INTERNSHIP DIARY

NAME OF THE ADVOCATE: ADISH AGGARWALA

AREA OF PRACTICE: CIVIL, CRIMINAL & CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS

COURT: DELHI HIGH COURT & SUPREME COURT

CHAMBER: 423-424, DOUBLE STOREY, NEW RAJINDER NAGAR, DELHI

110060.

DURATION OF INTERNSHIP: ONE MONTH (10.01.2017-10.02.2017)

NAME OF THE STUDENT: MUKESH NARAYAN

CLASS ROLL NO.-136

EXAMINATION ROLL NO.140291

LLB FINAL YEAR

SECTION –A

CAMPUS LAW CENTER

I started interning with Mr. Adish Aggarwala at his residence cum office at 423-
424, Double Storey, New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi, and Delhi 110060.
I secured this internship after taking an interview post my application via email and
received confirmation through e-mail within a week. One of the major advantages
of interning under Mr. Adish Aggarwala is that the interns learn about time
management and everyone has to complete their tasks within the time assigned.

For a period of three weeks, I had the opportunity to intern under Adish
Aggarwala, Advocate and Chairman of AIBA. He is a respected lawyer with
numerous feathers in his cap; working hours were strict, and extended from 10
a.m. to 6:30 p.m.
The first day of internship was all about introduction with the interns and meeting
new people and the process is gradual and allow oneself to involve in matters
concerning success and illusory aspects of the legal profession. It involves about
discerning hard hitting facts, learning about the complexities involved in the legal
system. Initially it was all about reading files and researching about the cases and
law on the legal databases.
Day 2:
I had to go Supreme Court to make observations regarding matter dealt in the
Supreme Court and accordingly went to the court and observed as follows and
reported to the office.
Case study: Harvinder Singh V. Paramjit Singh & ors.
Facts: Suit for possession of land to the extent of the share filed in trial court based
on land being ancestral, joint Hindu possession, the will is null & void. The trial
court gives the findings that the will is devoid of any merit & the order that the
land is an ancestral property. On an appeal by beneficiaries of the will, the learned
appellate judge hold that predecessor –in – interest of the parties to the suit, was
not ancestral, but self –acquired and, hence, he was competent to alienate the same
in any manner as he liked; that will was validly executed and that the findings
recorded by the learned trial judge on that score was unsustainable. On the account
of settlement between the appellant & plaintiff, the trial order was set aside. But
the Defendant No.5 filed an appeal before the High court under Section 100 C.P.C
which held that appeal is not maintainable.
Issues:
1. Whether the defendant No.5 cannot be regarded as aggrieved party to assail
the impugned decree invoking the jurisdiction of the High court under
section 100 C.P.C?
2. Whether appeal could lie against a mere finding for the simple reason that
the code does not provide for such an appeal?
3. Whether the finding would operate as Res Judicata in the subsequent
proceeding?
Held: Though the High court has referred to the said pronouncement, yet it has not
applied the ratio correctly to the facts. In the present case, as we find, the plaintiff
claiming to be co-sharer filed the suit and challenged the will. The plaintiff entered
into a settlement with the contesting defendants who had preferred an appeal. Such
a decree, we a disposed to think, prejudicially affects the defendant No.5 and,
therefore, he could have preferred an appeal. The same having been unsettled, the
benefit accrued in his favour become extinct.

DAY 3:
Parbin Ali and Another v. State of Assam
Appeal directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed
by the Guwahati High court whereby the Division Bench of the High court gave
the stamp of approval to the conviction recorded by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Silchar under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and order of
sentence sentencing the accused-appellant to the imprisonment for life and to pay a
fine of Rs 500/-, in default, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one month.

Held: Having said that all the discrepancies which have been brought put are not
material, we may address to the issue of delay in lodging the F.I.R. It is perceptible
from the evidence that the father-in-law of the deceased had gone to the police
station and lodged the ezahar and, therefore, an F.I.R was lodged. The learned trial
Judge has analyzed the said aspect in an extremely careful and cautious manner
and on a closer scrutiny; we find that the analysis made by him is impeccable. In
view of our aforesaid analysis, we conclude and hold that the appeal is sans
substratum and, accordingly, the same has to pave the path of dismissal which we
direct.
DAY 4:
Miscellaneous matters, generally related for directions and office report, adjourned
matters and fresh matters mostly related to delay in filing of SLP or ex-parte stay
or see permission to file additional matters.
1. In a matter related to 498- A IPC matter were referred to the Ranchi
mediation center where appellant is praying to seek transfer.
2. In a matter connected to quashing of complaint under sec-482 Cr.p.c read
with Art. 32 before Supreme Court and under Art. 226 before High court
where such pray was dismissed , but here learned counsel raised the issue
that wife has filed complaint in sec-346,323 & 379 IPC which was
completely malafide, based on false allegations, require re-examination, as
FIR & closure report has already been filed, the Hon’ble court allows the
matter.
3. In a matter of cheque under NI Act an important legal question is raised that
whether all the five essential ingredients of sec. 138 of NI Act, took place at
different places will create independtly a cause of action in different places .
4. In a matter, regarding reservation benefits to Ad-hoc posts, the Hon’ble
court simply says such principle of reservation can’t be applied in Ad-hoc
posts, matter dismissed.
DAY 5:
Research Question :
Whether if the punishment or penalty is altered by law through amendment &
maximum punishment or penalty is unaltered, is it an ex-post facto, a law which is
violative of art.20(1)?

In doing the research, I came across three case laws, two from the U.S. court and
another one are from Indian courts, Calder v Bull which laid down the principles &
its applications involved in ex-post facto law.
1. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law. And
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2. Every Law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was. When
committed
3. Every Law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.
4. Every Law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
offence, in order to convict the offender.
In Dovert v. Florida which says that even if the punishment or penalty is modified
where its maximum limits is unaltered, then it is just a procedural change and it
does affect the vested rights of the accused and it is not violative of Art. 20(1) of
the Indian constitution. Similarly in Satwant Singh v State of Punjab(1960) SCR
89 that maximum penalty remains unaltered as this is prescribed by section 14 B
which remains the same. Therefore, when the exercise of discretion is governed by
more rational and generally better guidelines, such guidelines must be applied from
the date when they come into existence.
DAY 6:
Research Question:
To understand the scope of “Per Incuriam” doctrine and how it has been utilized by
common law courts in England and U.S. and how it has been enunciated by
supreme court of India by understanding the application of “Per Incuriam”
doctrine?
I analyzed the doctrine as per the doctrine applied by the courts in India in cases
Philip Jeysingh v The Joint Registrar , Rashmi Rekha Thatoi & Anr v State of
Orissa & ors. , Where it is concluded that the decisions of the court of Appeal upon
questions of law must be followed by Divisional courts and courts of first instance
and as a general rule are binding on the court of Appeal until a contrary
determination has been arrived at by the House of Lords.

DAY 7:
This day involved client observation and briefing by the client to a lawyer and also
observing the part of the judicial process and the functioning of the courts.
Litigation which accrues has to run its course. Civil litigation commences with a
plaint. There are summons to the defendant, receiving of his response (written
statement) and other predatory procedures followed by a first hearing at which
issues are framed. Then, there is trial at which evidence of both sides are recorded.
The court requires evidence so as to be able to adjudicate disputed contention of
facts. From commencement to culmination of the judicial process is the ground
which we have to cover. It is here that we have to remove impediments and
improve efficiencies. While doing so, we have to differentiate between processing
time, waiting time and hearing time. We have also to examine today’s pattern of
litigation, the bottlenecks being encountered together and the kinds of abuse of
legal procedures are subjected to. Unless they can be understood and identified, the
solution will continue to be elusive.
All stakeholders in the legal system have long recognized the importance of
reducing delays, but little has been done towards reform. Attention must be paid to
ensure that the judicial administration is efficient and people are able to get results
fairly, with confidence & trust in reasonable time and at a reasonable cost. The
quantum of disputes and other aberrations which arise from various walks of life,
be it economic, social or administrative, and reach the courts is only a portion of
the actual. It is time that effort is made to achieve not only an effective and
efficient functioning of the system but also one that ensures welfare and speedy
disposal of cases.

DAY 8:
There is 15-20 year delay in trial; accused is partly responsible for the delay,
whether the accused can quash the proceedings of the trial court under section 482
Cr.p.c & Art. 226 before High court & Art. 32 before the Supreme Court raising
plea of his violation of fundamental rights of speedy trial?
I analyzed the concept of speedy trial as used in U.S. Supreme Court as well as in
India, and also the nature & ambit of Section 482 Cr.p.c & powers given under
Art.226 to High court & Art.32 to supreme court.
Smith v Hooey, Barker v. Wingo, Strunk v. United States, where it was held
that a defendant in federal position charged with Texas state crime was denied the
right to a speedy trial when Texas still had not prosecuted him for the crime after
seven years. Held that the case must be thrown out. In another case, it was held that
violation of the speedy trial clause must be decided on a case –by-case basis,
taking into four factors:
1. Length of the Delay;
2. Reason for the Delay;
3. Whether and when the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial;
4. Degree of harm to the defendant caused by the delay.
Held that a defendant in custody on different charges maintains the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial on new charges.