South China Sea:

Rules-Based Order Undermined by

Chinese Militarization

Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer

The University of New South Wales Canberra
Presentation to U3A Club
Austrian Club, Southlands, ACT
June 6, 2018
 Outline
1. Strategic Importance - South China Sea
2. International Law
3. Arbitral Tribunal Award Philippines –v –
China
4. China’s Militarisation of its Artificial
Islands
5. U.S. Freedom of Navigation
Operational Patrols (FONOPS)
6. Conclusion
1. Strategic Importance of the
South China Sea
Geographical Features
Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands

Baselines promulgated
 Scarborough Shoal
Seized by China in 2012
 Shipping Routes
Trade via South China Sea
China 64%
Japan 42%
Global 33%
USA 14%
Percentage of Total Trade
China 40%
India 31%
Japan 29%
Germany 9%
USA 6%

Value of Trade
US$3.4-5 trillion
Global LNG 40%
Twelve per
cent of the
global fish
catch
comes
from the
South
China Sea,
and it is
headed for
collapse.
 2. International Law
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

• UNCLOS is the Constitution of the World’s Oceans

• Does not deal with sovereignty
• Semi-enclosed Sea
– Duty to Cooperate
– Protect marine environment
• Maritime zones & features (next slide)
• Sovereign jurisdiction over resources
• Provisional arrangements of a practical nature
• Dispute settlement
 UNCLOS
Land dominates the sea
• Baselines at low tide
• Internal waters
• Territorial Sea
• Contiguous Zone
• Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ)
• Continental Shelf
• High Seas
• International waters
 Spratly
claimants:
• Vietnam (21)
• Philippines (9)
• China (7)
• Malaysia (5)
• Taiwan (1)
• Brunei (0)
• [Indonesia]
 China’s U-
shaped
9-dash line
• Historic rights
• Four sha (四
沙 or sands)
• Pratas
• Paracel
• Spratly and
• Macclesfield
Bank
 UNCLOS Compulsory Dispute
Procedures – Binding Decisions
• All state parties to UNCLOS are free to choose
one or more of four means to settle disputes:
– International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS),
Hamburg
– International Court of Justice, The Hague
– Arbitral Tribunal
– Special Arbitral Tribunal
• Where the parties have not designated the
means for dispute settlement = Arbitral Tribunal
 3. Arbitral Tribunal Award
Philippines v China - July 12, 2016

Neither China nor the

Philippines designated a
dispute settlement
mechanism. The President
of the International
Tribunal on the Law of the
Sea (ITLOS) appointed
judges to the Arbitral
Tribunal from a panel
nominated by state parties
to UNCLOS

French, Polish, Ghanaian, German, Dutch

 Philippines Claim Against China,
January 2013
• China has made excessive maritime claims
• Determine legal status of islands, rocks and
low tide elevations and submerged banks
occupied by China
• China is interfering with Philippines’ lawful
rights within and beyond its EEZ and
continental shelf
• Declare 9-dash line illegal in international law
 Findings of the Arbitral Tribunal:
The Philippines v China
1. UNCLOS comprehensively allocates rights in the
maritime domain
2. None of the land features in the Spratlys is an island
3. China in breach of flag state obligations related to
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea (COLREGS)
4. China failed to protect marine environment
5. China aggravated and extended the dispute
 Arbitral Tribunal Award
• DECLARES that, as between the Philippines and
China, China's claims to historic rights, or other
sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the
maritime areas of the South China Sea
encompassed by the relevant part of the 'nine-
dash line' are contrary to the Convention and
without lawful effect to the extent that they
exceed the geographic and substantive limits of
China's maritime entitlements under the
Convention; and further DECLARES that the
Convention superseded any historic rights, or
other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, in excess of
the limits imposed therein.
 Status of Features in the Spratlys
Rocks Low Tide Elevations*
• Cuarteron Reef** • Gaven Reef (South)**
• Fiery Cross Reef** • Hughes Reef**
• Gaven Reef (North)** • Mischief Reef**
• Johnson Reef** • Second Thomas Shoal
• McKennan Reef • Subi Reef**
• Scarborough Shoal
** occupied by China *Not subject to appropriation
 Annex VII
Article 11 Finality of Award*

• The award shall be final and without appeal,

unless the parties to the dispute have agreed in
advance to an appellate procedure. It shall be
complied with by the parties** to the dispute.
• **China and the Philippines

• *UNCLOS has no provisions for enforcement

 4. China’s Militarization
of Artificial Islands
To give a military To make preparations
character to… for war

Dual civil-
military

Facilities on three features could Red Line?

house 2,400 military personnel
Not ‘land reclamation’

Original
structure 1995
Hangars can accommodate 24
combat aircraft and four larger
planes (such as ISR, transport,
refuelling, or bomber aircraft)
Mischief Reef July 2016

Low Tide Elevation

Hangars can accommodate 24 combat

aircraft and four larger planes (such as ISR,
transport, refuelling, or bomber aircraft)
Subi Reef (LTE)
400 buildings

Hangars can
accommodate 24
combat aircraft and
four larger planes
(such as ISR,
transport, refuelling,
or bomber aircraft)
Recent Chinese Militarisation

Chinese H-6K
nuclear bombers
have 3,500 km
combat radius
covering all of
South China Sea
and most of the
Philippines

Woody Island, Paracels

 Recent Chinese Militarisation
• Military Cargo Aircraft
– Xian Y-7 and Shaanxi Y-8 transport
• Mobile Electronic Jammers
– Mischief Reef
• Anti-ship Cruise Missiles
– YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missile
• Surface-to-Air Missiles
– HQ-9 long range active radar homing
 5. U.S. Freedom of
Navigation Operational Patrols
• U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS
• Assert freedom of navigation and overflight
rights and freedoms worldwide under UNCLOS
• No acquiescence to unilateral acts
• Highlight UNCLOS navigation provisions to
protect maritime rights worldwide
• Triple track – diplomatic representations,
operational assertions and bi- & multilateral
consultations
 PHILIPPINES 21
21
U.S. Freedom of
Navigation challenges
18
OMAN 17
17
16
CHINA 15
14

by State and number of

13
VIETNAM 12
11
11
TAIWAN 8
8

years under challenge,

8
NICARAGUA 7
7
6
PERU 6
6

FY 1991-96
6
VENEZUELA 5
5
5
BANGLADESH 5
4
4
JAPAN 4
4
4
ALGERIA 4
4

China is not the main

3
THAILAND 3
3
3
EL SALVADOR 3
2

target
2
SAUDI ARABIA 2
2
2
DOMENICAN REPUBLIC 2
2
2
TUNISIA 1
1
1
NIGERIA 1
1
1
HAITI 1
1
1
Acknowledgement: Tuan Anh Luc, ‘The US
CAPE VERDE 1
1
1
Freedom of Navigation Operations in the
ANGOLA 1
South China Sea’, forthcoming.
0 5 10 15 20 25
 US FONOPs Under Obama and Trump
No. US Navy Ship Date Location
1. USS Lassen (DDG-82) Oct 2015 Subi Reef, Northeast Cay, Southwest
Cay, South Reef, and Sandy Cay
2. USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG-54) Jan 30, 2016 Triton Island

3. USS William P. Lawrence May 2016 Fiery Cross Reef

(DDG-110)
4. USS Decatur (DDG-73) Oct 2016 Islands in the Paracel archipelago

5. USS Dewey (DDG-105) May 24, 2017 Mischief Reef and other artificial islands

6. USS Stethem (DDG-63) Jul 2, 2017 Triton Island

7. USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) Aug 10, 2017 Mischief Reef

8 USS Chafee (DDG-90) Oct 10, 2017 Paracel Islands

9 USS Hopper (DDG-70) Jan 17, 2018 Scarborough Shoal

10 USS Mustin (DDG-89) March 2018 Mischief Reef

11 USS Higgins (DDG-76) & USS May 27, 2018 Tree, Lincoln, Triton & Woody islands,
Antietam (CG-54) Paracels
Most Recent US FONOP - Paracels

Hypothetical Sea Maneuvering by U.S. Navy

 6. Conclusion

Rules-based order/international law

Arbitral Award
– Implications of non-compliance
– International case law and maritime powers
– Indonesia and Laut Natuna Utara (July 2017)
– High seas in the Spratlys
– Islands, rocks and low-tide elevations elsewhere
 ASEAN-China Code of Conduct
Unresolved Issues
• Prerequisite: full implementation of the 2002
Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC)
– a. marine environmental protection;
– b. marine scientific research;
– c. safety of navigation and communication at sea;
– d. search and rescue operation; and
– e. combating transnational crime, including but not limited
to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at
sea, and illegal traffic in arms.
 Current ASEAN-China
Negotiations on a Code of Conduct
Unresolved Issues
• Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
– Member states or unified group of ten states?
• Geographic scope
• Legally binding
• Enforcement
• Interests of non-claimant user states
 Major Power Rivalry
• Intensification of Major Power rivalry on
maritime disputes in the South China Sea
– Defence Secretary James Mattis “consequences”
• Freedom of Navigation Operational Patrols
• Naval Presence & Continuous Bomber patrols
• Solution or source of provocation?
– Australia, France, India, Japan, United Kingdom
• Reassert high seas freedoms
• China indisputable sovereignty & self-defence
– Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ)?
 Australia
• Promoting a rules-based order in the face of
Chinese intransigence
• How should RAN and RAAF respond when
challenged by China in South China Sea?
• Traditional freedom of navigation –v– U.S.
freedom of navigation operational patrols
• China’s likely punitive responses?
• Weighing trade benefits and strategic costs
 South China Sea:
Rules-Based Order Undermined by
Chinese Militarization

Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer

The University of New South Wales Canberra
Email: c.thayer@adfa.edu.au