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2. NO.

pursuant to Section 5 (b) of said Act, the judicial review of "any decision of the
FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION Commission . . . shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has
exhausted his remedies before the Commission." In the case at bar, plaintiff has not
Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Social Security System exhausted its remedies before the Commission. The Commission has not even been given a
GR No. L-20383 chance to render a decision on the issue raised by plaintiff herein, because the latter has not
May 24, 1967 appealed to the Commission from the action taken by the System in insisting upon the
enforcement of Circular No. 34
On November 6, 1960, the Social Security System — hereinafter referred to as the System — ___________________
issued, with the approval of the Chairman of the Social Security Commission — hereinafter
referred to as the Commission — Circular No. 34 (Exhibit A), requiring all insurance firms to UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK vs E. GANZON, Inc.
submit immediately the names of their agents, solicitors or underwriters, who, pursuant to the G.R. No. 168859 G.R. No. 168897 June 30, 2009
Social Security Act 1 — hereinafter referred to as the Act — are employees of said firms, subject
to compulsory coverage of the System, and to pay the corresponding premiums, based on the Facts: United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) is a universal bank duly organized and existing
actual commissions received by each agent during each month. under Philippine Laws. On the other hand, E. Ganzon Incorporated (EGI) is a corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws and engaged in real estate construction and
Sometime later, the System, through the manager of its Production Department, sent to the development business.
Philippine American Life Insurance Company — hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff — the
communication Exhibit B, dated February 11, 1961, enclosing therewith SSS Form R-1-A.1, EGI availed itself of credit facilities from UCPB to finance its business expansion. To secure said
advising plaintiff that, pursuant to said Circular No. 34, the insurance agents thereof are credit facilities, EGI mortgaged to UCPB its condominium unit inventories in EGI Rufino Plaza,
considered its employees, subject to compulsory coverage under said Act, and urging plaintiff to located at the intersection of Buendia and Taft Avenues, Manila.
accomplish said SSS Form (for the purpose of supplying the necessary data concerning said
agents, solicitors and underwriters) and to submit the same, within ten (10) days, to avoid the Initially, EGI was able to make periodic amortization payments of its loans to UCPB. When the
penalties provided for by law negative effects of the Asian economic crisis on the property development sector, EGI started
defaulting in its payment of amortizations, thus, making all of its obligations due and
Instead of complying with this request, on May 30, 1961, plaintiff commenced, in the Court of First demandable. Subsequently, EGI was declared in default by UCPB in its letters. Thereafter, UCPB
Instance of Manila, the present action, for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the stopped sending EGI monthly statements of its accounts.
Commission — to restrain the latter 1) from compelling plaintiff to remit contributions to the
administrative branch of the System, as an incident of the alleged inclusion of plaintiff's agents, In 1999, EGI and UCPB explored the possibility of using the mortgaged condominium unit
solicitors or underwriters in the compulsory coverage of the System, and 2) from prosecuting inventories of EGI in EGI Rufino Plaza as payment for the loans of EGI to UCPB. Upon agreeing,
plaintiff and its officers for their refusal to make the aforementioned contributions — upon the on the valuation of said mortgaged properties, EGI and UCPB entered into a Memorandum of
theory that said agents of the plaintiff are not employees thereof. Agreementin settlement of the loans of EGI from UCPB. Based on this MOA, the outstanding loan
obligations of EGI with UCPB amounted to P904,491,052.00.
The trial court ruled(1) holding that plaintiff's agents, solicitors or under writers are not employees
of plaintiff. The Philippine American Life Insurance Company and that plaintiff is not their According to the MOA and its amendments, titles to the properties of EGI shall be transferred to
employer as the plaintiff's said insurance agents, solicitors or underwriters do not fall under the UCPB by the following modes: (1) foreclosure of mortgage; (2) dacion en pago; (3) creation of a
compulsory coverage of the Social Security System; (2) commanding defendant Social Security holding company; and (4) use of other alternatives as may be deemed appropriate by UCPB.
Commission to desist absolutely from taking criminal action against plaintiff's officers.
UCPB proceeded to foreclose some of the properties of EGI listed in the MOA, the foreclosure
ISSUES : proceeds of said properties amounted only to P723,592,000.00, less than the value of the
properties of EGI stipulated in its amended MOA with UCPB, there was still an unpaid balance
1) Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to hear and decide this case; and of P192,246,822.50.
2) Whether plaintiff has a cause of action against the Commission.
Some of the other properties of EGI at EGI Rufino Plaza, valued at P166,127,369.50, were
RULING : transferred by way of dacion en pago to UCPB. However, during the signing of the transaction
papers, EGI Senior-VP Architect Grace Layug noticed that said papers stated that the remaining
1. No. We find that the appeal taken by the Commission is well-founded for the present action loan balance of EGI in the amount of P192,246,822.50 had increased to P226,963,905.50. EGI
is one for a writ of prohibition, which may be issued only by a superior court to an inferior complained to UCPB about the increase, yet UCPB did not take any action on the matter.
court, corporation, board or person, to prevent the latter from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction or power it does not have (3 Moran on Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 157). Section This prompted EGI President Engineer EulailoGanzon and SVP Layugto review their files to verify
5 (a) of the Act acknowledges in the Commission the power to determine and settle claims, the figures. They discovered the UCPB Internal Memorandum signed by UCPB corporate officers
which partakes of a quasi-judicial function, in the exercise of which, the Commission is not wherein the memorandum presented two columns: One is for the ACTUAL which amounted only
inferior to courts of first instance, in much the same way as the Public Service Commission, to P146,849,412.58 figures and another the FIGURES DISCLOSED TO EGI amounting to
as a board performing quasi-judicial functions, is not inferior to said courts. 5 The quasi- P226,967,194.80.
judicial nature of the functions of the Commission is emphasized by its authority, expressly
granted by said Section 5 (a), to promulgate rules and regulations governing "the filing, EGI wrote UCPB a letter demanding a refund in which UCPB maintained the difference in figures
determination and settlement of claims." Hence, the lower court had no jurisdiction to issue and thereon refused to concede that UCPB had any obligation to make a refun. EGI then filed
the writ of prohibition prayed for. with the BSP an administrative complaint against UCPB, et al.,for the commission of irregularities

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and conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner. In which the BSP Monetary Board RULING: YES. The remedies available to respondent were stated clearly enough in the 1999
dismissed the administrative complaint of EGI. SEC Rules of Procedure. The proper remedy from an adverse decision of a hearing officer or
subordinate units, was to appeal to the SEC en banc. G.G. provided no reason for not doing such.
EGI then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure CA erroneously drew the conclusion that the SEC en banc could not supposedly provide
with the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether the BangkoSentralngPilipinas erred in respondent with adequate relief.
dismissing the administrative complaint filed by EGI against UCPB
The exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, as enumerated in
UCPB et al. aver that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals are: (1) when there is a violation of due
and/or resolutions of the BSP Monetary Board on administrative matters. The BSP Monetary process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action
Board is not among the quasi-judicial agenciesover which the Court of Appeals has appellate is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part
jurisdiction. of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the decision of the BSP implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
Monetary Board remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when
the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide
Ruling: Yes. Although there are no statements in the law which explicitly allows an appeal of the a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the
decisions of the BSP Monetary Board, this shall not mean that said decisions are beyond judicial urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant;
review. (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political
agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
Section 9(3) of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act rendered moot.
of 1980 reads that
Respondent's claim that it was not given due process is without basis. Even more baseless is the
“Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders argument that an appeal to the SEC en banc was useless for reason that "it is a given that SEC
or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or will not reverse itself.”
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Distrust of an administrative agency alone, unsupported by concrete evidence, is not sufficient
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service reason to dispense with the doctrine of administrative remedies, which serves a very useful
Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.” purpose in ensuring the efficient and speedy disposal of cases. Once the courts condone the
circumvention of the mechanisms of administrative appeals on mere suspicion of an agency's
Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial powers integrity, the doctrine is as good as dead.
or functions. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, the BSP Monetary Board is an
independent central monetary authority and a body corporate with fiscal and administrative
autonomy, mandated to provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking and credit. HON. TOMAS N. JOSON III (Governer of Nueva Ecija)
vs.
Having established that the BSP Monetary Board is indeed a quasi-judicial body exercising quasi- CA and Elizabeth Vargas (Mayor of Aliaga)
judicial functions, therefore, the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
orders, resolutions or awards of the BSP Monetary Board on administrative complaints against
banks and quasi-banks, which the former acquires through the filing by the aggrieved party of a FACTS: Eight members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija (SB Members), filed
Petition for Review. with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan an administrative complaint against the incumbent Municipal
Mayor of Aliaga, Elizabeth R. Vargas (Mayor Vargas), for dishonesty, misconduct in office, and
abuse of authority. The SB Members alleged that Mayor Vargas submitted to the Provincial
Hongkong& Shanghai Bank vs. GG Sportswear Mgf. Co., 489 SCRA 578 Budget Officer two falsified documents.
Mayor Vargas filed a complaint for annulment of falsified minutes of session and appropriation
FACTS: Respondent, G.G. Sportswear (G.G.) filed a petition with the SEC. for a "Declaration of ordinance with damages against the SB members before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
State of Suspension of Payments, for Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan and for City.
Appointment of Management Committee." SEC hearing panel issued an order directing the
suspension of all actions, claims and proceedings against G.G. and also scheduled a creditors'
meeting. The creditors elevated the matter to the SEC en banc for preliminary injunction. During Mayor Vargas filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan a motion to suspend proceedings
the en banc hearings, it was deduced that respondent was merely suffering from liquidity and/or motion to dismiss due to the pendency of a prejudicial question in the RTC of Cabanatuan,
problems rather than insolvency. Respondent G.G. was therefore ordered to amend its petition. specifically questioning the genuineness of the documents she allegedly falsified. Without
G.G. eventually filed an amended petition, which the hearing panel admitted and set for hearing resolving the motion, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended Governor Joson the
along with several motions filed by both respondent G.G. and its creditors. SEC hearing panel preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas for 60 days.
dismissed the joint petition filed by G.G. and its sister company. They filed a "petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order/injunction" with the Mayor Vargas appealed to the Office of the President praying for the reversal of the Resolution of
Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the SEC decision. the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals should have dismissed respondent's special civil action
for certiorari for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

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Governor Joson issued an order of preventive suspension against Mayor Vargas. Mayor Vargas The petitioner, an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, was deputized at the Office of the City
filed before the Office of the President a very urgent petition to set aside the suspension order. Prosecutor of Makati City and assigned at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58, Makati
The petition is granted. City. The respondent is the presiding judge of the said branch. Petitioner arrived ten minutes late
in one of the hearing, just when the second case in the calendar was on its first call. The
respondent Judge forthwith ordered the petitioner to explain within seventy-two hours her failure
Governor Joson filed with the Office of the President a motion for reconsideration and the Office to come to court on time. Petitioner answered with alleged falsity. Both the petitioner and the
of the President granted such motion ordering the preventive suspension of Mayor Vargas. respondent Judge have resorted to personal attacks against each other in this case. Verbal clash
with the branch clerk followed because of refusals to let petitioner enter the undersigned’s
chambers. Petitioner was later cited in contempt of Court. Aggrieved by the aforementioned
Mayor Vargas appealed to the Court of Appeals in which it resolved to issue a writ of preliminary orders, the petitioner instituted with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari. The
injunction to further enjoin and restrain Governor Joson from imposing the order of preventive Court of Appeals limited the issues to whether the petitioner was tardy and whether she
suspension and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from conducting proceedings in the committed falsehood in her explanation. The CA ruled in favor of the respondent.
administrative case against Mayor Vargas. ISSUE:
Whether or not the charges of the respondent judge will hold against the petitioner.
HELD:
Petitioner alleged that Mayor Vargas filed the action for certiorari even while her motion for NO. Petition was granted, but petitioner must be re-assigned somewhere else.
reconsideration was still pending resolution before the Office of the President. According to RATIO:
petitioners, the Court of Appeals acted with manifest bias and partiality when it issued the writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners despite the filing of a wrong remedy and the non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The respondent Judge disregarded the requirements of due process in contempt proceedings
and, therefore, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: W/N respondent Vargas clearly failed to exhaust administrative remedy.

[P]ronouncements, however, should not be understood as absolving the petitioner from any
HELD: No, the special civil action of certiorari is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction liability for her tardiness or from her solemn duty as an officer of the court. As a lawyer, she is
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of bound by her oath to conduct herself as a lawyer according to the best of her knowledge and
jurisdiction. All the issues submitted for resolution in the Court of Appeals involve questions of discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to her client. She should never forget that
law which are reviewable on certiorari. punctuality is not only a practice mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility
Rule 11.02 A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
and Canons of Professional Ethics it is a virtue which must be faithfully maintained as part of her
In this case, Mayor Vargas filed the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that contribution in the task of ensuring a speedy, efficient, and effective administration of justice. If the
Secretary Gaite issued the Resolution with grave abuse of discretion. Mayor Vargas raised the petitioner then had committed a breach of her duty to the court she should accordingly be dealt
following issues: with but in accordance with established procedure. The right to do so is hereby reserved to the
1) whether it was proper for Secretary Gaite to have ruled that Mayor Vargas is considered in respondent Judge.
default pursuant to Article 126, Rule XIX of the Rules Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991; PAREDES-GARCIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
2) whether the civil case filed by Mayor Vargas before the Cabanatuan RTC for annulment of [G.R. No. 120654. September 11, 1996]
falsified minutes of session and appropriation ordinance with damages is a prejudicial Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.
question which warrants the suspension of the proceedings in the administrative case;
3) whether the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has jurisdiction to hear the administrative case filed FACTS:
against Mayor Vargas, when the relief sought is her removal from office.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the
decision of 19 June 1995[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37081 dismissing the
The issues raised are questions of law which involve the interpretation and application of laws. petitioners special civil action for certiorari to annul the order of respondent Judge Escolastico M.
Resolution of such questions constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power which is Cruz, Jr., which cited the petitioner for contempt and ordered her to pay a fine of P100.00.
exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such courts as the Legislature may establish.
Since the issues involve purely legal questions which the court may review, exhaustion of  The petitioner, an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, was deputized at the Office
administrative remedies may be dispensed with. of the City Prosecutor of Makati City and assigned at the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 58, Makati City. The respondent is the presiding judge of the said branch.
PETITION DISMISSED.  When the respondent judge commenced the session of his court, the petitioner, who
was the prosecutor assigned to the case was not yet around. Petitioner arrived ten
minutes late in one of the hearing, just when the second case in the calendar was on its
Paredes-Garcia vs. CA [G.R. No. 120654. September 11, 1996] first call. The respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to explain within seventy-two (72)
24SEP hours her failure to come to court on time.
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.  Petitioner answered with alleged falsity.
FACTS:
 PETITIONER ALLEGED THAT:

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- She actually reported to her office at 8:00 a.m., as shown by a copy of a page of First established in 1972, decisions of NLRC were declared to be appealable to the
the Prosecutors logbook, and that she went to respondent judges court; Secretary of labor and, ultimately to the President. But under the present state law, there is no
- However, she returned to her office to attend to some matters prior to the hearing. provision for appeals from NLRC decisions. The court held that there is an underlying power of
She thereafter proceeded back to the respondent Judges court for the hearings the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though
but was late for ten minutes. not right of review is given by statute, that the purpose of jurisdiction review is to keep the
- Further, petitioner alleged that she had never been late in any of the hearings of administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and
that is part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls
the court nor previously fined or ordered to explain for tardiness in any hearing.
arbitrary and unjust jurisdictions.
 The respondent judge issued an order cited the petitioner in contempt of court and Subsequently under RA 7902, effective March 1995, the mode for judicial review over
directed her to pay within 72 hours from receipt of the order a penalty of P100.00. NLRC decisions in that of a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The same confuses by declaring
 Both the petitioner and the respondent Judge have resorted to personal attacks against that the CA has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
each other in this case. Verbal clash with the branch clerk followed because of refusals SC, including the NLRC decisions.
to let petitioner enter the undersigned’s chambers. Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of BP 129 to supposed appeals from
 Petitioner was later cited in contempt of Court. Aggrieved by the aforementioned NLRC to SC are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari
orders, the petitioner instituted with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for under Rule 65. All such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the doctrine on the
certiorari. hierarchy of courts as appropriate forum for the relief desired.
 The Court of Appeals limited the issues to whether the petitioner was tardy and whether Case remanded to CA.
she committed falsehood in her explanation. The CA ruled in favor of the respondent
judge. CASE DIGEST
Facts:
 The petitioner then came to this Court through the instant petition for review contending
MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an application for the revision of its rate schedules to reflect
that the decision of the Court of Appeals is based on a mere possibility, thereby
an average increase in its distribution charge. ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the
depriving her of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent. condition that should the COA thru its audit report find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase,
all excess amounts collected from the latter’s customers shall either be refunded to them or
correspondingly credited in their favor. The COA report found that MERALCO is entitled to a
ISSUE: Whether or not the charges of the respondent judge will hold against the petitioner.
lesser increase, thus ERB ordered the refund or crediting of the excess amounts. On appeal, the
CA set aside the ERB decision. MRs were denied.
HELD: NO. Petition was granted, but petitioner must be re-assigned somewhere
Issue:
else.
Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of rates of MERALCO is valid.
Ruling: YES.
RATIO:
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the
The respondent Judge disregarded the requirements of due process in contempt proceedings
State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid
and, therefore, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public
Pronouncements, however, should not be understood as absolving the petitioner from any liability
interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to
for her tardiness or from her solemn duty as an officer of the court. As a lawyer, she is bound by
promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by
her oath to conduct herself as a lawyer according to the best of her knowledge and discretion with
discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to her client. She should never forget that punctuality is
regulation.
not only a practice mandated by the Code of Professional ResponsibilityRule 11.02 A lawyer shall
In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and
punctually appear at court hearings.and Canons of Professional Ethics it is a virtue which must be
excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the
faithfully maintained as part of her contribution in the task of ensuring a speedy, efficient, and
power to regulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to
effective administration of justice. If the petitioner then had committed a breach of her duty to the
deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the
court she should accordingly be dealt with but in accordance with established procedure. The
State must be one that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property
right to do so is hereby reserved to the respondent Judge.
performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public for the services rendered. The
fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer
interests.

St. Martin Funeral vs. NLRC


G.R. 130866 September 16, 1998 295 SCRA 494
Regalado, J.: G.R. No. L-46570 April 21, 1939
FACTS:
Respondent Aricayos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter. There
JOSE D. VILLENAvs.THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
being no employer-employee relationship between the two, petition was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Arcayos appealed to NLRC cotending errors of the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: The Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over NLRC appeals? the Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the petitioner, as a result of which the latter
RULING: was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized
practice of the law profession. The respondent, therefore, recommended to the President of the

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Philippines the suspension of the petitioner to prevent possible coercion of witnesses, which and directs his acts; he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not
recommendation was granted. The Secretary of the Interior suspended the petitioner from office any of his secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable for the
and then and thereafter wired the Provincial Governor of Rizal with instruction that the petitioner acts of administration of the entire Executive Department before his own conscience no less than
be advised accordingly. before that undefined power of public opinion which, in the language of Daniel Webster, is the last
repository of popular government. These are the necessary corollaries of the American
presidential type of government, and if there is any defect, it is attributable to the system itself. We
The petitioner contends in his petition: (1) That the Secretary of the Interior has no jurisdiction or
cannot modify the system unless we modify the Constitution, and we cannot modify the
authority to suspend and much less to prefer by himself administrative charges against the
Constitution by any subtle process of judicial interpretation or constitution.
petitioner and decide also by himself the merits of the charges as the power to suspend municipal
elective officials and to try and punish them for misconduct in office or dereliction of duty is lodged
in some other agencies of the government… (2) (a) Because the Secretary of the Interior, by The petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
suspending the petitioner, has exercised control over local governments when that power has
been taken away from the President of the Philippines by the Constitution for the to abrogate and
the power to abrogate means the power to power to control has been interpreted to include the Bongcawil vs. Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte, 10 SCRA 327
power usurp and the power to usurp necessarily includes the power to destroy.
Digest
Issue: Did the Secretary exceeded its authority and encroach upon the powers of the President? FACTS:

Ruling:Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code speaks, of direct control, direction, and A complaint was filed against petitioner by VictorioDy for commission of certain irregularities in his
supervision over bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this capacity as Mayor. The former was suspended.
section should be interpreted in relation to section 86 of the same Code which grants to the
Department of the Interior "executive supervision over the administration of provinces, The complaint was then set for hearing where both parties submitted evidence both oral and
municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions." In the case of Planas vs. documentary. The case was then submitted to the provincial board for decision that designated
Gil (37 Off. Gaz., 1228), we observed that "Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active Vice Governor Valerio V. Rovira to draft the decision in the case. He submitted the draft in August
power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and 1961 for deliberation and study by the board but before final decision,2 of its members launched
conditions in order to render the power real and effective. their candidacies vacating their respective position so it was only after they were duly substituted
when the newly constituted provincial board formally and finally acted upon the case and
rendered its decision on September 7, 1962unanimously resolving to adopt the draft finding
We hold, therefore, that the Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to order the petitioner guilty of the charges and recommending dismissal from office.
investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that
purpose. Petitioner did not appeal to the office of the president but interposed the present petition for
certiorari. According to the petitioner, the board acted in gross violation of the law and with grave
There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a abuse of discretion when it rendered a new decision on the same complaint. (There’s only one
municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the decision on September 7, 1962. There was vacancy of the position of the board when 2 members
provincial governor by section 2188 of the Administrative Code. The fact, however, that the power launched their candidacy so they were not able to act and deliberate on the draft submitted by the
of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial GovRovira. Petitioner mistook the opinions of the boards and the resofoRovira drafting the case
governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the as the final decision).
Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the
oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office Issue: WON Certiorari is proper.
in virtue of his greater power of removal to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the
President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official, it would be a legal Ruling. No, the present petition cannot be sustained because of petitioner's failure to appeal from
incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would the decision of the Provincial Board of Lanao Del Norte to the Office of the President as provided
be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official, the in Section 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code which shows that he failed to exhaust his
President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. administrative remedies as required by law before he may be given the right to interpose the
present special civil action.

In the deliberation of this case it has also been suggested that, admitting that the President of the
Philippines is invested with the authority to suspend the petitioner, and it appearing that he had
IRENEO ROQUE, petitioner-appellant, v. THE HONORABLE, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS; THE
verbally approved or at least acquiesced in the action taken by the Secretary of the Interior, the
HONORABLE, THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT and JOSE
suspension of the petitioner should be sustained on the principle of approval or ratification of the
FACUN, respondents-appellees.
act of the Secretary of the Interior by the President of the Philippines.
G.R. No. L-25373. July 1, 1976
Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot
impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a FACTS:Petitioner Roque allege that he had been in occupation of the disputed portion since
matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but 1937, for the whole of Lot No. 4507. Likewise Respondent Facun filed his homestead application
this is by mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular on the same land in 1935 and submitted the final proof therefore in 1939.
field. If the President, then, is the authority in the Executive Department, he assumes the -In settling the dispute, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources decided in favor of
corresponding responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he controls Roque but upon re investigation it is found out that Roque submitted his sales application for the
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disputed portion in 1948, only during the course of the investigation of his protest and it was DANR acted in excess of their jurisdiction when it arrogated the function of hearing the adverse
verified during the re investigation of this case that the appellee (Roque) entered upon the claims.
disputed portion in 1951 only. So the President, through respondent Assistant Executive Issue: Whether or not the DANR acted in excess of their jurisdiction when it ordered the conduct
Secretary awarded the land in favor of the respondent Facun. of hearing after the finality of this decision since the order was done after a second motion for
-The petitioner prayed that the order of the respondent Honorable Director of Lands and the reconsideration.
decision of the respondent Honorable Assistant Executive Secretary, be set aside on the alleged Held:
ground that the said order of the Director of Lands was issued with grave abuse of discretion, (1) Only upon the affirmance of the Sec. of DANR does the findings of facts become
consisting of unqualified reliance and the biased report and recommendation. And said that the conclusive, leaving only questions of law for the court to decide. In the order
decision of the Honorable Executive Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction and committed a grave complained of, the DANR sought to have a rational basis for the acceptance or
abuse of discretion disregarding the sales award of the land in question in favor of the herein rejection of the conclusion of Bureau of Mines. Petitioner would thus ignore the
petitioner having already paid is for the price of the same, and praying further that the decision of basic principle that unless administrative procedure followed conforms with the
the Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be sustained. requirement of procedural process, the actuation is void, a hearing deemed of the
-Respondent Jose Facun, through Atty. Cipriano A. Tan, filed an answer to the petition denying
essence of such proceeding. Absence of which would result in the loss of
specifically the allegation of abuse of discretion, arbitrariness and excess of jurisdiction of the
jurisdiction.
Honorable Director of Lands and Assistant Executive Secretary is perfectly valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not Assistant Executive Secretary lacks the power to overrule the descision
(2) To sustain the contention of the Petitioner would be to run counter to what was
of Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources?
held in the AngTibay vs. CIR case, which specifically spoke of cardinal primary
RULING:No, to contend that the Office of the President, through respondent Assistant Executive rights embraced in the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
Secretary, lacks the power to overrule the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources is to trials and investigations of an administrative character. Here precisely, vital and
betray lack of awareness of the implications of what Justice Laurel referred to in Villena v. e4ssentials facts remained at issue. It was considered judgment of the Acting
Secretary of the Interior as " As was further stressed by him: "Without minimizing the Secretary of DANR that a hearing should be held to ascertain the truth of the
importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the matter. It is but right and proper in the interest of justice that a formal hearing on
projection of that of the President…. the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed the merits of the case be conducted. The reason for this ruling is that proceedings
and Promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the before this office is administrative in character, therefore parties to the vase must
Chief Executive, presumptive the acts of the Chief Executive.” be given all opportunity to be heard.
-The President has control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices and under Pelaez
v. Auditor General "The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers." Clearly then, there is nothing to prevent the President to disapprove the act of a
department head. PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION VS. ARLENE DE GUZMAN, ET AL., June 21,
-Assistant Executive Secretary of the President is correct for sustaining the award by the Director
of Lands of a homestead application and thus overruling the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural 2004
Resources, because it is in conformity with the policy of the law. Petitioner, himself a previous
beneficiary of the statute, would seek to add to his holding by a sales application. The prevailing POLICE POWER/Public Health; THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE A PROFESSION
party, private respondent Jose Facun, on the other hand, had applied for the disputed lot as a Facts:
homesteader as far back as 1935, and had submitted his final proof in 1948.

After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) released the names of successful
BENGUET EXPLORATION VS. SECRETARY OF DANR
FACTS: examinees in the Medical Licensure Examination, the Board of Medicines observed that the
Benguet Exploration is a domestic Mining Company engaged in the development of
grades of the 79 Fatima College of Medicine successful examinees were unusually and
mineral claims. Private complainant Sofia V. Reyes filed with the Bureau of Mi9nes an adverse
claim against Benguet Exploration covering three mining claims of the latter’s load lease exceptionally high in the two (2) most difficult subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and
application located in Benguet, Mountain Province. Benguet Exploration filed a motion to dismiss,
Reyes countered in her opposition. Bureau of Mines dismissed the claim, and appealed in the Obstetrics and Gynecology.
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. At first, DANR dismissed the appeal. Upon a
second motion for reconsideration, DANR issued an order setting aside its first decision and order
dismissing the same and thereby directed Atty. Romulo Redula to conduct a formal hearing of the The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as physicians of all the
case. Petitioner contends that there is a failure on the part of the DANR in following the statutory
requirements laid down in Sec. 73, RA 4388 (Mining Act), which provides that the finding of facts examinees from Fatima College of Medicine. Compared with other examines from other schools,
in the decision or order of the Director of mines and affirmed by the DANR shall be final and the results of those from Fatima were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to
conclusive, and the aggrieved parties desiring to appeal from such decision shall file in the SC a
petition for review wherein only questions of law may be raised. (1) What was objected to by the each other. The NBI Investigation found that the “Fatima examinees gained early access to the
Petitioner is that it could no longer be done as a matter had reached the stage of finality, such
order coming only after a second motion for consideration. Petitioner further contends that (2) test questions.”

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On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of e. to protect public morals; (DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569; ERMITA
Manila to compel the PRC to give them their licenses to practice medicine. Meanwhile on July MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967; JMM PROMOTIONS VS. CA, 260 SCRA
21, 1993, the Board of medicine issued Resolution No. 21 charging the respondents of 319; VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS, February 13, 1983)
immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud and deceit and recommended that the test results of the f. to promote the economic security of the people. (ichong vs. hernandez, 101 Phil.
Fatima Examinees be nullified. 11155)

On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its decision ordering the PRC to allow Office of the Ombudsman v Santos

the respondents to take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians. The same was
FACTS:
appealed by the PRC to the Court of Appeals which sustained the RTC decision.
Estrelita L. Gumabon, Teacher III, Lagro Elementary School, filed a complaint against the school
Principal, respondent Florentina A. Santos, before the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner
Hence, this petition. alleged that respondent falsified her daily time record as her entries therein did not match the
entries of the school’s security guard in their logbook. The complaint also pointed out that
respondent was one of the owners/incorporators of Golden Child Montessori (GCM) and held the
Held: position of President/Chairman of the Board. It was further alleged that respondent exhibited rude
and oppressive behavior not only to the teachers and personnel of Lagro Elementary School, but
also to the parents of their pupils. In a supplemental complaint, Gumabon also charged
It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a profession or pursuit of an respondent with taking several pieces of galvanized iron sheets used in the construction and
occupation cannot be exercised by the State in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner. repair of some rooms and toilets at Lagro Elementary School. Respondent allegedly ordered one
Jose Sabalilag to take the galvanized iron sheets and deliver them to her house, and even asked
However, the regulating body has the right to grant or forbid such privilege in accordance with a school janitress to accompany Sabalilag to show him the direction to respondent’s house.

certain conditions.
Respondent explained that it was her daily routine upon arrival at the school to inspect its outer
premises before entering the school grounds, to see if the school fence is clean and garbage-free.
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their exercise may be regulated The security guard only logs in the time of respondent’s entry into the school grounds as her
arrival time. As regards the incident on the difference of time logs, respondent stated that she
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, sought permission from the District Supervisorto attend an activity at Golden Child Montessori.
She said that Mrs. Quejada did not object to her request. Respondent also admitted being an
safety, and general welfare of the people. As such, mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of owner/incorporator of Golden Child Montessori, but argued that it did not violate any existing law.
Medicine to issue licenses for the respondents to practice medicine. With respect to the taking of the galvanized iron sheets, respondent explained that they were
excess materials from the construction projects in the school and they were sold to her by the
project contractor at cost.
RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the
Hearings were conducted before Graft Investigation Officer Joselito P. Fangon at the
qualifications of the candidates for the board examination, the scope and conduct of the Administrative Adjudication Bureau, Office of the Ombudsman.
examinations, the grounds for the denying of the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a
Several witnesses testified and corroborated the above stated complaints of respondents role at
license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the examinee must prove that he has fully
GCM and her rude behavior. Witnesses also specified her role in GCM as handling bank finances
complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by law and the licensing authority to and signing checks.

be granted the privilege to practice medicine. In short, he shall have all the qualifications and
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding respondent guilty of dishonesty,
none of the disqualifications. The petition is therefore granted. violation of Sec. 4 (c) of R.A. 6713 and grave misconduct. The Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the decision of the Ombudsman and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It held that the
findings of the Office of the Ombudsman were not supported by substantial evidence.21
c. to promote and protect public safety; (AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195; TAXICAB
OPERATORS VS. JUINIO, 119 SCRA 897 ) ISSUE:

d. to maintain and safeguard peace and order; (GUAZON VS. DE VILLA)

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1. Contrary to the appellate court a quo’s [sic] ruling, the extant evidence on record
constitutes more than substantial evidence to establish the administrative guilt of
respondent.

2. Findings of fact of an administrative agency are generally accorded not only respect
but at times finality.

HELD:

1. Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." A finding of


guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported
by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint
or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

A reading of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman and a thorough examination
of the records of this case show sufficient evidence to prove respondent’s
administrative liability. The respondent failed to present any evidence to counter the
complaints, and as such, her guilt has been adequately shown.

2. As a general rule, factual findings of administrative bodies are accorded great respect
by this Court. We do not see any reason to depart from this policy, except as regards
respondent’s liability for holding the position of President/Chairman of the Board of
Golden Child Montessori and managing the affairs of said school. Contrary to the
Ombudsman’s ruling that such act does not violate any provision of law, Section 7 (b)
(2) of R.A. 6713 prohibits all public officials and employees from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of
one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, but the
professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall
likewise apply.

The rule is that all public officers and employees are prohibited from engaging in the
private practice of their profession. The exception is when such private practice is
authorized by the Constitution or law. However, even if it is allowed by law or the
Constitution, private practice of profession is still proscribed when such practice will
conflict or tends to conflict with the official functions of the employee concerned.
Indeed, public servants are expected to devote their undivided attention to their public
duties, to give the tax payers the competent and excellent service that they deserve. In
fact, Section 4 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees enjoins said officials and employees to always uphold public interest over
and above personal interest. By actively participating in the management of Golden
Child Montessori, a private school, while serving as Principal of Lagro Elementary
School, a government school, respondent has transgressed the provisions of Section 7
(b) (2) of R.A. 6713.

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