SOE 2015 1 Ebook

Institute for East and
Southeast European Studies

Institut für Ost- und
Südosteuropaforschung
Südost-
europa
Volume 63 no. 1 2015
The Romanian Political

System after 1989
Sergiu Gherghina (Guest Editor)
Sergiu Mişcoiu
Sorina Soare
Daniel Brett
Emanuel Emil Coman
Radu Cinpoeș
George Jiglău
Dragoș Dragoman
Südosteuropa
Journal of Politics and Society
Published on behalf of the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Regensburg
Editors:
SABINE RUTAR (Regensburg), Editor-in-Chief

GER DUIJZINGS (Regensburg)
WIM VAN MEURS (Nijmegen)
Editorial Board:
Heinz-Jürgen Axt (Duisburg-Essen) Denisa Kostovicova (London)

Florian Bieber (Graz) Ivan Krastev (Sofia)
Dimitar Bechev (Sofia/Oxford) Mladen Lazić (Belgrade)
Johanna Bockman (Washington, DC) Joseph Marko (Graz/Bozen)
Xavier Bougarel (Paris/Berlin) Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (Bukarest/Berlin)
Ulf Brunnbauer (Regensburg) Vjeran Pavlaković (Rijeka)
Marie-Janine Calic (München) Nadège Ragaru (Paris)
Nina Caspersen (York) Sabrina P. Ramet (Trondheim)
András Inotai (Budapest) Solveig Richter (Erfurt)
Deema Kaneff (Birmingham) Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers
(Bournemouth)
Stef Jansen (Manchester)
Milica Uvalic (Perugia)
Jürgen Jerger (Regensburg)
Editorial Office:
Sabine Rutar
Michael Knogler
Christian Mady (Assistant)
Wim van Meurs (Book Review Editor)
Südosteuropa, volume 63, no. 1, 2015
C ontent
The Romanian Political System after 1989
Sergiu Gherghina: Introduction: Political Dynamics in Post-Communist

Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
Sergiu Mișcoiu: What Grounds for Representing the People? An Analysis
of Post-Communist Romania through the Lens of Discourse Theory . . . 7-24
Sorina Soare: Enhancing Democracy through Constitutional Reforms.
Is Semi-Presidentialism Romanian Democracy’s Achilles’ Heel? . . . . . . . 25-46
Daniel Brett: Fiddling while Rome Burns: Institutional Conflict and Party
Politics in Romania since 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47-74
Emanuel Emil Coman: Electoral Reform in Romania: From the Need for
Party System Consolidation to Concern for Improved Quality of
Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75-94
Radu Cinpoeș: The Dilemmas of Political (Mis-)Representation: Political
“Cruising” in Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95-113
George Jiglău: The Interethnic Stalemate in Romania: Origins and Risks . 114-135
Dragoș Dragoman: Ethnic Relations in Mixed Communities in Romania
after 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136-156
Book Reviews
Ivana Maček (ed.) Engaging Violence: Trauma, Memory and Represen-

tation (Ger Duijzings) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157-159
Enikő Dácz (ed.), Minderheitenfragen in Ungarn und in den Nachbar-
ländern im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert (Christopher Walsch) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159-162
Đorđe Tomić / Roland Zschächner / Mara Puškarević / Allegra Schneider
(eds.), Mythos Partizan. (Dis-)Kontinuitäten der jugoslawischen Linken:
Geschichte, Erinnerungen und Perspektiven (Sabine Rutar) . . . . . . . . . . . . 162-164
Maria Koinova, Ethnonationalist Conflict in Postcommunist States.
Varieties of Governance in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Kosovo
(Wim van Meurs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165-166
Südosteuropa 63 (2015), no. 1, pp. 1-6
Sergiu Gherghina
Introduction:
Political Dynamics in Post-Communist Romania
The contributions to this special issue describe and analyse the institutional
and behavioural dynamics of the political processes that have occurred in
Romania since 1989. The country is one of the largest of the East European
members of the European Union (EU) with a population and territorial area
exceeded only by that of Poland, and the idiosyncrasies of its economic, politi-
cal and social transition make it an appealing case study of political dynamics
in a new democracy. There are the circumstances of its elite continuity and the
question of corruption to consider, the positions of minorities, the comparative
lateness of its democratic achievements as well as its more recent social convul-
sions. Largely as a consequence of many of the problems associated with those
matters, Romania was able to join the EU only in 2007, although its accession
process had been initiated at the same time as in other countries which were
admitted to the EU in 2004.
The authors of this special issue reflect on a number of the core developments
in Romanian politics throughout the post-communist period, and each of their
studies offers a valuable source of primary information about the Romanian
political landscape, while together they form a useful basis for comparisons
with other countries in Eastern Europe. Not all the articles cover the entire
period since the regime change of 1989, but the perspective is longitudinal, it
accounts for at least one decade, and through qualitative approaches it focuses
on what happened and on why certain decisions were taken. The authors have
structured their research from the more general topics identified as crucial to
political developments in Romania, ranging from the actual processes of democ-
ratization, constitutional politics and institutional conflict, to particular matters
concerning ethnic relations, the electoral system and party politics.
Earlier research has charted the bumpy road to democratization in Roma-
nia. A high degree of elite reproduction made the legacies of the previous
regime more visible and coincided with the quasi-absence of major political
and economic reforms in Romania until the mid-1990s.1 During that period
1  According to previous, theoretically informed research, the change of system did hardly
affect individuals of the elite, and those who were privileged under the communist regime
2 Sergiu Gherghina
the government sought both to maintain public support by reducing the social
costs of transition and to increase the control exerted by political elites over
state resources. The result was an orientation towards the maintenance of the
status quo by limiting the number of reforms. The 1996 legislative elections gave
democratic forces the opportunity to gain access to government, but the great
expectations excited by the change were not fulfilled in reality. The govern-
ment’s term in office was characterized by instability caused by conflict within
the coalition, unpopular economic reforms and the dithering of state authorities.
In general, establishing the rule of law remained an important problem as new
corruption scandals emerged. Furthermore, the parliamentary and presidential
elections which followed in 2000 raised concerns about the fragility of the coun-
try’s democratization. Romania was the first East European country in which
a radical right-wing party achieved relevant electoral success when the Greater
Romania Party (Partidul România Mare, PRM) became the second largest party in
Parliament with more than 20% of the seats. The vote for the radical right was
seen mainly as a protest against an ineffective political establishment, current
economic policies and the prevailing instability.2
In line with the problems of democratic transition and consolidation, Sergiu
Mișcoiu seeks to understand direct and representative democracy in the coun-
try. He uses discourse theory to highlight the rhetoric about democracy and the
people in the public discourse of the Romanian presidents, his major hypothesis
being that the absence of the demos in Romania’s decision-making processes
eventually fuelled a rhetoric based on direct democracy. His analytical findings
distinguish between two periods, one of democratic enthusiasm combined with
authoritarian paternalism in the first ten years after communism; and another of
hegemonic discourse in what he identifies as a second post-communist period.
The discursive system established during Ion Iliescu’s two terms in office as
President from 1990-1996 and again from 2000-2004 sharpened a representa-
tive and sometimes technocratic perspective on politics which did not envisage
the direct participation of the people. Beginning in 2004, the year that marked
the beginning of a new type of politics in Romania, there came a new rhetoric
of direct democracy associated with the idea of popular sovereignty, and it
succeeded in establishing itself as a hegemonic discourse backed by Iliescu’s
initiatives and, for some time, by popular support.
continued to be privileged after its removal. For details, see Istvan Szelenyi / Szonja Szelenyi,
Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern
Europe: Introduction, Theory and Society 24 (1995), no. 5, 615-638.
2  Grigore Pop-Elecheș, Whither Democracy? The Politics of Dejection in the 2000 Romanian
Elections, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, Berkeley
2001; Rogers Brubaker, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town.
Princeton 2006.
Introduction 3
The existence of institutional conflict is quite common in post-communist

Eastern Europe. Irrespective of the precise system of government, numerous
conflicts emerged between Presidents and Prime Ministers, for example those
between Havel and Klaus in the Czech Republic, Antall and Göncz in Hungary,
Wałesa and Pawlak in Poland, Kovacs and Meçiar in Slovakia. Indeed, in April
2004 President Rolandas Paksas of Lithuania became the first European leader
to be removed from office, following an impeachment procedure which was the
result of an institutional conflict with Parliament. Romania experienced both
types of conflict. On the one hand, during the first decade there were conflicts
exclusively between President and Prime Minister, such as those between
Iliescu and Roman, or between Emil Constantinescu and Radu Vasile, which
did not involve Parliament because the opponents were members of the same
party. Then, in 2007 and again in 2012, during the second post-communist
decade, conflicts emerged between President and Parliament during the period
of cohabitation, when the parliamentary majority backed the Prime Minister.3
Favourable referendum results enabled the President Traian Băsescu to survive
both attempts at impeachment. One explanation for those conflicts was the active
and often constitutionally questionable involvement of the President in party
politics. He pushed his constitutional rights to the extreme and sometimes even
acted according to a distinctly sketchy interpretation of the legislation. Some of
the initiatives proposed by the President concerned institutional reforms, one
of the most important among them being changes to the constitution.
Sorina Soare investigates the causes and consequences of the semi-presidential
system for the development of democracy in Romania, exploring the process of
constitution-building and its modifications through the lens of the President’s
place in the institutional system. Her analysis reveals subtleties of the Romanian
system of semi-presidentialism which are revealed as being not necessarily bad
for democratic performance. Her findings indicate that the hasty adoption of the
1991 Constitution and then the partial revision of it in 2003, different patterns of
parliamentary majorities and the strong personalities of individual Presidents
all produced different subtypes of semi-presidentialism, each with a different
propensity for conflict. A sharp difference existed between relationships within
the executive during the first and second decades after communism. Throughout
the 1990s, both Romanian Presidents sought to formulate their own independent
political agendas, trespassed on their Prime Ministers’ powers, and tried to influ-
ence a legislature in which they belonged to the parliamentary majority. Their
interpretations of their institutional role was encouraged both by constitutional
ambiguities and by the fact that both Presidents were the leaders of the party
or alliance which supported them in Parliament. The second post-communist
3  Sergiu Gherghina / Sergiu Mișcoiu, The Failure of Cohabitation: Explaining the 2007 and
2012 Institutional Crises in Romania, East European Politics & Societies 27 (2013), no. 4, 668-684.
4 Sergiu Gherghina
period brought periods of co-habitation and revealed a shift in both the type
of conflict and in the solutions found. From the longitudinal perspective, there
was a discontinuity in approach that sheds light on the complexities of execu-
tive relationships in the Romanian semi-presidential system in the context of
fairly similar political actors.
One major reform on the political agenda of many East European countries has
been change of the electoral system. In Romania, the initial choice of a closed-
list proportional representation system was favoured to ensure proportionality
and representation for ethnic minorities. However, support for electoral reform
gained momentum after the first post-communist decade, in particular after the
2000 legislative election, and there were three major drivers for it. Those were
the question of legitimacy in the change from a party-centred to a candidate-
centred approach, the question of the quality of the elected representatives, and
the ties between citizens and their representatives.4 Electoral reform has been
implemented since 2008 and combines voting in single member districts with
proportional representation. Due to its design, the new system has been seen
as making it even more difficult for newly created parties to reach Parliament.
In theory, it is difficult for newly created parties to win many votes in single
member districts against established parties with candidates having greater
visibility. However, in practice the situation was different: the 2012 legislative
election and the arrival in Parliament of a newly created party called the Dan
Diaconescu’s Popular Party (Partidul Poporului Dan Diaconescu, PPDD) showed
no basis in fact for such an argument.
Dan Brett illustrates the relationship between the most salient variables in
the political history of post-communist Romania. He refers to the role of insti-
tutional conflict and political parties, and his central argument is that while
the potential for conflict had existed in Romania ever since regime change in
1989, it became more prominent only as a result of the changes that occurred
to the party system after 2000, changes themselves triggered by modification
of the electoral system. Complementarily to the discourse approach presented
by Mișcoiu and to the formal division of power within the executive (Soare),
Brett suggests that inter-party interactions of cooperation, competition, or coa-
lescence and the organization of the most powerful Romanian political party,
the Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat, PSD) together offer valid
explanations for intra-executive conflicts over the last ten years. Brett’s main
analytical findings illustrate how the semi-presidential form of government has
created a great deal of room for manoeuvre for the PSD, which exploits state
resources to compensate for its partial detachment from society. The mechanism
is rather similar to those identified in other European party systems over the last
4  Sergiu Gherghina / George Jiglău, Where Does the Mechanism Collapse? Understanding
the 2008 Electoral System, Representation 48 (2012), no. 4, 445-459.

Introduction 5
decades and fulfils many of the criteria for a cartel party.5 In that sense, Brett
positions the Romanian case in line with other European countries, especially
in the second post-communist decade.
While the effects of change to the electoral system were very visible in the
structure of the party system – a point well made by Brett – the modification of
the competition rules had an impact on the political system as a whole. Emanuel
Emil Coman investigates electoral reform throughout the entire post-communist
period in Romania and emphasizes the different factors driving change. He dis-
tinguishes between two different periods in the electoral history of the country
and sees a shift in the logic behind electoral change from the first to the second
post-communist decade. While in the 1990s the goal had been reduction of the
number of competitors by means of increases in the electoral threshold, in the
2000s the system was altered to try to increase the responsibility of individual
representatives. It was thought such a change could be achieved by hold-
ing elections for single-member districts as opposed to the candidate-centred
perspective of the closed-list. According to Coman, the two motivations show
Romania’s good intentions in its struggle to implement democratic order, but
more precisely they correspond to the different requirements that characterized
stages in the process of democratization. In the first phase, stability of competi-
tion was seen as being of paramount importance, with the emphasis shifting to
the quality of political representation in the second.
One usual reason for electoral reform is the desire to improve the quality of
representation, and Radu Cinpoeș places that at the core of his analysis. He
explains the reasons behind party switching in Parliament with a focus on the
sources and consequences of political elites’ party switching over the most recent
decade. The study also links such behaviour to electoral politics, shedding yet an
additional light on the complex matters revealed in Coman’s contribution. The
results indicate that party switching leads to political instability and fragmen-
tation and has therefore limited the institutionalization of the Romanian party
system. At the same time, party switching is motivated neither by primarily
political ambitions nor by attempts to by-pass voter accountability. Instead, the
patronage and clientelism characterizing Romanian politics appear to be the
main drivers as politicians seek to become part of the governing party in order to
gain access to the distribution of public funds. Both conclusions place Romania
in the category of East European countries with fluid political representation
and a considerable degree of political instability. For example, floor-crossing can
artificially change parliamentary majorities without involving the voters, and it
feeds back into the quality of democracy as scrutinized by Mișcoiu and Soare.
5  For a detailed discussion, see Richard S. Katz / Peter Mair, Changing Models of Party
Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party, Party Politics 1 (1995),
no. 1, 5-28.
6 Sergiu Gherghina
Eastern Europe is well-known for its ethnically diverse populations, and

ethnic relations in Romania were tense until the mid-1990s. In March 1990
at the beginning of the post-communist period, the mid-sized Transylvanian
town of Târgu Mureș had seen violent clashes between Romanian nationalists
and Hungarian groups. The drafting of a constitution with what could be seen
as nationalist provisions and which denied certain collective rights to ethnic
minorities only prolonged the tension. In 1996, the victory of democratic forces
in the legislative elections and the inclusion in the coalition government of the
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrată Maghiară
Română, UDMR) – although the government had a majority in Parliament even
without the Hungarian party – marked a turning point in the evolution of eth-
nic relations in Romania.6 The progress registered in terms of reforms and the
positive attitude of the Romanian state towards ethnic minorities was partly
driven by the relatively constant presence of the UDMR in government after
1996. The last two articles in this special issue address the topic of interethnic
relations from different points of view.
George Jiglău provides a detailed account of the evolution of interethnic rela-
tions from the perspective of the Romanian state and of the Hungarian minority.
He focuses on the legislative dimension and accounts for external influences
such as membership of the EU, with the conclusions of his study pointing to the
progress made in Romanian-Hungarian relations during the post-communist
period. If Romanian politics and mainstream parties had a nationalist tendency
and the UDMR was considered a radical ethnic party at the beginning of the
1990s, 25 years later the situation is completely different. The Hungarian lan-
guage is an integral part of the education system at a number of levels, there
seem to be only isolated instances of tensions between Romanians and Hungar-
ians and the Hungarian party is a frequent coalition partner for various parties
from across the political spectrum – with the exception of radical right parties.
Dragoș Dragoman expands this discussion by focusing on the dimensions of
cultural and linguistic elements in the relationship between Romanians and
Hungarians. He has included in his analysis more of Romania’s ethnic minori-
ties, such as the Germans, and shifted the focus of his analysis from national
to local politics. His discussion gains particular relevance in the context of the
presidential elections of November 2014, which were won by Klaus Iohannis,
an ethnic German.
How have Romanian politics and society been transformed in the last two
and a half decades? What lessons can be drawn for future research on the new
East European democracies? This special issue of Südosteuropa seeks to offer
some answers by combining theoretical approaches and rich empirical evidence.
6  For details see Sergiu Gherghina / George Jiglău, The Role of Ethnic Parties in the
Europeanization Process: The Romanian Experience, Romanian Journal of European Affairs 8

(2008), no. 2, 82-99.
Sergiu Mișcoiu
What Grounds for Representing the People?

An Analysis of Post-Communist Romania
through the Lens of Discourse Theory
Abstract. Using the methodology of discourse theory, this chapter aims to analyse how
Romanian society evolved after 1989 with special regard to the tension between direct and
representative democracy. The author’s main hypothesis is that in time the absence of the
demos from the actual decision-making process fuelled a rhetoric based on direct democracy,
and that beginning in 2004 that rhetoric succeeded in establishing itself as a hegemonic
discourse. To test the hypothesis, the author uses the logical framework of discourse theory,
analysing the constitutive modalities of the rhetoric about democracy and the people, paying
close attention to the tensions that have arisen between direct and representative democracy
and charting the sociocultural background of those tensions. He uses the methodological
arsenal of discourse theory, focusing on its five key arguments. Finally, he suggests a series
of preliminary conclusions derived from his analysis.
Sergiu Mișcoiu is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of European Studies
at the Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania.
After the communist regime ended in 1989, Romania’s democratisation process

was marked by a series of ruptures that have affected its substance and consist-
ency. A fundamental one of those ruptures occurred during the first transition
year and concerned the relationship between the citizens and their elected of-
ficials. After an initial period from December 1989 to May 1990 characterised
by unbridled democratic enthusiasm the new leadership structures became
grouped around Ion Iliescu, whose National Salvation Front (NSF) benefitted
from a comfortable parliamentary majority and decisively settled the debate
about representative vs. direct democracy in favour of representation. In doing
so the NSF delegitimized any political action whose manifestation was other
than strictly parliamentary, although in fact their action was limited to tabling
veto motions.1 With certain episodic inflections, the representative option has
1  See, for example, Attila Ágh, The Role of Political Parties. Political Culture and Electoral
Behaviour – the Politics of Central Europe. London 1990, 101-126.

8 Sergiu Mișcoiu
been embraced by all political majorities in post-socialist Romania, at least it

was until December 2004. Notable consequences of the representative option
included turning “The People” into a latent discursive resource and using
an “appeal to the people” as a political and electoral strategy in a context in
which the institutions of representative democracy had been discredited.2 That
discrediting opened a third stage, in which “The People” were invoked and
convoked through the use of referenda not simply to settle political disputes,
but to account for certain constitutional amendments and to stigmatise political
opponents as well.3
Using the methodology of discourse theory, this article analyses the evolution
of Romanian society after 1989 by looking closely at how tension developed
between direct and representative democracy.4 My main hypothesis is that the
absence of a demos from political decision-making eventually led to the crea-
tion of a rhetoric based on direct democracy, which from 2004 onwards became
the leading discourse. I turned to discourse theory to test the hypothesis, and
the first part of this article is an explanation of it. Then comes an analysis of
the constitutive modalities of the rhetoric about democracy and people, insist-
ing that tensions in democracy arise from the differences between direct and
representative versions of it. The sociocultural background of these tensions
is charted, too. The analysis presented here employs the range of methods
available from discourse theory, and will focus on its five key arguments, as
synthetically outlined by Jacob Törfing.5 Supporting evidence is provided by
a data set compiled within wider research conducted between 2008 and 2013
and includes the main forms of discourse to provide collective representations.6
Those were some 4,300 speeches, programmes of the parties and candidates,
policy papers, manifestos, articles, and broadcasts. Finally, I propose a series
of preliminary conclusions derived from my analysis.
2  For an extensive use of “The People” as a major discursive reference see Sergiu Mișcoiu,
Au pouvoir par le Peuple! Le populisme saisi par la théorie du discours. Paris 2012.
3  This argument is supported by Jean-Michel De Waele, Faces of Populism in Central and
Eastern Europe, in: Hannes Swoboda / Jan Marinus Wiersma (eds.), Democracy, Populism
and Minority Rights. Brussels 2008.
4  For the stages of democratic development in Romania, see, among others, Daniel Şandru,
Democraţia românească pe lungul drum al consolidării, Sfera Politicii 115 (2005), no. 21-26;
and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Politica după comunism. Structură, cultură și psihologie politică.
Bucharest 2002.
5  See Jacob Törfing, Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges, in:
David Howarth / Jacob Törfing (eds.), Discourse Theory in European Politics. Identity, Policy
and Governance. Oxford 2005, 1-32.
6  This research was a part of the research project “Populism and Neo-Populism in East-
Central Europe”, financed by the Romanian National Research Council.

Post-Communist Romania through the Lens of Discourse Theory 9
Discourse Theory and Politics

Discourse theory as a discipline emerged in the 1970s and has now reached
its third generation of researchers, who study the discursive representations
of power relations – more specifically the creation, confrontation, dismantling
and restructuring of the dominant networks of power through the dynamics
of discursive positions.
In short, discourse theory is based on an anti-essentialist ontology and an
anti-foundationalist epistemology.7 The adepts of discourse theory consider
that there is no pre-existing nor self-determining essence of the world. Religion,
enlightened rationality, the immutable laws of capitalism, class struggle or, more
recently, global warming are all constructs falsely claiming to offer a definitive
explanation of human history. Drawing on the work of Jean-François Lyotard,8
discourse theorists consider that underpinning all efforts deployed to try to
generate a single authoritative representation of the world is the will to impose
political hegemony. They aim to study the consequences of the absence of an
ultimate centre capable of lending structure to and managing the world. In ad-
dition, the epistemology of discourse theory is relativistic. Its point of departure
is Richard Rorty’s idea that the existence of the world is no guarantee in itself
that truth also exists.9 Truth is therefore subject to a regime of truth, which, ac-
cording to Michel Foucault, is itself coextensive with power. We must therefore
abandon the claim that we can know the absolute truth and study instead the
relationship between knowledge and power, which limits us to assessing the
degree of truth inherent in statements strictly in relation to their context and
our perception of the external world.
The implication of those two major premises is not chaos, but rather a sys-
tem of polymorphous relations in which identities are established through
interaction. The construction of identities through social interactions that may
be discursively analysed remains the main object of this discipline. The central
idea of discourse theorists is that the definition of identity becomes possible
only by determining the non-identities from which it can be distinguished.
The operation is quasi-discursive, to the extent that we produce or reproduce
descriptions which enable us to identify ourselves in relation to the outside
world. Discourse therefore both creates and alters identity, determining the rap-
ports between individuals and between groups. The political field is obviously
affected by this linguistic and discursive constraint, as its functioning depends
on the permanent negotiation of the rules underlying government.
7  Törfing, Discourse Theory, 13.
8  See Jean-François Lyotard, La condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le savoir. Paris 1979,
especially the chapter “Le problème: la légitimation”.

9  Richard Rorty, Philosophical Papers Set: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Cambridge
1991, 151-161.
10 Sergiu Mișcoiu
Following the post-structuralist logic of Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida,

both Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe consider that one of the main distin-
guishing features of the social is the constitutive uncertainty of its structural
determination. That uncertainty allows for the emergence of the space necessary
for the political-hegemonic articulations which create and recreate retrospec-
tively the interests they claim to represent.10 Since the social is indeterminate,
the identities that are part of it are also incomplete, being based on constantly
shifting relations of differentiation so that the individual “is forced into filling
in the structural gaps through identification”.11 Or, in other words, identifica-
tion can be seen as the effort made by the subject to acquire a complete identity.
This discursive approach is inspired by Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory that
language does not consist of positive terms, but rather of strings of differences.
Among discourse theorists Ernesto Laclau especially insists upon the logic of
difference and opposition, arguing that identity is established via differentiation
from other identities.12 That implies that all the principles and values governing
identity acquire meaning according to that logic.13 For instance, identity is linked
to a specific context, which relates to gender, ethnicity, religion, culture, history,
nation or region and becomes what it is by virtue of its relative position within
an open structure of differential relations. The incompleteness of subjective
identities is linked to the political contestation of signifiers which assume the
form of requirements (“demands”), and is itself a prerequisite for generating
any hegemonic process. Ernesto Laclau uses the following model to highlight
how hegemonic articulation operates (see Graph 1).14
Assuming that the social structure implies the existence of empty spaces
(gaps), Laclau illustrates how certain signifiers, D1, D2, D3, and so on, reach
various positions within that structure. One of the signifiers, D1, has man-
aged to temporarily fix its meaning at a nodal point, becoming a “command
centre” for the other signifiers. That discursive process is consubstantial with
the production of hegemony. The formula whereby a particularity undertakes
the representation of universality, with which it is incommensurable, is what
we may call a hegemonic relationship. In other words, particularity replaces
10  Ernesto Laclau / Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical
Democratic Politics. London 1985, xi.

11  Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen, Discursive Analytical Strategies. Understanding Foucault,
Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann. Bristol 2003, 52.

12  Ernesto Laclau, La raison populiste. Paris 2008, 86.
13  Dirk Nabers, Crises, Hegemony and Change in the International System: A Conceptual
Framework, GIGA Research Programme: Transformation in the Process of Globalisation, 1 (2007),

1-37.
14  Ernesto Laclau, Constructing Universality, in: idem / Judith Butler / Slavoj Žižek (eds.),
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London 2000,

281-307.
T
F
Ɵ D1
D1, D2, D3, D4 Signifiers

F Frontier
T Excluded element
Ɵ ≡ Ɵ ≡ Ɵ ≡ Ɵ ... Ɵ Void space (gap)
≡ Equivalence
D1, D2, D3, D4 ...
Graph 1. Ernesto Laclau, The Generation of Discursive Hegemony.
totality, with which it identifies itself. The identification is fundamentally po-

litical since it gives rise to perpetual inner tension, reiterated whenever a new
signifier attempts to identify itself with totality. Hegemonic identity becomes
the order of an empty signifier that aims to replace the unreachable totality. We
can therefore see that totality represents a horizon rather than a foundation.15
However, the prerequisite for totality is the existence of an external space that
marks off the system boundaries (F).
What remains outside represents a difference, but not one that is either neu-
tral or integrated amongst the elements of totality. On the contrary, the exterior
corresponds to the excluded element (T) which operates according to the logic
of equivalence and antagonism so that in relation to the excluded element, all
the other identities are grouped on a chain of equivalences.16 The connection
between the identities is the rejection of the excluded identity. While equivalence
emphasises the effect of solidarity against what is perceived to be a common
enemy, the community is discursively constructed in positive terms so as to
allow the construction of collective identities. In other words, while the logic of
antagonism emphasises the difference, the logic of equivalence tones it down.
Moreover, for Laclau, the tension between equivalence and difference is the
condition for the emergence of the social.
The construction of the social also depends on the appearance of an empty or
floating signifier.17 Laclau defines the notion of an empty signifier as a signifier
without conceptual content, in other words, as a “fullness which is constitutively
15  Laclau, La raison populiste, 89, 144.

16  Ibid., 88.
17  Ibid., 87.
12 Sergiu Mișcoiu
absent”. “Empty signifier” is a term that has different meanings and may there-
fore be utilised to unite disparate social and political movements so that, for
instance order, or justice might be seen to function as signifiers of that kind. On
the other hand, a floating signifier can acquire different meanings depending on
the topic addressed in a particular discourse. Thus, terms such as Freedom, Justice
and Equality can function as floating signifiers within thematically structured
discourses. If, in the case of a void signifier, the limits of vacuity are considered
immutable, the floating signifier enables the very dislocation of those limits.18
Notwithstanding all this, the difference between the two concepts remains
minimal and quasi-operational.
Discourse theorists have tried to apply their hypotheses to various domains of
policy and politics. However, their efforts have been successful in only a limited
number of sub-domains, typically in the study of radical, extremist and populist
political phenomena. I shall not enlarge here upon the possible explanations for
the propensity that discourse theory has revealed for that type of analysis, but
instead I shall limit myself to noting that, unlike interpretations that resort to
deterministic or mechanistic explanations, discourse theory attempts to make
intelligible the multidimensional aspects of political phenomena by associating
its linguistic and semantic approaches with those derived from social psychol-
ogy, behavioural sociology or post-structuralist political anthropology.19
Analysing Romanian Politics through Discourse Theory

What concerns us here is the extent to which discourse theory can provide
a useful reading grid for how the concept of “The People” and the idea of direct
democracy have evolved in post-communist Romania. To that end, it is useful
to reiterate the main hypothesis on which I have relied, which is that although
sometimes excessively invoked, “The People”, as the political demos, have been
almost absent from the decision-making process and that their absence has
fostered a rhetoric based on direct democracy, which since 2004 has succeeded
in imposing itself as a hegemonic discourse. In my analysis, I wish to illustrate
my hypothesis by methodically applying the five key arguments of discourse
theory as synthesised by Jacob Törfing.20
To begin with, any form of social practice takes place in an environment
dominated by specific discourses, each of which has a particular history. What
is “said” today bears the burden of what was “said” yesterday and determines,
18  Ibid.,
157.
19  For
an example of political radicalism analysed from the vantage point of discourse
theory, see Martin Reisigl / Ruth Wodak (eds.), The Semiotics of Racism: Approaches in
Critical Discourse Analysis. Wien 2000.
20  Törfing, Discourse Theory, 1-32.
in turn, what will be “said” tomorrow. Evolution from one dominant discourse
to another takes place by releasing various signifiers which as soon as they
become free are incorporated into new logical sequences. Some of the free
signifiers turn into nodal points that pool together diverse representations of
reality into a coherent whole, nonetheless preserving the legacy of their previ-
ous meanings and configurations.
The study of the sociocultural context in which key signifiers for the recon-
figuration of political space are released is therefore indispensable. In our case,
the context of the early 1990s consisted of a rapid alternation between the initial
moment of “Revolution” characterised by democratic enthusiasm (December
1989 to May 1990), and then a moment of complacency, or indifference, and
dismay following the victory of the National Salvation Front in the first gen-
eral elections to be held in the post-communist period. As the analysis of the
public speeches of the main party leaders in the 1990 elections indicates, that
initial sequence, marked as it was by widespread disruption ensuing from the
violent removal of the Ceaușescu regime, saw the release of signifiers such as
Freedom, Democracy and Unity/Union. Those signifiers were then discursively
reconstituted by various actors as they attempted to take the new political stage,
figures ranging from the NSF to the historical parties or newly emerging ones.21
What is important, however, is the fact that the signifier “The People” did
not impose itself as a nodal point of the new discursive ensembles because it
did not represent a differentiating element in relation to the discursive order
of the old regime, an order in fact epitomised by the slogan “The People/The
Party-Romania-Ceaușescu”. Although it can be argued that the signifier “The
Nation” was indeed present as a nodal point in the discursive configuration
of the nationalist movements (The Romanian Cradle, The Romanian National
Unity Party, and then The Greater Romania Party) or of the ethnic minority
parties (in particular The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania), it
should be noted that the distance between “nation” and “people” is considera-
ble.22 The distance between them resides precisely in the fact that the Romanian
“Nation” has a clearly ethnocultural character and its unity claims to be organic
and a-historical, while the Romanian “People” embodies a civic and political
character much more deeply engrained in the collective consciousness. In other
words, the people can be summoned to a referendum, while the nation cannot.
21  Analysis of 45 of the 48 public speeches held by NSF leader Ion Iliescu between February
and May 1990, Freedom, Democracy and Union/Unity shows that they appear to be positively
and systematically correlated in 38 public speeches and as a central structuring axis of the
discourse in 30 speeches.
22  Jacques Droz, Concept français et concept allemand sur l’idée de nationalité, in: Europa
und der Nationalismus. Bericht über das III. Internationale Historiker-Treffen in Speyer, 17.-
20. Oktober 1949. Baden-Baden 1950, 111-117.
14 Sergiu Mișcoiu
The very absence of “People” as a signifier may itself be converted into

a nodal point capable of supporting the creation of the political platform that
ensured transition to the second sequence, after the NSF won the elections of
May 1990. As I have noted elsewhere,23 the signifier “Consensus” enabled Presi-
dent Iliescu’s discourse to be articulated, which was done with the intention of
maintaining the order legitimised at the ballot box.24 Within that discourse the
people existed only as an amorphous but docile mass, while the “institutions”
and “constructive forces” of the country were the only actors legitimised by
the new power.25 What is often overlooked is that the electoral habitus of the
old regime had contributed to this evolution towards a vaguely representative
democracy, and that those habits were, in fact, an infrastructural sociological
element which had managed to transcend the moment of December 1989 and
then replicate itself in the early 1990s.26 That predisposition may be synthesised
as automatism in terms of voter turnout, a conformist tendency to re-elect the
incumbent candidate as well as lack of interest in and sometimes even contempt
for democratic debate. All those characteristics prevented the emergence of
a distinctive civic discourse as an alternative to the official consensualist rhetoric.
According to the second point of discourse theory, a discourse will gain shape
via a series of hegemonic battles for moral and political leadership through
the articulation of meaning and identity. This concept from discourse theory
suggests that hegemony goes beyond the mere domination of the adversary:
to be hegemonic means to impose your own representation of reality as the
only possible yardstick for the construction of all other social identities. So, the
hegemonic character of the battles is crucial. Hegemony clashes are far from
likely to be waged between tightly compartmentalised, consciously established
camps, being instead deployed as an infinite series of sequential and chaotic ef-
forts. The outcome of them depends on the willingness of individuals and their
propensity to choose identitarian landmarks strong enough first to maintain
and then to boost certain articulations of meaning, particularly the dominant
articulation of the moment. It is those articulations that can offer a credible
principle on the basis of which the public can understand the events that be-
come dominant articulations. “Ideological totalisation” is used to create and
23  Sergiu Mișcoiu, Între retorica consensului și practica rupturii. Efectele oscilațiilor
strategice asupra percepției publice față de Parlamentul României, in: Sergiu Gherghina
(ed.), Cine decide? Partide, reprezentanți și politici în Parlamentul României și cel European.
Iași 2010, 91-106.
24  Ion Iliescu emphasised the idea of consensus, explaining his reasons for choosing this
strategy. See Ion Iliescu, Revoluţie și Reformă. Bucharest 1994, 158-160.

25  The quantitative-analytical research reveals that “People” appears in the 1990 NSF
leader’s public interventions only as a linguistic substitute for “Overwhelming Majority”, the
“Nation” or the “Romanians” and without being endowed with a proper political dimension.
26  Alfred Bulai, Mecanismele electorale ale societății românești. Bucharest 1998.
maintain such articulations: this is a process whereby discourse is structured

around several nodal points.
In post-communist Romania, competition over various representations of
society initially occurred in a conformist manner, at least in so far as there was
agreement about representative democracy. The adoption of the new Consti-
tution in 1991 took place against a background of persistent political tensions
generated first by the prospect of the NSF’s becoming divided between the
wings led respectively by President Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman, who was
Prime Minister between May 1990 and September 1991, and then by rapid in-
flation and the increasing precariousness afflicting broad social layers. On the
other hand the mechanisms of consensualist rhetoric allowed the articulation
of a monist view of the need to adopt the constitutional text drafted by Antonie
Iorgovan. The will of the political majority was adroitly substituted by that of
a technocratic, cross-party team, represented in the person of Theodor Stolojan.
The struggle to establish a hegemonic vision of the new constitutional order
took the form of a disproportionate confrontation between, on the one hand,
the discourse of a coalition government endorsed by Ion Iliescu, and, on the
other hand, an opposition group that founded the Democratic Convention of
Romania. Iliescu’s main signifiers were “Consensus”, “Unity”, “Experience”,
“Competence” and whose centre of gravity was technocracy as an advanced
form of indirect democracy,27 while the opposition were reluctant to criticise
the constitutional text openly and systematically but attempted to dissociate
Iliescu’s undemocratic actions from Stolojan’s positive image. They demanded
that elections should be held under the new Constitution, even though they
were wary of the possibilities of direct consultation of the people that would
result from a referendum. The result was the consolidation of the hegemonic
discourse, which legitimated an incipient form of political oligarchy, safe from
any requirements that might be expressed directly by the electorate, whose
consolidation was still tentatively underway.
A third point of discourse theory is that it shows that hegemonic articulations
of meaning and identity are based on the construction of social antagonisms.
Any logic that is based on ideological totalisation entails the existence of an
“Other”; it is in opposition to the “Other” that the identity and principles of
a particular group are structured. Thus, the invention of the “Other” carries in
itself the identification of a “Non-Us” which, in the context of the social and
political competition, becomes an opponent whose nature and dimensions
may be represented through discourse. To give meaning to our own identity,
the “Other” is excluded and, within the framework of social antagonism, is
27  From an analytical perspective, more than two thirds of the public interventions of the
five main NSF leaders in 1991 revolved around discursive chains that were structured by
“Unity” and “Consensus”.
16 Sergiu Mișcoiu
fought against and sometimes suppressed. The “Other’s” identity structures

our own, but also makes possible the dismantling of “Us” because it provides
an alternative to our own identity. Determining what to include and what to
exclude from our identity therefore becomes crucial to how we relate to the
world and how we conceive the political sphere. Such determinations become
intelligible through the imaginary drawing of political frontiers, which in the
case of radical or extremist identities are barely permeable if at all, but become
less rigid as parts of moderate collective identities.
After 1989, the main binary-discursive opposition was undoubtedly that be-
tween the “anti-communists” and the “neo-communists”. It is obvious that their
opposition was the result of the articulation produced by the “anti-communist”
camp who tried to draw the political frontier between themselves and “neo-
communists” along a series of popular-referendary demands, including the
consultation of the electorate, the effective separation of powers, the account-
ability of the officials to the people, and so on.28
The two sides’ antagonism witnessed two moments of climax. The first cor-
responded to the victory of the Democratic Convention of Romania (DCR) in
the general elections of November 1996, after the almost seven-year presidency
of Ion Iliescu. The reformist rhetoric initially included the idea of striking a bal-
ance between representative democracy and direct, participatory democracy
by consulting the people on the prospect of concluding bilateral treaties with
Ukraine and Moldova – or on the restitution of the land and buildings confis-
cated by the communist regime. Later however, government instability during
the 1996-2000 electoral term and the need to satisfy a broad political clientele
caused the DCR to distance itself from referendary democracy.29 The second
critical moment in the antagonism between the “anti-communists” and the “neo-
communists” was decisive, for it saw the beginning of the transition to the third
phase in the evolution of Romanian post-communism, which was characterised
by referendary populism. That moment came in 2004 when Traian Băsescu man-
aged to merge the anti-communist and the law-upholding, injustice-redressing
arguments, and in doing so not only made the will of the victimised people
a general political principle, but turned it into the engine of everyday political
action. Băsescu resumed his discursive antagonistic division in 2009, in a way
I have explained elsewhere30 but which I shall outline briefly here.
28  The quantitative data show that, between May 1990 and March 1995, more than 80%
of the recurrent references to “communism” were made by political representatives of the

anti-NSF and anti-Iliescu opposition.
29  Steven D. Roper, From Opposition to Government Coalition: Unity and Fragmentation
within the Democratic Convention of Romania, East European Quarterly 31 (1997), no. 4, 519-542.
30  Sergiu Mișcoiu, Introducere, in: Sergiu Gherghina / Sergiu Mișcoiu (eds.), Partide și
personalități populiste în România post-comunistă. Iași 2010, 9-52.

The elections of November 2009 took place after four years of muffled con-
frontations between President Băsescu and the volatile, unofficial parliamentary
alliance that had been struck in the second half of 2005 between the Liberals and
the Social Democrats. The confrontations reached a paroxysm in 2007 with the
failed attempt at impeaching the president and after a year of coalition govern-
ment between the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Democratic Liberal
Party (PDL) (December 2008—September 2009). The coalition turned out to be
profitable for the incumbent president and was eventually broken up in Septem-
ber 2009 by the Social Democrats who then attempted to position themselves in
the opposition for the pending November elections. This time, Traian Băsescu
openly played the “People” card, which he opposed to the “connivance of the
communist partocracy, financed by the media oligarchies that want to divide
the country’s resources amongst themselves”.31 The effectiveness of Băsescu’s
discourse was at its peak between the two rounds of the election, when the So-
cial Democrat Mircea Geoană benefited from the support of a broad coalition
which included, most significantly, the Liberal Crin Antonescu, who had come
third in the first round, with 20% of the vote. To summarise the antagonistic
representation of “Us against Them” in the particular case of Traian Băsescu’s
populism, we can use the scheme proposed by Ernesto Laclau32 and apply it as
follows to the actual situation of the 2009 electoral confrontation (see Graph 2).
The central discursive split therefore is between people and elites. One of
Băsescu’s campaign slogans perfectly epitomises the discursive strategy: “They
with them, and you with us!” Still, that strategy would have been unlikely to
succeed had it not been made explicit in a series of complementary antagonisms,
and if no suggestion had been made of equivalence between the terms of the
antagonisms. And here is the specific content of those antagonisms:
(i) networks/without the People (Geoană) – referendum/with the People (Băsescu).
This discursive representation corresponds to Mircea Geoană’s preference for
the use – particularly at the parliamentary level – of political networks and al-
liances to form a heterogeneous bloc opposed to Traian Băsescu. On the other
hand, Băsescu pitted the “voice of the people” against them, choosing the day
of the presidential elections to call a referendum on reducing the number of
MPs and suppressing bicameralism, themes he had used abundantly in his
election campaign.
(ii) inefficient (Geoană) – efficient (Băsescu). This refers to a series of electoral
failures suffered by the Social Democrat leader who had already been defeated
31  “Romania does not belong to the oligarchs. Romania belongs to you all!”; extract from
the speech Traian Băsescu delivered in Iași on 1 November 2009, available at <http://www.
newsiasi.ro/v2/eveniment/politica/17159-video-discursul-integral-al-lui-traian-basescu-la-
mitingul-de-la-iasi.html>. All internet sources were accessed on 19 February 2015.
32  Laclau, Constructing Universality, 281-307.
18 Sergiu Mișcoiu
Mircea Geoană et al. = Them
elitist corrupt inefficient weak neo- anti- opaque

communist reformist
alliance moguls parliamen- needs Iliescu state connections

networks tarist “God- assistance with
fathers” Russia
without
the People
Traian Băsescu and the DLP = Us
popular simple anti-com- honest open reformist pro-West- strong

munist efficient
referendum says denounces has also anti- Atlantist acts on

what he commu- won bureau- his own
believes nism before cracy
avows denounces
to his his enemies
with past
the People
Graph. 2. The discursive representation of the protagonists from the second round of
the 2009 presidential elections, as operated by Traian Băsescu’s camp.
once by Băsescu, in the first round of the 2004 mayoral elections for Bucharest,
only to be beaten again by Băsescu’s PDL party in the parliamentary elections
of 2008. During the campaign, Băsescu expatiated on his own success story and,
especially, the need to have a “true man of action and not a puppet of the red
barons” as President.33
33  Extract from Traian Băsescu’s statement of 29 November 2009, available at <http://www.
mediafax.ro/politic/Băsescu-sforarii-din-psd-si-mogulii-nu-si-lasa-marioneta-pe-geoana-la-
dezbateri-5141238>.
(iii) corrupt (Geoană) – honest (Băsescu). The more or less overt support Geoană
received from the main private media (especially the trusts Intact Media Group
and Realitatea – Caţavencu) gave Traian Băsescu the opportunity to go against
the media oligarchs, symbolically incriminated as “moguls”. Băsescu was thus
able to capitalise on the possible danger of “venal factions” taking over an im-
portant part of the economic sector through the political networks of the PSD.
Unlike his opponents, Băsescu presented himself as an honest citizen, who had
served his country as the captain of a merchant ship and began his career in
business as a small-scale producer of ice cream. He had always made himself
available to investigators if ever any suspicions arose about his activities either
as a civil servant or as a statesman.34
(iv) weak (Geoană) – strong (Băsescu). One of the recurring strategies of Băsescu’s
campaign was to highlight the contrast between the weakness of his rival, pre-
sented as a “red diplomat” who had always needed the backing of the “mobster
interest groups” or an alliance with the “bow-tie Liberals”,35 and the sheer force
of Băsescu, as President a man who had not hesitated to take difficult decisions
and who had bravely stood alone against “the 322”, as he called the MPs who
had voted in favour of his impeachment in 2007.
(v) opaque (Geoană) – simple and open/Atlantist (Băsescu). This dichotomy is based
on a twofold dimension. First, Geoană belonged to the political elite formed
under the communist regime, “away from the people and without really get-
ting to know them”, which was in contrast to Băsescu’s popularity as a “man
of the people”, “having the same customs as the rest of the Romanians”36 – for
example wearing a simple sweater on his days off and driving an unremark-
able Dacia Logan car. Second, it was a matter of the perspectives of the two on
foreign policy: Băsescu shrewdly speculated about Geoană’s visit to Russia as
President of the Senate, suggesting his rival had been considering “overturn-
ing the alliances in Russia’s advantage”. As far as Băsescu was concerned, he
presented himself as a convinced Atlanticist, an advocate of the U.S. missile-
shield project and a champion of the idea that Romanian troops should be
maintained in Iraq and Afghanistan. He also strongly supported the Moldovan
34  Băsescu resumed, on several occasions, the “Fleet File” episode, in which he was accused
of participating in the dismantling of the Romanian commercial fleet in the early 1990s, when
he was Minister of Transport. In 1994, Băsescu resigned from Parliament in order to make
himself available to the prosecution. In the event he was not indicted, which subsequently
allowed him to claim that the affair had substantiated his honesty.
35  Traian Băsescu used this expression while criticizing the elitism of the liberal leaders,
which contrasted with the “modesty and poverty of the Romanians”. See Liberali la papion,
la ședinţa Parlamentului, Realitatea.net, 28 February 2007, available at <http://www.realitatea.
net/liberali-la-papion--la-sedinta-parlamentului_45797.html>.
36  Extract from Băsescu’s portrait made by an “anonymous citizen”, which was reproduced
in an audio election spot targeting the rural environment.

20 Sergiu Mișcoiu
anti-communists and nationalists in their conflict with Vladimir Voronin, the

pro-Russian president of their country.37
(vi) anti-reformist (Geoană) - reformist (Băsescu). Presented as “a man of the
past” by the Băsescu camp, Geoană was branded a prisoner of political immo-
bility, especially because the PSD had resisted the “modernising of institutional
reforms”. As his antithesis, Băsescu advocated the restructuring of institutions
and indeed of the entire decision-making system. The reforms mainly entailed
the downsizing of the bureaucratic apparatus (“on which the PSD relies to feed
its clientele”) and in general the financial and fiscal support of the private sec-
tor at the expense of the public sector. That strategy allowed Băsescu to turn
private sector employees against civil servants and to accumulate electoral
capital through his expressed intention to “avenge the ordinary Romanians
against the villainous system”.38
(vii) communist (Geoană) – anti-communist (Băsescu). Finally, the last dialecti-
cal Băsescu used established a connection between the past and the present
and allowed him to reinforce the anti-communist stance he had acquired after
his official condemnation of communism in 2006.39 The apparently surprising
redeployment of the theme in an election held twenty years after the fall of
communism was coherently integrated in a discourse that clearly identified
the “historical enemy of the Romanian people, Bolshevism”.40 Unlike his oppo-
nent, who was “the son of a Securitate General” and a “UTC activist himself”,41
Băsescu posed as a true military man and a convinced democratic capitalist,
while being ready to admit, as a token of his sincerity, that he had also been,
“like three and a half million other Romanians, a simple member of the Roma-
nian Communist Party”. The effectiveness of the two sides’ antagonism grew
exponentially after the coalition that supported Geoană in the second round
was set up, its founding document having been signed in Timișoara, where the
anti-communist revolt had begun in 1989 and which had always been opposed
to PSD candidates. Finally, even if Geoană had ousted Ion Iliescu as PSD leader
in 2005, Băsescu’s camp still publicly speculated that the PSD had never actually
37  This strategy proved fruitful for Traian Băsescu, given that over 85% of Moldovans who
also had Romanian citizenship voted him in December 2010.

38  Extract from an interview with Traian Băsescu on B1 TV Channel on 5 November 2009.
39  Condemnation du communisme en Roumanie, roumanie.com, 18 December 2006,
available at <http://www.roumanie.com/Politique-communisme_dictature-communiste_
Roumanie-A1773.html>.
40  Traian Băsescu used this expression in an interview aired on the Realitatea TV Channel
on 8 November 2009.
41  Raluca Barbuneanu, Băsescu: „Domnule Geoană, ce aţi căutat la domnul Vîntu la 12
noaptea?”, Capital.ro, 3 December 2009, available at <http://www.capital.ro/basescu-domnule-

geoana-ce-ati-cautat-la-domnul-vintu-la-12-noaptea-128862.html>. The abbreviation UTC
refers to the Union of Communist Youth (Uniunea Tineretului Comunist).
emerged from the shadow of its founder, and cultivated “the Iliescu scare” in
most of its electoral messages between the two rounds.
The fourth assertion of discourse theory suggests the displacement of a par-
ticular discursive order. A discursive system will crumble if it no longer manages
to explain the events it is confronted with. The displacement takes place under
the “destructive” action of other discursive systems that aspire to hegemony
and strive to capture the signifiers released by the formerly dominant system
which will by now be in its death throes. By capturing a set of free signifiers with
a strong public resonance and including them in coherent ideological totalisa-
tion, a particular discursive system gains decisive chances to win against others.
The “Iliescian” discursive system, based mostly on connecting the signifiers
“Consensus”, “Moderation”, “Experience”, and “Temperance”, manifested in
the periods 1992-1995 and 2000-2003, reached saturation during the last year of
Iliescu’s presidential mandate (2004), when the contrast between the sociopoliti-
cal reality and Prime Minister Adrian Năstase’s administration became obvious.
The incompatibility between the manner — indicted as opulent and authori-
tarian — in which Adrian Năstase had carried out his term and the discursive
system, which had remained faithful to the “Iliescu era”, allowed the release
of signifiers such as Justice, Truth, Fairness, Freedom (of expression), Equality (of
opportunity).42 It was no coincidence that the first two signifiers were chosen
by the Alliance between the National Liberal Party and the Democratic Party
as the name of the new opposition coalition (the Truth and Justice Alliance,
TJA). The discursive system sanctioned by the Alliance was plainly opposed to
the consensualist discourse, which it denounced as “undemocratic and anti-
popular”. Eversince the 2004 local elections, the establishment of certain forms
of direct democracy had represented a prevalent subject for the opposition’s
discourse and were later resumed in the campaign for the presidential elections
of November 2004 to rally popular participation against the “arrivisme of the
PSD leaders”.43
In 2004 therefore, we witnessed the emergence of the conditions for displac-
ing the dominant consensualist discourse, the political logic of which was
based on reconciling different outlooks by means of institutional mechanisms
and by enabling voters’ participation in decision making exclusively through
their representatives. As proof of the pain suffered by the consensualist system
stands the referendum held in the autumn of 2003 to ratify amendments to the
constitutional text. As a matter of fact it was the only referendum held in Ro-
42  The quantitative analysis of 213 speeches and public declarations made between August
and November 2004 shows that the combination of these four signifiers was particularly
salient in the speeches of most opposition candidates for the 2004 parliamentary elections.
43  One of Traian Băsescu’s main slogans for the second round of the presidential campaign
was: “They cannot steal as much as you can vote!”

22 Sergiu Mișcoiu
mania after 1991, and with the result seen as a foregone conclusion it enjoyed
only a meagre turnout and its validation was the subject of major controversy.44
Against the consensualist-institutionalist discursive system, the opposition
managed to build a “dissensualist”-popular counter-discourse, in which the
invocation of direct democracy featured prominently.
Finally, discourse theory postulates that the displacement of a particular
discursive universe is concurrent with the emergence of the “split subject”.
Since it is impossible for the subjects to acquire a fully integrated identity,
they will perpetually search for an identity that might offer the illusion of
such integration. Politics represents a field in which promises to achieve “the
common good” can be translated into the prospect whereby full identity may
be accomplished. According to Slavoj Žižek, the failure of the “final identifica-
tion” induces a dramatisation of the quest for identity which can be manifested
by opting for radical discourses that promise immediate identity fulfilment.45
Such a quest is also fuelled by responsibility displacement: it is always “oth-
ers” who are responsible for “our” failure to acquire full identity. Therefore the
perpetual creation and re-creation of discourses whereby those excluded from
the group are responsible for the non-fulfilment of integral identity become
indispensable actions.
Transition in post-communist Romania has been and remains a fertile ground
for the emergence of the split subject, which has in turn identified itself with
the paternalistic order embodied by Ion Iliescu, the moralist reformism of Emil
Constantinescu, the nationalist outbreaks of Corneliu Vadim Tudor or Gheorghe
Funar, and the populist voluntarism of Traian Băsescu. None of the political
“offers” sampled has provided a final answer to the quest for identity that fol-
lowed the trauma engendered by the collapse of the communist regime, the
dominant discourse of which had been anchored in signifiers such as “Order”,
“Equality”, “Respect”, “Homeland”, and “Leadership”. The identitarian rift
produced by the dislocation of the old discursive system and the impossibility
under political pluralism of establishing a unique discourse that might settle
the ensuing identitarian vacillations have together meant that the emergence
of the split subject has thwarted all efforts to build a political demos. Thus, the
44  For the results of the referendum of October 2003, cf. Caitlin L. Wood, Crafting Democracy
through Constitutional Change: Comparing the Recent Cases of Romania and Serbia in the
Context of EU Incentives, CUREJ – College Undergraduate Electronic Journal (2009), 46 and
passim, available at <http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/103>.
45  Resuming and developing the arguments of Freud and Lacan, Žižek speaks of the
“symptom” in the sense of a repressed dissatisfaction that affects every individual, and
regards Utopia as the belief in generality or universality lacking any symptom, that is, lacking
its own negation. See Slavoj Žižek, Invisible Ideology: Political Violence Between Fiction
and Fantasy, Journal of Political Ideologies 1 (1996), 16-18; see also idem, Le centre absent de
l’ontologie politique. Paris 2007.
transition crisis may be the crisis of a democratic paradox: the proliferation of

political offers leads to the emergence of the split subject and to cracks in the
foundation of collective civic action, while by contrast a totalitarian order pro-
duces a unitary “political body” whose compact identity influences individual
identities, given the absence of alternatives.
What then becomes intelligible is discursive representations that went from
monistic in 1990 (Iliescu as substitute of Ceaușescu) to institutionalist-consen-
sualist (1991-2003, with moments of inflection in 1996-1997 and 2000) and then,
after 2004, to dissensualist-populist. In search of a full identity, the split subject
substituted at first one leader with another, then became temporarily accustomed
to a pluralistic system. It always looked for solutions (nationalism, Christian
moralism, radical justicialism), stopping for a time (again temporarily) at a par-
ticular representation that held out the promise of acquiring full identity through
the illusion of a common definition of that particular identitarian content.
In these terms then, the popular referenda held during Traian Băsescu’s first
term make sense in that they reconfigured the collective discursive subject that
was on a quest for its own self. The referendum of April 2007 for the impeach-
ment of the President marked the moment of fusion between him and the
people, strengthening Traian Băsescu’s anti-elitist and anti-partisan discourse
and restoring the unity that had been divided by the diverse political offers.
The semi-failure of the 2008 referendum on the introduction of the uninominal
voting system can be understood if read through the anti-institutionalist lens:
being held simultaneously with parliamentary elections, just like them it ap-
peared to be a “second hand” ballot, because Parliament’s credibility was at its
lowest. By contrast, the referendum of November 2009 on reducing the number
of MPs and abolishing one of the two chambers of parliament was a success for
the Băsescu camp precisely because it symbolically reiterated the union between
the President and the people, branding and punishing the institutions and the
parties that had attempted to undermine it, who were characterised as the
“Others”, guilty of lacking a “full” identity. Finally the second referendum on
the impeachment of the President in July 2012 turned against Băsescu the same
populist-referendary rhetoric strategy that he himself had used during his first
term of office, and although unsuccessful in that turnout was less than half, it
nevertheless showed that 7.6 millions voters (four fifths of those participating)
wanted to dismiss Băsescu and that his only protection against “The People”
was the institutional framework.
Conclusion
The evolution of Romanian democracy can be analysed using the methodology
of discourse theory insofar as we can identify the specific changes affecting the
24 Sergiu Mișcoiu
rapports between the political actors as a result of various major discursive inflec-
tions. As regards the relation between representative and direct democracy, the
present study has attempted to demonstrate that we are facing such a situation
now. The constitutive indeterminacy of both people and democracy has led to
both those concepts acquiring content exclusively by becoming combined with
other notions and by establishing complex relationships of either equivalence
or contrast with the latter.
The periodisation of this evolution based on the content markers associated
with the concepts of democracy and the people has generated three time seg-
ments, unequal in duration and intensity. In the first of the segments, demo-
cratic enthusiasm combined with authoritarian paternalism produced popular
emulation around Ion Iliescu. The discursive system established during his two
mandates (1990-1996 and 2000-2004) fostered a representative and, at times,
technocratic perspective on politics that excluded the people’s participation
through direct decision-making, and may be seen as the second segment,
which may be called consensualist-institutionalist. The period from 1996-2000
can be considered exceptional in that it brought to the fore the theme of direct
democracy while at the same time discrediting it. Finally, hegemonic discourse
underwent a major inflection with the accession to power of Traian Băsescu,
who gave direct democracy a substantial content, associating it with idea of
popular sovereignty.46
Discourse theory has the merit of setting together interdisciplinary explana-
tions and providing an alternative perspective on the political sphere. In this
specific case study of the alternation between direct and representative democ-
racy in post-communist Romania, the contribution of discourse theory may be
to demonstrate the potential of the rhetorical forms commonly used by political
actors to alter public perceptions not only of the possibility of participating in
the decision-making process, but also about the very nature of the processes
of democracy.
46  Further developments in 2011-2012 indicate that popular expectations of populist
discursive offers continued to develop and spread. See, for example, the spectacular
development and abrupt fall of the newly created People’s Party: Sergiu Gherghina / Sergiu
Mișcoiu, A Rising Populist Star: The Emergence and Development of the PPDD in Romania,
Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 22 (2014), no. 2, 181-197.
Sorina Soare
Enhancing Democracy through Constitutional Reforms.

Is Semi-Presidentialism Romanian Democracy’s
Achilles’ Heel?
Abstract. Considering that ambiguously written constitutional articles have regularly been
seen in Romania as sources of major political crises and triggers for democratic collapse, this
article aims to explore the complexities of the position of the President in the Romanian po-
litical system. Drawing on insights from Romanian constitutional provisions for the balance
of power among the main institutions, the article aims to demonstrate that it is not semi-
presidentialism per se that should be seen as problematic from the standpoint of the quality
of Romanian democracy, but the incomplete or confused codification of the relationship
between the President and the Prime Minister.
Sorina Soare is a lecturer in Comparative Politics at the Department of Political and Social
Sciences in the School of Political Sciences “Cesare Alfieri” at the University of Florence, Italy.
Over the last decade, the debate over institutional performance in Romania has
intensified, in particular in relation to multiplied tensions among the President,
the Prime Minister,1 and the legislature, to the point that opposition to or mere
dissent coming from one camp was regularly equated by the other camp with
opposition to democracy itself, and as potential backsliding into authoritarian-
ism. Voices would then be raised against the unequal legitimacy, responsibility,
and accountability of the dual executive and the absence of a neat division of
authority, all criticisms regularly associated with semi-presidentialism.2 The
vulnerability of the Romanian system became even more visible in times of
cohabitation, when democratic performance deteriorated under the cumulative
effect of institutional impasses and government reshuffles affected legislative
coalitions. The course of the decline is illustrated by Freedom House’s Nations in
Transit (NIT) democratic score for Romania over the last decade, which detects
a downward trend beginning immediately after 2007, particularly in relation to
1  Given that all Romanian presidents and prime ministers have been men, I have refrained
from using a gender neutral language.

2  Sergiu Gherghina / Sergiu Mișcoiu, The Failure of Cohabitation: Explaining the 2007 and
2012 Institutional Crises in Romania, East European Politics & Societies 27 (2013), no. 4, 668-
684, 676f.
26 Sorina Soare
national democratic governance and the judicial framework (graph 1). Begin-
ning in 2013, the normalization of relationships within the dual executive and
between the President and Parliament made for a promotion in the country’s
national democratic governance rating, which improved from 4 to 3.75.3 It should
be noted that from a broader, regional perspective, after the political turmoil of
2012 Romania is the only country to have registered a net improvement over
the last two years, although its overall democratic performance remains among
the poorest in the region (see Graph 1).4
Using the position of the President in Romania’s constitution as a kind of
prism, this article aims to contribute to the longstanding debate on the causes
and consequences of specific constitutional engineering, and in particular on
semi-presidentialism’s implications for democracy. The main question that
arises is: “Why the Romanian case?” First, because the drafting of Romania’s
constitution was done with reference to the semi-presidential prototype par
excellence - the French 5th Republic Constitution - as its major source of inspira-
tion, albeit in a rather inconsequential, partial and contradictory way.5 Second,
there is rich empirical evidence of conflict within the Romanian dual executive
over the last quarter of a century. Moreover, one Romanian president contrived
to remain in office even after two attempts to impeach him.6
Building on Skach’s heuristic framework,7 three independent variables were
taken into account in investigating Romanian semi-presidentialism’s impact on
democratic performance. They were, first, the constitutional codification of the
dual executive with the focus on the strengths and weaknesses of presidential
powers; then the features of parliamentary majority; and finally the party lead-
ership positions of President and Prime Minister.
In spite of the fact that the topic of Romanian semi-presidentialism has been
rigorously covered by a number of scholars both from Romania and abroad,
there have been rather fewer attempts to investigate Romanian semi-presiden-
tialism’s relationship with democracy. The main finding of this article is that
the conventional wisdom that semi-presidentialism is bad for democratic per-
formance needs to be fine-tuned. The “constitutional” infirmities perpetuated
3  According to Freedom House, countries are rated on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 equalling
the highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic progress.

4  Sylvana Habdank-Kołaczkowska, Nations in Transit 2014: Eurasia’s Rupture with
Democracy, Freedom House, Washington/DC 2014, available at <http://www.freedomhouse.

org/sites/default/files/NIT2014%20booklet_website.pdf>. All internet sources were accessed
on 25 February 2015.
5  Bogdan Iancu, Romania under EU Influence: Note on the Constitutive Limits of External
Constitutional Interventions, Romanian Journal of Political Science 12 (2010), no. 2, 53-76, 59; Ion
Stanomir, După 1989. Câteva reflecții asupra constituționalismului românesc postcomunist,
Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review 6 (2006), no. 1, 157-170, 165.
6  Gherghina / Mișcoiu, The Failure of Cohabitation, 669.
7  Cindy Skach, The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semipresidentialism, International
Journal of Constitutional Law 5 (2007), no. 1, 93-121, 105.

Graph 1: Romania NIT Rating History and Regional Averages (2005-2014).
Source: Valentina DIMULESCU / Adriana IORDACHE / Ioana LUPEA, Romania, Nation in Transit 20
transit/2014/romania#.VQk2NOGQI_g>.
Enhancing Democracy through Constitutional Reforms 27
4,5
3,5
2,5
2
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Romania National Democratic Governance
National Democratic Governance NMS average*
Romania Judicial Independence
Judicial Independence NMS average*
Romania Democracy score
Democratic score NMS average* * EU members (excluding Croatia)
Graph 1. Romania NIT Rating History and Regional Averages (2005-2014). Source: Valen
tina Dimulescu / Adriana Iordache / Ioana Lupea, Romania, Nation in Transit 2014, available at
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2014/romania#.VQk2NOGQI_g>.
since the hasty adoption of the 1991 Constitution, combined with different pat-
terns of forceful characters and parliamentary majorities, can produce different
subtypes of semi-presidentialism in which the propensity for conflict varies.
The article is structured in five parts. It begins with a brief overview of the
literature on semi-presidentialism, then moves its focus to the particular con-
stitutional features of the Romanian variety of it. The third part details how the
performance of Romanian semi-presidentialism is contingent upon the interac-
tions of political parties, with reference both to parliamentary majorities and
the relationships between the President, the Prime Minister, and party politics
in general. Part four details the main stages in the development of the debate
about how Romanian semi-presidentialism might provide increased institutional
equilibrium, and finally I touch upon possible future trajectories, taking into
consideration the November 2014 presidential election and the currently frozen
debate about constitutional amendments.
28 Sorina Soare
Constitutional Arrangements and Democracy:

the Search for the Best Type of Democratic Regime
In the shadowy light of the ruins of the communist regimes, constitutions were
seen as major milestones on the way to definitively democratic settings. In line
with the commonly shared idea that the type of government tends to influence
both the viability and the quality of a democracy,8 parliamentary debates a fo-
cused most closely on the choice between parliamentary and semi-presidential
systems, with relatively few references to a purely presidential one.9 Throughout
the post-communist 1990s, semi-presidentialism’s growing popularity among
both practitioners and scholars transformed it into the modal constitutional
choice,10 the preference being to combine a directly elected President with
a Prime Minister and Ministers who would be allowed to remain in office only
with the consent of Parliament.11 Various subtypes were further developed
and nuances were added not only in relation to the constitutional powers of
the President, both legislative and non-legislative,12 but also in relation to the
formation and termination of the government,13 the cohabitation dimension14
and intra-executive conflicts.15 Among those, Shugart and Carey’s distinction
between president-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems focused on
the degree of presidential control over the cabinet as the main heuristic variable.16
While in premier-presidentialism the government was exclusively accountable
to Parliament, in president-parliamentarism there was so-called dual control of
the government, and higher levels of presidential powers.
  8  Matthew S. Shugart / John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design
and Electoral Dynamics. New York 1992; Robert Elgie / Sophia Moestrup / Yu-Shan Wu (eds.),
Semi-presidentialism and Democracy. Basingstoke 2011.
  9  Only six countries adopted presidential features: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Oleh Protsyk, Semi-Presidentialism under Postcommunism,

in: Elgie / Moestrup / Wu (eds.), Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy, 98-116.
  10  Cindy Skach, Borrowing Constitutional Designs. Constitutional Law in Weimar
Germany and the French Fifth Republic. Princeton/NJ 2009, 2.

11  Robert Elgie, A Fresh Look at Semi-Presidentialism. Varieties on a Theme, Journal of
Democracy 16 (2005), no. 3, 98-112, 100.

12  Shugart / Carey, Presidents and Assemblies.
13  Petra Schleiter / Edward Morgan-Jones, Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary
and Semi-Presidential Democracies Compared, European Journal of Political Research 48 (2009),

no. 5, 665-693; David Samuels / Matthew S. Shugart, Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers.
How Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior. New York et al. 2010.
14  Robert Elgie / Ian McMenamin, Explaining the Onset of Cohabitation under Semi-Presi
dentialism, Political Studies 59 (2011), no. 3, 616-635.

15  Tomas Sedelius / Joakim Ekman, Intra-Executive Conflict and Cabinet Instability. Effects
of Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe, Government and Opposition 45 (2010),

no. 4, 505-530.
16  Shugart / Carey, Presidents and Assemblies.
While semi-presidentialism has been praised by some as a prudent and flex-

ible solution for new democracies, critics have found many arguments against
it. One of the most frequently mentioned weaknesses of semi-presidentialism
is potential conflict within the dual executive. Ongoing intra-executive conflict
has been associated with more or less radical institutional deadlocks, and even
with the potential collapse of democracy. The direct election of a President can
prove to be a liability, with particular risk of increased personalization of the
political process. The damaging effects of a divided minority cabinet have been
emphasized, considering that neither the President nor the Prime Minister,
nor any party or coalition enjoys a substantive majority in the legislature.17
Moreover, semi-presidentialism has regularly been linked to the perils of the
ambiguous allocation of ties of power of the sort that can act as dangerous po-
litical catalysts, which can have highly damaging effects on new democracies.
Despite such doubts, a quarter of a century on, the empirical evidence testifies
to semi-presidentialism’s appeal in post-communist Europe. Of the 29 former
communist-bloc countries, only eight adopted a purely parliamentary form
of government. Six countries favoured presidential settings while 15 adopted
semi-presidential systems, more commonly of the premier-presidential variety
than the president-parliamentary one.18 Recent inquiries into institutional effects
on democratic performance in fact conclude that post-communist premier-
presidential systems have received rather good evaluations of their democratic
performance, equal or even superior to parliamentary regimes like those in
Hungary, Estonia, the Czech Republic, or Slovakia.19
The Constitutional Features

of Romanian Semi-Presidentialism
Romanian semi-presidentialism can be qualified as “tempered”.20 It fea-
tures a directly elected President, affording the position of President the same
popular legitimacy as is recognized for Parliament. The government is politi-
cally answerable only to Parliament, though appointment procedures also rely
on the President’s right to designate a candidate. The government consists of
a two-pronged executive; a President with a wide range of powers limited
by the obligation to cooperate regularly with other state authorities, such as
Parliament, the government and the Superior Council of the Magistracy. The
President is answerable both politically and legally; he can dissolve Parlia-
17  Skach, The “Newest” Separation of Powers, 103.

18  Protsyk, Semi-Presidentialism under Postcommunism.
19  Ibid.
20  Expression taken from Bogdan Dima, Semiprezidenţialismul românesc postdecembrist,
Sfera Politicii 17 (2009), no. 139, 14-29, available at <http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/139/

art02-dimab.html>.
30 Sorina Soare
ment de jure, though the practicability of the procedure is limited; but he can-
not dismiss the Prime Minister.21 The Romanian case therefore resembles the
premier-presidential system, in the sense that only Parliament has the right to
dismiss the government.
The constitutional role and powers of the Romanian President are indeed di-
verse, but they are subject to numerous restrictions and to supervision by other
public authorities.22 In the formation of the government, the influence of the
President is rather weak, because he can do no more than nominate a candidate
for Prime Minister. The President must appoint as Ministers only individuals
endorsed by Parliament, and may never dismiss a duly elected Prime Minister.23
The President has more scope for politicking in the context of consultation with
the government “about urgent, extremely important matters” (Art. 86). It is
a rather unclear area of intervention that leaves the President a certain amount
of room for discretionary influence. Similar room for manoeuvre is provided
by the President’s role as guardian of the Constitution and his involvement in
the process of promulgating laws. More specifically, according to Art. 77.2, the
President of Romania may return proposed laws to Parliament for reconsidera-
tion, and although he can do so only once, what was intended as a constitutional
provision became transformed into a strategic tool of political blackmail. It is
significant, for example, that during his two terms in office President Băsescu
made extensive use of that very power, but far from using it as a real power of
veto, Băsescu fashioned it into an efficient tool for exerting pressure on both
the legislature and the government.24
Though both Parliament and the President are directly elected, only Parlia-
ment is constitutionally defined as the supreme representative body of the Ro-
manian people.25 This nuance does not limit the equal legitimacy of President
21  Claudia Gilia, Is Romania Heading Towards a Presidential Republic?, Acta Universitatis
Danubius 9 (2013), no. 1, 89-98; Gherghina / Mișcoiu, The Failure of Cohabitation; Bogdan

Iancu, Formă de guvernământ și regim politic: condiții de posibilitate constituțională, Sfera
Politicii 20 (2012), no. 172, 62-69, available at <http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/172/art07-Iancu.
php>; Cristian Preda / Sorina Soare, Il regime, i partiti e il sistema politico in Romania. Rome
2012; Protsyk, Semi-Presidentialism under Postcommunism; Dima, Semiprezidenţialismul
românesc; Stanomir, După 1989; Elena-Simina Tănăsescu, The President of Romania or the
Slippery Slope of a Political Regime, European Constitutional Law Review (2008), no. 1, 64-97;
Radu Carp / Ion Stanomir, Limitele Constituţiei. Despre guvernare, politică și cetăţenie în
România. Bucharest 2008.
22  Dima, Semiprezidenţialismul românesc; Gilia, Is Romania Heading Towards
a Presidential Republic?
23  Though the 2003 revision of the constitution failed to bring greater clarity to the balance
of powers, it mentioned explicitly the prohibition of dismissal of the Prime Minister by the
President. Over the last decade the Constitutional Court positioned itself in favour of the
prerogatives of the President, hence strengthening his role in the institutional framework.
24  Tănăsescu, The President of Romania or the Slippery Slope.
25  Dima, Semiprezidenţialismul românesc. This interpretation has been strongly challenged
by the pro-President camp in the campaign prior to the 2007 referendum of impeachment,
and Parliament with respect to the citizens, and was specifically introduced as
an element of the 1991 Constitution and maintained thereafter “to prevent any
possibility that people turned out to vote in simulated parliamentary elections
as if it were an already-made decision”.26 By the same token, the Constitution
prohibited the serving of more than two terms of office, with the aim of limiting
potential drift towards authoritarianism.27
Although the French model has influenced the constitutional provisions
concerning the President,28 the concrete outcome was rather different. The role
of the Romanian President in the dissolution of Parliament (Art. 89) is quite
telling.29 In order to dissolve Parliament, the President must initiate consulta-
tion with the presidents of both Chambers and the leaders of the parliamentary
groups, but only under specific conditions. There must have been no vote of
confidence to form a government within 60 days of the first request, and at least
two requests for investiture must have been rejected. Moreover, Parliament may
be dissolved only once in a calendar year and may not be dissolved during the
last six months of the President’s term of office, nor during a state of emergency.
Other arguments in favour of limiting the powers of the President in the Ro-
manian constitutional setting can be provided by the fact that the constituents
established two forms of presidential responsibility, namely political responsi-
bility for serious breaches of the constitution (Art. 95), and criminal liability for
high treason, which implies a jurisdictional procedure wherein Parliament acts
as prosecutor and the High Court of Justice and Cassation as Judge (Art. 96).30
considering that members of Parliament are elected based on closed party lists and considered
to be less legitimate than a President who is directly elected.
27  This specific limitation was the first major constitutional dispute in post-communist
Romania on the eve of the 1996 presidential elections. The incumbent President Ion Iliescu
decided to run for another term, though numerous opponents claimed that he was in excess
of two or even three terms of office (the first term dating from December 1989, the second
term dating from the May 1990 presidential elections, the third term from the September
1992 presidential elections). Still, the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of a different
method of calculation, considering that the counting should start from the coming into force
of the 1991 Constitution, as it would otherwise ignore the principle of non-retroactive laws.
According to the ruling, the first term of Iliescu started only after the elections organized in
1992. Elena-Simina Tănăsescu, The Impossible Dismissal of a President. Romanian Political
Design, Revista Direito Mackenzie 6 (2013), no. 1, 116-124.
28  Tănăsescu pinpoints the fact that not only was Art. 80 of the constitution openly inspired
by Art. 6 of the 1958 French Constitution as revised in 1962, but the reasons behind it echoed
General de Gaulle’s vision of the French head of State. She quotes the words of a member of
the technical committee for the drafting of the 1991 Constitution: “The President personifies
the Romanian State; he is the symbol of the nation as a whole because of his direct election
by the people. By exercising his powers he ensures balance and the smooth running of the
activities of all public authorities, in accordance with the principle of separation of powers”:
Tănăsescu, The Impossible Dismissal of a President, 118.
29  Stanomir, După 1989, 165.
30  Dima, Semiprezidenţialismul românesc.
32 Sorina Soare
The codification of those liabilities equates to a preventive mechanism against

potential tendencies to hyper-presidentialization.31
Another highly problematic question is that of the neutrality of the President,
a subject for debate and an element in the presidential impeachment procedures
of 2007 and 2012, as well as the one in 1994. The codification in Art. 84.1 of the
incompatibility of the President’s position with membership of any political
party while in office has been a requisite that has been difficult to implement,32 at
least in part because every Romanian President has been elected on behalf of the
party to which he belonged and which he led.33 Full neutrality of the President
would amount to “political death”, because to be re-elected a serving President
is reliant on the financial and organizational support of his party, which main-
tains active if indirect allegiance even during his official term.34 Note that in
the context of the 2007 political crisis, on that specific matter the Constitutional
Court issued an advisory opinion in favour of a more flexible interpretation,
according to which the Constitution should not forbid the President from hav-
ing relations with the political party that endorsed his candidacy nor with other
political parties, considering that such a ban would clash with a directly elected
President’s obligations to the people who elected him.35
On the whole, since the 1991 Constitution, from a normative point of view
the figure of the Romanian President more closely resembles what Tănăsescu
calls a moderator, or a regulator, than the representative of a strong institution
with commensurate decision-making powers.36 In line with the 2003 amend-
ments and in order to reinforce their authority, Parliament or the government
(in particular during cohabitation periods) have regularly fought back against
the President’s attempts to expand his constitutional powers.
Unstable Equilibrium: Presidents, Parties

and Legislatures in Post-Communist Romania
The Romanian institutional configuration features a directly-elected fixed-
term President and a Prime Minister and Cabinet accountable to Parliament, ele-
ments compliant with the standard minimum definition of semi-presidentialism.
Even before the adoption of the first post-communist constitution in 1991, the
direct election of the President was codified by Law Decree no. 92 of 14 March,
31  Tănăsescu,The Impossible Dismissal of a President.
32  Eadem,The President of Romania or the Slippery Slope.
33  Emil Constantinescu was the only former President who did not lead a party organisa-
tion, but the “Anticommunist Coalition” (CDR).

34  Ibid.
35  Aviz Consultativ nr. 1 din 5 aprilie 2007 privind propunerea de suspendare din funcţie
a Președintelui României, domnul Traian Băsescu, Monitorul Oficial no. 258, 18 April 2007,
available at <http://www.ccr.rofiles/products/avizconsultativ.pdf>.
1990, a de facto “mini-constitution”.37 Ever since the elections of May 1990 the
mandate of the people has bestowed upon the President the authority to act
as the embodiment of the nation.38 Though constitutionally defined as the su-
preme representative body of the Romanian people, Parliament was perceived
right from the start as an aggregation of representatives selected by political
parties.39 Still, the post-communist constitutional codification failed to create
clear delineations of responsibilities and patterns of accountability, neither
within the executive, nor among the principal institutions.40 As a result, conflicts
between Presidents and Prime Ministers multiplied, in particular in relation to
overlapping powers and responsibilities regarding national security, judicial
affairs and Romania’s representation in meetings of the European Council.41
Empirical evidence has thrown up a strong contradiction of the early 1990s
constituents’ commitment to the constitutional codification of the institution of
a moderator/regulator in order to prevent a President from possessing too many
powers. Experience has in fact shown that Romanian presidents have regularly
aspired to formulate their own independent political agendas in attempts to
influence the legislature, thereby encroaching on their Prime Ministers’ areas
of responsibility.42 Presidents’ individual interpretations of their institutional
role have been facilitated not only by constitutional ambiguities, but also by
specific political party configurations and the involvement in party politics of
both Presidents and Prime Ministers at the beginnings and ends of their terms.
Every post-communist Romanian president has been the leader of a political
party or alliance which has supported him in Parliament, whether there was an
overall majority (Ion Iliescu 1989-1992), a dominant party coalition (Ion Iliescu
1992-1994; 2000-2004), or a balanced coalition (Emil Constantinescu 1996-2000).43
37  The direct election of the Head of State appears to be not only a continuation of
a presidential office tailored to the character of Ion Iliescu, but also consonant with the
constitutional features of the 1974 designated President of Romania. Stanomir, După 1989, 165.
38  Ibid.
39  While trust in the state is rather low in Romania, in surveys over the last decade more
than half of Romanians stated they trusted the presidency, while few Romanians place their
trust in Parliament or political parties. As illustrated by Tufis, the difference can be explained
as a result of identification with an individual in a high office, with the Romanian presidency
being a highly personalized institution. It is significant that trust in institutions decreases
over time, and that trust in the central state institutions is lower than trust in local ones. For
more details see Claudiu Tufiș, Changes in Institutional Trust in Postcommunist Romania,
1 June 2013, power point presentation available at <http://www.trust.democracycenter.ro/
linked/claudiu_tufis.pdf>.
41  Ibid, 675f.
43  Valentina Dimulescu, The Institution of Presidential Impeachment in Semi-Presidential
Systems. Case Study: Romania 2007, Europolis. Journal of Political Science and Theory 4 (2010),
no. 7, 101-132.
34 Sorina Soare
Traian Băsescu’s first term was more complex, in that one of the Justice and Truth
alliance’s partners provided the President and the other the Prime Minister.
Each President of post-communist Romania has had at least one moment
of tension with his Prime Minister, and once the conflict was resolved they
preferred to designate “obedient” Prime Ministers, such as Stolojan in 1991,
Văcăroiu in 1992, Isărescu in 1999, and Boc in 2008.44 A great deal of room for
manoeuvre was granted in cases of so-called consolidated majority governments
in which the President enjoyed “full autonomy” in view of the fact that he be-
longed to the same legislative majority as his Prime Minister.45 The tendency
for conflict to develop between President and Executive was diminished if at
the beginning of the term the President was the leading figure in his party. The
President’s ability to control the Prime Minister and the Cabinet increased even
further as a consequence of two other strategic advantages. First, there was the
symbolic value of the fact that the President is directly elected, whereas the Prime
Minister elected indirectly. Then there are practical aspects: if the President is the
de facto leader of the majority political party or coalition in Parliament, theoreti-
cally he can influence the dynamics of the parliamentary majority, for example
in relation to the designation of a candidate to the office of Prime Minister,46 or
motions for debate. Intervenient variables with broadening or restrictive effects
on the President’s influence on the parliamentary majority include parliamentary
party discipline and his number of terms in office.47
Consolidated majority governments minimized the potential for tension
within the executive, and between the executive and the legislature if the Presi-
44  Dima,Semiprezidenţialismul românesc.
45  Skach,The “Newest” Separation of Powers, 100-102.
46  In accordance with Art. 103, after consultations with the majority in the legislature, the
President designates a candidate to the office of Prime Minister for which he seeks Parliament’s
vote of confidence within ten days of the formal designation. Although the President of
Romania cannot directly appoint the Prime Minister, his power to form a government increases
if he can designate a candidate from among his own majority in the legislature. The subsequent
vote of confidence expressed within Parliament becomes a de facto formal confirmation of the
President’s anointed candidate. Since the government is answerable only to the legislature,
the powers of the President cannot be analysed without taking into account the dynamics of
the party system and, in particular, the composition of coalition governments. For example,
in 1996, the designation of a candidate for the Prime Minister’s function is the result of pre-
election agreements among the parties forming the CDR (with the consent of the USD and the
UDMR). In cases of cohabitation the President’s influence on government formation decreases
considerably, although, as illustrated by a tense political episode in 2012, the President can
try to stretch his constitutional powers. In the aftermath of the 2012 constitutional crisis and
on the eve of the 2012 legislative elections, President Băsescu declared that he would refuse
to nominate the incumbent PSD Prime minister, V. Ponta, although the polls announced
a landslide victory for the PSD and PNL alliance. The spectre of a political standoff fine-tuned
President Băsescu’s initial position and a new Ponta-led government was sworn in.
47  And, in particular, the capacity to impose vote conformity. See Laurențiu Ştefan / Sergiu
Gherghina / Mihail Chiru, We All Agree That We Disagree Too Much. Attitudes of Romanian
MPs Towards Party Discipline, East European Politics 28 (2012), no. 2, 180-192.
dent was in a position to run for a second term. As seen in table 1, the calmest
presidential term was Ion Iliescu’s from 1992-1996, during which the President’s
expectations and ambitions controlled the agenda of the Government of Prime
Minister Nicolae Văcăroiu who was non-aligned – at least at first. Even so, there
was one salient moment of tension dating back to 1994 with the first suspension
procedure against the President. Then, a solid parliamentary majority, endorsed
by the negative ruling of the Constitutional Court, minimized the likelihood of
an institutional clash. President Iliescu’s final term from 2000-2004 also displayed
the characteristic features of a consolidated majority government, in which the
dual executive originated from a PSD-led parliamentary majority. The difference
in terms of institutional equilibrium is illustrated by the challenging position
of Prime Minister Adrian Năstase, who was to be the PSD candidate in the
next presidential elections. Still, as noted by Gherghina and Mișcoiu, that was
a classic case of dirty laundry being aired within the party.48 Only a few of the
conflicts made their way onto the broader public agenda.
President Emil Constantinescu’s term was rather more of a subtype. On pa-
per, both the President and the Prime Minister enjoyed the support of the same
parliamentary majority, albeit one that was inchoate and fragmented.49 Nev-
ertheless, the presidential term from 1996-2000 was plagued both by continual
interventions from Constantinescu himself and government reshuffles. On the
whole, though, the period corresponds to the second round of democratization
across the post-communist region,50 and looking past the political instability
and social turmoil that came with the introduction of economic reforms, we
can see that Constantinescu’s term had no really problematic effect on overall
democratic performance.51
At first, the electoral term from 2004-2009 saw a consolidated majority govern-
ment. However, the personal ambitions of the President and the hopes of the
Prime Minister troubled the dual executive with numerous tensions that eventu-
ally exploded in the 2007 impeachment procedure against President Băsescu.52 As
noted by Valentina Dimulescu, the result was a divided majority government
in which a PNL-UDMR minority government was supported in Parliament
49  Mihai Chiru / Sergiu Gherghina / Marina Popescu / Sorina Soare, Stable or Fluid?
Making Sense of Party System Changes in Post-Communist Romania, ECPR Joint Session of
Workshops Paper. Mainz 2013.
50  Valerie Bunce / Sharon L. Wolchik, Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions,
Journal of Democracy 17 (2006), no. 4, 5-18.

51  Romania obtained the status of a free democracy in 1996 (not free 1990-1991, partially free
1992-1996). If we look at the temporal evolution of Romania from the perspective of political
rights and civil liberties, these scores reflect the improvement in terms of democratic governance
starting with the 1996 alternation in power. Adrian Karatnicky / Alexander Motyl / Aili Piano
(eds.), “Romania”, Nations in Transit 1999-2000, Freedom House, Washington/DC 2000, 508,
available at <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacn550.pdf>.
52  Gherghina / Mișcoiu, The Failure of Cohabitation, 677, 681.
Table 1: Overview of Romanian Presidents and Prime Ministers. Updated version of Preda/Soare, Il regime, i partiti e il sistema politico in Romania, 288.
36
President Term dura- Function in Cause of Prime min- Term Function in Cause of the Function Composi- Parliamenta-
(Party) tion the party at the end of ister duration the party at end of term in the tion of the ry majority
the begin- the term (Party) the begin- party at govern-
ning of the ning of the the end of ment
term term the term
I. Iliescu 1990-1992 President End of P. Roman 1990-1991 President Resignation1 President FSN FSN
(FSN) FSN term (FSN) FSN FSN2
T. Stolojan 1991-1992 n.a. End of term n.a. FSN + FSN + PNL
(Indep.) PNL + + MER
MER
I. Iliescu 1992-1996 n.a.3 End of N. Văcă- 1992-1996 n.a. End of term PDSR FDSN FDSN (PDSR)
(FSN) term roiu Member (PDSR)4 + PRM+PUNR
(Indep.) (34.41) + PSM+PDAR
E. Con- 1996-2000 President End of V. Ciorbea 1996-1998 CDR Direc- Resignation5 PNTCD CDR + CDR +
stantinescu CDR term (CDR) tion member UDMR + UDMR +
(CDR) R. Vasile 1998-1999 PNTCD Resignation6 Expelled USD USD
(PNTCD) Secretary from the
General PNTCD
Sorina Soare
M. Isărescu 1999-2000 n.a.7 End of term n.a.

(Indep.)
I. Iliescu 2000-2004 President End of A. Nastase 2000 Party direc- End of term President PSD + PSD + PUR +
(PDSR/ PSD term (PSD) -2004 tion PSD PUR UDMR
PSD)
T. Băsescu 2004-2009 President End of C.P. Tări- 2004-2007 Ad interim Reshuffling President DA + DA + UDMR
(DA/PD) PD term ceanu President PNL UDMR + + PUR + eth-
(PNL) PNL PUR nic minority
MPs
C.P. Tări- 2007-2008 President End of term President PNL + PNL + UDMR
ceanu PNL PNL UDM + PSD + PC +
(PNL) ethnic minor-
ity MPs
E. Boc 2008-2009 President Parliament President PDL + PDL + PSD
(PDL8) PDL motion of no PDL PSD
confidence9
T. Băsescu 2009-2014 n.a.10 End of E. Boc 2009-2012 President Resigna- President PDL + PDL +
(PDL) term PDL tion11 PDL UDMR + UDMR +
(PDL) UNPR UNPR
M.R. Un- 02.2012- Indep. Parliament Indep. PDL + PDL +
gureanu 04.2012 motion of no UDMR + UDM +
confidence UNPR UNPR
V. Ponta 05.2012- President End of term President USL USL
(PSD) 12.2012 PSD PSD
V. Ponta 12.2012- President Reshuffling President USL + USL + UNPR
(PSD) 02.2014 PSD PSD UNPR
V. Ponta 03.2014- President End of term President PSD + PC PSD + PC
(PSD) 12.2004 PSD PSD + UDMR + + UDMR +
UNPR UNPR
Klaus 2014- President V. Ponta 12.2014 President – PSD + PC PSD + PC
Johannis PNL (PSD) PSD + PLR + + UDMR +
(PNL) UNPR UNPR + PLR
1  Prime Minister P. Roman considered his forced resignation a coup orchestrated by the President, forced by the miners’ violent protests against the
government’s economic reforms.
2  Following the election of P. Roman as president of the FSN, Ion Iliescu’s supporters formed a new party in April 1992 – the Democratic National Salva-
tion Front (FDSN), currently known as the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Under the leadership of O. Gherman, the June National Convention endorsed Ion
Iliescu’s candidacy for the September 1992 presidential elections.
3  According to the 1991 Romanian Constitution, Art. 84.1 specifies that the President cannot be a party member during the duration of the term. Ion Iliescu
could not occupy an official position in the party, and his candidacy was endorsed by the recently created FDSN.
4  During the first two years of the cabinet, PUNR representatives received governmental responsibilities. Note also that the Agrarian party (PDAR) backed
the parliamentary majority during the first two years of the administration.
5  Prime Minister V. Ciorbea’s resignation came after he lost the full support of the coalition government in a context of political uncertainty and stalled
economic reforms.
6  The President, endorsed by the governing coalition leaders, forced the Prime Minister to resign after the PNTCD withdrew its support and various
ministers resigned, though he lacked a clear constitutional prerogative to dismiss the Prime Minister.
7  M. Isărescu was the Governor of the National Bank of Romania. After running in the 2000 presidential elections, he returned to the position of Governor.
Enhancing Democracy through Constitutional Reforms
8  The Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) was formed in December 2007 following the merger between PD and the PNL splinter, the Liberal Democratic
party (PLD).
9  Following increased tensions between the PSD and the PDL and, in particular, the removal of a PSD minister from office in October 2009, all the other
PSD ministers resigned. Consequently, the political composition was changed, and the previously PSD-led ministers were managed in the interim by the PDL.
In accordance with Art. 85.3, which states that in the case of a change in the political structure or composition of the government, the President is empowered
to appoint or dismiss members of the government as proposed by the Prime Minister and with Parliament’s approval. Considering the changed majorities
in Parliament, on the 13th of October Parliament voted in favour of a motion of no confidence. In December 2009, a new Cabinet headed by the same Prime
Minister, E. Boc, did secure Parliament’s confidence.
10  See Art. 84.1 provisions (Constitutions 2003).
37
11  The Boc II Cabinet resigned en masse following widespread protests against austerity measures.
38 Sorina Soare
by the Social Democrats (PSD) for two years, while the President belonged to
a different party, the PDL.53 A similarly divided government can be identified
on the eve of the third impeachment procedure against a Romanian President.
Following the election of Klaus Iohannis as Romania’s new president in No-
vember 2014, a new cohabitation period began between a PNL Head of State
and a coalition government led by V. Ponta. It is too soon to evaluate either
continuity or change within the dual executive (see Table 1).
Beyond the well-known political crisis of 2012,54 the schematic overview
illustrated in table 1 indicates that from the early 1990s, the popularly elected
President regularly clashed with an indirectly elected Prime Minister. From
1990-2004 the President’s powers began to be widened with the synchroniza-
tion of parliamentary and presidential elections,55 and although Romanian
presidents have repeatedly played major roles in dissolving Cabinets during
the first two decades of post-communism, the classic dismissal procedure was
used only in the case of Prime Minister Radu Vasile in 1999.56 In most cases,
conflicts within parliamentary majorities, together with pressures from the
Romanian President, triggered government reorganization and the resigna-
tion of the Prime Minister. It should be noted that only two governments were
dissolved as the result of parliamentary votes of no confidence. Of the sixteen
post-communist Romanian Cabinets, only seven have ended in regulation time
with new legislative elections. All in all, despite regular changes of government
since 1996, Romanian Presidents have converged in holding Prime Ministers
accountable for their government’s failures, while Prime Ministers have chal-
lenged the President’s agenda.57
The President under Scrutiny: Constitutions and

Constitutional Revisions in Post-Communist Romania
The institutional hiccups and constitutional ambiguities analysed above
have been topics of discussion for more than twenty years. From the earliest
adoption of the constitution in 1991, the partial and contradictory “copy and
paste” approach to the French model has generated what Iancu calls a “sense
of uncertainty with respect to the place of the president institution within the
53  Dimulescu,The Institution of Presidential Impeachment.

54  Ulrich
Sedelmeier, Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and
Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and Romania after Accession, Journal of Common Market
Studies 52 (2014), no. 1, 105-121.
55  The probabilities of cohabitation increased after the 2003 constitutional revision; the
President’s term of office was changed to five years (Art. 85.1), while the 4-year term of office
for MPs was maintained (Art. 63.1).
56  This event determined the introduction of an explicit ban of a dismissal power after the
2003 revision of the constitution.

constitutional architecture and the proper division of powers between the head
of state and the prime minister”,58 leaving wide leeway for a “personal” interpre-
tation of the role and tasks of the Romanian President and creating favourable
opportunities for ambitious Prime Ministers to challenge the Head of State.
Considering the two-thirds majority needed for constitutional revision, the
amendment of the Constitution remained nothing more than a political debate
for the best part of a decade. It was only in the aftermath of the parliamentary
elections of 2000 that, with a view to EU integration, the 1991 Constitution was
amended and finally completed. The revision of the Constitution provided
a window of opportunity for debate on amending or specifying presidential
powers in Romania. Significantly, during the debates related to the 2003 revi-
sion, few voices were raised in favour of radical change to the political setting;
only the UDMR endorsed a purely parliamentary system, a preference that
was eventually abandoned.59 Changes such as the introduction of a construc-
tive motion inspired by Art. 67 of the German Constitution were abandoned
too, as was the reviewed draft version of Art. 89, under which the President of
Romania would have been able to dissolve Parliament after consulting not only
the presidents of the two Chambers, but also the Prime Minister, provided that
the majority in the legislature changed.60
Of particular interest to this paper, the version adopted of the 2003 Con-
stitution referred explicitly to the principle of separation of powers, but the
institutional setup remained almost untouched, with the only major change
being the extension of the President’s term of office from four to five years.
The desynchronizing of the presidential and parliamentary elections was mo-
tivated by the official (and technical) aim of guaranteeing the principle of state
continuity while at the same time being intended to limit the personalization
of political competition.61 The immediate effect was a proliferation of conflict
between a President deprived of a loyal majority in Parliament and an ambi-
tious Prime Minister endorsed by a more or less stable majority. Still, it is worth
noting that in both Tăriceanu’s second Cabinet which ran from 5 April 2007 to
58  Iancu, Romania under EU Influence, 59.
59  Overall, Loneanu reminds us that, over the decades, the parties emerging from the
National Salvation Front (the current PSD and PDL) had leaders who, when holding
a presidential mandate, tended to support projects of constitutional revision that favoured
a stronger presidential role, while the other parties, most notably PNL and UDMR, but also the
PNŢCD in the 1990s, were in favour of a ceremonial role of the President in a parliamentary
republic. Irina Lonean, Construirea formei de guvernare prin discurs în 2003 și 2009, Sfera
Politicii 20 (2012), no. 172, 83-96, available at <http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/172/art09-
Lonean.php#_ftn36>.
60  Cristian Pîrvulescu / Todor Arpad, Reforma Constitutională în Romania. Aspecte
teorice și istorice legate de evoluția constituțiilor. Bucharest 2008, 33, available at <http://
forumconstitutional2013.ro/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Aspecte-teoretice-%C5%9Fi-istorice-
legate-de-evolu%C5%A3ia-constitu%C5%A3iilor-ApD-2008.pdf>.
40 Sorina Soare
22 December 2008 and the first Cabinet of Ponta from 7 May to 21 December
2012, the divided majority government was not the direct result of elections,
but the outcome of changes to the parliamentary majority during its term. In
both cases, new majorities were created with the specific purpose of opposing
the President, with immediate negative effects in terms of the radicalization of
institutional relations such as the referendum for impeachment, and the veto.62
Immediately after the failed attempt at impeachment in 2007, President
Băsescu publicly expressed his desire to address the ambiguities of Romanian
constitutional law and established a Presidential Commission, whose report was
released in January 2009.63 The entire process was focused on the clarification
of the Romanian semi-presidential regime, openly criticizing the ambiguities of
the 1991 and 2003 constitutional settings. Major emphasis was laid on the lack
of coherence between the direct election of a Head of State and the position’s
lack of appropriate powers, as well as on its damaging effects on Romanian
democracy. The final report was widely documented, adopted a broad com-
parative perspective, and was endorsed by well-known experts. Nevertheless,
the polarization of the Romanian political arena limited the potential for the
implementation and practicability of the scenarios identified in the report.
In a highly tense, climactic political moment, President Băsescu formulated
a specific political agenda that placed revision of the Constitution at its centre.
Băsescu made use of the provisions of Art. 90 of the 2003 Constitution to hold
a referendum on modification of both the size and structure of the Romanian
Parliament. The proposal was for change from the bicameral model adopted in
1991 to a single Chamber with a maximum of 300 seats.64 A turnout of 50.95%
validated the referendum with 77.78% in favour of the adoption of a unicameral
Parliament, and 88.84% in favour of the reduction in the number of its members.
By June 2011, President Băsescu presented a new project to revise the Consti-
tution based on the solutions endorsed by the 2009 referendum.65 The inten-

63  Raportal Comisiei Prezidenţiale de Analiză a Regimului Politic și Constituţional din
România. Pentru consolidarea statului de drept, available at <http://www.presidency.ro/static/
ordine/CPARPCR/Raport_CPARPCR.pdf>.
64  Note that President Băsescu had already used this procedure in 2007 in relation to the
organization of the parliamentary elections in uninominal constituencies in two rounds. In

the aftermath of the first failed impeachment referendum, the adoption of a new electoral
law offered the opportunity for a new clash between the two camps. The President called for
a referendum on the adoption of the two-round system, scheduled for the same date as the
first elections for the European Parliament. Though 81.36% of the votes were in favour of the
electoral reform, the referendum was not valid because of the low voter turnout of 26.51%. As
a result, the Romanian parliament adopted a mixed electoral system. The 2009 referendum
was organized at the same time as the first round of the presidential election.
65  Proiect de lege privind revizuirea Constituţiei României, înregistrat la Camera Deputaţilor
pentru dezbatere la 27.06.2011 (PL-x nr. 492/2011), available at <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/

proiecte/upl_pck.proiect?idp=12163>.
tion was to strengthen the power of the executive in relation to Parliament by

strengthening the powers of the President, and by proposing small amendments
to the relationship between government and Parliament.66 All in all, the project
of revision was presented not only as a transition to a unicameral Parliament,
but also as a rational answer to the economic crisis and stricter budget rules,
and a continuation of the fight against corruption by restricting parliamentary
immunity.67 Considering the radical changes to the equilibrium of parliamentary
majorities already evident at the beginning of 2012, the constitutional project
was rejected in May 2013.68
In the aftermath of the second impeachment referendum, defeat of the anti-
Băsescu camp in the most recent parliamentary elections was supposed to have
eroded the dialogue between the President and the Prime minister even further,
pitting one half of the executive against the other.69 President Băsescu’s legiti-
macy was weakened by both the 2012 impeachment referendum and the PDL’s
disappointing results in that year’s elections. On the other hand, his credibility
was reinforced by the indirect endorsement he received from EU institutions
and their official warning to the Romanian Government not to undermine the
rule of law and to respect the independence of the judiciary. The same thing
happened to Prime Minister Victor Ponta in reverse, who was bolstered by the
USL’s outstanding success in the 2012 parliamentary elections but weakened by
concerns voiced by EU institutions about his management of domestic politics.
Triggered by the claim of both sides of the dual executive that they represented
legitimate authority, immediate consequences were forecast in terms of institu-
tional deadlocks, diminished executive efficiency, and legislative immobility. All
of those things work against democratic performance and, at least theoretically,
can lead to constitutional crises or even complete breakdown. In light of the
relationship between constitutional ambiguities and party politics, in particular
the salience of the various political battles across parliamentary majorities and
the President’s own expectations and ambitions, President Băsescu launched an
innovative, if temporary, political solution. In December 2012 Băsescu and the
Prime Minister signed a so-called “cohabitation pact”, an agreement which re-
66  Bogdan Dima, Două proiecte – două viziuni – o luptă, 15 August 2013, available at
<http://bogdandima.ro/page/2/#_ftn2>.
67  Emil Boc, The Revision of the Romanian Constitution: Current Issues, Revista de cercetare
și intervenție socială 35 (2011), 149-170, available at <http://ideas.repec.org/a/lum/rev2rl/

v35y2011ip149-170.html>.
68  Of the 318 MPs attending the meeting, 41 voted in favour (33 PDL, 2 PSD, 2 PNL), 18
abstained (1 PDL, 15 PPDD, 1 ethnic minorities, 1 independent) and 259 voted against the
project (136 PSD, 79 PNL, 4 PPDD, 13 UDMR, 14 ethnic minorities, 12 PC, 1 independent).
Minutes available at <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/eVot.Nominal?idv=10394>.
69  The Social Liberal Union (USL) secured over 65% of the parliamentary seats. Cf. final
official results of the 2012 Romanian parliamentary elections, available at <http://www.

becparlamentare2012.ro/rezultate%20finale.html>.
42 Sorina Soare
drew the rules for power-sharing within the dual executive with particular refer-
ence to sensitive overlapping competencies. The agreement specified a protocol
to be followed in cases of conflict between the President and the Government.
Overall, the text confirmed the pre-eminence of the President’s role in Foreign
Affairs, which was in exchange for the Prime Minister’s pre-eminence in the man-
agement of domestic economic and social matters. In order to tighten the binding
nature of the agreement, President Băsescu handed out copies of the document to
various European leaders during the European Council Summit held in Brussels
in December 2012, and it was published on the Presidential website.70
For a time, the cohabitation pact pulled the executive out of political turmoil,
although the first rift appeared soon enough, when the president of the PNL,
Crin Antonescu, voiced his opposition to a document without legal value that
indirectly endorsed the legitimacy of President Băsescu. The agreement fell
apart rapidly, with reciprocal allegations of violating both the pact and the rule
of law. While President Băsescu accused the Prime Minister of encroaching on
foreign policy by adopting a significantly different position from that of the
President on the matter of whether or not to recognize the independence of
Kosovo, Băsescu himself had exploited his own constitutional leverage, such as
the fact that he might ask Parliament to review laws. The President made use
of the Constitutional Court’s judgment that he was entitled to make political
evaluations of the competence of proposed members of the Cabinet; indeed he
vetoed two proposed Ministers, those for Culture and the Budget.
The violation of the different points of the cohabitation deal – in fact a gentle-
men’s agreement more than a legal entity – eventually triggered only public de-
nunciations and no legal sanctions. On the eve of the 2014 presidential elections,
the conflict between the two figures of the executive re-emerged. In August 2014,
the Prime Minister addressed an open letter to the President denouncing the
cohabitation pact. The President reacted by revealing in a television programme
that he had used the agreement as a stratagem to “outwit” a Prime Minister
endorsed by a majority of two-thirds of Parliament. The tense relationship
in the dual executive continued in the run-up to the presidential elections of
November 2014, with Băsescu even alleging that between 1997 and 2001 Prime
Minister Ponta, the candidate of the PSD in the upcoming presidential election,
had been an undercover foreign intelligence agent.
After the 2012 political crisis, there was increased endeavour to revise the
Constitution. More than two decades after the adoption of Romania’s first
post-communist Constitution a convoluted process of constitutional review
was launched, with the declared intent of reconfiguring political institutions.
One of the stated aims was to improve things by taking into account the lack
70  Acordul
de colaborare instiţutională între Președintele României și Primul ministru al
Guvernului, Președintele României, 12 December 2012, available at <http://www.presidency.
ro/static/Acord_de_colaborare.pdf>.
of clarity associated with the performance of the current Constitution in cases

of co-habitation. In its reviewed form, the Constitution was meant to limit
presidential competences in favour of those of the government and Parliament.
The process of revision was initially depicted as the removal of manoeuvring
room for a “player-President” who had until then been able assume an active
and extensive engagement in domestic politics within an existing context of
constitutional ambiguity. Reform of the redundant bicameral system was to
be included by transforming the Senate to represent local communities, most
probably the regions, subject to parallel administrative-territorial reform. De-
spite initial declarations, the draft version, adopted by Parliament on 7 Feb-
ruary 2014, retained the eclectic nature of the Romanian regime and thereby
appeared not to challenge the status quo. The Joint Parliamentary Committee
for the Revision of the Constitution had thus carried out a short-term political
project strongly dependent on the dynamics and actors of the 2012 political
crisis. Beyond a reduction in the presidential term from five to four years as in
the 1991 Constitution, the 2014 draft version71 failed to make a clear distinc-
tion between a President who would be an arbitrator and one who would be
a political player.72
Initially scheduled for the same date as the May 2014 elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the referendum for the adoption of a reviewed version of the
constitution was postponed indefinitely, because the original constellation of
alliances that had sustained the 2013 project for revision changed radically on
the eve of the 2014 European Parliamentary elections. The constitutional project
had been shaped by an opposition to President Băsescu which brought together
the Liberals and Social Democrats in the USL alliance. Talks for a merger be-
tween the PNL and the PDL,73 as well as the endorsement of a single candidate
in the 2014 presidential elections, further complicated the fate of the 2014 draft.
71  Minuta ședinţa din 16 februarie 2014 (Dosar nr. 95 a/2014), successively published in the
Official Gazzette as Decizia CCR nr. 80/2014 asupra propunerii legislative privind revizuirea
Constituției României, Monitorul Oficial, Partea I, no. 246, 7 April 2014, available at <http://
www.legalis.ro/2014/04/09/decizia-ccr-asupra-propunerii-legislative-privind-revizuirea-
constitutiei-romaniei/>.
72  From the beginning of his first term, President Băsescu described himself as a “player-
President and not as a spectator-president”. This interpretation of the presidential position

in the institutional setting was closer to the active presidency of Ion Iliescu (in particular in
the period 1990-1996); ex post, both presidencies saw an increase in the (in)formal powers of
the presidential administration.
73  According to a 2014 Protocole, on 17 November 2014, the PDL merged into the PNL.
44 Sorina Soare
The Romanian Political Regime: a Self-Evident Matter?

The classification of Romania’s institutional models over two decades of
post-communism is not an easy task.74 The complexity of the subject arises from
its resemblance to the French model, although that was more of an inspiration
than a template, with the Romanian Head of State appearing overall to be much
weaker than the French one, and with much more emphasis on Parliament.
On the whole, over and above the formal instruments made available by the
Constitution (both of them, 1991 and 2003) there are fluid informal elements or
contextual features that appear to enhance the Romanian President’s visibility.
My first conclusion is about the endurance of the Romanian semi-presidential
regimes. A foundation institutional organization was established in 1990, and
the constitutional reforms of 2003 did not alter it. Analysis here has pointed
to a political regime that endowed the President with rather weak powers,
whether legislative or non-legislative, consistent with the premier-presidential
subtype of semi-presidentialism. On closer inspection, the text of the Consti-
tution revealed confused codifications, both of the relationship between the
dual executive and between President and Parliament, although the potential
flashpoints are to be found at the level of the President’s relationship with the
government. The President has no power to appoint a Prime minister, and in
relation to the appointment of the Cabinet, may only confirm Parliament’s de-
cisions. But the constitution leaves the President with plenty of room to select
a candidate from among the leaders of the parliamentary parties, a facility he
can use as to pressurize political opponents. The President has no authority to
choose the rest of the government, for whom the chief political endeavour is
to secure the confidence of Parliament. Similarly, though cooperation between
President and Parliament is required at various levels and for many things, it
happens in a rather unbalanced way. Parliament can impeach the President,
but the President lacks both a real power of veto and any effective power to
dissolve Parliament. An extensive interpretation of the role of the President
in the process of promulgation has become the norm since 2004, giving the
President the potential to pressure (or even, effectively, blackmail) Parliament
by sending laws back to Parliament for reconsideration, beyond extrinsically
constitutional matters.75 If that rather cluttered landscape is taken into account,
it is not surprising that there is a tortuous and still open debate on the need to
re-balance constitutional competences both at the level of the dual executive
and in the relationship between the President and Parliament. The current
74  Sorin Bocancea (ed.), Constituția României. Opinii esențiale pentru legea fundamentală.
Iași 2012; Bogdan Dima / Elena-Simina Tănăsescu (eds.), Reforma Constituţională: analiză

și proiecţii. Bucharest 2012; Ion Deleanu, Instituţii și proceduri constituţionale – în dreptul
român și în dreptul comparat. Bucharest 2006; Carp / Stanomir, Limitele Constituţiei.
cohabitation period becomes extremely interesting for evaluating the potential

of conflict and instability.
Can Romanian Semi-Presidentialism Function

in Any Other Way?
The analysis of the Romanian case seems to provide evidence in favour of
rather ambiguous constitutional prerogatives and discretionary interpretations
of the role of major institutional players within the institutional set-up. Those
ambiguities have led to political turmoil, and the fragility of the system is laid
out by Drăganu:
“The constitutional frame […] confronts a President of the Republic, with a strongly
outlined judicial status, and a Parliament which can be dissolved only in excep-
tional circumstances. It goes without saying that such a constitutional regulation
mirrors the principle of separation of powers. This narrow separation is softened
by the fact that between these two bodies, which do not depend on one another,
a cushion body has been placed: the Government, a scapegoat, designed to be the
sole possible victim in the clash between two titans.”76
Those ambiguities seem like the sword of Damocles, hanging forever over
Romanian democracy. Dima rightly stressed that
“if the President and Prime Minister of Romania do not have an understanding
for a certain period of time, it does not mean that constitutional provisions should
be amended. But if disagreements persist over time, even if the political actors
change, this means that they are inherent in the constitutional design, and that an
institutional system reconfiguration is needed in order to eliminate the potential
for conflict.”77
Regular changes to the composition of Parliament, created when individual MPs
cross the floor, or party splits and mergers and shifting alliances, place additional
pressure on a poorly codified division of powers.78 The probability of crises is
increased by incompatible personal ambitions and contrasting political views
that derive from a shared tendency to personalization under semi-presidential
regimes. Even in the theoretically calmer government subtype of consolidated
majority, the efficiency of the dual executive is strongly dependent on the indi-
vidual characters of the President and the Prime Minister, and on their ability
to shape the rules of the game. Still other intervenient variables emerged, such
as the roles played by Presidents and Prime Ministers as leaders of political
parties, the loyalty of the parliamentary majority, and the dynamics of party
discipline in the Romanian Parliament. Among the causes of Romanian semi-
76  Quoted by Gilia, Is Romania Heading Towards a Presidential Republic?, 94.

77  Dima, Semiprezidenţialismul românesc.
78  Chiru et al., Stable or Fluid?
46 Sorina Soare
presidentialism’s poor reputation, politicking and intrigues act as dangerous

accelerants in periods of cohabitation, leading to unstable scenarios accompa-
nied by gradual backsliding and erosion of democracy (graph 1). Moreover,
Presidents and Prime Ministers alike, together with other significant figures in
the parliamentary majority, tend to personalize their offices and claim that the
very survival of Romanian democracy depends on their own current terms in
office. Opposition to those offices is therefore associated with backsliding and
even with an anti-democratic mind-set.
In a degraded political climate, the analysis of the Romanian case shows that
the dual executive has facilitated means to use powers that are beyond consti-
tutional limits. Possible solutions range from decreasing the executive powers
of the President with a shift towards a more ceremonial role, to the conserva-
tion of the current arrangements in parallel with the strengthening of players
like the Constitutional Court. Though mentioned in the 1991 Constitution, the
Romanian Constitutional Court gained major competences only following the
revision of the Constitution that took place in 2003, in particular in relation to
mediation of inter-institutional conflict. Over the last ten years the Court has
been called upon on various occasions to adjudicate questions concerning the
dual executive arrangement.79 Considering the demonstrable relevance of the
fact that Presidents and Prime Ministers are involved in party politics, and that
such involvement tends to lead them either to maintain stability or to trigger
institutional conflicts, a move towards synchronized presidential and parlia-
mentary elections might further limit the likelihood of institutional arrhythmias
by more closely linking Presidents to the policy platforms of their parties.
To conclude, it thus seems more instructive to explore specific political and
institutional practices associated with a subtype in one period and across time
than to look at the general features of the regime. Accordingly, this study sug-
gests the need to finetune semi-presidential assessments by looking not only at
the constitutional features of the system itself, but also at context-dependent fluc-
tuations in power relations. That said, further analysis is needed before definitive
judgments can be made about the relationship between semi-presidentialism
and democracy in the Romanian case. In particular other semi-presidential ar-
rangements across the region should be compared, by examining the detailed
dynamics of inter-executive conflicts and conflicts between different branches.
Finally, relevant input could be provided by the inclusion of an analysis of how
citizens’ perception of the quality of government evolves over time.
79  Paul Blokker, Constitution-Making in Romania. From Reiterative Crises to Constitutional
Moment?, Romanian Journal of Comparative Law 3 (2013), no. 2, 187-204.

Daniel Brett
Fiddling while Rome Burns:

Institutional Conflict and Party Politics
in Romania since 2007
Abstract. Drawing on the work of Maurice Duverger, this paper explores the dynamics of
dual systems in the post-communist world by focusing on Romania. Unlike in states such as
Poland and Russia, where conflicts between the president and the parliament were resolved
relatively early in the transition period, conflict appears to have only recently emerged in
Romania. This paper argues that the capacity for such conflict has existed since 1989 due to
the nature of Romania’s exit from communism and its subsequent transition, which shaped
and institutionalised Romanian political culture and its party system. However, actual conflict
has emerged only because of recent, externally generated changes in the party system, and
the relative decline in the electoral power of the Social Democratic Party. Two attempts by
President Băsescu’s opponents to remove him from office, along with increasing constitutional
manipulation by all actors, calls into question the consolidation of democracy in Romania. The
desire of actors to gain power or remove their opponents by any means necessary, including
the use of undemocratic methods, rather than by establishing a broad popular base to achieve
these ends reflects the structural problems of the Romanian party system.
Daniel Brett is an Associate Lecturer at the Open University in the UK.
Introduction
Since its accession to the European Union in January 2007, Romania has ex-
perienced a period of sustained institutional conflict and instability between the
president and the parliament, including two attempts to remove the president
via the impeachment process, rows over their respective roles, and attempts to
change the institutional architecture to ensure that one side has an advantage
over the other.1 The conflict has largely been seen in terms of the politics of
personality, the combative approach of President Traian Băsescu, having alien-
1  The author would like to thank Irina Marin, Anna Fruhstorfer, Amy Samuelson, Radu
Cinpoeș, Sherrill Stroschein, Dennis Deletant, and Sergiu Gherghina for their help and
encouragement with this article.
48 Daniel Brett
ated his former allies and sent them into the arms of his opponents in the Social
Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat, PSD).2 This instability is considered to
represent a new phase in Romanian politics and potentially points to a weaken-
ing commitment to democracy and the acceptance of elections by some actors.
This article argues that the potential for such conflicts – arising from an ambigu-
ous constitution, a poorly defined separation of powers, and the likelihood of
periods of cohabitation – has been present within Romanian politics since the
revolution of December 1989. However, the driving force behind the attempts
to remove Băsescu have been the declining electoral fortunes of the PSD and
the need to shore up their support. While cohabitation has always been a pos-
sibility in the post-communist period, changes to the party system as well as the
electoral system and cycle have caused periods of cohabitation to become more
likely. Because no party can gain an overall majority, any actor wishing to gain
office has to form a coalition; however, the nature of the Romanian party system
makes these coalitions highly volatile and unstable. We thus see a process of
mutual reinforcement: the institutional framework exacerbates party instability,
and in response political actors exploit the institutional architecture to further
their short-term political goals as a response to this instability. This article ex-
plores the interplay between the party system and the institutional architecture
to explain the high level of institutional conflict since 2007.
Here I seek to answer the following questions: Why has the recent political
conflict in Romania taken place? To what extent was it driven by vested interests
or concern over declining electoral fortunes? Why did it break out when it did?
How much was the timing of the conflict influenced by the process of accession
to the EU and by key anti-corruption cases? What was the role of institutional-
ised but non-constitutional distribution of power, and the nature of the party
system? Ultimately, the article aims to answer the broader question about the
degree to which democracy is consolidated in Romania.
Focusing on the period of Traian Băsescu’s presidency (2004-2014), this essay
argues that the attempts to remove him from office were motivated by certain
actors’ strategic objectives rather than by any single issue or event. Băsescu’s
opponents opportunistically seized upon events to create exploitable political
crises, and took advantage of the constitutional architecture to achieve the short-
and medium-term objectives of the PSD and the National Liberal Party (Partidul
Naţional Liberal, PNL). Neither the events of 2007 nor of 2012 can be looked at in
isolation, as in each case they were the result of long-term conflicts and changes
in the structure of Romanian politics. Furthermore, it would be incorrect to look
2  For more on the PSD and its roots in the National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvării
Naționale, FSN), see Sergiu Gherghina, Party Organization and Electoral Volatility in Central
and Eastern Europe. Enhancing Voter Loyalty. London 2014.
Institutional Conflict and Party Politics since 2007 49
at the Băsescu-era conflicts without examining how his predecessors had shaped
the presidency and how previous conflicts had been resolved. Thus the paper
takes a long-term perspective in its view of how power has been institutionalised
in Romania. Inevitably, profuse coverage will be given to the PSD as the largest
political party in the post-1989 Romanian party system, the main inheritor of the
pre-1989 Romanian Communist Party in terms of membership, ideology, and
political infrastructure, and the party that dominated the Romanian political
scene after the fall of communism.
This paper explores the theoretical literature both on institutional conflict
between president and parliament and on semi-presidentialism, but argues that
these theories’ usefulness is limited, as they analyse primarily the formal divi-
sions of power rather than the everyday workings of power within the system.
Although the recent conflict has centred on the institutionalisation of power
during the transition in contradiction to the formal distribution of power laid
out in the constitution, its underlying causes reflect the shifting dynamics of
Romanian society and its impact on party politics and elections. Attention must
therefore be given to ideas about institutionalisation, the nature of the Romanian
party system, and the question of democratic consolidation.
This essay thus examines presidentialism in Romania in relation to the theo-
retical literature and explores the nature of the country’s party system. Taking
a chronological survey of the conflicts between the president and Parliament
during Băsescu’s presidency, it uses a process-tracing analysis that accounts
for the emergence of the recent period of crisis.
The events in Romania can be seen as part of a wider tide of democracy
being rolled back by actors willing to resort to authoritarianism to gain and
consolidate power in post-communist Europe in recent years. From the earlier
unsuccessful attempts by Poland’s Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość,
PiS) to the successful rolling back of democracy in Hungary by Viktor Orbán,
to those who have flirted with authoritarian rhetoric at times, such as Robert
Fico in Slovakia and Václav Klaus in the Czech Republic, to the post-Yugoslav
states which are variously considered to have defective democracy or to be
mere electoral democracies,3 political actors in post-Communist countries seem
to be increasingly willing to embrace illiberal democracy. Once elected either
to parliament or the presidency, actors then consolidate their power through
constitutional revision and the erosion of judicial and media independence,
thereby helping them to remain in power. The question is whether Romania
is part of the emerging trend of “semi-soft authoritarianism” as Florian Bieber
3  See Florian Bieber / Irena Ristić, Constrained Democracy. The Consolidation of Democracy
in Yugoslav Successor States, Southeastern Europe 36 (2012), no. 2, 373-397, 374.

50 Daniel Brett
has described it,4 or whether the current situation represents a deeper erosion
of democracy.5
While it is easy to view the current events as a rolling back of democracy and
a rise of a new authoritarianism, an alternative explanation is that a section of
the Romanian political, economic and social elite has never fully embraced
democracy. This rejection of democracy can in part be traced back to the 1989
revolution and the failure to remove the deposed regime’s old guard, which
subsequently reinforced itself through the party system, particularly within the
PSD but also in sections of other parties. That the response to declining electoral
performance is to attempt to gain power through the back door reflects the failure
of democratic values to become entrenched within the Romanian party system.
Democratic Consolidation
It might be assumed that, some twenty-five years after the revolution that
overthrew communism, and despite the often difficult journey to democracy,
the rules of the democratic game would have been absorbed into Romanian
political culture by the time of its sixth presidential election and that democracy
would now be largely consolidated. However, as events in Hungary have shown,
despite apparent consolidation, authoritarian actors can roll back democracy
very quickly and easily. As Juan J. Linz writes, consolidation occurs when “de-
mocracy is the only game in town”.6 Furthermore, as Guillermo O’Donnell notes,
“elected (and some appointed) officials should not be arbitrarily terminated
before the end of their constitutionally mandated terms”.7 Both authors adopt
a behavioural threshold to determine consolidation.8 Thus the recent period of
conflict calls into question the degree to which democracy has been consolidated
in Romania and whether there is backsliding into authoritarianism. Given the
failure of the 2007 impeachment referendum, Băsescu’s subsequent electoral
victory in 2009 and its accompanying mandate, and, more significantly, the fixed
limit on presidential terms, one has to ask: why did the Social Liberal Union
4  Florian Bieber, The Authoritarian Temptation, 15 March 2014, available at <https://fbieber.
wordpress.com/2014/03/15/the-authoritarian-temptation/>. All internet sources were accessed

on 31 March 2015.
5  As a point of comparison the decline of democracy in east-central Europe during the
interwar period is instructive. The best account is still Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe
Between the Wars 1918-1941. London 31962.
6  Juan J. Linz, Transitions to Democracy, The Washington Quarterly 13 (1990), no. 3, 143-
164, 156.
7  Guillermo O’Donnell, Illusions about Consolidation, Journal of Democracy 7 (1996),
no. 2, 34-51, 35.

8  Juan J. Linz / Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore/MD 1996, 5.

(Uniunea Social Liberală, USL) not wait out the last two years of Băsescu’s presi-
dency as a “lame duck”, after their victory in the 2012 parliamentary elections?
The literature on presidentialism and semi-presidentialism and the dangers
for democracy that it poses focuses on transitional rather than consolidated
democracies. Linz highlights how presidentialism can weaken democracy by
thwarting the development of a strong party system, which leads to the con-
centration of powers in one office or, alternately, causes political gridlock and
polarisation as two institutions – the presidency and the parliament – each claim
supreme authority and legitimacy.9 Dual legitimacy, because of the division
of powers and responsibility, makes interbranch conflicts more likely, as often
the system lacks mechanisms to resolve them. Conflict is likely to increase the
zero-sum character of presidential elections, leading to further polarisation.
Semi-presidentialism makes dual legitimacy even more likely because of the
formalisation of shared powers between president and parliament. In addi-
tion, the potential for cohabitation is greater in a semi-presidential system.
The emergence of dual legitimacy has been regarded as a significant threat to
democracy. Juan J. Linz and Albert Stepan note:
“When supporters of one or the other component of semi-presidentialism feel that
the country would be better off if one branch of the democratically legitimated
structure of rule would disappear or be closed, the democratic system is endangered
and suffers an overall loss of legitimacy, since those questioning one or the other
will tend to consider the political system undesirable as long as the side they favor
does not prevail […]. In a semi-presidential system, policy conflicts often express
themselves as a conflict between two branches of democracy.”10
Robert Elgie responds by suggesting that semi-presidentialism is not as dan-

gerous as expected.11 In his analysis of young democracies, the collapse of
democracy after the introduction of semi-presidentialism occurred relatively
shortly after the end of communism – in fledgling political systems, not those
that had survived for nearly twenty years. Nor does cohabitation necessarily
cause a reversal of democratisation.12 In Eastern Europe, where there have
been cases of cohabitation in a semi-presidential system, only in Bulgaria (1997)
and Lithuania (2004) has cohabitation resulted in the early termination of the
president’s term or the dissolution of the parliament. In all other cases, despite
conflict, the issue was resolved when the term of either the president or the
  9  Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, Journal of Democracy 1 (1990), no. 1, 51-69.
10  Linz / Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 286.
11  Robert Elgie, The Perils of Semi-Presidentialism: Are They Exaggerated?, Democratization
15 (2008), no. 1, 49-66, available at <http://doras.dcu.ie/4514/1/Elgie_Democratization_2008_

Perils_of_semipresidentialism.pdf>.
12  Idem, Semi-Presidentialism, Cohabitation, and the Collapse of Electoral Democracies,
1990-2008, Government and Opposition 45 (2010), no. 1, 29-49, 35, available at <http://www.
astrid-online.com/i-nuovi-pr/studi--ric/elgie_gov-and-opp_1_2010.pdf>.
52 Daniel Brett
parliament ended as scheduled and voters responded at the polls.13 It should

be noted that in the post-communist world as a whole, the potential for conflict
among political actors has been high but has generally declined over time in all
semi-presidential systems.14
Semi-Presidentialism in Romania
Romania is considered to be a semi-presidential system,15 although there
is some debate about the degree of presidentialism within the system.16 The
difference between what is supposed to exist on paper and what actually tran-
spires in practice lies at the heart of the tensions in Romanian politics.17 On
paper the prime minister is the politician in charge of the day-to-day running
of the government and is responsible for the shape of the executive branch.18
The presidency is largely meant to serve as a check-and-balance institution. In
practice, however, the distribution of power has been shaped by the way disputes
were resolved during the early stages of the transition out of communism: when
conflict emerged between prime minister and president, it was the president
who triumphed and the prime minister who ultimately lost the battle and the
job.19 This meant that in practice the system ultimately became more presiden-
tial, with the president being the dominant politician and the prime minister
as clearly subordinated to the president. The president’s primacy has also been
13  Ibid, 37.
14  Thomas Sedelius / Olga Mashtaler, Two Decades of Semi-Presidentialism. Issues of
Intra-Executive Conflict in Central and Eastern Europe, 1991-2011, East European Politics 29
(2013), no. 2, 109-134, 123.
15  See Robert Elgie, The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism, in: Idem (ed.), Semi-Presidentialism
in Europe. Oxford 1999, 1-21, 14. Thomas Baylis argues that it is not even clear to experts what
type of executive is prevalent in Romania: Thomas Baylis, Presidents Versus Prime Ministers.
Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe, World Politics 48 (1997), no. 3, 297-323.
16  Although André Krouwel shows that there is debate within the literature, with
characterisations of Romania’s political system ranging from presidentialism to limited

presidentialism to semi-presidentialism, it is most commonly considered to be a presidential
system, but to varying degrees. Cf. André Krouwel, The Presidentialisation of East Central
European Countries, paper presented to the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Copenhagen,
14-19 April 2000, 3, available at <http://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/b736a5ff-ab2b-4d45-
ac21-43c325e42610.pdf>.
17  A useful comparison can be made with Bulgaria in the 1990s regarding the evolution
of what in theory was a carefully crafted semi-presidential system, which however did not
function as intended. See Venelin I. Ganev, Bulgaria, in: Elgie (ed.), Semi-Presidentialism in
Europe, 125-148.
18  See Tony Verheijen, Romania, in: Elgie (ed.), Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, 193-215,
199-201.
19  In particular the dispute between Petre Roman and Ion Iliescu, which culminated in
Roman losing his job. Tom Gallagher, Theft of a Nation. Romania Since Communism.
London 2005, 98f.
helped by the timing of elections, as presidential and parliamentary elections

were held concurrently and the president’s party or alliance usually formed
the parliamentary majority. As a result, without real checks or balances, the
system became increasingly presidential. With the uncoupling of parliamentary
and presidential elections, voters can punish the incumbent president, who by
virtue of presidential dominance is seen as the person most responsible for the
problems Romania is facing.
The problem with many definitions of semi-presidentialism20 is that they
are based on formal powers rather than the actual practice and operation of
political life, and thus do not help us understand why constitutional conflict
emerges. Because the literature has failed to account for the institutionalisation
phase, much of it has little to say about Romania. It is perhaps useful, then, to
return to Maurice Duverger’s original analysis, which focuses on the way the
semi-presidential system functions.21 Duverger highlights three key factors to
explain the nature of a semi-presidential system and the variation within them:
1) the events surrounding the formation of the system;
2) the constitutional powers of the president, prime minister, and parliament;
3) the nature of the parliamentary majority and the relationship between the
president and the majority.22
In the case of Romania, the current phase of conflict was caused by the first
and third factors, and the third factor is shaped in turn by the nature of the party
system. The constitutional powers are defined in theory, albeit ambiguously.
As Sergiu Gherghina and Sergiu Mișcoiu note, this is not the first time that
confrontation has emerged between president and prime minister;23 what has
changed involves the third element of Duverger’s model – the nature of the par-
liamentary majority and the relationship between president and that majority.
The institutionalisation of the Romanian system needs to be revisited to un-
derstand how it functions and how the crisis came about. Panebianco describes
institutionalisation thus:
“The consolidation of the organization, the passage from an initial, structurally
fluid phase, when the new-born organization is still forming, to a phase in which
20  Robert Elgie, Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting
Explanations, Political Studies Review 2 (2004), no. 3, 314-330, 315-317, available at <http://
doras.dcu.ie/63/>.
21  For a recent revisiting of Duverger see Raul Magni-Berton, Reassessing Duvergerian
Semi-Presidentialism: An Electoral Perspective, Comparative European Politics 11 (2013) no. 2,

222-248.
22  Maurice Duverger, A New Political System Model. Semi-Presidential Government,
European Journal of Political Research 8 (1980), no. 3, 165-187.

23  Sergiu Gherghina / Sergiu Mișcoiu, The Failure of Cohabitation. Explaining the 2007
and 2012 Institutional Crises in Romania, East European Politics and Societies 27 (2013), no. 4,
668-684, 671.
54 Daniel Brett
the organization stabilizes, develops stable survival interests and just as stable or-
ganizational loyalties. Institutionalization is the process which marks this transition
from one phase to the other.”24
The problem is that the political culture and practice that has emerged since
1992 has been one of presidential supremacy, while the constitutional archi-
tecture is one of parliamentary supremacy. While parliament bases its claim
on an electoral mandate and constitutional powers, the president also claims
an electoral mandate and powers built on practice, and discredits parliament
based around its conduct, which he claims is unconstitutional.
The two recent periods of confrontation – 2004-2008 and 2011-2014 – reflect
a response to Romania’s institutionalisation as a system more presidential in
practice than the semi-presidential system that is supposed to exist on paper.
However, the system’s constitutional blueprint allows Parliament to challenge
the power of the presidency and to invoke the constitution during periods of
cohabitation. With cohabitation occurring after 2004 and the uncoupling of
elections, both president and Parliament have claimed legitimacy. As noted,
dual legitimacy and constitutional conflict are among the perils highlighted by
Linz, and Romania seems to have fallen into this predicament. Its difficulties in
this regard can be attributed to the first and third shaping factors identified by
Duverger. However, beyond this, it begs explanation why Romania has gone
down the deviant path of attempting to remove the president. The reason the
PNL under Antonescu, and the PSD under Geoană and then Ponta, took to
attempting to removing Băsescu, involves the pressure that the parties respec-
tively put on the leaderships to do so. To understand why the parties were so
keen to remove Băsescu, it is necessary to look at the nature of the Romanian
party system, the aims and objectives of actors within the parties, and what
they consider the function of a political party to be.
Institutional Architecture: The 1991 Constitution

and the Pre-Enlargement Constitutional Revisions
The Romanian system draws heavily upon the pre-1982 French model,25 which
the elite actors seemed to have accepted by 2004. The system was designed to
have a politically neutral president as head of state, with a prime minister serving
24  Angelo
Panebianco, Political Parties. Organization and Power. Cambridge 1988, 18.
25  “The
most important deviations from the French system lie in the much more limited
powers of the president. The imposition of political neutrality, the limitations on presidential
powers to dissolve parliament, and the conditions imposed on the use of decree powers, in
particular the fact that parliament has to approve the use of decree powers by the government
in every instance, all constitute important differences with the French system. These deviations,
which weaken significantly the constitutional position of the president, are a reaction to the
previous institutional system.” Verheijen, Romania, 198.
as head of the government, responsible to the bicameral Parliament (compris-

ing the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate). In reality, as noted, the president
has been politically dominant, with a subordinate prime minister. In addition,
the President, Chamber of Deputies, and Senate each choose three nominees
to serve nine-year terms on Romania’s Constitutional Court. In practice, these
court appointments have allowed presidents and members of parliaments to
continue to influence the political process after leaving office.
The 1991 constitution is contradictory, reflecting to some extent the situation
within which it was written and the process of dialogue between president and
parliament at that time.26 As a result, differing articles appear to give the same
powers to differing arms of the executive, especially in the area of foreign af-
fairs and security.27 Whereas only the president can propose a prime minister,
presidents lack the power to dismiss an incumbent and can dissolve parliament
only under special circumstances (namely, if their nominee for prime minister
has been twice rejected). At the same time, the threshold for suspending the
president is relatively low, requiring the support of only one-third of the mem-
bers of parliament to launch a motion for suspension.
From the outset there has always been scope for conflict between actors; how-
ever, 2004 represents the first period of genuine cohabitation, where a coalition
imploded into open conflict between president and prime minister. Moreover,
after the 2004 elections the dynamics of the party system shifted: the PNL,
which after 2000 had regarded itself as the PSD’s primary opponent, found itself
squeezed into third place, as Băsescu’s Democratic Party (Partidul Democrat,
PD),28 previously the junior partner in the Justice and Truth Alliance (Alianţa
Dreptate și Adevăr, DA),29 gained in popularity following Băsescu’s election. As
the PNL tried to avoid being marginalised and the PD attempted to expand their
position, conflict arose – first between the president and the prime minister,
then more widely throughout the system.
The 2003 constitutional changes included the extension of the presidential
term to five years prior to the 2004 elections, an act that legitimised the practice
of amending the Constitution and marked the start of what has been a period of
26  The Romanian Constitution can be found on the website of the Romanian Chamber of
Deputies, available at <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=371>.

27  See Verheijen, Romania, 198f., for a more detailed discussion of the relative powers of
the president and the prime minister of Romania.

28  The PD became the PDL (Partidul Democrat Liberal) following a split within the PNL.
Dissenting members of the PNL left and joined the PD as PDL. The PD itself was a splinter
group led by Petre Roman that had emerged from the split within the FSN in 1992. See also
Gherghina, Party Organization and Electoral Volatility in Central and Eastern Europe.
29  The DA was an electoral alliance for the 2004 elections comprising the PNL and the PD.
56 Daniel Brett
continual constitutional rewriting.30 The PSD spearheaded this change in an at-

tempt to extend the term of Prime Minister Adrian Năstase, who was running for
president; however, this backfired on the PSD when Năstase lost the presidential
election to Traian Băsescu of the DA. The change in term length uncoupled the
presidential and parliamentary elections and increased the likelihood of periods
of cohabitation. Until this point, the simultaneous elections had ensured that
the president was aligned with the parliamentary majority. After the change,
voters regarded the parliamentary elections as midterm referendums on the
president and thus took the opportunity to punish his party. External factors
made this more likely, such as the economic crisis of 2008, which resulted in
the IMF imposing severe economic austerity measures on Romania, damaging
the economy and causing widespread anger. The period since 2004 has been
marked by a far more fluid and hence volatile relationship between president
and parliament as the dynamics of the relationship and support have been sub-
ject to change, reflecting a shift in Duverger’s third element and re-emphasis in
explaining the functioning of the system.
While each side sees the other as a threat to democracy, the dispute between
Băsescu and his opponents in parliament is more than a simple clash of person-
alities. A more nuanced analysis suggests that it is being driven by personality
and ideology. On the one hand we have the combative, prickly personality of
the president, who has explicitly linked corruption to the communist era and
the country’s failure to confront that past,31 and on the other hand we have an
opposition who either materially benefited during communism and thus do
not look back at the period negatively, or positioned themselves during the
transition’s early years to take advantage of the opportunities of that moment
although not always legally. Both factions’ commitment to democracy is weak,
and each is willing to resort to constitutional games and the manipulation of
the legal system to strengthen its position. The authoritarianism in Romania’s
factional politics has made many fear that the elite regards Hungary under
Viktor Orbán to be a desirable model for a future Romania.32
30  Parliament of the Republic of Romania, Chamber of Deputies, Law for the Revision of
the Constitution of Romania, Monitorul Oficial no. 669, 22 September 2003, available at <http://
www.cdep.ro/pdfs/reviz_constitutie_en.pdf>.
31  On the difficulty of confronting the past and the state see Lavinia Stan, Lustration
in Romania. The Revolution’s Stillborn?, paper for the 20th International Political Science
Association World Congress, Fukuoka, 9 July 2006, available at <http://paperroom.ipsa.org/
papers/paper_5041.pdf>, and for more detail eadem, Romania, in: eadem (ed.), Transitional
Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Reckoning with the Communist Past.
London 2008, 128-151.
32  Both sides have shown intolerance towards criticism as well as a willingness to remove
critics from positions within state-run institutions and to replace them with loyal supporters.
Examples include Prime Minister Victor Ponta’s sacking of the excellent Dorin Dobrincu as
head of the national archives, the replacement of Horia-Roman Patapievici as head of the
In the period between the Romanian revolution in the winter of 1989 and
the election of President Traian Băsescu in the winter of 2004, despite some
conflicts among the president, the prime minister, Parliament, and the Consti-
tutional Court, the country avoided the institutional political crises that affected
some other post-communist states. Parliament did not attempt to impeach the
president, for example, nor was there conflict surrounding the system itself, as
happened in Poland and Russia.33
Why, then, has politics in Romania become so ridden with conflict since
2007? A cynic would argue that Romanian politics has always been this way.34
Duverger’s first feature in explaining the development and functioning of
a semi-presidential system depends upon the events surrounding its formation.
A crucial focus of analysis to explain recent instability must therefore be the
foundation period. Angelo Panebianco emphasises the
“fundamental intuition of classical sociology, in particular Weberian, concerning
the importance of the founding moment of institutions. The way in which the cards
are dealt out and the outcomes of the different rounds played out in the forma-
tive phase of an organization, continue in many ways to condition the life of an
organization even decades afterwards. […] The crucial political choices made by
its founding fathers, the first struggles for organizational control, and the way in
which the organization was formed, will leave an indelible mark. Few aspects of
an organization’s functioning and current tensions appear comprehensible if not
traced to its formative phase.”35
We cannot make sense of the current phase of conflict without looking back
at key moments of critical juncture during the early years of the transition to
democracy, even though their impact on contemporary events may not be
obvious at first sight. Linz and Stepan stress that the nature of communism in
Romania resulted in a specific type of palace coup by groups close to the old
regime and the absence of any rupture for Romania’s slow and problematic
Romanian Cultural Institute (responsible for promoting Romania’s culture abroad), and the
recent dismissal of the journalist Moise Guran from Romanian state television (Televiziunea
Română, TVR). See Laurențiu Ciocăzanu, Exclusiv: Moise Guran, “executat” de la TVR pentru
liniștea lui Ponta. Emisiunea “Biziday”, out din noua grilă, reportervirtual.ro, 18 September
2014, available at <http://www.reportervirtual.ro/2014/09/executat-moise-guran-dat-afara-
de-la-tvr-pentru-linistea-lui-ponta.html>.
33  For an assessment of the degree of institutional conflict in post-communist states
see Oleh Protsyk, Intra-Executive Competition between President and Prime Minister.
Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation under Semi-Presidentialism, Political
Studies 54 (2006), no. 2, 219-244, 240, available at <http://www.policy.hu/protsyk/Publications/
PolStudiesIntraExConflict.pdf>.
34  Romanian political culture during the interwar period tended towards constitutional
manipulation and authoritarianism. See Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars
1918-1941, 122-156, 199-205.
35  Panebianco, Political Parties. Organization and Power, xiii-xiv.
58 Daniel Brett
transition.36 However, one must avoid the teleological assumption that imputes
all of Romania’s ills to Ceaușescu. Unlike in other former communist states,
there was no democracy movement or any mobilisation of civil society before
the revolution.37 There was also no Romanian Wałesa, Michnik, or Havel. The
Ceaușescu regime imploded in the face of short, sharp street protests after it lost
control of the situation. The flight of Ceaușescu created a power vacuum into
which the self-proclaimed National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvării Naționale,
FSN) emerged. The rapid capture, show trial, and execution of Ceaușescu and
continued street fighting did not bode well for the start of Romanian democ-
racy. The FSN’s leadership was made up of second-tier communists, many of
whom, such as Ion Iliescu, had fallen out of favour with Ceaușescu.38 Iliescu is
a key figure in the shaping of Romanian political life for the worse during the
institutionalisation phase. His weak commitment to democracy,39 his intoler-
ant and vituperative responses to dissent and challenges to his power, and his
willingness to engage in anti-democratic actions to protect his position have all
been absorbed into Romania’s post-communist political culture. His confronta-
tional battles and domination of the FSN, and the subsequent elevation of the
presidency to the dominant political office aided by strong parliamentary sup-
port, in contradiction to the nuances of the constitution, set in motion a system
that has been more presidential in practice than it was on paper.
In 1990-91, the clash between Iliescu and Prime Minister Petre Roman over
political and economic reforms brought pro-reform protesters onto the streets
of Bucharest. Iliescu showed his contempt for the Romanian people, particularly
dissenters, by bringing miners from the Jiu Valley to Bucharest to attack the
protestors. An unknown number of people were killed during the violence;40
Iliescu branded his opponents as hooligans and fascists and praised the miners.41
36  Linz / Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 358, 365.

37  Richard Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century –
and After. London 21997.
38  SeePeter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Ithaca/NY 2005.
39  Iliescuinitially rejected liberal democracy in favour of what he described as “original
democracy”, in which democracy would be conducted through the FSN, a type of “one-party
democracy”, or a “form of political pluralism” based on “maintaining and consolidating the
national consensus”. Quoted in Georgeta Pourchot, Mass Media and Democracy in Romania.
Lessons from the Past, Prospects for the Future, in: Lavinia Stan (ed.), Romania in Transition.
Aldershot 1997, 67-92, 70.
40  The FSN and security services mobilised some sixteen thousand people, mainly coal miners
from the Jiu Valley in Transylvania, and transported them to Bucharest, encouraging them to attack
anyone who expressed political opposition to Iliescu and the FSN. The security services were
later accused of infiltrating opposition rallies and distributing fake Legionary leaflets to discredit
Iliescu’s opponents and support Iliescu’s charges of “fascism”. See Virgil George Băleanu, The
Enemy Within. The Romanian Intelligence Service in Transition, The Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research Centre, January 1995, available at <http://www.fas.org/
irp/world/romania/g43.html>.
41  Linz / Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 344-365.
The Mineriad (Mineriadă), as it became known, was profoundly important for

the shaping of the nascent post-communist political culture, illustrating how
state institutions such as the security services could be used by the govern-
ment for its own ends, and proving that the elite would protect their interests
by flouting the rules of the democratic game as well as the law. Moreover, the
elite responded to the situation with ideologically charged labels against the
dissenters, contributing to the sense of polarisation and crisis. Significantly,
the Mineriad also marked the culmination of the conflict between Iliescu and
Petre Roman, which ended with Roman’s resignation and the confirmation of
the president as the dominant political force.
The Romanian Party System

As noted, the nature of the relationship between president and parliament is
paramount in understanding how the system functions. Within the parliament
it is crucial to grasp the parties’ priorities and motivations. Romanian parties
can be characterised as either rent- or office-seeking, or both.42 Rent seekers
aim to increase their share of existing wealth without creating wealth; to do
so in politics, one enters a government career with the explicit aim of personal
enrichment.43 By contrast, “office-seeking parties maximize their control over
political office benefits, that is, private goods bestowed on recipients of po-
litically discretionary governmental or sub-governmental appointments”.44
Office-seeking parties aim to reward supporters with offices, thus ensuring their
continued support during election campaigns and their loyalty thereafter. Such
a party may encounter rent-seeking behaviour by other actors who seek office
in return for support; thus the office-seeking party tends towards client-patron
relations. The distinction between office-seeking and rent-seeking is slight, but it
represents the difference between clientelistic politics and outright kleptocracy.
Parties’ dependence on their ability to provide either rents or offices in return
for allegiance exacerbates an inability to establish strong ideological differen-
42  For a model of rent-seeking behaviour see Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the
Rent-Seeking Society, American Economic Review 64 (1974), no. 3, 291-303. Cf. also Wolfgang
Müller / Kaare Strøm, Political Parties and Hard Choices, in: eadem (eds.), Policy, Office or
Votes. How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. Cambridge 1999, 1-35,
5-9; and Milana Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration
After Communism. Oxford 2005.
43  See Era Dabla-Morris / Paul Wade, Rent Seeking and Endogenous Income Inequality,
IMF Working Paper 01/15, February 2001, available at <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/

ft/wp/2001/wp0115.pdf>. For historical examples see William J. Baumol, Entrepreneurship:
Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive, Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990), no. 5, part 1,
893-921, available at <http://web.econ.unito.it/gma/massimo/sdt/sdt/baumol90.pdf>.
44  Müller / Strøm, Political Parties and Hard Choices, 5.
60 Daniel Brett
tiation.45 Using Herbert Kitschelt’s schema, politics in Romania is dominated

by parties in the lower right quadrant.46 To varying degrees these parties are
socially conservative and tend towards authoritarianism, often using populist
and nationalistic rhetoric to mobilise supporters while adhering to free-market
economic policies (see Fig. 1).47
There is, however, a gap between discourse and practice. When placing Roma-
nian parties in this rubric it is done so not on the basis of rhetoric or published
programmes but upon policies implemented. The USL, for example, spoke of
social justice and opposed austerity and the exploitation of the Roșia Montană
mine when in opposition, only to commit a volte face once in power; its poli-
cies in power were the opposite of those it had espoused in opposition. The
lines are further blurred, because all parties take advantage of the expansive
Romanian public sector as a tool to recruit voters, often through pension or
wage increases. The PSD may appear to be more traditionally socially left, as
it speaks the language of the economically marginalized, but its actual policies
remain firmly in the free market, providing that those policies enable mem-
bers of the PSD to enrich themselves as a rent seeking party. The other parties
tend to be more office seeking, using governance as an opportunity to reward
supporters, which largely explains the high degree of politicization of many
bodies and institutions. This goes for both the national parties as well ethnic
parties.48
As Radu Cinpoeș shows elsewhere in this issue, party switching is widespread
in Romanian politics. The absence of ideological or programmatic differentia-
tion between the parties, and parties’ dependence upon the ability of rent and
office seekers to have their demands met, provide ample scope for defection
and hence party instability. This also means that opportunistic actors can easily
destabilise rival factions through the offer of incentives.
As a result, the principal cleavage differentiating the parties concerns attitudes
toward the past and the causal role of the failed revolution and the transition
in causing corruption and poor economic performance. Anti-PSD politicians
have successfully used the relationship between the past and contemporary
45  See Sergiu Gherghina, Going for a Safe Vote. Electoral Bribes in Post-Communist
Romania, Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 21 (2013), no. 2-3, 143-164, 147.
46  Herbert Kitschelt, Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies.
Theoretical Propositions, Party Politics 1 (1995), no. 4, 445-472.

47  See Daniel Brett / Ellie Knott, 2014 Romanian Presidential Elections. Where Does
Romania Go From Here?, lsee blog, 19 November 2014, available at <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/

lsee/2014/11/19/2014-presidential-romanian-elections-where-do-we-go-from-here/>.
48  See Andreea Cârstocea, Ethno-Business. The Unexpected Consequence of National
Minority Policies in Romania, in: Zdenka Mansfeldová / Heiko Pleines (eds.), Informal

Relations from Democratic Representation to Corruption. Stuttgart 2011 (Case Studies from
Central and Eastern Europe Changing Europe Series, 8), 163-183.
Social Liberal
State Free Market
Authoritarian /
Traditionalist
Figure 1: Kitschelt’s model of political cleavages and party alignment in post-communist

Eastern Europe.
corruption in order to distinguish themselves from the PSD.49 The name “Truth
and Justice” was chosen to emphasise the difference between the alliance and
the corruption of the PSD. Furthermore, corruption is one of the few practical
policy areas where parties can distinguish themselves from one another either
by supporting or opposing anti-corruption efforts.
Discourse, Party Organisation, and Conflict

The structure of what became the PSD illustrates the gap between members
of the party elite and the core electorate. President Iliescu based his political
discourse on populist rhetoric and the fears of large sections of the population,
especially those who stood to lose if the country underwent rapid economic
transformation, as occurred in states such as Poland. Iliescu legitimated his au-
thoritarianism by linking democratisation with existential dangers that it would
bring to the population through economic liberalisation.50 It is no accident that
the areas that consistently support Iliescu and the PSD most strongly electorally
are the poorest regions, where there were large rural populations making a liv-
ing from the land and fearful of competition pushing down agricultural prices,
49  See Băsescu’s use of the issue in the televised 2004 presidential debates, which were
seen as a turning point in the electoral campaign. Ovidiu Simonca, Dezbatere cu învingător:
Traian Băsescu, HotNews.ro, 10 December 2004, available at <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-
arhiva-1607734-dezbatere-invingator-traian-basescu.htm>.
50  For an excellent account of Iliescu and the transition, see Vladimir Tismăneanu, The
Quasi-Revolution and Its Discontents. Emerging Political Pluralism in Post-Ceaușescu Romania,

East European Politics and Societies 7 (1993), no. 2, 309-348.
62 Daniel Brett
or where heavy and other outmoded industries are based. In these areas, the
impact of economic shock therapy was likely to be devastating. Milada Anna
Vachudova argues that the PSD’s authoritarianism and nationalism served to
hide its rent-seeking nature. Moreover, she points out that in states where po-
litical discourse pivots around populist nationalism, there have been negative
effects on the quality of democracy and on economic performance.51
In the revolution’s immediate aftermath, the FSN moved rapidly to consoli-
date control over the Romanian state. It seized the assets of the Romanian Com-
munist Party, and by mid-January 1990 it had confiscated all large industrial
enterprises, which had recently brought in over 220 million dollars in hard
currency. It also took control of eighteen thousand state farms, all forms of
state-owned transportation, and Ceaușescu’s sixty-two palaces and villas, as
well as state television and official media. The disbanded Securitate was soon
recreated with sixty percent of the same personnel.52 Iliescu thus successfully
co-opted a large part of the former economic and security nomenklatura and
accepted their rent-seeking behaviour.53 The failure to engage in economic, po-
litical, and judicial reform allowed them to consolidate their power. Absent the
rule of law, and given the nomenklatura’s technical knowledge and expertise,
they were well placed to identify opportunities for enrichment and to commit
outright theft. The party came to depend upon these “barons” (baroni), many of
whom had strong local links or media interests with which to mobilise voters,
and the development of client-patron relations within the PSD has subverted
the development of politics in Romania. The party is still dependent upon the
“barons” at a local level.54 The PSD is thus a curious hybrid, whose discourse
is built around the concerns of the transition’s losers, and who draws its nu-
merical support from those sections of society, but whose party elite is drawn
from transition winners.
The perception of the electoral dominance of the PSD and its predecessors
in using these networks and rewards to build up a loyal voter base resulted
in other parties coming to depend similarly upon “barons” and patronage
51  Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage, and Integration
After Communism. Oxford 2005, 34-39.

52  See Daniel Brett, Romania. Old Problems and New Challenges, in: Sharon L. Wolchik /
Jane Leftwich Curry (eds.), Central and East European Politics: From Communism to
Democracy. New York 32014, 383.
53  Ninety-six percent of the ministers in Nicolae Văcăroiu’s 1992 government had been
members of the RCP. Cf. ibid., 386. For an excellent and complete account of the process, see
Gallagher, Theft of a Nation.
54  Cum au confiscat baronii locali România: cine sunt oamenii de încredere ai liderilor
politici din fiecare judeţ și cum au împânzit toate instituţiile statului, Adevărul, 30 April 2014,
available at <http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/cum-confiscat-baronii-locali-romania-oamenii-
incredere-liderilor-politici-judet-impanzit-institutiile-statului-1_5360c0d20d133766a83a0c1b/
index.html>.
networks; both the PNL and PDL also rely but to a lesser degree on “barons”
to finance them. The PNL came to lean very heavily on Dinu Patriciu, the then
owner of Rompetrol, the former state owned oil company. Here we see how the
first element of Duverger’s analysis, the events surrounding the formation of the
system, has shaped the third element, the nature of the parliamentary majority
and the relationship between the president and the majority.
President Băsescu embraced what Peter Učeň calls centrist populism,55 differ-
entiating himself by focusing on corruption and the PSD as the primary causes
why life for many Romanians had not improved. This rhetoric, especially in
the presidential campaign against Adrian Năstase, proved to be very effective
in mobilising younger and urban voters, as well as voters in Transylvania.
Băsescu’s reformist agenda included attempts to improve anti-corruption ef-
forts; unsurprisingly, this meant a direct, overt challenge to the PSD “barons”
and leadership, including Năstase himself. The conflict between the PSD and
Băsescu is not primarily ideological; rather, it is a result of anti-corruption meas-
ures targeting a stratum of Romanian society that benefited extensively during
the transition and now sees its position challenged. The PSD’s motivation for
seeking Băsescu’s removal is a fear that they could be prosecuted, as Năstase
was. The PSD and PNL (whose “barons” have also come under pressure) both
argue that Băsescu’s anti-corruption drive is a politically motivated strategy
designed to remove his enemies.56 However, PDL politicians have also been
subject to investigation, arrest, and prosecution.57
There is a tendency to see post-communist politics in Romania through the
prism of the 1990-2004 period, when (except from 1996 to 2000) the FSN/FDSN/
PSD held the presidency and controlled the Parliament. However, this party’s
success seems diminished if we take a longer view and extend the period to
2014. The PSD’s electoral record since 1992 shows that it has remained either the
largest or the second largest parliamentary party; it has controlled large amounts
of the local administration, and its candidates have always made the second
round of presidential elections. However, it won only the presidential elections
of 1992 and 2000. Success for the DNSF/PSD was accompanied by the complete
55  Peter Učeň, Parties, Populism, and Anti-Establishment Politics in East Central Europe,
SAIS Review of International Affairs 27 (2007), no. 1, 49-62.

56  See Romania’s Anti-Corruption Battle Heats Up – Former PM Nastase and Oil Baron
Patriciu Face Increased Scrutiny, U.S. diplomatic cable, 17 February 2006, Wikileaks.org,
available at <http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06BUCHAREST289_a.html>.
57  The former PDL Mayor of Cluj was sentenced to more than four years in prison for
corruption. Former Cluj Mayor Sentenced to 4 Years and 6 Months in Prison, Agerpress, 7 July
2014, available at <http://www.agerpres.ro/english/2014/07/07/former-cluj-mayor-sentenced-
to-4-years-and-6-months-in-prison-16-37-46>.
64 Daniel Brett
fragmentation of the centre-right.58 The PSD’s victory in 2000 resulted from the
collapse of the Democratic Convention and Emil Constantinescu’s decision not
to seek a second term, meaning that the only challenger to Ion Iliescu in the
second-round runoff was the right-wing extremist Corneliu Vadim Tudor of
the Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare, PRM). Voters chose Iliescu
simply because he was the lesser of two evils.
”Epoca Băsescu” and

Instability after Accession to the EU
Romania was excluded from the first wave of post-communist states admit-
ted to the European Union in 2004. The country’s admission was problematic;
the EU had serious reservations about its commitment to democracy and re-
form, along with concerns about corruption and state capacity. The EU first
delayed Romania’s accession until 2007, and during that period they pressured
Romania into completing the necessary reforms to join by threatening further
delays in membership. Thus the 2004 presidential election took place against
the backdrop of threats to delay EU accession, a fact used by Justice and Truth
to mobilise support.
Duverger’s third element deals with the relations of president, prime minister,
and parliament and the shifting power dynamics among them. Ed Maxfield has
described Băsescu as a “pirate politician”,59 attacking those in front of him until
he runs out of enemies, then turning on his allies. Băsescu’s attacks on the party
“barons” of his PNL allies, in particular Patriciu, contributed significantly to
the collapse of the DA and drove the PNL towards the PSD.60
Once in office, tensions between Băsescu, of the PD, the alliance’s junior
partner, and his Prime Minister Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, of the larger PNL,
became clear. They were largely held in check by fears that the EU would delay
Romania’s accession even further if the governing coalition collapsed. So, despite
very public friction between the two, neither made any direct moves against the
other. The tensions were made worse by the ambiguous institutional practice
58  Steven D. Roper, From Opposition to Government Coalition. Unity and Fragmentation
within the Democratic Convention of Romania, East European Quarterly 31 (1998), no. 4, 519-542.
59  Edward Maxfield, A New Right for a New Europe? Băsescu, the Democrats & Romania’s
Centre-Right, University of Sussex SEI Working Paper 106, September 2008, 27, available
at <https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sei-working-paper-no-106.
pdf&site=266>.
60  See Dinu Patriciu îl acuză pe Băsescu că a lovit un copil și că e comunist, Atac. Ziar Na
țional, 26 November 2009, available at <http://www.ziarulatac.ro/politic/dinu-patriciu-il-

acuza-pe-basescu-ca-a-lovit-un-copil-si-ca-e-comunist>; and Patriciu îl atacă pe Băsescu la
Tribunal, evz.ro, 25 June 2009, available at <http://www.evz.ro/patriciu-il-ataca-pe-basescu-
la-tribunal-856373.html>.
vs. architecture, which allowed each to accuse the other of over-reaching. Each
claimed legitimacy for himself, and so emerged the problem of dual legitimacy,
and de facto cohabitation between two rival factions.61 Between 2004 and 2007,
while they fought publicly, Băsescu refrained from sacking Popescu-Tăriceanu
or calling early elections, and Popescu-Tăriceanu resisted the urge to sack minis-
ters who were strongly supportive of, or supported by, Băsescu – including the
PD Justice Minister Monica Macovei, whose efforts to reform the judiciary and
to strengthen anti-corruption institutions made her many enemies among not
only the PSD but also the PNL, due to investigations being opened against key
PNL supporters and patrons, including Patriciu. Despite the desire to sack her
by her enemies in both the government and opposition, doing so would have
been seen by the EU as Romania backsliding on its commitments, thus increasing
the likelihood that the EU (as was threatened) would delay Romanian accession
by a year using the safeguard mechanism.62 The goal of EU membership and
the leverage that the EU had was sufficient to hold the government together.
After Accession:
Democracy Not the Only Game in Town?
But after accession, the EU no longer had much leverage over Romania or
its elite, and within months the political games that had been held in abey-
ance since 2004 restarted.63 In the spring of 2007, the PSD and PNL initiated
attempts to remove Băsescu and the PD from government. On 7 April 2007,
Popescu-Tăriceanu reshuffled his cabinet and removed all the PD ministers. The
government now comprised PNL ministers with the support of the PSD and
the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrată Maghiară
din România, UDMR). On 19 April 2007, the PNL with the PSD and their allies
voted 322 to 108 in favour of President Băsescu’s impeachment. The accusations
against Băsescu included:
–– infringing upon and “substituting the authority” of the government, the
judicial system, and Parliament;
–– committing acts of “political partisanship” with direct reference to the Demo-
cratic Party, abusing his power and acting more like a “judge of the other
public authorities” than a “collaborator”, and thus “abandoning his role of
impartial mediator required by the Romanian Constitution”;
61  Linz,The Perils of Presidentialism, 51-69.

62  Romanian Justice Minister’s Dismissal May Prompt Safeguard Clause Activation,
HotNews.ro, 19 February 2007, available at <http://m.hotnews.ro/stire/1752164>.
63  See Gelu Trandafir, Political Turmoil Deepens as Romanian Prime Minister Postpones
EP Elections, Setimes, 13 March 2007, available at <http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/

xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2007/03/13/feature-02>.
66 Daniel Brett
–– manipulating and “instigating public opinion against other state institutions”

such as the Parliament and the government.
Băsescu denied this, arguing that he was fighting corruption and “circles of
business interests” who had enriched themselves unlawfully, returning to the
discourse he had successfully deployed during the election campaign. The
Constitutional Court found no evidence that the president had breached the
Constitution. However, the court’s ruling was only consultative and thus could
not stop the impeachment.
The emergent alliance that would become the USL was nicknamed the “black”
or “unholy” alliance at the time. However, it spanned a broad spectrum of
political parties and interests: former communists within the PSD favouring
heavy state involvement in the economy; national liberals, former members of
the nomenklatura, and conservatives favouring business interests; Hungarian
minority MPs and anti-Hungarian ultra-nationalists. All felt threatened by
Băsescu, seeing him as either an ideological adversary or a challenge to their
source of power.
Three quarters of the voters in the impeachment referendum supported
Băsescu, albeit with a turnout of just 44.45%. As in the 2004 elections, backing
for Băsescu was strongest among Transylvanians, the young, and especially
those living abroad. This voting pattern reinforces the view that the cleavage
around the past remains salient: these groups favoured Băsescu and his reform-
ist agenda in dealing with the past and corruption.
The attempt to oust Băsescu prematurely takes us back to the wider question
about the consolidation of democratic values within the Romanian political elite
and the problem of personal interests continuing to trump democratic values.
Following the lengthening of presidential terms and the attempted impeach-
ment, the next move in the “constitutional game” of re-writing the rules of
politics came from Băsescu. The 2008 electoral reform can be seen as Băsescu’s
response to the attempts by the PNL and PSD to remove him from office. Aiming
to build on the PDL’s popularity following the failed impeachment, Băsescu tried
to change the voting system to create a complex mixed system, specifically by
increasing its “first past the post” elements and making it a more majoritarian
system.64 As per Maurice Duverger’s model, the PDL believed that a majoritar-
ian system would result in the squeezing of the third party, causing opposition
to the PSD to coalesce around the PDL, thus relegating the PNL to the political
margins.65 The reform continued a trend of rewriting the rules of the game to
64  See Daniel Brett, Romania’s Election Law. Everything You Always Wanted to Know…,
Dr. Sean’s Diary, 16 March 2008, available at <http://drseansdiary.wordpress.com/2008/03/16/

romanias-election-law-everything-you-always-wanted-to-know/>.
65  Maurice Duverger, Party Politics and Pressure Groups. A Comparative Introduction.
New York 1972, 23-32.

Table 1: The results of the 2008 Romanian Parliamentary elections.

Chamber of Deputies Senate
Party Votes Percent- Seats Change Votes Percent- Seats Change
age age
PSD + PC 2,279,449 33.1 114 -10 2,352,968 34.16 49 -6
PDL 2,228,860 32.4 115 +48 2,312,358 33.57 51 +22
PNL 1,279,063 18.6 65 +10 1,291,029 18.74 28 +4
UDMR 425,008 6.2 22 +0 440,449 6.39 9 -1
PRM 217,595 3.2 0 -22 245,930 3.39 0 -13
Others* 456,819 6.3 18 245,321 3.38 0
Invalid 352,077 4.8 350,816 4.8
Total 7,238,871 100 334 +2 7,238,871 100 137
* This includes the ethnic minority parties, who are guaranteed one representative seat for each
registered minority.
Source: România Biroul Electoral Central, Alegeri Parlamentare – 30 Noiembrie 2008, Situația
voturilor valabil exprimate pe competitori electorali, 2 December 2008, available at <http://www.
becparlamentare2008.ro/rezul/part_tara_100.pdf>
maximise one’s own power. Manipulating the institutional architecture to secure

an advantage has thus been institutionalised and normalised within Romanian
political culture and reflects the contempt for the rules of the democratic game.
The 2008 parliamentary elections, with voter turnout below 40%, resulted
in the PSD remaining the largest party in Parliament, though it lost seats. The
PDL, which now became the second largest party, made gains, and the PNL
was squeezed into third place. The biggest losers were the extreme right-wing
parties, who failed to make it into Parliament. Băsescu was able to appoint
a PDL led government with former Cluj mayor Emil Boc as prime minister in
a grand coalition with the PSD. These developments once again bring into focus
the third element of Duverger’s analysis, showing weak parliamentary backing
for the president (though his party was the largest single party) in the face of
an increasingly polarised and confrontational opposition. The Boc government
would last until October 2009, when it did not survive a no-confidence vote;
a second Boc government was installed after Băsescu’s victory in the presidential
elections in December, this time with the PDL supported by the UDMR.
The 2008 Economic Crisis and Its Aftermath

The economic crisis hit Romania severely. The situation was made worse because
of the fiscal mismanagement of the Popescu-Tăriceanu government between 2004
and 2007.66 In March 2009, the government was forced to turn to the IMF, the EU,
66  The Economist Intelligence Unit, Romania: Country Report December 2009. London
2009, 6.
68 Daniel Brett
and the ERBD. The funds offered to Romania were dependent upon the introduc-
tion of austerity measures by the government. Wages in the public sector were
cut, some public employees were forced to take unpaid leave, and pension plans
were reformed. The demands of the IMF hit hardest those at the lowest levels of
society, namely pensioners and the many poorly paid public-sector employees.
These groups’ living standards grew steadily worse until the introduction of further
reforms in autumn 2011 triggered a wave of popular unrest. The situation came to
a head over the proposed privatisation of the SMURD ambulance service. The highly
respected health minister Raed Arafat resigned in protest, sparking street protests.
Although he had cultivated an image as a man of the people, Băsescu turned a tin ear
to their concerns, attacking those who criticised austerity as “leftists”,67 thus mak-
ing the situation worse and bringing more people onto the streets. The PSD and its
new leader Victor Ponta rediscovered the Iliescu-era discourse that represented the
interests of the marginalised, and began vociferously opposing austerity measures.
The PSD’s tactics changed after the 2008 parliamentary elections. The change
in the electoral system aimed at excluding the smaller parties and squeezing the
PNL. Furthermore, the nature of the party system and the absence of ideologi-
cal differentiation among parties aided the PNL’s switch from an alliance with
the PDL to one with the PSD. Through the USL alliance with the PNL, the PSD
capitalised on the unpopularity of the PDL and Băsescu, allowing them to win both
the local and parliamentary elections in the spring and summer of 2012 and to put
them in prime position for the 2014 presidential elections.
In the run-up to the second round of the 2009 presidential election, the PSD
began courting the PNL and its leader, Crin Antonescu. The PSD recognised
that the PNL was in danger of becoming the third party in the political mix, and
the hostility of the PNL and Antonescu towards Băsescu made them receptive
to alignment with the PSD. Despite Antonescu’s support in the second round,
the PSD’s Mircea Geoană was defeated in the 2009 presidential elections. In the
election aftermath the PSD quickly replaced Geoană as leader with Victor Ponta.
There are two possible interpretations of the PSD’s moves towards the PNL.
It can be seen as evidence of a broad-based coalition against Băsescu and a re-
sponse to the economic crisis, or as cynical opportunism. The PSD adopted what
can be considered modern day salami tactics68 and took advantage of the PNL
leadership’s fears of marginalisation and their vanity. The deal struck in 2011
created an anti-Băsescu alliance, which agreed to work to gain the premier-
67  Traian Băsescu către Raed Arafat: Să nu creăm o psihoză că acest guvern ticălos vrea
să distrugă sistemul de ambulanță. Dacă ăsta e mesajul, e mincinos și incorect, HotNews.ro,

9 January 2012, available at <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-11149580-traian-basescu-
catre-raed-arafat-nu-cream-psihoza-acest-guvern-ticalos-vrea-distruga-sistemul-ambulanta-
daca-asta-mesajul-mincinos-incorect.htm>.
68  Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – and After, 223.
ship for Victor Ponta and the PSD, while Antonescu would take the important
role of chairman of the Senate and would become president should Băsescu be
suspended or impeached. Under the agreement, Antonescu would be the USL
candidate in the 2014 presidential elections and the PSD would support him.
To achieve this, they took a two-pronged approach, first bringing down the
PDL-led government of Boc and then Ungureanu, culminating in the installa-
tion of Ponta as prime minister. Then after the elections of June 2012 gave the
USL a two-thirds majority in parliament and allowed them to start to move to
remove Băsescu.69 To refer to Duverger once more, the dynamics of parliamen-
tary support and legitimacy had shifted again. The USL’s legitimacy vis-à-vis
the institutional conflict was very high at this point, as it had an electoral man-
date as well as support on the street and was aided by a largely sympathetic
media. However, the rapidity with which it moved against Băsescu, its attacks
on state institutions such as the Romanian Cultural Institute perceived to be
headed by opponents, and its threats to amend the Constitution and to ignore
the Constitutional Court should it reject any amendments – all of this happening
at a time of major economic crisis – caused most Romanians to regard these efforts
as yet more self-indulgent politicking by the elite. Coming so soon after Hungary’s
slide into authoritarianism, this stirred the international community. The US and
the EU condemned the moves and warned of political and economic consequences
if such measures went ahead. In response, the USL retreated into a defensive na-
tionalist discourse reminiscent of the Ceaușescu years, attacking the EU and US
for interfering. Ultimately, the impeachment referendum failed due to low voter
turnout; however, for several months, Romania experienced political paralysis that
called into question the consolidation of its democracy.
Antonescu performed poorly as acting president during Băsescu’s suspen-
sion; in response to international criticism he appeared weak, prickly, and
defensive. The failure of the impeachment referendum further damaged Anto-
nescu’s position within the PNL and showed the wider public that he was not
a viable candidate for the presidency. Factional games within the PNL began,
and a split opened up between supporters of Popescu-Tăriceanu and those of
Antonescu. Antonescu ultimately lost the PNL presidential nomination to the
ethnically German mayor of Sibiu, Klaus Iohannis. Popescu-Tăriceanu left the
party and ran as an independent candidate. The PDL also imploded. Băsescu
chose to promote his protégé Elena Udrea as the party’s candidate over Monica
Macovei, Boc, or Ungureanu, causing a split and the creation of a new party, the
People’s Movement Party (Partidul Mișcarea Populară, PMP). Macovei ran as an
69  The USL won the parliamentary elections with an absolute majority, which would appear
to indicate widespread popular support for them. However, voter turnout was only 47.11
percent. See Biroul Electoral Central, Alegeri pentru Camera Deputaţilor și Senat, 9 Decembrie
2012, available at <http://www.becparlamentare2012.ro/index.html>.
70 Daniel Brett
independent candidate, and those remaining in the PDL united with the PNL
under Iohannis as the Christian Liberal Alliance (Alianța Creștin-Liberală, ACL).
In the run-up to the elections, the centre-right was again completely fractured.
The inability to create a united front against the PSD meant, in the eyes of many
voters, that the politicians involved were neither serious nor credible. The PSD,
although subject to factional games, has thus far avoided the splits that have
weakened the centre-right, and it has quickly jettisoned leaders it considers to
have failed, such as Mircea Geoană.70
The USL’s strategy shows the influence of Hungarian prime minister, Vik-
tor Orbán, on Romanian politicians. Having seen how easily with a two thirds
majority Fidesz managed to pass authoritarian legislation in order to consoli-
date their power, factions within the PSD viewed Băsescu’s unpopularity in
the wake of the economic crash and the subsequent austerity measures as an
opportunity to launch a similar power grab; to this extent the PNL provided
“useful idiots”. By running as the USL with the PNL, PSD candidates in local
and parliamentary elections won seats that they might not have won other-
wise. This allowed the USL to gain control of the Senate and the Chamber of
Deputies with a two-thirds majority. However, unlike Fidesz in Hungary, the
PSD had to rely upon the PNL, as PSD candidates won only 38.5% of the seats
in the Chamber of Deputies and 35.7% of the seats in the Senate.71 Despite the
unpopularity of the PDL and of Băsescu, the PSD only slightly increased their
share of seats from 34.1% in 2008.
Furthermore, efforts by the USL to follow Orbán’s lead met with a stronger
reaction from the EU than had been the case with Hungary. An attempt at
extending immunity and weakening anti-corruption legislation,72 which was
a reward to the party ”barons”, provoked a critical response from the EU, and
ultimately Băsescu rejected these measures.73
The continued existence of the PSD is a sign of the party’s embeddedness.
Despite the obvious toxicity of the party and many of its members,74 it remains
70  O sută de boieri l-au preacinstit pe Ponta, la patru ani de domnie în PSD, ziare.com, 21
February 2014, available at <http://www.ziare.com/bucuresti/stiri-actualitate/o-suta-de-boieri-

l-au-preacinstit-pe-ponta-la-patru-ani-de-domnie-in-psd-4522727>.
71  Biroul Electoral Central, Alegeri pentru Camera Deputaţilor și Senat, 9 Decembrie 2012.
72  Luiza Ilie, Romania Parliament Boosts Criminal Immunity, May Irk EU, Reuters.com, 22
January 2013, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/22/us-romania-politics-

idUSBRE90L0PG20130122>.
73  Băsescu RESPINGE Statutul parlamentarilor. De ce trebuie MODIFICAT proiectul și
cum comentează politicienii, România Liberă, 4 February 2013, available at <http://www.

romanialibera.ro/politica/institutii/basescu-respinge-statutul-parlamentarilor--de-ce-trebuie-
modificat-proiectul-si-cum-comenteaza-politicienii-292389>.
74  See Călin, Studiu! Convertită în electricitate, ura față de Ponta ar asigura consumul
mondial pentru 174 de ani, Times New Roman, 16 October 2014, available at <http://www.
the largest party and a constant on the Romanian political scene. It has benefited
from the inability of its opponents on the left and right to develop a coherent
alternative. The party has survived despite losing the last two presidential
elections and has not undergone any major reform. The choice of Victor Ponta,
Năstase’s protégé, as leader shows the strength of the “baronial faction” and
the resistance against any potential reformation of the party.
Ponta’s profile has been aided by sympathetic television media, whose owner-
ship is dominated by PSD-supporting “barons”, in particular the increasingly
influential Antena 3 news station founded by Dan Voiculescu. Voiculescu, who
was jailed after a lengthy legal battle on corruption charges and faced investiga-
tion for his activities during the communist years, naturally has a vested interest
in rolling back anti-corruption efforts.75
Ponta followed the same strategy of appealing to voters with populist rhetoric
used by Iliescu and Băsescu. During the economic crisis, Ponta took a strongly
anti-IMF stance and promised to reverse the cutbacks, similarly taking advan-
tage of anger over proposals to open Romania up to fracking by western oil
companies. Once in office he reversed those positions. Faced with the Saxon
Protestant Iohannis as his primary opponent, Ponta re-embraced the nationalist
rhetoric of Iliescu and the far right, making constant references to his Romanian
ethnic identity and Orthodox religion to reinforce the idea that he is the only
“true” Romanian in the battle between the two.76 These tendencies show Ponta’s
willingness to draw from the well of nationalist populism to connect with voters.
More dangerous politically was his proposal for the reunification of Romania
timesnewroman.ro/it-stiinta/studiu-convertita-in-electricitate-ura-fata-de-ponta-ar-asigura-
consumul-mondial-pentru-174-de-ani>.
75  See Cariera politică a lui Dan Voiculescu: de la trădarea PSD-ului din 2004 la “soluţia
imorală” pentru Traian Băsescu, ZF Politică, 8 August 2014, available at <http://www.zf.ro/

politica/cariera-politica-a-lui-dan-voiculescu-de-la-tradarea-psd-ului-din-2004-la-solutia-
imorala-pentru-traian-basescu-13059476>; and Aventura de după 1989 a lui “Felix” de la
Securitate. Portret Dan Voiculescu: Cum a ajuns unul dintre cei mai bogați români, Ştirile proTV,
8 August 2014, available at <http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/actualitate/dan-voiculescu-definitia-
succesului-in-politica-si-afaceri-portretul-omului-ajuns-stapan-pe-un-imperiu-de-milioane-
de-euro.html> for accounts of his political career and political attitudes. See Dosar finalizat
in 2415 zile de la inceperea urmăririi penale. Dosarul “I.C.A.” – Dan Voiculescu, HotNews.ro:
Dosare Anticorupție, n. d., available at <http://anticoruptie.hotnews.ro/ancheta-7475495-dosarul-
dan-voiculescu.htm> for an account of the corruption case against him. See also Dan Voiculescu
a făcut poliție politică, EVZ.ro, 16 June 2006, available at <http://www.evz.ro/dan-voiculescu-
a-facut-politie-politica-405179.html> and Dan Voiculescu a fost general în serviciul secret al lui
Ceaușescu, HotNews.ro, 11 September 2004, available at <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-
1257866-dan-voiculescu-fost-general-serviciul-secret-lui-ceausescu.htm>.
76  Ethnic German Candidate Brings Suspense to Romania’s Presidential Race, EurActiv.
com, 18 August 2014, available at <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/elections/ethnic-german-

candidate-brings-suspense-romanias-presidential-race-307817>.
72 Daniel Brett
and Moldova by 2018, which seems designed to appeal to the extreme right,
who harbour this dream.77
At first glance it would appear that Ponta did not need to adopt such a dis-
course, as the polls pointed to him winning the first round of the elections;
however, far from reflecting the entrenchment of the PSD in Romania’s political
landscape, Ponta’s embrace of extremist discourse revealed the party’s weakness
or, at least, its declining fortunes. Although the PSD had won in 2000, it lost
the elections of 2004 and 2009, which it had been expected to win. Its victory
in 2000 was largely due to the disintegration of the centre-right. In 1996, 2004,
and 2009, the PSD won the first round, but in the second round Constantinescu
and Băsescu increased their vote more than the PSD did. The PSD has strug-
gled to expand its voter base beyond its core electorate. In 2009, the vote was
closer, as the PNL vote was divided when its leader Crin Antonescu chose to
support the PSD’s Mircea Geoană rather than Băsescu. However, even with this
intervention, the PSD could not win the presidency for Geoană. Angered by this
failure, the “barons” within the PSD removed Geoană and installed Năstase’s
protégé Victor Ponta as party leader instead.78 The choice of Ponta reflects the
strength of the PSD “barons” and the resistance of the party to reform. Ştefan
Vlaston described the situation thus:
“Ponta is no longer credible to his own barons and to those who await prison
sentences [puscariabili: jailbirds]. More and more news is coming that at the latest
meeting of the PSD leaders in the Danube Delta, things came to the fore and the
main subject was: ‘you either get us off the hook with the DNA [the National Anti-
Corruption Directorate, Direcția Națională Anticorupție], or you can kiss the presi-
dency goodbye’. Radu Mazare [mayor of Constanţa] was reportedly the first who
banged his fist on the table and threatened Ponta that he would share Geoană’s fate,
and in Constanţa he would fail lamentably. Mazare called the minister of justice,
Cazanciuc, a milksop. The barons will not put up with another deception. Ponta
has already deceived them once in December 2012. He promised that if he wins
the elections he will save them from the DNA.”79
77  Mihai Drăghici, REACŢIA Rusiei după afirmaţiile lui Ponta privind unirea României cu
Republica Moldova: Sunt iresponsabile și inacceptabile. Cerem o poziţie UE, Mediafax.ro, 16

September 2014, available at <http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/reactia-rusiei-dupa-afirmatiile-
lui-ponta-privind-unirea-romaniei-cu-republica-moldova-sunt-iresponsabile-si-inacceptabile-
cerem-o-pozitie-ue-13279824>.
78  O sută de boieri l-au preacinstit pe Ponta.
79  “Ponta nu mai e crezut de proprii baroni și pușcariabili. Vin tot mai multe știri că la
ultima ședință a capilor PSD din Delta au sărit scântei, iar principalul subiect a fost: ne scapi
din ghiarele DNA, sau spui adio președinției. Primul a fost Radu Mazăre, care, se zice, a bătut
cu pumnul în masă și l-a amenințat pe Ponta că va avea soarta lui Geoană, și că la Constanța
va înregistra un eșec de proporții. Același Radu Mazăre care l-a acuzat pe ministrul justiției,
Cazanciuc, că este un papă lapte. Ponta și-a mai aburit odată pușcariabilii și în decembrie 2012.
Le-a promis că dacă o să câștige alegerile, îi scapă de DNA.” Ştefan Vlaston: Dilema lui Ponta –
salvează clientela de DNA sau pierde președinția, Ziare.com, 24 August 2014, available at
The paradox faced by the PSD is that its dependency on the “barons” to provide
it with electoral support and render it a consistent political force also makes it
incapable of expanding its electoral base and makes it toxic for in the eyes of
voters, as the 2014 presidential elections showed. Beneath the surface, it remains
the party of “barons”, corruption, and authoritarianism, and voters are aware
that the party has not changed. To detoxify the party, the leadership would
need to remove the influence of the “barons”. However, the party is dependent
on the “barons” for votes, especially in the south and east, so removing them
would jeopardise support for the PSD in these regions. The “barons” continue to
drive the party’s policy and direction. The constitutional games, the nationalist
electoral discourse, and the attempts at voter suppression among the diaspora
in the 2014 elections can all be seen as facets of the same phenomenon, which
takes us back to the interaction of Duverger’s first and third factors of a semi-
presidential system. The first factor – the events surrounding the formation
of the system – concerns the nature of Romania’s exit from communism. The
foundation period gave rise to a party system dependent on local “barons”
with strong links to the sources of economic, political, and state power. It pro-
duced a political culture among the elite marked by limited acceptance of the
rules of democracy and a desire above all to protect their own interests. The
constitutional games, the impeachment crises, and the attempts to suppress
the vote abroad reflect the ebb and flow of Duverger’s third factor, the nature
of the parliamentary majority and the relationship between the president and
the majority. Yet each of these aspects has ultimately furthered the interests of
the “barons” and their primary goal of capturing the presidency to consolidate
and defend their power.
Conclusions
The constitutional games described in this essay reflect several interrelated
elements of the wider Romanian political landscape. These include a political
culture that tends towards authoritarianism, the use of intolerant populist rheto-
ric as a mobilising device in lieu of meaningful ideological differentiation, and
political parties who adopt rent- and office-seeking strategies to attract local and
national elites. Actors have little party loyalty; hence the party system is highly
volatile, leading to frequent fragmentation, coalescence, and re-fragmentation.
The PSD has remained unreformed organisationally and is still the same rent-
and office-seeking party that it was in the 1990s. However, it has realised that
it can no longer be assured of controlling either the presidency or Parliament.
As a result, it has engaged in a series of constitutional games to maintain its
<http://www.ziare.com/victor-ponta/candidat-alegeri-prezidentiale-2014/invitatii-ziare-com-
stefan-vlaston-dilema-lui-ponta-salveaza-clientela-de-dna-sau-pierde-presedintia-1318063>.
74 Daniel Brett
rent-seeking opportunities by regaining control of political offices, either by

forcing the incumbent’s removal or by dividing their opponents. The control
that the barons exert over party politics and their willingness to play games to
protect or advance their interests suggest that we can draw wider conclusions
and call into question the degree to which Romanian democracy is consolidated.
Obviously, not all actors have accepted that democracy and the rule of law is
the only game in town.
Although this paper focuses on Romania, its lessons have implications for
post-authoritarian states in general. Crises obviously can and do emerge out of
the wreckage of the unresolved issues from the transition to democracy. Such
crises may not necessarily be caused by the institutional architecture, but actors
can easily exploit the system to further their own interests. The examples of
Hungary, Poland, and other post-communist states show that the notion that
a quarter of a century after the collapse of the old system the consolidation of
democracy remains a long way off. Romania is part of a wider trend in which
authoritarian anti-democratic actors have reasserted themselves – and this trend
is more than the expression of “soft semi-authoritarianism”. These authoritar-
ians have found that the easiest paths to power are through the use of populist
discourse and the exploitation of the constitutional architecture. The ultimate
goal is to extend and consolidate power so that it is difficult or impossible to
be removed from power electorally or constitutionally. The conflict in Romania
has taken place not because it is a semi-presidential system, but rather because
semi-presidentialism provided a space that could be exploited by actors who saw
their power base eroding. This space was opened up by shifts in the distribution
of parliamentary and public support and in the power dynamics between the
president and Parliament. Duverger’s reflections turn out to be applicable to
the Romanian case: the conflicts that exist stem from the first of his three fac-
tors – the “stolen” revolution and the slow, subverted transition to democracy.
Twenty-five years after the revolution, Romanian politics still lives in its shadow.
Emanuel Emil Coman
Electoral Reform in Romania:

From the Need for Party System Consolidation
to Concern for Improved Quality of Representation
Abstract. This study looks at electoral reforms in Romania made since the end of the com-
munist period. It identifies two broad periods of reform corresponding to two different
types of pressures on the policy-makers. (1) In the 1990s, there was a need for party system
consolidation, and this led to the adoption of a highly inclusive first electoral law, followed
up by two increases in the electoral threshold. (2) In the 2000s, a vociferous movement de-
manded more individual responsibility from parliamentary representatives. This led to the
electoral reform of 2008, stipulating that candidates must run in single-member districts. The
two different pressures outlined correspond to different stages of democracy and indicate
a healthy evolution from the proto-democratic order of the 1990s, concerned with party
system consolidation, to the more developed democratic order of the 2000s, when the public
was concerned with the quality of representation and the power to unseat unresponsive MPs.
In practice, however, as the academic literature shows, the 2008 reform has fallen short of
its promises: the individual responsiveness encouraged by the reform seems instead to be
leading to stronger political clientelism.
Emanuel Emil Coman is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations
and a Tutor at Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford.
Introduction
In 2008 Romania undertook an electoral reform that changed the country’s
method of voting from a classical closed-list proportional representation system
to a system requiring all members of parliament to be elected in single-member
districts. While this reform has received a lot of scholarly attention, little atten-
tion has been given to the electoral arrangements before 2008 and the reasons
behind them.
This study is an excursus into the rules governing elections to the Romanian
parliament in the post-communist period. The rules employed in the first two
decades of democratic order are set out with explanations of why the policy-
makers opted for them. I begin by explaining the rules established for the
76 Emanuel Emil Coman
founding elections of 1990 and two significant changes in the electoral threshold
that were adopted in the years that followed. I then focus on the major reform
of 2008 and its implications for Romanian democracy.
In the analysis of these electoral changes I identify two different types of
concerns policy makers had to address, which strongly influenced the choices
made – first in the 1990s and then in the 2000s. The concerns raised at these times
pertained to two different effects electoral rules can have on political represen-
tation: (1) the translation of votes into seats and the effects of this on the party
system; (2) the ties between voters and members of parliament. Throughout
the 1990s, policy makers responded primarily to domestic and international
concerns for the stabilization and consolidation of the party system – a very
legitimate concern in the first years of any new democracy.1 Accordingly, in
1990, they opted for a highly proportional system that allowed representation
of the many parties and interests that had emerged in the aftermath of the fall
of communism. Then, to reduce fragmentation in the system and to secure
more efficient functioning of parliament, they twice increased the threshold
of representation, first in 1992 and then in 2000. The 2008 reform, on the other
hand, was a response to the voters’ demand to hold their representatives more
accountable. As such, it is reflective of a different stage in the process of de-
mocratization: concern for party system institutionalization (characteristic of
every proto-democracy) had been replaced by a call to make elected officials
accountable and thus improve the quality of representation.
Judged from the perspective of established theories of electoral reform, the
reforms in Romania can primarily be explained as action carried out by rational
actors pursuing their own interests, but under constraints from both the interna-
tional community and civil society. The role of the international community was
important in the adoption of the electoral law of 1990, while pressure from civil
society and public opinion were the main catalysts for the 2008 electoral reform.
Rational Calculus and Structural Constraints

in the Selection of Electoral Rules
The existing literature on the creation and amendment of electoral rules em-
phasizes both the rational interests of politicians and the structural constraints
that limit what they can do.2 In a nutshell, rational choice theory proposes that
1  See Larry J. Diamond, Toward Democratic Consolidation, Journal of Democracy 5 (1994),
no. 3, 4-17.
2  See for instance Alan Renwick, The Politics of Electoral Reform: Changing the Rules
of Democracy. New York et al. 2010; Kenneth Benoit, Models of Electoral System Change,
Electoral Studies 22 (2004), no. 3, 363-389; Michael Gallagher / Paul Mitchell, The Politics of
Electoral Systems. Oxford 2005.
Electoral Reform 77
electoral reforms are driven by political actors (mainly parties) who want to
maximize their benefits. In the case of national legislative elections, these benefits
are primarily measured in numbers of seats in the legislature, although parties
may also be interested in maximizing their capacity to pursue the policies they
champion.3 Among the first to emphasize the rational calculus of parties was
Stein Rokkan, who argued that the choice of Western European countries to shift
from single-member district (SMD) elections to proportional representation (PR)
elections in the aftermath of the workers’ enfranchisement was determined by
the rational calculus of politicians in power. These politicians were afraid that,
in a SMD system, the growing power of the workers’ parties would seriously
weaken their position in the legislature; a PR system, it was thought, would
minimize the effect of their decreasing popularity.4 Carles Boix builds on Rok-
kan’s theory, arguing that the ideology of the party in power in any country at the
time of the workers’ enfranchisement has significance. In Britain, long periods
of Conservative rule in the aftermath of World War I kept the SMD system in
place, because the Conservatives were not concerned with the growing power
of the workers’ movement, which was mainly threatening the centre-left Lib-
eral Party.5 The manner in which electoral systems are the product of political
actors’ intentionality is best summarized by Kenneth Benoit, who claims that
“electoral laws will change when a coalition of parties exists such that each party
in the coalition expects to gain more seats under an alternative electoral institution,
and that also has sufficient power to effect this alternative through fiat given the
rules for changing electoral laws.”6
When it comes to electoral reforms in post-communist Europe, the scholarly

literature of rational choice has looked primarily at the interaction between
the communist elites in power and the opposition forces on the eve of the first
elections.7 Building on Rokkan’s theory, Arendt Lijphardt argues that PR was
adopted in Eastern European countries as the compromise between these two
groups. The communists preferred a proportional system that would allow them
to maintain some power. Lijphardt admits, however, that the communists in
these countries had little initial awareness of their potential electoral fortunes,
a conclusion shared by Andrews and Jackman, for whom the decision-makers
were “strategic fools”, having to make choices about electoral laws under
3  Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise. Congressional Choices About
Administrative Procedures, American Political Science Review 89 (1995), no. 1, 62-73.

4  Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties. Approaches to the Comparative Study of the
Process of Development. Oslo 1970.

5  Carles Boix, Setting the Rules of the Game. The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced
Democracies, American Political Science Review 93 (1999), no. 3, 609-624.

6  Benoit, Models of Electoral System Change, 363.
7  Arendt Lijphardt, Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia,
Korrektur
Hungary and Poland 1989-91, Journal of Theoretical Politics 4 (1992), no. 2, 207-223. wirklich so???
conditions of extreme uncertainty.8 Similarly, Birch, Millard, Popescu and Wil-

liams argue that national leaders in the first days of democracy were primarily
concerned with minimizing potential loss. The PR system emerged as the op-
tion of choice as it minimized the risk that runs so high in an environment of
uncertainty.9
Structural accounts of electoral choice do not deny the role of leaders’ self-
interest, but these interests are constrained by country-specific peculiarities, such
as the electoral systems in place before the communist period, the presence of
ethnic minorities,10 the consensual nature of Eastern European democracies,11
and the nature of the interaction between the actors involved in the process of
decision.12
My explanations for the electoral rules in post-communist Romania take into
account both the rational calculus of political actors and the structural constraints
in which they had to operate. The final forms of the electoral laws adopted are
reflective of both aspects.
Electoral Rules of the 1990s:

Efforts to Create a Strong Party System
The first democratic elections in post-communist Romania took place on 20
May 1990, less than five months after the fall of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s regime.
The elections for the two chambers of parliament – the Chamber of Deputies
and the Senate – took place under similar electoral rules. The country was split
into 41 multi-member districts and, in both chambers, the number of seats per
district was made proportional to the populations of these districts. Voters were
asked to choose among closed party lists of candidates, and the allocation of
seats was made using the Hare formula.13 There was no electoral threshold for
parties, and the average number of seats per district was 9.6 for the Chamber
of Deputies and 2.9 for the smaller Senate.14
  8  Josephine T. Andrews / Robert W. Jackman, Strategic Fools: Electoral Rule Choice under
Extreme Uncertainty, Electoral Studies 24 (2005), no. 1, 65-84; see also Bernard Grofman / Evald
Mikkel / Rein Taagepera, Electoral System Change in Estonia, 1989-1993, Journal of Baltic
Studies 30 (1999), no. 3, 227-249.
  9  Sarah Birch et al., Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist
Europe. Basingstoke 2002, 186.

10  Lijphardt, Democratization and Constitutional Choices.
11  Csaba Nikolenyi, When Electoral Reform Fails: The Stability of Proportional
Representation in Post-Communist Democracies, West European Politics 34 (2011), no. 3, 607-625.

12  Birch et al., Embodying Democracy.
13  Decree law 92/14.03.1990 for the election of the parliament and the President of Roma-
nia, published in Monitorul Oficial [The Official Gazette], no. 35, 18 March 1990.
14  This information is taken from the dataset by Jessica S. Wallack et al., Particularism
Around the World, The World Bank Economic Review 17 (2003), no. 1, 133-143.
Electoral Reform 79
Such highly proportional election rules enabled ten different parties to be

represented in the first parliament.15 The clear winner of the 1990 elections was
the National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvării Naționale, FSN), which obtained
over 65 per cent of the seats in both chambers. Its leader, Ion Iliescu, also won
in the presidential election, which was held on the same day: he gained an over-
whelming 85 per cent of the popular vote. The two historical parties from the
interwar period, the National Peasants Party (Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin
și Democrat, PNȚCD) and the National Liberal Party (Partidul Național Liberal,
PNL), came second and fourth – way behind the FSN,16 the party which had
led the transitional government that took over on 22 December 1989 and had
been in power when the elections were announced.17 From the political base
gained in the election, Ion Iliescu and the other FSN leaders were in full control
of legislation and could have opted for a less proportional and inclusive system
that would have increased their power. They were, after all, writing the rules
of the game.
Regarded from a purely rational choice perspective,18 the chosen electoral
rules make little sense. But in Romania’s special circumstances, additional con-
siderations influenced the simple utilitarian calculus of parties. To understand
what was happening, we need to grasp the political context surrounding the
first months of Romanian democracy (see Table 1).
When Romania began the transition towards democracy in December 1989, it
stood out from other former communist countries both because of its low level of
economic development and because civil society there was almost inexistent.19
There were severe economic problems throughout Southeastern Europe in the
1980s, primarily manifested in the scarcity of consumer goods; but nowhere
were these problems as intense as in Romania. Also, while most of the leaders
of communist regimes had adopted some liberalization reforms in the 1980s,
Ceaușescu had refused to do so, and Romania had gained a name as one of
the most severely authoritarian countries in the entire communist bloc.20 Civil
15  This number does not include the ethnic minorities parties, which had reserved seats
and did not run under the same electoral rules.

16 The PNȚCD obtained 2.5% of the votes in the Senate elections and 2.6% of the votes in
the Chamber of Deputies elections, while the corresponding scores for the PNL were 7.1%
and 6.4% respectively.
17 At the time, the country was led by the Provisional Council for National Union (CPUN),
a decisional body in which the FSN held a majority of seats.

18  See Benoit, Models of Electoral System Change; also Boix, Setting the Rules of the Game.
19  Mark Almond, Romania since the Revolution, Government and Opposition 25 (1990),
no. 4, 484-496, 494.

20  Vladimir Tismăneanu, The Revival of Politics in Romania, Proceedings of the Academy of
Political Science 38 (1991), no. 1, 85-99, 97; also Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceaușescu: The
Politics of Intolerance. Edinburgh 1995; Paul G. Lewis, Questions and Issues: The European
Table 1: Results of seven elections to the Romanian Senate and Chamber of Deputies.
Sources: 1992-2008 – Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability; 1990
1990, 2012 – Adam Carr archive at <www.psephos.adam-carr.net> Senate C. Deputies
Party % % % %
(if starred, the name given is the present name after a name change) Votes Seats Votes Seats
FSN/PSD National Salvation Front + Social Democratic Party 67.0 76.5 66.3 66.6
PNȚCD National Peasants Party 2.5 0.8 2.6 3.0
CDR Democratic Convention of Romania – – – –
PDL Liberal Democratic Party – – – –
PUNR Romanian National Unity Party – – – –
UDMR Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania 7.2 10.8 7.2 7.3
PDAR Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania 1.8 0 1.8 2.2
PRM Greater Romania Party – – – –
PSM Socialist Party of Labour – – – –
PNL National Liberal Party 7.1 8.4 6.4 7.3
DA Justice and Truth Alliance – – – –
MER Romanian Ecologist Movement 2.4 0.8 2.6 3.0
AUR Alliance for Romanian Unity 2.2 1.7 2.1 2.2
PER Romanian Ecologist Party 1.4 0.8 1.7 2.0
PSDR Romanian Social Democratic Party – – 0.5 0.5
Socialist – – 1.0 1.2
USL Social Liberal Union – – – –
1992 1996 2000
Senate C. Deputies Senate C. Deputies Senate C. Deputies
Party % % % % % % % % % % % %
Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats
FSN/PSD 28.3 34.3 27.7 34.3 23.1 28.7 21.5 26.5 37.1 46.4 36.6 44.9
PNȚCD – – – – – – – – – – – –
CDR 20.2 23.8 20.0 24.0 30.7 37.1 30.2 35.7 – – – –
PDL 10.4 12.6 10.2 12.6 13.2 16.1 12.9 15.4 7.6 9.3 7.0 9.0
PUNR 8.1 9.8 7.7 8.8 4.2 4.9 4.4 5.2 – – – –
UDMR 7.6 8.4 7.5 7.9 6.8 7.7 6.6 7.3 6.9 8.6 6.8 7.8
PDAR 3.3 3.5 2.9 0 – – – – – – – –
PRM 3.8 4.2 3.9 4.7 4.5 5.6 4.5 5.2 21.0 26.4 19.4 24.3
PSM 3.2 3.5 3.0 3.8 – – – – – – – –
PNL – – – – – – – – 7.5 9.3 6.9 8.7
DA – – – – – – – – – – – –
MER – – – – – – – – – – – –
AUR – – – – – – – – – – – –
PER – – – – – – – – – – – –
PSDR – – – – – – – – – – – –
Socialist – – – – – – – – – – – –
USL – – – – – – – – – – – –
2004 2008 2012
Senate C. Deputies Senate C. Deputies Senate C. Deputies
Party % % % % % % % % % % % %
Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats
FSN/PSD 37.2 41.6 36.8 39.7 34.2 a 35.8 a 33.1 a 34.1a – – – –
PNȚCD – – – – – – – – – – – –
CDR – – – – – – – – – – – –
PDL – – – – 33.6 37.2 32.4 34.4 16.7 13.6 16.5 13.6
PUNR – – – – – – – – – – – –
UDMR 6.2 7.3 6.2 6.6 6.4 6.6 6.2 6.6 5.2 5.1 5.1 4.4
PDAR – – – – – – – – – – – –
PRM 13.6 15.3 13.0 14.4 3.6 – 3.1 – – – – –
PSM – – – – – – – – – – – –
PNL – – – – 18.7 20.4 18.6 19.5 – – – –
DA 31.8 35.8 31.5 33.7 – – – – – – – –
MER – – – – – – – – – – – –
AUR – – – – – – – – – – – –
PER – – – – – – – – – – – –
PSDR – – – – – – – – – – – –
Socialist – – – – – – – – – – – –
USL – – – – – – – – 60.1 69.3 58.6 66.3
a Denotes an alliance with a minor party in this election.
Electoral Reform 81
society organizations were virtually non-existent, let alone political groupings

outside the Communist Party.
It was in this economic and political context that Ion Iliescu and a group of
“revolutionaries”21 appeared on Romanian national television on 22 December
1989 to declare the end of the communist regime. This announcement was the
corollary of a series of violent mass protests that had started on 16 December
in the Transylvanian city of Timișoara and had spread through the whole
country. Since political power had been entirely concentrated in the hands of
the Communist Party, the cessation of the old regime created a power vacuum
that needed to be filled,22 and, on the same evening as the main announcement
(22 December), Iliescu confirmed the establishment of the Council of National
Salvation Front (CFSN),23 a non-political provisional government whose main
purpose was to prepare the country for national elections.24
The figures at the head of the CFSN were mainly former communist leaders
who had overnight turned democrats. Ion Iliescu himself had been a member
of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and Minister for
Youth-Related Issues in the 1960s.25 From their position of power Ion Iliescu
and his FSN colleagues had all the chips to make their party a strong political
force. First, most Romanians, having witnessed the 1989 revolution on TV, saw
them as the revolutionaries who had brought the communist regime to an end.
Indeed, the term “salvation” in the name of their provisional government was
not chosen arbitrarily, but symbolized the messianic role of the new leaders.
Secondly, the CFSN controlled the media, which at the time was entirely in the
hands of the government (private media emerged only later). Of crucial impor-
tance was the CFSN’s control of national television, which, in the days follow-
ing the revolution, extended its programmes from three hours a day (mostly
communist propaganda) to all-day coverage which most Romanians followed.
Those in power could use national television as a vehicle for misinformation
Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, in: idem / Zdenka Mansfeldová (eds.),
The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Basingstoke 2006, 1-19.
21  Whether the people who appeared on TV were indeed revolutionaries is still subject to
debate. Tismăneanu, The Revival of Politics in Romania, for instance, argues that this group
actually stole the revolution from those in the streets.
22  Liliana Mihuț, The Emergence of Political Pluralism in Romania, Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 27 (1994), no. 4, 411-422, 412.

23  The Council of National Salvation Front refers to the provisional government that led
Romania from December 1989 until February 1990; the National Salvation Front was the
political party derived from this provisional government.
24  Tismăneanu, The Revival of Politics in Romania; idem, The Quasi-Revolution and Its
Discontents: Emerging Political Pluralism in Post-Ceaușescu Romania, East European Politics

& Societies 7 (1993), no. 2, 309-348.
25  Alexandru Gussi, La Roumanie face à son passé communiste. Mémoires et cultures
politiques. Paris 2011.

and control. Thirdly, because of the suppression of political organization during

communism, there was no political alternative to the CFSN and thus no real
political opposition.26
The first political parties did indeed emerge in the first month after the end
of communism, but they had little resources and little political clout. The most
important among them were the National Peasants Party (PNȚCD) and the
National Liberal Party (PNL), which had been the most important parties in
the pre-communist period. Also, by January 1990, the Hungarian minority
had formed its own party, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania
(UDMR).27
The emergence of these opposition parties was necessary in Romania’s path to
democratization, but their mission was not an easy one. Because the CFSN had
all the means of public control outlined above, it was difficult for the opposition
leaders to make themselves known to the public. As historical parties, the PNL
and the PNȚCD had had political followers, but this had been over forty years
earlier. In January 1990 their political base was virtually non-existent and, with
the CFSN controlling dissemination of information, it was difficult to build such
a base.28 On top of these problems, the main obstacle to the formation of an
opposition was the lack of any legislative body or forum where the opposition
could make its voice heard and where, if it had good enough representation, it
could get policy concessions. In the first months of democracy, Romania only
had a provisional executive, the CFSN, but no legislative body.
Despite all these advantages, the CFSN did not have a problem-free run in
its first months. A series of protests broke out throughout the country, and
especially in Bucharest. The protesters accused the former communists now at
the head of the CFSN of having “stolen” the Romanian revolution. The protests
intensified when, in January 1990, the CFSN officially announced that it would
itself run in the coming elections as a political party, the National Salvation
Front (FSN). Many people had already assumed that this would be its inten-
tion. It meant that the supposedly apolitical transitional government in charge
of preparing the country for the first elections had now become a participant in
a game whose rules it could write one-sidedly. For the protesters in the street,
the announcement also had strong symbolic overtones: it made clear that the
people were ruled by an unelected single authority composed of former com-
munists, with no legislative forum in which the opposition could make its voice
26  For a detailed discussion of the campaign advantages see Almond, Romania Since the
Revolution; Tismăneanu, The Revival of Politics in Romania, 93.

27  William E. Crowther / Oana-Valentina Suciu, Romania, in: Sten Berglund et al. (eds.),
The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe. Cheltenham 32013, 369-406.

28  This aspect was emphasized in a discussion between the PNȚCD leader Ion Rațiu and
the then prime minister of Britain, Margaret Thatcher: Răspunsuri alunecoase ca un săpun,
Adevărul, 9 March 1990, 1.
Electoral Reform 83
heard. It was like a return to the previous regime.29 Such a government lacked
legitimacy in the eyes of the populace and of the international community.30
The regime’s lack of political legitimacy led Iliescu and his colleagues to
adopt two important measures. First, they tried to show that, unlike the previ-
ous regime, they were willing to include other political forces in the decisional
process. On 9 February 1990 they formed the Provisional Council for National
Union (Consiliul Provizoriu de Uniune Naţională, CPUN), a new government
replacing the FSN as a decisional organ (not as a party). It included representa-
tives of the other political parties. The move was meant to appease both the
masses in the streets and the foreign donors to Romania, who were growing
anxious.31 The CPUN functioned more or less as a miniature parliament-cum-
cabinet in which all parties could express their views on issues; but it was still
the FSN that made final decisions. This was because, as part of the protocol for
the formation of the CPUN, the opposition parties had had to agree that the
FSN would maintain a majority of the seats.32 As a second response to accusa-
tions that they lacked legitimacy inside and outside the country, the leaders of
the transitional government resolved to hold elections as early as possible.33
Elections were held in early May. This was to the FSN’s advantage since, at
this time, most Romanians were still struggling to understand democracy and
capitalism and, more importantly, the political opposition was weak and had
little electoral basis.34
Given that the rules for the founding elections were chosen in this context –
political dominance by the FSN – the choice of a fairly inclusive system seems
odd. On a purely party-centered rational choice basis, Iliescu and the FSN should
have opted for a less proportional system, rather than one that disadvantaged the
small parties but benefited the big ones. For instance, a plurality system would
have given the FSN a large majority of seats in the first parliament. Furthermore,
following Duverger’s law,35 it is likely that a plural system would, in the long
29  William E. Crowther, Romania, in: Sten Berglund / Joakim Ekman / Frank H. Aarebrot
(eds.), The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe. Cheltenham 22004, 363-414.
30  Mihuț, The Emergence of Political Pluralism in Romania, 414; Tismăneanu, The Quasi-
Revolution and its Discontents.

31  Idem, The Revival of Politics in Romania, 93; Almond, Romania since the Revolution, 494.
32  Crowther, Romania.
33  As Mihuţ, The Emergence of Political Pluralism in Romania, 414, puts it: “Early elections
may have been necessary because of the immediate need to establish legitimate power.”
34  For instance, in the first Central and Eastern Eurobarometer that included Romania
in the autumn of 1991, only 35% of respondents believed that the free market economy was
a good thing for Romania, compared to an average of 58% for all countries in the survey.
35  Maurice Duverger, Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern
State. London 1954.

run, have led to a two-party system and that the FSN would have been one of
the two parties that would alternate in power.36
Despite claims in some of the literature on Eastern Europe that results in the
first elections could not be predicted, it is hard to believe that the FSN leaders
were not sure of winning, since, as shown above, they had a wide range of ad-
vantages over their adversaries. The FSN gained 67 per cent of the popular vote.
This can hardly have come as a surprise in an election with so many parties. Why
did the FSN leaders not want a less inclusive, less proportional system, which
would more obviously favour them? Well, they did. On 1 February 1990, the
CFSN launched a public debate on a proposal for what was essentially a single-
member district law.37 Needless to say, given the results of the 1990 elections,
the law would have brought tremendous advantages to the FSN. It is difficult
to estimate these advantages precisely, as we do not know what the districts
would have looked like, but it is conceivable that, of the opposition parties,
only the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania – which had support
concentrated in the Székely region – would have gained any parliamentary
representation under this SMD system.
However, the inclusive law used in the first elections was adopted shortly
afterwards, not in the CFSN, but in the CPUN. The FSN had a majority in
this mini-legislature, and could still in principle have passed an electoral law
that, from a utilitarian point of view, would have been more favourable to
themselves than the one actually adopted. They had their reasons for letting it
pass. The CPUN was meant to function as a consensual organism countering
allegations that Iliescu and his colleagues were acting in the same way as the
previous regime. The international community, especially, was concerned about
the weakness of the opposition and wanted more political pluralism, sending
observers to be present at the debates the CPUN held in early March 1990 over
the form of the law.38 As a consequence, the minimum winning coalition neces-
sary, on a rational choice basis, became much broader. In fact the international
observers pushed for full agreement and, with their coaxing, the final law was
voted through on 15 March with only one vote against and one abstention. In
an interview with the newspaper Adevărul, Ion Iliescu declared that the foreign
36  This logic is similar to the one used by Boix, Setting the Rules of the Game, to explain
why the SMD system was kept in Britain.

37  Proiect în dezbatere publică: Consiliul Frontului Salvării Naţionale. Decret-Lege pentru
alegerea parlamentului, a președintelui României și a consiliilor locale [Project of Public

Debate: The Council of the National Salvation Front. Law-Decree for the Election of Parliament,
President of Romania and the Local Councils.], Adevărul, 1 February 1990, 4-5. The fact that
the FSN wanted a SMD system is probably the single most important argument against those
who claim that the PR system was the result of mere uncertainty about electoral fortunes.
38  Crowther, Romania; Daniel Gheorghe Luchian, Cu un vot împotrivă și două abţineri
a fost votată legea electorală, Adevărul, 15 March 1990, 1.

Electoral Reform 85
observers from the US and France were very happy with the almost unanimous
consent of all parties in the CPUN.39
The electoral rules used in the first elections thus ensured the representa-
tion of as many political parties as possible and, in this way, satisfied the early
needs of the Romanian democracy. Pressures from the street demonstrators and
the international community were determinant. It was the street demonstra-
tors who (with outside backing) became the main catalysts for the formation
of the CPUN; and, once the debate over the form of the law was moved from
inside the CFSN to this new body, it was the foreign observers who pushed for
a consensual agreement that could satisfy all actors. This is what lay behind the
highly proportional solution.
It soon became apparent that such a fragmented system could potentially
result in high cabinet volatility, an unwanted situation for any country and
especially for a young democracy. Though the 1990 elections, despite the diver-
sity of parliamentary representation, had brought in a one-party cabinet, this
was seen as an idiosyncratic event unlikely to be replicated. Furthermore, the
splitting of the FSN into two political parties, one led by president Ion Iliescu
and the other by former prime minister Petre Roman, demonstrated that the
party system was fragile and needed consolidation.40 This split happened in
June 1991, a few months before the 1992 elections.
The introduction of a 2 per cent threshold for the 1992 elections is reflective of
the general belief among the political class that the existing system was not suf-
ficiently robust.41 From the perspective of rational choice theory, the move was
beneficial for most of the parties in parliament. As a general rule, an increase in
the threshold makes the parties that decide on it better off than they were before.
The votes wasted on parties that do not reach the threshold are redistributed
among the parties that do. By 1992 most of the small parties that made it to the
first parliament had disappeared, and had been incorporated into the bigger
parties, especially the FSN, and this meant it was no longer difficult to form
coalitions to gain majority votes.42 As the literature has shown, when drafting
electoral laws, party leaders think in terms of future government coalitions,43
so it is likely that both the FSN and the main opposition parties were also think-
ing forward to possible government coalitions that might be to their advantage
39  Ibid. Iliescu declared that “[…] foreign observers from the USA and France have
appreciated the collaboration with the other political parties”.

40  Crowther, Romania, 372.
41  The adoption of the threshold was done through Law 68 of 1992, published in Monitorul
Oficial no. 164 of 16 July 1992.

42  According to Tismăneanu, The Revival of Politics in Romania, 93, around 40 of the 80
parties that ran in the first elections were FSN offshots which soon disappeared or became
incorporated within the larger parties.
43  Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise.
after the 1992 elections. Reducing the fragmentation of the system was thus in
the interest of most of the main politicians.
The goal of the reform was at least partially fulfilled: the number of parties
(and coalitions) that entered the Romanian parliament was reduced from ten in
the 1990 elections to seven in 1992. Unfortunately, because the electoral rule was
new to them, the voters did not act as strategically as they could have done, so
that nearly 20 per cent of the votes in the 1992 elections were wasted (see Table
1). The 1996 elections took place under the same rules and brought the first shift
in power. In the presidential elections the winner was Emil Constantinescu,
candidate of the centre-right coalition Convenţia Democrată (Democratic Con-
vention) which brought together the National Liberal Party (PNL), the National
Peasants Party (PNȚCD), the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania
(UDMR) and a few other smaller parties. The cabinet was formed from an alli-
ance of the Democratic Convention and the centre-left Uniunea Social-Democrată
(Social Democratic Union).
The coalition in power between 1996 and 2000 was thus a “coalition of coali-
tions”, including in its ranks no fewer than nine individual parties. As such,
it was plagued by numerous internal conflicts, which resulted in two changes
of prime minister and numerous cabinet reshuffles. As a consequence the
Democratic Convention urged further consolidation of the party system, and
this culminated in the introduction of a five per cent threshold for individual
parties, and even higher thresholds for party coalitions.44 This increase in the
threshold was effective, as it brought the number of parties represented in the
legislature down to five (see Table 1). Oddly enough, the Democratic Convention
(the main coalition of parties in cabinet) itself failed to pass the high threshold
for coalitions imposed by the new rules. The party within it that had initiated
the law was the National Peasants Party (PNȚCD), the leading party in the
governments between 1996 and 2000,45 and, after the 2000 elections, it virtually
disappeared from the political scene.46
To sum up, the electoral systems tried out throughout the first decade of
Romanian democracy were designed to consolidate a multi-party system. To
this end, the first elections were run under a highly proportional system to
44  For the first extra party in a coalition an extra 3% was needed, then an extra 1% for each
additional party, up to a maximum of 10%; see Ordonanţa de urgenţă nr. 63 din 26 mai 2000
[Emergency Government ordinance no. 63 of 26 May 2000], published in Monitorul Oficial
240 of 31 May 2000.
45  See Alexandra Ionescu, La résurgence d’un acteur politique en Roumanie. Le Parti
National Paysan Chrétien Démocrate, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review 2
(2002), no. 1, 141-202.
46  This is one rare example of miscalculation and uncertainty about results, but the failure
of the PNȚCD and their partners in the Convention to enter parliament is primarily explained
by the departure from it of the party that was arguably strongest, the PNL.
Electoral Reform 87
allow the multitude of new parties representation and visibility – necessary

conditions for their societal entrenchment. The main party at the negotiation
table, the FSN, would have preferred an electoral law much less slanted to
proportional representation, but pressure from the streets and, especially, from
the international community constrained what it could demand. Later, when
party leaders were faced with fragmentation inside parliament, they decided to
introduce electoral thresholds to reduce the number of parties and thus stabilize
the system. In the next section I discuss the 2008 electoral reform, which aimed
to achieve a different goal: that of increasing the responsiveness of elected of-
ficials to the wishes of their voters.
The 2008 Reform

The two changes in the electoral threshold made in 1992 and in 2000 were part
of a general trend to consolidate emerging party systems and strengthen existing
parties that can be seen in East Central and Southeastern Europe throughout
the 1990s.47 For instance, the 1993 Polish electoral reform introduced electoral
thresholds for parties and party coalitions,48 and the 2000 reform in the Czech
Republic established the rule that candidates could only run if nominated by
parties or party coalitions.49 Both these reforms made it harder for small parties
to enter the legislature. Similar efforts to consolidate party systems were taken
in Ukraine, Latvia and Lithuania – countries that shifted from single-member
district plurality elections to more proportional systems encouraging the de-
velopment of party loyalties rather than loyalty to individuals.50
What set the electoral law in Romania apart from the laws of other countries
was the extremely important role given to parties in the political process and
the lack of accountability parliamentarians had to their voters. Electoral rules
that emphasize the role of parties as opposed to individual candidates may con-
47  David M. Olson / Gabriella Ilonszki, Two Decades of Divergent Post-Communist
Parliamentary Development. The Journal of Legislative Studies 17 (2011), no. 2, 234-255; Sarah
Birch, Lessons from Eastern Europe: Electoral Reform Following the Collapse of Communism,
paper presented at the conference on “Electoral Reform in Canada: Getting Past Debates about
Electoral Systems”, Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada, 10-12 May,
2005, available at <http://elibraria.org/assets/2005-Birch-CausesOfElectReformInCEE.pdf>. All
internet sources were accessed on 26 March 2015.
48  Ewa Nalewajko / Włodzimierz Wesołowski, Five Terms of the Polish Parliament, The
Journal of Legislative Studies 13 (2007), no. 1, 59-82.

49  Lukas Linek / Zdenka Mansfeldová, The Parliament of the Czech Republic, 1993-2004,
The Journal of Legislative Studies 13 (2007), no. 1, 12-37.

50  Birch, Lessons from Eastern Europe; Vello Pettai / Marcus Kreuzer, Party Politics in
the Baltic States: Social Bases and Institutional Context, East European Politics and Societies 13
(1998), no. 1, 148-189; John T. Ishiyama, Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist
Eastern Europe, Political Science Quarterly 112 (1997), no. 1, 95-115.
solidate parties, but are also likely to minimize the connection between elected
officials and their constituencies.51 In the early 2000s, Romanians were voting on
predetermined party lists and could not punish individual sitting representatives
through their vote. Though the electoral reforms in other countries increased the
role of parties, they did keep the candidates accountable. In Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, and Latvia, this was done through various forms of
open list, which allowed voters to single out individual candidates. In Hungary,
Lithuania and Ukraine it was done through mixed-member electoral systems.
Romania, on the other hand, kept its closed-list system in place.52
As a consequence, public dissatisfaction with the electoral system began to
be heard and new discussions were initiated on further electoral reform. This
started in the late 1990s. The demand for reform was no longer related to the
structure of the party system, but rather to the closed-list element in elections.
It was widely believed that corrupt individuals associated with the old regime
were able to secure advantageous positions on the lists, due to connections in
the party, and could thus get themselves elected.53 Unsurprisingly, this impetus
for reform did not come from inside the parties in the legislature, but from the
public and from civil societal organizations.
The political leaders reacted to these pressures following utilitarian calculi,
and the final form of the law reflected the interaction between bottom-up de-
mands for reform and the leaders’ reactions to them. With its popular origins,
the pressure for reform in Romania bore witness to a new, more mature stage
in democratic life. Concern about the strengthening of opposition parties had
been replaced by public clamour to have more responsive governing structures
representing the people’s will, and those who wanted this also wanted sanc-
tions on politicians who failed in their duties. There was a widespread public
perception that many members of parliament were simply corrupt individuals
collecting rents from the state.54 Trust in government officials in general, and
members of parliament in particular, was also negatively affected by the eco-
nomic crisis of the late 1990s.55
51  John M. Carey, Legislative Voting and Accountability. New York et al. 2008.
52  Emanuel Emil Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws.
The Consequences of the 2008 Romanian Electoral Reform, The Journal of Legislative Studies
19 (2013), no. 4, 467-489.
53  Ibid.
54  Mihail Chiru / Ionuţ Ciobanu, Legislative Recruitment and Electoral System Change.
The Case of Romania, CEU Political Science Journal 4 (2009), no. 2, 192-231, available at <http://
epa.oszk.hu/02300/02341/00015/pdf/EPA02341_ceu_2009_02_192-231.pdf>.
55  For instance only 32.4% of the respondents in the 2001 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer
were inclined to trust the Romanian Parliament. Coman, Increasing Representative Account
ability, 470.
Electoral Reform 89
The early efforts of the Pro-Democracy Association (Pro-Democratia) split

those involved in politics. Some MPs were supportive; others were wary about
a reform whose declared goal was the renewal of the political class. Among the
political parties, the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Social Democratic
Party (PSD) claimed to be in favour of some degree of reform that would in-
crease accountability.56 In 2006 parliament created a commission charged with
making proposals for electoral reform, but its work was thwarted by disagree-
ments among the parties.57 A similar committee had held back work on a new
electoral law before the 2004 elections.58
The efforts of the reform initiators received a boost in 2007 when the Roma-
nian president, Traian Băsescu, began to campaign for their cause and pushed
parliament to adopt a new electoral law before the elections scheduled for the
autumn of 2008.59 In November 2007, Băsescu called a referendum on his pro-
posal to adopt the French two-round system of elections. Even though a large
majority of those who participated voted in favour of the proposed system,
the referendum was declared invalid due to low turnout. In putting forward
the two-round system, the president was, at least partially, guided by a seat-
maximizing strategy, since his party (the Democrat Liberal Party, PDL) was
leading in the polls and a two-round system would have helped it win. The
prime minister at the time, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, saw things differently, as
he was the leader of a less popular party, the National Liberals (PNL). Rather
than the French system, Popescu-Tăriceanu advocated a mixed-member sys-
tem similar to the one found in Germany. This system has some MPs elected
in single-member districts and some elected from central party lists; it assures
proportional translation of votes into seats and does not disadvantage smaller
parties, while still ensuring that half of the MPs are elected in single-member
districts. Significantly, by the end of 2007 the issue of increasing individual ac-
countability through electoral reform had become so salient that all proposals
had put this objective to the fore. However, the prime minister’s proposal was
rejected by the Romanian Constitutional Court, which held it unacceptable
because it violated the constitutional provision that all members of parliament
be chosen directly by universal, equal, and secret vote. The court came to this
56  Sergiu Gherghina / Larențiu Ştefan / Mihail Chiru, Electoral Reform – Cui Bono?
Attitudes of Romanian MPs to the Electoral System Change, The Journal of Legislative Studies
19 (2013), no. 3, 351-369.
57  Asociaţia Pro-Democraţia, Istoria unui dezacord: Uninominalul [The History of a Discord:
the Uninominal]. Bucharest 2008, 21.

58  Gherghina / Ştefan / Chiru, Electoral Reform – Cui Bono?, 353.
59  Emanuil Emil Coman, Legislative Behavior in Romania: The Effect of the 2008 Romanian
Electoral Reform, Legislative Studies Quarterly 37 (2012), no. 2, 199-224.

conclusion because the candidates on the party list in Popescu-Tăriceanu’s

proposal did not have to stand in the uninominal election.60
As a consequence of these setbacks, a unique alternative emerged: a law
which aimed at increasing the connection between MPs and their voters while
still ensuring that there was a proportional translation of the popular vote into
seats in the legislature.61 What distinguishes the Romanian system from other
mixed systems is the fact that it has no list element and thus all members are
elected in single-member districts, while at the same time it yields highly pro-
portional results obtained through two rounds of redistribution at the county
and country levels.62 This law was adopted in March 2008.
The electoral rules of the 1990s had the consolidation of a party system as
their main objective and, judging from the electoral results following the im-
plementation of these rules, it can be said that the objective was met. The aim
of the 2008 electoral reform was different: the initiators came from civil society
and were primarily concerned with strengthening the connection between voters
and their elected representatives. They wanted to increase the accountability
of MPs to the people who elected them. From its initiation until its eventual
enactment, the reform idea underwent changes reflecting the wishes of the vari-
ous parties. But the need for increased accountability remained the crux of the
political discourse. The two main characteristics of the proposals – individual
single-member districts and full proportionality – reflect both the driving idea
behind the reform movement and the rational calculus of the political leaders
(especially the prime minister) whose parties would most probably have lost
seats under the law proposed by the president.63
In the final part of the study, which draws on existing scholarly work on the
effects of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform, I assess the extent to which the
new electoral law fulfilled the desiderata of its promoters. I evaluate the success
60  Romanian Constitutional Court, Decizie nr. 1.177 din 12 decembrie 2007 referitoare la
sesizarea de neconstituţionalitate a Legii pentru alegerea Camerei Deputaţilor și a Senatului și

pentru modificarea și completarea Legii nr. 67/2004 pentru alegerea autorităţilor administraţiei
publice locale, a Legii administraţiei publice locale nr. 215/2001 și a Legii nr. 393/2004 privind
Statutul aleșilor locali, available at <http://www.lege-online.ro/lr-DECIZIE-1177%20-2007-
%2888054%29-%281%29.html>; found in Monitorul Oficial no. 871, 20 December 2007.
61  Law 35 of 2008, published in Monitorul Oficial no. 196 of 13 March 2008. The paternity
of the law is attributed to the PSD senator Anghel Stanciu; see Cristian Preda, The Romanian
Political System after the Parliamentary Elections of November 30, 2008, Studia Politica.
Romanian Political Science Review 9 (2009), no. 1, 9-35.
62  A detailed depiction of the electoral law is beyond the scope of this study; for details
see Chiru / Ciobanu, Legislative Recruitment and Electoral System Change; see also Sergiu
Gherghina / George Jiglău, Where Does the Mechanism Collapse? Understanding the 2008
Romanian Electoral System, Representation 48 (2012), no. 4, 445-459.
63  A similar law was proposed in the 2000 election manifesto of the PSD, which at the time
was the strongest party and thus expected to gain from it. See Gherghina / Ştefan / Chiru,
Electoral Reform – Cui Bono?
Electoral Reform 91
of the law by reviewing the extent to which it achieved three goals: 1) renewal
of the political class; 2) accountability of MPs to their constituencies; and 3)
effective translation of votes into seats (in other words, the proportionality of
the system).64
Effects of the 2008 Electoral Reform

The Renewal of the Political Class
One of the declared objectives of the initiators of the electoral reform was
the renewal of the political class.65 The closed-list system, it was believed, al-
lowed corrupt individuals into parliament. Some of them had been associated
with the old communist regime and were able to get themselves put at the top
of party lists because of their connections and money. Studies made to date of
the profiles of MPs elected under the new rules yield a mixed picture. Protsyk
and Lupsa Matichescu find that MPs elected under the new rules have differ-
ent occupational profiles from their predecessors.66 Similarly, incumbent MPs
running in the 2008 elections were less successful than incumbent MPs running
in the previous elections, and this suggests that, for the first time, voters were
able to express their dissatisfactions with the political class in a direct fashion
through the ballot box.67 Only 37 per cent of the deputies and 24 per cent of
the senators elected in 2008 had served in the previous term of parliament. The
same study also finds that candidates associated with acts of corruption have
been less likely to find themselves on the ballot list at all.68 Stan and Vancea
argue that the electoral campaign discourse for the 2008 elections saw a change
in themes: there were fewer references to nationalism and decommunization.69
Gherghina and Chiru find that MPs’ experience and parliamentary positions
have now become less important predictors of party loyalty: the MPs seem to
have become more concerned about their popularity with the voters.70 Chiru
and Ciobanu conclude that in the 2008 elections there were fewer “parachut-
ists” on the ballot than in previous elections. “Parachutists”, usually old-school
politicians with party connections or money, are candidates who run in safe
64  See Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws.

65  See Asociaţia Pro-Democraţia, Istoria unui dezacord.
66  Oleh Protsyk / Marius Lupsa Matichescu, Clientelism and Political Recruitment in
Democratic Transition: Evidence from Romania, Comparative Politics 43 (2011), no. 2, 207-224.
67  Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws, 478.
68  Ibid.
69  Lavinia Stan / Diane Vancea, Old Wine in New Bottles, Problems of Post-Communism
56 (2009), no. 5, 47-61.

70  Sergiu Gherghina / Mihail Chiru, Determinants of Legislative Voting Loyalty under
Different Electoral Systems: Evidence from Romania, International Political Science Review 35
(2014), no. 5, 523-541.
districts without residing there. However, the same authors have also found
that the 2008 elections brought in more candidates with financial means of
their own – able to support their personal campaigns – than was previously
the case. It seems here that the 2008 reform had the opposite effect on the role
of money in politics than might have been expected.71 This apparent anomaly
can be explained through a rational choice perspective. Under the new elec-
toral rules, candidates have stronger incentives to invest their own money in
campaigns because the money helps them directly as individuals. Under the
old electoral law, private money could be of benefit to individual candidates
only indirectly, through the list system; while under the new law, money spent
in a single-member district supports the candidate’s own campaign (and only
indirectly, the party).72
Accountability of MPs
Increasing the accountability of MPs appeared as a leitmotif throughout the

campaign for electoral reform. President Traian Băsescu’s call for higher ac-
countability of MPs was especially notable. This came after his suspension in
2007 and the subsequent referendum showing that the MPs’ decision to suspend
the country’s president was at odds with the will of the populace.73
When it comes to this second popular desideratum, accountability, the indica-
tions of success are also mixed. The degree of voting independence MPs have
in the Romanian parliament has not changed since the 2008 reform, and they
are still very likely to toe the party line when voting inside the legislature.74 The
determinants of voting behaviour have remained fairly similar too.75 Increased
independence in parliamentary voting would signify that MPs have become
more concerned with the needs of the constituencies they represent, as opposed
to the demands of their parties. However, MPs do appear to be more likely to
initiate legislation since the reform and are also more likely to address questions
to the prime minister – a course of action now regarded as less dangerous to
their careers. The increased activity of politicians in parliament may be a sign of
genuine concern for the needs of their constituencies or could be mere theatre
meant to help them at re-election.76
71  Chiru / Ciobanu,Legislative Recruitment and Electoral System Change.

72  Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws.
73  Cosmin Gabriel Marian / Ronald F. King, Plus ça change: Electoral Law Reform and
the 2008 Romanian Parliamentary Elections, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43 (2010),
no. 1, 7-18, 10.
74  Coman, Legislative Behavior in Romania.
75  Gherghina / Chiru, Determinants of Legislative Voting Loyalty.
76  Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws, 470.
Electoral Reform 93
The representation of constituencies is still patchy. Interviews with Roma-

nian MPs show that there are few viable means of transmission through which
they can learn about constituency needs.77 The only voter-MP interaction takes
place in the weekly consultation hours (“surgeries”) which are used by voters
for personal gains as opposed to gains for the districts the MPs should be sup-
porting. This situation may well lead to the development of clientelistic ties
between the elected officials and their voters – ties that are detrimental to the
welfare of the districts and to the country as a whole. The problem is not one
faced by Romania alone: there is a broader debate about whether making MPs
more accountable increases the overall quality of representation.
Translation of Votes Into Seats
One of the most vaunted features of the 2008 electoral law was the high degree
of proportionality it provided. In this area the law is unique, for it offers the
prospect of combining electoral proportionality with elections in single-member
districts for all seats in the legislature. This combination cannot be found in any
other mixed-member system. The proportionality of the Romanian system has
remained almost intact.78 Nevertheless, the literature on the 2008 elections has
identified some flaws in the translation of votes into seats.
Two of these flaws became apparent to voters immediately after the 2008 elec-
tions. On the election night, the then president of the Social Democratic Party
(PSD), Mircea Geoană, celebrated the electoral victory he assumed was his on
the basis of exit polls taken some hours earlier. The following day it became
clear that, although the PSD had won the most votes, the Democratic Liberal
Party (PDL), which came close second, had gained more seats in parliament.
This odd occurrence was a consequence of the multiple redistribution stages of
the electoral law, a process most voters did not know about.79 Another surprise
to many voters was the fact that candidates were able to win seats even if they
finished second, third, or even fourth in the district they contested. In fact only
three-quarters of the MPs elected in 2008 had come first in the votes cast in their
districts. Interviews with MPs conducted in 2010 revealed that those elected first
on the list felt they had more legitimacy, when it came to legislation, than their
peers who had won their seats through redistribution.80 Since the candidates
of small parties are more likely to gain their seats without coming first in the
popular vote of their district, this upshot of the electoral law is more likely to
plague the small parties.
77  Ibid.
78  Marian / King,Plus ça change.
79  Gherghina / Jiglău,Where Does the Mechanism Collapse?
80  Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws.
Small parties may also be disadvantaged by another feature of the electoral

law. Although the law translates the proportions of votes into proportions of
seats fairly accurately, supporters of small parties may consider voting for their
preferred party a wasted vote and instead opt for larger parties ideologically
close to them. A vote for the preferred party is not wasted in the sense that it
helps the party in one of the two rounds of redistribution, but for the voters
concerned primarily with the fate of their own districts, voting for the candidate
from a larger party gives them a greater feeling of control.81 Additionally the
new system may have discouraged voter participation, since there is some confu-
sion whether to vote on party lines or according to candidate characteristics.82
Concluding Remarks
This excursus into changes in the electoral law of post-communist Romania
has identified two broad periods of reform. These arose from two different kinds
of pressures to which policy-makers had to respond: in the 1990s electoral rules
primarily reflected pressures from the international community, and the main
concern was the establishment of a strong party system able to offer viable op-
position to those in power. This concern was initially addressed by adopting
a very inclusive system in the first free elections, allowing a wide range of parties
with different views to participate in the first parliament. The follow-up was the
imposition of electoral thresholds to reduce the number of parties, consolidate
the party system and reduce political volatility. In the 2000s there were different
pressures. The push for electoral reform arose from people’s concern that MPs
were not sufficiently accountable to their voters.
These two quite different waves of pressure suggest positive development in
Romania’s struggle to implement democratic order: they correspond to needs
characteristic of different stages in the process of democratization. The fact that
the 2008 electoral reform emerged as a bottom-up civil-society movement led
by a non-governmental organization dissatisfied with the low level of MPs’ re-
sponsiveness to their voters is especially encouraging. It shows that Romanian
society has developed aspirations associated with more mature democracies.
Yet evaluation of the 2008 reform based on the existing literature yields a rather
sombre picture. The representational aims that drove the reform have clearly not
reached full fruition. We can only hope that, as the electoral law becomes more
entrenched, the imperfections identified in scholarly works will be eliminated.
This would in turn strengthen the ties between voters and elected representa-
tives, and hence the overall quality of Romania’s new democracy.
81  Ibid.
82  Gherghina / Jiglău, Where Does the Mechanism Collapse?
Radu Cinpoeș
The Dilemmas of Political (Mis-)Representation:

Political “Cruising” in Romania
Abstract. This article analyses the widespread phenomenon of party switching, labelled
“political cruising” in Romania, that characterises that state’s electoral politics. First, it con-
siders party switching to be a dimension of fragmentation (alongside fusions and divisions
within the parties themselves), which helps more accurately gauge the level of party system
institutionalisation in a given case. Second, it looks at why individuals change parties and
why parties accommodate and embrace such switching to explain why the phenomenon has
reached endemic levels in Romania. Finally, the author suggests that the pervasive political
“cruising” driven by clientelism in Romania has resulted in a lack of public trust in political
institutions and a decrease in electoral turnout.
Radu Cinpoeș is Senior Lecturer in Politics, Human Rights and International Relations at
Kingston University, London.
Introduction
Representative democracies aggregate diverse public interests and preferences
and cater to them. Stable democratic systems facilitate effective political choice
by providing viable, coherent programmes and a range of policy alternatives and
by ensuring unimpeded links between voters and their political representatives.
These achievements, in turn, enhance public political engagement and electoral
participation.1 It has been argued that the conditions of post-communism in
Central and Eastern Europe have affected the emergence and consolidation
of institutional frameworks that could effectively organise what Peter Mair
calls the political marketplace. These countries’ fragmented party systems and
1  Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition. New Haven/CT 1971; Russell
J. Dalton, Political Parties and Political Representation. Party Supporters and Party Elites in
Nine Nations, Comparative Political Studies 18 (1985), no. 3, 267-299; idem / Martin Wattenberg,
Parties without Partisans. Oxford 2000; Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy. Government
Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven/CT 1999.
96 Radu Cinpoeș
weak links between parties and their potential constituencies have generated
an unstable “supply” for such a marketplace.2
Joining the growing research on party system institutionalisation in Central
and Eastern Europe and its effects on representation and electoral participation,
this article focuses on party switching, viewing it as a practice that hampers
the development of competitive political parties that would offer the electorate
clear choices in the service of the public interest. It takes a staggered process-
tracing approach to contribute to a better understanding of Romanian party
politics. The case study allows for an intensive examination of party switching,
based largely on analysis of official documents and data, secondary data from
existing research, and media reports. Its longitudinal data analysis identifies
specific trends in patterns of switching and electoral participation. Romania’s
case offers an interesting picture: widespread party switching both within and
outside parliamentary politics has important consequences on central aspects
of the democratic process, especially the links between voters and parties. The
main focus here is on floor-crossing in the Parliament, because this practice
points to the instability and fragmentation of the party system and directly
influences electoral competition and voter participation.
Thus the article aims, first, to make an analytical contribution by showing
that party switching reflects the deeper nature of Romanian politics today. Al-
though some degree of stability has been achieved, Romania’s party system is
still highly unpredictable and prone to fragmentation. This article argues that
party switching is an important dimension of the broader instability affecting
political parties (which routinely splinter and merge), a sign of the fragmenta-
tion and lack of institutionalisation among individual parties and throughout
the party system in Romania.
Second, it discusses the frequency of the practice in relation to clientelism and
the distribution of public resources. The aim here is to explain why Romanian
parties accommodate defectors and thus perpetuate a vicious circle of inter-
party movement. Politicians and political parties not only tolerate but actively
encourage party switching, and thus it has become regrettably pervasive.
Finally, the consequences of party switching are discussed in relation to
representation and participation, showing that this characteristic of non-insti-
tutionalisation results in voter alienation (rather than volatility),3 manifested
2  Peter Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford 1997; Geoffrey
Evans / Stephen Whitefield, Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe,

British Journal of Political Science 23 (1993), no. 4, 521-548; Jack Bielasiak, Substance and Process
in the Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe, Communist and Post-Communist
Studies 30 (1991), no. 1, 23-44.
3  As Gherghina and Chiru argue, the Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat,
PSD), for example, has achieved a reasonably low level of electoral volatility, at least from
2000 onwards, and it can consistently count on around 35 percent of the votes. See Sergiu
The Dilemmas of Political (Mis-)Representation 97
through decreased participation in electoral politics. While the effects of party

switching on accountability are common areas of investigation in the literature,
the link to electoral participation has not been explored in the case of Romania,
where the phenomenon is rampant.
Conceptual Clarifications
Research on democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe has focused
on electoral politics and, within this field, on party system dynamics in the
cases investigated; the level of democratisation has been assessed according
to patterns evident in the institutionalisation of party systems, the level of sta-
bility and regularity of party competition and the electoral process, the level
of voter volatility, and the links between parties and voters.4 Based on such
analyses, scholars have claimed that Central and Eastern European countries
have evolved – especially in the last fifteen years – towards greater stability
and a higher degree of institutionalisation of party systems, with Hungary and
the Czech Republic appearing to be among the least volatile of those nations.5
Romania occupies a middle rank for democratisation and institutionalisation:
after a shaky start, it recently developed a relatively stable party system.6 To
some extent, this assessment appears to be borne out when looking at its party
system and state of electoral competition.
Democratisation, however, is not a linear process that enables a country to
move gradually from being less democratic to more democratic, and it is not
unidirectional. In fact, to make a distinction between “stable” and “unstable”
countries is to oversimplify the picture. When it comes to stability and institu-
tionalisation, as noted by Grotz and Weber, states often follow “idiosyncratic
paths”: some countries held up as examplars for democratisation because of
Gherghina / Mihail Chiru, Taking the Short Route. Political Parties, Funding Regulations, and
State Resources in Romania, East European Politics and Societies 27 (2013), no. 1, 108-128, 110.
However, as will be shown, the decrease in electoral participation also means a net decrease
in PSD voters.
4  See Mair, Party System Change; Scott P. Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the
Third Wave of Democratization. The Case of Brazil. Stanford/CA 1999; Sarah Birch, Electoral
Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe. One Europe or Several?
Basingstoke 2003.
5  Margit Tavits, On the Linkage between Electoral Volatility and Party System Instability
in Central and Eastern Europe, European Journal of Political Science 47 (2008), no. 5, 537-555;
Florian Grotz / Till Weber, Party Systems and Government Stability in Central and Eastern
Europe, World Politics 64 (2012), no. 4, 699-740.
6  See George Jiglău / Sergiu Gherghina, The Ideological Institutionalization of the
Romanian Party System, Romanian Journal of Political Science 11 (2011), no. 1, 71-90, which
counts among the features of this stabilisation the establishment of clearer ideological cleavages
in Romanian politics.
98 Radu Cinpoeș
relatively speedy movement towards stable and institutionalised party systems

have then regressed in those areas. Telling examples include Latvia – consid-
ered to be stable, though in the 2006-2010 term it went through four differ-
ent cabinets – and Poland – considered to be less stable, though there were
no changes in its cabinet between 2006 and 2011.7 Similarly, Romania seems
partly institutionalised at best, as it shows fluctuation in voter volatility and in
the ideological coherence of both its parties and its voters.8 The identification
of progress in party institutionalisation, therefore, tells only part of the story:
contingent factors and dynamics that can influence (positively or negatively)
such developments must also be explored.
Investigating party switching can be revealing when evaluating the stability
of political systems of any country. In addition, what happens below the level
of party system and electoral competition is (at the very least) equally relevant,
inasmuch as it can bring to light other factors that shape the political process.
Party switching, therefore, is considered here as an important (micro-level)
phenomenon that accounts for the instability and fragmentation of Romania’s
party system, complementing macro-level phenomena such as splits and merg-
ers among parties, as well as the emergence of new parties and the extinction
of others.9
The relatively limited but growing literature on party switching suggests
increasing research interest in this phenomenon. The concept itself is straight-
forward, with little disagreement in the existing research about what it entails:
broadly speaking, it refers to “any recorded change in party affiliation on the
part of a politician holding or competing for elective office”.10 Analyses of party
switching generally look at MPs who change party allegiance, likely because
these shifts on the level of parliamentary politics are more visible and exert
a more direct impact on elections. However, party switching by those other
than MPs or would-be MPs is also relevant, and this study considers it as part
of the broader phenomenon, including in its discussion group movements from
one party to another that may affect the number of parties competing in elec-
tions. Processes of fusion – where the number of parties decreases because two
or more groups consolidate into a single organisation – and of fission – where
splits into factions increase the number of parties – influence the level of insti-
  7  Grotz / Weber,
Party Systems and Government Stability, 699.
  8  Clara
Volintiru, The Institutionalisation of the Romanian Party System, Sfera Politicii
172 (2012), no. 6, 134-143, available at <http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/172/cuprins.php>.
All internet sources were accessed on 4 March 2015.
  9  Marcus Kreuzer / Vello Pettai, Party Switching, Party Systems, and Political Repres-
entation, in: William B. Heller / Carol Mershon (eds.), Political Parties and Legislative Party
Switching. Basingstoke 2009, 265-286.
10  Carol Mershon / Olga Shvetsova, Parliamentary Cycles and Party Switching in Legis-
latures, Comparative Political Studies 41 (2008), no. 1, 99-127, 104.

tutionalisation in a political system.11 They exercise a similar effect to that of

party switching because they weaken the link between voters and parties, and
lower trust in the political process.
“Party switching” is sufficiently self-explanatory and conceptually straight-
forward so as not to require amendment. But it is important to point out that
the widespread phenomenon of party switching has been dubbed traseism politic
(political cruising) in colloquial Romanian12 – a coinage with negative sexual
connotations, emphasizing the immorality of the practice.13
Looking beyond the concept, several trends can be observed in the litera-
ture. First, party switching is a phenomenon with rather limited relevance for
European politics. It is broadly associated with politics in relatively young de-
mocracies, and research shows it to be more prevalent in places such as Brazil,
India, and parts of Africa. Not that it does not occur in Europe: the research has
highlighted it happening in Italy and, more recently, Poland.14
A second trend relates to explanations of the movement of individuals from
one party to another. McMenamin and Gwiazda accurately observe that rea-
sons for switching can be circumscribed within Strøm’s three avenues to in-
stitutionalisation, a model that distinguishes vote-seeking, office-seeking, and
policy-seeking parties.15 Thus, in the first category, defectors act on electoral
incentives, either those that enhance their re-election prospects or allow them to
avoid accountability. The office-seeking category covers switching by politicians
who eye a favourable distribution of office positions or – as Desposato notes,
11  Diana Z. O’Brien / Yael Shomer, A Cross-National Analysis of Party Switching, Legislative
Studies Quarterly 38 (2013), no. 1, 111-141, 113.

12  Radu Cinpoeș, Extremism in Disguise. Casual Intolerance and Political Cruising in
Romania, Holocaust. Study and Research / Studii și Cercetări 6 (2013), 228-251.

13  In Romanian, the term traseistă refers to prostitutes soliciting sex by the side of the road.
It is common for lorry drivers to pick them up and drive on, to the nearest service station or
lay-by. Although not having precisely the same connotations, the English slang word cruising
nevertheless captures something similar: travelling for the purpose of engaging in sexual
activities that suggest, at least for those who disapprove of them, loose morals. Both terms
describe temporary encounters made out of convenience and for personal gain – though only
the Romanian term makes it explicit that money changes hands. Romania is not unique in
developing a local phrase for party switching: in New Zealand, the term waka-jumping is used
colloquially to refer to politicians “jumping ship”.
14  William B. Heller / Carol Mershon, Dealing in Discipline. Party Switching and Legislative
Voting in the Italian Chamber of Deputies: 1988-2000, American Journal of Political Science 52
(2008), no. 4, 910-925; eadem, Introduction, in: eadem (eds.), Political Parties and Legislative
Party Switching. Basingstoke 2009, 3-28, 4; Iain McMenamin / Anna Gwiazda, Three Roads
to Institutionalisation. Vote-, Office- and Policy-seeking Explanations of Party Switching in
Poland, European Journal of Political Research 50 (2011), 838-866; Daniel J. Young, An Initial Look
into Party Switching in Africa. Evidence from Malawi, Party Politics 20 (2014), no. 1, 105-115.
15  Kaare Strøm, A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties, American Journal of
Political Science 34 (1990), no. 2, 565-598; McMenamin / Gwiazda, Three Roads to Institutio

nalisation, 841.
100 Radu Cinpoeș
writing of Brazil – the means to allocate “pork”. Finally, those politicians whose
defections are motivated by policy aim either to obtain greater control in policy
making, which may otherwise be hindered by fuzzy party labels, or to minimise
ideological heterogeneity.16 These categories have the virtue of being analytically
distinct, but the actual motivations for switching are more ambiguous and do
not always fit neatly into one of these rationales. In Romania’s case, however,
research shows that party switching has largely been a means to secure access
to the distribution of public funds.17 Conversely, switching to avoid being held
accountable by the electorate does not seem to be a significant motivation for
Romanian politicians, especially since floor-crossing in Parliament happens
throughout each term (rather than right before the end), and often occurs very
soon after elections (as opposition party members switch to the ruling party),
as will be shown.
Finally, the literature discusses political parties’ relation to party switching
largely as a way to identify the interplay between a party and its potential
defectors; that is, it looks at the conditions that would put a party at a higher
or lower risk of defections, that would allow it to command greater or lesser
loyalty from its members. In the last few years, there has emerged particularly
relevant research on party switching concentrating on Romania. Work by Ştefan
et al., for example, focuses on party discipline and points out that floor-crossing
is facilitated by underlying issues with political parties and a lack of program-
matic enforcement of discipline.18 Complementary research by Gherghina looks
at the mutual benefits (for defectors and the parliamentary party groups that
receive them) of party switching, exploring the conditions in which parties are
willing to accept defections.19 The present study adds to the debate about why
political parties benefit from and encourage defections by looking at clientelistic
16  McMenamin / Gwiazda, Three Roads to Institutionalisation, 841f.; Scott W. Desposato,
Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology and Party Switching in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies,
American Journal of Political Science 50 (2006), no. 1, 62-80, 70f.; Carol Mershon, Legislative
Party Switching and Executive Coalitions, Japanese Journal of Political Science 9 (2009), no. 3,
391-414, 394.
17  Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Romania. Outsmarting the EU’s Smart Power, in: Michael Emer
son / Richard Youngs (eds.) Democracy’s Plight in the European Neighbourhood. Struggling

Transitions and Proliferating Dynasties. Brussels 2009, 41-48, 43f. See also information on
corruption and party switching offered by the civil society-based project “Alianţa pentru o
Românie curată”, available at <http://romaniacurata.ro/>.
18  Laurenţiu Ştefan / Sergiu Gherghina / Mihail Chiru, We All Agree that We Disagree
Too Much. Attitudes of Romanian MPs towards Party Discipline, East European Politics 28
(2012), no. 2, 180-192.
19  Sergiu Gherghina, Rewarding the ‘Traitors’? Legislative Defection and Re-Election
in Romania, Party Politics, published online before print (2014), available at <http://ppq.
sagepub.com/content/early/2014/09/17/1354068814550434.abstract>, 1-11. See also Michael
Laver / Kenneth Benoit, The Evolution of Party Systems between Elections, American Journal
of Political Science 47 (2003), no. 2, 215-233, for a broader discussion of some of these issues.
practices embedded in Romanian politics. Political clientelism is understood

here primarily in relation to structurally embedded networks indicative of
long-term interaction based on the preferential distribution of public employ-
ment and public funds. Electoral gains are often the goal of these transactions
(examples of the short-term iterative and non-iterative exchanges distinguished
by Volintiru, which are made with varying degrees of success).20 In addition,
the article looks at the effects of these interactions on voter confidence in the
political process and consequently on participation.
The Case of Romania

Assessing the Level of Party Fragmentation
Because its party system dynamics are unpredictable, Romania is an interest-

ing case in terms of its level of institutionalisation. It reinforces emphatically
Grotz and Weber’s claim mentioned earlier about the non-linear paths that states
can take to democratisation and stability. Until recently, Romania followed
a slow but steady route to a party system where the number of parliamentary
parties that competed consistently and repeatedly in elections had gradually de-
creased.21 At first glance, the outcome of the 2012 parliamentary elections seems
aligned with this trend: only four political groups won seats in both the upper
and lower chambers of Parliament. However, only two were discrete parties: the
People’s Party Dan Diaconescu (Partidul Poporului – Dan Diaconescu, PP-DD) and
the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrată Maghiară
din România, UDMR). The other two were large blocs comprising several par-
ties. The Social Liberal Union (Uniunea Social Liberală, USL) bloc was formed
of two alliances: the Centre Left Alliance (Alianţa de Centru Stânga, ACS) and
the Centre Right Alliance (Alianţa de Centru Dreapta, ACD). On the other side,
the Right Romania Alliance (Alianţa România Dreaptă, ARD) brought together
20  Clara Volintiru, Clientelism: Electoral Forms and Functions in the Romanian Case
Study, Romanian Journal of Political Sciences 12 (2012), no. 1, 35-66. For a broader discussion
of forms of clientelism in Romania, see also Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, A Case Study in Political
Clientelism. Romania’s Policy-Making Mayhem, working paper, 3 October 2010, available at
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1686617>; Clara Volintiru, How Public Spending is Fuelling
Electoral Strategies in Romania, Südosteuropa 61 (2013) no. 2, 268-289; Sergiu Gherghina, Going
for a Safe Vote. Electoral Bribes in Post-Communist Romania, Debatte. Journal of Contemporary
Central and Eastern Europe 21 (2013), no. 2-3, 143-164.
21  As Jiglău and Gherghina argue, Romania moved from having sixteen parliamentary
parties in 1990 to seven in 1992, six in 1996, five in 2004, and four in 2004 and 2008. Jiglău / Gher
ghina, The Ideological Institutionalization, 72. The authors consider the results for the second
chamber, but even then it can be argued that technically the number of parliamentary parties
in 2008 was five, given that the Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat, PSD) and the
Conservative Party (Partidul Conservator, PC) entered the elections in an alliance.
102 Radu Cinpoeș
several parties. Combined, the two blocs encompassed seven parties, so that
the total of parliamentary parties was nine.22
Moreover, as of summer 2014 (in the same 2012-2016 term), due to various
splits and realignments, the situation has become even more complicated and
volatile. Now ten parties are represented in both houses.23 Interestingly in this
context, the electoral system change of 2008, which eliminated the party-list
proportional representation system and adopted a mixed-member proportional
system, has not produced significant changes in stability for the party system.
In fact, in this regard Romania regressed in the elections of 2008 and fell back
even further in 2012. At the moment the political arena is very much in flux,
with attempts at realignments on the right side of the political spectrum.
The (in)stability of the political parties due to repeated splits and mergers
needs to be considered, – though we can do so only in a perfunctory manner,
due to the complexity of the party permutations since 1990. Many of the main
parliamentary parties at the moment (setting aside their various alliances and
coalitions) have undergone significant changes.
The current Social Democratic Party (PSD) is one of the two heirs of the
National Salvation Front (FSN), the group that emerged in the aftermath of
the 1989 events in Romania and was supposed to ensure the transition to free
elections.24 In 1992 the FSN split. The faction led by former president Ion Iliescu
formed the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN), which became the
Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) in 1993, having absorbed the
Romanian Socialist Democratic Party (PSDR), the Social Solidarity Party (PSS),
and the Republican Party (PR). In 2001 the PSD was created out of the merger
of the PDSR with the PSDR; it absorbed the Labour Socialist Party (PSM) and
the Socialist Party of National Rebirth (PSRN), a splinter group that had left the
Greater Romania Party (PRM) in 2003, and the National Initiative Party (PIN),
formed by a splinter group from the Democratic Party (PD), in 2011. As for
breakaway factions, a group led by Teodor Meleșcanu left the (then) PDSR to
form the Alliance for Romania (APR) in 1997, and the current UNPR was formed
in 2010 by MPs who left either the PSD or the National Liberal Party (PNL).25
22  Thus, the ACS included the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the National Union for
the Progress of Romania (Uniunea Națională pentru Progresul României, UNPR), while the ACD
included the National Liberal Party (Partidul Național Liberal, PNL) and the Conservative Party
(PC). The ARD comprised the Democratic Liberal Party (Partidul Democrat-Liberal, PDL), the
Civic Force (Forța Civică, FC), and the Christian Democrat National Peasants’ Party (Partidul
Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat, PNŢCD).
23  These parties are: the PSD, the PNL, the PDL, the PP-DD, the UDMR, the PC, the UNPR,
the FC, the PNŢCD, and the Green Party (Partidul Verde, PV).
24  Despite huge criticism, the group subsequently organised itself as a political party and
won in the 1990 elections.

25  It is worth mentioning here that the UNPR, having partially emerged out of a split
from the PSD, competed in the 2012 elections together with the PSD, as part of the Centre
The other faction of the FSN in the 1992 split carried on under the leader-
ship of Petre Roman and changed the party’s name to the Democratic Party
the following year. It merged with the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) – itself
a breakaway PNL faction – and formed the PDL. In 2014, the PDL merged with
the Civic Force (Forța Civică, FC), and in July 2014, the two parties announced
a merger between the PDL and the PNL, which is still being finalized. The group
will retain the name PNL.
Finally, the PNL has undergone many transformations over the years. Having
been reconstituted after the collapse of communism, the party endured repeated
splits and mergers in the early 1990s. In July 1990, a group broke away from
the PNL to form the National Liberal Party-Youth Wing (Partidul Național Libe
ral – Aripa Tânără, PNL-AT). There followed in 1992 another splinter group, the
National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention (PNL-CD), which itself broke
apart after the 1992 election when a faction within it founded the National Liberal
Party-Câmpeanu (PNL-C). In 1993, PNL-AT became the Liberal Party ’93 (PL ’93)
and later formed – with the Civic Alliance Party (PAC) – the Liberal Party (PL).
In 1998, the PNL absorbed the PL and the PNL-CD and merged with the PAC;
it merged with the APR in 2002, and the following year it absorbed the Union
of Right-Wing Forces (UFD). In 2014, the PNL approved the merger with the
PDL (which included within its ranks the former breakaway faction from the
PNL, which had formed the PLD). Also in 2014, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu and
around thirty MPs left the PNL to found the Liberal Reformist Party (Partidul
Liberal Reformator, PLR).26
Such varied permutations (with numerous and ongoing splits, mergers, and
absorptions) among the political parties reflects a very fluid and fragmented
party system. In the following section, an examination of the micro-level dy-
namics in party switching will reinforce this view. In turn, as will be suggested,
a party system in constant flux and widespread political cruising result in vot-
ers’ disenchantment with the political process and induce low participation in
electoral politics.
Assessing Party Switching in Romania
The often quasi-incestuous transformations of the main political parties are

part of the broader fragmentation that mars Romanian political life. Consider-
Left Alliance. Furthermore, discussions took place in 2012 about a possible merger between
the PSD and the UNPR (which has not materialised). See Florin Necula, Fuziune între PSD
și UNPR? Ce zic liderii progresiști, Ziare.com, 18 September 2012, available at <http://www.
ziare.com/unpr/victor-ponta/fuziune-intre-psd-si-unpr-ce-zic-liderii-progresisti-1190626>.
26  For details about party transformations, see Jiglău / Gherghina, The Ideological
Institutionalization; and Cinpoeș, Extremism in Disguise.

104 Radu Cinpoeș
ing individual party switching makes the situation appear even more alarming.
These factors have profound implications on political representation in several
ways.
First, rampant party switching has contributed to notable realignments in
the Romanian party system since 1990. The phenomenon has been responsible
for the consolidation of some parties’ positions and the outright extinction of
other parties. It has also caused the party system to evolve unpredictably, with
periods of apparent stabilisation and institutionalisation followed by turmoil.
Second, and consequently, this fluidity has exerted a negative impact on voters’
trust in their representatives and on participation in elections.
As suggested earlier, party switching in Romania can be better understood
if observed both as a parliamentary phenomenon and as something that affects
inter-party relations. A look at party switching across several legislative sessions
reveals a steady trend of increases during periods marked by important shifts in
the organisation of the party systems. Data concerning the full structure of the
Chamber of Deputies in each legislative term in Figure 1 and Table 1 detail the
number of MPs in the lower house of the Romanian Parliament who served in
one term as members of a different party than in the previous legislative session
(including those with no party affiliation) (see Fig. 1, Table 1).27
Several aspects require further qualification and discussion, especially regard-
ing the limitations of the data presented above. First, the figures do not account
for changes across chambers, which would likely show additional migration.
Second, the figures up to the current 2012-2016 term represent only the switches
that have taken place between parliamentary sessions. The count is based on
the composition of the Chamber of Deputies at the end of each term (from data
provided by the website of the Romanian Parliament). Thus the figures do not
account for migration during a term, and so the number of switchers from one
term to the next will be significantly smaller than if these politicians had also
been counted. Hypothetically, if an MP moves from the PDL to the PSD during
the 2008-2012 term, and is counted in the 2008-2012 Parliamentary data as a PSD
representative, then he or she will not appear as a switcher in the 2012-2016 term.
Looking at floor-crossing within each parliamentary term shows an even
higher level of defection than indicated in the tables below. Research by Ştefan
et al., for example, shows that during each parliamentary term from 1992 until
2011 the proportion of floor-crossers ranged from 10 to nearly 25 percent of
27  Compiled from data available on the website of the Romanian Parliament, Camera
Deputaţilor, available at <http://www.cdep.ro/>. Figure 1 and Table 1 account only for the
MPs that served in one term as part of a different party than in the previous term (including
independent MPs), using the end-of-term lists of MPs. Thus, the figures exclude those who
did not complete their term (or were not re-elected), as well as floor-crossing taking place
within terms.
30
25 24
21
20
17
14
15
12
10
0
1996‐2000 2000‐2004 2004‐2008 2008‐2012 2012‐2016
(April 2013)
Figure 1. MPs in the lower house who are members of a different party than they had
been in the previous legislative session.
Figure 1. MPs in the lower house who are members of a different party than they had be
Table 1. MPs in the lower house who were members of a different party than they had
the previous legislative session.
been in the previous legislative session presented as net numbers and as a percentage
of the number of all MPs in each legislature.
Legislature 1996-2000 2000-2004 2004-2008 2008-2012 2012-2016
(April 2013)
Net total of MPs in the 24 17 21 14 12
lower house who switched
compared to the previous
legislative session
Percentage of the total num-   7   5   6.5   4.6   3
ber of MPs in each legislative
session
the total MPs in the lower house.28 In addition, halfway through the current
2012-2016 parliamentary term, 66 MPs (16.5 percent) have switched parties,
if we compare the April 2013 and August 2014 lists of deputies. With the next
parliamentary elections still more than two years away, more are likely to do so,
especially given the splits and mergers currently in process, which have not yet
been fully accounted for in the structure of the Parliament. The current situation
tallies with the pattern of frequent floor-crossing in previous terms (Figure 2).
Furthermore, data from the Alliance for a Clean Romania (Alianţa pentru o
Românie Curată, ARC) show that during periods in the 2008-2012 parliamentary
28  Ştefan / Gherghina / Chiru, We All Agree that We Disagree, 185f.

106 Radu Cinpoeș
25
23,5
19,5
20
16,5
15
15
12,5 13
10
10
5
0
1992‐1996 1996‐2000 2000‐2004 2004‐2008 2008‐2011 2008‐2012 2012‐2014
Figure 2. Party switching during each term in the lower house of the Romanian Par-
liament since 1992 (as a percentage of total MPs). Source: Data compiled using Ştefan /
Figure 2. PartyWeswitching
Gherghina / Chiru, during
All Agree that each186,
We Disagree, term in period
for the the lower house
1992-2011; ofAlexan
Violeta the Romanian
dru / Adrian Moraru / Raluca Mihai, Sinteza activităţii parlamentarilor în mandatul 2008-2012,
Institutul
since 1992pentru Politici
(as a Publice, September
percentage of 2012,
totalavailable
MPs).at <www.ipp.ro/protfiles.php?IDfile=162>,
for the term 2008-2012; and the author’s findings using data available on the website of the Romanian
Parliament for the period 2012-2014. The 2008-2011 and the 2012-2014 figures show only partial
Source: Data compiled using ŞTEFAN / GHERGHINA / CHIRU, We All Agree that We D
results (as in the former case, data was collected before the term had finished, while in the latter
case, the parliamentary term was ongoing when the research was carried out). See also Gherghina,
for the period 1992-2011; Violeta ALEXANDRU / Adrian MORARU / Raluca MIHAI, Sinte
Rewarding the ‘Traitors’?, 5f., for additional figures of floor-crossing within parliamentary terms.
parlamentarilor în mandatul 2008-2012, Institutul pentru Politici Publice, September 20
term alone, 80 MPs (52 in the Chamber of Deputies
at <www.ipp.ro/protfiles.php?IDfile=162>, and
for the 28 in
term the Senate)and
2008-2012; switched
the author’s fi
parties.29 Looking at data for the entire 2008-2012 term, the Institute for Public
data available on the website of the Romanian Parliament for the period 2012-2014. Th
Policies in Romania (IPP) found that 94 MPs (59 deputies and 35 senators) did
so,
andtotalling 120 switches
the 2012-2014 figures(some
show switched more
only partial than(as
results once). Similar
in the formerincidences
case, data was coll
of switching have occurred in other legislative terms as well, showing a much
the term had finished, while in the latter case, the parliamentary term was ongoing when
higher overall level of switching in Romania than elsewhere. Thus, the IPP
was carried
shows out). See
that during thealso
2000-2004 term,, Rewarding
GHERGHINA the ‘Traitors’?,
the party most affected by5f., for additional figu
defections
was the PD, who lost 20 percent of their MPs; the PRM shed 18 MPs over the
crossing within parliamentary terms.
same period. During the 2004-2008 legislature, party switching increased and
exerted the most pronounced effect on the PSD, who lost 18 MPs.30
Floor-crossing in Parliament is complemented by broader, widespread inter-
party switching. Taking place away from the very public scene of parliamen-
29  Adrian Popescu, Traseism parlamentar: 20% din aleșii poporului și-au trădat partidul
în actuala legislatură. ARC vă prezintă lista completă a celor 80 de senatori și deputaţi

migratori, Alianţa pentru o Românie Curată, 24 April 2012, available at <http://romaniacurata.
ro/traseism-parlamentar-20-din-alesii-poporului-si-au-tradat-partidul-in-actuala-legislatura-
arc-va-prezinta-lista-completa-a-celor-80-de-senatori-si-deputati-migratori/>.
30  Alexandru / Moraru / Mihai, Sinteza activităţii parlamentarilor.
tary politics, it has received less attention from organisations that monitor the
phenomenon. It is also much more difficult to account for. Nonetheless, there
is some data about inter-party switching that shows the impact it has had on
Romanian politics.
For instance, the rise of the extreme right in post-communist Romania and its
eventual collapse were shaped – at least to some extent – by party migration.
In the early 1990s, the battle between the Party for Romanian National Unity
(Partidul Unităţii Națiunii Române, PUNR) and the PRM for supremacy on the
extreme right was settled by significant migration from the former to the latter.
In 1997, following a leadership squabble in the PUNR, Gheorghe Funar, one
of its prominent members and the former mayor of Cluj Napoca, was expelled
from the party. His ouster led to a splinter group exiting the party. He and some
of his followers joined the PRM in 1998, with Funar serving as its General Sec-
retary. Arguably, this led to a shift in voter support away from the PUNR and
towards the PRM, as voting patterns in the former Transylvanian strongholds
of the PUNR show.31
After the 2000 elections (and more visibly from 2004 onwards), the PRM’s
decreasing popularity triggered another major wave of defections, with many
of its members seeking refuge within the mainstream parties.32 At the broad
level of inter-party dynamics, instances of collective party switching have be-
come common in Romania. In several cases not only groups of individuals but
entire local organisations have shifted party allegiance, either in protest against
unpopular decisions from the party centre or simply because their party’s
popularity is waning.33
Considered together, the high level of floor-crossing in the Parliament and
the switching taking place in local party organisations paint a bleak picture of
the level of stability of the Romanian political system. Because these migrations
occur without relevant constituencies being consulted, they are likely to have
consequences on voter satisfaction, which in turn exerts an impact – as will be
discussed – on electoral participation.
31  Radu Cinpoeș, Nationalism and Identity in Romania. A History of Extreme Politics from
the Birth of the State to EU Accession. London, New York 2010, 93f.
32  For a more detailed examination of the incorporation of extreme right-wing politicians
into the mainstream in Romania, see Cinpoeș, Extremism in Disguise.

33  For example, news agencies reported that several hundred local PDL and PC members
in Petrila and Lupeni migrated to the PNL in 2008: Alexandra Șandru, Sute de membri PDL
și PC din Valea Jiului au migrat în PNL, Ziare.com, 5 February 2008, available at <http://www.
ziare.com/pnl/stiri-pnl/sute-de-membri-pd-l-si-pc-din-valea-jiului-au-migrat-in-pnl-232714>.
See also Cinpoeș, Extremism in Disguise, 243 and note 14.
108 Radu Cinpoeș
Party Switching in Romania: Features and Effects
Party switching in Romania thus pervades all levels of the political process
and influences party system dynamics. What follows in this section outlines
some of its visible characteristics and evaluates its more prominent effects on
electoral participation.
Observing the level of party switching since 1996 across different legislative
terms, there appears to be no significant change after 2008, unlike in the previ-
ous period. The year 2008 is relevant because it marks the date of Romania’s
electoral system change. The move from a closed-list proportional representation
(PR) system to a single-member constituency system should have produced
– in theory – some changes in MP behaviour concerning party switching. In
a closed-list PR system, elected MPs have weaker links with their constituents
than in single-member constituencies. That switching has not decreased since
the mixed-member proportional (MMP) system was introduced suggests that
politicians are not especially concerned with how their constituents regard their
performance as MPs (and do not fear potential punishment at the polls); electoral
incentives – at least those involving accountability – are not chiefly why they
switch. Their indifference to voter scrutiny suggests that the electoral system
change has not strengthened links between MPs and their constituents. In fact,
evidence shows that voters continue to manifest an utter lack of information
and awareness about their representatives. In a 2012 survey by the Romanian
Institute for Evaluation and Strategy (IRES), 62 percent of the respondents did
not know the name of the deputy who had been their representative for the past
four years; 68 percent did not know the name of the senator during the same
period. Surveys of voter knowledge about the activities of their representatives
in Parliament yielded even worse results: 73 percent knew nothing about what
their deputy had done, and 80 percent were completely ignorant of their sena-
tor’s activities.34
Electoral incentives do seem to play a role, however, at least for politicians
aiming to enhance their chances of getting elected. As was shown in the cases of
the PUNR and, later, the PRM, when a party’s popularity decreases, in concert
with other contextual aspects that reduce an MP’s re-election chances, politicians
will often defect to another party (unsurprisingly, usually one trending upwards
in popularity) to maximise their chances of retaining a parliamentary seat.
Politicians’ willingness to sacrifice party loyalty to keep their seats does not,
in itself, explain why they act this way. Data on party switching reveal that
a great deal of the movement happens during rather than across legislative
34  De ce și cu ce schimbăm sistemul electoral, Societatea Academică din România Policy Brief
64, June 2013, 8, available at <http://www.romaniacurata.ro/spaw2/uploads/files/Policy%20

brief%20iunie%202013-1.pdf>.
terms, and quite often very early on, as the details of the 2012-2016 term show.
This may appear curious, as far as the pressure of securing a seat goes; after all,
these individuals have mounted successful electoral campaigns. The direction
of migration is relevant in this respect. During the 2000-2004 term, the main
beneficiary of the PD and PRM defections was the PDSR, the party in govern-
ment. Similarly, in the 2004-2008 term, switching affected the PSD, which lost
the elections, and benefitted mainly the PD but also the PNL, which were part
of the coalition government. After 2007, disagreements emerged between the
PNL and the PD, and the PNL split. The PD (in its new, PDL incarnation) ac-
quired – via their newly constituted party – the defectors from the PNL. In the
current term, it is – unsurprisingly – the PSD, the main governing party (after
the PNL pulled out of the coalition), that has attracted most of the switchers
(mainly from the PP-DD), whereas other cross-party movement is attributable
to fluidity along the centre-right spectrum.35 Considering the timing and the
direction of migration, party switches can patently be explained as efforts by
politicians to be part of the governing structure, whereby they gain preferential
access to the distribution of public funds. As Mungiu-Pippidi notes, “Romanian
politics continues to be dominated by nepotism and clientelism, with public
resources being the main source of spoils and fuel of politics, recycled through
private businesses to political parties”.36 In short, there is a direct link between
switching and the amount of governmental funds that can be allocated to the
constituency of an MP who is in the governing party. This clientelistic relation-
ship is further evinced by the many amendments put forth by MPs concerning
state budget projects.37 Volintiru’s detailed research on political clientelism in
Romania highlights the different avenues suited to such activity. For instance,
she points to the potential for preferential distribution of public investment funds
through direct transfers to local public administrations, and offers a thorough
analysis of the use of discretionary government funds to bankroll clientelistic
exchanges.38
These power dynamics, revolving around the allocation of public funds, help
explain another puzzling aspect of the phenomenon: the attitude of the political
35 Alexandru / Moraru / Mihai, Sinteza activităţii parlamentarilor, 29-30; Institutul pentru
Politici Publice, Review of the First Parliament Session for the Current Term of Office (Februa
ry – June 2013), Bucharest, 15 July 2013, 6, available at <http://ipp.ro/library/bilant%20de%20
sesiune_OSI_ENG.pdf>.
36 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (ed.), Landslide Victory for Left-Right Coalition in Romanian
Elections, Societatea Academică din România. Policy Brief 63, December 2012, updated, available
at <http://sar.org.ro/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Policy-Brief-SAR-63-3.pdf>.
37  De ce și cu ce schimbăm sistemul electoral, 8.
38  Volintiru, How Public Spending is Fuelling Electoral Strategies; see also idem,
Clientelism. Electoral Forms and Functions; and idem, The Institutionalisation of the Romanian
Party System.
110 Radu Cinpoeș
parties themselves towards party switching. At first sight, it may appear coun-
terintuitive that political parties tolerate party migration. Politicians who have
been disloyal towards their own parties might well be regarded suspiciously
by other political parties – which, presuming defectors to be politically fickle,
would be reluctant to accept such people into their ranks. And if floor-crossing
reached a certain threshold then the scale of the phenomenon would risk
jeopardising the parliamentary positions of certain political parties; thus we
would expect parties to establish (formally or informally) some self-regulating
framework to limit switching. But this has not happened in Romania, where,
in fact, parties seem to regard the risks of haemorrhaging MPs after losing
an election an acceptable price to pay for the benefits of attracting members
from opposing parties. When on an ascending trajectory, a party that accepts
defectors can ensure that it will acquire more comprehensive control over state
funds. While the law prohibits elected local officials from switching parties,
there is no such ban for members of the legislature, where parties encourage
such practices in their efforts to secure large governing majorities that would
reduce the legislature’s power to scrutinise them.39 A vicious circle is created:
local party organisations contribute to the election of their candidates with the
clear expectation that rewards will be directed to their constituencies from the
public purse, thus perpetuating preferential networks and exchanges.40
Overall, party switching facilitates clientelistic practices and prolongs party
system instability; it leads to voter alienation and a lack of trust in politicians
and political institutions. In the Romanian public’s perception, political parties
and the Parliament are the institutions most affected by corruption.41 This view,
in turn, can be linked to a decrease in electoral turnout.
The weak link of candidates and/or elected representatives with voters de-
spite the personalisation of the elections (via the electoral systems) suggests
that switching parties has little bearing on whether individuals get elected.
This is because voters make their choices largely on the basis of party names,
which they are more familiar with.42 Sometimes, however, popular figures
win based purely on personality rather than on party support: George Becali,
a controversial football club owner, secured his seat with ease in 2012 after mak-
ing a last minute pre-election switch from his own party, the New Generation
Party-Christian Democratic (PNG-CD), to the PNL. Voter choice based on party
name recognition increases the importance of the local party organisation, and
39  Mungiu-Pippidi (ed.), Landslide Victory, 10; Alexandru / Moraru / Mihai, Sinteza acti
vităţii parlamentarilor, 30f.; Institutul pentru Politici Publice, Review of the First Parliament
Session, 5.
40  De ce și cu ce schimbăm sistemul electoral, 8f.
41  Volintiru, Clientelism: Electoral Forms and Functions, 51.
42  De ce și cu ce schimbăm sistemul electoral, 8.
30
27
25 26
25
24
19 22 22
20
16 16 16 16
15 13
12
10
10
5
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Parliament Government Political parties
Figure 3. Level of trust in political parties, legislative and executive bodies.
Figure 3. Level of trust in political parties/legislative/executive.

despite legislation limiting large electoral gifts, these laws are frequently not
enforced. Allegations of electoral bribery and vote buying persist in Romania.43
As a result, trust in politicians and in the main political institutions – the
legislative and the executive – is very low. According to data from the Euroba-
rometer, it falls short of the EU average by a significant margin, although it is
to some extent comparable with trends in other Central and Eastern European
countries (see Fig. 3).44
A decline in voter turnout underscores the lack of trust in political institutions
and the general disconnect between the electorate and its elected officials (see
Fig. 4). Turnout for parliamentary elections since 1992 has shown a continu-
ous downwards trend. In this respect, Romania is one of the worst cases in
the EU (only Lithuania fares worse). The only exception is the 2012 elections,
although the 2.56 percent difference compared to 2008 is marginal (39.20 in
2008, compared to 41.76 in 2012). The slight improvement could be explained
by President Traian Băsescu, the polarising figure who was the main driver of
43  The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe / The Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, Romania. Parliamentary Elections 9 December 2012, Warsaw,
16 January 2013, 12, available at <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/96479?download=true>;
Volintiru, Clientelism. Electoral Forms and Functions.
44  European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm>. Since for 2014 only the spring wave is currently

available, data for the spring wave were used for the other years, starting with 2007, the year
Romania joined the EU. For trust in political parties, only autumn-wave data were available
and were used for 2007 and 2011.
112 Radu Cinpoeș
90
80 76,29 76,01
70 65,31
58,51
60
50
41,76
40
39,2
30
20
10
0
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Figure 4. Voter turnout in Romanian parliamentary elections. Data compiled from the
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout Data for
Figure 4.available
Romania, Voter turnout in Romanian parliamentary elections.
at <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=189>.
Source: Data compiled from the International Institute for Democracy and Electora
the electoral competition, pitching the anti-Băsescu left-right coalition the Social
Assistance,
Liberal UnionVoter
(USL)Turnout Data was
against what for Romania,
perceived available at
to be the pro-Băsescu camp –
the Right Romania Alliance (ARD), a makeshift attempt to unify centre-right
http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=189.
groups including the PDL, the PNTCD, and the newly formed Civic Force (FC).
The steady drop in turnout is also dramatic in net terms: the difference between
the highest and the lowest points of the interval is 37.09% per cent, a drop of
nearly half the 1992 figures.
Concluding Remarks
Party switching poses important analytical and normative questions concern-
ing party system institutionalisation, political representation, and voter partici-
pation. A party system’s stability is directly related to the stability of political
parties themselves, that is, to their ability to secure internal cohesion and retain
member loyalty. Without these features, political parties may fragment, break
apart into factions, and be vulnerable to party switching. As a phenomenon to
be studied, party switching has received relatively little attention, which can
perhaps be justified by its relatively low frequency (rare enough so that it does
not affect the political process) within older, more established democracies.
Scholarly attention has focused on newer democracies. This study contributes
to this growing literature by focusing on the case of Romania, where this type
of movement between parties is endemic.
The case study reveals that party switching is an important cause of instability
and fragmentation and shows that the Romanian party system still suffers from
limited institutionalisation. Its pervasiveness shows that party switching is not
a result of fuzzy party labels, nor is it primarily motivated by political ambition
or even by an attempt to avoid being accountable to the voters. Instead, the
clientelism embedded in Romanian politics and society incentivises politicians
to seek to become part of the governing party or parties so as to gain access to
the distribution of public funds. Rather than being frowned upon by political
parties, the practice is actually encouraged as a way to maximise control of
the public purse when in power. Most importantly, this vicious circle – where
individual interests drive party switching and party interests encourage it –
alienates the electorate from the political process, causing an erosion of trust
in political institutions and decreased levels of electoral turnout.
The analysis opens up an important normative question as well. If the profit
motive acts as a powerful incentive for political institutions to perpetuate this
vicious circle, how can the situation be changed? Ultimately, voters can hold
politicians accountable. At the moment, apathy and a lack both of specific
information and more general political education are strong hindrances. The
dissemination of information and more robust political education can provide
a way out of this catch-22 situation. In the last few years there have been some
encouraging initiatives. The Romanian Academic Society and the Alliance for
a Clean Romania have been scrutinising candidates using varied criteria (in-
cluding party migration, nepotism, business relationship with the state, etc.),
and have made data on candidates’ integrity publicly accessible. It is hoped that
such initiatives can lead voters to more closely scrutinise candidates as well as
put pressure on political parties to reform themselves – particularly with regard
to their embrace of party switching.
George Jiglău
The Interethnic Stalemate in Romania:

Origins and Risks
Abstract. The accommodation of ethnic diversity has played an important role in the develop-
ment of the Romanian political system following the fall of communism. The first decade of
transition witnessed a sinuous path of interethnic relations between the Romanian majority
and the Hungarian minority, from violent clashes and implementation of minority unfriendly
legislation to minority inclusion in the national government. The second stage, associated
with the efforts leading to Romania’s Euro-Atlantic integration, brought a change in tactics
from the Hungarian politicians. The author presents a general overview of how the political
game between the Romanian state and the Hungarian minority developed in the last two
decades and emphasises the legislative dimension of the disputes. The main argument of this
article is that, although the interethnic relations have been normalised, the legal dispute is in
a stalemate, which, if unresolved, threatens the current stability in the longer term.
George Jiglău works as a researcher at the Department of Political Science at Babeș-Bolyai

University, Cluj.
Introduction
The Romanian political system and the political mobilization of the Hungarian
minority create a fertile ground on which to explore some of the most important
theoretical expectations regarding political mobilization of ethnic minorities as
such. Romania encompasses a Hungarian minority of approximately 6% of the
population and includes a growing Roma population, officially considered to be
at around 3% of the population however the exact is size still unaccounted for.
In total, Romania officially recognizes 19 ethnic minorities,1 offering a perfect
context in which to study the interaction between a large ethnic majority – over
80% of the population is ethnic Romanian – and either small minorities with
historical and cultural relevance or large minorities with strong political repre-
sentation, claims, and ambitions. Two other factors increase Romania’s relevance
1 Ronald F. King / Cosmin Gabriel Marian, Minority Representation and Reserved
Legislative Seats in Romania, East European Politics and Societies 26 (2012), no. 3, 561-588.
The Interethnic Stalemate 115
in this context: the interethnic historical background is relatively contentious,

especially with respect to Romanian-Hungarian relations in the historical region
of Transylvania. Secondly, Romania is one of the largest states in post-communist
Europe, in terms of both population and territory, and, consequently, the ethnic
groups are numerically larger than in other ethnically diverse post-communist
states, such as Estonia or Lithuania.
In this article, I pursue the evolution of interethnic relations between the
Hungarian minority and the Romanian majority from the regime change in
1990 until 2014. The goal of this analysis is to emphasize that, although there
has been significant progress in the political accommodation of Hungarian
identity within the Romanian political system and the society as a whole, the
major goals set by Hungarians at the beginning of the transition have not yet
been met, despite various political tactics that have involved both internal and
external political instruments, and despite having been represented in govern-
ment for 16 of the last 18 years. This circumstance continues to pose a potential
threat to the stability of interethnic relations. Throughout the analysis, I refer
to the particularities of the Romanian political system and mainly to electoral
(or governmental) cycles, each associated with a particular political position
of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (in Hungarian Romániai
Magyar Demokrata Szövetség, RMDSz; in Romanian Uniunea Democrată Maghiară
din România, UDMR), the main political minority movement.2
I first provide a brief historical account of Romanian-Hungarian relations.
Then I discuss the political dynamics in the first years of transition and empha-
size how interethnic relations were influenced by international organizations. In
the second half of the article, I approach the more recent interethnic dynamics
and discuss three important political episodes that illustrate how the Hungar-
ians aimed, but failed, to attain their relevant political goals. Finally, I place the
discussion in the current political context.
Romanian-Hungarian Relations Throughout History

Over time, the Romanian-Hungarian relations have constantly been a source of
tension in the region. The “official” history, including what is taught in schools,
of the Romanian state claims that Romanians inhabited today’s Transylvania
long before the arrival of the Hungarians (or in fact the Huns, their predeces-
sors), who left an area located around the Ural mountains sometime around
1,000 BC and started to migrate westwards. After several phases of migration,
they entered the Carpathian basin around 895 AD. During the kingdom of Saint
2  Under the Romanian law, the UDMR is not registered as a political party, but rather
as a non-governmental organization. However, it acts as a party, i.e. it stands in local and

national elections, it runs territorial offices, it has its own political and electoral manifestos etc.
116 George Jiglău
Stephen, Hungarians converted to Christianity, a move seen both as a religious

choice and as a political move to ensure a stronger strategic position for the king-
dom in an area located at the crossroads of Roman and Byzantine influences.3
The Romanian-Hungarian relations have largely been defined by shifting
power relations, numerous border changes affecting Transylvania and influenc-
ing the position of one group in relation to the other, as well as by numerous
armed conflicts. It is worth mentioning that Romania and Hungary were on
opposite sides during the second part of World War One, especially towards the
end with Transylvania constantly at the forefront of territorial disputes between
the two states. The current territorial status relies on treaties implemented at
the end of the First World War. In particular the Treaty of Trianon (1920) stipu-
lated that the regions Transylvania, Banat, Crișana, and Maramureș, formerly
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, were to be incorporated into Romania,
which had fought as an ally of the winning entente. Immediately, Hungarian
elites initiated attempts to recuperate the lost territories and vowed to protect
Hungarian nationals left outside the new borders of Hungary. The territories
were partially and briefly re-integrated into Hungary after the Vienna Dictate in
1940. This arrangement was accepted by Romania while it was fighting side by
side with Admiral Horty’s regime in the German-led camp during the Second
World War. After Romania joined the Allies in 1944, the northwestern border
of the country was reinstated within the limits set by the Trianon Treaty.4
During the communist era, both Romania and Hungary were part of the
USSR’s sphere of influence. In this context, the chances for territorial disputes
between the two states were reduced to a minimum, mainly in respect to any
potential claim on Hungary’s part. Between 1952 and 1968, the Romanian state
created a separate and autonomous Hungarian region. However, the period
after 1960 represented a time of reinforced nationalist myths. In the field of
historiography, both Romanian and Hungarian scholars interpreted history
accordingly, contradicting each other and serving the political interests of the
communist regimes in each state. On the other hand, the communist regime in
Romania incorporated Hungarian elites into the party, the state apparatus and
the secret police Securitate. This left little ground for any meaningful Hungarian
movement to express itself politically until the end of the regime.5
3  Béla Köpeczi (ed.), History of Transylvania. Budapest 1994.

4  Constantin Iordachi, The Anatomy of a Historical Conflict: The Romanian-Hungarian
Conflict in the 1980s. Budapest 1996.
5  For a more detailed report on the history of the relations between Romanians and
Hungarians, see Center for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe –

Southeast Europe, Minorities in Southeast Europe, Hungarians of Romania, available at <http://
www.edrc.ro/resurse/rapoarte/Hungarians_of_Romania.pdf>. See also Katherine Verdery,
National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu’s Romania.
Berkeley 1991. All internet sources were accessed on 1 April 2015.
The First Years of Transition

After the fall of the communist regime in Central and Eastern Europe, ethnic-
ity re-emerged as a potential source of violence and large-scale conflicts in the
entire region. In the context of the rapid changes affecting the societies and the
political systems at the beginning of transition in most post-communist states,
historical ethnic and territorial grievances re-emerged as salient social issues.
Some of them were quickly brought into the political arenas and regulated
strictly through peaceful, political means. This was the case, for example, re-
garding the demands of the Poles in Lithuania or, to some extent, those of the
Turks in Bulgaria, while other such issues spilled beyond the political arenas
and resulted in violence. The most severe example of this were the bloody wars
in Yugoslavia.
Although the relations between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania
never reached warlike dimensions, they rapidly turned violent too after the 1989
revolution. After only ten weeks from the fall of the regime, both Hungarians
and Romanian nationalists mobilized politically. The Democratic Alliance of
Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) was formed in the days of the revolution, with
several other nationalist parties and movements also rapidly emerging, such as
the Party for National Unity of Romanians (Partidul Unităţii Națiunii Române,
PUNR) or the ultra-nationalist Romanian Cradle movement (Vatra Românească,
VR). While Hungarian politicians quickly began to formulate claims for more col-
lective rights, nationalists interpreted each of these claims as a sign that Hungary
aimed to reincorporate Transylvania into its borders. Right after the National
Salvation Front (Frontul Salvării Naționale, FSN) took power in December 1989,
the UDMR was included in the National Unity Committee, formed in January
1990. Several decrees were issued by the new government, such as granting
minimal facilities for the minorities in Romania regarding education in their
own languages. However, more radical demands by the UDMR were rejected,
for example the recognition of Hungarian as the second official language in
the Romanian state.6 Despite these early signs of moderate cooperation, any
decision regarding Hungarians, or ethnic minorities in general, was regarded
as a threat to Romanian radicals and as a sign of discrimination by Hungarian
radicals. On 15 March 1990, less than three months into the new regime, in
the Transylvanian town of Târgu Mureș demonstrators organised to mark the
National Day of Hungarians in remembrance of the beginning of the revolu-
tion in 1848. They were interrupted by Romanian nationalist demonstrators,
and the ensuing violent clashes on 19 and 20 March led to numerous deaths
6  Monica Andriescu / Sergiu Gherghina, Discursul identitar maghiar în România post
comunistă, Sfera Politicii 2013, no. 171, available at <http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/171/

art10-Andriescu_Gherghina.php>.
118 George Jiglău
and many wounded.7 Radicalism on both sides was fueled by declarations of

several top-level politicians in Budapest, who conveyed the Hungarians as a na-
tion that goes beyond the borders of the state and even suggested a revision
of the Trianon Treaty. The most prominent among them was József Antál, the
Hungarian prime minister from the beginning of 1990, who viewed himself as
the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians – a number which includes the
Hungarians living in neighbouring states.8
The clashes in Târgu Mureș marked the beginning of post-communist rela-
tions between Romanians and Hungarians and generated a climate of mistrust
that has shaped interethnic dynamics throughout the entire transition. Yet, the
UDMR continued to use conventional politics as the main tool to pursue its
goals. In the first democratic national elections, in May 1990, which resulted in
a very fragmented Romanian parliament,9 the UDMR emerged as the second
most important political movement in Romania, with over 7% of the votes, even
though well behind the winning FSN (over 65% of the votes). The main goal of
this first elected legislative was to draft a new constitution, a process that led
to additional tension. Benefitting from the support of nationalist MPs, the FSN
secured a majority that generated a document which stated in its first article
that “Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible National
State”.10 The UDMR rejected the new constitution due to this provision, gen-
erating accusations of lack of loyalty towards Romania as a state. Moreover, in
the referendum needed to approve the 1991 constitution, the UDMR urged the
Hungarian voters not to participate. These debates occurred after Hungary had
already passed its own new constitution in which it defined itself as responsible
for the fate of the entire Hungarian nation, including the communities that exist
outside its borders, in article 6, paragraph 3, but also gave collective rights to
ethnic minorities living in Hungary, in article 68.11 However, national minorities
did not pose a threat in Hungary compared to those existing in Romania. No
state in the region could have made territorial claims to Hungary. Furthermore,
  7  Katherine Verdery, Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-Socialist Romania,
Slavic Review 52 (1993), no. 2, 179-203.

  8  Ronald H. Linden, Putting on Their Sunday Best: Romania and Hungary and the Puzzle
of Peace, International Studies Quarterly 44 (2000), no. 1, 121-145, 129.

  9  Mainly due to the absence of an electoral threshold, cf. Emanuel Emil Coman’s
contribution to this special issue.

10  The 1991 Constitution of Romania is available at <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.
page?den=act1_2>.
11  “The Republic of Hungary grants protection to national and ethnic minorities, it ensures
the possibilities for their collective participation in public life, and enables them to foster their
own culture, use the mother tongue, receive school instruction in the mother tongue, and
freedom to use their names as spelled and pronounced in their own language. […] National
and ethnic minorities may set up their own local and national government organizations.”
The Hungarian Constitution is available at <http://www.constitution.org/cons/hungary.txt>.
the largest ethnic minority in Hungary are the Roma, which represent less than
2% of the population.
The climate of mistrust between ethnic Romanians and ethnic Hungarians at
the societal level, as well as the incapacity of Romanian and Hungarian politi-
cal elites to cooperate, became especially noticeable in the second Romanian
electoral cycle (1992-1996). The conservative faction of the former FSN,12 seen
as the successor of the communist party, governed with the support of three
other nationalistic parties.13 Facing a rejection of all its demands from the na-
tional political elites, the UDMR oriented its actions mainly towards European
institutions.
The Triadic Nexus at Work

and the International Institutions
An important tool in analyzing interethnic relations is Rogers Brubaker’s
concept of a triadic nexus,14 later developed into a quadratic nexus by Smith,15
which captures the importance of kin-states in the mobilization of an ethnic
minority. The triadic nexus is formed by the home-state, the ethnic minority
and the kin-state of the minority. The essence of this tool is the interdependence
between the three actors: if one acts, the others will react. The intervention of
a kin-state to help its co-nationals abroad, is considered an incentive for the
political mobilization of the minority. Besides official declarations of support,
the most effective way a government can help its co-nationals is by funding,
which is facilitated by the presence of a strong organization. The kin-state and
the political representatives of the minority can effectively act as partners to
convince the government of the home-state to improve its policies towards the
minorities.
12  Before the 1992 elections, FSN split into two parties: 1) the Democratic National Salvation
Front (FDSN), led by president Ion Iliescu, seen as the unreformed wing of the former
movement, which later changed its name to the Party for Social Democracy in Romania
(Partidul Democraţiei Sociale în România, PDSR) and then to Social Democratic Party (Partidul
Social Democrat, PSD); and 2) the National Salvation Front, which later changed its name into
the Democratic Party (Partidul Democrat, PD) and then to Democratic Liberal Party (Partidul
Democrat-Liberal, PDL).
13  The Party for the National Unity of Romanians (PUNR), the Socialist Labour Party
(Partidul Socialist al Muncii, PSM), and the Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare, PRM).
14  Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in
the New Europe. Cambridge 1996.

15  David J. Smith, Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe.
A Quadratic Nexus?, The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2 (2002), no. 1, 3-16.

120 George Jiglău
International institutions have been considered as playing an additional

role in the dynamic of the triadic nexus, thereby forming a quadratic nexus.16
Romania, Hungary, and the Hungarian minority in Romania, along with the
international (European) institutions, offer an appropriate context in which to
witness this theoretical instrument at work, due to the European dimension
of the UDMR’s political activity, especially in the first years of the transition.
In its demands for greater rights, the UDMR constantly appealed to European
bodies, such as the Council of Europe or the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE). To convince the Romanian authorities of the need
to grant further rights to minorities, the UDMR called on “European norms
and standards”, pointing out the different models of minority accommodation
across Western states. The most frequently used examples being the Southern
Tyrol region in Italy, the Åland Islands in Finland and the territorial devolution
deployed in the UK.
The best example of UDMR’s use of European institutions to attain internal
political goals, is in the field of education and the role Max van der Stoel played
as the OSCE’s High Commissioner for Minorities in the early 1990s. Van der
Stoel made several visits to Bucharest and Transylvania to meet the representa-
tives of the Romanian government and UDMR. He contributed to the adoption
of an education law which satisfied the desires of both the government and the
Hungarian minority regarding mother-tongue-education. The High Commis-
sioner also contributed to creating two separate lines of study – Hungarian and
German – at the Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, by encouraging the
Romanian government to promote a multicultural education model.17
Another relevant international body is the European Commission for De-
mocracy through Law, better known as the Venice Commission. Since 1990, it
has been a consultative body for the Council of Europe on matters related to
legislation and constitutional issues. The main role of the Commission is to offer
assistance to member states of the Council in drafting their constitutions on the
basis of European legal norms and values. Its council members are, according
to article 2 of the statute of the Commission “independent experts who have
achieved eminence through their experience in democratic institutions or by
their contribution to the enhancement of law and political science”.18
The Commission has also been actively involved in issues related to national
minorities, particularly since the turn of the millennium. In 2001, for instance,
16  For instance, see Erin K. Jenne / Stephen M. Saideman, The International Relations of
Ethnic Conflict, in: Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies III. Ann Arbor/MI
2009, 260-279.
17  Patrice C. McMahon, Taming Ethnic Hatred: Ethnic Cooperation and Transnational
Networks in Eastern Europe. Syracuse 2009, 114.

18  Cf. the official website of the Venice Commission, available at <http://www.venice.coe.
int/>.
a report by the Commission with respect to the law regarding the status of
Hungarians residing outside of Hungary, mediated the verbal disputes between
Hungary on the one hand, and Romania and Slovakia on the other. The latter
two states were primarily affected by the provisions of the Hungarian law, as
their territories include the largest Hungarian minorities.19 Another example of
involvement by the Commission was a report on the status of national minori-
ties in Romania. This report was commissioned by the Romanian government
in preparation of parliamentary debates on the issue.
However, the international institution which played the most important role
in the UDMR’s political strategy, and consequently with most relevant impact –
though limited – on interethnic relations in Romania, was the Council of Europe.
In 1993 Romania became its member and sent a delegation of MPs to the Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which is very active in
promoting minority rights. For instance, in 1993 it passed Recommendation 1201,
which defined an ethnic minority in collective terms and asserts that autonomy
should be regarded as a tool to ensure the protection of minority rights.20 Also,
this recommendation refers to the right of education in the maternal language,
in article 8. Then, in 1995, the Assembly passed the Framework Convention for
National Minorities, requesting its member to enforce both individual and col-
lective rights for minorities on their respective territories. In article 3, paragraph
2, of this convention it is stated that “[p]ersons belonging to national minorities
may exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing from the principles
enshrined in the present Framework Convention individually as well as in
community with others”. Furthermore, it recommends state authorities not to
modify the ethnic structure of a population and not to redraw the boundaries
of administrative divisions with the aim of dividing a national minority.21
UDMR representatives at the PACE were among those who contributed to the
Convention and then used its provisions at an internal level to re-enforce their
demands for more collective rights. In turn, this refueled the anti-Hungarian
discourse of Romanian nationalists. However, since the Convention was not
a legally binding document, the Romanian government refused to implement
it. Furthermore, the phrasing of some provisions used words such as “where
possible” or “where it is the case” and thus left room for interpretation. Also,
in order to enter into force, a state had to both sign it and ratify it, which sev-
19  Almost 1.5 million Hungarians live in Romania and over 500.000 Hungarians live in
Slovakia, according to the CIA World Fact Book, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/>.
20  The text of Recommendation 1201 is available at <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/
Documents/AdoptedText/ta93/EREC1201.htm>.
21  The text of the Framework Convention is available at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
en/Treaties/Html/157.htm>.
122 George Jiglău
eral states refused to do. France and Turkey did not even sign the document,
whereas Belgium and Greece signed it but did not ratify it.22
Thus, the Council of Europe was the main political arena where internal
political ethnic disagreements became visible and started to draw the attention
of the international community. This was due to a number of reasons. Firstly,
the Council of Europe was the most accessible European institution for post-
communist states, but it also used a maximal approach when it came to the
protection of national minorities, which is seen as a pre-condition to any stable
democracy. The Council of Europe thus also provided the first context in which
Hungary’s influence over the internal political dynamics in Romania became
visible. Hungary became a member of the Council of Europe in November 1990,
whereas Romania and Slovakia joined three years later, and therefore Hungary
had the upper hand in relation with the two states. When Romania became
a candidate for accession, the Hungarian government stated that it would
only support its neighbour if the Romanian government would pass laws that
guaranteed the protection of the Hungarian minority and would immediately
implement the provisions of the 1201 Recommendation.23 Romania conceded to
introduce laws to facilitate the access to education in the language of minorities.
Still, Hungary abstained from voting on Romania’s accession.
At the same time, as shown above, unless member states agree to the Coun-
cil’s decisions, they remain purely symbolic. To sanction states that refuse to
comply is very limited. Nevertheless, the dynamics occurring at the level of the
Council had implications for the relations of post-communist states with more
important international institutions, such as the European Union and NATO,
which represented the main stakes in foreign policies of post-communist states,
including Romania, in the first years of transition. Contrary to the approach of
the Council of Europe, the European Union and NATO did not refer in very
strict terms to national minorities when it came to the enlargement towards
post-communist states. The EU did not incorporate minority issues into the
acquis communautaire, and only made a general reference to the protection of
national minorities in the Copenhagen criteria of 1993, both documents needing
to be implemented and fulfilled by any state that wishes to become a member.
NATO insisted only on good relations with neighbours. By emphasizing Roma-
nia’s lack of will to enforce more substantial minority rights, especially those
22  Council of Europe, Documents: Working Papers, 2006 ordinary session (first part), 23-27
January 2006, vol. 1, 235.

23  Margit Bessenyey-Williams, European Integration and Minority Rights: The Case of
Hungary and its Neighbours, in: Ronald Linden (ed.), Norms and Nannies. The Impact of
International Organizations on the Central and East European States. New York 2002, 227-258.
recommended by international institutions, the UDMR claimed that Romania

was not ready to become a member of the EU or NATO.24
This illustrates another episode of the UDMR and Hungary working together
to influence internal politics in Romania. Beyond the Council of Europe, NATO
was the next main “target” of the post-communist states. One of the criteria was
to have resolved any territorial dispute with neighbouring states. A bilateral
agreement, through which Hungary and Romania would mutually recognize
their common borders, became a necessity. A treaty was signed in September
1996 after difficult negotiations, during which Hungary again tried to impose
measures regarding collective rights for the Hungarian minority and the accept-
ance of Recommendation 1201 by the Romanian government. Eventually, the
document accepted by both sides was the Framework Convention for National
Minorities, which adopted a “softer” stance than Recommendation 1201. The
latter was mentioned only in an appendix of the treaty, explicitly mentioning that
it does not require the Romanian state to grant collective rights to minorities.25
Despite having signed the bilateral treaty, Romania was left out of the first
group that joined NATO in 1997, and consequently its chances of rapidly open-
ing negotiations with the EU were slim. The troubled relations of the Romanian
state with its minorities was one of the reasons frequently mentioned by inter-
national bodies for non admission.26
Thus, Hungary’s influence over the political dynamics inside Romania was
highly visible throughout the first decade of transition, especially if this inter-
action is seen in the international context. By adopting a generous domestic
legislation with respect to national minorities residing within its own territory
immediately after the regime change, Hungary tried to impose these provisions
as European standards, which would force other states in the region, such as
Romania and Slovakia, to adopt similar measures. Internationalising minority
issues and the attempt to obtain more rights for minorities through external
means is a tool used by Hungary, albeit at a lower scale. This strategy was not
only used by Hungary in the first years of transition, but throughout. A good
example is the adoption of Recommendation 1735 by the PACE in 2006, which
will be dealt with below. Hungary constantly had the upper hand with respect
to Romania regarding the relevant European institutions, including the EU
24  Judith Kelly, Ethnic Politics in Europe. The Power of Norms and Incentives. Princeton
2010, 154-156.
25  Kinga Gál, Bilateral Agreements in Central and Eastern Europe. A New Inter-State
Framework for Minority Protection?, ECMI Working Paper 4, Flensburg 1999, available
at <http://www.ecmi.de/publications/detail/04-bilateral-agreements-in-central-and-eastern-
europe-a-new-inter-state-framework-for-minority-protection-191/>.
26  Sergiu Gherghina / George Jiglău, The Role of Ethnic Parties in the Europeanization
Process – the Romanian Experience, Romanian Journal of European Affairs 8 (2008), no. 2, 82-99.
124 George Jiglău
and NATO, and readily pointed to the situation of the Hungarian minority in
Romania.
1996 – the Turning Point

The UDMR’s behaviour on the international stage did not only alienate the
nationalist elites at the internal level, but also the reformist opposition. The op-
position was represented by the Romanian Democratic Convention (Convenţia
Democrată Română, CDR), a coalition of parties opposed to the Iliescu regime,
led mainly by the Christian democrats and the liberals. In 1995, the UDMR was
forced to leave the Convention, after the other parties claimed that it carried an
“extremist” discourse.
However, the 1996 elections marked a turning point for the interethnic rela-
tions in Romania, as well as for the relations between the UDMR and the other
Romanian parties. The Democratic Convention won the elections, committing to
a more vigorous effort towards joining the EU and NATO. As a sign of reformist
intentions, the Convention and its social democratic allies formed a government
together with the UDMR, although they already had a majority in parliament.
This signal was very important for Romania’s international ambitions. In July
1997, US President Bill Clinton visited Bucharest to reassure Romania that
NATO enlargement would proceed, despite not being included in the initial
incorporation of post-communist states. Clinton referred to the inclusion of the
UDMR in the governing coalition as a wise move:
“You have turned old grievances to new friendships, within your borders and
beyond. You have forged landmark treaties with Hungary and Ukraine. You have
brought ethnic Hungarians into democratic government for the first time. You are
giving minorities a greater stake in your common future.”27
In 1999, the EU opened negotiations with Romania. This step was recognition
that Romania fulfilled all political criteria established in 1993, including those
related to minority protection.
Since 1996, the UDMR has been a permanent ally to the governing parties.
The CDR lost the elections in 2000 in favour of the Party for Social Democracy in
Romania (Partidul Democraţiei Sociale în România, PDSR). This party’s discourse
with respect to Hungarians had changed, together with adopting a more pro-
European attitude. As the PDSR did not have a majority on its own, it formed
a parliamentary alliance with the UDMR, yet the Hungarian movement re-
mained outside government. However, the PDSR was open to compromise
27  Bill Clinton’s speech, given on 11 July 1997, on the University Square in Bucharest is
available at The American Presidency Project, Remarks to the Citizens of Bucharest, Romania,
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=54402>.
with the UDMR, not only on issues related to minority protection, but also on
regular pieces of legislation.
After the 2000 elections, the PDSR had the option of forming a governing
coalition with its old ally, the Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare,
PRM). However, the context was very different from that of 1992-1996. Romania
received a clear commitment from NATO that it would be in the next wave of
enlargement. In 1999, the EU began negotiations with Romania. Meanwhile,
the president of the PRM reached the second round of presidential elections
of 2000, causing major concerns among Western states. An alliance with the
PRM would have been a disastrous step of the new social democratic govern-
ment, which had the challenging task of continuing the negotiations with the
EU.28 An alliance with the UDMR was a much wiser move. In the 2000-2004
period the Romanian government did not receive any significant complaints
regarding minority issues from Euro-Atlantic institutions. Moreover, Romania
was invited to join NATO in 2002, and was again referred to as an example for
minority accommodation, relevant for a region facing the crises in Kosovo and
Macedonia at that time.
The UDMR’s alliances with the CDR and then with the successors of the former
communists – which show that the Hungarian movement became a desirable
partner for both sides of the political spectrum – would not have been possible
without a change in discourse from the UDMR as well. The movement should
be regarded as an umbrella organization for several Hungarian movements.
From its inception, the goal of UDMR was to unite Hungarians through their
shared ethnicity despite ideological differences. But more importantly, it should
also be regarded as a mix of radicals and moderates, with respect to Hungarian
minority interests. At the beginning of the transition period, the UDMR was
dominated by radicals. One of its most prominent figures was bishop László
Tőkés, who acted as honorary president of the movement and has remained
an important political figure to this day. He had a radical approach, frequently
calling for territorial and political autonomy for the regions where Hungarians
constituted a majority.
This attitude served the interests of Romanian ultranationalists and was one
of the arguments of those who supported the drafting of the first article of the
Constitution in its mentioned form. A change in the discourse of the UDMR
was noticeable from 1993, when the moderate Béla Markó became president
of the party, replacing Géza Domokos. Under Markó’s leadership, the calls
for autonomy were gradually toned down, especially after the 1996 elections.
Instead, the UDMR started to campaign for greater administrative decentraliza-
28  Paul Sum, The Radical Right in Romania: Political Party Evolution and the Distancing of
Romania from Europe, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 8 (2010), no. 1, 19-29.
126 George Jiglău
tion, although self-determination on an ethnic basis as a political objective, was

not taken out of the political program.
At the same time, extremist parties saw a slow decrease in influence on Ro-
manian society. The PUNR as well as the Socialist Labour Party (PSM) lost their
political importance after 2000. The PRM and its leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor,
reached their peak of popularity in the 2000 elections, but were left out of the
government by the Social Democratic Party (PSD) – the only party which had
considered it as an ally in the past. In 2004, PRM dropped to 13% of the seats,
continued to be isolated, and finally in 2008, disappeared from parliament.
The UDMR has been a constant member of the governing coalitions since
2004 until the present, with two short exceptions – for almost one year after the
2008 elections and throughout 2013. Although they were left in the opposition
after the 2008 and the 2012 elections, they were asked to help form a majority
in late 2009 and in early 2014. In the following section, three issues that sparked
vivid debates regarding interethnic relations and the UDMR, will be dealt with
in greater detail.
Recent Political Developments

Recommendation 1735
As Romania’s path to EU accession approached its final stages from 2004, the
role of international institutions in interethnic relations in Romania decreased.
However, one significant debate was sparked by a decision taken at the Council
of Europe, one year prior to Romania joining the EU. On 26 January 2006, the
PACE adopted a new recommendation regarding the issue of national minori-
ties. Its main goal was to define the concept of “nation”, in order to clarify the
legal status of national minorities in their home states. Recommendation 1735
declares in articles 4-7, that “nation” has habitually been used in two ways:
either as a synonym of citizenship, or in order to identify a people. These two
understandings relate to the constructivist and, the primordialist views of the
concept, respectively. Primordialism states that the nation is based on an ethnic
core, a pre-existent community that shares the same cultural traits, mainly the
language; the identity of the nation can thus not be altered. Constructivism on
the other hand maintains that nations are constructs, created by elites according
to temporary interests. As a matter of fact, Recommendation 1735 introduced
the primordialist conception of the nation into European legislation. In essence,
it maintained that states that define themselves as “nation states” lose their le-
gitimacy, if there are national minorities on their territory. The recommendation
explicitly mentions, in article 10, the fact that the national minorities, based on
their cultural and linguistic particularities, have to represent the object of “col-
lective protection” from the state authorities. However, the same article mentions
that these collective rights are not territorially based, not even if the minority
forms over 50% of the population on a specific territory. The most important
statement in Recommendation 1735 is found in article 16, paragraph 4, where
the member states are “invited” to modify their constitutions in conformity
with “contemporary democratic European standards which call on each state to
integrate all its citizens, irrespective of their ethnocultural background, within
a civic and multicultural entity and to stop defining and organizing themselves
as exclusively ethnic or exclusively civic states”.29 An example of an ethnically
defined state is Romania, which included the expression “nation state” in the first
article of its constitution, while an example of a civically defined state is France.
Prior to this, the PACE adopted other documents which also dealt with nation-
al minorities issues. For instance, in Resolution 1335 from 2003 – adopted in the
context of Hungary’s law regarding the expatriate status of ethnic Hungarians,
the PACE acknowledged that help given by “mother-states” to the communi-
ties living on the territory of another state represented “a positive tendency”.30
The Law on the Status of Minorities
The debate on the PACE’s Recommendation 1735 overlapped with another

internal debate, namely a legislative proposal promoted by the UDMR. In
December 2004, the UDMR entered a governing coalition with the National
Liberal Party (PNL), the Democratic Party (PD), and the smaller Conservative
Party (PC). Then in 2005, the government, under the leadership of the liberal
prime minister Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, put forward an ambitious project
regarding the status of national minorities. The UDMR persuaded its partners
to include provisions in the legislative proposal which granted national minori-
ties cultural autonomy.31
While criticism was limited at the time of governmental debates, two of the
governing parties in parliament – PD and PC – disagreed with the text sent for
approval by the government precisely because of the issue of cultural autonomy.
They argued that such a status to minorities is in conflict with the Constitution,
29  The full text of Recommendation 1735 is available at <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.
asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta06/EREC1735.htm>.
30  The full text of Resolution 1335 is available at <http://assembly.coe.int//main.asp?link
=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta03/ERES1335.htm>.
31  “Cultural autonomy” was also requested by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms
(MRF), the political representative of the biggest ethnic group in Bulgaria – the Turks – and
was requested by the Hungarian parties when the Slovakian Constitution was adopted in 1992.
This would mean, in essence, to establish self-governing only on issues related to education
or cultural activities in the language of minorities. The concept of cultural autonomy was
invented by the Austrian social democrats (Austro-Marxists) Otto Bauer and Karl Renner on
the threshold of the 19th and 20th centuries with respect to the accommodation of the various
nations existing under Habsburg rule.
128 George Jiglău
as the state would lose control over certain aspects concerning minorities as
well as, implicitly, part of its sovereignty. With the opposition – formed by the
PSD and the PRM – also disagreeing, the law stalled in endless parliamentary
debates. The only supporters of the text were the UDMR and the PNL.
At the time, the UDMR returned to some of its older tactics and began a strong
lobbying activity within the European People’s Party (EPP), relying on the sup-
port of the right-wing nationalist Hungarian party Fidesz, also a member of
EPP. In the context of the vivid debates in Romania, Fidesz’ member of parlia-
ment, György Schöpflin, argued in the European Parliament that the Romanian
authorities were willingly enforcing the assimilation of the Csango population
(in Hungarian Csángók; in Romanian Ceangăi), which has a Hungarian ethnic
background and speaks an old Hungarian dialect, providing a short movie as
evidence. Furthermore, in the country report on Romania issued by the Euro-
pean Parliament in the spring of 2006, the EPP delegates managed to impose
an amendment urging Romania to take concrete action in order to protect and
extend the rights of minorities, explicitly mentioning the need to grant them
cultural autonomy.
Despite international pressures, the Romanian parliament did not proceed
with the debates on the draft legislation. In the meantime, the Venice Commis-
sion mandated its own assessment of the project in October 2005. While it agreed
with the concept of cultural autonomy and recommended its implementation in
Romania, given the structure of the Romanian society, it stated that this cannot
be regarded as an international obligation to which the state should comply.
This position deepened the internal deadlock, as both sides claimed that the
arguments of the Commission served their interest. From a more technical
perspective, the two sides clashed over the provision in the draft legislation
regarding the role of the Council of National Minorities, a self-governing body
representing all ethnic minorities. The project gave the Council the power to
veto any appointment made by local authorities in cultural or educational
institutions falling under the incidence of the law. The opponents of the law
claimed that the Council should not hold such powers, again tying this issue
to state sovereignty.
Regardless of UDMR’s vocal support in favour of the law and the PNL’s
support, the issue faded away towards the second half of 2006. The main rea-
son for this was that the political agenda was increasingly dominated by the
tensions between the PNL and the PD, and between prime minister Tăriceanu
and president Traian Băsescu, which eventually led to the breakdown of the
governing coalition. The PNL continued to govern with the UDMR, with the
parliamentary support of the PSD. However, the draft legislation was not
brought back on to the agenda.
Only in September 2012, prior to the parliamentary elections, the Chamber

of Deputies voted to restart the debate on the proposal, but no substantial ac-
tion followed. As a result of the parliamentary elections in December 2012, an
alliance formed by the PSD and the PNL and as they held a large majority, they
did not need the UDMR’s support. However, after the PNL left the coalition
in January 2014, the UDMR joined and reaffirmed its support for the minority
status law, according to the initial proposal promoted in 2005 and the recom-
mendations of the Venice Commission. The media reported that the agreement
signed by the UDMR and the PSD stated that the government would support
the proposal. However, in the six months that followed no progress was made,
and in July 2014 the leaders of the UDMR threatened to leave the coalition un-
less the proposal was revived. Given that the presidential elections were due
in November 2014, a bold political move would have been required from PSD
leader Victor Ponta, who was the current prime minister and the frontrunner in
the presidential race, and would consequently risk alienating part of the ethnic
Romanian electorate. On the other hand, the UDMR could have persisted and
threatened to support Ponta’s main rival, the ethnic German Klaus Johannis.
Regardless of the outcome, even with Klaus Johannis now as Romania’s first
ethnic minority prime minister, the adoption or at least the parliamentary de-
bate of the law on the status of minorities is unlikely in the coming years, with
neither of the mainstream parties being ready to commit to measures that would
ensure any form of autonomy for ethnic Hungarians.
The Failed Quest for Autonomy via National Territorial Reform
Discussions on a territorial reform have periodically emerged in post-com-

munist Romania, with Hungarians are at their core for several reasons. The first
is based on the current territorial division. Romania is a large country, with
a population of over 20 million inhabitants, and has a reasonably high degree
of ethnic diversity. Since 1968, the country has been divided into 41 counties.
After the fall of communism, not only ethnicity emerged as a salient cleavage
within Romanian society, but also – albeit to a lesser extent – a sense of regional
identity, especially visible in the northwestern region of Transylvania. Histori-
cally, this region has had constant stronger ties with Western culture, enjoyed
a higher level of social and economic development, and accommodated, besides
numerous ethnic groups, also different religions. Throughout the 1990s, several
intellectuals in Transylvania formulated claims that the region has a distinct
identity and therefore should enjoy a degree of autonomy from the central
authorities in Bucharest. These claims were regarded by Romanian nationalists
as overlapping with the demands for territorial autonomy formulated by the
UDMR and thus discarded as “revisionist”.
130 George Jiglău
Hungarians themselves represent a second reason why territorial reform is

a constant theme in political debates. Approximately 80% of the Hungarian
population is concentrated in three counties located in the centre of the coun-
try – Harghita, Covasna, and Mureș, forming the so-called Székely land. The
remaining fifth are dispersed throughout Transylvania, especially in the large
cities, such as Cluj-Napoca, Oradea, Alba Iulia or Baia Mare. The calls for ter-
ritorial autonomy, formulated by the UDMR and other Hungarian groups after
1990, refer to the Székely land, whereas the calls for cultural autonomy refer
to the self-administration of all cultural and educational matters of the entire
group, regardless of a specific “territory”.
The 41 counties are a source of discontent in themselves with regard to the
current administrative status quo. They are seen as too small and lack the capac-
ity to compete for economic resources as well as to have an identity. However,
as a result of the heated debates concerning the autonomy of Hungarians at
the beginning of the 1990s, the reform process has stalled. Only in 1998, the
government created eight “development regions”, each including circa five
counties, intended to coordinate economic activity. However, they lack any
political authority.
As noted earlier, the UDMR included territorial autonomy for the Székely land
and cultural autonomy for the Hungarians as goals in its political program in the
early years of transition. After it gradually moderated its discourse, Hungary’s
involvement diluted and the leverage of international institutions reduced, the
UDMR tried to attain its goals and to modify the Romanian legislation through
internal tools, such as by promoting several legislative initiatives. One of them
addressed precisely the issue of territorial reform at the state level (not only the
status of the Székely land). In September 2009, the UDMR’s members of parlia-
ment drafted an initiative for reform on the basis of which Romania would be
divided into 16 micro regions and five macro regions; with one micro region
constituting the Székely land. Moreover, while another micro region would
be formed by the northwestern counties of Bihor, Maramureș and Satu Mare,
the two micro regions together would form one separate macro region. Thus,
the UDMR’s initiative had the clear intention to administratively separate the
regions where Hungarians are concentrated from the rest of the country.
In February 2010, the Senate tacitly adopted the initiative and sent it to the
Chamber of Deputies for a final decision.32 The fact that such a reform proposal
had passed the first chamber of the Parliament brought new vigor to the debate
on territorial reform. At the time, the UDMR was a member of the governing
coalition led by the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL). Delegate Emil Boc rejected
the initiative, claiming that it was not “appropriate”, and vowed to come up with
32  If a legislative initiative is not debated or voted on until the deadline set at the time of
its enlistment, it is considered adopted by the respective chamber.

a different proposal. The UDMR’s initiative was then blocked by the Chamber
of Deputies. In June 2011, the PDL put forward a simpler proposal that would
transform the existing eight development regions into counties, without any
additional suprastructures. However, this project ignored the UDMR’s desire to
create a separate administrative entity for the Hungarians. The PDL’s intention
was to use a special, faster procedure to promote this reform, with the govern-
ment taking responsibility for the proposal in the Parliament.33 Because Hungar-
ians did not receive a special status through the new law, the UDMR rejected
the proposal, leaving the PDL vulnerable to a potential vote of no confidence.34
As a result of the failed negotiations between the PDL and the UDMR, the
proposal was dropped. To date the UDMR’s initiative has not been brought to
the fore again. Nevertheless, it is a clear illustration of how the UDMR used
its blackmail potential inside the governing coalition. If it could not promote
legislation that would aid to attain its political goals, it would at least attempt
to halt legislation that would damage its interests.
The debates on territorial reform were reopened in February 2013 by a new
governing coalition, formed by the PSD and the PNL and in which the UDMR
was no longer included. A new proposal concentrated on enforcing the exist-
ing eight development regions, while also maintaining the 41 counties, but
avoided any special status for the Hungarian dominated regions – which was
unacceptable for the UDMR. Nevertheless, the proposal was not passed for two
main reasons. Firstly, it was now associated with a broader and more difficult
to implement constitutional reform. Secondly, the coalition broke down before
the process was carried through. The PNL went into opposition, with their place
in government taken by the UDMR, whose support facilitated the formation
of a new majority in the Parliament. Territorial autonomy remains their main
long-term political goal.
Intraethnic Dissent
According to the literature on ethnic outbidding, any perceived moderation
of an ethnic party leads to the emergence of other, more radical, parties at the
level of the minority. This in turn would lead to a spiral of radicalization, pos-
33  This meant that the government would only present the law to the Parliament, without
any additional debates. However, the procedure is risky, because it allows for the immediate
request for a vote of no confidence for the government. The law can enter into force only if
the opposition does not request such a vote or if the government survives the procedure.
34  The UDMR also rejected the PDL’s intention to by-pass parliamentary debates on the
topic, claiming that the territorial reform is too important to go ahead without consulting
the Parliament.
132 George Jiglău
ing significant threats to the democratic stability of a country.35 In the follow-

ing, this phenomenon will be discussed and especially how it occurred up to
a certain point in Romania and was visible mainly at a discursive level, with
a particular feature of the electoral system preventing ethnic outbidding from
spreading to the party system.
The Hungarian minority in Romania should not be regarded as a political
monolith, at least in the second half of the post-communist period. In the heated
political environment shaped by the first years of the 1990s, dominated by
nationalistic discourses on both sides, the UDMR emerged as the single voice
of the Hungarian minority. Formed as an umbrella for various Hungarian
political orientations, the radical discourse on autonomy and collective rights,
promoted then by the UDMR’s leadership, synced with the collective feelings
of the minority.
However, a change in attitude can be observed within the minority after the
UDMR moderated its tone enough to make it a desirable coalition partner for
mainstream parties. The 1996-2000 period, in which the UDMR was in a coali-
tion with the CDR, marked the first governmental experience of the movement.
Despite the positive international interpretation of the UDMR’s presence in gov-
ernment, regarded by international organizations as a guarantee for interethnic
peace in Romania, various political voices within the Hungarian minority began
to express dissatisfaction with the UDMR’s perceived mildness in pursuing the
main political goals of the group. Indeed, compared to the previous six years,
it can be observed that the UDMR avoided any significant dialogue regarding
autonomy (except a heated debate on the use of Hungarian in schools in 1997),
or to use international leverage to put pressure on Romanian authorities, as had
happened in previous years. On the contrary, with Romania’s negotiation for
accession to the EU set to begin in 1999, the UDMR claimed that it must support
all efforts of Romanian authorities to join the EU – the discursive motive. The
same strategy was also used by the authorities of the Hungarian state, being
that the Hungarian nation could be reunited within the borders of the EU.
The internal political dissent amplified after the 2000 elections, when the
UDMR chose to support the minority social democratic government. The oppo-
nents within the minority claimed that the UDMR only pursued its own political
position within the party system and no longer placed sufficient emphasis on
the issues that matter to the minority as a whole. In 2001, the first alternative
Hungarian political movement to the UDMR was created: the Hungarian Civic
Union (in Hungarian Magyar Polgári Párt, MPP, in Romanian Partidul Civic
Maghiar, PCM). It was led by the mayor of an important town in the Székely
35  Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley/CA 1985; idem, The Deadly
Ethnic Riot. Berkeley/CA 1991.

land and claimed to fight vigorously for territorial autonomy, placing itself in
opposition to the moderate tactics of the UDMR.
However, it was not yet registered as a political party and could not stand
in the 2004 national elections.36 Although it remained one of the most vocal
opponents of the UDMR’s political actions, it never gained a relevant voice at
the national level. Only in 2008 it was registered as a party, but did not stand
in the 2008 national elections.
A more recent development in intraethnic politics is the foundation of the
Hungarian People’s Party in Transylvania (in Hungarian Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt,
EMNP; in Romanian Partidul Popular Maghiar din Transilvania, PPMT). It is the
political spin-off of another civic movement led by the previously mentioned
László Tőkés. Although he remained a member of the UDMR until 2012, he
represented the most radical voice within the movement after 2000, constantly
criticizing the leaders for not pursuing the minority’s goals more aggressively.
In the 2007 elections for the European Parliament, he was not included in the
UDMR’s list and ran as an independent candidate, managing to gain enough
votes to secure a seat.37 In the 2009 elections, he was included in the list of
candidates by the UDMR. In the meantime, however, he had mentored the
foundation of the PPMT.
The 2012 elections were the first in which two ethnic Hungarian movements
stood in the elections – the UDMR and the PPMT – posing a direct threat to
the representation of the minority in the Parliament.38 Aware that the PPMT
would not have the electoral strength to reach the 5% threshold, they hoped
to benefit from a special provision in the electoral law that would allow them
to win parliamentary representation if they gained six seats in the Chamber of
Deputies and three seats in the Senate.39 However, the party failed to do so and
36  The Romanian electoral law allows for the existence of only one “movement” which
can represent an ethnic minority in national elections and can claim the reserved seat if it
does not pass the 5% threshold set for any electoral competitor. However, any party can
stand in the elections, even if it claims to represent the interests of a particular minority. Also,
any movement, even if it is not registered as a party, can stand in local elections. The new
alternative Hungarian movement stood in several local elections in 2004 and gained a total
score of around 15%.
37  In fact, Tőkés won 3.44% of the votes, almost double the amount needed to gain a seat
as an independent.
38  As the only representatives of the Hungarian minority in all national elections since 1990,
the UDMR constantly capitalized on the votes of almost the entire minority, winning around
6% of the votes. As the electoral threshold to enter parliament is set at 5%, any challenger
that would detour at least 1% of the votes from the UDMR would make it fall below the
threshold. This would leave the entire Hungarian minority, as well as any of the other 17
officially recognized minorities in Romania, represented by just one MP.
39  For a more detailed account of how the Romanian electoral law functions, see Sergiu
Gherghina / George Jiglău, Where Does the Mechanism Collapse? Understanding the 2008
Table 1: Developments in interethnic relations in Romania (per electoral cycle).
134
Electoral UDMR Main govern- Main demands and Intraethnic Involvement of Hungary and
cycle political status ing party political actions of UDMR political challenges international organisations
(leading the
Government)
1990-1992 Opposition FSN Rejects the new constitution None Hungary passes its own constitution grant-
and boycotts the constitutional ing collective rights to minorities. Hungar-
referendum. ian politicians claim the state represents all
Hungarians, even beyond borders. Hungary
joins the Council of Europe.
1992-1996 Opposition PDSR Territorial autonomy; None Romania joins the Council of Europe in 1993.
the use of Hungarian in the PACE passes Recommendation 1201 and the
educational system. Framework Convention for National Minori-
ties. Romania and Hungary sign a bilateral
agreement.
1996-2000 Government PNTCD1 Extended use of Hungarian None Romania is left out of the first NATO enlarge-
(part of CDR) in the educational system. ment in 1997; Hungary joins the alliance.
Romania begins EU negotiations in 1999.
2000-2004 Support for PSD General call for more rights. Foundation of PCM Hungary passes a citizenship law which
PSD minority targets Hungarians living abroad. Roma-
government nia joins NATO in 2002 and continues the
negotiations with the EU. Hungary joins the
EU in 2004.
George Jiglău
2004-2008 Government PNL The implementation of The foundation of the National PACE passes Recommendation 1735 in 2006,
cultural autonomy, extended Council of Hungarians in Tran- promoting collective rights.
by the law on minority status; sylvania under the mentorship Romania joins the EU in 2007.
extended collective rights; of László Tőkés.The registration
a constitutional reform to re- of PCM as a party. László Tőkés
formulate article 1 that defines runs as independent in the EP
Romania as a nation state. elections, gaining 3.44% of the
votes.
2008-2012 In opposition PSD The creation of separate The foundation of PPMT, which Minor involvement of international institu-
until fall of administrative entity in the stands in the 2012 elections, but tions. A more aggressive discourse from
2009. In gov- Székely land. Extended rights gains only 0.79% of the votes. Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary, but
ernment after in the education system. with low influence in Romania.
fall of 2009.
2012- In opposition PSD Restarting debates on the law PCM and PPMT continue to Minor involvement of international institu-
present until March of minority status and the exist, but do not pose a direct tions. A more aggressive discourse from
2014. implementation of cultural threat to UDMR at this point. Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary, but
autonomy. with low influence in Romania.
1  In Romanian, Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin și Democrat, PNȚCD.
gained only 0.79% of the vote overall. The UDMR gained its lowest electoral
score since the 1990 elections, with only 5.11% for the Senate.40
From 2012, both the PCM and the PPMT offered the UDMR to form an alliance
or to merge into a single party, but the UDMR refused this option. At this mo-
ment, despite the continuing internal dissent, no rival movement seems capable
to threaten the UDMR’s position at the minority level in the 2016 parliamentary
elections. In sum, the table below displays the main elements that shaped the
relations between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority in each
electoral cycle after 1990.
Conclusions
Two and a half decades after the fall of communism, interethnic relations in
Romania have come a long way. Romanian politics and the government itself
are no longer dominated by nationalists. Moreover, the UDMR is no longer
considered and no longer behaves like a radical ethnic party, on the contrary,
any of the mainstream parties would probably consider the UDMR as the first
partner for a governing coalition, that is, in the absence of a grand coalition.
The Hungarian language is an integral part of the education system. Tensions
between Romanians and Hungarians at the societal level have reduced signifi-
cantly, and episodes such as in the town of Târgu Mureș in March 1990 are
highly unlikely. Both Romania and Hungary are now part of NATO as well as
the EU. However, the main political goals of the Hungarian minority, voiced
by the UDMR and the other Hungarian movements – territorial and/or cultural
autonomy – have not yet been met.
A solution to the demands of the Hungarians is difficult to foresee in the near
future. The November 2014 presidential elections for the first time saw a poli-
tician from an ethnic minority – Klaus Johannis, an ethnic German – become
president of Romania. Johannis won against Victor Ponta, the former president
and the leader of the governing coalition which included the UDMR. It is un-
likely that Johannis will take the political risk of passing legislation that would
grant any form of autonomy to Hungarians, or any other ethnic minority. If this
were to happen, then this would pose huge electoral risks and might reactivate
nationalistic feelings within the political spectrum and society as a whole. The
current political situation reflects that of a fragile equilibrium, where the slight-
est pressure can tip the scales.
Romanian Electoral System, Representation 48 (2012), no. 4, 445-459; as well as Emanuel Emil
Coman’s contribution to this special issue.
40  For all election results mentioned in this article I use data offered by the Permanent
Electoral Authority in Romania, available at <http://www.roaep.ro/istoric/>.

Dragoș Dragoman
Ethnic Relations in Mixed Communities

in Romania after 1989
Abstract. Ethnic conditionality, along with democratisation and marketisation, has been
a salient factor of the post-communist transition in Romania. It has concerned ethnically
mixed communities as well as inter-state relations, and covers the whole period since 1989.
Actors, strategies and outcomes are to be differentiated, because ethnic matters are greatly
dependent on internal and external contexts. The changing contexts in Romania turned it
from a place of bloody ethnic conflict in March 1990, even before such conflict turned violent
in Yugoslavia, to a level of “banal” everyday nationalism, with the overall characteristic of
peaceful coexistence between ethnicities.
Dragoș Dragoman is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the

Lucian Blaga University in Sibiu, Romania.
After the collapse of the communist regimes in 1989, many scholars expected
to see institutional and economic transition follow the same pattern as it had
in countries in Southern Europe and in South America during earlier waves of
democratization there.1 In fact it took almost a decade before it became clear that
former communist countries, and especially those in southeastern Europe, have
supplementary obstacles to overcome. It emerged that besides harsh economic
changes and a new democratic institutional design, those countries had inherited
problems related to ethnic minorities, disputed borders, nationhood, and even
statehood. Their transition had to balance national integration and secessionist
threats, the legal recognition of inherited borders following the disintegration
of previous multiethnic states in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet
Union, and a constitutional framework able to accommodate minorities.2
1  Cf. for example Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic
Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge 1991; Juan J. Linz / Alfred Stepan,
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and
Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore/MD 1996.
2  Taras Kuzio, Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple, Politics 21 (2001),
no. 3, 168-177.
Ethnic Relations in Mixed Communities after 1989 137
Romania also had to tackle the job of combining institutional, economic and
ethnic factors. Although the exit from communism was certainly not as dif-
ficult, ethnically speaking, for Romania as it was for Yugoslavia,3 Romania’s
post-communist trajectory was still heavily influenced by ethnic considera-
tions inherited from both its communist past and the time before that. Modern
Romania was built up by the integration of provinces that had once been part
of Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman Empires, with ethnic Romanians
constituting the largest share of the population in the respective regions. Fol-
lowing the 1859 alliance between the historical provinces of Wallachia and
Moldova and subsequent independence, Romania engaged in a vigorous and
rapid process of modernization to accompany its nation-building.4
Before 1918, Romania had been an ethnically rather homogenous country,
apart from its Jewish and Roma minorities. Its present heterogeneity is ultimately
a consequence of the First World War, which led to the creation of Greater Ro-
mania from the ruins of the earlier empires. On the one hand, the integration of
new provinces fulfilled the dream of Romanian national elites in Transylvania,
Bukovina and Bessarabia that one day those provinces would be integrated
into Romania.5 On the other hand, their integration brought with it large ethnic
minorities with vigorous, well-educated, urbanized, and very active elites of
their own. The new minorities soon became the targets of nationalist policies put
in place by the Romanian elites, whose aim was to consolidate the Romanian
element and to homogenize national culture and territory.6 Such policies were
considered necessary – if for no other reason – for as long as ethnic Hungarians
living in Transylvania continued to be supported by the neighbouring Hungar-
ian state as part of the Hungarian nation. Throughout the 20th century, tensions
between Romanian and Hungarian national elites were based on the parallel
anxieties about the potential for brutal secession on one side, and the fear of
slow but painful assimilation on the other.
The history of the past century only served to consolidate the fears of both
sides. As long ago as 1940, by the second Vienna Award that followed the se-
cret protocol of the Non-Agression Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union, a large tract of Transylvania was attached to fascist Hungary, in spite of
the fact that both Hungary and Romania were allies of Nazi Germany, only for
it to be recovered again by Romania after the Second World War.7 At the same
3  Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito
to the Fall of Milošević. Boulder/CO 2002.

4  Keith Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947. Oxford 1994.
5  Idem, The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780-1849. Cambridge/MA
1969.
6  Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, Nation-Building
and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930. Ithaca/NY 1995.

7  Denis Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally. Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania 1940-
1944. Basingstoke 2006.

138 Dragoș Dragoman
time, the Hungarian population in Transylvania began to decline in a process

that continued for the rest of the 20th century and not even the communist
system under which both Hungary and Romania were governed managed to
erase the continued suspicions in each country.8 Despite its internationalist
scope, communism turned into fierce nationalism in Romania under Ceaușescu,
a man who used nationalism to consolidate his own authority in a relentless
effort to reconcile nationalism and universalist Leninism.9 Ceaușescu limited
the rights of ethnic minorities by restricting the use of their native languages
and by restricting even further the limited regional autonomy of the Hungarians
in Transylvania. The regime brutally urbanized many rural areas and deliber-
ately changed the ethnic balance in many cities by means of internal migration
flows, causing the Hungarian population to decrease even further in districts
like Târgu-Mureș, Oradea, Timișoara, Arad, or Brașov.10
Ethnic Relations in the 1990s

The upheaval of 1989 cannot be seen as a turning point in Romanian ethnic
relations, for although the fall of communism in that year brought significant
change in numerous political, economic and social areas, nationalism remained
an essential political vehicle.11 Indeed, the post-revolutionary period is marked
by the birth of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (in Hungarian
Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség, RMDSz; in Romanian Uniunea Democrată
Maghiară din România, UDMR), the political party for ethnic Hungarians which
would put up candidates in all the forthcoming elections. In response, Romanian
nationalist parties organized and challenged the UDMR in Parliament and in
numerous towns in Transylvania. One of the most vocal Romanian parties was
the Romanian National Unity Party (Partidul Unităţii Națiunii Române, PUNR),
which between 1992 and 2004 won all the mayoral elections in Cluj-Napoca,
Transylvania’s largest town.12 In March 1990, ethnic conflict turned violent on
the streets of Târgu-Mureș, bringing Romania to the brink of ethnic disaster only
months before Yugoslavia began to be ravaged by a similar sort of bloodshed.
It was the willingness of the more moderate political elites in Romania to co-
  8  Elemér Illyés, National Minorities in Romania. Change in Transylvania. Boulder/CO 1982.

  9  Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in
Ceaușescu’s Romania. Berkeley/CA 1995; Cheng Chen, The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in
Romania. A Historical Institutionalist Analysis of the Leninist Legacy, East European Politics
and Societies 17 (2003), no. 2, 166-201.
10  Gabriel Andreescu, Schimbări în harta etnică a României. Cluj-Napoca 2005.
11  Tom Gallagher, Nationalism and Political Culture in the 1990s, in: Duncan Light /
David Phinnemore (eds.), Post-Communist Romania. Coming to Terms with Transition.

Basingstoke 2001, 104-126.
12  Rogers Brubaker / Margit Feischmidt / John Fox / Liana Grancea, Nationalist Politics
and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town. Princeton/NJ 2006.

operate and find political solutions which took the tension out of the situation
and shepherded the problem towards Parliament.
The inclusion of the Hungarian party into the political arena was one of nu-
merous internal and external contextual factors that influenced ethnic relations
in Romania, in this case favourably so. In Parliament, the UDMR was able to
represent and defend the rights of the Hungarian minorities both leading up to
the adoption of the new constitution in 1991 and then in the debates on the most
important laws concerning public administration and education. Although the
Romanian framework favours the parliamentary majority and largely expresses
the official domination of the Romanians, the early decision to include the
UDMR in the political framework proved highly significant. With the UDMR
in parliament, the new institutional design at least kept open the possibility of
improving the minorities’ rights through political and parliamentary strategies
at some time in the future, so that there would be no need to resort to overt
ethnic struggle.13 Romania was thus spared Yugoslavia’s fate.14
As a matter of fact, the new Romanian constitution and laws only partially
acknowledged minority rights. The intention was to reconcile a desire for ethnic
Romanian supremacy, national sovereignty, territorial unity, and the minimum
international standards on minority rights, for example the requirements to be
fulfilled in order to join the Council of Europe. Beginning with 1993 and full
membership of the Council of Europe, alongside other countries in the region
Romania accepted European conditions, which had serious effects on its demo-
cratic trajectory.15 Earlier, in 1991, the constitution expressed ethnic Romanian
domination by the proclamation of the nation state of Romania, its sovereignty
based on the unity of the Romanian people in an explicitly ethnic definition.
There was even to be exclusive use of the Romanian language. When such an
ethnocentric approach generated protests from Hungarian political elites,16
the constitution acknowledged the existence of national minorities and their
legitimate efforts for the preservation, development and expression of their
own ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity (Article 6). Moreover, the
constitution guaranteed the right of any national minority, even if too small for
13  Mihaela Mihăilescu, The Politics of Minimal “Consensus”. Interethnic Opposition
Coalitions in Post-Communist Romania (1990-96) and Slovakia (1990-98), East European Politics
and Societies 22 (2008), no. 3, 553-594.
14  Vedran Džihić / Dieter Segert, Lessons from “Post-Yugoslav” Democratization.
Functional Problems of Stateness and the Limits of Democracy, East European Politics and
Societies 26 (2012), no. 2, 239-253; Sabrina P. Ramet / Ola Listhaug / Dragana Dulić (eds.),
Civic and Uncivic Values. Serbia in the Post-Milošević Era. Budapest 2011.
15  Lynn M. Tesser, The Geopolitics of Tolerance. Minority Rights Under EU Expansion in
East-Central Europe, East European Politics and Societies 17 (2003), no. 3, 483-532.
16  Catherine Kettley, Ethnicity, Language and Transition Politics in Romania. The
Hungarian Minority in Context, in: Farimah Daftary / François Grin (eds.), Ethnicity and
Language Politics in Transition Countries. Budapest 2003, 243-266.
proportional representation in Parliament under the terms of the electoral law,

all the same to return one Deputy and to be represented by one organization
only (Article 62). Those special provisions made Romania one of 32 nations that
reserve legislative representation for ethnic minorities.17 However, the UDMR
never actually made use of the provisions because the Hungarian party always
managed to exceed the required electoral thresholds, which increased from 3%
in 1992 to 5% in 2000.
The conflict in the early 1990s concerned the limitations of linguistic rights, as
part of broader cultural rights. The Hungarian minority released a lengthy list
of cultural and political claims, but for the time being the Romanian majority
was not prepared to make further concessions. Subsequent laws, based on the
foundations established in the constitution, granted technical rights to national
minorities but limited them in practice by making additional requirements. For
example, although the Local Administration Act from 1991 granted minorities
the right to use their native languages in communications with local authorities,
written requests had to be accompanied by translations into Romanian. Local
authorities were entitled, at their own discretion, to publish their decisions in mi-
nority languages only in localities where minorities were numerically significant.
The same applied to the Education Act of 1995. Although minority languages
were accepted when teaching specific matters pertaining to the preservation of
a minority’s identity and culture, especially at primary and secondary levels,
certain subjects such as history and geography were required to be taught only
in Romanian, regardless of the pupils’ native tongue. Moreover, the history to
be taught was the history of the Romanians, which included much that was
controversial among the ethnic minority communities who historically had been
the enemies of ethnic Romanians – something particularly true for Transylvania.
Geography too was taught in exclusively Romanian terms, despite the fact that
minorities had their own specific toponomies.
The restrictions aimed at asserting the primacy of ethnic Romanians in fact
remained more symbolic than practical because ethnic Hungarian teachers
continued to use Hungarian names for geographical features and did not fully
embrace the official historical version. In spite of their continued restrictive ele-
ments, the rights granted by early post-communist laws in Romania surpassed
similar provisions set up by other post-communist countries, especially in the
fields of culture and education. Romania was worlds away from the bitter ef-
forts made by the former Yugoslav and the Baltic states to support their official
languages, which effectively turned those new democratic regimes into ethnic
democracies.18 Even if during the first years of its democratic transition the
17  Ronald F. King / Cosmin Gabriel Marian, Minority Representation and Reserved
Legislative Seats in Romania, East European Politics and Societies 26 (2012), no. 3, 561-588.
18  Priit Järve, Language Battles in the Baltic States: 1998-2002, in: Daftary / Grin (eds.),
Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries, 73-106; Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship
Romanians set up a hegemonic model that claimed the primacy of Romanian as

the official language; their willingness to accept minority languages and create
room for future improvement in the status of minorities represented a major
difference between Romania and other countries in the region. Romania’s eager-
ness to join NATO led to the signing of a political treaty between Romania and
Hungary in 1996, with mutual recognition in both countries of existing state
borders and the rights of minorities.
The biggest opportunity for expanding minority rights came between 1996
and 2000, when a newly favourable internal circumstance arose. For the first
time, following the defeat of the ruling Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social
Democrat, PSD) which was the successor of the communist party, a new coalition
included the UDMR. Their participation in government was seen by the coali-
tion as helpful for joining NATO, while simultaneously the Hungarian minority
found itself in a much more favourable position to apply a reasonable amount
of pressure to improve minority rights. The two acts regulating education and
public administration were amended so that language rights were significantly
expanded with new provisions allowing more use of minority languages in
education, from primary to university level, and in public administration.19 All
those expanded rights are comparable to and sometimes even exceed minority
rights anywhere, both at EU level and at the level of internal provisions within
certain member states.20 Caught up in the process of European integration, some
candidate countries managed in effect to surpass internal conditions in older
EU member states, which have remained fearful of granting similar rights to
their own ethnic minorities.21
Such essential improvement in minority rights has turned Romania into
a regional model, and similar language laws were subsequently adopted by,
for example, Slovakia.22 Ethnic and political relations in Romania have changed
out of all recognition from how they were in the early 1990s as a result of Ro-
mania’s inclusion of the Hungarian party into the governing coalition, and the
good relationship between Romania and Hungary as expressed by a number
Struggles in Soviet Successors States, International Migration Review 26 (1992), no. 2, 269-291;
Igor Stiks, The Citizenship Conundrum in Post-Communist Europe. The Instructive Case of
Croatia, Europe-Asia Studies 62 (2010), no. 10, 1621-1638.
19  Dragoș Dragoman, Linguistic Pluralism and Citizenship in Romania, in: Dagmar
Richter / Ingo Richter / Iryna Ulasiuk / Reeta Toivanen (eds.), Language Rights Revisited.

Berlin 2012, 267-280.
20  Oana-Valentina Suciu, Ethnic Minorities in Romania in the Light of EU Integration.
London 2006, available at <http://www.crce.org.uk/briefings/brief9.shtml>.

21  Michael Johns, “Do as I Say, Not as I Do”: The European Union, Eastern Europe and
Minority Rights, East European Politics and Societies 17 (2003), no. 4, 682-699.
22  Farimah Daftary / Kinga Gál, The 1999 Slovak Minority Language Law: Internal or
External Politics?, in: Daftary / Grin (eds.), Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition
Countries, 31-72.
of common cabinet meetings and their common access to regional organiza-

tions like the Council of Europe, the European Union and NATO.23 Although
the internal ethnic power-sharing and good cooperation between Romania and
Hungary are remarkable achievements, that situation has been undermined by
developments that began in 1998 when the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz)
gained access to power in Hungary. Both internal and external relations came
to be characterized more and more by symbolic disputes that turned ethnic
cooperation into a sort of “benign”, or “banal”, nationalism, always ready to
become more extreme should the necessity occur.24
Ethnic Relations after 2000

Although the UDMR was not co-opted into government by the governing
Social Democratic Party in 2000, with the promise of further improvements of
minority rights a special agreement was reached to enable the UDMR to sup-
port the government. New steps forward were taken, previous government
acts, issued as emergency decrees between 1996 and 2000, were passed into law.
According to the new law of 2001 on public administration, the use of minority
languages is permitted wherever the relevant minority exceeds 20% of the local
population. Since then, citizens from minority ethnic groups have been able to
communicate with official personnel in their own native language, and elected
officials may themselves speak a minority language during meetings, and local
institutions may use them to disseminate information. It is a compromise that
maintains the primacy of the official language but allows the use of minority
languages in appropriate circumstances.25 Moreover, localities where minori-
ties surpass the 20% threshold may adopt multilingual public inscriptions, for
such things as nameplates and road signs. However, the influence exerted by
Fidesz on the Romanian-Hungarian relationship and its symbolic support for the
Hungarian minority has rapidly changed the course of interethnic relations in
Transylvania. New matters were debated, ranging from symbolic commemora-
tions, street names and statues of national heroes, to the claims for autonomy of
counties in Transylvania inhabited by large proportions of ethnic Hungarians.26
The new symbolic turn came in 2001 with the Hungarian special Law on the
Status of Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries, or as it was known at
23  Dan Chiribucă / Tivadar Magyari, The Impact of Minority Participation in Romanian
Government, in: Monica Robotin / Levente Salat (eds.), A New Balance: Democracy and
Minorities in Post-Communist Europe. Budapest 2003, 73-97.
24  The expression is borrowed from Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism. London 1995.
25  István Horváth, Evaluarea politicilor lingvistice din România, in: Levente Salat (ed.),
Politici de integrare a minorităţilor naţionale din România. Aspecte legale și instituţionale

într-o perspectivă comparată. Cluj-Napoca 2008, 203-213, 207.
26  Dragoș Dragoman, Ethnic Groups in Symbolic Conflict. The “Ethnicisation” of Public
Space in Romania, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review 11 (2011), no. 1, 105-121.
the time, the “Status Law”. The law was designed to grant special rights like
seasonal work permits, social assistance, travel, education and health benefits
to ethnic Hungarians living in the nearby diaspora. Since all the countries in-
volved had emerged from the ruins of the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire
at the end of World War I, the law excited much criticism. What raised so many
questions was its symbolism, its demonstrated willingness symbolically to ex-
pand the nation by turning the Hungarian diaspora into a Hungarian political
subject instrumentalized in Hungarian politics.27 In the end, the need for internal
electoral support for Fidesz went hand in hand with symbolic expansion of the
nation, with serious effects on the way Hungarians from both Hungary and
Transylvania have conceived citizenship, nationhood, and statehood.28
The nationalist politics promoted by Fidesz and their implications for the
Hungarian diaspora must be interpreted in the light of emotionally charged
campaigning and commemorations.29 As components of national symbolism,
commemoration keeps alive national myths, which is another way ethnic groups
establish and determine their own origins and systems of values.30 Through
myth, boundaries are established both within the community and between it
and others, in a constant effort of “imagining” the community.31 That is espe-
cially true when myths and commemorations conflict, when ethnic communi-
ties celebrate historical events from opposite angles. The commemoration by
ethnic Hungarians of the national revolution that took place in 1848 to re-unite
Transylvania and Hungary after a long period of separate statehood, and the
commemoration by ethnic Romanians of the secession of Transylvania from
Hungary in 1918 are two important celebrations in Hungary and Romania
respectively, and as turning points in their historical development they also
bear clearly opposite meanings, the conflicting significance of which formed
the background to a highly symbolic affair in 2004.
27  László Kulcsár / Cristina Bradatan, Politics without Frontiers: The Impact of Hungarian
Domestic Politics on the Minority Question in Romania, Communist and Post-Communist

Studies 40 (2007), no. 3, 301-314; Stephen Deets, Reimagining the Boundaries of the Nation:
Politics and the Development of Ideas on Minority Rights, East European Politics and Societies
20 (2006), no. 3, 419-446.
28  Mark A. Waterbury, Internal Exclusion, External Inclusion: Diaspora Politics and
Party-Building Strategies in Post-Communist Hungary, East European Politics and Societies 20

(2006), no. 3, 483-515; Agnes Batory, Kin-state Identity in the European Context: Citizenship,
Nationalism, and Constitutionalism in Hungary, Nations and Nationalism 16 (2010), no. 1, 31-48.
29  Brigid Fowler, Nation, State, Europe and National Revival in Hungarian Party Politics:
the Case of the Millennial Commemorations, Europe-Asia Studies 56 (2004), no. 1, 57-83; Agnes
Rajacic, Populist Construction of the Past and Future: Emotional Campaigning in Hungary
between 2002 and 2006, East European Politics and Societies 21 (2007), no. 4, 639-660.
30  George Schöpflin, The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths, in: Geoffrey
Hosking / George Schöpflin (eds.), Myths and Nationhood. New York 1997, 19-35.
31  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. London 1983.

The commemoration of the 1848 Hungarian revolution was literally carved

in stone in the form of statuary raised in the town of Arad in 1880, following
the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867. Arad was in Hungary until 1920,
but is now in Romania. Known as the “Liberty Statue”, the massive monument
depicts 13 Hungarian revolutionary generals who were executed as mutineers
by the Austrian imperial army in 1849 when the revolution was defeated with
the support of the Tsarist Russian army.32 After World War One and the integra-
tion of Transylvania into the Kingdom of Romania, the Romanian government
dismantled the group of statues, mainly because Hungarian revolutionaries had
killed many Romanians in the rising of 1848-1849 against Habsburg rule and
subsequent civil war. The “Liberty Statue” had in fact been placed in storage
in the city fortress and was finally restored to public display in 2004. Following
months of tense negotiations, it was placed in a “Romanian-Hungarian Recon-
ciliation Park” alongside architectural symbols of ethnic Romanians, raised in
order to diminish the element of Hungarian symbolism.
The symbolic domination of urban space is central to the strategies used by
ethnic groups, as long as such symbolism is to be seen as fitting into practical
categories, classificatory schemes and cognitive frames.33 In Cluj-Napoca, the
former capital city of Transylvania shared by ethnic Hungarians and ethnic
Romanians, Mayor Gheorghe Funar (PUNR) used an ethnically symbolic com-
petition to secure the votes of the Romanians who make up the majority of the
city’s electorate. He did everything he could both to assert the Romanian char-
acter of the centre of the city and to neutralize its Hungarian past.34 Continuing
the symbolic race that began with Fidesz’s diaspora politics, he threatened to
remove the historic equestrian statue of Mathias Corvinus, the most important
Renaissance era king of Hungary. The figure dominates the central square of
the city, and the mayor sponsored archaeological excavations there in a bid to
assert Romanian primacy in Cluj by emphasizing its Roman history. Finally,
he erected towering flagpoles flying Romanian flags on each side of the statue.
When Funar left the city’s town hall in 2004 after three mayoral terms, still trying
to dominate the urban space ethnically, he replaced the white-painted benches
in the central square with new ones in Romanian national colours.
The climax of the symbolic confrontation came with the much more sensitive
matter of autonomy for ethnic Hungarians living in Transylvania. Although not
new, having been advanced by the UDMR since the early 1990s, the subject was
emphasized by Hungarian autonomists as soon as almost all other other basic
32  István Deák, The Lawful Revolution. Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849.
New York 1979.

33  Rogers Brubaker, Rethinking Nationhood: Nation As an Institutionalized Form, Practical
Category, Contingent event, Contention 4 (1994), no. 1, 3-14.

34  Brubaker / Feischmidt / Fox / Grancea, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in
a Transylvanian Town.
linguistic and patrimonial rights had been granted,35 especially after Romania
ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 2008.36
In acquiring its cultural rights supported by important patrimonial restitution,
the Hungarian community recovered many of the proper conditions for the
preservation of its cultural identity. In many city centres such as Timișoara, Cluj-
Napoca, Arad, Brașov, or Oradea, the Hungarian churches, both Roman-Catholic
and Protestant, donated or rented many of the historic buildings returned to
them by the Romanian property restitution act to Hungarian-language schools
and high schools. As compensation, new school buildings were required for
ethnic Romanian pupils in other urban areas, sometimes in peripheral and
semi-peripheral areas, and more and more schools that were previously mixed
Romanian and Hungarian were now separated as monolingual ones. The
Hungarian community’s willingness after 1989 to adopt separate schools after
decades of forced ethnic cohabitation during communist rule, combined with
the symbolic matter of whether their location was peripheral or central urban
led to protests by Romanian teachers and pupils about having to use separate
school buildings in various towns in Transylvania. Many Romanians saw the
situation as a defeat after the effort made for centuries by their own elites in
Transylvania, who had struggled to promote Romanian culture as being equal
to Austrian and Hungarian culture.37 That effort was symbolized soon after
1918 by the building of Romanian orthodox churches in many city centres in
Transylania, especially Cluj-Napoca, Târgu-Mureș, and Timișoara.
The matter of territorial autonomy is more sensitive, because it is in conflict
with both the 1991 Constitution and the 2001 Law of Public Administration,
both of which acknowledge that Romania is a unitary nation state. According
to those two laws, the largest territorial unit is the county, and the current ter-
ritorial design is the one put in place in 1968. Before that, the Hungarian com-
munity benefitted from autonomy under the Soviet-style administration, in the
framework of an autonomous region called the ‘Hungarian Autonomous Region
of Mureș’. That autonomy ended with the nationalization of communism, the
homogenization of the socialist nation and the settlement of the county as a ter-
ritorial unit.38 It was only in 1998 that the Romanian Parliament adopted the
35  Monica Călușer, Carta europeană a limbilor regionale sau minoritare în România. Între
norme și practici. Cluj-Napoca 2009; Marian Chiriac, Provocările diversităţii. Politici publice
privind minorităţile naţionale și religioase în România. Cluj-Napoca 2005.
36  The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is a document issued by the
Council of Europe in 1992. The document has been signed and ratified since then by certain
countries, including Romania, whereas a number of countries (France, Italy, Russia) only
signed the document without proper ratification, and other countries (Greece, the Baltic
States, Belgium, Portugal) refused even to sign it.
37  Keith Hitchins, A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement in Transylvania,
1860-1914. Bucharest 1999.

38  Cheng Chen, The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania.
Law on Regional Development and accepted eight macro-regions in order to

comply with the requirements of the European territorial statistical units system
(NUTS, from the French Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques).39 The
new approach was more of a development tool than a regionalization in terms
of restructuring the regional administration, and was similar to early measures
adopted by other EU candidate countries at the request of the European Com-
mission.40 The new approach never involved effective regionalization, and
successive governments postponed concrete steps towards full autonomy for
the regional units.41
The government’s indecision is closely related to symbolic actions and claims
to territorial autonomy. In 1998 the government decided not to overlap admin-
istrative and ethnic inner borders when shaping regional units in Romania.
Considering the brief autonomy of the Hungarian community in Transylvania
between 1952 and 1968 under the umbrella of the Hungarian Autonomous
Region, which more or less covered the current mostly ethnic Hungarian coun-
ties of Harghita, Covasna and Mureș, the government decided to include those
counties into a larger regional unit and place them alongside Alba, Brașov and
Sibiu, counties inhabited by majority ethnic Romanians. That regional design
was constantly challenged whether in power or in opposition both by Hungar-
ian autonomists and the Hungarian UDMR party. They claimed autonomy for
the historical “Székelyland” (Székelyföld in Hungarian and Ţinutul Secuiesc in
Romanian), covering more or less the Harghita, Covasna and Mureș counties.
The name recalls the medieval administrative organization of Transylvania,
when Szeklers, a Hungarian population defending the Eastern borders of the
Hungarian Kingdom, benefitted from extensive autonomy granted by the Hun-
garian king.42 The relationship between ethnic Hungarians and Szeklers is of
great symbolic importance, since Transylvania became the shield of the Hungar-
ian nation when western areas of the former Hungarian Kingdom were occupied
by the Ottomans after the historic defeat of 1526 and subsequent dismantling
of the medieval Hungarian state.43 Before that, Hungary had been a wealthy
and important regional power encompassing the whole Carpathian Basin and
including the principality of Transylvania. Its borders were defended by au-
tonomous communities, the Szeklers and Saxons, who with noble Hungarians
formed the bulk of the upper classes (medieval états). The historic autonomy of
39  Dragoș Dragoman, Regional Inequalities, Decentralisation and the Performance of Local
Governments in Post-Communist Romania, Local Government Studies 37 (2011), no. 6, 647-669.

40  Martin Ferry, From Government to Governance: Polish Regional Development Agencies
in a Changing Regional Context, East European Politics and Societies 21 (2007), no. 3, 447-474.
41  Dragoș Dragoman / Bogdan Gheorghiţă, European Conditionality, Ethnic Control or
Electoral Disarray? The 2011 Controversial Territorial Reform Attempt in Romania, Polis.
Journal of Political Science 2 (2014), no. 1, 72-90.
42  Gyula Kristó, Histoire de la Hongrie médiévale. Le temps des Arpads. Rennes 2000.
43  Paul Lendvai, The Hungarians: A Thousand Years of Victory in Defeat. Princeton/NJ 2004.
Szeklers is still invoked today for the recognition of a special autonomous status
for the Hungarians in Transylvania and for a special design for regional units
inhabited in large shares by ethnic Hungarians. This is the purpose of a new
Hungarian party in Transylvania, the Civic Hungarian Party (Hungarian, Magyar
Polgári Párt, Romanian, Partidul Civic Maghiar, PCM), which is challenging the
long-established Hungarian UDMR party, partner of the Romanian parties in
parliament and government. The PCM unilaterally set up a Szekler National
Council as a representative body of Szeklers in Transylvania with the stated
goal of working for autonomy for “Székelyland”. They wish to adopt the use
of ethnic symbols like a national anthem, flag and a separate national coat of
arms. Additionally, the council intends to make an official proposal for a law
regarding an autonomous Székely territory, defined as a distinct and indivisible
territorial unit that should not be merged into a larger territorial unit, unlike as
things are today with the three counties, Harghita, Covasna and Mureș, which
are parts of a larger regional administrative unit.
Symbolic conflict has become even more visible since 2007 when the council
of the 73.79% ethnic Hungarian Covasna county decided to set up eight tourist
road signs at its borders, to mark entry into “Székelyland”. Immediately, au-
thorities from neighbouring Harghita inhabited by 84.61% ethnic Hungarians
expressed their willingness to set up similar signboards for the benefit of tourists
at their borders. The legal dispute, between the two county councils dominated
by elected councillors of Hungarian ethnicity and the Romanian State Road
Company which initially removed the signboards, ended with the permanent
installation of road signs at the borders of the two counties. Under pressure from
the UDMR on its coalition partner PSD, in 2014 the government finally agreed
that local authorities, town councils and county councils should be entitled to
raise flags specific to each town or county, in addition to the Romanian and EU
flags. Moreover, the Association of the Hungarian Regions, a lobby institution
in Brussels designed to keep the Hungarian Regional Development Agencies in
touch with European institutions, decided in 2011 to include the “Székelyland”
office among the other regions it represents, which almost amounts to official
recognition of representation of the province by Hungary.
The increasing symbolism that defines relations between ethnic Romanians
and ethnic Hungarians very often emphasizes unresolved conflict. Pushing to ex-
pand minority rights by exceeding the current linguistic regulations, the UDMR
faced a clear refusal to accept separate public university teaching in Hungarian
from all its political partners during its periods of participation in government
(1996-2000, 2004-2008, 2010-2012, 2014-). The current legal framework allows
for full education in Hungarian, but no Romanian government has yet taken
the difficult decision to dismantle the bilingual university “Babeș-Bolyai” in
Cluj-Napoca. All governments have instead preferred to encourage private
universities to teach in Hungarian, financed by private subsidies and financial

allocations from the Hungarian government.
The Franz Joseph University in Transylvania, named after the Emperor
himself, was founded in Cluj-Napoca in 1872 by the Hungarian government,
following the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and the formal political
unification of Hungary with Transylvania.44 The university ended its activity
upon the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the unification of
Transylvania with Romania, when taking control over it was one of the top
priorities for the new Romanian authorities. In 1919, the Hungarian university
symbolically and officially moved across the new border to Szeged, in Hun-
gary, yet all the material assest including the buildings and laboratories of the
old university remained in Cluj-Napoca at the disposal of the new Romanian
University. For a brief period after World War Two, emphasizing the friend-
ship between the socialist Hungarian and Romanian people, the Hungarian
university was restored to Cluj-Napoca and was re-named after the illustrious
Hungarian mathematician Janos Bolyai. However, the Hungarian university’s
period of autonomy was short, for it was forcibly merged with the Romanian
“Victor Babeș” university in the aftermath of the Hungarian uprising of 1956.
Since then, the state university in Cluj-Napoca has been bilingual in Romanian
and Hungarian and has borne the combined names of the two scientists, “Babeș-
Bolyai”. From then on, Hungarian speaking professors and students have been
able to organize themselves into dedicated study-groups and departments, but
cannot form distinctive faculties using Hungarian as the teaching language.
Although it is first of all a practical question, the possibility that Hungar-
ian-speaking professors and students might group themselves into autono-
mous faculties or even split off from the current university to form a separate
Hungarian-speaking public university in Cluj-Napoca is highly symbolic. In
the past, one of the purposes of the new university created in 1872 was to
fully emancipate Hungarian culture and science and to signal their primacy in
Transylvania. The Hungarian community received similarly symbolic answers
to its requests to reshape or split up the existing Babeș-Bolyai University. The
Romanian-dominated ruling body’s main argument against the proposal for
autonomous organization of the two faculties currently housing the Hungarian
departments, was the preservation of multiculturalism and scientific competi-
tiveness. Both would be better promoted by the current organization of chairs
and faculties, they said. Despite pressure in favour of autonomous organization
of Hungarian-speaking faculties coming from the central government formed
by UDMR and Romanian parties, the ruling body of the university consistently
rejected the idea.
44  Victor Karady / Lucian Nastasă, The University of Kolozsvár/Cluj and the Students of
the Medical Faculty (1872-1918). Budapest 2004.

The highly symbolic turn of ethnic relations between Hungarians and Ro-
manians in Transylvania during the last decade relates to mechanisms of dif-
ferentiation and power in the field of cultural production,45 but it also works
as a narrative of banal nationalism.46 This kind of nationalism is “banal” as
long as it encompasses non-material issues and is opposed to direct, hard,
hot nationalism expressed by violence and bloodshed.47 Such a sort of banal
nationalism, working to mark public space symbolically, contrasts the “other”
and thereby strengthens an ethnic group’s identity.48 Born at the same time
as growing ethnic symbolism, the competing idea of a transnational identity
that generates a “civic regionalism” was a plausible alternative to both banal
and violent nationalism. In an optimistic environment with both Hungary and
Romania gaining full membership of the EU and joining NATO, with strong
cooperation between national governments and the expansion of minority rights
in both countries, “civic regionalism” was presented in 2000 by a handful of
Romanian and Hungarian intellectuals in Transylvania as a plausible alternative
to the current political representation of Transylvanian citizens.49
The new Transylvanian regionalism was based on the alleged existence of
“Transylvanism”, a cultural peculiarity related to the multiethnic history of
Transylvania and to its proximity to Central and Western Europe. By its dif-
ferent traditions, history, and especially by its multiethnic composition, Tran-
sylvania has been said to be essentially different from the rest of Romania. In
Transylvania, the coexistence of Western and Oriental Christianity has allowed
the expression of the great styles of European culture: romantic, gothic, renais-
sance, baroque, and classical. Moreover, Transylvania appears as a space of
religious tolerance and renewal, especially when one notices that many ethnic
Romanians in Transylvania display religious beliefs different from those of their
counterparts in other Romanian provinces. The point was made by the Greek-
Catholic Romanian United Church with Rome, a major part of the Orthodox
Church in Transylvania, when in 1699 it symbolically accepted the supremacy
of the Pope as leader of the Holy Church. The Greek-Catholic Church in fact
played an essential role in the history of Romanians in Transylvania and is
considered both a factor in its progress and a distinctive feature differentiat-
ing Transylvania from the rest of Romania. The Greek-Catholic Church was
45  PierreBourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production. Cambridge/MA 1994.

46  Billig,Banal Nationalism.
47  Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging. Journeys into the New Nationalism. London
1994.
48  Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction.
London 1979.
49  Gusztáv Molnár, Regionalism Civic, Provincia I (2000), no. 2.
outlawed by the Communist regime in 1948 and its patrimony donated to the
Orthodox Church, but since 1989 has been fighting for its restitution.50
Taking cultural difference as a sufficient basis for a regional party that fights
for decentralization and state reform, Transylvanian intellectuals have proposed
a regionalist solution for the harmonious development of Romania that would
consider the historical, economic and sociocultural identity of its regions. They
submitted a Memorandum to Parliament Regarding the Regional Structuring
of Romania, which triggered a public debate. However, unambiguous refusal
by the government to consider civic regionalism as the basis for regionalization
and the negative reactions from Romanian nationalist parties put the project
on hold. The failure of civic regionalism consolidated ethnic symbolism, fuel-
ling identity strategies to ensure domination of the public space in many urban
contexts in Transylvania.51
Ethnic Relations with Small Minority Groups:

the German Minority in Context
Beginning in 2000, a parallel and different relationship developed between
ethnic Romanians and ethnic Germans in Transylvania. Once again, context
proved to be decisive. In 2000, Klaus Johannis, the candidate of the Demo-
cratic Forum of the Germans in Romania (in German Demokratisches Forum der
Deutschen in Rumänien, DFDR, in Romanian Forumul Democrat al Germanilor din
România, FDGR) managed to win the mayoral elections in Sibiu, a medium-sized
town in Southern Transylvania, despite the scant share of ethnic Germans in
the city.52 He won the subsequent mayoral elections in Sibiu in 2004, 2008 and
2012, turning the city into a psephological phenomenon, and thus marking an
essential difference from the Hungarian candidates in Transylvania, who are
voted for exclusively by ethnic Hungarians.53
Although comparing relations between ethnic Romanians and ethnic Hun-
garians on the one hand with those between ethnic Romanians and ethnic
Germans on the other hand might carry some risk given the demographic
sizes and symbolic power of the different communities, the comparison is
important to an understanding of the evolution of ethnic relations in Romania.
The normalization of relations between Hungarian and Romanian parties in
50  Chiriac, Provocările diversităţii.
51  Dragoș Dragoman, Ethnic Groups in Symbolic Conflict. The “Ethnicisation” of Public
Space in Romania, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review 11 (2011), no. 1, 105-121.
52  Idem, La recomposition du champ politique régional en Roumanie. Le succès du Forum
Allemand à Sibiu/Hermannstadt”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review 5 (2005),

no. 1, 181-201.
53  Andreea Zamfira / Dragoș Dragoman, Le vote (non)ethnique en Roumanie, 2000-2008.
Les performances électorales des partis des minorités allemande et hongroise en perspective
comparée, Revue d’Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest 40 (2009), no. 2, 127-156.
parliament, but also between Romania and Hungary, paved the way for ethnic
cooperation in other contexts, as was the case in Sibiu. The comparison could be
made on limited electoral grounds, taking into account the potential of ethnic
mobilization, but it could be made from a broader perspective too, taking into
account larger favourable factors like the general process of democratization
and Europeanization.54
The Transylvanian electoral success of the German candidate came in a very
special urban community, where ethnic relations seem to differ greatly from the
overall ethnic environment. First of all, the history of Sibiu is very much related
to the persistence of the German ethnic element. Founded by Western settlers
in the 12th century close to what was then the Eastern border of the medieval
Hungarian kingdom,55 the city of Sibiu (Hermannstadt in German, Nagyszeben
in Hungarian) enjoyed considerable autonomy for centuries. It was a distinct
political unit, under its own jurisdiction and directly subject to Hungary’s king,
who undertook to guarantee its rights.56 The colonists were referred to as “Sax-
ons” (Hospites saxonicarum), although in fact they had come from a large area
of the Rhine and Mosel basins to defend the Hungarian crown (ad retinendam
Coronam); from Cologne, Trier, Luxembourg and the Westerwald.57 They were
united by their destination, not by their different origins, for they were actually
from Franconia, Wallonia, and Luxembourg. The unity and the autonomy of
the settlers (unus sit populus) were successively accepted by the king, with the
final unification of the jurisdiction of all towns inhabited by Saxons under the
capacious umbrella of the Nationsuniversität (Universitas Saxonum).
For a long time, the autonomy of the Saxon community, which adopted the
Lutheran brand of Christianity in the 16th century, was defended in the frame-
work of medieval power structures when the Nationsuniversität was represented
in the Transylvanian House of Commons, alongside the Hungarian nobility and
the Székely community, and each group could defend its interests and privileges
by use of a veto (curiatvotum). The medieval power system excluded ethnic
Romanians, very many of whom were peasants of Christian Orthodox faith.
It was a Medieval injustice, perpetuated into modern times and lived through
by many generations of Romanians in Transylvania and never forgotten. The
Saxon community gradually lost its autonomy in the face of dramatic historical
developments in the region. There was the crushing defeat of the Hungarian
kingdom in 1526 by the Ottoman Empire and the limited autonomy of Transylva-
nia although it survived as a distinct principality subject to the Ottomans. Then
came the hegemony of the catholic House of Habsburg and religious conflict in
54  Sherrill Stroschein, Ethnic Struggle, Coexistence, and Democratization in Eastern
Europe. Cambridge 2012.

55  Kristó, Histoire de la Hongrie médiévale.
56  Harald Roth, Hermannstadt: Kleine Geschichte einer Stadt in Siebenbürgen. Köln 2006.
57  Ernst Wagner, Istoria sașilor ardeleni. Bucharest 2000.
Transylvania, until modernization imposed by Emperor Joseph II finally put

an end to the range of privileges inherited from the Middle Ages, and in 1781
the Saxon community lost its exclusive right to citizenship of Sibiu.58 Moreover,
the Nationsuniversität could no longer use its veto and was reduced to a small
minority when the curiatvotum was transformed in the House of Commons
into individual vote almost proportional to its ethnic share. The national idea
promulgated by the 1848 revolution consolidated the modernization, putting
an end to the medieval administrative system of laws which was replaced by
the Austrian civil code, and following the Austro-Hungarian Compromise
Hungarian became the only official language.59 Finally, a law of 1876 broke up
the territorial unity of the Saxon community and turned the Nationsuniversität
into an ordinary private foundation, in charge of the administration of the
community’s patrimony.
The formation of the Romanian national unitary state and its struggle to
achieve cultural homogenization of the newly enlarged Romanian territory se-
riously affected the economic situation of the German community after 1918.60
Monetary unification with Romania and land reform diminished German wealth
in both currency and land, with a huge reduction in bank deposits and Church
land properties.61 The situation became even more serious after 1945, when the
entire German community in Romania was held responsible and collectively
sanctioned for its alleged support of Nazi Germany during World War Two. All
ethnic Germans were deprived of their civil and political rights, while 30,000 of
them were deported to the Soviet Union. Tens of thousands of German farmers,
craftsmen and merchants were deprived of their property, while their banks,
factories, shops, and houses were nationalized by the Romanian state.62 On the
basis of the Ostpolitik promoted in the 1970s by the German Federal Govern-
ment, many ethnic Germans decided to pay a sum of money to allow them to
leave Romania. The German migration only intensified after 1989, when legal
and administrative restrictions were lifted, leaving behind a very long history
of conviviality and struggle, of cooperation and conflict, of ethnic and religious
diversity. At the end of the 20th century, the German community constituted
fewer than 2% of the overall population in Sibiu and fewer than 0.5% of the
overall population in Romania.
How can the great success of the German Forum in Sibiu be explained?
Gherghina and Jiglău identified a number of key factors that influence ethnic
58  Angelika Schaser, Josephinische Reformen und sozialer Wandel in Siebenbürgen. Die
Bedeutung des Konzivilitätsreskriptes für Hermannstadt. Stuttgart 1989.

59  Thomas Nägler, Românii și sașii până la 1848. Sibiu 1997.
60  Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania.
61  Vasile Ciobanu, Contribuţii la cunoașterea istoriei sașilor transilvăneni. 1918-1944.
Sibiu 2001.
62  Konrad Gündisch, Siebenbürgen und die Siebenbürger Sachsen. München 1998.
mobilization in post-communist countries.63 Things like territorial concentration,

past relations of conflict between the dominant group and the ethnic minority,
successful anti-minority parties, the influence of the kin-state and formal and
informal discrimination generally lead to a political mobilization of a given
minority group. With no ethnic competition in the current urban setting, with
no successful anti-minority parties, with no effective discrimination and with
a biased memory of past conflicts, ethnic Romanians in Sibiu overwhelmingly
voted for the German Forum, expressing in fact a nostalgia that overempha-
sized positive ethnic characteristics.64 In the memories of Romanian voters two
decades after the German emigration from 1990-1991, ethnic Germans were
serious, trustworthy, and hard-working people.65 Moreover, voting for a Ger-
man candidate could also be motivated by a rational choice. Voting in 2000 can
be seen as expressing hope for closer ties with the German Federal Republic,
significant German investment and future economic growth after decades of bit-
ter economic contraction, social uncertainty, unemployment, and deprivation,66
expectations almost fulfilled in the subsequent development of the city. Boosted
by important direct investments in local industry, as well as by massive public
investment in transport infrastructure and by a rise in tourism after 2007 when
Sibiu was a European Capital of Culture,67 the city saw impressive economic
growth. Sibiu today is one of the most important cultural destinations, as well
as one of the most economically attractive cities in Romania. All these economic
features became electoral assets in 2008 and 2012, when the FDGR maintained its
power at local and county levels and emphasized its politically neutral profile.68
The electoral model put forward by the city was duplicated on a smaller
scale in other urban settings in Mediaș, Cisnădie and Avrig, some of the most
important cities in Sibiu county. The German Forum’s influence not only
helped consolidate local democracy by offering viable political alternatives to
mainstream parties and avoiding relying on extremist anti-system parties, but
63  Sergiu Gherghina / George Jiglău, Explaining Ethnic Mobilisation in Post-Communist
Countries, Europe-Asia Studies 63 (2011), no. 1, 49-76.

64  Dragoș Dragoman / Andreea Zamfira, L’influence des stéréotypes sur les performances
électorales des partis des minorités ethniques en Roumanie. Allemands et Hongrois en

perspective comparée, Transitions 48 (2008), no. 1, 135-161.
65  Dragoș Dragoman, Capital social et tolérance ethnique. Coopération, confiance et
préjugés ethniques en Roumanie, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review 5 (2005),
no. 3, 733-751.
66  Ivan T. Berend, Social Shock in Transforming Central and Eastern Europe, Communist
and Post-Communist Studies 40 (2007), no. 3, 269-280.

67  Florica Vasiliu / Dragoș Dragoman, Evaluating the Economic Impact of Large Cultural
Events. A Case Study of Sibiu, European Capital of Culture 2007, Studia Politica. Romanian
Political Science Review IX (2009), no. 2, 317-327.
68  Dragoș Dragoman, The Success of the German Democratic Forum in Sibiu: Non-Ethnic
Voting, Political Neutrality and Economic Performance, Transitions 53 (2013), no. 1/2, 97-117.
shaped state politics as well.69 In October 2009, Klaus Johannis was supported
by a large coalition formed by the PSD and the National Liberal Party (PNL) as
a candidate for Prime Minister after the dismissal by Parliament of the previ-
ous Democratic Liberal (PDL) Prime Minister. Only the controversial refusal of
the Romanian President Traian Băsescu (formerly the PDL leader) prevented
Klaus Johannis from being appointed. In March 2014, the PNL nominated Jo-
hannis, then PNL vice-president, for Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Affairs
Minister, to force reform of the governing alliance between PNL and PSD. The
Social Democrat Party refused to accept the nomination whereupon the PNL
withdrew from the governing coalition.
President Băsescu was not the only one to express populist attitudes, when he
mocked the decision of the parliamentary majority to appoint Klaus Johannis
following the dismissal of the PDL government. The President’s scorn was in
line with his general attitude of constantly undermining Parliament, which twice
suspended him from office, in 2007 and 2012. During his two consecutive terms,
the President initiated referendums seeking to reduce drastically the number
of MPs and to turn the existing bicameral assembly into a single chamber. He
sought stronger majoritarian electoral systems in local and national elections and
the consolidation of executive power, launching his counteroffensive by pitting
his own personal popularity against the low esteem in which Parliament was
held.70 Once in power following the 2012 general elections, the PSD initiated
a nationalist and populist rhetoric based on the party’s allegiance to both the
dominant Romanian ethnic group and the Orthodox Church. Their aim was to
justify the PSD’s opposition to external pressure and criticism coming from the
European Commission and the US Embassy in Bucharest. Its rhetoric is even
more striking in the context of the presidential elections in 2014, when the new
PNL-PDL alliance was represented by Klaus Johannis, who is neither an ethnic
Romanian nor an Orthodox Christian. This turn of events has to be integrated
into a broader picture of democratic backsliding following the ending of ex-
ternal pressure once accession to the European Union had been secured.71 In
the whole region, populists in power have refused to respect the separation of
69  Idem, Partide regionale și democraţie locală în România, in: Sergiu Gherghina (ed.),
Voturi și politici. Dinamica partidelor românești în ultimele două decenii. Iași 2011, 319-345.
70  Idem, Populism, autoritarism și valori democratice în opinia publică din România,
in: Sergiu Gherghina / Sergiu Mișcoiu (eds.) Partide și personalităţi populiste în România

postcomunistă. Iași 2010, 267-207; Cosmin G. Marian / Ronald F. King, “Plus ça change”.
Electoral Law Reform and the 2008 Romanian Parliamentary Elections, Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 43 (2010), no. 1, 7-18.
71  Dragoș Dragoman, Post-Accession Backsliding: Non-Ideologic Populism and Democratic
Setbacks in Romania, Southeast European Journal of Political Science 1 (2013), no. 3, 27-46;
Paul Levitz / Grigore Pop-Elecheș, Why No Backsliding? The European Union’s Impact
on Democracy and Governance Before and After Accession, Comparative Political Studies 43
(2010), no. 4, 457-485.
powers, nor do they acknowledge the existence of politically neutral institutions

like the Courts of Justice, constitutional courts, or supervising and regulating
institutions for mass media. The populists have claimed to speak for the true,
sovereign people and therefore openly despise all liberal democratic institutions
standing between the people and their representatives.72 They make claims for
direct democracy and support charismatic leaders who channel social discontent
against opposition elites whom they depict as biased against ordinary people.73
Populist political action could fuel the irrationalism and anti-intellectualism of
an economically frustrated middle class and finally help the resurgence of harsh
nationalism and xenophobia.
The enormous influence of the small German party underlines the special
relationship between ethnic groups in Sibiu. In contrast to the tense ethnic con-
text in mixed Romanian-Hungarian communities, ethnic Germans are seen as
trustworthy fellow citizens, defined by Protestant values as hard-working and
persevering. Moreover, a number of contextual factors seem to work together
for their success. Their ethnic size no longer represents a threat on the labour
market, unlike at the beginning of the 20th century when Sibiu was still a Saxon
city.74 In addition, the kin-country does not use discriminatory policies when
dealing with its kin minority in Romania, and Romania has no fear of territo-
rial threat from the allegiance of the minority group. The symbolic presence
of the German minority is therefore largely accepted, along with all the public
inscriptions in German and the large signs saying “Hermannstadt” at the city
boundary. The local community in Sibiu has avoided significant symbolic
confrontations by largely accepting the use of the German language in primary
schools and high schools, where the overwhelming majority of pupils are in fact
ethnic Romanians who gladly learn German as a language of culture, science
and business, to improve their prospects on the labour market.
Conclusions
Ethnic relations between Romanian and minority groups differ by and large
depending on the local context. The contextual factors explained above all
shape the way ethnic Romanians perceive their bonds with ethnically different
communities in Romania, in a period marked by essential social and economic
change. Following a period of overt and bloody conflict at the beginning of the
72  Bojan Bugarič, Populism, Liberal Democracy, and the Rule of Law in Central and Eastern
Europe, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 41 (2008), no. 2, 191-203.

73  Ivan Krastev, The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus, Journal of Democracy 18
(2007), no. 4, 56-63.

74  Dragoș Dragoman, Modernizare și naţionalism: Sibiul la începutul secolului XX.
Competiţia elitelor într-un oraș multicultural (1905-1945), Studia Politica. Romanian Political
Science Review 7 (2007), no. 1, 31-69.
post-communist transition period, relations between ethnic Romanians and

ethnic Hungarians, as the largest ethnic minority, moved towards a more peace-
ful setting with the acceptance of minority rights, although with the powerful
ethnic domination of the majority group. After 1989, it took almost ten years to
find a reasonable compromise for the unrestricted use of language rights and
the fulfilment of the standards required for effective cultural rights. Favourable
conditions, both internal and external, have been the willingness of the two
neighbouring countries, Romania and Hungary, to accept EU conditions on
minority rights, as well as the inclusion of the Hungarian party in Romania in
almost every governing coalition from December 1996 onwards.
The changing political context in Hungary and the rise to power of the populist
Fidesz party turned the previously negotiated compromise between the ethni-
cally defined parties in Romania into a very tense symbolic conflict. Matters at
stake ranged from public inscriptions and street names in Hungarian to ethnic
commemorations, historical statues and buildings; until finally there was the
question of territorial autonomy for the Székely region and its political repre-
sentation abroad. In fact, the new symbolism affecting ethnic relations has been
considerably favoured by the internal context in Romania, where for many years
President Traian Băsescu and his governing party PDL cooperated electorally
with Fidesz, its fellow member of the European People’s Party. They supported
each other for internal elections as well as for the European elections in 2009
and 2014. Viktor Orbán, the Fidesz leader, strongly supported Traian Băsescu
when he was impeached by Parliament in 2012 and persuaded the Hungarian
community to boycott the legal referendum for Băsescu’s dismissal. With the
essential help of the Hungarians, the referendum was therefore invalidated on
the technicality of not reaching the legal numerical threshold, despite a crushing
90% of votes being cast against Băsescu.
Although the symbolic conflict worked electorally in favour of the populists,
it undermined existing good relations between ethnic Hungarians and ethnic
Romanians and fuelled extremist parties on both sides. Hungarian extremists
are now pushing at the standard European limits for cultural rights, and they
exploit fears of territorial autonomy and secession in an environment dominated
by general suspicion and hatred. This is very much in contrast with relations
between Romanians and Germans, who came to a reasonable accommodation
in various urban settings and, in Sibiu, even managed to surmount ethnic bar-
riers when considering major political and electoral concerns. Indeed, that is
why Sibiu was designated a European Capital of Culture in 2007, the year of
Romania’s accession to the European Union.
Book Reviews
Ivana Maček (ed.) Engaging Violence: get close to informants’ intimate experi-
Trauma, Memory and Representation. ences. In fact, there is hardly a person better
London, New York: Routledge, 2014 equipped for the task of editing this book
(Cultural Dynamics of Social Represen- than Maček: she is an anthropologist who
tation). XV + 198 pp., ISBN 978-0-415- grew up in Yugoslavia and wrote an excel-
83169-7, € 132.72 lent ethnography of everyday life in be-
sieged Sarajevo (Sarajevo under Siege. An-
This exceptional book tackles a topic that thropology in Wartime, Philadelphia 2009).
is rarely openly talked about: what research Maček is also a psychotherapist and one
on genocide, torture, and mass violence of the founders of the network on Trauma
does to the researchers. How do scholars, and Secondary Traumatization (TRAST)
anthropologists for instance, who have at Uppsala University’s Hugo Valentine
worked in the former Yugoslavia, deal with Centre. In 2012, she held an international
the emotional stresses that such research symposium on “Trauma and Secondary
provokes. One reason why they may not Traumatization in Work with Genocide
want to discuss this topic is because their and Mass Political Violence” of which this
responses to the research they choose to do, book is the outcome.
out of free will, can surely not be compared The contributors come from a range of
to the horrific unwanted and involuntary disciplines (anthropology, sociology, his-
experiences of their collocutors. Their view tory, refugee studies, religious studies,
is, quite rightfully, that they belong at the social psychology), and what they have in
bottom of any hierarchy of suffering, yet common is that they have done extensive
that does not make the psychological bur- research on politically motivated mass vio-
den of dealing with such topics less real. lence, covering the Holocaust and geno-
There is some research on what exposure cides in Armenia, Bosnia and Rwanda.
to emotionally burdening material does to Every single chapter draws from personal
psychiatrists and humanitarian aid work- experiences, which are presented in an
ers, but not what it does to researchers, extraordinarily honest and self-reflexive
neither in the traumatization nor methodo- manner. Many observations made in the
logical literature. Hence this book provides book resonate with my own experiences in
a welcome first step in the exploration of the former Yugoslavia, and hence reading
this field. Twelve insightful chapters, in- the book triggered painful and confronting
cluding Maček’s introduction, all written memories but also offered helpful insights
by experienced researchers, explore vari- into my responses while carrying out re-
ous responses to long-term engagement search in Kosovo and Bosnia during the
with distressing material. It shows what 1990s.
are the benefits and pitfalls of empathic re- This is difficult research, especially for
search; such as in anthropology and other scholars who get close to people: the an-
disciplines where researchers or therapists thropologist Nerina Weiss, in her chapter
158 Book Reviews
“Research under duress”, refers in this resembling primary traumatization in the

context to James Clifford’s definition of shape of intrusive or haunting emotional
ethnography as a “means for producing states. Researchers immersed into such
knowledge from an intense, intersubjec- topics may become blind and insensitive
tive engagement” (127), which cannot be to “normal” suffering (see Weiss’s contri-
stressed enough here. Hence anthropolo- bution). Yet there may also be enriching
gists, oral historians and others who use effects on one’s private and professional
ethnographic methods may not be used to life, such as on one’s parenting practices,
set boundaries and keep a distance, as most as Debóra Dwork shows in her text “To
professional psychotherapists learn to do work with the history of the Holocaust”,
for instance by containing the threat, cre- or an altruistic engagement with the wider
ating a sterile and “artificial” therapeutic world as a response to psychic numbing, as
environment between the four white walls Ervin Laub writes in his contribution “Life
of a therapy room and for a set period of in the trenches: hope in the midst of human
time. Those employing ethnography do tragedy”. Exposure to extreme violence can
interviews in homes or refugee shelters, have both destructive as well as gratifying
and during these interviews, which may consequences for the researcher.
take many hours or days, collocutors share The book draws on concepts from psy-
their experiences with them. Intimacy is an chodynamic theory, a field which explores
important part of their work: the intimate diverse forms of intersubjective commu-
stories of excessive violence and suffering nication, such as transference and counter-
may later become intrusive, involuntary transference, which refers to researchers
and sometimes cannot be willed away, as picking up and responding unconsciously
Maček writes in her introduction “Engag- to non-verbal clues and signals of trauma-
ing violence” (11). Also the ambiguities and tized collocutors; or projective identification
ethical problems of the material, where one where people communicate their traumatic
discovers, for instance, that victims and experiences in a direct manner without
perpetrators may not always be clearly using language or symbols (powerfully il-
separable categories, or where perpetrators lustrated by Weiss); or containment, where
too may be traumatized, creates all kinds of researchers process overwhelming mate-
moral dilemmas (see for instance Giorgio rial and communicate it back to collocu-
Doná’s contribution “Intersectional trau- tors in a less disturbing and threatening
matization”, and Anne Kubai’s chapter form; or parallel processes, where scholars
“Conducting fieldwork in Rwanda”). unconsciously replicate certain negative
When doing this kind of research schol- phenomena that they find in their research
ars need to be prepared to pay a price, in in institutional and private contexts; or the
terms of experiencing strong emotions such logic of the inner, which is based on Freud’s
as anger, sadness, hopelessness, helpless- notion of the unconscious, where research-
ness, loneliness, and depression. There ers insert their topics and findings into their
may be involuntary bodily symptoms, own everyday lives, confusing the two.
such as insomnia, anxiety attacks, nausea, One core distinction proposed by Laurie
vomiting, headaches, and trembling, and Pearlman in her chapter “Vicarious trau-
one may also easily head off in substance matization in mass violence researchers” is
abuse, overeating and overworking. The between (involuntary) secondary trauma-
symptoms may be so serious that they start tization, which refers to trauma transmis-
Book Reviews 159
sion between family members and loved Pearlman’s last chapter is nevertheless
ones, and (voluntary) vicarious trauma- helpful in terms of offering useful tools
tization, which happens in professional to remedy some of the issues, the crux of
relationships, between researchers and which is that researchers take care of them-
collocutors for instance. These may blend selves while doing this kind of research.
in some cases: indeed one of the book’s One should keep a healthy balance be-
recurring themes is that scholars who do tween identifying with and distancing one-
research on violence, and may experience self from one’s research topic, allowing one
vicarious trauma as a result of that, may to recuperate physically and psychologi-
also have been subject to forms of primary cally. Researchers should train themselves
traumatization, sometimes in combination in “exquisite empathy” (177) which enables
with traumatic family histories, for which them to get close to informants without fus-
Doná proposes the concept of “intersec- ing the client’s experiences with their own.
tional traumatization” (91). This is akin to Putting something in-between oneself and
the notion of multiple or complex traumati- the horrific material, through note-taking
zation in clinical psychology, which is often and photographs for example, and finding
the rule rather than the exception. Several alternative preoccupations, such as musical
contributors to the volume are living ex- and artistic pursuits, are all very helpful
amples of intersectional traumatization, strategies. In short, this is a courageous
demonstrating how the choice to do this book that is potentially of great help to
type of research is often driven by strong those who do research on extreme violence.
personal motives to come to terms with
aspects of one’s own biography or one’s Ger Duijzings (Regensburg)
family history.
One of the most salient themes of the
book is the institutional and academic Enikő Dácz (ed.), Minderheitenfragen in
context in which this research is embed- Ungarn und in den Nachbarländern im
ded, where colleagues and administrators 20. und 21. Jahrhundert. Baden-Baden:
often poorly understand the difficult na- Nomos 2013 (Andrássy Studien zur Eu-
ture of the research. The combative and ropaforschung 8). 393 pp., ISBN 978-3-
judgmental behaviours displayed by col- 8487-0779-9, € 69.00
leagues, for the sake of “scoring points”
in a debate for instance, are unhelpful This book is volume eight of the relative-
practices that deprive researchers of the ly recent and commendable series Andrássy
much needed support, and these typical Studien zur Europaforschung, launched in
competitive academic practices are poten- 2013 and edited by a collective of profes-
tially more upsetting than in other kinds of sors of the Andrássy University Budapest
research. Because of the increased financial (AUB), a small, research-oriented gradu-
pressures academic institutions are under, ate university. The AUB enjoys financial
some recommendations the book makes, support from Hungary, Austria, Germany,
such as changing the organizational cul- and Switzerland, as well as from Bavaria,
ture, or organizing regular counselling Baden-Württemberg, and the autonomous
sessions with trauma therapists to be pro- region Trentino-Südtirol. The university
vided by these institutions, seem unlikelier has emerged as a centre of expertise in po-
than ever. litical science, history, and cultural studies
160 Book Reviews
dealing with Central, Eastern and South- (Saxons) in the Hungarian parliament
eastern Europe, which is reflected in the (Enikő Dácz). Other chapters are concerned
publication of its book series. So far the An- with ethnic Germans living on Hungarian
drássy Studien zur Europaforschung has territory. Here, the analyses of Gerhard See-
published six volumes per year. wann and Dóra Frey stand out. Both serve
The study under review is a result of as showcases of a “nationalism in action”
a three-day conference in Budapest in Feb- that transcends historical circumstance.
ruary 2013, organised by the editor Enikő Their case studies can be read as illustra-
Dácz, who recently took a position at the tions of competing ideas and institutions.
Institute for German Culture and History Seewann’s chapter “Grenzüberschrei
in Southeastern Europe at the Ludwig tender Minderheitenschutz 1919-1941:
Maximilian University in Munich. Divid- Patronagestaat Deutschland, Heimatstaat
ed into three sections, the book contains Ungarn und der Völkerbund” [Cross-bor-
nineteen chapters in all. The first section, der Minority Protection 1919-1941: Patron-
dealing with judicial issues, offers two ex- State Germany, Homeland Hungary, and
cellent essays: Christoph Schnellbach’s on the League of Nations] connects German
the internationalisation of minority rights, and Hungarian German discourses of
and Günther Rautz’s on the European di- nationhood with such discourses in the
mension of minority rights. Rautz presents titular nation, be it Hungary or Romania,
an in-depth discussion of the Framework and with the international discourses on
Convention for the Protection of National minority protection initiated by the League
Minorities issued by the Council of Europe of Nations. Seewann reveals that national
in 1998. While the Council of Europe was minorities served as a “bargaining chip”
the decisive institution to shape the treaty, (126) for various actors. There can be no
the author, a member of the European doubt that Hungarian German identity
Academy in Bozen/Bolzano, analyses it in discourses increasingly overlapped with
the context of the OSCE’s activities in the those of German nationalism. However,
early and mid-1990s, which were politically Seewann also proves that, whatever the
instrumental for the advocacy of minority arrangements and actions of the German
issues. Both Rautz and Schnellbach con- Nazi or Hungarian governments in the pe-
sider the European Union to be the main riod 1933-1945, the outcome was always
political actor to enforce any agreement the same: the German minority in Hungary
during the 2000s and 2010s, through ei- served as a figure on the chessboard for
ther soft laws or the monitoring of perti- both Hungarian and Nazi politicians – and
nent processes. Readers of the two chap- in the end paid a heavy price for being ex-
ters profit from clear distinctions made to ploited by both the state of the titular na-
differentiate the various actors in minority tion, Hungary, and the patron state, Nazi
affairs, but can also better understand their Germany.
interconnectedness. Dóra Frey’s “Völkerrechtliche Quellen
The second section, “Historic Perspec- der Zwangsmigration nach dem Zweiten
tives”, covers architecture in multiethnic Weltkrieg in Ungarn (1945-1948)” [Inter-
Transylvania at the turn of the twentieth national Law Sources of Forced Migration
century (Timo Hagen), that region’s efforts after the Second World War in Hungary]
at political reform (Stéphanie Danneberg), explores the fine lines of difference between
and its representation by ethnic Germans international obligations and national ar-
Book Reviews 161
rangements concerning the forced mi- standards, access to work and public ser-
grations of Germans after 1945. Working vices, and access to schooling. He then of-
chronologically, Frey discusses land refers a chronological sketch and an analysis
form, the Potsdam Protocol, the Paris Peace that considers whether elites have sought
Treaty of 1947, the population exchange to treat Roma as a separate group or rather
with Czechoslovakia, and finally the mat- to regard its individual members as part of
ter of Hungarian refugees from neighbour- the broader social majority. He concludes
ing states. Frey’s conclusions are similar that under coercive political regimes the
to the insights of Seewann: most of the group was either excluded as a whole or its
power rested with the national elites and individual members were assimilated; in
was directed towards their strategic inter- rights-based political regimes, which have
est of constructing a nation-state based on been the standard since 1990, the group ei-
a homogeneous nation, with international ther enjoys minority rights or its individual
obligations playing a secondary role. As members can hope for integration and in-
evidence for this claim, her essay discusses clusion. Horváth’s article is aptly comple-
the land reform, which was detrimental for mented by Sergiu Constantin’s “Romanian
the Germans, and the population exchange Minority Politics and Policies in a Europe-
procedures, where national authorities act- an Context”. Constantin covers the same
ed with little countering influence exerted ground but discusses in greater detail the
by international obligations. period since 1990, which he divides into
The third and final section, “Contempo- three sequences: 1990-1997, 1997-2007, and
rary Minority Issues”, has a strong focus from 2007 to the present. He analyses three
on the challenges of integration faced by levels of governance – national, Central Eu-
the Roma minority in contemporary Hun- ropean, and European – and their interac-
gary, Romania, and Serbia. Erzsébet Ma tion throughout these three periods.
gyar’s chapter “Encounter of the Extremes. Another insightful chapter in this section
Archduke Joseph and the Roma” gives an is Balázs Dobos’s “Roma Political Parties
insightful longue durée view of Roma issues. in Hungary after 1989”, which discusses
Archduke Joseph was a veritable ethnolo- the severe fragmentation of Romani politi-
gist and published a Romani grammar in cal parties in Hungary since 1989. In line
1888. He initiated and realized a Roma set- with the typology used by Horváth, the
tlement project of thirty-six families on his author concludes that no preferential par-
estates and worked hard to reduce nega- liamentary representation has materialised
tive public attitudes towards them in the for the Roma. Hungarian Roma, accord-
surrounding villages. The impact of the ing to Dobos, have to use the side road
archduke’s activities was, at least during of civil organisations to make their voice
his lifetime, substantial among the elites heard, or else pursue integration within the
and members of the government. Due to mainstream parties. The greatest chances
his publishing activities his engagement of enactment of minority representation
aroused the attention of ethnologists and rights lie on the local level. Finally,
worldwide. Margit Feischmidt and Kristóf Szombati
István Horváth, in his chapter “The Ro- analyse the mobilisation of extreme na-
manian Roma. The Dilemma of Integra- tionalists in Gyöngyöspata, where there
tion”, reviews census figures and assesses were severe acts of violence against Roma
social conditions based on Roma living in 2009.
162 Book Reviews
Overall, this collection is an important natives to the current state of (neoliberal,

volume. Several texts by Hungarian and nationalist) affairs.
Romanian authors are here made available In fact, this message is the book’s pri-
to a readership in the West for the first time. mary agenda. In terms of history, remem-
Hence, the book fulfils one of the aims of brance, and perspective, the partizan is as
the Andrássy Studien zur Europaforschung much a metaphor as an object of research.
series: to connect local and regional exper- The starting point here – and in many ways
tise with the scholarship from Germany also the prospect looking forward – is op-
and other Western countries. Minority is- position to fascism: the resistance against
sues will continue to affect Europe in the national socialist and fascist occupation,
twenty-first century; the interested reader oppression, and violence, and the positive
will here find essays that would merit in- values connected to this struggle.
clusion in a handbook on minority rights The project at the book’s core involved
(the two chapters on judicial issues), add a journey with stops in Ljubljana, Zagreb,
substantially to ongoing debates (the stud- Jasenovac, Donja Gradina, Kozara, Bel-
ies of contemporary Roma representation grade, Zrenjanin, Sarajevo, Jablanica, and
in Hungary and Romania), and that con- Mostar, all symbolic and historically im-
nect present issues to longue durée perspec- portant places of the former Yugoslavia
tives (the essays by Seewann and Frey). located variously in present-day Slovenia,
Croatia, Serbia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina. In
Christopher Walsch (Budapest) several of these places, the project partici-
pants interviewed locals who gave testimo-
nies of how the “myth of the partizan” has
Đorđe Tomić / Roland Zschächner / Mara shaped their lives. The three interviews
Puškarević / Allegra Schneider (eds.), featured in the book offer poignant ac-
Mythos Partizan. (Dis-)Kontinuitäten counts of lifetime political beliefs and en-
der jugoslawischen Linken: Geschich- gagements, combined with regret, if not
te, Erinnerungen und Perspektiven. bitterness, at how much amnesia has been
Münster: Unrast Verlag 2013. 431 pp., created around certain events and achieve-
ISBN 978-3-89771-824-1, € 24.00 ments. The volume also includes research
essays and journalistic reports, as well as
The book under review is a result of black-and-white photographs taken during
“Partisans in the (Post-)Yugoslav dis- the research trip. Taken together, the con-
course. Myth Partizan”, a two-year project tributions bundle a collective experience
funded by the Hans Böckler Foundation. Its as much as they individualize it. Thereby
authors track down the legacies of Yugosla- the book highlights how a historical legacy
via’s Left in the country’s successor states lives on within various mental frames and
and provide overviews of several relevant forms of remembrance.
historical topics, all of which touch upon Conceptually, the book is divided into
the history of the Second World War and four sections that provide a convincing or-
of socialist Yugoslavia. While concerning ganization and arrangement of its material:
itself with Yugoslavia’s political and intel- “Yugoslavia and Its Left. An Introduction”
lectual Left and its heritages, the book also is followed by respective sections on the
carries a political message about “reinvent- Second World War, the battles around its
ing” the Left through the creation of alter- remembrance, and a final section called
Book Reviews 163
“Pokret! [Movement!] Resistance Contin- that call for uprising was the German inva-
ues. History and Presence of Social Strug- sion of the Soviet Union, which invalidated
gle”. In the introductory part, Holm Sund- the Hitler-Stalin Pact and prompted the
haussen opens the volume with a concise Soviet Union’s allies to act against the oc-
overview of Yugoslavia’s history “from cupiers. Zschächner erroneously states that
cradle to grave” (29-45). Đorđe Tomić and Italy occupied the Istrian peninsula in 1941
Krunoslav Stojaković sketch the history of (Istria had been a part of Italy since 1919).
the Yugoslav Left between the nineteenth Given these and other, similar inaccuracies,
century and the outbreak of the Second the chapter comes across as ideologized
World War, and the research lacunae that and detracts from the book’s overall goal.
await full and proper consideration (47- A differentiated history of the partisan
87). This text was originally published in movement is missing from the volume, as
2012 in the first issue of the Berlin-based Zschächner makes only superficial efforts
journal Südosteuropäische Hefte, easily acces- towards such an account.
sible online. It is a pity that the authors did The section on the memory conflict is
not refurbish their text for book publication stronger. Building on Heike Karge’s essay
and make it a genuinely comprehensive on death as a motif in (early) negotiations
overview of existing research on the politi- about how to officially commemorate cer-
cal Left of the Yugoslav peoples. Even the tain events and locations (151-165), Robert
founding date of the Yugoslav Socialdemo- Burghardt and Gal Kirn engage in a sug-
cratic Party remains mistakenly identified gestive display, via text and photographs,
as 1886 instead of 1896 (54), and no mention of Yugoslav partisan monuments (167-191).
is made of the main locations of its activi- Their assessment that these monuments,
ties – Trieste and Ljubljana. The suggestive or what is left of them, “today not only are
capacity of the adjective “Yugoslav” is not monuments to the Second World War and
sufficiently deconstructed, especially for to partisan resistance, but in fact remind
the period before 1918, when the first Yu- of Yugoslavia as such and its progressive,
goslav state was founded. anti-nationalist, and anti-fascist perspec-
The two chapters designed to serve as tive” (191), invites hefty reproaches of Yu-
a sort of historical prelude to the sections gonostalgia. Milan Radanović’s chapter on
on remembrance and legacies present monuments dedicated to the Second World
overviews of the fate of the Jews (Marija War in Belgrade (192-211) offers an interest-
Vulesica, 91-109) and of the Second World ing presentation of various (understudied)
War as a whole in occupied Yugoslavia monuments, but it adds hardly any analyti-
(Roland Zschächner, 111-135). It is not clear cal value. Todor Kuljić rightly points to the
why the latter follows the former, rather role of European memory politics in shap-
than vice versa. Zschächner in particular ing remembrance “between anti-fascism
commits unfortunate omissions that would and Tito-nostalgia” (213-221). In a similar
have made for a fuller picture had they vein, Olivera Milosavljević identifies ways
been added. For example, he writes that that historical revisionism towards the Sec-
“already in July 1941, shortly after the be- ond World War (223-233) was strengthened
ginning of the occupation, the Communist by Yugoslav diaspora publications that be-
Party of Yugoslavia called for the popula- gan in the 1950s. Such efforts flourished in
tion to resist against the occupier” (111). He the fertile ground of communism’s demise,
does not mention that a central trigger to the rise of nationalisms after the fall of the
164 Book Reviews
Berlin Wall, and more recent European ef- variations on the section’s overall theme
forts to “equal out” the remembrances of by extending the social-struggle motif to
communism and fascism. Milosavljević fo- “queers in the post-Yugoslav space” (Jo-
cuses on Serbia, as does Mara Puškarević in hanna Moser, Đorđe Tomić, and Roland
her analysis of two recent Serbian history Zschächner, 371-401) and to Romnija and
textbooks (235-252). Puškarević vividly Roma in Belgrade (Allegra Schneider, 403-
shows how little these textbooks have to 421). The volume closes with an interview
do with historical truth. However, because with Jovana Vuković, coordinator of the
not much is said about the actual state of Regional Centre for Minorities in Belgrade.
research on the Second World War in Yu- As much as I sympathize with the politi-
goslavia, readers not too familiar with that cal agenda of the editors and authors, and
history may find this chapter, like some of as much as I support its plea that the Left’s
the others, difficult to grasp. history be given its rightful place within
The final section, made up of nine Europe’s memory-scape and especially
chapters, sketches central aspects of the within the memory-scapes of the former
history of Yugoslavia’s Left, encompass- state socialist countries, I do not think that
ing the 1968 student protests against this volume fully achieves its goal of open-
the “red bourgeoisie” (Boris Kanzleiter, ing up new paths for future research on the
269-285), the Praxis group’s critical intel- topic. It is a remarkable attempt, yes, but it
lectuals (Nenad Stefanov, 287-301), and is flawed by too many instances of amne-
the economic self-management, “a failed sia, omissions, and by a certain blindness
model for the future” (Ursula Rütten, 303- to differentiation. Together, the chapters
317). Against this background, the reader touch on many important aspects, yet are
is then taken into the post-Yugoslav era. too short and too thematically scattered
Đorđe Tomić and Boris Kanzleiter (319- to serve as in-depth or even comprehen-
341), however, begin their “sketch to bet- sive analyses. The book’s core agenda is
ter understand” the post-Yugoslav Left to discern the future potential of antifas-
(319) with the same wishful thinking that cist and leftist legacies. Its scope seems
permeates the book as a whole when they to aim for the reconstruction rather than
declare that the pre–World War I socialist the deconstruction of the “Mythos Par-
and communist movement was “strongly tizan”, or at least to bring this mythos to
present”, and the antifascist partisans in the a greater and more fitting consciousness
Second World War successfully “mobilised than has been the case over the last two
hundreds of thousands of combatants” decades. This goal is pursued through
(319). This cannot pass without comment, a selective recapitulation of the narrative
as these “hundreds of thousands” were traditions of the Yugoslav founding myth
hardly all motivated by allegiance to the of partisan resistance, and through the
socialist or communist cause, but instead connection of that myth to today’s societal
acted out of an utter lack of alternatives, imaginaries.
the sheer wish to survive, and, not least,
were subject to coercion by the partisans. Sabine Rutar (Regensburg)
Mara Puškarević and Petar Atanacković
focus on one aspect of the preceding
overview, Serbia’s “small, but plurifold”
Left (343-357). The last two chapters offer
Book Reviews 165
Maria Koinova, Ethnonationalist Conflict both types ignore the temporal dimension
in Postcommunist States. Varieties of of a conflict. Koinova argues quite rightly
Governance in Bulgaria, Macedonia that from the perspective of the late 1980s
and Kosovo. Philadelphia: University of and early 1990s the conflicts of her three
Pennsylvania Press 2013, 328 pp., ISBN case studies were remarkably similar in
978-0-8122-4522-6, $ 69.95 intensity and prognosis. Nevertheless,
political choices and contingency at that
More often than not studies of ethnona- critical juncture set Kosovo on the path to
tionalist conflicts have focused on the es- escalation, shepherded Bulgaria towards
calation and containment or pacification a cooperative solution and left Macedonia
of a single conflict, whereas comparative somewhere in the middle. Firmly eschew-
studies have offered a rather crude expla- ing the “easy” explanation that historical
nation by reducing them to a handful of legacies or ancient hatreds can be assumed
variables. The latter have generally failed to be among the explanatory factors, Koi-
to convince the well-informed about spe- nova sidelines other comprehensive ex-
cific conflicts, but in the book under review planations of ethnonationalist conflicts.
Maria Koinova promises a more sophisti- Her argument, that although factors such
cated approach. Making comparisons of as economic motives for secessionism are
Kosovo and its Serb minority, Bulgaria and relevant they do not offer sufficient expla-
its Turkish citizens and the Albanian mi- nation, comes across as somewhat unfair
nority in Macedonia, she sets out to explain since her own model claims no decisive
why certain conflicts escalated into civil explanatory power. On the other hand,
war whereas quite stable arrangements amidst such a dense and diverse literature,
were found in other cases. Because Koi- I think she can be forgiven a certain amount
nova refuses to juxtapose Western conflict of brashness.
management in the region and the nation- Koinova is at her best in identifying
alizing agendas of the Southeast European the deficits and incongruities in the politi-
states, the first chapter deals with domestic cal scientific literature on contemporary
constellations of majorities and minorities ethnopolitical conflicts, which is quite an
in the web of “parties” to the conflict, with achievement considering the complexity
the international community and diaspo- and magnitude of the field of study. How-
ras or kin states appearing in subsequent ever, her own analysis of Kosovo, Bulgaria
chapters. and Macedonia occasionally feels some-
Maria Koinova makes a strong case by what overstated. In the end, the critical
arguing that the relationships of these par- juncture argument is indeed a relevant
ties to the conflict should be the common insight, but is surely complementary to
focus in comparative conflict studies. She existing explanations rather than a com-
is absolutely right that conflict studies tend plete alternative, and re-worded insights
to commit the cardinal sin in political sci- concerning the virtuous and vicious circles
ence of selecting on the dependent variable: of majorities making concessions to minori-
some studies prefer successful cases of in- ties are hardly original. Nor are warnings
ternational conflict management and de- against the risks involved in non-territorial
escalation, while others choose their case ethnic conflicts acquiring a non-negotiable
studies from the equally plentiful instances territorial dimension. Koinova’s analysis
of extreme violence, and many studies of points to the fact that re-ordering sover-
166 Book Reviews
eignty makes international conflict man- of conflict management, for Koinova’s

agement less likely to succeed. In the cases argument about critical junctures, albeit
of the Ahtisaari Plan and the Ohrid Frame- somewhat overstated, is much more so-
work Agreement, however, it is hard to phisticated and productive than generic
imagine an international strategy without path dependencies and historical legacies
such a redefinition of statehood. pointing to a national trajectory and a com-
The book’s unusual way of presenting munist past as determinants. The work cer-
the comparative cases has both advantages tainly deserves follow-up studies for other
and disadvantages. Each chapter introduc- regional or cross-regional sets of case stud-
es a new category of parties to the conflicts. ies. Even in the middle of conflict, ethnic
First are the domestic majorities and mi- majority and minority implicitly agreed
norities, next the international community, on the “rules of the game” and a bounded
and finally diasporas and kin states, and rationality that ruled out or at least disfa-
thus the actual unfolding of the conflict is voured certain strategies. Rational choice
told and re-told repeatedly. For those un- institutionalists and proponents of cultural
familiar with the conflict cases the result is determinism typically overlook such in-
a fragmented presentation of the details. stances of self-limitation by the parties to
Analytically, the incremental order of the a conflict. Demonstrating the persistence
book makes the comparison stand out much of such informal institutionalizations of
more clearly, although to this reviewer’s conflict is where the author excels.
taste the mechanical flowcharts and graphs From a policy perspective, the undeni-
intended to demonstrate the dynamics of able downside of Koinova’s approach to
each conflict offer scarcely any added value comparative conflict studies is predicta-
and even seem to be at odds with the so- bility. The introduction mentions Ukraine
phistication of the arguments on informal and its Russian minority as an example of
rules, feedback and modified expecta- a well-managed conflict with a positive
tions within and among regional conflicts. critical juncture that never produced sub-
Koinova’s argument of the critical junc- stantial violence, despite all prophecies to
ture is convincing, but it remains unclear the contrary. In retrospect informal conflict
why the years around 1990 are highlighted institutionalization indeed pointed in that
as the critical juncture at which conflict tra- direction, but Putin’s external shocks nev-
jectories were determined. In subsequent ertheless managed to reverse the dynam-
chapters the author shows how, a decade ics and pit Ukrainians against Russians in
later, informal conflict institutionaliza- the Crimea, Lugansk and Donetsk. Where
tions had been replaced by new rules of external shocks like ethnic diasporas, geo-
the games imposed by the international political interests, foreign interventions or
community. Overall, this study certainly adjacent conflicts appear on the scene – and
deserves the attention of academics and, they always do – formative junctures are no
to a lesser extent, practitioners in the field longer much of a predictor.
Wim van Meurs (Nijmegen/Kleve)

Südosteuropa
Journal of Politics and Society
Published on behalf of the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Regensburg
Contact: Dr. Sabine Rutar.

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© 2015 by Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (IOS)

Published by De Gruyter Oldenbourg, München
The journal and all its contributions and illustrations are subject to copyright. Their use beyond the narrow
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Layout: Kraus PrePrint, Landsberg am Lech

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Printed in Germany
ISSN 0722-480X
Südosteuropäische Arbeiten 153
Florian Kührer-Wielach
Siebenbürgen ohne Siebenbürger?

Zentralstaatliche Integration und politischer Regionalismus
nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg
At the end of 1918, Transylvanian Romanians strongly supported the forma-

tion of a “Greater Romania”. Their wartime dream of becoming a part of their
enlarged kin-state, instead of belonging to (Austria-)Hungary, now came true.
Yet, the new “Greater Romania” faced problems of social and institutional in-
tegration. Many Romanians from Transylvania felt they were being treated
as second-class citizens within the new central state. Local Romanian politi-
cians developed a wide range of discursive and practical strategies to address
the specific interests of the former Habsburg regions, on the one hand, and
to pursue their programmatic and personal interests, on the other. Florian
Kührer-Wielach explores these strategies and shows how a new and greater
Transylvania – in comparison with the narrower traditional concept of that re-
gion – was created alongside and within Greater Romania. The political failure
of a mostly “Transylvanian” new state government installed in 1928, he argues,
strongly contributed to the failure of Romanian interwar democracy and its re-
placement by authoritarian rule.
Florian Kührer-Wielach is Deputy Director at the Institute of German Culture and

History in Southeastern Europe at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.
416 pp., De Gruyter Oldenbourg, München 2014, ISBN 978-3-11-037890-0, € 54,95

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Institute for East and

Southeast European Studies

The Romanian Political

SABINE RUTAR (Regensburg), Editor-in-Chief

Heinz-Jürgen Axt (Duisburg-Essen) Denisa Kostovicova (London)

The Romanian Political System after 1989

Sergiu Gherghina: Introduction: Political Dynamics in Post-Communist

Ivana Maček (ed.) Engaging Violence: Trauma, Memory and Represen-

The Romanian Political System after 1989

The existence of institutional conflict is quite common in post-communist

4 Sergiu Gherghina / George Jiglău, Where Does the Mechanism Collapse? Understanding

the 2008 Electoral System, Representation 48 (2012), no. 4, 445-459.

Eastern Europe is well-known for its ethnically diverse populations, and

Europeanization Process: The Romanian Experience, Romanian Journal of European Affairs 8

The Romanian Political System after 1989

What Grounds for Representing the People?

After the communist regime ended in 1989, Romania’s democratisation process

Behaviour – the Politics of Central Europe. London 1990, 101-126.

been embraced by all political majorities in post-socialist Romania, at least it

Central Europe”, financed by the Romanian National Research Council.

Discourse Theory and Politics

especially the chapter “Le problème: la légitimation”.

Following the post-structuralist logic of Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida,

10 Ernesto Laclau / Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical

Democratic Politics. London 1985, xi.

Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann. Bristol 2003, 52.

Framework, GIGA Research Programme: Transformation in the Process of Globalisation, 1 (2007),

Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London 2000,

D1, D2, D3, D4 Signifiers

Graph 1. Ernesto Laclau, The Generation of Discursive Hegemony.

totality, with which it identifies itself. The identification is fundamentally po-

15 Laclau, La raison populiste, 89, 144.

Analysing Romanian Politics through Discourse Theory

The very absence of “People” as a signifier may itself be converted into

23 Sergiu Mișcoiu, Între retorica consensului și practica rupturii. Efectele oscilațiilor

strategy. See Ion Iliescu, Revoluţie și Reformă. Bucharest 1994, 158-160.

maintain such articulations: this is a process whereby discourse is structured

fought against and sometimes suppressed. The “Other’s” identity structures

of the recurrent references to “communism” were made by political representatives of the

personalități populiste în România post-comunistă. Iași 2010, 9-52.

Mircea Geoană et al. = Them

elitist corrupt inefficient weak neo- anti- opaque

alliance moguls parliamen- needs Iliescu state connections

Traian Băsescu and the DLP = Us

popular simple anti-com- honest open reformist pro-West- strong

referendum says denounces has also anti- Atlantist acts on

in an audio election spot targeting the rural environment.

anti-communists and nationalists in their conflict with Vladimir Voronin, the

also had Romanian citizenship voted him in December 2010.

noaptea?”, Capital.ro, 3 December 2009, available at <http://www.capital.ro/basescu-domnule-

was: “They cannot steal as much as you can vote!”

transition crisis may be the crisis of a democratic paradox: the proliferation of

46 Further developments in 2011-2012 indicate that popular expectations of populist

The Romanian Political System after 1989

Enhancing Democracy through Constitutional Reforms.

from using a gender neutral language.

the highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic progress.

Democracy, Freedom House, Washington/DC 2014, available at <http://www.freedomhouse.

Journal of Constitutional Law 5 (2007), no. 1, 93-121, 105.

Constitutional Arrangements and Democracy:

8 Matthew S. Shugart / John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Oleh Protsyk, Semi-Presidentialism under Postcommunism,

Germany and the French Fifth Republic. Princeton/NJ 2009, 2.

4  Sergiu Gherghina / George Jiglău, Where Does the Mechanism Collapse? Understanding

10  Ernesto Laclau / Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical

15  Laclau, La raison populiste, 89, 144.

23  Sergiu Mișcoiu, Între retorica consensului și practica rupturii. Efectele oscilațiilor

46  Further developments in 2011-2012 indicate that popular expectations of populist

  8  Matthew S. Shugart / John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design

17  Skach, The “Newest” Separation of Powers, 103.

53  Dimulescu,The Institution of Presidential Impeachment.

62  Gherghina / Mișcoiu, The Failure of Cohabitation, 678.

76  Quoted by Gilia, Is Romania Heading Towards a Presidential Republic?, 94.

79  Paul Blokker, Constitution-Making in Romania. From Reiterative Crises to Constitutional

3  See Florian Bieber / Irena Ristić, Constrained Democracy. The Consolidation of Democracy

4  Florian Bieber, The Authoritarian Temptation, 15 March 2014, available at <https://fbieber.

20  Robert Elgie, Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting

36  Linz / Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 358, 365.

51  Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage, and Integration