
CASE: SY TIONG V. SY CHIM
EMERGENCY DIGEST
Quick Facts:
- There are 2 cases consolidated because they involve the same parties. The relevant case for
pleadings is the 2nd case. The first case just talks about policy of non-interference,
prejudicial questions and probable cause. I included it so we don't need to make digests for
that topic if this case comes up again.
- Second case:
- Sy Tiong Shiou et al filed a case for accounting and damages filed against Spouses Sy
for failure to make cash deposits to any of the corporation’s banks from 1 November
2001 to 31 January 2003. TRO also filed because Sy (president) was no longer the
president but he was still calling for meetings
Page 10 of 22
- Spouses Sy filed a third party complaint. The posit that it was Sy Tiong Shiou and Tan
(corp. treas.) who were authorized to control, supervise and administer corporate funds
and were thus responsible for the disparity in the books of account. RTC granted. CA
reversed on the ground that a third-party complaint is not allowed under the Interim
Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799
(Interim Rules)
Doctrine:
- The third-party complaint should be allowed. There is a conflict in the law , for while a
third-party complaint is not included in the allowed pleadings, neither is it among the
prohibited ones.
- Statutory construction: look at the intent of the law!
- Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules: These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, summary, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action or proceeding.
- A third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file
against a person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. It is
independent of, and separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. The purpose of a
third-party complaint is to avoid circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of law
suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all the matters arising from one
particular set of facts.
- Summary nature of the proceedings governed by the Interim rules and the purpose of a third
party complaint are the same: expeditious disposition of cases.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
GR 174168 (SKIP)
FACTS:
- Spouses Sy filed 4 criminal complaints against Sy Tiong Shiou et. al. for the following
- 2 for violation of Sec 74 of Corp. Code. They weren't allowed to inspect the books and
records of the corporation Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. despite being stockholders and
directors. Defense: several civil and intra-corporate cases pending in court.
- 2 for falsification and perjury for executing under oath the 2003 General Information
sheet (GIS) where he falsely stated that the shareholdings of the Spouses Sy had
decreased despite the fact that they had not executed any conveyance of their shares.
Defense: prejudicial question; there’s a case for accounting and damages before the
RTC. Besides, petitioners saw the GIS and did not object.
- Basically, no one wanted to approve the criminal complaints. Denied by investigating
prosecutor, MR denied. DOJ denied it too. BUT! On appeal, the CA granted the petition and
directed the City Prosecutor’s office to file the appropriate information. CA said that there
was no prejudicial question and they found probable cause
ISSUE:
1. W/N findings of the DOJ in affirming, modifying or reversing recommendations of the
public prosecutor can be subject of certiorari or review of the CA?
Held: G.R. No. 174168 - The petition for review is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2006 and 8 August 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
91416 are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
- General Rule: A preliminary proceeding is not a quasi-judicial function and that the DOJ is
not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings
of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause.This Court has adopted a
policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations and leaves to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information
against the supposed offender.
- Exception: grave abuse of discretion which would authorize the aggrieved person to file a
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. DOJ
committed GADLEJ when it suspended the hearing of the charges for violation of the
Corporation Code on the ground of prejudicial question and when it dismissed the criminal
complaints.
- A prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed since howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
G. R. No. 179438. (RELEVANT CASE)
- Tan, corporate treasurer of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (corporation) submitted a letter to the
Board of Directors stating:
- the control, supervision and administration of all corporate funds were exercised by
Spouses Sy
- Felicidad Chan Sy did not make cash deposits to any of the corporation’s banks from 1
November 2001 to 31 January 2003, thus the total bank remittances for the past years
were less than reflected in the corporate financial statements, accounting books and
records.
- Tan sought to be free from any responsibility over all corporate funds.
- The Board granted Juanita Tan’s request and authorized the employment of an external
auditor (Banaria & Company) to render a complete audit of all the corporate accounting
books and records.. Banaria & Co. attributed to the Spouses Sy P67,117,230.30 as
unaccounted receipts and disbursements from 1994 to 2002
- A demand letter was served on the Spouses Sy on 15 April 2003. On the same date, the
children of the Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the corporation cash, postdated checks and
other important documents. After the incident, the Spouses Sy transferred residence and
ceased reporting to the corporation. Corporation filed a CRIMINAL CASE FOR
ROBBERY.
- Sy Tiong Shiou, corporate Vice President and General Manager, called a special meeting to
be held on 6 May 2003 to fill up the positions vacated by the Spouses Sy. He was elected
as the new president and his wife, Juanita Tan, the new Vice President. Despite these
developments, Sy Chim still caused the issuance of a Notice of Stockholders meeting dated
11 June 2003 in his capacity as the alleged corporate president.
Page 11 of 22
- The Corporation also filed an Amended Complaint for Accounting and Damages against the
Spouses Sy before the RTC Manila, praying for a complete and true accounting of all the
amounts paid to, received and earned by the company since 1993 and for the restitution of
the said amount and for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction
to restrain Sy Chim from calling a stockholders’ meeting on the ground of lack of authority.
- Spouses Sy denied all the claims and tried to aver that it was Sy Tiong Shiou and his wife
who were authorized to control, supervise and administer corporate funds. They filed a
Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint praying that their attached Third
Party Complaint be allowed and admitted against Sy Tiong Shiou and his
spouse. Granted. Summons issued against Sy Tiong Shiou and Tan.
- CA ruled in favor of Sy Tiong Shiou and Tan. A third-party complaint is not allowed under
the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No.
8799 (Interim Rules)
ISSUE:
3. W/N third-party complaint is excluded or prohibited by the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim Rules)
HELD: The petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
26 May 2004 and 29 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 81897 are SET ASIDE and
the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 46 dated 8 October 2003 and 19
December 2003 are REINSTATED.
RATIO:
- The third-party complaint should be allowed.
- There is a conflict in the law, for while a third-party complaint is not included in the
allowed pleadings, neither is it among the prohibited ones. Nevertheless, this conflict may
be resolved by following the well-entrenched rule in statutory construction, that every part
of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.
- This spirit and intent can be gleaned from Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules, which reads:
These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a
just, summary, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.
- A third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file
against a person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. It is
independent of, and separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. The purpose of a
third-party complaint is to avoid circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of law
suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all the matters arising from one
particular set of facts.
- Summary nature of the proceedings governed by the Interim rules and the purpose of a third
party complaint are the same: expeditious disposition of cases.
- In this case, the third-party complaint of the Spouses Sy should be admitted.
- A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-party
claim be found to exist. It is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant
or both for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant, although the
third-party defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction. A third-party complaint
 must allege facts which prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party defendant.
The allegations in the third-party complaint impute direct liability on the part of Sy Tiong Shiou
and Juanita Tan to the corporation for the very same claims which the corporation
interposed against the Spouses Sy. It is clear therefore that the Spouses Sy’s third-party
complaint is in respect of the plaintiff corporation’s claims, and thus the allowance of the third-
party complaint is warranted.
7) EQUITABLE CARD NETWORK V. CAPISTRANO, G.R. NO. 180157, FEBRUARY 08,
2012 – VADA!
ECI’s allegations
- That Mrs. C applied for membership at the Manila Yacht Club under their widow-
membership program
- That since the club and the bank had a credit card sponsorship agreement, Mrs. C applied
for and was granted a Visa CC.
- That Mrs. C, authorized her daughter (Mrs. Redulla) to claim her CC and ATM app form.
- That Mrs. C started using the card.
- That Mrs. R personally issued a Php45k check as partial payment of Mrs. C’s account with
the bank. (bounced!)
ECI filed a collection suit before the RTC.
Mrs. C’s denials
- denied applying
- denied that Mrs. R was her daughter
- denied authorizing Mrs. R or anyone to claim a CC for her.
- said that assuming she applied for such card, she never used it.
RTC Ruling
After trial, the RTC ruled that, having failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of ECIs actionable documents that were attached to the complaint, Mrs. Capistrano
impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of those documents. In effect she
admitted:
1) applying for membership at the MYC;
2) accomplishing the MYC membership information sheet which contained a request for an
ECI Visa card;
3) holding herself liable for all obligations incurred in the use of such card;
4) authorizing Mrs. Redulla to receive the Visa card issued in her name;
5) applying for an ATM Card with ECI; and
6) using the credit card in buying merchandise worth P217,235.36 as indicated in the sales
slips.
A mere statement that the documents were procured by fraudulent representation does not raise
any issue as to their genuineness and due execution.
CA Ruling - reversed RTC
Page 12 of 22
- The CA ruled that, although Mrs. Capistrano’s answer was somewhat infirm, still she raised
the issue of the genuineness and due execution of ECIs documents during trial by presenting
evidence that she never signed any of them.
- Since ECI failed to make a timely objection to its admission, such evidence cured the
vagueness in her answer.
- Further, the CA ruled that Mrs. Capistrano sufficiently proved by evidence that her
signatures had been forged.
Issues
1. W/N the CA correctly ruled that, although Mrs. Capistrano failed to make an effective
specific denial of the actionable documents attached to the complaint, she overcame this
omission by presenting parol evidence to which ECI failed to object; and
2. W/N the CA correctly ruled that Mrs. Capistrano presented clear and convincing evidence
that her signatures on the actionable documents had been forged.
SC Ruling
When the defendant wants to contest the documents attached to the claimants complaint which
are essential to his cause of action is found in Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
In substance, ECIs allegations, supported by the attached documents, are
- that Mrs. Capistrano applied through Mrs. Redulla for a credit card and
- that the former used it to purchase goods on credit yet Mrs. Capistrano refused to pay ECI
for them. On the other hand, Mrs. Capistrano denied these allegations for lack of knowledge
as to their truth.
- This mode of denial is by itself obviously ineffectual since a person must surely know if he
applied for a credit card or not, like a person must know if he is married or not.
- He must also know if he used the card and if he did not pay the card company for his
purchases.
- A person’s denial for lack of knowledge of things that by their nature he ought to know is
not an acceptable denial.
In any event, the CA ruled that, since ECI did not object on time to Mrs. Capistrano’s evidence
that her signatures on the subject documents were forged, such omission cured her defective
denial of their genuineness and due execution. - THIS IS INCORRECT
True, issues not raised by the pleadings may be tried with the implied consent of the parties as
when one of them fails to object to the evidence adduced by the other concerning such
unimpleaded issues.
- But the CA fails to reckon with the rule that a party’s admissions in the course of the
proceedings, like an admission in the answer of the genuineness and true execution of the
plaintiffs actionable documents, can only be contradicted by showing that defendant made
such admission through palpable mistake.
- Here, Mrs. Capistrano never claimed palpable mistake in the answer she filed.
It is of no moment that plaintiff ECI failed to object to Mrs. Capistranos evidence at the trial
that the subject documents were forgeries.
Notwithstanding the above, the Court holds that the CA correctly ordered the dismissal of ECIs
action since, contrary to the RTCs finding, Mrs. Capistrano effectively denied the genuineness
and due execution of ECIs actionable documents.
- True, Mrs. Capistrano denied ECIs actionable documents merely for lack of knowledge
which denial, as pointed out above, is inadequate since by their nature she ought to know the
truth of the allegations regarding those documents.
- But this inadequacy was cured by her quick assertion that she was also denying the
allegations regarding those actionable documents for the reasons as stated in her special and
affirmative defenses.
In the Special and Affirmative Defenses section of her answer, Mrs. Capistrano in fact denied
ECIs documented allegations that she applied for a credit card, was given one, and used it. She
said:
11. Defendant denies having applied for membership with the Equitable
Cardnetwork, Inc. as a widow of a deceased member of the Manila Yacht Club.
12. She has never authorized anyone to get her alleged card for the preceding
reason. Therefore, being not a member, she has no obligation, monetary or
otherwise to herein plaintiff.
Neither the RTC nor the CA can ignore Mrs. Capistrano’s above additional reasons denying
ECIs allegations regarding its actionable documents.
- Such reasons form part of her answer.
- Parenthetically, it seems that, when Mrs. Capistrano denied the transactions with ECI for
lack of knowledge, it was her way of saying that such transactions took place without her
knowing.
- And, since Mrs. Capistrano in fact verified her claim that she had no part in those
transactions, she in effect denied under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
documents supporting them.
- For this reason, she is not barred from introducing evidence that those documents were
forged.
8) PTA OF ST. MATTHEW ACADEMY V. METROBANK, G.R.NO. 176518, MARCH 2,
2010 – LUCENARIO
PTA of St. Matthew Academy v. Metrobank
Emergency Recitation:
• SPS. ILAGAN took out a loan with METROBANK secured by a REM over a parcel
of land. They defaulted, extrajudicial foreclosure, METROBANK highest bidder.
METROBANK filed a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession upon filing of
required bond.
• ST. MATTHEW SCHOOL (and students and teachers) which was practically owned
by SPS. ILAGAN and was leasing the land on a monthly basis from SPS. ILAGAN
filed a petition for injunction to prevent the grant of the issuance of the writ of
possession claiming that the exception to the entitlement to a writ of possession is
when there is a third party claming ownership and claiming the land.
Page 13 of 22
• Trial Court in the LRC case granted the writ of possession. ST. MATTHEW filed a
special civil action under Rule 65 claiming denial of due process, violation of right to
education, and [relevant] lack of authority of the METROBANK branch manager to
sign the certificate of non-forum shopping therefore rendering it worthless.
• ISSUE:W/N ST. MATTHEW qualified as the exception to the grant of a writ of
possession NO. W/N lack of authority to sign the CNFS was fatal NO.
• HELD: Petition dismissed
• RATIO:
St. Matthew does not fall under the exeption
• The issuance a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is
a third party in possession of the property claiming a right adverse to that of the
debtor/mortgagor. St. Matthew never even claimed ownership adverse to SPS.
ILAGAN. They were mere lessees with inferior rights. The lease was also not
registered in the title and hence not binding on third parties.
Lack of authority for CNFS not fatal [Pleadings related]
• The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession was not really a petition
although entitled as such. It was a motion. Hence, certificate of non-forum shopping
wasn’t required in the first place
• Green Asia vs. CA: A certification on non-forum shopping is required only in a
complaint or a petition which is an initiatory pleading. In this
• case, the subject petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by private
respondent is not an initiatory pleading. Although private respondent denominated
its pleading as a petition, it is more properly a motion.
• What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the
title given by the party executing it, but its purpose. The purpose of a motion is not to
initiate litigation, but to bring up a matter arising in the progress of the case where the
motion is filed.
St. Matthew was accorded due process
• This ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act
No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a "judicial process" as contemplated in Article 433
of the Civil Code.
• As a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser
in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit by which one party “sues another for
the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong. It is a proceeding where the relief is granted without requiring an opportunity
for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard. It does not matter even if
the herein petitioners were not specifically named in the writ of possession nor
notified of such proceedings.
• As long as a verified petition states the facts sufficient to entitle the petitioner to the
relief requested, the court shall issue the writ prayed for. There is no need for
petitioners to offer any documentary or testimonial evidence for the court to grant the
petition
FACTS:
• SPS. ILAGAN took out a loan (Php4,790,000) from METROBANK secured by a
REM over parcels of land
 • SPS. ILAGAN defaulted, METROBANK extrajudicially foreclosed and won as the
highest bidder. During the redemption period, METROBANK filed an ex-parte
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession upon filing of the required bond
• St. Matthew Christian Academy (practically owned by SPS. ILAGAN) and teachers
and students filed a petition for injunction on the ground that it cannot be ejected for
being a third party occupying the property.
• Trial Court granted the writ of possession in favor of Metrobank. Piercing the veil of
corporate fiction and that St. Matthew was merely a lessee and not occupying the
property with title contradictory to SPS. ILAGAN.
• St. Matthew filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
o Pleadings related issue raised: the certificate of non-forum shopping
attached to the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was signed
by the branch manager who did not have authority to do so. Hence, this
lapse rendered the petition worthless.
o Other issues (not so important): violation of students’ and teachers’ right to
quality education and academic freedom, failure to provide them due
process
ISSUE:
• W/N St. Matthew qualifies as a third party for the purpose of falling under the
exception to granting a writ of possession upon filing a bond. NO
• W/N the lack of authority of the branch manager to sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping was fatal. NO
• W/N St. Matthew et al were awarded due process YES
HELD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued is
hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
RATIO:
St. Matthew et al are not “Third Parties” against whom the writ of possession cannot be issued
and implemented.
• The exception enunciated in Policarpio vs. Active Bank provides: the obligation of
the trial court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial once it appears
that there is a third party in possession of the property claiming a right adverse to
that of the debtor/mortgagor
• However, in this case, St. Matthew cannot be considered as third parties because
they are not claiming a right adverse to the judgment debtor. Petitioner-teachers and
students did not claim ownership of the properties, but merely averred actual
“physical possession of the subject school premises.”
• Also, their interest over the school premises is necessarily inferior to that of the
school. Besides, their contracts are with the school and do not attach to the school
premises. Moreover, the foreclosure of the current school premises does not prevent
the SMCA from continuing its operations elsewhere.
The lack of authority to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Possession was an insignificant lapse.
Page 14 of 22
• The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession was not really a petition
although entitled as such. It was a motion. Hence, certificate of non-forum
shopping wasn’t required in the first place.
In Green Asia Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, where the issue
of validity of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping was questioned in an application for the
issuance of a Writ of Possession, we held that:
x x x it bears stressing that a certification on non-forum shopping is required only in a
complaint or a petition which is an initiatory pleading. In this case, the subject petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession filed by private respondent is not an initiatory
pleading. Although private respondent denominated its pleading as a petition, it is more
properly a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its
form or the title given by the party executing it, but its purpose. The purpose of a motion is not
to initiate litigation, but to bring up a matter arising in the progress of the case where the
motion is filed. (Emphasis supplied)
It is not necessary to initiate an original action in order for the purchaser at an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property to acquire possession. Even if the application for the writ of
possession was denominated as a “petition”, it was in substance merely a motion. Indeed, any
insignificant lapse in the certification on non-forum shopping filed by the MBTC did not render
the writ irregular. After all, no verification and certification on non-forum shopping need be
attached to the motion.
Hence, it is immaterial that the certification on non-forum shopping in the MBTC’s petition
was signed by its branch head. Such inconsequential oversight did not render the said petition
defective in form.
The petitioners were accorded due process.
This ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135
is not, strictly speaking, a "judicial process" as contemplated in Article 433 of the Civil Code.
As a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a
foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit by which one party “sues another for the enforcement
of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
It is a proceeding where the relief is granted without requiring an opportunity for the person
against whom the relief is sought to be heard. It does not matter even if the herein petitioners
were not specifically named in the writ of possession nor notified of such proceedings.
As long as a verified petition states the facts sufficient to entitle the petitioner to the relief
requested, the court shall issue the writ prayed for. There is no need for petitioners to offer any
documentary or testimonial evidence for the court to grant the petition
Final Note: Rule 65 petition wasn’t the proper remedy. There was no MR filed or anything
serving as prerequisite. Also, proper remedy for the petitioners is a separate, distinct and
independent suit, provided for under Act No. 3135:

SEC. 8.
The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty
days after the purchaser was given possession,
petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession canceled,
specifying the damages suffered by him,
because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the
provisions hereof, and
the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure
provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six;
and
if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the
bond furnished by the person who obtained possession.
Either of the parties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen
of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six;
but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal.
In De Gracia v. San Jose,, we held that:
x x x the order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper
motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. No discretion is left to the court. And any
question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale (and the consequent cancellation
of the writ) is left to be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in section 8.
Such question is not to be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of
possession, since, under the Act, the proceeding for this is ex parte. (Emphasis supplied)
9) ABBOT LABORATORIES V. ALCARAZ, 2013 - MAGTAGNOB
ABBOTT LABORATORIES V. ALCARAZ
Topic: Pleadings
EMERGENCY DIGEST –
Note in advance: this case involves 2 CA Petitions: 1) FIRST CA petition- re the illegal
dismissal case, and 2) SECOND CA petition- re the issuance of the writ of execution.
Quick Facts:
• Alcaraz was a probationary employee at Abbott Lab. She failed to meet the standards,
so she was asked to resign by Abbott’s officers. Alcaraz filed a case for illegal
dismissal before the LA. LA dismissed, but NLRC reversed and ordered her
reinstatement. Abbott filed the FIRST CA Petition re the NLRC decision of illegal
dismissal. While the FIRST CA petition was pending, Alcaraz filed a motion for the
execution of the NLRC decision regarding her reinstatement before the LA, which
the LA denied, but the NLRC granted on appeal. Abbot then filed the SECOND CA
petition re the issuance of the writ of execution. While this SECOND CA petition is
pending, Abbott again moved for the issuance of a writ of execution before the LA,
which the LA granted and which Abbott appealed to the NLRC via Memorandum of
Appeal. Meanwhile, the SECOND CA petition (before the CA, of course) was denied
and attained finality. Hence, only the FIRST CA petition re the NLRC decision of
illegal dismissal remains to be solved in this petition.
Page 15 of 22
• Alcaraz contends that Abbott is guilty of forum shopping when it filed the SECOND
CA petition while the FIRST CA petition was pending. Also, she contends that Abbott
violated the certification requirement in Sec 5 of Rule 7 when it failed to disclose in
the instant petition (re FIRST CA petition) the existence of a Memorandum of Appeal
filed before the NLRC (connected with the SECOND CA petition).
Issue: W/N Abbott is guilty of forum shopping and of violating the certification requirement-
NO
Ratio:
• The FIRST CA petition involves the NLRC decision of illegal dismissal, while the
SECOND CA petition involves the propriety of execution of the NLRC decision
pending the resolution of the FIRST CA petition. There is no forum shopping because
although there is identity of parties, there is no identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for nor is there existence of res judicata between the 2 petitions.
• Furthermore, the existence of the Memorandum of Appeal need not be disclosed in a
certification as it involves a different cause of action (re writ of execution) compared
to the cause of action in the instant petition (re illegal dismissal).
Doctrine:
• The prohibition against forum shopping is different from a violation of the
certification requirement under Sec 5, Rule 7. The failure to comply with the
certification requirement constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without
prejudice to the filinf od the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after
hearing, while the violation of the prohibition against forum shopping is a ground for
summary dismissal of the complaint and for direct contempt.
• Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely 1)
identity of parties, 2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, and 3) identity
between the 2 cases such that any judment that may be rendered in the pending case
would amount to res judicata in the other case.
• Sec 5(b), Rule 7 requires that a plaintiff who files a case should provide a complete
statement of the present status of any pending case if the latter involves the same
issues as the one that was filed. If there is no such similar pending case, Sec 5(a)
provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare under oath that to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending.
COMPLETE DIGEST
FACTS:
• Abbott Lab published its need for a Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager, to
which Alcaraz (then a Regulatory Affairs and Info Managaer at Aventis) showed
interest and submitted her application. Abbot formally offered Alcaraz the position,
wherein Alcaraz will be employed on a probationary basis for 6 months. Alcaraz
accepted the offer and she received an email from Abbot’s Recruitment Officer
confirming the same.
• During the course of her employment, Alcaraz noticed that some of the staff had
disciplinary problems. She would reprimand them for their unprofessional behavior.
 However, her method was considered by her superior a “too strict”. She was told
to lie low and let Walsh (superior) handle the matter.
• Alcaraz was later on informed that she failed to meet the regularization standards for
the position of Regulatory Affairs manager. She was asked to tender her resignation.
It was also announced in her department by Walsh that she resigned due to health
reasons. Subsequently (May 25), Walsh et al handed to Alcaraz a letter stating that
her services had been terminated effective May 19 and stating the reasons therefore.
• Alcaraz filed a case for illegal dismissal and damages against Abbott and its officers.
Alcaraz contends that she was not apprised of the standards to being regularized.
• LA- dismissed Alcaraz’s complaint. She was briefed regarding her work during her
pre-employment orientation meeting. Alcaraz was unable to meet the standards set by
Abbott.
• NLRC- reversed LA. Alcaraz was illegally dismissed. Ordered reinstated to former
position.
**Tricky relevant part:
• Abbott filed a petition for certiorari with issuance of TRO/WPI of NLRC decision of
illegal dismissal (FIRST CA Petition) before CA- CA denied.
• Pending FIRST CA petition, Alcaraz moved for the Execution of NLRC Decision
before the LA- LA denied.
• Alcaraz appealed the motion for execution- NLRC granted.
• Abbott filed another petition for certiorari with CA re motion for execution
(SECOND CA Petition) of NLRC decision ordering the reinstatement of Alcaraz-
CA denied.
• MR of FIRST Petition was also denied by the CA.
• Abbott filed an MR for the SECOND Petition.
• Pending MR for SECOND petition, Alcaraz again moved for the issuance of writ
of execution before the LA. LA granted. Abbot received LA’s order which it
appealed to the NLRC via Memorandum of Appeal on the ground that its MR for the
SECOND Petition would be rendered moot and academic..
• Subsequently, the MR for SECOND petition (re motion for execution) was denied. It
attained finality for Abbott’s failure to timely appeal. So, the FIRST Petition remains
to be resolved.
• In her Comment, Alcaraz alleged that Abbott was guilty of forum shopping when they
filed the SECOND Petition pending the resolution of the MR of the FIRST petition.
Abbott also did not comply with the certification requirement under Sec 5, Rule 7
when they failed to disclose in the instant petition (re FIRST CA petition) the
existence of the Memorandum of Appeal filed before the NLRC (connected with
SECOND CA petition).
ISSUE:
W/N Abbott is guilty of forum Shopping for violation of the certification requirement- NO.
HELD:
Abbott is not guilty of forum shopping or violation of certification requirement.
RATIO:
• The prohibition against forum shopping is different from a violation of the
certification requirement under Sec 5, Rule 7. Compliance with the certification
Page 16 of 22
requirement against forum shopping is separate from and independent of the
avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. The failure to comply with the
certification requirement constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without
prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after
hearing, while the violation of the prohibition against forum shopping is a ground for
summary dismissal of the complaint and for direct contempt.
• Forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same
parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. It
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely 1) identity of parties,
2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, and 3) identity between the 2 cases
such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would amount to res
judicata in the other case.
• In this case, except for the element of identity of the parties, the elements of
forum shopping do not exist. The FIRST CA petition question the ruling of the
NLRC that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed. On the other hand, the SECOND CA
petition pertains to the propriety of the enforcement of the judgment award pending
the resolution of the FIRST CA petition and the finality of the decision in the labor
dispute between Alcaraz and Abbott. A judgment in the SECOND CA petition will
not constitute res judicata insofar as the FIRST CA petition is concerned. Thus, there
is no forum shopping.
• As to the violation of the certification requirement, when Abbott did not disclose the
fact that it filed a Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC, the matter has already
become moot and academic.
• Sec 5(b), Rule 7 requires that a plaintiff who files a case should provide a complete
statement of the present status of any pending case if the latter involves the same
issues as the one that was filed. If there is no such similar pending case, Sec 5(a)
provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare under oath that to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending.
Records show that the issues raised in the Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC cover
different subject matters and causes of action. Thus, Abbott did not have to disclose in the
present petition the filing of said Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC. In any event,
considering that the issue re the writ of execution had been resolved in SECOND CA Petition
and has already attained finality, the matter of disclosing the Memorandum of Appeal is now
moot and academic.
10) PERMANENT SAVINGS BANK V. VELARDE, G.R. NO. 140608, SEPTEMBER 23,
2004 - MUTI
Quick Facts: Velarde didn’t pay sum of his loan so Bank sued him. Velarde, in his Answer,
disclaims liability but admits that the signature in the loan instrument is his. He filed demurrer
to evidence, claiming that the Bank failed to prove its case. Bank says it does not need to
present proof because he has already admitted the genuineness and due execution of the loan
instrument.
Doctrine: Specific denial contemplated under Rule 8 of the ROC means that the defendant
must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or
fabricated. Any other kind of denial amounts to an implied admission of the genuineness and
due execution of the document.
FACTS: Permanent Savings and Loan Bank (“Bank”) sought to recover from respondent
Velarde, the sum of money based on a loan. Despite a number of demands, Velarde failed to
settle his account. Thus, the Bank filed a Complaint for Sum of Money in the RTC.
In his Answer, Velarde disclaims any liability on the instrument, but admits that the signature at
the back of the promissory note was his. However, as to any liability arising therefrom, the
receipt of the said amount shows that the amount was received by another person, and not him.
After the Bank rested its case, Velarde, instead of presenting evidence, filed with leave of
court his demurrer to evidence, alleging the grounds that: (a) Bank failed to prove its case by
preponderance of evidence; and (b) the cause of action is barred by prescription and/or laches.
The Bank claims, that there is no need to prove the loan and its supporting papers as Velarde
has already admitted these.
TC granted the demurrer and dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed. Hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: w/n Velarde specifically denied under oath the genuineness and due of the subject loan
documents, thereby contesting such documents in accordance with Rule 8, Section 8 of the
Rules of Court – NO!
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the RTC Manila are SET
ASIDE. Velarde is ordered to pay.
RATIO: The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Rule 8, Section 7 of the Rules
of Court which provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a document, the
genuineness or due execution of the instrument shall be deemed impliedly admitted unless the
defendant, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts.
A reading of Velarde’s Answer, however, shows that he did not specifically deny that he signed
the loan documents. What he merely stated in his Answer was that the signature appearing
at the back of the promissory note seems to be his. He also denied any liability on the
promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan
documents do not express the true intention of the parties.
Respondent’s denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. In
the early case of Songco vs. Sellner, the Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and
due execution of an actionable document, viz.:
… This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the
document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the
answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation
raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is
an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to
avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.
In fact, Velarde’s allegations amount to an implied admission of the due execution and
genuineness of the promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a
document means
- that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it
was signed by another for him and with his authority;
- that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of
the party relying upon it; xxx
Therefore, Velarde is deemed to have admitted the loan documents and acknowledged his
obligation with the Bank; and with his implied admission, it was not necessary for petitioner to
present further evidence to establish the due execution and authenticity of the loan documents
sued upon.
Page 17 of 22
While Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that private documents be proved of
their due execution and authenticity before they can be received in evidence, i.e., presentation
and examination of witnesses to testify on this fact; in the present case, there is no need for
proof of execution and authenticity with respect to the loan documents because of
Velarde’s implied admission thereof.
Velarde claims that he did not receive the net proceeds in the Loan Release Sheet date. The
document, however, bears his signature as borrower. Res ipsa loquitur. The document speaks for
itself. He has already impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of the loan
documents. No further proof is necessary to show that he undertook the obligation with
petitioner. "
Lastly, if a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the
movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. The movant who presents
a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the TC
disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court
disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to
present their own evidence.
11) S.C. MEGAWORLD CONSTRUCTION V. PARADA, 2013 - NARVASA
S.C. Megaworld Construction v. Parada, G.R. No. 183804, September 11, 2013
Topic: Pleadings (Rules 6 to 8)
ER: Megaworld bough electrical lighting materials from Parada, and failed to pay. Blamed its
sub-contractor Enviro Kleen, saying the latter should be the one who pays since it was it who
really benefitted and that there was an agreed novation on the contract to exchange the debtors.
RTC ruled for Parada.
In the higher courts, Megaworld brought a new issue: W/N the complaint should be
dismissed for an invalid verification and certification of non-forum shopping?
• SC said that this issue should not be first be brought up on appeal.
Megaworld contends that the verification and certification was signed by the son of Parada, and
was not based on personal knowledge and should be dismissed.
• Section 4 of Rule 7 provides that the verification need not be based on the verifier’s
personal knowledge but even only on authentic records.
• Sales invoices, statements of accounts, receipts and collection letters for the
balance of the amount still due to the Parada from the Megaworld are such
records.
• There is clearly substantial compliance by the Parada’s attorney-in-fact with the
requirement of verification.
And W/N Gentile should have been impleaded? No!
• Gentile Industries is merely the DTI-registered trade name or style of the Parada by
which he conducted his business. As such, it does not exist as a separate entity apart
from its owner, and therefore it has no separate juridical personality to sue or be sued.
Facts:
Megaworld bought electrical lighting materials from Gentile Industries, a sole proprietorship
owned by Engineer Luis U. Parada, for its Read-Rite project in Laguna. Megaworld was
unable to pay for the above purchase on due date, but blamed it on its failure to collect under
its sub-contract with the Enviro Kleen Technologies, Inc. (Enviro Kleen).
• It was however able to persuade Enviro Kleen to agree to settle its above purchase,
only paying Parada P250,000.00.
 • Enviro Kleen stopped making further payments, leaving an outstanding balance of
P816,627.00.
The Megaworld in its Answer denied liability, claiming that it was released from its
indebtedness to the Parada by reason of the novation of their contract, saying it has been
substituted by Enviro Kleen as new debtor.
RTC: Megaworld pays the P816,627.00 representing the principal obligation due, plus interest
etc.
CA: No novation, but Megaworld, for the first time, argued that the trial court should have
dismissed the complaint for failure of the Parada to implead Gentile Industries as "a proper
party in interest.” Enviro merely an additional debtor.
CA said that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene
the basic rules of fair play and justice.
• And still Parada is the proprietor of Gentile Industries, as shown on the sales
invoice and delivery receipts. A special POWER OF ATTORNEY was executed
by Engr. Luis U. Parada in favor of Engr. Leonardo A. Parada authorizing the
latter to file a complaint against the Megaworld.
Issues:
1. W/N the complaint should have been dismissed outright for an invalid non-
forum shopping certification;
2. W/N Gentile needs to be impleaded?
3. W/N there was a novation of the contract between the parties through substitution of
the debtor, which resulted in the release of the Megaword from its obligation to pay
the Parada the amount of its purchase.
1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the complaint is not a
jurisdictional but a formal requirement, and any objection as to non-compliance
therewith should be raised in the proceedings below and not for the first time on appeal.
No question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below.
Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel."
Megaworld says that the verification is invalid, since the SPA executed by the Parada did not
specifically include an authority for Leonardo to sign the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping. [See Sec. 4&5].
The Megaworld’s argument is untenable. Megaworld failed to reckon that any objection as to
compliance with the requirement of verification in the complaint should have been raised in the
proceedings below, and not in the appellate court for the first time.
The question of forum shopping cannot be raised in the CA and in the Supreme Court, since
such an issue must be raised at the earliest opportunity in a motion to dismiss or a similar
pleading. The high court even warned that "invoking it in the later stages of the proceedings or
on appeal may result in the dismissal of the action.”
Moreover Section 4 of Rule 7 provides that the verification need not be based on the verifier’s
personal knowledge but even only on authentic records.
• Sales invoices, statements of accounts, receipts and collection letters for the
balance of the amount still due to the Parada from the Megaworld are such
records.
• There is clearly substantial compliance by the Parada’s attorney-in-fact with the
requirement of verification.
Page 18 of 22
Lastly, a strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
substantial justice may be served. It is clear that the present controversy must be resolved on its
merits, lest for a technical oversight the Parada should be deprived of what is justly due him.
2. A sole proprietorship has no juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its
owner, and need not be impleaded as a party-plaintiff in a civil case.
On the question of whether Genlite Industries should have been impleaded as a party-plaintiff,
Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that only natural or juridical persons or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case. [See Article 44 of the New Civil Code]
Gentile Industries is merely the DTI-registered trade name or style of the Parada by which he
conducted his business. As such, it does not exist as a separate entity apart from its owner, and
therefore it has no separate juridical personality to sue or be sued.
3. Novation is never presumed but must be clearly and unequivocally shown.
Novation is a mode of extinguishing an obligation by changing its objects or principal
obligations, by substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by subrogating a third
person to the rights of the creditor. It is "the substitution of a new contract, debt, or obligation
for an existing one between the same or different parties." [See Art. 1293 NCC]
Thus, in order to change the person of the debtor, the former debtor must be expressly released
from the obligation, and the third person or new debtor must assume the former’s place in the
contractual relation.
There was no consent by Parada to release Megaword from the obligation, or to substitute
Enviro Kleen.
WHEREFORE, Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation is ordered to pay
Parada P816,627.00, plus interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum.
12) FUJI TELEVISION V. ARLENE ESPIRITU, G.R. NO. 194176, SEPTEMBER 10, 2014 -
VADA!
Arlene S. Espiritu ("Arlene") was engaged by Fuji Television Network, Inc. ("Fuji") asa news
correspondent/producer "tasked to report Philippine news to Fuji through its Manila Bureau
field office."
- Arlene’s employment contract initially provided for a term of one (1) year but was
successively renewed on a yearly basis with salary adjustment upon every renewal.
- Sometime in January 2009, Arlene was diagnosed with lung cancer.
- She informed Fuji about her condition. In turn, the Chief of News Agency of Fuji, Yoshiki
Aoki, informed Arlene "that the company will have a problem renewing her contract" since
it would be difficult for her to perform her job.
- She "insisted that she was still fit to work as certified by her attending physician.”
After several verbal and written communications, Arlene and Fuji signed a non-renewal
contract on May 5, 2009
- where it was stipulated that her contract would no longer be renewed after its expiration on
May 31, 2009.
- The contract also provided that the parties release each other from liabilities and
responsibilities under the employment contract.
In consideration of the non-renewal contract, Arlene "acknowledged receipt of the total amount
of US$18,050.00 representing her monthly salary from March 2009 to May 2009, year-end
bonus, mid-year bonus, and separation pay.”
- However, Arlene affixed her signature on the non- renewal contract with the initials "U.P."
for "under protest."
Complaint
The day after Arlene signed the non-renewal contract, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and attorney’s fees with the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission.
- She alleged that she was forced to sign the non-renewal contract when Fuji came to know of
her illness and that Fuji withheld her salaries and other benefits for March and April 2009
when she refused to sign.
- Arlene claimed that she was left with no other recourse but to sign the non-renewal contract,
and it was only upon signing that she was given her salaries and bonuses, in addition to
separation pay equivalent to four (4) years.
LA Ruling - dismissed Arlene’s complaint
- Arlene was not Fuji’s employee.
- Arlene was an independent contractor.
NLRC Appeal - reversed LA
- Arlene was a regular employee!
- She continuously rendered services that were deemed necessary and desirable to Fuji’s
business.
Both parties went up to the CA. In favor of Arlene.
- Arlene was a regular employee because she was engaged to perform work that was
necessary or desirable in the business of Fuji and the successive renewals of her fixed-term
contract resulted in regular employment.
- According to the Court of Appeals, Sonza does not apply in order to establish that Arlene
was an independent contractor because she was not contracted on account of any peculiar
ability, special talent, or skill.
- The fact that everything used by Arlene in her work was owned by Fuji negated the idea of
job contracting.
The Court of Appeals also held that Arlene was illegally dismissed because Fuji failed to
comply with the requirements of substantive and procedural due process necessary for her
dismissal since she was a regular employee.
The Court of Appeals found
- that Arlene did not sign the non-renewal contract voluntarily and
- that the contract was a mere subterfuge by Fuji to secure its position that it was her choice
not to renew her contract.
She was left with no choice since Fuji was decided on severing her employment.
Petition for Review by Fuji - that CA erred.
Page 19 of 22
Among others: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was filed on February 8,
2013.
- On February 27, 2013, Arlene filed a manifestation stating that this court may not take
jurisdiction over the case since Fuji failed to authorize Corazon E. Acerden to sign the
verification.
- Fuji filed a comment on the manifestation on March 9, 2013.
I
Validity of the verification and certification against forum shopping
Fuji’s Comment
In its comment on Arlene’s manifestation, Fuji alleges that Corazon was authorized to sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping
- because Mr. Shuji Yano was empowered under the secretary’s certificate to delegate his
authority to sign the necessary pleadings,
- including the verification and certification against forum shopping.
Arlene’s Side
On the other hand, Arlene points out that the authority given to Mr. Shuji Yano and Mr. Jin Eto
in the secretary’s certificate is only for the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
- Fuji did not attach any board resolution authorizing Corazon or any other person to file a
petition for review on certiorari with this court.
- Shuji Yano and Jin Eto could not re-delegate the power that was delegated to them.
- In addition, the special power of attorney executed by Shuji Yano in favor of Corazon
indicated that she was empowered to sign on behalf of Shuji Yano, and not on behalf of Fuji.
The Rules of Court requires the submission of verification and certification against forum
shopping
Rule 7,
- Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides the requirement of verification,
while
- Section 5 of the same rule provides the requirement of certification against forum shopping.
These sections state:
-
SEC. 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings
need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and
belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping.— The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
- The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions.
- If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
Section 4(e) of Rule 45 requires that petitions for review should "contain a sworn certification
against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42."
- Section 5 of the same rule provides that failure to comply with any requirement in Section 4
is sufficient ground to dismiss the petition.
Effects of non-compliance
Uy v. Landbank discussed the effect of non-compliance with regard to verification and stated
that:
[t]he requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional.
- Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance
of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
- Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are
true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that
the pleading is filed in good faith.
- The court may order the correction of the pleading if the verification is lacking or act on the
pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may
thereby be served. (Citations omitted)
Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals cited the discussion in Uy and differentiated its effect
from non-compliance with the requirement of certification against forum shopping:
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by
the submission thereof after the filing of the petition.
- Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the
petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including
the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
Page 20 of 22
- The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf
of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a
petition on behalf of the corporation. (Emphasis supplied)
- Effects of substantial compliance with the requirement of verification and certification
against forum shopping.
Although the general rule is that failure to attach a verification and certification against forum
shopping isa ground for dismissal, there are cases where this court allowed substantial
compliance.
In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, petitioner Alan Loyola submitted the required certification one
day after filing his electoral protest. This court considered the subsequent filing as substantial
compliance since the purpose of filing the certification is to curtail forum shopping.
In LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, Ma. Lourdes Dela Peña signed the verification and
certification against forum shopping but failed to attach the board resolution indicating her
authority to sign. In a motion for reconsideration, LDP Marketing attached the secretary’s
certificate quoting the board resolution that authorized Dela Peña.84 Citing Shipside, this court
deemed the belated submission as substantial compliance since LDP Marketing complied with
the requirement; what it failed to do was to attach proof of Dela Peña’s authority to sign.
Havtor Management Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission and General Milling
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission involved petitions that were dismissed
for failure to attach any document showing that the signatory on the verification and
certification against forum-shopping was authorized.88 In both cases, the secretary’s certificate
was attached to the motion for reconsideration.89 This court considered the subsequent
submission of proof indicating authority to sign as substantial compliance. Altres v. Empleo
summarized the rules on verification and certification against forum shopping in this manner:
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential
pronouncements . . . respecting non-compliance with the requirement on, or submission of
defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render
the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on
the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule
may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge
to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification,
and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons.”
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners
in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with
the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader,
not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is
unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of
record to sign on his behalf.
There was substantial compliance by Fuji Television Network, Inc.
Being a corporation, Fuji exercises its power to sue and be sued through its board of directors
or duly authorized officers and agents.
- Thus, the physical act of signing the verification and certification against forum shopping
can only be done by natural persons duly authorized either by the corporate by-laws or a
board resolution.
In its petition for review on certiorari, Fuji attached Hideaki Ota’s secretary’s certificate,
authorizing Shuji Yano and Jin Eto to represent and sign for and on behalf of Fuji.
- The secretary’s certificate was duly authenticated by Sulpicio Confiado, Consul-General of
the Philippines in Japan.
- Likewise attached to the petition is the special power of attorney executed by Shuji Yano,
authorizing Corazon to sign on his behalf. The verification and certification against forum
shopping was signed by Corazon.
Arlene filed the manifestation dated February 27, 2013, arguing that the petition for review
should be dismissed because Corazon was not duly authorized to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping.
- Fuji filed a comment on Arlene’s manifestation, stating that Corazon was properly
authorized to sign.
- On the basis of the secretary’s certificate, Shuji Yano was empowered to delegate his
authority.
Quoting the board resolution dated May 13, 2010, the secretary's certificate states:
(a) The Corporation shall file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, against
Philippines’ National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") and Arlene S. Espiritu, and
participate in any other subsequent proceeding that may necessarily arise therefrom,
including but not limited to the filing of appeals in the appropriate venue;
(b) Mr. Shuji Yano and Mr. Jin Etobe authorized, as they are hereby authorized, to verify and
execute the certification against forum shopping which may be necessary or required to be
attached to any pleading to [sic] submitted to the Court of Appeals; and the authority to so
verify and certify for the Corporation in favor of the said persons shall subsist and remain
effective until the termination of the said case;
....
(d) Mr. Shuji Yano and Mr. Jin Etobe authorized, as they are hereby authorized, to represent and
appear on behalf the [sic] Corporation in all stages of the [sic] this case and in any other
proceeding that may necessarily arise thereform [sic], and to act in the Corporation’s name,
Page 21 of 22
place and stead to determine, propose, agree, decide, do, and perform any and all of the
following:
1. The possibility of amicable settlement or of submission to alternative mode of dispute
resolution;
2. The simplification of the issue;
3. The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
4. The possibility of obtaining stipulation or admission of facts and documents; and
5. Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.99 (Emphasis in the
original; Italics omitted)
Shuji Yano executed a special power of attorney appointing Ms. Ma. Corazon E. Acerden and
Mr. Moises A. Rollera as his attorneys-in-fact. The special power of attorney states:
That I, SHUJI YANO, of legal age, Japanese national, with office address at 2-4-8 Daiba,
Minato-Ku, Tokyo, 137-8088 Japan, and being the representative of Fuji TV, INc., [sic]
(evidenced by the attached Secretary’s Certificate) one of the respondents in NLRC-NCR Case
No. 05-06811-00 entitled "Arlene S. Espiritu v. Fuji Television Network, Inc./Yoshiki Aoki",
and subsequently docketed before the Court of Appeals asC.A. G.R. S.P. No. 114867
(Consolidated with SP No. 114889) do hereby make, constitute and appoint Ms. Ma. Corazon
E. Acerden and Mr. Moises A. Rolleraas my true and lawful attorneys-infact for me and my
name, place and stead to act and represent me in the above-mentioned case, with special power
to make admission/s and stipulations and/or to make and submit as well as to accept and
approve compromise proposals upon such terms and conditions and under such covenants as
my attorney-in-fact may deem fit, and to engage the services of Villa Judan and Cruz Law
Offices as the legal counsel to represent the Company in the Supreme Court;
The said Attorneys-in-Fact are hereby further authorized to make, sign, execute and deliver
such papers or documents as may be necessary in furtherance of the power thus granted,
particularly to sign and execute the verification and certification of non-forum shopping needed
to be filed.101 (Emphasis in the original)
In its comment on Arlene’s manifestation, Fuji argues that Shuji Yano could further delegate his
authority because the board resolution empowered him to "act in the Corporation’s name, place
and stead to determine, propose, agree, decided [sic], do and perform any and all of the
following: . . . such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.”
To clarify, Fuji attached a verification and certification against forum shopping, but Arlene
questions Corazon’s authority to sign.
Arlene argues
- that the secretary’s certificate empowered Shuji Yano to file a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals, and not a petition for review before this court, and
- that since Shuji Yano’s authority was delegated to him, he could not further delegate such
power.
Moreover, Corazon was representing Shuji Yano in his personal capacity, and not in his
capacity as representative of Fuji.
A review of the board resolution quoted in the secretary’s certificate shows
- that Fuji shall "file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals” and "participate in
any other subsequent proceeding that may necessarily arise therefrom, including but not
limited to the filing of appeals in the appropriate venue," and
- that Shuji Yano and Jin Eto are authorized to represent Fuji "in any other proceeding
that may necessarily arise therefrom [sic]."
As pointed out by Fuji, Shuji Yano and Jin Eto were also authorized to "act in the Corporation’s
name, place and stead to determine, propose, agree, decide, do, and perform any and all of the
following: . . . 5. Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.”
Considering that the subsequent proceeding that may arise from the petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals is the filing of a petition for review with this court, Fuji substantially
complied with the procedural requirement.
Corazon’s affidavit states that she is the "office manager and resident interpreter of the Manila
Bureau of Fuji Television Network, Inc." and that she has "held the position for the last twenty-
three years."
- As the office manager for 23 years, Corazon can be considered as having knowledge of all
matters in Fuji’s Manila Bureau Office and is in a position to verify "the truthfulness and the
correctness of the allegations in the Petition."
- Thus, Fuji substantially complied with the requirements of verification and certification
against forum shopping.
-

On the issue of whether Shuji Yano validly delegated his authority to Corazon, Article
1892 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states:

ART. 1892. The agent may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from
doing so; but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute:
(1) When he was not given the power to appoint one;
(2) When he was given such power, but without designating the person, and the person
appointed was notoriously incompetent or insolvent. All acts of the substitute appointed
against the prohibition of the principal shall be void.

The secretary’s certificate does not state that Shuji Yano is prohibited from appointing a
substitute. In fact, he is empowered to do acts that will aid in the resolution of this case.

This court has recognized that there are instances when officials or employees of a corporation
can sign the verification and certification against forum shopping without a board resolution.

In Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. CIR,108 it was held that:

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the
verification and certification without need of a board resolution:
(1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors,
(2) the President of a corporation,
(3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager,
(4) Personnel Officer, and
(5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the
verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the
authority was done on a case to case basis.

The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or
representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping,
being ‘in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.’

Page 22 of 22