SPECPRO| RULE 73| 1

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973 administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration
of the said court, giving as reasons the following:
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs. It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing
CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the
CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents. petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in
the basic petition for the issuance of letters of
TEEHANKEE, J.: administration. 2

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its
subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing
of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a
petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for
the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance
of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in
the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.

On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila

Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner
Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein
Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to
petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus
Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for
Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta.
Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April
Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage,
1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on
respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion
petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of
Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita
Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document
Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano
Jesus Cuenco." 3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late the probateproceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to
Senator) 1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu
Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433- court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition
R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in proceedings in the appellate courts.
Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of
his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and
City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition
Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and
for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the
assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain
heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof
petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp.
at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province
Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her
of Cebu.
petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed
that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
new and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that
the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to
Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that
dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding
respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special
over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further found in said order
that the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69

Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said
order follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5
of the opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows:
"that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a
resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the
aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12
March 1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong
venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of
the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted
allegation, the Court is made to understand that the
oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a
resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate
proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate
proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the
probate of the will should take precedence, but that the
probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City Court
of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the
oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also
be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the
petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don
Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a
resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last
Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition
for probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time
when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a
resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City,
and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his
first choice and the latter as his second choice of
residence." If a party has two residences, the one will be
deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself
selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be
the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the
instant petition before this Court, follows the first choice of
residence of the decedent and once this court acquires
jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion
of all others. 5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City
court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over
the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27
April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was
likewise denied.
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 2
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing
for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-
hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors
appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the
hearing in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon
City court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under
their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required
by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or
some other persons for his benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud
and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend
that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time
he affixed his signature thereto. 6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the
notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had
been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the
three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty.
Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the
notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and
the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates,
income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that
the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also
affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15
May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as
having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all
formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his
estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as
probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the
will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof,
respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case
CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No.
Q-7898.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 3

On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent
respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore
that: taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge,
therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc.
2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of
court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition
attached. It is that court which can properly and exclusively for review on certiorari.
pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent
left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate
decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death. court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City
court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was the testateproceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and
follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without
exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This
was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit,
Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent should assert her whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave
rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction
CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court. over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's
order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court)
March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, should first act "on the petition for probate of the document purporting to
acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" -
appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for which order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged
the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City
for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for
sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, toproceed with the hearing of
certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as
the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the to its due execution and authenticity.
moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of
jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in
events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from
does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge. proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all
its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as
follows: executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express
wish, for the following considerations: —
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue,
commanding and directing the respondent Court of First 1. The Judiciary Act 7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts
Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate
respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays
from proceeding and taking any action in Special down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in

order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may
properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited
Rule provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of the province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record. (Rule 73) 8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of
his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but
merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran
in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho 9 as follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that
in probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is
regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its
mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case
has been submitted in good faith to the Court of First
Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided.
All the parties, however, including all the creditors, have
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
the case is therein completely finished except for a claim of
a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on
appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first time in
this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for
lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we
consider such question of residence as one affecting the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the
effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all
decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 4
court will have to be annulled and the same case will have
to be commenced anew before another court of the same
rank in another province. That this is of mischievous
effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious
to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co.,
G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section
600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled in the province where he
had last resided, could not have been intended as defining
the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-
matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as
we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-
General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The
law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 —
confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all
probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First
Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No.
190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each
case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of
the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this
ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where
the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly
called "venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with
whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive
jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estateof a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between
courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with
whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the
decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving
widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 5

the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without
be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing
the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the
which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last testator's testamentary disposition.
will.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority
it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding against respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon
City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate
Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take
cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to
be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon
effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession
deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the
or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally
of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather
true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence
than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated
in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of
that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it
the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has
negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the
been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
decedent within its territory and venue.
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is
found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take proceedings even if at that state an administrator had
cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. already been appointed, the latter being required to render
final account and turn over the estate in his possession to
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged
petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall
cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a
jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will
Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14
the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate. The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in
this case, the Quezon City court) although opining that certain
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein
before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros
deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding
the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending
exclusion of all other courts. Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate
Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the
appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in

this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition,
albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is
merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the
opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to
raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by
laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that
petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan
Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio
Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in
Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was
served with notice of the existence (presence) of the
alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the
petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August
28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for
the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these
notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed
with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an
Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the
dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein
up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to
appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to
admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or
more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to
assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will
by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings
had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium
on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that
this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had
in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper
venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same
proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the
objection against said proceedings is raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City
court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of
the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that
Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his
conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly
given by the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from
said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly
provides:
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 6
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in
comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the
record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken
cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the
late senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a
legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of
whichever court is considered to prevail in the exercise
jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First Instance of
Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that
the question of the residence of the deceased is a serious
one, requiring both factual and legal resolution on the basis
of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of
procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the
fact that the deceased was better known as the Senator
from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu,
besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this
matter requires airing in the proper court, as so indicated in
the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon.
Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of
the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to
the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked
the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent and
whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would depend
the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The
Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts — at the
behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court —
that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate
and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no
applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require
the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated
in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of
the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 7

Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different
respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding based on courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating
documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice,
Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on and that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives
appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race
inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City. as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice
regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last
is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition will and testament and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix
for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule
"jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly
in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his administration of justice.
residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court
is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his 9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who
estate in such province." under all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu
court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the
"(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12,
a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the 1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the
whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly
is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's
a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all

validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within its the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate
jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings
proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to be converted into a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the
it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner- proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as
widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the
should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.
jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should
instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and
dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in
admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue
accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money
remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she
had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.
the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under
Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of Rule 73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with
considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial the death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate
court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the have to be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the
same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that
province "is too obvious to require comment." petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of
the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the
the decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of
decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 8

her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed
even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent. decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered
did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of dismissed. No costs.
discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by
petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's
last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to
dismiss) showed the falsityof the allegation in the intestate petition that the
decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never
challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of
10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City
court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of
deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have
acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting
the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in
accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled
doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule
of venue, not of jurisdiction.

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City

court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing
petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to
issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final and
can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its
supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine,
as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by
and transferredto the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice
and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference
and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will
and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix
without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders
and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and
authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to
repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to
revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that
indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the
strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City
was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 9

G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000 In an order8 dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 93, sitting as a probate court, granted the private respondents' twin
RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner, motions, in this wise:
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift,
DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE expunge or delete the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates of
MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents. Title Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 5182 and it is hereby
further ordered that the properties covered by the same titles as well as
BUENA, J.: those properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 613494, 363123,
236236 and 263236 are excluded from these proceedings.
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be
included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person? SO ORDERED.

Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review
on certiorari, the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April
1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617, which nullified and set aside the orders
dated 04 July 19952, 12 September 19953 and 15 September 19954 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court.
Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition9 which
contained the following averments:
3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following
business entities, to wit:

Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim
Business
whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Address:
Entity
Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy
Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner".1âwphi1.nêt
xxx xxx xxx
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing
Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action
Company are corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine Alliance Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF
laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system. Marketing, Homes, Parañaque, Metro
Inc. Manila.
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as
surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, fried on
xxx xxx xxx
17 March 1995, a joint petition5 for the administration of the estate of
Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Speed
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the 910 Barrio Niog, Aguinaldo
Distributing
inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion 6 for the lifting Highway, Bacoor, Cavite.
Inc.
of lis pendens and motion7 for exclusion of certain properties from the
estate of the decedent.
xxx xxx xxx
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 10

Auto Truck 2251 Roosevelt Avenue, xxx xxx xxx

TBA Corp. Quezon City.

k. Auto Truck TCT No. Sto. Domingo TBA

xxx xxx xxx 617726 Corporation Cainta,
Rizal

Active Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF

Distributors, Homes, Parañaque, Metro q. Alliance TCT No.
Prance, Metro Manila
Inc. Manila. Marketing 27896

xxx xxx xxx Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax
Declarations are hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".

Action 100 20th Avenue Murphy, xxx xxx xxx

Company Quezon City or 92-D Mc-
Arthur Highway Valenzuela 7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late
Bulacan. Pastor Y. Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him
during the existence of his marriage with petitioner.

3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in business
8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim
with the public as corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were
which petitioner could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will submit to
however, personally owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged
this Honorable Court the identities thereof and the necessary documents
stockholders and officers appearing in the respective articles of
covering the same as soon as possible.
incorporation of the above business entities were mere dummies of Pastor
Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only for purposes of registration with
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
issued an order10, thus:

4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the
Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the
following banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the
Avenue, Quezon City Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly
annotation of lis pendens in case said annotation had already been deleted
Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and in other banks
and/or cancelled said TCT Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and
whose identities are yet to be determined.
51282.

5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of the
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123,
above entities, were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage
236256 and 236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant
with petitioner, to wit:
petition.

Corporation Title Location SO ORDERED.

 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 11

On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari14, with an urgent
administrator11 and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special prayer for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the
administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of Court of Appeals questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting
administration were accordingly issued. as a probate court.

In an order12 dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew
private respondents' motion for exclusion, in this wise:
The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the
corporations are the mere alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim,
Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of the corporate veil,
a matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and
not the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease
vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided by the regular
court was whether the corporation involved therein was the mere extension
of the decedent. After finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled that the
assets of the corporation are also assets of the estate.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private
respondents, rendered the assailed decision15, the decretal portion of which
declares:
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action
for certiorari is hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by respondent
court on July 4, 1995 and September 12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set
aside. The impugned order issued by respondent on September 15, 1995 is
nullified insofar as petitioner corporations" bank accounts and records are
concerned.
SO ORDERED.

A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner
SEC's exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is simply Rufina Luy Lim now comes before us with a lone assignment of
a suit to settle the intestate estate of a deceased person who, during his error16:
lifetime, acquired several properties and put up corporations as his
instrumentalities. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower
court which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the
SO ORDERED. private respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic) Pastor
Y. Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion power to repeal, to disobey or to ignore the clear and explicit provisions of
filed by petitioner, issued an order13 the dispositive portion of which reads: Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the
petitioner, from performing her duty as special administrator of the estate
Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under as expressly provided in the said Rules.
enumerated are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to
produce and submit to the special administrators, through this Honorable Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds.
Court within (5) five days from receipt of this order their respective records
of the savings/current accounts/time deposits and other deposits in the In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders
names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations above-mentioned, showing all the issued by the probate court which were subsequently set aside by the Court
transactions made or done concerning savings/current accounts from of Appeals.
January 1994 up to their receipt of this court order.
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on
xxx xxx xxx jurisdiction over probate proceedings is indeed in order.

SO ORDERED.

The provisions of Republic Act 769117, which introduced amendments to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent:
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross
value of the estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in
probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings,
testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper
cases, where the value of the personal property, estate or amount of the
demand does not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in
Metro Manila where such personal property, estate or amount of the
demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000),
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs, the amount of which must be specifically
alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's,
litigation expenses and costs shall be included in the determination of the
filing fees, Provided further, that where there are several claims or causes
of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in
all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions;
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 12
xxx xxx xxx
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over
matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the
decedent.
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily
on the principle that a probate court may pass upon title to certain
properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory.
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may
extend its probing arms in the determination of the question of title in
probate proceedings.
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,18 held:
. . . As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in
the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS19:
. . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court.
However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which
may be instituted by the parties.
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE20 citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE21,
We made an exposition on the probate court's limited jurisdiction:
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed
to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 13

the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator.
If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so.
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO22, We had occasion to elucidate, through Mr.
Justice Andres Narvasa23:
Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court),
acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no
power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property
claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant
and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly
or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced,
the reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a
particular matter should be resolved by the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g.
probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in
essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be
waived. . . .
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting
to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have
a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in
the law itself, which of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as
a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. . . .
. . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a
property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence
of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be
considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is
nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as
in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named
in the title. . . .
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence
was ever presented by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the
title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree", proscribes
collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:

. . . . These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the xxx xxx xxx
Torrens title is not in the decedent's name but in others, a situation on
which this Court has already had occasion to rule . . . . (emphasis Ours) Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
under the Torrens system and registered in the name of private respondent
corporations should be included in the inventory of the estate of the In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the
decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the property subject of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens
probate court of whether these properties should be included or not is system, We categorically stated:
merely provisional in nature, thus, not conclusive and subject to a final
determination in a separate action brought for the purpose of adjudging . . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in
once and for all the issue of title. the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
registered in the name of private respondent corporations, the excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the
jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY vs., ALCID 24 is of great essence and estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession
finds applicability, thus: and ownership of the property. . . .
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 14

Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the articles of incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as incorporators
the Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the thereof, are mere dummies since they have not actually contributed any
name of private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a amount to the capital stock of the corporation and have been merely asked
personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their respective signatures thereon.
absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the
presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and
should stand undisturbed. distinct from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held
liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents' personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected
motion for exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, with it.28
acting in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a
probate court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a
of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the
adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties, it is no same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity
less true that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to
jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution the persons comprising it.
to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS29, We
Torrens system in the name of private respondents, and as such were to be enunciated:
afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court
obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to . . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an
issue the impugned orders. illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the
circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the law
utter disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of covers and isolates the corporation from the members or stockholders who
private respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act compose it will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an
transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence aggregation of individuals. . . .
on this matter.
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that
respondent corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate but also ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a
the private respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.30
contention, petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime,
organized and wholly-owned the five corporations, which are the private The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced
respondents in the instant case.25 Petitioner thus attached as Annexes when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another
"F"26 and "G"27 of the petition for review affidavits executed by Teresa Lim corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is
and Lani Wenceslao which among others, contained averments that the defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate
incorporators of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no actual fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught.31
and participation in the organization and incorporation of the said
corporation. The affiants added that the persons whose names appeared on
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 15

Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing
the veil of corporate fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or
complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but
of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that
the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate
mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such control must have been used by
the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a
statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in
contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and
breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained
of. The absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the corporate
veil".32
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or
nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient
reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.33
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
As to the order36 of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of
Appeals correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted
without jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate court had no
authority to demand the production of bank accounts in the name of the
private respondent corporations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of
Appeals which nullified and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12
September 1995 is AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt

Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, SO ORDERED.

the wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be
presumed.34

Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely
acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed
to adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale
the veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the
affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing
considering that the aforementioned documents possess no weighty
probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us
to stress that such affidavits are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the
affiants were not at all presented during the course of the proceedings in
the lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the
admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply
such basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with the law and
jurisprudence.

Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY

vs. LEONIDAS35 finds pertinence:

Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally
prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiant's statements, which may thus be either omitted or
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 16

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976 Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G.
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular
Vl, petitioners, administratrix after due hearing.
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court,
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents. Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G.
Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976 raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her
appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner, incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest
vs. against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First administratrix and as officer of the court.
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B.
GARCIA, respondents. In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of
MARTIN, J.: Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in
the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word Luzon.
"resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to
the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for
Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This
to be reviewed. supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the
allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his
Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the
for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G.
alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and
and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission
even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion. of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the
reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the
1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special beginning because the original petition was deficient.
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition
for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and
the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of
for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of

Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special
administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973,
praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent
allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances
from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation
made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to
making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the
state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order,
received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of
Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the
supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition,
because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has
not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3)
Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit
from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution
Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also
sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to
the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one,
to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in
the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to
Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting
outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still
another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the
petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus
motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 17
of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of
the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous qualification made by the
court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing
agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association should remain with the latter; and that the special
administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August
20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of
title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was
ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name
without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not
appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue
of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973,
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of
Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of
Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration
in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was
cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by
praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973
to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of
substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first,
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special
administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special
administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets
of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the
foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as
they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal
standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction;
(d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and

(e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in
the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July
19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one,
directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special
administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of
sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the
estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule
two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another,
directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his
possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the
word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C)
before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of
Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was
Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence
certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his
death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that
Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death,
and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the
first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a
special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily
to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the
questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974,
denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion
to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among
others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974,
directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix,
Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 18
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling
the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G.
Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case
was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the
Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975
a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the
same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa
B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of
the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed
Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00.
Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge
Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings
therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested,
however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision
of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First
Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it
being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings
before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final
outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This
notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to
Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the
previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the
decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had
already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before
the Court.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 19

On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the
Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the administration. 3
benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of
the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
Laguna. specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue,
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
12,1976. Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define
the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was
Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is
February 9, 1976. not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in
which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the
in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated. provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it
loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method,
in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of convenience to the parties. 5
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes
record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the
79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will,
affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of
sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And
and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the
assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as
seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. "venue." 6
The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country
are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the 2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides"
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at

the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term
"resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the
application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B.
Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his
death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court
of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated
"(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba,
Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition
for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of
venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba,
Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non
sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in
his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the
Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia
was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 20
alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove
the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia
G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of
residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained
three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of
Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his
two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973,
transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of
land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's
last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes
imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to
improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules
of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to
dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals
had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to
the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative
remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the
enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the
last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special
administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims
preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80
provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions
causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators

appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only
proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The
new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree
among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special
administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15That, however, is no
authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and
dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that
discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle.
There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles
governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into
account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong
for the judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a
regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the
consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial
interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law,
the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest
in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The
good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than
the naked ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the
widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia
maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G.
Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of
any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia
is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs
be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but
temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is
appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to
share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the
administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree
of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the
parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The
preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation
Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973
in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to
Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 21
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna
filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B.
Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia
can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G.
Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs.
Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all
inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was
properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the
interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City
court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix
over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First
Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and
instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975,
granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed
by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No.
L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as
special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of
estate obligations is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule
in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 22

G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987 vs.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO
BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE CUENCO
BORROMEO, and PETRA O. BORROMEO, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-65995 July 23, 1987

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO, AMELINDA BORROMEO,

and JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO,petitioners,
No. L-55000 July 23, 1987 vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Presiding Judge of Branch XV,
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO, DECEASED, Regional Trial Court of Cebu; RICARDO V. REYES, Administrator of
PILAR N. BORROMEO, MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO, the Estate of VITO BORROMEO in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R; and
JOSE BORROMEO, CONSUELO B. MORALES, AND CANUTO V. DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.
BORROMEO, JR., heirs-appellants,
vs. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-appellee.
These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO. 916-R of the then Court
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x of First Instance of Cebu.

No. L-62895 July 23, 1987 G.R. No. 41171

JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioner, Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on
vs. March 13, 1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, As heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
presiding Judge of the (now) Regional Trial Court, Branch XV,
Region VII, RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Estate of On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of
Vito Borromeo in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and Cebu a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and
DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents. testament left by the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas,
Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The document, drafted in
No. L-63818 July 23, 1987 Spanish, was allegedly signed and thumbmarked by the deceased in the
presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Felixberto Leonardo
DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of who acted as witnesses.
the Intestate Estate of VITO BORROMEO, Sp. Proceedings No. 916-
R, Regional Trial Court of Cebu, joined by HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, after
P. BURGOS, as Presiding Judge of Branch XV of the Regional Trial due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of
Court of Cebu, as a formal party, and ATTYS. FRANCIS M. ZOSA, the deceased was a forgery.
GAUDIOSO RUIZ and NUMERIANO ESTENZO, petitioners,
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 23

On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the Vito Borromeo
probate of the will was affirmed in Testate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H.
Junquera et al. v. Crispin Borromeo et al. (19 SCRA 656). Paulo Borromeo

The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Anecita Borromeo
Several parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging
themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. Quirino Borromeo and

The following petitions or claims were filed: Julian Borromeo

1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme
Borromeo filed a petition for declaration of heirs and determination of
heirship. There was no opposition filed against said petition.
2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo also filed a petition for
declaration as heir. The heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo
filed an opposition to this petition.
3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo de Castro,
Ramon Ocampo, Lourdes Ocampo, Elena Ocampo, Isagani Morre, Rosario
Morre, Aurora Morre, Lila Morre, Lamberto Morre, and Patricia Morre, filed a
petition for declaration of heirs and determination of shares. The petition
was opposed by the heirs of Jose and Cosme Borromeo.
2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952, without any issue, and
all his brothers and sisters predeceased him.
3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the following children:
a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on Oct. 16, 1939
b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1, 1955, or 3 years after the death
of Vito Borromeo. He was married to Remedios Cuenco Borromeo, who died
on March 28, 1968. He had an only son-Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo one of
the petitioners herein.
c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.

4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo Atega, Luz Borromeo,
Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp, Rosario Borromeo, and Fe Borromeo
Queroz filed a claim. Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana
Borromeo and the heirs of Carlos Borromeo represented by Jose Talam filed
oppositions to this claim.
4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died ahead of him and left an
only daughter, Aurora B. Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950 leaving the
following children:
a. Anecita Ocampo Castro

When the aforementioned petitions and claims were heard jointly, the b. Ramon Ocampo
following facts were established:
c. Lourdes Ocampo
1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, husband and wife (the latter
having predeceased the former), were survived by their eight (8) children, d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and
namely,
e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased), survived by claimant Jose
Jose Ma. Borromeo Barcenilla, Jr.

Cosme Borromeo 5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war
and left the following children:
Pantaleon Borromeo
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 24

a. Marcial Borromeo e. Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3, 1923, but survived by his
children:
b. Carlos Borromeo,who died on Jan. 18, 1965,survived by his wife,
Remedios Alfonso, and his only daughter, Amelinda Borromeo Talam aa. Maria Borromeo Atega

c. Asuncion Borromeo bb. Luz Borromeo

d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948. cc. Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp

e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944. dd. Rosario Borromeo

f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925. ee. Fe Borromeo Queroz

The last three died leaving no issue. On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued
an order declaring the following, to the exclusion of all others, as the
6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the intestate heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo:
war and left the following children:
1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo
a. Exequiel Borromeo,who died on December 29, 1949
2. Judge Crispin Borromeo
b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 1959, leaving the following
children: 3. Vitaliana Borromeo

aa. Federico Borromeo 4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera

bb. Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. Putong, Rec. p. 85) 5. Salud Borromeo

cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr. 6. Asuncion Borromeo

dd. Jose Borromeo 7. Marcial Borromeo

ee. Consuelo Borromeo 8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and

ff. Pilar Borromeo 9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo

gg. Salud Borromeo The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito
Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal
hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera and equitable shares among the 9 abovenamed declared intestate heirs.

c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948 On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of
Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the properties of
d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6, 1946 the deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 25

order of August 15, 1969. In this same order, the trial court ordered the hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared
administrator, Atty Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.
deceased in the way and manner they are divided and partitioned in the
said Agreement of Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on July 7, 1975.
value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated. All attorney's
fees shall be taken and paid from this segregated portion. In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial
court's order dated December 24, 1974, declaring respondent Fortunato
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo and the July 7,
claimed as heir under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court 1975 order, denying the motion for reconsideration.
praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito
Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that in The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take
the declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in cognizance of the claim of respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is not
disregard of the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime a money claim against the decedent but a claim for properties, real and
like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated personal, which constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the decedent's
that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the estate, heirs who allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The claim of the
legitime of an acknowledged natural child. private respondent under the waiver agreement, according to the
petitioner, may be likened to that of a creditor of the heirs which is
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the improper. He alleges that the claim of the private respondent under the
order of the court dated April 12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein waiver agreement was filed beyond the time allowed for filing of claims as it
as the legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the was filed only sometime in 1973, after there had been a declaration of heirs
motion on June 25, 1973. (April 10, 1969), an agreement of partition (April 30, 1969), the approval of
the agreement of partition and an order directing the administrator to
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum partition the estate (August 15, 1969), when in a mere memorandum, the
he submitted to support his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed existence of the waiver agreement was brought out.
the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and
incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly It is further argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of
signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Hereditary Rights" executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been
Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato
Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales, Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect because there
Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid
heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to
motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting as a probate Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of
court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the death of the one from
Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that whom he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since the
the waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the inheritance
heirs; that the same is void having been executed before the distribution of until they were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore, uncertain. This
the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057 of the
void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter. same Code which directs heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify their
acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that order for the distribution of the estate.
the five declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their

Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under
Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a person to be first
declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is
required is that he must first be certain of the death of the person from
whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the
inheritance. He points out that at the time of the signing of the waiver
document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were
certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their rights to the
inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the
validity of the waiver of hereditary rights, respondent Borromeo asserts
that since the waiver or renunciation of hereditary rights took place after
the court assumed jurisdiction over the properties of the estate it partakes
of the nature of a partition of the properties of the estate needing approval
of the court because it was executed in the course of the proceedings. lie
further maintains that the probate court loses jurisdiction of the estate only
after the payment of all the debts of the estate and the remaining estate is
distributed to those entitled to the same.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the
properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as
belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the
character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession
from the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle established in
article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according to which
the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less,
time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the
heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in
any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article
989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the
adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and
Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531). The heirs, therefore, could waive
their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was
issued only in 1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot
be considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are
essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence
thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador,
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 26
(CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or
advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only
proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly
consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the
particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his
conduct is possible (67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil.,
151, 159).
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver
document did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their
rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia
Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a
proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they
proposed to concede to all the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all
properties, personal and real, including all cash and sums of money in the
hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not contested
or claimed by them in any action then pending in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and concede to them all the 14
contested lots. In this document, the respondent recognizes and concedes
that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver document, is an
heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This
shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what
the respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise, there
would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to
mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to
concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and
30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement on how
the estate they inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition
was approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29, 1968,
the petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed of
Assignment" purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent
and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights,
interests, and participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the
deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was
P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas,
and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned deed of
assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the
heirs-assignors named in the same deed of assignment. The stated
consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment
and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 27

Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed this With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants contend that without
document on March 24, 1969. any formal pleading filed by the lawyers of Fortunato Borromeo for the
approval of the waiver agreement and without notice to the parties
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had concerned, two things which are necessary so that the lower court would be
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It must be vested with authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide the validity of said
noted that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court disallowed the waiver agreement, nevertheless, the lower court set the hearing on
probate of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed September 25, 1973 and without asking for the requisite pleading. This
the decision of the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498. resulted in the issuance of the appealed order of December 24, 1974, which
Subsequently, several parties came before the lower court filing claims or approved the validity of the waiver agreement. The appellants contend that
petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito this constitutes an error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial court in exercising jurisdiction
and trying the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by waiving their hereditary
court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its rights in favor of Fortunato Borromeo, the signatories to the waiver
recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate. document tacitly and irrevocably accepted the inheritance and by virtue of
the same act, they lost their rights because the rights from that moment on
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court dated became vested in Fortunato Borromeo.
December 24, 1974, is hereby SET ASIDE.
It is also argued by the appellee that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code
G.R. No. 55000 there is no need for a person to be declared as heir first before he can
accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he is certain of
This case was originally an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to the
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, dated December 24, 1974, inheritance. At the time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31,
declaring the waiver document earlier discussed in G.R. No. 41171 valid. 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were certain that Vito
The appellate court certified this case to this Court as the questions raised Borromeo was already dead and they were also certain of their right to the
are all of law. inheritance as shown by the waiver document itself.

The appellants not only assail the validity of the waiver agreement but they
also question the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and decide the
action filed by claimant Fortunato Borromeo.
The appellants argue that when the waiver of hereditary right was executed
on July 31, 1967, Pilar Borromeo and her children did not yet possess or
own any hereditary right in the intestate estate of the deceased Vito
Borromeo because said hereditary right was only acquired and owned by
them on April 10, 1969, when the estate was ordered distributed.
On the allegation of the appellants that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the claim because of the alleged lack of a pleading
invoking its jurisdiction to decide the claim, the appellee asserts that on
August 23, 1973, the lower court issued an order specifically calling on all
oppositors to the waiver document to submit their comments within ten
days from notice and setting the same for hearing on September 25, 1973.
The appellee also avers that the claim as to a 5/9 share in the inheritance
involves no question of title to property and, therefore, the probate court
can decide the question.

They further argue that in contemplation of law, there is no such contract of
waiver of hereditary right in the present case because there was no object,
which is hereditary right, that could be the subject matter of said waiver,
and, therefore, said waiver of hereditary right was not only null and void ab
initio but was inexistent.
The issues in this case are similar to the issues raised in G.R. No. 41171.
The appellants in this case, who are all declared heirs of the late Vito
Borromeo are contesting the validity of the trial court's order dated
December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the
estate of Vito Borromeo under the waiver agreement.

As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of hereditary rights can
not be validated. The essential elements of a waiver, especially the clear
and convincing intention to relinquish hereditary rights, are not found in
this case.
The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable settlement conceding to all
the eight (8) intestate heirs various properties in consideration for the heirs
giving to the respondent and to Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo the fourteen
(14) contested lots was filed inspite of the fact that on July 31, 1967, some
of the heirs had allegedly already waived or sold their hereditary rights to
the respondent.
The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed, the June 29, 1968
deed of assignment, the deed of reconveyance, and the subsequent
cancellation of the deed of assignment and deed of reconveyance all argue
against the purported waiver of hereditary rights.
Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already stated in G.R. No.
41171 that the trial court acquired jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
the waiver agreement because the trial court's jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate.
The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 62895
A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul M. Sesbreno,
representative of some of the heirs-distributees, praying for the immediate
closure of Special Proceeding No. 916-R. A similar motion dated May 29,
1979 was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora. Both motions were grounded on the
fact that there was nothing more to be done after the payment of all the
obligations of the estate since the order of partition and distribution had
long become final.
Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos failed or refused to
resolve the aforesaid motions, petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo-filed a
petition for mandamus before the Court of Appeals to compel the
respondent judge to terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R.
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 28
Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was due to pending
motions to compel the petitioner, as co-administrator, to submit an
inventory of the real properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash
in his hands, pending claims for attorney's fees, and that mandamus will
not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary function, the appellate
court denied the petition on May 14, 1982. The petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the respondent judge on the
motion filed on April 28, 1972 for the closure of the administration
proceeding cannot be justified by the filing of the motion for inventory and
accounting because the latter motion was filed only on March 2, 1979. He
claimed that under the then Constitution, it is the duty of the respondent
judge to decide or resolve a case or matter within three months from the
date of its submission.
The respondents contend that the motion to close the administration had
already been resolved when the respondent judge cancelled all settings of
all incidents previously set in his court in an order dated June 4, 1979,
pursuant to the resolution and restraining order issued by the Court of
Appeals enjoining him to maintain status quo on the case.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs,
with the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of
partition of the properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was
approved by the trial court, in its order dated August 15, 1969. In this
same order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya,
Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased in the way and manner they
are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and further
ordered that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall
be segregated and reserved for attorney's fees.
According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco Burgos dated July 5,
1982, (p. 197, Rollo, G. R. No. 41171) his court has not finally distributed
to the nine (9) declared heirs the properties due to the following
circumstances:
1. The court's determination of the market value of the estate in order to
segregate the 40% reserved for attorney's fees;

2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo as
beneficiary of the 5/9 of the estate because of the waiver agreement signed
by the heirs representing the 5/9 group which is still pending resolution by
this Court (G.R. No. 4117 1);
3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to render his
accounting; and
4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for 1/2 of the estate causing annotations of
notices of lis pendens on the different titles of the properties of the estate.
Since there are still real properties of the estate that were not vet
distributed to some of the declared heirs, particularly the 5/9 group of heirs
due to the pending resolution of the waiver agreement, this Court in its
resolution of June 15, 1983, required the judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, to expedite the determination of Special
Proceedings No. 916-R and ordered the co-administrator Jose Cuenco
Borromeo to submit an inventory of real properties of the estate and to
render an accounting of cash and bank deposits realized from rents of
several properties.
The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in G.R. No. 65995.
Considering the pronouncements stated in:
1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting aside the Order of the trial
court dated December 24, 1974;
2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for review seeking to modify the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and
inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the Intestate Estate
of Vito Borromeo and ordering the remand of the case to the
Executive,Judge of the Regional trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling; and
3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to restrain the respondents from
further acting on any and all incidents in Special proceedings No. 916-11
because of the affirmation of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court in G.R. No. 63818.
the trial court may now terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R,
subject to the submission of an inventory of the real properties of the
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 29
estate and an accounting of the call and bank deposits of the petitioner, as
co-administrator of the estate, if he has not vet done so, as required by this
Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983. This must be effected with all
deliberate speed.
G.R. No. 63818
On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo and Petra 0.
Borromeo filed a motion for inhibition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch 11, presided over by Judge Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit the judge
from further acting in Special Proceedings No. 916-R. 'The movants alleged,
among others, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. Antigua filed a motion for the
production of the certificates of title and to deposit the same with the
Branch Clerk of Court, presumably for the ready inspection of interested
buyers. Said motion was granted by the Hon. Court in its order of October
2, 1978 which, however, became the subject of various motions for
reconsideration from heirs-distributees who contended that as owners they
cannot be deprived of their titles for the flimsy reasons advanced by Atty,
Antigua. In view of the motions for reconsideration, Atty Antigua ultimately
withdraw his motions for production of titles.
7. The incident concerning the production of titles triggered another
incident involving Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno who was then the counsel of
herein movants Petra O. Borromeo and Amelinda B. Talam In connection
with said incident, Atty. Sesbreno filed a pleading which the tion. presiding,
Judge Considered direct contempt because among others, Atty. Sesbreno
insinuated that the Hon. Presiding Judge stands to receive "fat commission"
from the sale of the entire property. Indeed, Atty. Sesbreno was seriously
in danger of being declared in contempt of court with the dim prospect of
suspension from the practice of his profession. But obviously to extricate
himself from the prospect of contempt and suspension. Atty. Sesbreno
chose rapproachment and ultimately joined forces with Atty. Antigua, et al.,
who, together, continued to harass administrator
xxx xxx xxx

9. The herein movants are informed and so they allege, that a brother of
the Hon. Presiding Judge is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.
10. There is now a clear tug of war bet ween Atty. Antigua, et al. who are
agitating for the sale of the entire estate or to buy out the individual heirs,
on the one hand, and the herein movants, on the other, who are not willing
to sell their distributive shares under the terms and conditions presently
proposed. In this tug of war, a pattern of harassment has become apparent
against the herein movants, especially Jose Cuenco Borromeo. Among the
harassments employed by Atty Antigua et al. are the pending motions for
the removal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo, the subpoena duces
tecum issued to the bank which seeks to invade into the privacy of the
personal account of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, and the other matters
mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof. More harassment motions are expected
until the herein movants shall finally yield to the proposed sale. In such a
situation, the herein movants beg for an entirely independent and impartial
judge to pass upon the merits of said incidents.
11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to sit and take cognizance of
this proceeding, including the incidents above-mentioned, he is liable to be
misunderstood as being biased in favor of Atty Antigua, et al. and
prejudiced against the herein movants. Incidents which may create this
impression need not be enumerated herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo)
The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge Francisco P. Burgos. Their
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the private respondents
filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction
before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
In the appellate court, the private respondents alleged, among others, the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the necessity of having to state
herein that respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos has shown undue interest
in pursing the sale initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua, et al.
Significantly, a brother of respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos is married to
a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 30
17. Evidence the proposed sale of the entire properties of the estate cannot
be legally done without the conformity of the heirs-distributees because the
certificates of title are already registered in their names Hence, in pursuit of
the agitation to sell, respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos urged the heirs-
distributees to sell the entire property based on the rationale that proceeds
thereof deposited in the bank will earn interest more than the present
income of the so called estate. Most of the heirs-distributees, however.
have been petitioner timid to say their piece. Only the 4/9 group of heirs
led by Jose Cuenco Borromeo have had the courage to stand up and refuse
the proposal to sell clearly favored by respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos.
xxx xxx xxx
20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein the merits of the shotgun
motion of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua as well as other incidents now pending
in the court below which smack of harassment against the herein
petitioners. For, regardless of the merits of said incidents, petitioners
respectfully contend that it is highly improper for respondent Hon. Francisco
P. Burgos to continue to preside over Sp. Proc. No. 916-R by reason of the
following circumstances:
(a) He has shown undue interest in the sale of the properties as initiated by
Atty. Domingo L. Antigua whose sister is married to a brother of
respondent.
(b) The proposed sale cannot be legally done without the conformity of the
heirs-distributees, and petitioners have openly refused the sale, to the
great disappointment of respondent.
(c) The shot gun motion of Atty. Antigua and similar incidents are clearly
intended to harass and embarrass administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo in
order to pressure him into acceding to the proposed sale.
(d) Respondent has shown bias and prejudice against petitioners by failing
to resolve the claim for attorney's fees filed by Jose Cuenco Borromeo and
the late Crispin Borromeo. Similar claims by the other lawyers were
resolved by respondent after petitioners refused the proposed sale. (pp. 41-
43, Rollo)
On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its decision granting the
petition for certiorari and/or prohibition and disqualifying Judge Francisco P.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 31

Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916-R. January, 1977 to February 1982, inclusive, without mentioning the
The court also ordered the transmission of the records of the case to the withholding tax for the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In order to bolster the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling. agitation to sell as proposed by Domingo L. Antigua, Judge Burgos invited
Antonio Barredo, Jr., to a series of conferences from February 26 to 28,
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate 1979. During the conferences, Atty. Antonio Barredo, Jr., offered to buy the
court on April 11, 1983. Hence, the present petition for review seeking to shares of the heirs-distributees presumably to cover up the projected sale
modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it initiated by Atty. Antigua.
disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the
case of Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and orders the remand of the On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences, a motion was filed by
case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re- petitioner Domingo L. Antigua praying that Jose Cuenco Borromeo be
raffling. required to file an inventory when he has already filed one to account for
cash, a report on which the administrators had already rendered: and to
The principal issue in this case has become moot and academic because appear and be examined under oath in a proceeding conducted by Judge
Judge Francisco P. Burgos decided to retire from the Regional Trial Court of Burgos lt was also prayed that subpoena duces tecum be issued for the
Cebu sometime before the latest reorganization of the judiciary. However, appearance of the Manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.,
we decide the petition on its merits for the guidance of the judge to whom bringing all the bank records in the name of Jose Cuenco Borromeo jointly
this case will be reassigned and others concerned. with his wife as well as the appearance of heirs-distributees Amelinda
Borromeo Talam and another heir distributee Vitaliana Borromeo.
The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo has been Simultaneously with the filing of the motion of Domingo Antigua, Atty. Raul
harassed. They contend that Judge Burgos has benn shown unusual H. Sesbreno filed a request for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum to
interest in the proposed sale of the entire estate for P6,700,000.00 in favor the Manager of Consolidated Bank and 'Trust Co., Inc.; Register of Deeds of
of the buyers of Atty. Antigua. They claim that this disinterest is shown by Cebu City; Register of Deeds for the Province of Cebu and another
the judge's order of March 2, 1979 assessing the property of the estate at subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
P15,000,000.00. They add that he only ordered the administrator to sell so
much of the properties of the estate to pay the attorney's fees of the On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces
lawyers-claimants. To them, the inhibition of Judge Burgos would have tecum to the Managert of the bank, the Register of deeds for the City of
been unreasonable because his orders against the failure of Jose Cuenco Cebu, the Register of Deeds for the Province, of Cebu. and to Jose Cuenco
Borromeo, as administrator, to give an accounting and inventory of the Borromeo.
estate were all affirmed by the appellate court. They claim that the
respondent court, should also have taken judicial notice of the resolution of On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty Gaudioso v. Villagonzalo in behalf
this Court directing the said judge to "expedite the settlement and of the heirs of Marcial Borromeo who had a common cause with Atty
adjudication of the case" in G.R. No. 54232. And finally, they state that the Barredo, Jr., joined petitioner Domingo L. Antigua by filing a motion for
disqualification of judge Burgos would delay further the closing of the relief of the administrator.
administration proceeding as he is the only judge who is conversant with
the 47 volumes of the records of the case. On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum to private respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo to
Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he had been harassed. bring and produce all the owners" copies of the titles in the court presided
countered that Judge Burgos appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as co- order by Judge Burgos.
administrator of the estate on October 11, 1972, yet Borromeo was singled
out to make an accounting of what t he was supposed to have received as
rentals for the land upon which the Juliana Trade Center is erected, from

Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces
tecum commanding Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce the
titles in court.
All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7, 1979 but on June
14, 1979, before the date of the hearing, Judge Burgos issued an order
denying the private respondents' motion for reconsideration and the motion
to quash the subpoena.1avvphi1
It was further argued by the private respondents that if ,judge Francisco P.
Burgos is not inhibited or disqualified from trying Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, there
would be a miscarriage of justice Because for the past twelve years, he had
not done anything towards the closure of the estate proceedings except to
sell the properties of the heirs-distributees as initiated by petitioner
Domingo L. Antigua at 6.7 million pesos while the Intestate Court had
already evaluated it at 15 million pesos.
The allegations of the private respondents in their motion for inhibition,
more specifically, the insistence of the trial judge to sell the entire estate at
P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of heirs objected, cannot easily be
ignored. Suspicion of partiality on the part of a trial judge must be avoided
at all costs. In the case of Bautista v. Rebeuno(81 SCRA 535), this Court
stated:
... The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties
litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very
first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or
not, the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A
judge may not be legally Prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when
circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and
probity in favor or of either partly or incite such state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a
way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired, "The
better course for the Judge under such circumstances is to disqualify
himself "That way he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity
and objectivity is preserve ed. what is more important, the Ideal of
impartial administration of justice is lived up to.
In this case, the fervent distrust of the private respondents is based on
sound reasons. As Earlier stated, however, the petition for review seeking
to modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 32
disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo case and ordering the remand of the case
to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court for re-raffling should be
DENIED for the decision is not only valid but the issue itself has become
moot and academic.
G.R. No. 65995
The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further acting on any
and all incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R during the pendency of
this petition and No. 63818. They also pray that all acts of the respondents
related to the said special proceedings after March 1, 1983 when the
respondent Judge was disqualified by the appellate court be declared null
and void and without force and effect whatsoever.
The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has set for hearing all
incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R, including the reversion from the
heirs-distributees to the estate, of the distributed properties already titled
in their names as early as 1970, notwithstanding the pending inhibition
case elevated before this Court which is docketed as G.R. No. 63818.
The petitioners further argue that the present status of Special Proceeding
No. 916-R requires only the appraisal of the attorney's fees of the lawyers-
claimants who were individually hired by their respective heirs-clients, so
their attorney's fees should be legally charged against their respective
clients and not against the estate.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the petition is a dilatory
one and barred by res judicata because this Court on July 8, 1981, in G.R.
No. 54232 directed the respondent Judge to expedite the settlement and
liquidation of the decedent's estate. They claim that this resolution, which
was already final and executory, was in effect reversed and nullified by the
Intermediate Appellate Court in its case-AC G.R.-No. SP - 11145 — when it
granted the petition for certiorari and or prohibition and disqualified Judge
Francisco P. Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings
No. 916R as well as ordering the transmission of the records of the case to
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling
on March 1, 1983, which was appealed to this Court by means of a Petition
for Review (G.R. No. 63818).
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 33

We agree with the petitioners' contention that attorney's fees are not the
obligation of the estate but of the individual heirs who individually hired
their respective lawyers. The portion, therefore, of the Order of August 15,
1969, segregating the exhorbitantly excessive amount of 40% of the
market value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and
paid should be deleted.
Due to our affirmance of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in
G.R. No. 63818, we grant the petition.
(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating 40% of the
market value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and
paid should be, as it is hereby DELETED. The lawyers should collect from
the heirs-distributees who individually hired them, attorney's fees according
to the nature of the services rendered but in amounts which should not
exceed more than 20% of the market value of the property the latter
acquired from the estate as beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, —

(1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated December
24, 1974, declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the estate of the late
Vito Borromeo and the order dated July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned order are hereby SET
ASIDE for being NULL and VOID;

(2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the waiver
document valid is hereby SET ASIDE;

(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue in the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying and ordering the
inhibition of Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing Special
Proceedings No. 916-R is declared moot and academic. The judge who has
taken over the sala of retired Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall immediately
conduct hearings with a view to terminating the proceedings. In the event
that the successor-judge is likewise disqualified, the order of the
Intermediate Appellate Court directing the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle the case shall be implemented:

(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. 'The issue seeking
to restrain Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further acting in G.R. No. 63818
is MOOT and ACADEMIC:

(5) In G.R, No, 62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to speedily
terminate the close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the
submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate and an
accounting of the cash and bank deposits by the petitioner-administrator of
the estate as required by this Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983;
and

G.R. No. 95574 August 16, 1991
HADJI WAHIDA MUSA, HADJI SALMA MUSA, RIZAL MUSA and
BASSER MUSA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, Cotabato City and HADJI
JAHARA ABDURAHIM, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p
Questions of jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, and of venue, in an
intestate proceeding are herein raised.
Involved is the intestate estate of the late Jamiri Musa, a Muslim, who
passed away on 31 December 1987. He had six (6) wives, three (3) of
whom he later divorced, and twenty three (23) children. He had extensive
real and personal properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao,
Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental. Petitioners, Hadji WAHIDA Musa and
Hadji SALMA Musa, are among those he divorced, while private respondent
Hadji Jalai a ABDURAHIM is one of the three (3) surviving widows, RIZAL
Musa and BASSER Musa are two (2) of his sons.
On 7 July 1989, Respondent ABDURAHIM filed a "Joint Petition for the
Administration and Settlement of the Inestate Estate of the Late Jamiri
Musa and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership," before the Shari'a District
Court, Fifth Sharia's District, with station at Cotabato City (SDC Spec.
Proceedings No. 89-19) (the Intestate Case). That Court embraces the
province of Maguindanao within its jurisdiction but not the provinces of
Davao del Sur and Oriental.
The Petition averred that the decedent Jamiri Musa a resident of Linao, Upi,
Maguindanao, left various properties located in the provinces of
Maguindanao (184 hectares), Davao del Sur (61 hectares), and Davao
Oriental (207 hectares). Aside from the settlement of the vast estate, also
prayed for was the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets of the
decedent and ABDURAHIM and the segregation and turn-over to the latter
of her one-half (1/2) share.
Appearing as oppositors were: Petitioners WAHIDA and SALMA, the
divorced wives, who also claim to be widows of the deceased: RIZAL, Putih
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 34
Musa, and Erum Musa, children of WAHIDA with the decedent; and
BASSER, another son. They alleged that venues was improperly said and
that the properties of the decedent located outside Aguinaldo were beyond
the jurisdiction of the Shari'a District. Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
Finding the Joint Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Respondent
Judge issued the Order of Publication on 1 July 1989 and initially set the
case for hearing on 18 September 1989.
All interested parties were duly represented during the hearing on said date
where petitioners, through counsel, manifested their desire to have the
case amicably settled, Respondent Judo "in the interest of peace and
harmony among the heirs of the deceased Jamiri Musa," appointed the
following as Special Administrators: ABDURAHIM, for all properties situated
in Maguindanao; RIZAL. for all properties situated in Davao Oriental; and
BASSER. for all properties situated in Davao del Sul.
However, on 4 October 1989, ABDURAHIM, in her manifestation and Motion
to Cite for Contempt," accused BASSER, among others, of having allegedly
fired upon the house of her son in-law in Maguindanao on 21 September
1989.
Whereupon, on 13 October 1989, an "Opposition to Petition for
Administration and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership" was filed by
Petitioners, alleging that ABDURAHIM was never legally married to the
decedent and, as such, there was "nothing to support her claim" of having
had a conjugal partnership with the latter; and that venue was improperly
laid. Petitioners also asked that RIZAL be issued Letters of Administration
instead.
In her Reply, filed on 25 October 1989, ABDURAHIM averred that, her
marriage to the decedent was admitted by the latter in various Deeds of
Sale he had signed, which were presented as documentary evidence. Since
there was no amicable settlement reached, hearings on the Joint Petition
were conducted, commencing on 27 December 1989.
On 16 May 1990, Respondent Judge, issued an Order appointing
ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix upon the finding that she was legally
married to the decedent. Petitioners moved for reconsideration.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 35

In the interim, Respondent Judge issued an Amended Order, dated 4 June Since the disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of a
1990, incorporating the testimonies of the two (2) other witnesses deceased Muslim is, in fact, involved herein, the Joint Petition was correctly
presented by Petitioners, which were omitted in the Order, dated 16 May filed before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
1990. Otherwise, the appointment of ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix
was maintained. In invoking improper venue, however, petitioners call attention to the Rules
of Court mandating that:
On 10 August 1990, Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With
Motion to Dismiss," raising once again, mainly the questions of venue and Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is an
of jurisdiction of the respondent Court over the real properties of the inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental. an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
Respondent Judge denied both Motions and upheld the Court's jurisdiction resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
in his Order, dated 22 August 1990. Hence, the elevation of the instant country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
Petition for Prohibition before this Court seeking to enjoin respondent Judge The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
Corocoy D. Moson, presiding over the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
District, from further taking action on the "Joint Petition ." jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location his estate, shall not be
Petitioners take the position that Respondent Judge should have dismissed contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the Intestate Case for lack of jurisdiction and for improper venue. Private the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
respondent maintains the contrary. (Rule 73). (Emphasis supplied).

We rule against Petitioners.
Pres. Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines, explicitly provides that exclusive original
jurisdiction, in matters of settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims,
belong to Shari'a District Courts. Thus:
It is then claimed that since the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death was actually in Davao City, not Maguindanao, as averred by
ABDUHARIM, the proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a
District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, and that venue is more properly laid in
Davao City before the Regional Trial Court since there are no Shari'a
District Courts therein.

Art. 143. Original Jurisdiction.—The Shari'a District Court shall At this juncture, it should be recalled that the residence of the deceased in
have exclusive original jurisdictionover: an estate proceeding is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but merely of venue. The law of jurisdiction confers upon Courts of
xxx xxx xxx First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased (In the matter of
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate the intestate estate of Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239 [1943]).
of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration
or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or To all appearances, the decedent was a resident of both Linao, Upi,
the aggregate value of the property. (Chapter 1, Title I, Book IV, par. (b), Maguindanao, and Davao City. In fact, in various Deeds of Sale presented
(Emphasis supplied). as evidence by the parties, the decedent alternately stated his place of
residence as either Linao, Upi,Maguindanao which is the residence of
ABDURAHIM, or Davao City, where Petitioners reside. As this Court held
in Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954), "a man can have but one

domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence." Venue, therefore, ordinarily could be at
either place of the decedent's residence, i.e., Maguindanao or Davao City,
but for the provisions of the Muslim Code vesting exclusive original
jurisdiction, in matters of disposition and settlement of estates of deceased
Muslims, in Shari'a District Courts (supra).
But petitioners also contend that the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a
District, presided over by respondent Judge, has no territorial jurisdiction
over properties of the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur
and Davao Oriental, citing as statutory authority therefor the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, which provides:
Art. 138. Shari'a judicial districts.—Five special judicial districts, each to
have one Shari'a District Court presided over by one judge, are constituted
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) The Fifth Shari'a District, the Provinces of Maguindanao, North Cotabato
and Sultan Kudarat, and the City of Cotabato.
Indeed, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental are not comprised within the
Fifth Shari'a District. In fact, those provinces are outside the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao created by Republic Act No. 6734, its Organic
Act. But as stated in that law, "the Shari'a District Court and the Shari'a
Circuit Courts created under existing laws shall continue to function as
provided therein." (Art. IX, Sec. 13).
Additionally, the same Organic Act explicitly provides;
(4) Except in cases of successional rights, the regular courts shall acquire
jurisdiction over controversies involving real property outside the area of
autonomy. (Art. IX, Section 17[4]). (Emphasis supplied)
Since the subject intestate proceeding concerns successional rights, coupled
with the fact that the decedent was also a resident of Linao, Upi, SO ORDERED.
Maguindanao, owning real estate property located in that province, venue
has been properly laid with the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District,
winch is vested with territorial jurisdiction over Maguindanao,
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 36
notwithstanding the location in different provinces of the other real proper-
ties of the decedent.
A contrary ruling would only result in multiplicity of suits, to the detriment
of the expeditious settlement of estate proceedings (See Ngo Bun Tiong v.
Sayo, 30 June 1988,163 SCRA 237 [1988]). Besides, the judgment that
may be rendered by the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, may be
executed in other provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated.
When an action covers various parcels of land situated in different
provinces, venue may be laid in the Court of First Instance of any of said
provinces, and the judgment rendered therein may be executed in other
provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated (National Bank v.
Barreto, 52 Phil. 818 [1929]; Monte Piedad v. Rodrigo, 56 Phil. 310 [1931];
El Hogar Filipino v. Seva ,57 Phil. 573 [L-1932]; Bank of P.I. v. Green, 57
Phil. 712 [1932]).
The Rules of Court likewise provide that the Court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other Courts(Rule 73, sec. 1). There should be no
impediment to the application of said Rules as they apply suppletorily to the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, there being nothing inconsistent with the
provisions of the latter statute (Article 187 of said Code).
And while Rule 73 provides that "the jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record," we have taken cognizance of this Petition for
Prohibition considering that the jurisdiction of a Shari'a District Court, a
relatively new Court in our judicial system, has been challenged.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Prohibition is DENIED, and the case hereby
REMANDED to the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, for
continuation of the intestate proceedings. No costs.

G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991
MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES-TIMBOL,
ERLINDA REYES-VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES, ELIZABETH REYES,
ALEX, RAFAEL II, EMELINA and EVELYN, all surnamed REYES,
represented by their mother, MARIA VDA. DE REYES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and
ROSARIO MARTILLANOrespondents.
De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.
Santos, Pilapil & Associates for private respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
Assailed before Us in this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
11934, promulgated on 20 October 1989, 1 reversing the decision of 1
October 1986 of Branch 21 (Imus, Cavite) of the Regional Trial Court of the
Fourth Judicial Region in Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 entitled Maria
vda. de Reyes, et al. vs. Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano,
and Spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola, 2 and the resolution
of 1 March 1990 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the parties, the following
facts have been preponderantly established:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of
approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-
Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation
of the Torrens System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in
1921 without the title having been issued to him. The application was
prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his
property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs
(Exh. "6"). In the subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked,
indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It appears therein that two
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 37
lots, one of which is Lot No. I A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael
Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the
children thereafter secured tax declarations for their respective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original
certificate of title for the whole property — OCT No. 255 — was issued. It
was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who was
by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area
of 23,431 square meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio
Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot
No. 1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed of sale, however,
did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee immediately took
possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.
In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of
Title. As reconstituted, the new title is OCT (0-4358) RO-255 (Exhs. "4" to
"4-A").
On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. "D") based on the aforestated
subdivision plan (Exh. "6"), the lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr.,
who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his only son and
heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners
herein). Private respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in
representation of her mother, Marta Reyes, one of the children of Gavino
Reyes.
As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and
in lieu thereof, several transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided
lots were issued in the names of the respective adjudicatees. One of them
is TCT No. 27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr. covering Lot No. 1-A-14.
The Transfer Certificates of Title were, however, kept by one Candido
Hebron. On 10 January 1969, some of the heirs of Gavino Reyes filed a
case of Annulment of Partition and Recovery of Possession before the Court
of First Instance of Cavite City, which was docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 1267. One of the defendants in said case is herein private respondent
Rosario Martillano. The case was dismissed on 18 September 1969, but
Candido Hebron was ordered by the trial court to deliver to the heirs
concerned all the transfer certificates of title in his possession. 3

After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from
Hebron, pursuant to the aforesaid order in Civil Case No. 1267, petitioners
herein, as successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March
1983 with the Regional Trial Court the above-mentioned Civil Case No.
RTC-BCV-83-17 against private respondents (defendants therein) for
recovery of possession or, in the alternative, for indemnification, accounting
and damages. They allege therein that after "having definitely discovered
that they are the lawful owners of the property," (Lot No. 1-A-14), they,
"including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated demands to
(sic) defendants to surrender the possession of and vacate the parcel of
land belonging to the former, but defendants refused to vacate and
surrender the possession of the said land to herein plaintiffs;" the last of
the demands was allegedly made on 8 October 1982. They further allege
that they have been deprived by said defendants of the rightful possession
and enjoyment of the property since September 1969 — which coincides
with the date of the order in Civil Case No. 1267. 4
In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the
complaint and assert that they are the owners of the lot in question, having
bought the same from Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the issuance of TCT No.
27257 is null and void, for such sale was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that
they have been in possession of the property and have been paying the
land taxes thereon; and that petitioners are barred by prescription and/or
laches. 5
Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to implead as
additional defendants the spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emerita
Gardiola, on the basis of the following claims:
xxx xxx xxx
9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of the defendants spouses Dalmacio
Gardiola and Rosario Martillano's evidence the former testified that they
mortgaged the subject land to the Rural Bank of Carmona Inc. For their
failure to redeem the mortgage the same was foreclosed by the bank.
10. However, within the period of one(1) year from such foreclosure the
questioned land was redeemed by the original defendants' son in the
person of Ricardo M. Gardiola, who was knowledgeable/aware of the
pendency of the above captioned case. The corresponding redemption was
effected through a deed of conveyance, . . . . 6
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 38
The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the alternative relief for
indemnification for the reasonable value of the property "in the event
restitution of the property is no longer possible." 7
In its decision of 1 October 1986, 8 the trial court concluded that
petitioners' "title over the subject property is valid and regular and thus
they are entitled to its possession and enjoyment," and accordingly decided
thus:
WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone acting for and in their behalf are
hereby ordered to relinguish possession or vacate the property in question
which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 in favor of the
plaintiffs.
All other claims and/or counterclaims of the parties relative to this case are
dismissed for lack of proper substantiation.
The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that (a) there is no
evidence that the heirs of Gavino Reyes entered into any written agreement
of partition in 1936 based on the subdivision plan; (b) there is no identity
between Lot No. 1-14-A and the land sold to private respondents by Rafael
Reyes, Sr., or otherwise stated, the description of the latter as indicated in
the deed of sale (Exh. "5") does not tally with the description of the former;
and (c) moreover:
Granting, arguendo, that the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to the
defendants covered the land in question — Lot No. 1-A-14 — and that
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 was obtained by means of fraud,
the claim of the defendants over the said property is already barred. Action
for reconveyance prescribes in four (4) years from the discovery thereof. If
there was fraud, the defendant could have discovered the same
in 1967 when the partition was made in as much as defendant Rosario
Martillano was a party to that partition. Let us grant further that the
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 to Rafael Reyes, Jr.
created a constructive or implied trust in favor of the defendants, again, the
claim of the defendants is also barred. From 1967 to the filing of their
answer (let us consider this as an action for reconveyance) to this case
sometime in July, 1983, a period of about sixteen (16) years had already
elapsed. Prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust is ten (10) years.

The trial court further held that the continued possession by private
respondents, which it found to have started in 1943, did not ripen into
ownership because at that time, the property was already registered, hence
it cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 9
Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals
which docketed the appeal as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934. In its decision of 20
October 1989, the respondent Court of Appeals formulated the issues
before it as follows:
I (Exh. 6) undisputedly showed on its face that the 70 hectares of land
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the property of the
late Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was partitioned only in 1967 by
his grandchildren after discovery of the existence of OCT No. 255 and that
no actual partition was made in 1936 by the decedent's children.
II
Whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that the parcel of land
sold by the appellees' predecessor-in-interest, the late Rafael Reyes, Sr. to
appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under
litigation. 10
and resolved such issues, thus:
On the first issue, We believe that the lower court committed a reversible
error when it declared that the landed estate of the late Gavino Reyes was
partitioned only in 1967 by the latter's grandchildren; and that no actual
partition was made in 1936 by the decedents' (sic) children. The evidence
on record bears out the existence of a subdivision plan (Exh. 6) which was
not controverted nor denied by the appellees. In like manner, the lower
court itself recognized the fact that the property of the late Gavino Reyes
consisting of 70 hectares was surveyed and subdivided in 1936 as
evidenced by the said subdivision plan (Exh. 6). With the existence of a
subdivision plan, and from the uncontroverted testimony of appellants'
witness, We can only infer that at least an oral partition, which under the
law is valid and binding, was entered into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes
regarding his properties in 1936. As held in a long line of decisions,
extrajudicial partition can be done orally, and the same would be valid if
freely entered into (Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997, March 1953). The reason
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 39
for this is because a partition is not exactly a conveyance for the reason
that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other but
rather a confirmation by them of their ownership of the property. It must
also be remembered that when Gavino Reyes died on March 7, 1921, his
property was admittedly not yet covered by a torrens title, as it was only in
1941 when said properties were brought into the application of the torrens
system. With this factual milieu, it can also be concluded that his heirs have
indeed settled, subdivided and partitioned Gavino Reyes' landed estate
without formal requirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court when a parcel
of land is covered by a torrens title. As told earlier, the Subdivision Plan
belonging to the late Gavino Reyes was subdivided and partitioned by his
children in 1936. On this score, the partition of the said property even
without the formal requirements under the rule is valid as held in the case
of Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 176, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1943 (Exh. 5) executed
by Rafael Reyes, Sr. in favor of appellant Dalmacio Gardiola, the land sold
therein was described as "na aking minana sa aking ama." This alone would
confirm the contention of the appellants that there was already an actual
partition (at least an oral partition) of the property of Gavino Reyes in
1936. As aforestated, the presence of the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) is an
(sic) evidence of such partition which appellees failed to controvert not to
mention the fact that the lower court itself recognized the existence of said
plan, in the same manner that it concluded that the property was already
surveyed and actually subdivided in 1936 (page 3, pars. 3 and 4, Decision).
From the foregoing considerations it is evident that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. D) executed by the grandchildren of
the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the
property subject of the partition in the deed was already partitioned in 1936
by the children of Gavino Reyes. It is for this reason that the lots
supposedly inherited by the grandchildren named in the deed of 1967 were
the same lots inherited and given to their respective fathers or mothers in
1936 while the land was not yet covered by the torrens system. Hence, in
the case of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land inherited by him was two (2) parcels
of land known as Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14 described in the Subdivision
plan of 1936 (Exh. 6), which were the same parcels of land allegedly
inherited by Rafael Reyes, Jr. from Gavino Reyes in representation of his

father, pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate for which
TCT No. 27257 was issued.
Coming to the second issue, the lower court likewise erred when it
concluded that the parcel of land sold by appellee's predecessor-in-interest
to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under
litigation. It must be pointed out that the identity of the parcel of land
which the appellees sought to recover from the appellants was never an
issue in the lower court, because the litigants had already conceded that
the parcel identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was the same
parcel of land identified as Cadastral Lot No. 1228 and 1235 described in
Tax Declaration No. 4766. Despite this admission, however, the lower court
declared that "as described in the deed of sale (Exh. 5), the land's
description does not tally with the description of Lot No. 1-A-14, the land in
litigation." As correctly pointed out by the appellants however, the
discrepancy in the description was due to the fact that the description of
the land sold in the Deed of Sale was expressed in layman's language
whereas the description of Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was done in
technical terms. This was so because, when Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold the
property in dispute to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola on December 3, 1943,
the only evidence of title to the land then available in so far as Rafael
Reyes, Sr. was concerned was Tax Declaration No. 4766, because at that
time, neither he nor appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was aware of the
existence of OCT No. 255 as in fact TCT No. 27257 was issued only in 1967.
Consequently, the land subject of the Deed of Sale was described by the
vendor in the manner as described in Tax Declaration No. 4766. However,
the description of the land appearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) was
exactly the same land identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in the Subdivision Plan
(Exh. 6) of 1936. Accordingly, the assumption of the lower court that "if the
land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. was the one now in litigation, he could have
easily indicated Lot No. 1-A-14" is bereft of merit under the foregoing
circumstances. Interestingly enough, the appellees never denied the
identity of the subject lot during the hearing at the lower court. What they
were denying only was the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant
Dalmacio Gardiola which does not hold true because of the document
denominated as Deed of Sale (Exh. 5). 11
It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private
respondents or anyone acting in their behalf to relinquish the possession or
vacate the property in question. It thus decreed:
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 40
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one is rendered declaring appellants to be the lawful owners of
the lot identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257. No
costs. 12
Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been denied by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution of 1 March 1990, 13 petitioners filed the
instant petition on 6 April 1990 after having obtained an extension of time
within which to file it.
The petition does not implead original new defendants Ricardo Gardiola and
Emelita Gardiola.
As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, petitioners allege that said court has decided questions of
substance in a way not in accord with law or applicable jurisprudence when
it held that "the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate (Exh. "D")
executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no
moment considering that the property subject of the partition was already
partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes." In support thereof,
they claim that (a) TCT No. 27257 covers two parcels of land; the lot
described in paragraph 1 thereof is owned by petitioners and that
ownership was confirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 79882, hence, the Court
of Appeals should have affirmed the decision of the trial court; (b) private
respondent Rosario Martillano was a party to the extrajudicial settlement of
estate which was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds in 1967; said
registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates
a lien upon the land and also constituted constructive notice to the whole
world. The court cannot disregard the binding effect thereof Finally, the
pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that private respondents are the
lawful owners of the lot in question "militates against the indefeasible and
incontrovertible character of the torrens title," 14 and allows reconveyance
which is not tenable since the action therefor had already prescribed, as
stated in the decision of the trial court.
In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents to comment on
the petition. But even before it could do so, petitioner, without obtaining
prior leave of the Court, filed on 29 May 1990 a so-called Supplemental
Arguments in Support of The Petition For Review On certiorari 15 wherein
they assert, among others, that: (a) the findings of facts of respondent
Court are contrary to those of the trial court and appear to be contradicted

by the evidence on record thus calling for the review by this Court; 16 (b) it
also committed misapprehension of the facts in this case and its findings
are based on speculation, conjecture and surmises; (c) private respondents'
attack on petitioners' title is a collateral attack which is not allowed; even if
it is allowed, the same had already prescribed and is now barred.
It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed their
Comment. 17 We required petitioners to reply thereto, which they complied
with on 8 August 1990. 18 A rejoinder was filed by private respondents on
29 August 1990.
We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990 and required the
parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda which they
complied with.
Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's Memorandum, which was
filed on 10 December 1990, is the Resolution of this Court (Third Division)
of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811 entitled Spouses Artemio Durumpili
and Angustia Reyes vs. The Court of Appeals and Spouses Dalmacio
Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, which also involves the property of Gavino
Reyes, the partition thereof among his children in 1936, and the
extrajudicial settlement in 1967.
In said resolution, this Court held:
. . . The partition made in 1936, although oral, was valid. The requirement
in Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the
creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property must appear in a public instrument is only for
convenience and not for validity or enforceability as between the parties
themselves. [Thunga Hui vs. Que Bentec, 2 Phil. 561 (1903)] The
subsequent execution by the heirs of the Extrajudicial Partition in 1967 did
not alter the oral partition as in fact the share pertaining to Angustia Reyes
corresponded to that previously assigned to her father. Considering that
Angel Reyes sold this property to Basilio de Ocampo who, in turn, sold the
same to respondents, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the latter
lawfully acquired the property and are entitled to ownership and possession
thereof.
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 41
In answer to the charge of private respondents that petitioners deliberately
failed to cite this resolution, the latter, in their reply-memorandum dated
15 March 1991 and filed three days thereafter, allege:
Our failure to mention the aforementioned resolution before this Honorable
Court is not deliberate nor with malice aforethought. The reason is that to
date, we have not yet received any resolution to our Motion For Leave of
Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc. Moreover,
we honestly feel that the resolution that will be issued therein will not be
applicable to the case before this Honorable Court's Second Division. It
should be mentioned that in the Durumpili case before the Third Division,
the Court of Appeals relied on the alleged confirmation of the sale executed
by Angustia Reyes, while in the Reyes case before this Second Division,
there was no sale that was executed by the petitioners Reyes' predecessor-
in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R. No. 92811, which
reveals the following: (a) On 18 September 1990, petitioners therein,
represented by De Lara, De Lunas and Rosales, who are the lawyers of
petitioners in the instant case, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
resolution of 20 August 1990. 19 b) This motion was denied in the resolution
of 1 October 1990. 20 c) On 17 November 1990, petitioners therein,
through the same lawyers, filed a Motion For Leave Of Court To Refer Case
To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc And/Or Motion For
Reconsideration 21 wherein they specifically admit that said case and the
instant petition have "identity and/or similarity of the parties, the facts, the
issues raised," even going to the extent of "graphically" illustrating where
such similarities lie. 22d) This motion was denied in the resolution of 28
November 1990. Copy thereof was furnished the attorneys for
petitioners. 23 e) Entry of judgment had already been made therein and a
copy thereof was sent to petitioner's counsel per Letter of Transmittal of the
Deputy Court and Chief of the Judicial Records Office dated 20 December
1990.
What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this
simple issue: whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court.
We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is inevitable and
unavoidable because the legal and factual conclusions made by the trial
court are unfounded and clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals was not

bound to agree to such conclusions. The trial court erred in holding that:
(a) there was no partition among the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936
since there is no written evidence in support thereof; yet, it admits that
there was a survey and subdivision of the property and the adjudication of
specific subdivision lots to each of the children of Gavino; (b) the land sold
by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondents is not identical to Lot No. 1-A-
14, the lot specified for and adjudicated to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the partition
agreement; and (c) if the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private
respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is indeed Lot No. 1-A-14 and that TCT No. T-
27257 was obtained through fraud, the remedy open to the vendee was an
action for reconveyance, which should have been brought within four (4)
years from the discovery thereof in 1967 when the Extrajudicial Settlement
was executed since private respondent Rosario Martillano, wife of Dalmacio,
was a party thereto.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children
of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no
law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be
valid. 24 In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be
put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection
of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when
there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no
such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different
from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it
can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to
the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral
partition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds:
partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is
not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not
involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation
or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of
another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 42
Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly
sustained by this Court in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No.
92811. 25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in
1936 was not valid for some reason or another, We would still arrive at the
same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs
automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent. 26 The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership
by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or
interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of
is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-
ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
In Ramirez vs. Bautista, 27 this Court held that every co-heir has the
absolute ownership of his share in the community property and may
alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as to purely personal rights,
but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be
awarded to him upon the partition of the property.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent
Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino
Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son
and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners
herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr.
is identical to Lot No. 1-14-A, the trial court based its conclusion that it is
not, on his observation that the description of the former does not tally with
that of the latter, moreover, if Rafael did intend to sell Lot No. 1-14-A, he
should have specifically stated it in the deed since at that time, the
property had already been partitioned and said lot was adjudicated to him.
In addition to the contrary findings and conclusion of the respondent Court
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 43

on this issue to which We fully agree, it is to be stressed that Rafael had
this property declared for taxation purposes and the tax declaration issued
was made the basis for the description of the property in the deed of sale.
Upon the execution of the deed of sale, vendee — herein private
respondent Dalmacio Gardiola — immediately took possession of the
property. This is the very same property which is the subject matter of this
case and which petitioners seek to recover from the private respondents.
The main evidence adduced for their claim of ownership and possession
over it is TCT No. T-27257, the certificate of title covering Lot No. 1-14-A.
They therefore admit and concede that the property claimed by private
respondent, which was acquired by sale from Rafael Reyes, Sr., is none
other than Lot No. 1-14-A.
The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial
Settlement did not place private respondents in estoppel to question the
issuance of TCT No. T-27257. As correctly maintained by private
respondents, she signed it in representation of her deceased mother, Marta
Reyes, a daughter and an heir of Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in
behalf of her husband, Dalmacio Gardiola, vendee of the share of Rafael
Reyes, Sr.
respondents the ownership and possession of the lot from the time Rafael
Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint
and amended complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when,
after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they
definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in question.
And yet, despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual
physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and one-half
(13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of
possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial
court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial
court to place the burden on private respondents to bring an action for
reconveyance within four (4) years from their discovery of the issuance of
the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The instant petition then is without merit.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition with costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael
Reyes, Sr. in the estate of Gavino. Petitioners, as mere successors-in-
interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that
which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never
became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in
1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in
so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he
never became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a light
in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case, 28 it is but a
confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he never
had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the
settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of
the deed did not create any right or vest any title over the property in favor
of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot give them
what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.

There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners'

immediate predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action
against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the
latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private

G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y.
BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND
HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON,"
AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari 1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular,
petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the
RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, 4 filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages
(subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a.
"Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In
their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died
intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-
C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno,
Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their
subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to
the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and
successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as
evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from
Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. 9 Further,
by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no
cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of
action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 44
there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as
Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011
Order,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action
against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had
established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special
proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean
that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs.
Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is
Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the
documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage
contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of
Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,
denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on
which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance
was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-
2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or
not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is
determined by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a
complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the
relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 45

which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.19 Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an
illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the
plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed omitted)
by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of
title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for
allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted
decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding
proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been
Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24
that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made
in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature,
suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case: appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special
proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved,
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and
not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining
property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery of whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before
court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination
that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether
defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing
right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246
is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights
declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an concomitant therewith.
independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of
Appeals x x x: SO ORDERED.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and
heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special

G.R. No. 177066 September 11, 2009
JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO (as heir of the late Carlos Puno), Petitioner,
vs.
PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by JESUSA
PUNO, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become
stockholders of the corporation; neither are they mandatorily entitled to the
rights and privileges of a stockholder. This, we declare in this petition for
review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated October
11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86137.
The facts of the case follow:
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of
respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito
Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint
for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is
the son of the deceased with the latter’s common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As
surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late
father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that
respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an
accounting of all the transactions it entered into from 1962, and give
petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the
shares of Carlos L. Puno.2
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not
have the legal personality to sue because his birth certificate names him as
"Joselito Musni Muno." Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial
declaration that "Joselito Musni Puno" and "Joselito Musni Muno" were one
and the same.
The court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating
that petitioner’s certificate of live birth was no proof of his paternity and
relation to Carlos L. Puno.
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 46
Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name "Joselito
M. Puno," certified by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila, and the
Certificate of Finality thereof. To hasten the disposition of the case, the
court conditionally admitted the corrected birth certificate as genuine and
authentic and ordered respondent to file its answer within fifteen days from
the order and set the case for pretrial.3
On October 11, 2005, the court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Jesusa Puno and/or
Felicidad Fermin to allow the plaintiff to inspect the corporate books and
records of the company from 1962 up to the present including the financial
statements of the corporation.
The costs of copying shall be shouldered by the plaintiff. Any expenses to
be incurred by the defendant to be able to comply with this order shall be
the subject of a bill of costs.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision
dated October 11, 2006. According to the CA, petitioner was not able to
establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his birth
certificate was prepared without the intervention of and the participatory
acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA said
that petitioner had no right to demand that he be allowed to examine
respondent’s books. Moreover, petitioner was not a stockholder of the
corporation but was merely claiming rights as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an
incorporator of the corporation. His action for specific performance
therefore appeared to be premature; the proper action to be taken was to
prove the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the latter.5
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its
Resolution6 dated March 6, 2007.
In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
JOSELITO PUNO IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS DEMANDED HE BEING THE

HEIR OF THE LATE CARLOS PUNO, ONE OF THE INCORPORATORS [OF]
RESPONDENT CORPORATION.
II. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT FILIATION OF
JOSELITO PUNO, THE PETITIONER[,] IS NOT DULY PROVEN OR
ESTABLISHED.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT JOSELITO MUNO
AND JOSELITO PUNO REFERS TO THE ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
WHAT RESPONDENT MERELY DISPUTES IS THE SURNAME OF THE
PETITIONER WHICH WAS MISSPELLED AND THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION
E.G. RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AS HEIR OF CARLOS PUNO ARE DEEMED
ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY IN THE RESPONDENT[’S] MOTION TO
DISMISS.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THEREFORE ERRED I[N]
DECREEING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO INSPECT THE
CORPORATE BOOKS OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION.7
The petition is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish the right to
inspect respondent corporation’s books and receive dividends on the stocks
owned by Carlos L. Puno.
Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased
stockholder. However, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner was
not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder;
thus, the former cannot claim to be an heir of the latter.
Incessantly, we have declared that factual findings of the CA supported by
substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding.8 In an appeal
via certiorari, the Court may not review the factual findings of the CA. It is
not the Court’s function under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review,
examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented.9
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil
registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 47
the information of a third person.10 As correctly observed by the CA, only
petitioner’s mother supplied the data in the birth certificate and signed the
same. There was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner
as his son.
As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed that it can only
serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date
specified but not of the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s
paternity.11
In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code enumerate the
persons who are entitled to the inspection of corporate books, thus —
Sec. 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. — x x x.
The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes
of any meeting shall be open to the inspection of any director, trustee,
stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable hours on business
days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said
records or minutes, at his expense.
xxxx
Sec. 75. Right to financial statements. — Within ten (10) days from receipt
of a written request of any stockholder or member, the corporation shall
furnish to him its most recent financial statement, which shall include a
balance sheet as of the end of the last taxable year and a profit or loss of
statement for said taxable year, showing in reasonable detail its assets and
liabilities and the result of its operations.12
The stockholder’s right of inspection of the corporation’s books and records
is based upon his ownership of shares in the corporation and the necessity
for self-protection. After all, a shareholder has the right to be intelligently
informed about corporate affairs.13 Such right rests upon the stockholder’s
underlying ownership of the corporation’s assets and property.14
Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends
declared by the corporation, a right inherent in the ownership of the
shares.151avvphi1
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 48

Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become

stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the
deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed
first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must
be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation
Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the
parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the
corporation.16 During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable
owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the
court being vested with the legal title to the stock.17 Until a settlement and
division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the
administrator or executor.18 Consequently, during such time, it is the
administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the
deceased as stockholder.

Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish

that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect
respondent’s books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent,
absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the shares owned by
Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if
petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.

Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person,

claiming proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir
of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter. The status of
an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a decedent’s estate cannot
be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in a case for the recovery of
property.19 The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific
performance — to direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner to
exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased and his representatives.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6,
2007 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 49

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
vs. their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
x ---------------------------------------------------- x assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993,
she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007 Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to
Branch 146 thereof.
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs
DECISION are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration
1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which be issued to her.
reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3
Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds
motion for reconsideration. of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to
Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriagefile the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her
brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28,
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an dismiss.
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence
December 14, 1973. 6 showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in
Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she

presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to
Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo
had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26
of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately
filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E.
Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the
motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue
was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed
moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was
substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November
16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20
from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does
not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the
motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by
Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of
respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that
he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion
for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their
position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 50
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the
duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the
petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.
It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines
and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of
Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and
October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It
found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly
dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2,

Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage
with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of
the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and
the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there
is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement
— of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form
whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the
law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to
remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34
which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for
review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to
adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the
venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly
laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one
domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void
and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 51
latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity
to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional
Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In
the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile –
of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in
a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of
election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In
election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue
under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual
or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may
have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained
a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated
January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid
property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine
Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46
and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990
sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100
San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial
address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly
filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993.
At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 52
per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject
petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26,
par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us
to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved
through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce
was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest
in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The
Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the
alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife
after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony
by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely
freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 53

he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting

his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53 In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background
and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she were discussed, to wit:
should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she
should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It Brief Historical Background
held:
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on
has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of Articles 35, 37, and 38.
justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles
Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
other." 56 with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn
applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
effect. spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has x x x x
long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed Legislative Intent
marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-
that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
26. 61

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where
a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound
to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid
divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the
divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover
in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never
within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid,
may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 54
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our
nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and
the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to
motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo
under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. 71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate
and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said
law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file
the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered
the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent.
However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the
laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations
between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 55
ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and
the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family
Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and
wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79
we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court
described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of
parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved
the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 56

the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial
Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED.
Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127969 June 25, 1999
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE M. ESTRADA and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The instant petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. SP No. 39816 which has affirmed the judgment and orders of the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") or Cavite (Branch 20) in LRC Case No. 1077-
95, entitled. In Re: "Petition for Reconstitution of Los/Burned Original Copy On 20 June 1995, the trial court granted the petition for reconstitution;
of Transfer Certificates of Title No. 11203 and No. 11204.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, gave a brief factual and case settings
of the controversy.
On March 28, 1995, Jose M. Estrada, the private respondent in this case
and petitioner in LRC Case No. 1077-95 filed with the Regional Trial Court
Branch 20, Imus, Cavite the reconstitution of lost/burned original copies of
certificate of titles nos. T-11203 and T-11204 and for the issuance of new
owner's duplicate copies of the same certificates. These were allegedly lost
or destroyed when the capitol building was burned.
On April 29, 1995, RTC Branch 20 of Imus Cavite set the hearing of the
petition on June 19, 1995 at 9:00 A.M. requiring all interested parties to
appear and show cause, if any, why the petition be not granted. The order
required its publication in the Official Gazette for two successive issues with
the further directive that copies be furnished the adjoining owners, Office of
the Solicitor General, Land Registration authority, and the Register of
Deeds. It was likewise required that the petitioner post copies of the order
at the Bulletin Board of the Court, at the main entrance of the Provincial
Capitol Building, Trece Martirez City and at the Municipal Building of
Dasmariñas, Cavite, as well as where the properties is located.
There being no opposition to the petition, petitioner was allowed to adduce
his evidence in the presence of the public prosecutor who had been
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 57
deputized by the Solicitor General to represent him for the Republic of the
Philippines.
Florinda Estrada, a 41-year old daughter of the petitioner who was duly
authorized to represent her sickly father, introduced oral and testimonial
evidence. The lost/burned certificate of titles were presented in court as
well as the tax declarations in the name of petitioner. The official receipts of
tax payments were likewise introduced. A copy of the Deed of Sale dated
July 30, 1957 in favor of petitioner was submitted by him to the court. After
Florinda Estrada's testimonial evidence on the possession of her father of
the land and its not being mortgaged or encumbered, Francisco Cuenca,
owner of all the adjoining lots offered no objection to the petition. The
public prosecutor Zenaida de Castro cross-examined the petitioner's
witnesses. 1
thus —
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing
the Register of Deeds of Cavite to cause the reconstitution of the
lost/burned original of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 11203 and 11204
in the name of Jose Estrada upon payment of proper fees.
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Register of Deeds, the Solicitor
General, the Land Registration Authority and to petitioner. 2
On 24 July 1995, private respondent filed a motion to cite the Registrar of
Deeds of Cavite for contempt alleging, among other things —
3. That in spite of the finality of the judgment, and over the pleas of
petitioner's [private respondent's] representative, the Register of Deeds of
Cavite has refused and continues to refuse to effect the reconstitution,
thereby depriving the petitioner [private respondent] of the use of his
Transfer Certificate of Title.
4. That the Register of Deeds of Cavite insists on referring the matter first
to the Land Registration Authority, which is uncalled for, without factual
and legal basis, an exercise in futility, considering that the LRA was very
much aware of the proceedings and did not oppose the petition, and is
aware of the judgment and did not appeal either.

5. That the refusal of the Register of Deeds of Cavite to effect the
reconstitution is punishable contempt under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 71, of the
Rules of Court.
6. That under Section 7 of the same Rule, the Register of Deeds of Cavite
may be imprisoned until he effect the reconstitution. 3
Atty. Alejandro Villanueva, the then incumbent Registrar of Deeds of
Cavite, proffered his explanation asseverating —
That the Register of Deeds did not give due course to the registration of the
above decision for reconstitution in view of the doubt entertained by the
Register of Deeds as to the authenticity and genuiness of the alleged
owner's duplicate copy of TCT Nos T-11203 and T-11204 which serve as
basis for reconstitution of the original copy thereof when presented and
suggested that the same be subjected to government agencies like the NBI
to determine their genuiness.
That the tax declarations presented to the court to support the petition for
reconstitution and marked Exhibits K and K-1 were not genuine as per
Certification dated July 27,1995 issued by the Assistant Provincial Assessor
which is hereto attached as Annex "A";
That the alleged certification issued by the Register of Deeds that TCT Nos.
T-11203 and T-11204 were among those burned and marked as Exhibit J is
also not genuine.
That Lot 5766 as allegedly covered by TCT Nos. T-11203 and T-11204, is
already covered by a certificate of title issued on November; 6 1967 namely
TCT No. T-26877 in the name of PILAR DEVELOPMENT CO. INC., Xerox
copy hereto attached as Annex "B";
That as held by the Supreme Court in RP vs. C.T. of APP. et al 1-46626
Dec. 27, 1979, (Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds 1982 Ed. P-09)
— THUS, where a certificate of title covering a parcel of land was
reconstituted judicially, and it was found later that there existed earlier a
certificate of title covering the same property in the name of another
person, it was held that the existence of such prior title ipso facto nullified
the reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in said
proceeding as to the alleged ownership under the reconstituted title cannot
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 58
be given any credence. That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and
monstrous fraud FOISTED on the courts of justice.
That this explanation is being submitted for the appraisal of the Honorable
Court with a prayer that the Register of Deeds be not cited for contempt of
Court.
In an Order, dated 03 August 1995, Atty. Villanueva was ordered as
incarcerated until such times he would have complied with the judgment of
the RTC. A warrant for his arrest was issued, and a bond of P100,000.00 for
his provisional liberty was fixed which he posted.
Shortly after the complete records of LRC No. 1077-95, in connection with
the contempt charge against him, were elevated to the appellate court for
review, Atty. Villanueva assailants was slain by unidentified assailants in his
residence in Las Piñas, Metro Manila.
On 27 December 1995, the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Cavite caused the
reconstitution of the Originals of TCT No. 11203 and No. 11204 Pursuant to
the 22nd December 1995 order of the RTC.
On 20 February 1996, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for the
annulment of the judgment of the trial court. The petition for annulment
was anchored on the following grounds; to wit:
(a) That the two (2) reconstituted titles are patent nullity as they were
reconstituted pursuant to a void decision and secured thru fraud and
misrepresentation;
(b) that the amended order dated 29 April 1995 was not published;
(c) that the Solicitor General was not notified about the hearing on the
case; and
(d) that the Land Registration Authority was not furnished a copy of the
decision,
The appellate court, in its now assailed decision of 27 January 1997,
dismissed the petition for annulment and affirmed the judgment and orders

of the trial court. Unsatisfied with this outcome, the Republic of the
Philippines filed the instant petition for review, contending that —
I.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
RECONSTITUTION CASE.
II
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE VOID
DECISION. 5
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines would here insist that the RTC
erroneously proceeded to take cognizance of petition notwithstanding the
existence of several jurisdictional defects, among which included the
following shortcomings, namely, that —
1. The amended order advancing the initial hearing of the case from 24 July
1995 to 19 June 1995 was not published.
2. No notice to actual occupants and other interested persons were sent.
3. The owner's duplicate of TCT No. 11203 and No. 11204 presented by
private respondent to the RTC were fake and of doubtful origin because —
a. The said owner's duplicates are not in the official form.
b. Lot No. 5766 is declared for taxation purposes in the name of Luis
Pujalte from 1940 to 1994.
c. The signature of the Registrar of Deeds Escorastico Cuevas on both titles
are fake.
d. The technical descriptions on subject titles when plotted did not
coincide/conform, with the technical description of Lot 5766.
e. The Alleged registered owner and his Attorney-in-fact are not the
occupants of the parcels of land.
f. The tax declarations in the name of Jose Estrada are fake and spurious.
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 59
4. The existence Of other titles the same property barred the reconstitution
proceedings before the Regional Trial Court.
5. The void judgment reconstitution case was not served on the petitioner.
This Court, in its resolution of 16 April 1997, required respondents to
comment on the petition and forthwith issued a temporary restraining
order, enjoining private respondent Jose Estrada from conveying,
encumbering or otherwise dealing with the property, as well as public
respondent Registrar of Deeds of Cavite Province from registering any
transaction involving Transfer Certificates of Title No. 11203 and No.
11204, subject matter of the reconstitution proceedings in LRC Case No.
1077-95. In accordance with the resolution, private respondent Jose
Estrada submitted his comment. Following the reply filed by petitioner, the
Court gave due course to the petition. 6
The Court sees merit in the petition.
Reconstitution of a certificate of title, in the context of Republic Act No. 26,
denotes the restoration in the original form and condition 7 of a lost or
destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The
purpose of the reconstitution is to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been
when the loss or destruction occurred. Among the conditions explicitly
required by the law is publication of the petition twice in successive issues
of the Official Gazette, and its posting at the main entrance of the provincial
building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which
the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. 8 This
directive is mandatory; indeed, its compliance has been held to be
jurisdictional. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 9 the Court has said:
Anent the publication requirement, R.A. No. 26 obligates the petitioner to
prove to the trial court two things, namely that: (1) its order giving due
course to the petition for reconstitution and setting it for hearing was
published twice, in two consecutive issues of the Official Gazette; and (2)
such publication was made at least thirty days prior to the date of
hearing. 10
So also did the Court hold in Allama vs. Republic, 11 where the Court,
again, has stated:

The non-compliance with these requirements provided for under Section 13
of Republic Act No. 26 as regards the notice of hearing is fatal and the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition. 12
Private respondent admits that the amended Order has not been published
but seeks to justify this failure by stating that the amended order is simply
a verbatim reproduction of the first Order, published in the Official Gazette
on 29 May 1995 and 09 June 1995, and that, therefore, the omission is just
a minor lapse. The Court sees it differently. The flaw is fatal. The legally
mandated publication must be complied with in the manner the law has
ordained. The date of the actual hearing is obviously a matter of accurately
be stated in the notice. It is not here substance that must accurately be
stated in the notice. It is not here denied that the volume of the Official
Gazette, where the Order of Initial Hearing (for the 24 July 1995 setting)
can be found, has officially been released by the National Printing Office
only on 14 June 1995 or merely actual five days from the date of the actual
hearing on 19 June 1995. The clear directive of the law is for the notice to
be made "at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing." The Court of
Appeals indeed must have failed to take note that the Exhibits "B," "C," "D"
and "D-1" of the alleged jurisdictional requirements presented before the
trial court all pertain to the original order setting the initial hearing on 24
July 1995 and not to the amended order advancing the hearing to 19 June
1995. Concededly, the amended order has not been published at all.
One other compelling reason that militates against respondent is the
evident failure of due compliance with the requirement of notice to actual
occupants, the (although one of the adjoining owners, Mr. Francisco
Cuenca, would appear to have been duly notified of the hearing of 19 June
1995) and all other persons who may have an interest in the property.
Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26, provide:
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections
2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed
with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his
assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall
state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's
duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no
co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, a any
had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location,
area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the
buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 60
land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or
improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of
all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed
description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a
statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have
been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof
has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated
copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support to the petition for
reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided,
That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources
enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further
accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly
approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, [now
Commission of Land Registration] or with a certified copy of the description
taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the
preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in
successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main
entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to
the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to
be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner,
to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the
number of the lost or destroyed Certificate of Title, if known, the name of
the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession
of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other
interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and
the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and
file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the
hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice
as directed by the court.
The existence of several other titles, including —
1. TCTs No. T-96019 (Lot 5766-B) and T-96011 (Lot 5766-A) both in name
of Susan D. Degollacion.
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 61

2. TCT No. T-148177 (Lot No. 5766-B) in the names of spouses Jose del Finally, it may not be amiss for the Court to reiterate its admonition in
Rosario and Juliet dela Cruz. Ortigas and Company Ltd. Partnership vs. Velasco 18 that courts must
exercise the greatest caution in entertaining petitions for reconstitution of
3. TCT No. T-26877 (Lot No. 7524, a portion of Lot 5766) in the name of destroyed or lost certificates of title in order to help avoid litigations and
Pilar Development Company, Inc. 13 controversies, as well as discordant supervening events, that may be
spawned by a hasty grant of reconstitution.
mentioned in the records apparently have not been properly disclosed in
the petition for reconstitution nor in the corresponding notice caused to be WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and the decision of the
given by the court, which notice the law requires to be sent to all interested Court of Appeals, dated 27 January 1997, is set aside. The Temporary
parties at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The registered restraining order issued by this Court in 16 April 1997 is made permanent
owners named in these incompatible titles, as so aptly pointed out by the and the decision and the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite in the
Solicitor General, are interested persons within the meaning of the law reconstitution case (LRC Case No. 1077-95) are declared null and void for
entitled to notice of the date of initial hearing on 19 June 1995, the absence want of jurisdiction. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt
of which notice constitutes a jurisdictional defect. This Court has repeatedly
stated that the requirement of actual notice to the occupants and the SO ORDERED.
owners of the adjoining property under sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act
No. 26 is itself mandatory to vest jurisdiction upon the court in a petition
for reconstitution of title and to take the case on its merits. The non-
observance of the requirement invalidates the whole reconstitution
proceedings in the trial court. 14

The Court, given the foregoing circumstances, is constrained to accordingly

hold that the decision, dated 20 June 1995, in LRC Case No. 1077-95
decreeing the reconstitution of TCT No. 11203 and No. 11204 is null and
void. In contemplation of law, the decision is non-existent; in MWSS vs.
Sison, 15 the Court had said:

. . . (A) void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to valid

judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any
tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of
the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or
efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create
rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to
those who seek to enforce. All Proceedings founded on the void judgment
are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words a void judgment is
regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there
were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same
position they were in before the trial. 16

For want of jurisdiction, the trial court must be held to have been without
authority to take cognizance of the litigation and all its aspects. 17

G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA
JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision
rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED
in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s
common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein
petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.
Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented
by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. 3 In
her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 62
been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same
petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00
and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the
estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia,
together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of
the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The
petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, 7 the petition
for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac
and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the
petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be
appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of
Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The
lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las
Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of
the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be
issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this
Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28
November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV
No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held
that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of
Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the

RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO
QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC
OF LAS PIÑAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA
GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE
TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE
QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS
OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional
Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by
a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 63
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence
in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and
that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus
defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement
of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from
the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for
the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp
on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas,
Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in
death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the
time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the
courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been
living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972
up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact
that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against
Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their
marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 64

taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at
untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the
Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the cause of action.
trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.21 Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia,
we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals Amelia is void for being bigamous.
erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void
marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a
source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac
the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of
Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of
in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage
declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record
the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the
marriages, to wit: interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of
any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that
why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable Administration.
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.24 Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken
place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25 incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional
rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for and willing to serve;
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 65

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the
law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
satisfied.29Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one
of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested
party within the purview of the law.

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for
Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and
7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for

letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited

in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin"
refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are
entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited

by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party.
With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her
filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the

G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag
and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The
decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal
properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99,
over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-
8507.1 Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved
that he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother,
Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More
particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without
rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their
deceased parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper
venue.2 He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City
either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedent’s
actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother
used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated
due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia
Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment
and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously
executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voter’s
affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments,
motor vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their permanent
residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.1âwphi1.nêt
In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually
resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a SO ORDERED.10
matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death certificates that
their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was
City.4 Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 66
certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the
said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the
decedents’ residence on the death certificates in good faith and through
honest mistake. He gave his residence only as reference, considering that
their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely
transitory, in the same way that they were taken at different times for the
same purpose to Perico’s residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard.
The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence
of the decedents’ residence in light of the other documents showing
otherwise.5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the
position.6 Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the
petition be archived.7
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be
revived.8 After the parties submitted the names of their respective
nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special
administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.9
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was
denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in
1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last
place of residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on
the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V.
Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot
disown his own representation by taking an inconsistent position other than
his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for
lack of merit movant’s motion to dismiss.

Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court
a quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
The questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in
the assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition for
review, anchored on the following grounds:
I PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY
TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS.
593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN
SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A
PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENT’S
RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING
SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A
DECEASED.
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 67
V
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH
CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS
AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE
CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF
THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP.
PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.13
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be
had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence,
or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(underscoring ours)

Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or
letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the province
where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et
al.,14 where we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the
place where the decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the
time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following
factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to
choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen;
and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.15 While it appears that the
decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for
medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City
as their permanent residence.1âwphi1.nêt
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The
decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of
transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then
suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to
purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he
was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he
could move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his
domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot
be said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his
physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have
transferred to petitioner’s Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to
sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their elderly parents stayed in
his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that they
were both residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise.
Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mother’s death
certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least,
petitioner recognized his deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon City.
Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death
certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 68
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were
thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo.
We agree with the appellate court’s observation that since the death
certificates were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent
quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true
situation at the time of their parents’ death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’
residence at the time of death, over the numerous documentary evidence
presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner
pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required by the
Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule
v. Court of Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like
the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in
a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.17
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the
decedents have been living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and
for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by
the evidence on record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows
that, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the court below considered not only
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 69

the decedents’ physical presence in Quezon City, but also other factors SO ORDERED.
indicating that the decedents’ stay therein was more than temporary. In the
absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts’ factual findings
stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the
same must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.

Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in

Rule 4, Section 2,18 on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which
applies specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue
in the former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the
purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent
which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for
the settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile
because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept and
where most of the decedents’ properties are located.

Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.

It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are
kept in the place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed
that a person’s properties can be found mostly in the place where he
establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place
different from that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains
extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations can thus be
formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or
retain properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice and
peculiarities.

At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates

between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings.
In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20 we ruled
that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have
one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of
venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or
place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly
held that venue for the settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate was
properly laid in the Quezon City court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ
ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the
dismissal2 of the petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Efraim M. Santibañez entered into a loan agreement 3 in the amount
of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase
price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In
view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in
favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st
thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement,4 this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to
pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600
Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund,
executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside
from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty
Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic
will.6 Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before
the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706.
On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 70
administrator of the estate of the decedent.7 During the pendency of the
testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement 8 dated July 22, 1981,
wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of
the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1)
tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their
late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by
them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities9 was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned
all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed
the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner
filed a Complaint11 for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch
150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against
both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the
United States and there was no information on his address or the date of
his return to the Philippines.12 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed
down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer13 and
alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party
thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void;
hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 63.14Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a
decision was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint
for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for
lack of merit.15
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed
with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim

Santibañez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an
obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the
Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence,
on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent.
However, the said agreement was void, considering that it had not been
approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until
after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that
petitioner failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities.
The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola
that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedent’s account. Ruling
that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial
court held that the petitioner’s cause of action against respondent Florence
S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the
Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT
(EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN
PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.16
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased
had passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and
Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as
Exhibit "A" estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot
deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been
signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary
to present the same before the probate court for approval; the property
partitioned in the agreement was not one of those enumerated in the
holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the
heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 71
civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the
money claim of the petitioner should have been presented before the
probate court.17
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that
the petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided
under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that
the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid
partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the
CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject
properties (tractors) in generic terms when the deceased referred to them
as "all other properties." Moreover, the active participation of respondent
Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.18
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the
CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO
VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ
UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT
HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE
ESTATE PROCEEDING.

IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ ON THE
STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM
OF P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT
OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE
RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER
UNION BANK.19
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted
to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no
need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs
partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the
obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the
joint agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from asserting
any position contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that the
holographic will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the
tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the
said will. The active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S.
Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioner’s claim amounts to a
waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings,
and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint agreement to
escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under consideration would
be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage
and prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and
appellate courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S.
Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing
the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibañez
and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the
Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by
the late Efraim Santibañez, together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent
Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 72
concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express
provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes
executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly
and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to
file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses
that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal
capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains
that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased
Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate
court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint
agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the
petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which
might delay payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted to require them
to execute the said agreement.1a\^/phi1.net
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in
declaring that the agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the
agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it
should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not
waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that
the claim should be filed with the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could
not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any
continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any document presented as
evidence to show that she had caused herself to be bound by the obligation
of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the
partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not
the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c)
whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the
deceased.1awphi1.nét
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine
 SPECPRO| RULE 73| 73

whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of cannot allow.26 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-
properties to be administered.20 The said court is primarily concerned with heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.21 should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court
heirs until after the will has been probated: approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its
jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the
after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and decedent.28 In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in
the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the
will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for
other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other
for the validity of a will.22 possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate
of the deceased.
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the
same properties embraced in the will.23In the present case, the deceased, The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of
Efraim Santibañez, left a holographic will24 which contained, inter alia, the the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative.
provision which reads as follows: Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto
"have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness
discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of
indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and First Countryside Credit Corp."29 The assumption of liability was conditioned
Florence, my children. upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take
possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all- made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to
encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each
which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in
and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption
three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement 25 executed by
Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the
invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a decedent.l^vvphi1.net The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late
pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate
covering the said tractors. court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired
jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred;
tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate court’s exceptions. — All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or

contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set
forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined
shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim
had been presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate
court is mandatory.30 As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v.
Herrera:31
… This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the
deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against
it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is
a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the
rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early
delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law
strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims
against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.32
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private
respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her
late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed
and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the
petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it
may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said
promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any
defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to
delve into the matter further.
SPECPRO| RULE 73| 74
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not
sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and
liabilities.33 The petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of the
Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First
Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the
Philippines…"34 However, the documentary evidence 35 clearly reflects that
the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the
FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of
Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioner’s participation
therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial
evidence was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As
the trial court declared in its decision:
… [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff
failed to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice
does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised
by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative." (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36
This being the case, the petitioner’s personality to file the complaint is
wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming
the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.