Archaeological Inference and Inductive Confirmation Bruce D. Smith American Anthropologist, New Series, Volume 79, Issue 3 (Sep., 1977), 598-617. Stable URL: hutp//links jstor.org/sici2sici=0002-7294% 28197 7109%292%3\ 79%3A3%3C598%3A AIAICS3E2,0,CO%3B2-E ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhup:/www.jstor org/about/terms.html. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission. American Anthropologist is published by American Anthropological Association. Please contact the publisher for further permissions regarding the use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hutp:/www jstor.org/journals/anthro. hil. American Anthropologist ©1977 American Anthropological Association ISTOR and the ISTOR logo are trademarks of ISTOR, and are Registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office For more information on ISTOR contact jstor-info@umich.edv, (©2003 JSTOR hupslwww jstor.org/ ‘Sat Mar 1 16:14:35 2003Archaeological Inference and Inductive Confirmation BRUCE D. SMITH University of Georgia ‘The limitations of the hypothetico deductive (H-D) method of induetive confirma- tion are described, and an alternate method, the hypothetico-analog (H-A) method is described in detail. The H-A method can be characterized os a modified and ‘supplemented form of the simple H-D method, and is proposed as being more ‘eppropriate for archeeotogical inference. Aspects of the H-A method that are given articular attention include the establishment of boundary conditions for reference Classes, plausibility considerations, multiple working hypotheses, bridging argu- ‘ments, and criteria for selecting alternative hypotheses. scientific. method, archaeological inference, hypothetico-analog method, inductive confirmation) INTRODUCTION PREHISTORIC ARCHAEOLOGY over the last fifteen years has been suffering through ‘many of the symptoms of paradigm crisis described by Thomas Kuhn, Such periods of thoretical retooling are characterized not only by the borrowing of theoretical and methodological models from other flelds in the search for a new paradigm, but also by a recourse to philosophy (Kuhn 1970:88). It is specifically to the philosophy of science that a growing number of archaeologists hhave tumed in an attempt to make their research and their results more valid. Most archaeologists would now acknowledge the value and necessity of employing scientific ‘methodology in their reasoning. There is still no agreement, however, as to which variation of the “scientific method” should be employed in archaeological reasoning. ‘There are a number of reasons for the present state of confusion conceming the integration of scientific methodology into archaeological reasoning. The most obvious of ‘these reasons is that until recently formal training in either the philosophy of science or the different variations of the scientific method was not an integral part of graduate programs in anthropology. AAS a result, most archaeologists have minimal exposure to or understanding of scientific methodology, even though they may use such terms as hypothesis, confirmation, ete., in thelr working vocabularies. It is not surprising, therefore, that relatively few archaeologists have felt confident enough of their own understanding of scientific methodology to attempt to alleviate the state of ignorance of their colleagues by providing insight into how any one of the numerous variations of the scientific method could be employed in archaeological reasoning. It is also not surprising that of the attempts at Interpretation of scientific methodology that have been made by archaeologists, many have tended to confuse the issue further rather than providing needed clarification of the role of scientific methodology in archaeological reasoning (Morgan 1973:259-260). Lewis Binford is generally associated with the first attempts at. making archaeological reasoning more scientific, although one could trace the beginnings ofthis trend back through ‘Taylor (1948) to the late 1800s. Binford’s concem with explanation in archaeology is clearly 598Smith} INFERENCE AND INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION 599 ‘evident in many of his articles of the 1960s (see the collected essays in Binford 1972), as is his selection of the covering law (CL) model of explanation proposed by Carl Hempel: “After surveying most of the argumentative debate in the literature on the philosophy of science, I concluded that from a practical-science point of view, the arguments of Kan (sic) Hempel (see particularly Hempel, 1965) were the most useful” (Binford 1972:18). In @ number of his articles Binford also discusses the need for implementation of “Vogicodeduetive” (1972:70) or “rigorous hypotheticodeductive” (1972:96) method of confirmation in archaeology. Finally, Binford also presents a numberof specific examples of the way in which such @ hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method of confirmation could be applied to an archacological situation. The most detailed of the specific examples given by Binford is his discussion of smudge pits and hide smoking (see Binford 1972:33-58). Binford has recently been criticized by Sabloff, Beale, and Kurland for (1) advocating the CL model of explanation (1973:108); (2) organizing his arguments in terms of a simple hypothetico- ‘deductive structure while paying ‘‘polemical lip service to Hempel’s CL model” (1973:110); and (3) presenting specific archaeological examples that do not conform either to the CL ‘model of explanation or to the hypothetico-deductive method of confirmation (1973:111), While these criticisms appear to be justified, and wil be discussed in more detall later in this article, I would at this time like to pursue an interesting question that may at fist scem rather unimportant: Why were these criticisms so long (six years) in coming? The answer to this question in large measure has to do with the fact that Binford was apparently not so ‘much concemed with either stressing the importance of employing the CL model or ‘explaining in detall the structure of the HD method as he was with analyzing the structure of, archaeological reasoning: “However, it is noteworthy that Lewis R. Binford, the guiding ight of the new archaeclogy, has strongly supported a deductive approach without Polemically belaboring the role of the Hempelian deductive-nomological model” (Sabloff, Beale, and Kurland 1973:108). Binford was primarily interested, then, in presenting a rigorous logical method of confirmation that archaeologists could employ in their reasoning. Labeling the method he outlined (see especially Binford, 1972:47-48) as hypothetico- deductive and demonstrating in detail its relationship to Hempel’s CL model were apparently of secondary concem, judging from the very limited coverage given to these topics in his articles. This has interesting implications, because while Binford’s logical method of inference, as well as another complementary method applied to archaeological situations by Longacre (1970) and Hill (1968), do not, in fact, conform to the hypothetico-deductive framework, they are still recognized by philosophers as reasonable, if incomplete, methods of scientific inference (Morgan 1973:271-272; M. Salmon 1976:379). Philosophers and other interested individuals have as a result not focused thetr criticism s0 much at the method of scientific inference proposed by Binford, Longacre, Hil, and others, Rather they have directed their comments toward the numerous more recent attempts to claim that this method of inference must in fact be viewed as part of the CL ‘model of explanation: “The new archaeologists would have their colleagues believe that the new trends in theory and methodology, which they have helped to develop in the past decade, are inextricably linked to positivist philosophy and the deduetive-nomotogical (CL) ‘model of explanation, which they espouse” (Sabloff, Beale, and Kurland 1973:108). Two Publications in particular (Fritz and Plog 1970; Watson, LeBlanc, and Redman 1971) attempted both to describe Hempel’s CL model of explanation and to demonstrate the need for its acceptance and employment by archaeologists. The response by philosophers to these two publications was both rapid and devastating. Levin (1973) responded to the article by Fritz. and Plog, and Morgan (1973) replied in detail to the discussion of the CL model presented in the book of Watson, LeBlanc, and Redman. While these detailed criticisms by Levin and Morgan have apparently done severe damage to the image of the CL model of explanation within archaeology, they do not appear to have eliminated all support for the600 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST (79, 197 [positivist philosophy of Carl Hempel (see Watson 1974; Watson, LeBlanc, and Redman 1974), ‘This debate within archaeology in the early 1970s over the relative merits of the CL. ‘model of explanation unfortunately tended to divert attention from an article by James Hill (1972) which presented a comprehensive description of the hypothetico-deductive method of confirmation as well as providing a discussion of how it could be employed in archaeological reasoning. It is important to stress that Hill's article rather than addressing the issue of explanation in archaeology, was focused on the more important and more pressing problem of successful articulation of the H-D method of confirmation to archaeological situations. For a few years after the appearance of Hill's 1972 article it appeared that even if the issue of the identity of an appropriate model of explanation in archaeology remained unresolved, archaeologists could at least employ the hypothetlco- deductive method of confirmation in thelr reasoning. ‘This situation changed abruptly with the publication of two short articles in 1975 and 1976 by Merrilee Salmon, a philosopher with a research interest in archaeological ‘confirmation. Although rather brief, Salmon’s articles contain a number of very important points, including the following: (1) ‘The hypothetioodeducive method isan inductive rather than a deductive method of confirmation (1976:377). (2) Archaeologists do not employ the H:D method in their reasoning even if they believe and state that they do (1978:464, 1976:378). (3) The fact that archaeologists do not employ the H-D method in thelr reasoning, ‘ven If they think that they do, is good, not bad, This i because the H-D method i an oversimplified and incomplete ‘account ‘of scientific reasoning, and is inadequate for employment in archaeological inference. (4) The inductive method of logieal confirmation employed by many archaeologist is far more sophisticated than the H-D method, with whieh itis often confused (6) The method of logical confirmation employed by many archaeologists is, n fac, roughly comparable to a method of inductive inference described in a number of publications by Wesley Salmon (1963, 1967). ‘Thus In 1976 many archaeologists find themselves in a situation that is puzzling, surprising, and at the same time encouraging. Although they have thought of themselves as ‘employing an impressively deductive method of logical confirmation (HD), they find that the H-D method is not only inductive rather than deductive, but further that they were never actually employing the H-D method in their reasoning. Rather they were employing, in an admittedly incomplete way, a more sophisticated method of inductive inference. Merrilee Salmon begins the final paragraph of her 1975 article with this statement: “It is ‘my hope in presenting some of these issues and suggesting alternative models, that fruitful discussions of confirmation and explanation in archaeology will ensue” (1975:464). She has indeed presented a number of pertinent observations and suggestions concerning archaeologi- ‘al confirmation that deserve serious consideration by all interested archaeologists. While it is understandable that many archaeologists are perhaps not concemed with the issue of archaeological reasoning, or do not feel knowledgeable enough on the subject to offer an ‘opinion, or pethaps are not too excited about sticking their heads up out of the trench, I strongly agree with Sabloff, Beale, and Kurland (1973:118) that: “It eannot be ignored by @ thinking member of the profession; the argument revolves around the place of scientific ‘models in archaeological research. The true issues need a clear and vigorous airing in print.” In the present article, which is concemed specifically with confirmation in archaeology, @ umber of logical points raised by M. Salmon will be pursued, These points are elaborated ‘upon in a short initial section of this article. The following much longer section will beSmith) INFERENCE AND INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION 601 concemed with the method of inductive confirmation presented by W. C. Salmon and suggested to archaeologists by M. Salmon as an altemative to the H-D method. To facilitate discussion of this general method as it specifically applies to archaeological inference, it will bbe referred to as the Hypothetico-Analog (H-A) method of inductive confirmation. ‘THE HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE METHOD OF INDUCTIVE CONFIRMATION ‘The H-D method of confirmation will be briefly described prior to presenting a more detailed discussion of some of its inherent limitations. A more comprehensive treatment of the H-D method can be found in W. Salmon (1963:76-88) and Copi (1972:422-468). The hhypothetico-deductive method begins with the formulation of a hypothesis, which can be defined as a statement that ‘is taken asa premise, in order that its logical consequences can bbe examined and compared with facts that can be ascertained by observation” (W. Salmon 1963:77). Once the hypothesis has been formulated, and any necessary intial conditions are stated, the next step in the H-D method involves deducing logical consequences from the hypothesis. Such consequences, which are often termed test implications or observational predictions, when combined with the hypothesis and any stated initial conditions, constitute a logical argument. This argument, consisting of a hypothesis and initial conditions as premises and a test implication as conclusion must, in the hypothetico-deduetive method, be 4 deductive rather than an inductive type of argument. By definition, a deductive type of argument is one in which the conclusion must logically follow from the premises: “If all of the premises are true, the conclusion must be true” (W. Salmon 1963:14; see also M, Salmon 1976:377). Many of the people who believe the H-D method to be thoroughly deductive in ‘character would be correct if the method consisted only of deducing test implications from a hypothesis. But the H-D method includes a final step of confirmation. This involves ‘comparing the deduced observational predictions with reality to see if in fact they are true. If the observational predictions are true, the hypothesis is confirmed to some extent. In this final step of the hypothetico-deductive method, observational predictions and the hypothesis once again comprise an argument, but the hypothesis is now the conclusion and the observational predictions are the premises. This argument of confirmation can be seen to be inductive rather than deductive for the simple reason that even if all of the premises (observational predictions) of the argument are demonstrated to be true, the conclusion (hypothesis) might still be fale: “To argue that true implications confirm a hypothesis is to argue inductively, for it is logically possible for the implications to be true while the hypothesis is false” (M. Salmon 1976:377; see also W. Salmon 1967:18-20, 108-110), This point will be discussed in greater detail later in this article, Thus, although the H-D method employs deductive logic in one step, it must be viewed in total as an inductive method of ‘confirmation, because it also includes an inductive argument. The fact that the hypothetico- deductive method is not a deductive form of confirmation may be disconcerting to any archaeologists who hope to prove once and for all the absolute truth of thelr hypotheses, At the same time it will, however, make it easier for many archaeologists to accept the otherwise disturbing fact that they have not been employing the hypothetico-deductive ‘method of confirmation. The loss will not seem so serious if the hypothetico-deduetive ‘method is only inductive afterall (assuming it is possible to lose something you only thought you had). ‘The type of inference that many archaeologists, as well as most of the members of the larger scientific community, employ resembles the H-D method, but differs from it in a number of important ways: “It seems undeniable that science uses a type of inference at least loosely akin to the hy pothetlco-deduetive method” (W. Salmon 1967:18). ‘The most obvious, but not the most important, difference between the H-D method and the method of confirmation employed in archaeological inference has to do with the way in602 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST (79, 1977 which observational predictions are shown to follow logically from hypotheses. Rarely if fever are such arguments deductive in form. The truth of an observational prediction (conclusion) is often argued to be highly probable if an archaeological hypothesis (premise) is true, but rarely if ever could it be demonstrated that such an observational prediction ‘must be true if the hypothesis is true. This is in large part due to the inherent nature of archaeological inference. Hypotheses formulated in archaeological inference invariably have to do with various aspects of prehistoric human behavior (Hill 1972:101) and as a result, cannot be tested directly. They can, however, be tested indirectly. ‘The observational predictions of such hypotheses about human behavior take the form of statements ‘concerning predicted patteming of cultural debris in archaeological sites. It is logically impossible to deduce such observational predictions because of the problems of disturbance, oor preservation, or poor recovery of cultural debris. Few archaeologists would argue that if thelr hypothesis concerning prehistoric human behavior Is correct, the predicted pattern of cultural debris must be observed during excavation. But one cannot argue otherwise and still bbe employing the hypothetico-deductive method of confirmation. In discussing an archaeological hy pothesis concerning human behavior M, Salmon states: «the point here is a logieal one~that there is no deductive relation of the sort required iby’ the H-D method between the hypotheses and the “implication.” We can aay, however, that if the hypotheses are true then it is highly probable that the “implication” is nie, ... The “implication” was not deduced from the hypotheses, but was inferred with high probability on the basis of a correct inductive argument (1976:378], Similarly: “While they [test implications] are presumed to be likely consequences of a given hypothesis, they do not follow of necessity from it. They are not deduced from a hypothesis in the sense that there isa strict formal logical connection between the hypothesis and its test implication” (Hill 1972:83-84). This statement by Hillis especially interesting because throughout his paper he refers to the method being presented as being deductive, and more specifically being the hypothetico-