1
FIRST DIVISION represented by his mother, MA. LUZ GERCAYO, the former having been born with an
G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
and the Court of Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of anesthesiologists during the
surgical pull-through operation conducted on a three-year old patient born with an
imperforate anus.1
The antecedents are as follows:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 19922 with an imperforate anus. Two
days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of
the large intestine out through the abdominal wall,3 enabling him to excrete through a
colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.4
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a
pull-through operation.5Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted
by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists
included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr.
Solidum).6 During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia,7 and went into a coma.8His
coma lasted for two weeks,9 but he regained consciousness only after a month.10 He could no
longer see, hear or move.11
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending physicians.12
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely
against Dr. Solidum,13alleging: –
That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being
then an anesthesiologist at the Ospital ng Maynila, Malate, this City, and as such was tasked
to administer the anesthesia on three-year old baby boy GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO,
imperforate anus [no anal opening] and was to undergo an operation for anal opening [pull
through operation], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect to
use the care and diligence as the best of his judgment would dictate under said circumstance,
by failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said
GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications,
causing as a consequence of his said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD ALBERT
GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect called hypoxic encephalopathy
meaning insufficient oxygen supply in the brain, thereby rendering said GERALD ALBERT
GERCAYO incapable of moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to law.14
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was transferred to
the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of
1997),15 where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-190889.
Judgment of the RTC
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries,16 decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor
as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, ONE (1) MONTH and TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional as
maximum and to indemnify, jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, Dr. Anita So
and Dr. Marichu Abella, private complainant Luz Gercayo, the amount of ₱500,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.17
Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their solidary liability,18 the
RTC excluded them from solidary liability as to the damages, modifying its decision as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Dr. Fernando Solidum, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum
to one (1) year, one (1) month and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum and to
indemnify jointly and severally with Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant Luz Gercayo the

amount of ₱500,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages and to pay
the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.19
Decision of the CA
On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum,20 pertinently stating and
ruling:
The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.
x x x [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit to undergo a major
operation. As noted by the OSG, the accused himself testified that pre-operation tests were
conducted to ensure that the child could withstand the surgery. Except for his imperforate
anus, the child was healthy. The tests and other procedures failed to reveal that he was
suffering from any known ailment or disability that could turn into a significant risk. There
was not a hint that the nature of the operation itself was a causative factor in the events that
finally led to hypoxia.
In short, the lower court has been left with no reasonable hypothesis except to attribute the
accident to a failure in the proper administration of anesthesia, the gravamen of the charge
in this case. The High Court elucidates in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals 321 SCRA 584 –
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician
negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony,
where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of
care.
Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have
occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be
drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical
evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under
the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical
testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because
there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain
redress for injury suffered by him.
The lower court has found that such a nexus exists between the act complained of and the
injury sustained, and in line with the hornbook rules on evidence, we will afford the factual
findings of a trial court the respect they deserve in the absence of a showing of arbitrariness
2
or disregard of material facts that might affect the disposition of the case. People v. Paraiso
349 SCRA 335.
The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal cases. Although it creates
a presumption of negligence, it need not offend due process, as long as the accused is
afforded the opportunity to go forward with his own evidence and prove that he has no
criminal intent. It is in this light not inconsistent with the constitutional presumption of
innocence of an accused.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the modified decision of the lower court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.21
Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on May 7,
2010.22
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Dr. Solidum avers that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT IN UPHOLDING THE PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT’S OPINION, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE
FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL. ALSO, THERE IS A CLEAR
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS WHICH IF CORRECTED, WILL RESULT TO THE
ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER. FURTHER, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE SAID DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, AS THIS BREACHES THE
CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLE THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST PROVE THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE INFORMATION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND NOT ON
THE BASIS OF ITS PRESUMPTIVE CONCLUSION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES
IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) WHEN THE DEFENSE WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS NO
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AND NO OVERDOSING IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE ANESTHETIC AGENT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 100%
HALOTHANE ADMINISTERED TO THE CHILD, BUT ONLY ONE (1%) PERCENT AND THE
APPLICATION THEREOF, WAS REGULATED BY AN ANESTHESIA MACHINE. THUS, THE

APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) CONTRADICTED THE
ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE LAW APPLICABLE IN THE CASE.
III.
THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IS NOT JUSTIFIED
THERE BEING NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER. ASSUMING THAT
THE CHILD IS ENTITLED TO FINANCIAL CONSIDERATION, IT SHOULD BE ONLY AS A
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE, AND NO
OVERDOSING OF ANESTHETIC AGENT AND AS SUCH, THE AWARD IS SO EXCESSIVE,
AND NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS.23
To simplify, the following are the issues for resolution, namely: (a) whether or not the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein; and (b) whether or not Dr. Solidum was
liable for criminal negligence.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The
doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care."24 It is simply "a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of
common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may
justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality
causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with
negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the
basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere
occurrence of the accident itself.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge." 25
Jarcia, Jr. v. People26 has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but
merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to
the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the party charged. It merely determines
and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving a
breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.27
3
The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases was
significantly and exhaustively explained in Ramos v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court said
–
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa
loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves
of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. The
application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it
is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of
law, permit a given inference.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that
a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical
procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies
only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that
are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar
with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent
to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable
degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and
surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one
may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to
the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common
knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and
experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care
had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to
show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is
appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management
of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the
standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under
usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by
him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations:
leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on
a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the
wrong part of the body when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a
patient’s jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the
patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for
appendicitis, among others.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably
enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to
mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the
ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily
used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is
generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a
matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care
were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A
distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of
something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered
followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or
surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or
surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or
why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa
loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of
an operation or treatment was not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or
not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of
the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary
professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably
speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If
there was such extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and
the defendant is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must
first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due
to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.29
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate.
Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were
present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within
the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious during the
operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was
undeniably wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians
for a pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body
and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia
during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the
insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate,
scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-
through operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact
alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the
anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had
sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by
the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the patient.30
4
This conclusion is not unprecedented. It was similarly reached in Swanson v.
Brigham,31 relevant portions of the decision therein being as follows:
On January 7, 1973, Dr. Brigham admitted 15-year-old Randall Swanson to a hospital for the
treatment of infectious mononucleosis. The patient's symptoms had included a swollen
throat and some breathing difficulty. Early in the morning of January 9 the patient was
restless, and at 1:30 a.m. Dr. Brigham examined the patient. His inspection of the patient's
air passage revealed that it was in satisfactory condition. At 4:15 a.m. Dr. Brigham received a
telephone call from the hospital, advising him that the patient was having respiratory
difficulty. The doctor ordered that oxygen be administered and he prepared to leave for the
hospital. Ten minutes later, 4:25 a.m., the hospital called a second time to advise the doctor
that the patient was not responding. The doctor ordered that a medicine be administered,
and he departed for the hospital. When he arrived, the physician who had been on call at the
hospital had begun attempts to revive the patient. Dr. Brigham joined him in the effort, but
the patient died.
The doctor who performed the autopsy concluded that the patient died between 4:25 a.m.
and 4:30 a.m. of asphyxia, as a result of a sudden, acute closing of the air passage. He also
found that the air passage had been adequate to maintain life up to 2 or 3 minutes prior to
death. He did not know what caused the air passage to suddenly close.
It is a rare occurrence when someone admitted to a hospital for the treatment of infectious
mononucleosis dies of asphyxiation. But that is not sufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur. The
fact that the injury rarely occurs does not in itself prove that the injury was probably caused
by someone's negligence. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970). Nor is a
bad result by itself enough to warrant the application of the doctrine. Nelson v. Murphy, 42
Wn.2d 737, 258 P.2d 472 (1953). See 2 S. Speiser, The Negligence Case – Res Ipsa Loquitur §
24:10 (1972). The evidence presented is insufficient to establish the first element necessary
for application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The acute closing of the patient’s air passage and
his resultant asphyxiation took place over a very short period of time. Under these
circumstances it would not be reasonable to infer that the physician was negligent. There
was no palpably negligent act. The common experience of mankind does not suggest that
death would not be expected without negligence. And there is no expert medical testimony
to create an inference that negligence caused the injury.
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court next determines
whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum for criminal negligence.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.32Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists
of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage

results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform such act.33
Dr. Solidum’s conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and
properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at
100% halothane. In affirming the conviction, the CA observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He affirmed the findings
and conclusions in his report except for an observation which, to all intents and purposes,
has become the storm center of this dispute. He wanted to correct one piece of information
regarding the dosage of the anesthetic agent administered to the child. He declared that he
made a mistake in reporting a 100% halothane and said that based on the records it should
have been 100% oxygen.
The records he was relying on, as he explains, are the following:
(a) the anesthesia record – A portion of the chart in the record was marked as
Exhibit 1-A and 1-B to indicate the administration at intervals of the anesthetic
agent.
(b) the clinical abstract – A portion of this record that reads as follows was marked
Exhibit 3A. 3B – Approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes through the operation,
patient was noted to have bradycardia (CR = 70) and ATSO4 0.2 mg was
immediately administered. However, the bradycardia persisted, the inhalational
agent was shut off, and the patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another
dose of ATSO4 0.2 mg was given. However, the patient did not respond until no
cardiac rate can be auscultated and the surgeons were immediately told to stop
the operation. The patient was put on a supine position and CPR was initiated.
Patient was given 1 amp of epinephrine initially while continuously doing cardiac
massage – still with no cardiac rate appreciated; another ampule of epinephrine
was given and after 45 secs, patient’s vital signs returned to normal. The entire
resuscitation lasted approximately 3-5 mins. The surgeons were then told to
proceed to the closure and the child’s vital signs throughout and until the end of
surgery were: BP = 110/70; CR = 116/min and RR = 20-22 cycles/min (on assisted
ventilation).
Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract that the patient was
ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 when the bradycardia persisted,
but for one reason or another, he read it as 100% halothane. He was asked to read the
anesthesia record on the percentage of the dosage indicated, but he could only sheepishly
note I can’t understand the number. There are no clues in the clinical abstract on the
quantity of the anesthetic agent used. It only contains the information that the anesthetic
plan was to put the patient under general anesthesia using a nonrebreathing system with
halothane as the sole anesthetic agent and that 1 hour and 45 minutes after the operation
began, bradycardia occurred after which the inhalational agent was shut off and the patient
5
administered with 100% oxygen. It would be apparent that the 100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido
said should be read in lieu of 100% halothane was the pure oxygen introduced after
something went amiss in the operation and the halothane itself was reduced or shut off.
The key question remains – what was the quantity of halothane used before bradycardia set
in?
The implication of Dr. Vertido’s admission is that there was no overdose of the anesthetic
agent, and the accused Dr. Solidum stakes his liberty and reputation on this conclusion. He
made the assurance that he gave his patient the utmost medical care, never leaving the
operating room except for a few minutes to answer the call of nature but leaving behind the
other members of his team Drs. Abella and Razon to monitor the operation. He insisted that
he administered only a point 1% not 100% halothane, receiving corroboration from Dr.
Abella whose initial MA in the record should be enough to show that she assisted in the
operation and was therefore conversant of the things that happened. She revealed that they
were using a machine that closely monitored the concentration of the agent during the
operation.
But most compelling is Dr. Solidum’s interpretation of the anesthesia record itself, as he
takes the bull by the horns, so to speak. In his affidavit, he says, reading from the record, that
the quantity of halothane used in the operation is one percent (1%) delivered at time
intervals of 15 minutes. He studiedly mentions – the concentration of halothane as reflected
in the anesthesia record (Annex D of the complaint-affidavit) is only one percent (1%) – The
numbers indicated in 15 minute increments for halothane is an indication that only 1%
halothane is being delivered to the patient Gerard Gercayo for his entire operation; The
amount of halothane delivered in this case which is only one percent cannot be summated
because halothane is constantly being rapidly eliminated by the body during the entire
operation.
In finding the accused guilty, despite these explanations, the RTC argued that the volte-face
of Dr. Vertido on the question of the dosage of the anesthetic used on the child would not
really validate the non-guilt of the anesthesiologist. Led to agree that the halothane used was
not 100% as initially believed, he was nonetheless unaware of the implications of the change
in his testimony. The court observed that Dr. Vertido had described the condition of the child
as hypoxia which is deprivation of oxygen, a diagnosis supported by the results of the CT
Scan. All the symptoms attributed to a failing central nervous system such as stupor, loss of
consciousness, decrease in heart rate, loss of usual acuity and abnormal motor function, are
manifestations of this condition or syndrome. But why would there be deprivation of oxygen
if 100% oxygen to 1% halothane was used? Ultimately, to the court, whether oxygen or
halothane was the object of mistake, the detrimental effects of the operation are
incontestable, and they can only be led to one conclusion – if the application of anesthesia
was really closely monitored, the event could not have happened. 34
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable
doubt because the circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr.

Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack of precaution in monitoring the administration of
the anesthetic agent to Gerald. The Court aptly explained in Cruz v. Court of Appeals35 that:
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the
treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by
other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of
medical science. In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al., this
Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed
training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will
employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty
to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use
to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice
that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession
but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard.
Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are
determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert
testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of
breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and
the resulting death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the
attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainant’s wife and
newborn baby, this Court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the
‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done;
the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence
of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be
the proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot
create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the
proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.’"
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or administrative – calls for the
plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the
duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship,
to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b)
the breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable
standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal
connection between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the
damages suffered by the patient.36
6
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against
unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the physician
to act in respect of the patient. Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty of a particular
physician in a particular case exists. Because most medical malpractice cases are highly
technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications must provide guidance by giving the
knowledge necessary to render a fair and just verdict. As a result, the standard of medical
care of a prudent physician must be determined from expert testimony in most cases; and in
the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the standard of care by which the specialist
is judged is the care and skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists under
similar circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be higher than that required of the
general practitioner.37
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued for
negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on any
individual physician’s own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court
may determine whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the
patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required. The
judge, as the trier of fact, ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the
testimony of all medical experts.38
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical qualifications in
anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care was applicable. It
would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the first three
elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an anesthesiologist himself who
served as the Chairman of the Committee on Ethics and Malpractice of the Philippine Society
of Anesthesiologists that investigated the complaint against Dr. Solidum, his testimony
mainly focused on how his Committee had conducted the investigation.39 Even then, the
report of his Committee was favorable to Dr. Solidum,40 to wit:
Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year old male who underwent a
pull-thru operation and was administered general anesthesia by a team of anesthesia
residents. The patient, at the time when the surgeons was manipulating the recto-sigmoid
and pulling it down in preparation for the anastomosis, had bradycardia. The
anesthesiologists, sensing that the cause thereof was the triggering of the vago-vagal reflex,
administered atropine to block it but despite the administration of the drug in two doses,
cardiac arrest ensued. As the records show, prompt resuscitative measures were
administered and spontaneous cardiac function re-established in less than five (5) minutes
and that oxygen was continuously being administered throughout, unfortunately, as later
become manifest, patient suffered permanent irreversible brain damage.
In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the administration of anaesthesia, the
committee find that the same were all in accordance with the universally accepted standards

of medical care and there is no evidence of any fault or negligence on the part of the
anaesthesiologists.
Dr. Antonio Vertido, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation,
was also presented as a Prosecution witness, but his testimony concentrated on the results
of the physical examination he had conducted on Gerald, as borne out by the following
portions of his direct examination, to wit:
FISCAL CABARON Doctor, what do you mean by General Anesthetic Agent?
WITNESS General Anesthetic Agent is a substance used in the conduction of Anesthesia and
in this case, halothane was used as a sole anesthetic agent.
Q Now under paragraph two of page 1 of your report you mentioned that after one hour and
45 minutes after the operation, the patient experienced a bradycardia or slowing of heart
rate, now as a doctor, would you be able to tell this Honorable Court as to what cause of the
slowing of heart rate as to Gerald Gercayo?
WITNESS Well honestly sir, I cannot give you the reason why there was a bradycardia of time
because is some reason one way or another that might caused bradycardia.
FISCAL CABARON What could be the possible reason?
A Well bradycardia can be caused by anesthetic agent itself and that is a possibility, we’re
talking about possibility here.
Q What other possibility do you have in mind, doctor?
A Well, because it was an operation, anything can happen within that situation.
FISCAL CABARON Now, this representation would like to ask you about the slowing of heart
rate, now what is the immediate cause of the slowing of the heart rate of a person?
WITNESS Well, one of the more practical reason why there is slowing of the heart rate is
when you do a vagal reflex in the neck wherein the vagal receptors are located at the lateral
part of the neck, when you press that, you produce the slowing of the heart rate that
produce bradycardia.
Q I am pro[p]ounding to you another question doctor, what about the deficiency in the
supply of oxygen by the patient, would that also cause the slowing of the heart rate?
7
A Well that is a possibility sir, I mean not as slowing of the heart rate, if there is a hypoxia or
there is a low oxygen level in the blood, the normal thing for the heart is to pump or to do
not a bradycardia but a … to counter act the Hypoxia that is being experienced by the patient
Q Now, you made mention also doctor that the use of general anesthesia using 100%
halothane and other anesthetic medications probably were contributory to the production of
hypoxia.
A Yes, sir in general sir.41
On cross-examination, Dr. Vertido expounded more specifically on his interpretation of the
anesthesia record and the factors that could have caused Gerald to experience bradycardia,
viz:
ATTY. COMIA I noticed in, may I see your report Doctor, page 3, will you kindly read to this
Honorable court your last paragraph and if you will affirm that as if it is correct?
A "The use of General Anesthesia, that is using 100% Halothane probably will be contributory
to the production of Hypoxia and - - - -"
ATTY COMIA And do you affirm the figure you mentioned in this Court Doctor?
WITNESS Based on the records, I know the - - -
Q 100%?
A 100% based on the records.
Q I will show you doctor a clinical record. I am a lawyer I am not a doctor but will you kindly
look at this and tell me where is 100%, the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0, will you kindly look
at this Doctor, this Xerox copy if you can show to this Honorable Court and even to this
representation the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0 and then call me.
ATTY. COMIA Doctor tell this Honorable Court where is that 100, 1-0-0 and if there is, you
just call me and even the attention of the Presiding Judge of this Court. Okay, you read one
by one.
WITNESS Well, are you only asking 100%, sir?
ATTY. COMIA I’m asking you, just answer my question, did you see there 100% and 100
figures, tell me, yes or no?

WITNESS I’m trying to look at the 100%, there is no 100% there sir.
ATTY. COMIA Okay, that was good, so you Honor please, may we request also temporarily,
because this is just a xerox copy presented by the fiscal, that the percentage here that the
Halothane administered by Dr. Solidum to the patient is 1% only so may we request that this
portion, temporarily your Honor, we are marking this anesthesia record as our Exhibit 1 and
then this 1% Halothane also be bracketed and the same be marked as our Exhibit "1-A".
ATTY. COMIA Doctor, my attention was called also when you said that there are so many
factors that contributed to Hypoxia is that correct?
WITNESS Yes, sir.
Q I remember doctor, according to you there are so many factors that contributed to what
you call hypoxia and according to you, when this Gerald suffered hypoxia, there are other
factors that might lead to this Hypoxia at the time of this operation is that correct?
WITNESS The possibility is there, sir.
Q And according to you, it might also be the result of such other, some or it might be due to
operations being conducted by the doctor at the time when the operation is being done
might also contribute to that hypoxia is that correct?
A That is a possibility also.
ATTY. COMIA How will you classify now the operation conducted to this Gerald, Doctor?
WITNESS Well, that is a major operation sir.
Q In other words, when you say major operation conducted to this Gerald, there is a
possibility that this Gerald might [be] exposed to some risk is that correct?
A That is a possibility sir.
Q And which according to you that Gerald suffered hypoxia is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that is one of the risk of that major operation is that correct?
A That is the risk sir.42
8
At the continuation of his cross-examination, Dr. Vertido maintained that Gerald’s operation
for his imperforate anus, considered a major operation, had exposed him to the risk of
suffering the same condition.43 He then corrected his earlier finding that 100% halothane had
been administered on Gerald by saying that it should be 100% oxygen.44
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of
anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other
anesthetic medications."45However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in
administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertido’s findings did not preclude
the probability that other factors related to Gerald’s major operation, which could or could
not necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia
and had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his
report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and
precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur."46
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in
the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidum’s guilt, and moves us to acquit
him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable
doubt of guilt," according to United States v. Youthsey:47
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious doubt;
not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the defendant,
or a dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed the
evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree
of certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most important and crucial
affairs of your life, you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof
to a mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond the possibility of mistake.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from
civil liability.1âwphi1 But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the
circumstances that have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for
validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no
firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the
manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of
the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge
Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not
allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address
the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila
civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.

In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged.48 It is
puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly
and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng
Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower
courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against
Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the CA
overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the following observations for the
instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental
right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been
alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in
an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would
be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary
liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng
Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of
industry." The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business,
especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. 49 However, Ospital
ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but
purely in charitable and humanitarian work.50 Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila
was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital
ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he
definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that
civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here),
the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES AND SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20, 2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries; and MAKES no
pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
9
FACTS:
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
and the Court of Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of anesthesiologists during the
surgical pull-through operation conducted on a three-year old patient born with an
imperforate anus.
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two days
after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the
large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy
bag attached to the side of his body.
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a
pull-through operation. The petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum) was the
anesthesioligist. During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a
coma. He regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending physicians.
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely
against Dr. Solidum.
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was transferred to
the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997).
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. On January
20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum.
ISSUE(S): whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.
HELD: No
RATIO: Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the
levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane
and other anesthetic medications." However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together,
did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in
administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertido’s findings did not preclude
the probability that other factors related to Gerald’s major operation, which could or could

not necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia
and had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his
report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and
precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur."
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in
the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidum’s guilt, and moves us to acquit
him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable
doubt of guilt," according to United States v. Youthsey:
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious doubt;
not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the defendant,
or a dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed the
evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree
of certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most important and crucial
affairs of your life, you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof
to a mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond the possibility of mistake.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from
civil liability. But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances
that have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing
so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and
competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner
of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the
hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr.
Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed
to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address
the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila
civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. It is
puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly
and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng
Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower
courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against
10
Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the CA
overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the following observations for the
instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental
right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been
alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in
an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would
be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary
liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng
Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of
industry." The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business,
especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However, Ospital
ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but
purely in charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was
engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng
Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he
definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that
civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here),
the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; Civil Liability; In criminal
prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with
the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. In criminal
prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with
the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. It is puzzling,
therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and
severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng
Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower
courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against
Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172505 October 1, 2014
ANTONIO M. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
FERRO CHEMICALS, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Before this court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the Court of
Appeals dated August 11, 2005 and its· resolution3 dated April 27, 2006, denying petitioner
Antonio Garcia's motion for reconsideration.
Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through Ramon Garcia, as buyer, entered
into a deed of absolute· sale and purchase of shares of stock on July 15, 1988. The deed was
for the sale and purchase of shares of stock from various corporations, including one class
"A" share in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and one proprietary membership in the Manila Polo
Club, Inc.4 These shares of stock were in the name of Antonio Garcia.5 The contract was
allegedly entered into to prevent these shares of stock from being sold at public auction to
pay the outstanding obligations of Antonio Garcia.6
On March 3, 1989, a deed of right of repurchase over the same shares of stock subject of the
deed of absolute sale and purchase of shares of stock was entered into between Antonio
Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. Under the deed of right of repurchase, Antonio Garcia can
redeem the properties sold within 180 days from the signing of the agreement.7
Before the end of the 180-day period, Antonio Garcia exercised his right to repurchase the
properties.8 However, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not agree to the repurchase ofthe shares of
stock.9 Thus, Antonio Garcia filed an action for specific performance and annulment of
transfer of shares.10
On September 6, 1989, the class "A" share in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and proprietary
membership in the Manila Polo Club, Inc., which were included in the contracts entered
intobetween Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., were sold at public auction to
Philippine Investment System Organization.11
On September 3, 1990, the information based on the complaint of Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was
filed against Antonio Garcia before the Regional Trial Court.12 He was charged with
estafaunder Article 318 (Other Deceits) of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly
11
misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares subject of the contracts entered into
were free from all liens and encumbrances. The information reads:
The undersigned Assistant Prosecutor accuses Antonio M. Garcia of the felony of Estafa as
defined and penalized under Art. 318 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, committed as
follows:
THAT on or about 15 July 1988, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident bad faith and
deceit, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, misrepresent to FERRO
CHEMICALS, INC. (FCI) represented by Ramon M. Garcia, that his share of stock/proprietary
share with Ayala Alabang Country Club, Inc. and Manila Polo Club, Inc. collectively valued at
about ₱10.00 Million Pesos, being part of other shares of stock subject matter of a Deed of
Absolute Sale and Purchase of Shares of Stock between the accused and FCI, were free from
all liens, encumbrances and claims by third persons, when in truth and in fact, accused well
knew that aforesaid share of stock/proprietary share had already been garnished in July 1985
and subsequently sold at public auction in September 1989, and which misrepresentation
and assurance FCI relied upon and paid the consideration in accordance with the stipulated
condition/manner of payment, all to the damage and prejudice of FCI in the aforestated
amount of ₱10.00 Million Pesos.
Contrary to law.13
In the decision dated December 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Antonio Garcia was
acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.14 The Regional Trial Court held:
From the foregoing, it is very clear that private complainant was aware of the status of the
subject CLUB SHARES. Thus, the element of false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means which constitute the very cause or the only motive which induced the private
complainant to enter into the questioned deed of sale (Exh. "A") is wanting in the case at
bar.15 (Underscoring in the original)
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Regional
Trial Court in the order dated July 29, 1997.16
On August 25, 1997, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. appealed to the Court of Appeals the July 29, 1997
order of the Regional Trial Court as to the civil aspect of the case.17 The notice of
appeal18 filed was entitled "Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil
Aspect of the Case)." It alleged:
4. Herein private complainant hereby gives notice, out of extreme caution, that it is
appealing the Decision dated 12 December 1996 and the Order dated 29 July 1997 on the
civil aspect of the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that it is notin accordance with
the law and the facts of the case.

5. This notice of appeal is without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the criminal aspect, upon the giving of due
course thereto, private complainant shall endeavor to seek the consolidation of this appeal
with the said petition.19
On October 15, 1997, the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. also filed
a petition for certiorari20 with this court, assailing the Regional Trial Court’s December 12,
1996 decision and July 29, 1997 order acquitting Antonio Garcia.21
The petition for certiorari22 filed before this court sought to annul the decision of the trial
court acquitting Antonio Garcia. People of the Philippines and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. argued
that the trial court "acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it rendered the judgment of acquittal based on affidavits not at all
introduced in evidence by either of the parties thereby depriving the people of their
substantive right to due process of law."23 The verification/certification against forum
shopping, signed by Ramon Garcia as president of Ferro Chemicals, Inc., disclosed that the
notice of appeal was filed "with respect to the civil aspect of the case."24
In the resolution25 dated November 16, 1998, this court dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed, and entry of judgment was made on December 24, 1998.26
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals,27 in its decision28 dated August 11, 2005, granted
the appeal and awarded Ferro Chemicals, Inc. the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as actual loss
with legal interest and attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱20,000.00.29 The appellate court
found that Antonio Garcia failed to disclose the Philippine Investment and Savings
Organization’s lien over the club shares.30 Thus:
The issue in this case is whether or not Antonio Garcia disclosed to Ferro-Chemicals, during
the negotiation stage of the impending sale of the imputed club shares, the third attachment
lien in favor of Philippine Investment and Savings Organization (PISO) which, ultimately,
became the basis of the auction sale of said club shares. We have scrutinized the records of
the case but found no evidence that Antonio Garcia intimated to his brother the third
attachment lien of PISO over the said club shares. While it is true that Antonio Garcia
divulged the two liens of Security Bank and Insular Bank of Asia and America, the lien of PISO
was clearly not discussed. The affidavits executed by the two lawyers to the effect that the
lien of PISO was considered but deliberately left out in the deed cannot be given much
weight as they were never placed on the witness stand and cross-examined by Ferro-
Chemicals. If their affidavits, although not offered, were considered inthe criminal aspect and
placed a cloud on the prosecution’s thrust, theycannot be given the same probative value in
this civil aspect as only a preponderance of evidence is necessary to carry the day for the
plaintiff, Ferro Chemicals.
While Antonio Garcia insists that no consideration was ever made over the club shares as the
same were merely given for safekeeping, the document denominated as Deed of Absolute
12
Sale states otherwise. It is a basic rule of evidence that between documentary evidence and
oral evidence, the former carries more weight.
Also, We have observed that in Antonio Garcia’s letter of redemption addressed to Ferro
Chemicals, he mentioned his interest in redeeming the company shares only. That he did not
include the club shares only meant that said club shares no longer had any much redeemable
value as there was a lienover them. To redeem them would be pointless.
If they had no redeemable value to Antonio Garcia, to Ferro Chemical they were certainly
marketable assets. The non-disclosure of the third lien in favor of PISO materially affected
Ferro Chemicals since it was not able to act on time to protect its interest when the auction
sale over the club shares actually took place. As a result, Ferro Chemicals suffered losses due
to the unfortunate public auction sale. It is but just and fair that Antonio Garcia be made to
compensate the loss pursuant to Articles 21 and 2199 of the Civil Code.
The actual loss suffered by Ferro Chemicals amounted to ₱1,000,000.00 which
correspondents to the bid value of the club shares at the time of the auction as evidenced by
the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale.31 (Citations omitted)
Antonio Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. filed a partial
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. 32 These motions were
denied in the resolution33 dated April 27, 2006. Thus, Antonio Garcia filed this petition for
review on certiorari,34 assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Antonio Garcia argues that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals were erroneous 35 and
insists that "[Ferro Chemicals, Inc.] was fully aware that the shares covered by the Deed of
Absolute Sale, including the Subject Club Shares, were not free from liens and encumbrances
and that the Deed [of] Sale was executed [to] warehouse [Antonio Garcia’s] assets based on,
among other evidence, the affidavits executed by Jaime Gonzales . . . and Rolando Navarro. .
. ."36
Antonio Garcia faults the Court of Appeals in disregarding the affidavits executed by Jaime
Gonzales and Rolando Navarro. Antonio Garcia argues that even thiscourt in G.R. No. 130880
entitled People of the Philippines and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. v. Hon. Dennis Villa Ignacio and
Antonio Garcia where the admissibility of the affidavits was put in issue held that the trial
court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in the challenged decision.37 He then
reasoned that "pursuant to the law of the case, [the affidavits of Gonzalez and Navarro] are
admissible and should be given weight."38
Finally, Antonio Garcia claims thatboth he and and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. acted in bad faith
when they entered into the deed of absolute sale as a scheme to defraud Antonio Garcia’s
creditors. Thus, they are in pari delicto and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. should not be allowed to
recover from Antonio Garcia.39

In its comment,40 Ferro Chemicals, Inc. points out that Antonio Garcia raised factual issues
not proper ina Rule 45 petition and reiterates the findings of the Court of Appeals.41
There are pertinent and important issues that the parties failed to raise before the trial court,
Court of Appeals, and this court. Nonetheless, we resolve to rule on these issues.
As a general rule, this court through its appellate jurisdiction can only decide on matters or
issues raised by the parties.42 However, the rule admits of exceptions.43 When the
unassigned error affects jurisdiction over the subject matter44 or when the consideration of
the error is necessary for a complete resolution of the case,45 this court can still decide on
these issues.
We cannot turn a blind eye on glaring misapplications of the law or patently erroneous
decisions or resolutions simply because the parties failed to raise these errors before the
court. Otherwise, we will be allowing injustice by reason of the mistakes of the parties’
counsel and condoning reckless and negligent acts of lawyers to the prejudice of the litigants.
Failure to rule on these issues amounts to an abdication of our duty to dispense justice to all
parties.
The issues are:
I. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case
II. Whether the act of FerroChemicals, Inc. in filing the notice of appeal before the
Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari assailing the same trial court
decision amounted to forum shopping
III. Whether Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was entitled to the awards given as civil liability
ex delicto
The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is vested by law.46
In criminal cases, the
imposable penalty of the crime charged in the information determines the court that has
jurisdiction over the case.47
The information charged Antonio Garcia with violation of Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code, which is punishable by arresto mayor, or imprisonment for a period of one (1) month
and one (1) day to six (6) months. Article 318 states:
ART. 318: Other deceits. – The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the
amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon
13
any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the
preceding articles of this chapter.
Any person who, for profit or gain, shall interpret dreams, make forecasts, tell fortunes, or
take advantage of the credulity of the public in any other similar manner, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayoror a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
When the information was filed on September 3, 1990, the law in force was Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Under Section 32 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in criminal cases.–
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. This lack of
jurisdiction resulted in voiding all of the trial court’s proceedings and the judgment
rendered.48 Although the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction was never raised as an issue in any
part of the proceedings and even until it reached this court, we proceed with resolving the
matter.
In Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals,49 this court held:
Thus, we apply the general rule thatjurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or
waived by the parties. Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the
issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded fromruling that the lower court had
no jurisdiction over the case[.]
....
Having arrived at the conclusion that the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to try
the case against the appellant, it is no longer necessary to consider the other issues raised as
the decision of the Regional Trial Court is null and void.50

The trial court’s lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties’ silence on the
matter.51 The failure of the parties to raise the matter of jurisdiction also cannot be
construed as a waiver of the parties. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be waived by
the parties.
The assailed decision is void, considering that it originates from a void decision of the
Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping
Forum shopping is defined as "theact of a litigant who ‘repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by some other
court . . . to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another’."52 Once clearly established that forum shopping was committed willfully and
deliberately by a party or his or her counsel, the case may be summarily dismissed with
prejudice, and the act shall constitute direct contempt and a cause for administrative
sanctions.53
Forum shopping is prohibited, and sanctions are imposed on those who commit forum
shopping as "it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of
justice and adds to the already congested court dockets."54 This court has said:
What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks
different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered
by the different fora upon the same issues, regardless of whether the court in which one of
the suits was brought has no jurisdiction over the action.55 (Citation omitted)
The test and requisites that must concur to establish when a litigant commits forum
shopping are the following:
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentiaare present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicatain
another. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties asrepresent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicatain the action under
consideration; said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant
or lis pendens.56 (Citation omitted)
14
There is no question that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping when it filed an
appeal before the Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari before this court assailing the
same trial court decision. This is true even if Ferro Chemicals, Inc.’s notice of appeal to the
Court of Appeals was entitled "Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The
Civil Aspect of the Case)."57 The "civil aspect of the case" referred to by Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
is for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto. However, it failed to make a reservation before
the trial court to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delictoor institute
a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
There is identity of parties. Petitioner, Antonio Garcia, and respondent, Ferro Chemicals, Inc.,
are both parties in the appeal filed before the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari
before this court.
There is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in both actions. At a glance, it
may appear that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. asserted different rights: The appeal before the Court
of Appeals is purely on the civil aspect of the trial court’s decision while the petition for
certiorari before this court is allegedly only onthe criminal aspect of the case. However, the
civil liability asserted by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. before the Court of Appeals arose from the
criminal act. It is in the nature of civil liability ex delicto. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve
the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delictoor institute a
separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.58 Thus, it is an adjunct of the
criminalaspect of the case.1âwphi1 As held in Lim v. Kou Co Ping:59
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delictois based on the acts or omissions that
constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal
action.For this reason, the civil liability ex delictois impliedly instituted with the criminal
offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delictois instituted prior to or subsequent to the
filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the
criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the
criminal action declares that ‘the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist’."60 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).
When the trial court’s decision was appealed as to its criminal aspect in the petition for
certiorari before thiscourt, the civil aspect thereof is deemed included in the appeal. Thus,
the relief prayed for by Ferro Chemicals, Inc., that is, recovery of civil liability ex delicto, is
asserted in both actions before this court and the Court of Appeals.
Even the allegations in the notice of appeal readily show that Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
committedforum shopping, to wit:
5. This notice of appeal is without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the criminal aspect, upon the giving of due
course thereto, private complainant shall endeavor to seek the consolidation of this appeal
with the said petition.61

As to the third requisite, on the assumption that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case,
this court’s decision in G.R. No. 130880 affirming the trial court’s decision acquitting the
accused for lack of an essential element of the crime charged amounts to res judicatato
assert the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense. This court’s resolution dismissing
the petition for certiorari filed by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. states:
In any event, petitioners failed to sufficiently show that any grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the Regional Trial Court in rendering the challenged decision and order which,
on the contrary, appear to be in accord with the facts and the applicable law and
jurisprudence.62
Litigants cannot avail themselves of two separate remedies for the same relief in the hope
that in one forum, the relief prayed for will be granted. This is the evil sought tobe averted by
the doctrine of non-forum shopping, and this is the problem that has happened in this case.
This court denied the petition for certiorari filed byFerro Chemicals, Inc. resulting in finality of
the trial court’s decision.1awp++i1 The decision found Antonio Garcia not guilty of the
offense charged, and no civil liability was awarded to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. However, at
present,there is a conflicting decision from the Court of Appeals awarding Ferro Chemicals,
Inc. civil indemnity arising from the offense charged.
When the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is instituted with the criminal
action, whether by choice of private complainant (i.e., no reservation is made or no prior
filing of a separate civil action) or as required by the law or rules, the case will be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.63 The civil action cannot proceed
independently of the criminal case. This includes subsequent proceedings on the criminal
action such as an appeal. In any case, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. joined the public prosecutor in
filing the petition for certiorari before this court. Ramon Garcia, President of Ferro Chemicals,
Inc., signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition for
certiorari.64
We must clarify, however, that private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from
filing a motion for reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a
decision acquitting the accused. An exception to the rule that only the Solicitor General can
bring actions in criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or this court is "when the
private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court."65 As
discussed in Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Hajime Umezawa:66
In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising there from. Hence, if a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the
order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the
criminal aspect there of is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in
the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or
offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal
aspect of the case.However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for
15
reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil
aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not
secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for
reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for
certiorarior mandamus,if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown
and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.67 (Citations omitted)
This is in consonance with the doctrine that:
[T]he extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction ofthe civil
action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The
offended party may still claim civil liability ex delictoif there is a finding in the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists.
Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused’s
acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared
that the liability of the accused is only civil;and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not
arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.68
However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court
acquitting the accused and private complainant/s failed to reserve the right to institute a
separate civil action,the civil liability ex delictothat is inherently attached to the offense is
likewise appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex delictois impliedly instituted with the
petition for certiorari assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private complainant cannot
anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without violating the doctrine of
non-forum shopping.
On the other hand, the conclusion isdifferent if private complainant reserved the right to
institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto before the Regional Trial
Court orinstitute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case in accordance
with Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. In these situations, the filing of an appealas to the civil
aspect of the case cannot be considered as forum shopping.1âwphi1 This is not the situation
here.
We see no more reason to discuss the issues presented by the parties in light of the
foregoing discussion.
Entry of judgment having been made on the resolution of the court in G.R. No. 130880
involving the same parties and issues and by virtue of the doctrine of finality of judgment, we
reiterate the resolution of this court.
WHEREFORE, the resolution in G.R. No. 130880 is reiterated. We grant the petition insofar as
it prays for the setting aside of the Court of Appeals' decision d~ted August 11, 2005 and

resolution dated April 27, 2006 as a final decision over the assailed Regional Trial Court
decision that was rendered on November 16, 1998 in G.R. No. 130880.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Before this court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the Court of
Appeals dated August 11, 2005 and its• resolution3 dated April 27, 2006, denying petitioner
Antonio Garcia's motion for reconsideration.
Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through Ramon Garcia, as buyer, entered
into a deed of absolute• sale and purchase of shares of stock on July 15, 1988. The deed was
for the sale and purchase of shares of stock from various corporations, including one class
"A" share in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and one proprietary membership in the Manila Polo
Club, Inc.4 These shares of stock were in the name of Antonio Garcia.5 The contract was
allegedly entered into to prevent these shares of stock from being sold at public auction to
pay the outstanding obligations of Antonio Garcia.
On March 3, 1989, a deed of right of repurchase over the same shares of stock subject of the
deed of absolute sale and purchase of shares of stock was entered into between Antonio
Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. Under the deed of right of repurchase, Antonio Garcia can
redeem the properties sold within 180 days from the signing of the agreement.7
Before the end of the 180-day period, Antonio Garcia exercised his right to repurchase the
properties.8 However, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not agree to the repurchase of the shares of
stock.9 Thus, Antonio Garcia filed an action for specific performance and annulment of
transfer of shares.
On September 6, 1989, the class "A" share in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and proprietary
membership in the Manila Polo Club, Inc., which were included in the contracts entered into
between Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., were sold at public auction to Philippine
Investment System Organization.
On September 3, 1990, the information based on the complaint of Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was
filed against Antonio Garcia before the Regional Trial Court.12 He was charged with estafa
under Article 318 (Other Deceits) of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly misrepresenting to
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares subject of the contracts entered into were free from all
liens and encumbrances.
In the decision dated December 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Antonio Garcia was
acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
16
On August 25, 1997, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. appealed to the Court of Appeals the July 29, 1997
order of the Regional Trial Court as to the civil aspect of the case.
On October 15, 1997, the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. also filed
a petition for certiorari20 with this court, assailing the Regional Trial Court’s December 12,
1996 decision and July 29, 1997 order acquitting Antonio Garcia.
The petition for certiorari22 filed before this court sought to annul the decision of the trial
court acquitting Antonio Garcia. People of the Philippines and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. argued
that the trial court "acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it rendered the judgment of acquittal based on affidavits not at all
introduced in evidence by either of the parties thereby depriving the people of their
substantive right to due process of law."
The verification/certification against forum shopping, signed by Ramon Garcia as president of
Ferro Chemicals, Inc., disclosed that the notice of appeal was filed "with respect to the civil
aspect of the case."
In the resolution25 dated November 16, 1998, this court dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed, and entry of judgment was made on December 24, 1998.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals,27 in its decision28 dated August 11, 2005, granted
the appeal and awarded Ferro Chemicals, Inc. the amount of P1,000,000.00 as actual loss
with legal interest and attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00.29 The appellate court
found that Antonio Garcia failed to disclose the Philippine Investment and Savings
Organization’s lien over the club shares.
SIDE ISSUE: WON RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. This lack of
jurisdiction resulted in voiding all of the trial court’s proceedings and the judgment
rendered.48 Although the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction was never raised as an issue in any
part of the proceedings and even until it reached this court, we proceed with resolving the
matter.
MTC had jurisdiction by virtue of the penalty imposed for the crime of estafa. The trial court’s
lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties’ silence on the matter.51 The failure of the
parties to raise the matter of jurisdiction also cannot be construed as a waiver of the parties.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be waived by the parties.

MAIN ISSUE:
Whether the act of Ferro Chemicals, Inc. in filing the notice of appeal before the Court of
Appeals and the petition for certiorari assailing the same trial court decision amounted to
forum shopping
HELD: Yes.
Forum shopping is defined as "theact of a litigant who ‘repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by some other
court . . . to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another’." Once clearly established that forum shopping was committed willfully and
deliberately by a party or his or her counsel, the case may be summarily dismissed with
prejudice, and the act shall constitute direct contempt and a cause for administrative
sanctions.
The test and requisites that must concur to establish when a litigant commits forum
shopping are the following:
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of
litispendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in
another. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration; said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action
pendant or lis pendens.
There is no question that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping when it filed an
appeal before the Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari before this court assailing the
same trial court decision. This is true even if Ferro Chemicals, Inc.’s notice of appeal to the
Court of Appeals was entitled "Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The
Civil Aspect of the Case)." The "civil aspect of the case" referred to by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. is
for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto. However, it failed to make a reservation before the
17
trial court to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto or institute a
separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
There is identity of parties. Petitioner, Antonio Garcia, and respondent, Ferro Chemicals, Inc.,
are both parties in the appeal filed before the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari
before this court.
There is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in both actions. At a glance, it
may appear that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. asserted different rights: The appeal before the Court
of Appeals is purely on the civil aspect of the trial court’s decision while the petition for
certiorari before this court is allegedly only on the criminal aspect of the case. However, the
civil liability asserted by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. before the Court of Appeals arose from the
criminal act. It is in the nature of civil liability ex delicto. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve
the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto or institute a
separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case. Thus, it is an adjunct of the
criminal aspect of the case.
When the trial court’s decision was appealed as to its criminal aspect in the petition for
certiorari before this court, the civil aspect thereof is deemed included in the appeal. Thus,
the relief prayed for by Ferro Chemicals, Inc., that is, recovery of civil liability ex delicto, is
asserted in both actions before this court and the Court of Appeals.
As to the third requisite, on the assumption that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case,
this court’s decision in G.R. No. 130880 affirming the trial court’s decision acquitting the
accused for lack of an essential element of the crime charged amounts to res judicata to
assert the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense.
Litigants cannot avail themselves of two separate remedies for the same relief in the hope
that in one forum, the relief prayed for will be granted. This is the evil sought to be averted
by the doctrine of non-forum shopping, and this is the problem that has happened in this
case. This court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. resulting in
finality of the trial court’s decision. The decision found Antonio Garcia not guilty of the
offense charged, and no civil liability was awarded to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. However, at
present, there is a conflicting decision from the Court of Appeals awarding Ferro Chemicals,
Inc. civil indemnity arising from the offense charged.
When the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is instituted with the criminal
action, whether by choice of private complainant (i.e., no reservation is made or no prior
filing of a separate civil action) or as required by the law or rules, the case will be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.63 The civil action cannot proceed
independently of the criminal case. This includes subsequent proceedings on the criminal
 18

action such as an appeal. In any case, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. joined the public prosecutor in
filing the petition for certiorari before this court. Ramon Garcia, President of Ferro Chemicals,
Inc., signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition for
certiorari.
We must clarify, however, that private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from
filing a motion for reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a
decision acquitting the accused. An exception to the rule that only the Solicitor General can
bring actions in criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or this court is "when the
private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court."
[T]he extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the
civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The
offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists.
Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused’s
acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto:
Same; Criminal Procedure; When the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
instituted with the criminal action, whether by choice of private complainant (i.e., no
reservation is made or no prior filing of a separate civil action) or as required by the law or
rules, the case will be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
When the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is instituted with the criminal
action, whether by choice of private complainant (i.e., no reservation is made or no prior
filing of a separate civil action) or as required by the law or rules, the case will be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The civil action cannot proceed
independently of the criminal case. This includes subsequent proceedings on the criminal
action such as an appeal. In any case, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. joined the public prosecutor in
filing the petition for certiorari before this court. Ramon Garcia, President of Ferro Chemicals,
Inc., signed the verification and certification of nonforum shopping of the petition for
certiorari. We must clarify, however, that private complainants in criminal cases are not
precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil
aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. An exception to the rule that only the Solicitor
General can bring actions in criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or this court is
„when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court.

(a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is

required;

(b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil;and

(c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which the accused is acquitted.

However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court
acquitting the accused and private complainant/s failed to reserve the right to institute a
separate civil action, the civil liability ex delicto that is inherently attached to the offense is
likewise appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the
petition for certiorari assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private complainant cannot
anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without violating the doctrine of
non-forum shopping.

On the other hand, the conclusion is different if private complainant reserved the right to
institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto before the Regional Trial
Court or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case in accordance
with Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. In these situations, the filing of an appeal as to the civil
aspect of the case cannot be considered as forum shopping.1âwphi1 This is not the situation
here.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191411 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari1 are the October 6, 20092 and February
10, 20103Resolutions of public respondent First Division of Sandiganbayan (SB), denying the
Motion to Quash4 dated July 8, 2009 filed by petitioner Rafael L. Coscolluela (Coscolluela).
The said motion was adopted by petitioners Edwin N. Nacionales (Nacionales), Dr. Ernesto P.
Malvas (Malvas), and Jose Ma. G. Amugod (Amugod), praying for the dismissal of Crim. Case
No. SB-09-CRM-0154 for violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases.
The Facts
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental (Province) for three (3)
full terms which ended on June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special
Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales’ subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health
Officer.5
On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas (Office of the
Ombudsman) received a letter-complaint6 dated November 7, 2001 from People’s
Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and
agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount of ₱20,000,000.00 which allegedly
happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped down from office.
Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the Ombudsman
conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report7 dated April
16, 2002 which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against
petitioners.8 Consequently, petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits.9
On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares (Cañares)
prepared a Resolution (March 27, 2003 Resolution), finding probable cause against
petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and recommended the filing of the corresponding
information. On even date, the Information10 was prepared and signed by Cañares and
submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro (Miro) for recommendation.
19
Miro recommended the approval of the Information on June 5, 2003. However, the final
approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (Casimiro), came only on May 21, 2009,
and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the SB.
Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information
only when they received a copy of the latter shortly after its filing with the SB.11
On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash,12 arguing, among others, that his
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges
against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was
instituted. Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted Coscolluela’s motion.
In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Quash13 dated August 7, 2009,
explaining that although the Information was originally dated March 27, 2003, it still had to
go through careful review and revision before its final approval. It also pointed out that
petitioners never raised any objections regarding the purported delay in the proceedings
during the interim.14
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In a Resolution15 dated October 6, 2009, the SB denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash for lack
of merit. It held that the preliminary investigation against petitioners was actually resolved
by Cañares on March 27, 2003, one (1) year and four (4) months from the date the complaint
was filed, or in November 9, 2001. Complying with internal procedure, Cañares then
prepared the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information for the recommendation of the
Miro and eventually, the final approval of the Casimiro. As these issuances had to undergo
careful review and revision through the various levels of the said office, the period of delay –
i.e., from March 27, 2003 to May 21, 2009, or roughly over six (6) years – cannot be deemed
as inordinate16 and as such, petitioners’ constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases
was not violated.17
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration18 dated November
9, 2009 and November 6, 2009, similarly arguing that the SB erred in making a distinction
between two time periods, namely: (a) from the filing of the complaint up to the time
Cañares prepared the resolution finding probable cause against petitioners; and (b) from the
submission of the said resolution to the Acting Ombudsman for review and approval up to
the filing of the Information with the SB. In this regard, petitioners averred that the
aforementioned periods should not be compartmentalized and thus, treated as a single
period. Accordingly, the delay of eight (8) years of the instant case should be deemed
prejudicial to their right to speedy disposition of cases.19
The SB, however, denied the foregoing motions in its Resolution20 dated February 10, 2010
for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petitions.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether the SB gravely abused its discretion
in finding that petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article
III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which provides:
SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to
all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either
judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action to
all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.21
It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy disposition of cases should be
understood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning of
the time involved would not be sufficient.22Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed
violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried.23
Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to a speedy
disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the length of
delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.24
Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that petitioners’ right to a
speedy disposition of their criminal case had been violated.
First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount
of time to complete.
In this relation, the Court does not lend credence to the SB’s position that the conduct of
preliminary investigation was terminated as early as March 27, 2003, or the time when
20
Cañares prepared the Resolution recommending the filing of the Information. This is belied
by Section 4,
Rule II of the Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990, otherwise known as the
"Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman," which provides:
SEC. 4. Procedure – The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written
authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The above-cited provision readily reveals that there is no complete resolution of a case under
preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman approves the investigating officer’s
recommendation to either file an Information with the SB or to dismiss the complaint.
Therefore, in the case at bar, the preliminary investigation proceedings against the
petitioners were not terminated upon Cañares’ preparation of the March 27, 2003
Resolution and Information but rather, only at the time Casimiro finally approved the same
for filing with the SB. In this regard, the proceedings were terminated only on May 21, 2009,
or almost eight (8) years after the filing of the complaint.
Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case largely
remains unjustified.
To this end, the Court equally denies the SB’s ratiocination that the delay in proceedings
could be excused by the fact that the case had to undergo careful review and revision
through the different levels in the Office of the Ombudsman before it is finally approved, in
addition to the steady stream of cases which it had to resolve.
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the mantle of the Constitution,
mandated to be the "protector of the people" and as such, required to "act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers and employees of the Government, or
of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, in order to promote efficient
service."25 This great responsibility cannot be simply brushed aside by ineptitude. Precisely,
the Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through the
particulars of case but also to resolve the same within the proper length of time. Its dutiful
performance should not only be gauged by the quality of the assessment but also by the
reasonable promptness of its dispensation. Thus, barring any extraordinary complication,
such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved in the case or any event external
thereto that effectively stymied its normal work activity – any of which have not been
adequately proven by the prosecution in the case at bar – there appears to be no justifiable

basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman could not have earlier resolved the preliminary
investigation proceedings against the petitioners.
Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert
their right to speedy disposition of cases.
Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because
they were unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. They were only
informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information against them only after the lapse
of six (6) long years, or when they received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on
June 19, 2009.26 In this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the proceedings
against them have already been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why
petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether. Instructive on this point is the Court’s
observation in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan,27 to wit:
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case
because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was still on-
going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to
comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the proper procedure to follow in a
preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long years of being in
the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them had
already been dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special or
even novel reason which could justify the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its
excuse for the delay — the many layers of review that the case had to undergo and the
meticulous scrutiny it had to entail — has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was
the invocation in the Tatad case. The incident before us does not involve complicated factual
and legal issues, specially (sic) in view of the fact that the subject computerization contract
had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before the Anti-Graft League filed
its complaint. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the
petitioners’ duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office
of the Ombudsman’s responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable
timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. As
pronounced in the case of Barker v. Wingo:28
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty
of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.
Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy
delay in the proceedings against them.
21
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged
towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent
the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an
indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.30 This
looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be
weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. In the context of the right to a
speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan31 (Corpuz) illumined:
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily
compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the
speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration;
to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his
defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is
also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the
distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by
restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility.
His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to
public obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the
government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities
or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor
contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly
prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its
right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused
suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable
delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary
processes of justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay.
Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the
State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice
the defense should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the
prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to
harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a
missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

As the right to a speedy disposition of cases encompasses the broader purview of the entire
proceedings of which trial proper is but a stage, the above-discussed effects in Corpuz should
equally apply to the case at bar. As held in Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr.:32
Sec. 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads:
"Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."
Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid
constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of
justice. It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case"; includes
within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords broader
protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more
embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the period
after the submission of the case. The present constitutional provision applies to civil, criminal
and administrative cases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the Ombudsman’s
resolution of the case as well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has
caused, it is undeniable that petitioners’ constitutional right to due process and speedy
disposition of cases had been violated. As the institutional vanguard against corruption and
bureaucracy, the Office of the Ombudsman should create a system of accountability in order
to ensure that cases before it are resolved with reasonable dispatch and to equally expose
those who are responsible for its delays, as it ought to determine in this case.
Corollarily, for the SB’s patent and utter disregard of the existing laws and jurisprudence
surrounding the matter, the Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion when it denied
the quashal of the Information. Perforce, the assailed resolutions must be set aside and the
criminal case against petitioners be dismissed.
While the foregoing pronouncement should, as matter of course, result in the acquittal of
the petitioners, it does not necessarily follow that petitioners are entirely exculpated from
any civil liability, assuming that the same is proven in a subsequent case which the Province
may opt to pursue.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an acquittal in a criminal case does not
bar the private offended party from pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the delict,
unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist.33 As explained in the case of Abejuela v. People,34 citing
Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.:35
The Rules provide: "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
22
which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action
may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who
may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage
suffered."
In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., we declared:
"While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing
things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or
not the same be punishable by law."(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Based on the violation of petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases as herein discussed,
the present case stands to be dismissed even before either the prosecution or the defense
has been given the chance to present any evidence. Thus, the Court is unable to make a
definite pronouncement as to whether petitioners indeed committed the acts or omissions
from which any civil liability on their part might arise as prescribed under Section 2, Rule 120
of the Rules of Court.36 Consequently, absent this pronouncement, the Province is not
precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case based on the delict if only to recover the
amount of ₱20,000,000.00 in public funds attributable to petitioners’ alleged malfeasance.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated October 6,
2009 and February 10, 2010 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan are ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is likewise ordered to DISMISS Crim. Case No. SB-09-CRM-
0154 for violation of the Constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases of petitioners
Rafael L. Coscolluela, Edwin N. Nacionales, Dr. Ernesto P. Malvas, and Jose Ma. G. Amugod,
without prejudice to any civil action which the Province of Negros Occidental may file against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191411; Nacionales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
191871, 15 July 2013
On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas (Office of the
Ombudsman) received a letter-complaint from People’s Graftwatch, requesting for
assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for
the Province which allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped down
from his post as Governor of the Province of Negros Occidental.
 23

Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the Ombudsman
conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report dated April
16, 2002 which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners.
On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) prepared a Resolution
finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Anti-Graft law and recommended
the filing of the corresponding information. On even date, the Information was prepared and
signed by the GIO and submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas(DOV) for
recommendation. The DOV recommended the approval of the Information on June 5, 2003.
However, the final approval of Acting Ombudsman (AO), came only on May 21, 2009, and on
June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the SB.
On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that his constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved
only after almost 8 years since the complaint was instituted.
In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Quash dated August 7, 2009,
explaining that although the Information was originally dated March 27, 2003, it still had to
go through careful review and revision before its final approval. It also pointed out that
petitioners never raised any objections regarding the purported delay in the proceedings
during the interim.
The SB denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash for lack of merit
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Section 2, Rule111 of the Rules of Court
provides that an acquittal in a criminal case does not bar the private offended party from
pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the delict, unless the judgment of acquittal
explicitly declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist. Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an acquittal in a criminal case
does not bar the private offended party from pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the
delict, unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist. As explained in the case of Abejuela v. People,
200 SCRA 806 (1991), citing Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.,156 SCRA 325 (1987): The Rules provide: „The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it
in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable
for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325(1987), we declared: „While an act or omission is
felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is
a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can
readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of
everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or
omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law.

ISSUE: Is the right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases available during preliminary
investigation?

YES. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends
to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings,
either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action to all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. The preliminary
investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete. In this regard, the
proceedings were terminated almost eight years after the filing of the complaint.

NOTE: There is no complete resolution of a case under preliminary investigation until the
Ombudsman approves the investigating officer’s recommendation to either file an
Information with the SB or to dismiss the complaint. Therefore, in the case at bar, the
preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners were not terminated upon [the
DIO’s] preparation of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information but rather, only at the
time [the AO] finally approved the same for filing with the SB.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 199067 November 11, 2013
NISSAN GALLERY-ORTIGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
PURIFICACION F. FELIPE, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 or the Rules or Court seeks to review,
reverse and set aside the June 30, 2011 Decision1 or the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 120100,2 and its October 21, 2011 Resolution,3 for being issued in a manner not in accord
with law and jurisprudence.
This case stemmed from a criminal complaint for violation or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22)
filed by petitioner Nissan Gallery-Ortigas Nissan), an entity engaged in the business or car
dealership, against respondent Purificacion F. Felipe (Purificacion) with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. The said office found probable cause to indict Purificacion and
filed an Information before the Metropolitan Trial Court, (raffled to Branch 41), Quezon City
(MeTC), for her issuance of a postdated check in the amount of ₱1,020,000.00, which was
subsequently dishonored upon presentment due to "STOP PAYMENT."
Purificacion issued the said check because her son, Frederick Felipe (Frederick), attracted by
a huge discount of ₱220,000.00, purchased a Nissan Terrano 4x4 sports and utility vehicle
(SUV) from Nissan. The term of the transaction was Cash-on-Delivery and no downpayment
was required. The SUV was delivered on May 14, 1997, but Frederick failed to pay upon
delivery. Despite non-payment, Frederick took possession of the vehicle.4
Since then, Frederick had used and enjoyed the SUV for more than four (4) months without
paying even a single centavo of the purchase price. This constrained Nissan to send him two
(2) demand letters, on different dates, but he still refused to pay. Nissan, through its retained
counsel, was prompted to send a final demand letter. Reacting to the final demand, Frederick
went to Nissan’s office and asked for a grace period until October 30, 1997 within which to
pay his full outstanding obligation amounting to ₱1,026,750.00. Through further negotiation,
the amount was eventually reduced to ₱1,020,000.00.5
Frederick reneged on his promise and again failed to pay. On November 25, 1997, he asked
his mother, Purificacion, to issue the subject check as payment for his obligation. Purificacion
acceded to his request. Frederick then tendered her postdated check in the amount of
₱1,020,000.00. The check, however, was dishonored upon presentment due to "STOP
PAYMENT."6
24
A demand letter was served upon Purificacion, through Frederick, who lived with her. The
letter informed her of the dishonor of the check and gave her five (5) days from receipt
within which to replace it with cash or manager’s check. Despite receipt of the demand
letter, Purificacion refused to replace the check giving the reason that she was not the one
who purchased the vehicle. On January 6, 1998, Nissan filed a criminal case for violation of
BP 22 against her.7
During the preliminary investigation before the Assistant City Prosecutor, Purificacion gave
₱200,000.00 as partial payment to amicably settle the civil aspect of the case. Thereafter,
however, no additional payment had been made.
After trial, the MeTC rendered its judgment acquitting Purificacion of the charge, but holding
her civilly liable to Nissan. The dispositive portion of the judgment states that:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING accused PURIFICACION FELIPE of the
crime of Violation of Batas Pambansa 22. However, accused PURIFICACION FELIPE is ordered
to pay private complainant Nissan Gallery Ortigas the amount of SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (₱675,000.00) with legal interest per annum, from the filing of the
information until the finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.8
Purificacion appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Branch 105 thereof affirmed the
MeTC decision on December 22, 2008. The RTC ruled that Purificacion was estopped from
denying that she issued the check as a "show check" to boost the credit standing of Frederick
and that Nissan agreed not to deposit the same.9 Further, the RTC considered Purificacion to
be an accommodation party who was "liable on the instrument to a holder for value even
though the holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him or her to be merely an
accommodation party."10
Purificacion moved for a reconsideration, but her motion was denied.
The CA, before whom the case was elevated via a petition for review, granted the petition on
May 20, 2009.1avvphi1 In so deciding, the CA reasoned out that there was no privity of
contract between Nissan and Purificacion. No civil liability could be adjudged against her
because of her acquittal from the criminal charge. It was Frederick who was civilly liable to
Nissan.11
It added that Purificacion could not be an accommodation party either because she only
came in after Frederick failed to pay the purchase price, or six (6) months after the execution
of the contract between Nissan and Frederick. Her liability was limited to her act of issuing a
worthless check but by her acquittal in the criminal charge, there was no more basis for her
to be held civilly liable to Nissan.12 Purificacion’s act of issuing the subject check did not, by

itself, assume the civil obligation of Frederick to Nissan or automatically made her a party to
the contract.13 Thus, the decretal portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit therefrom, the instant petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Order dated December 22, 2008 and May 20, 2009,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, in Crim. Case No. Q-
08-151734, affirming the Judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 41,
Quezon City, for Violation of B.P. 22, acquitting petitioner of the crime charged but ordering
the latter to pay respondent the amount of Six Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(₱675,000.00) with 12% legal interest, is SET ASIDE and petitioner is EXONERATED from any
civil liability by reason of her issuance of the subject check.
SO ORDERED.14
Nissan filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was later denied.
Hence, this petition, with Nissan presenting the following
GROUNDS
A.
BOTH THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CONCURRED
THAT THE ISSUANCE BY RESPONDENT PURIFICACION OF THE SUBJECT BOUNCED CHECK WAS
FOR AND IN PAYMENT OF HER SON’S OUTSTANDING OBLIGATION TO NISSAN GALLERY
ORIGINATING FROM HIS PURCHASE OF THE SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLE, NOT MERELY AS A
"SHOW CHECK", HENCE, EVEN IF PURIFICACION IS NOT A PARTY TO THE SALES TRANSACTION
BETWEEN NISSAN GALLERY, AS SELLER, AND FREDERICK, AS BUYER, PURIFICACION, AS THE
ONE WHO DREW THE BOUNCED CHECK AS AND IN PAYMENT OF THE LONG-UNPAID MOTOR
VEHICLE PURCHASED BY HER SON, COULD NOT ESCAPE LIABILITY ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF
THE CASE.
B.
WHILE IT MAY BE TRUE THAT RESPONDENT PURIFICACION MAY BE ACQUITTED OF THE
CRIME CHARGED (VIOLATION OF B.P. 22), ONLY BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
PROVE THAT RESPONDENT PURIFICACION WAS PROPERLY NOTIFIED OF THE DISHONOR OF
THE SUBJECT BOUNCED CHECK, IT IS NOT CORRECT TO EXONERATE HER FROM THE CIVIL
ASPECT OF THE CASE.15
Ultimately, the question presented before the Court is whether or not Purificacion is civilly
liable for the issuance of a worthless check despite her acquittal from the criminal charge.
25
Ruling of the Court
The Court rules in the affirmative.
Well-settled is the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted upon the filing of a criminal
action, subject to certain exceptions. Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court specifically
provides that:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action (unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action).
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, with respect to criminal actions for violation of BP 22,
it is explicitly clear that the corresponding civil action is deemed included and that a
reservation to file such separately is not allowed.
The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability.
The civil aspect of every criminal case is based on the principle that every person criminally
liable is also civilly liable.16 If the accused, however, is not found to be criminally liable, it
does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.17 This rule more
specifically applies when (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon
the crime of which the accused was acquitted.18 The civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him.19
It can, therefore, be concluded that if the judgment is conviction of the accused, then the
necessary penalties and civil liabilities arising from the offense or crime shall be imposed. On
the contrary, if the judgment is of acquittal, then the imposition of the civil liability will
depend on whether or not the act or omission from which it might arise exists.
Purificacion was charged with violation of BP 22 for allegedly issuing a worthless check. The
essential elements of the offense of violation of BP 22 are the following:

(1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) The
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there were no sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) The dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or the dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the drawee bank to stop payment.20
Here, the first and third elements were duly proven in the trial. Purificacion, however, was
acquitted from criminal liability because of the failure of the prosecution to prove the fact of
notice of dishonor. Of the three (3) elements, the second element is the hardest to prove as
it involves a state of mind.21 Thus, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds which, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had
received a written notice of dishonor and that within five (5) days from receipt thereof, he
failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.22
Purificacion was acquitted because the element of notice of dishonor was not sufficiently
established.1âwphi1 Nevertheless, the act or omission from which her civil liability arose,
which was the making or the issuing of the subject worthless check, clearly existed. Her
acquittal from the criminal charge of BP 22 was based on reasonable doubt and it did not
relieve her of the corresponding civil liability. The Court cannot agree more when the MeTC
ruled that:
A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the
quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is
greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be
completely free from civil liability, a person’s acquittal must be based on the fact he did not
commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may
still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It
may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.23
The Court is also one with the CA when it stated that the liability of Purificacion was limited
to her act of issuing a worthless check. The Court, however, does not agree with the CA when
it went to state further that by her acquittal in the criminal charge, there was no more basis
for her to be held civilly liable to Nissan. The acquittal was just based on reasonable doubt
and it did not change the fact that she issued the subject check which was subsequently
dishonored upon its presentment.
Purificacion herself admitted having issued the subject check in the amount of ₱1,020,000.00
after Frederick asked her to do it as payment for his obligation with Nissan. Her claim that
she issued the check as a mere "show check" to boost Frederick’s credit standing was not
convincing because there was no credit standing to boost as her son had already defaulted in
his obligation to Nissan. Had it been issued prior to the sale of the vehicle, the "show check"
claim could be given credence. It was not, however, the case here. It was clear that she
assumed her son’s obligation with Nissan and issued the check to pay it. The argument that it
was a mere "show check" after her son was already in default its simply ludicrous.
26
The Court shall not be belabored with the issue of whether or not Purificacion was an
accommodation party because she was not. Granting that she was, it is with more reason
that she cannot escape any civil liability because Section 2924 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law specifically bounds her to the instrument. The crux of the controversy pertains to the
civil liability of an accused despite acquittal of a criminal charge. Such issue is no longer
novel. In cases like violation of BP 22, a special law, the intent in issuing a check is immaterial.
The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act prescribed
by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Considering the
rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has been breached. 25 The
lower courts were unanimous in finding that, indeed. Purificacion issued the bouncing check.
Thus, regardless of her intent, she remains civilly liable because the act or omission, the
making and issuing of the subject check, from which her civil liability arises, evidently exists.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision and the October 21, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-08-151734, dated December 22,
2008, affirming the Judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 41, Quezon City, for
Violation of B.P. 22 is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION with respect to the legal interest
which shall be reduced to 6% per annum from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.26
SO ORDERED.
BP 22; civil action deemed instituted in the criminal case. With respect to criminal actions for
violation of BP 22, it is explicitly clear that the corresponding civil action is deemed included
and that a reservation to file such separately is not allowed. The rule is that every act or
omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. The civil aspect of every
criminal case is based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.
If the accused, however, is not found to be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that
he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil action. This rule more specifically applies when (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the
court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted. The civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v. Purification F. Felipe,G.R. No. 199067, November 11, 2013.
BP 22; civil liability despite acquittal. If the judgment is of acquittal, the imposition of the civil
liability will depend on whether or not the act or omission from which it might arise exists. A
person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the
quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is
greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be
 27

completely free from civil liability, a person’s acquittal must be based on the fact he did not
commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may
still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It
may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged. Nissan Gallery-
Ortigas v. Purification F. Felipe,G.R. No. 199067, November 11, 2013.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Well-settled is the rule that a civil action is deemed
instituted upon the filing of a criminal action, subject to certain exceptions.―Well-settled is
the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted upon the filing of a criminal action, subject to
certain exceptions. Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.·(a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action (unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action). x x x x. (b) The criminal
action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Same; Same; Civil Liability; The civil aspect of every criminal case is based on the principle
that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable; The civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him.―The rule is that every act or omission
punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. The civil aspect of every criminal case is
based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. If the accused,
however, is not found to be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not
likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action. This rule more specifically applies when (a) the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares
that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not
arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The civil
action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or
where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187174 August 28, 2013
FELY Y. YALONG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUCILA C. YLAGAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions dated August 1,
20082 and March 10, 20093 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C A-G.R. SP No. 104075 which
dismissed petitioner Fely Y. Yalong's (Yalong) Petition for Review4 dated June 26, 2008
(subject petition for review), finding the same to be the improper mode of appeal.
The Facts
Stemming from a complaint tiled by respondent Lucila C. Ylagan (Ylagan ), an information
was filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Batangas City, Branch 1 (MTCC),
docketed as Criminal Case No. 45414, charging Yalong for the crime of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 225 (BP 22) as follows:
That on or about April 2, 2002 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, well-knowing that she does not have funds in or
credit with the Export and Industry Bank, Juan Luna Branch, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously draw, make and issue to Major Lucila Ylagan, Export and Industry
Bank Check No. 0002578833 dated May 3, 2002 in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱450,000.00), Philippine Currency, to apply on account or for value, but
when said check was presented for full payment with the drawee bank, the same was
dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of "Account Closed," which in effect is even
more than a dishonor for insufficiency of funds, despite notice of dishonor and demands
made upon her to make good her check by making proper arrangement with the drawee
bank or pay her obligation in full directly to Major Lucila Ylagan, accused failed and refused
to do so, which acts constitute a clear violation of the aforecited law, to the damage and
prejudice of transaction in commercial documents in general and of Major Lucila Ylagan in
particular in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Upon arraignment, Yalong pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charge. Hence, the case was
set for pre-trial and thereafter, trial ensued.7
28
During trial, Ylagan testified that sometime on April 2, 2002, Yalong borrowed from her the
amount of ₱450,000.00 with a verbal agreement that the same would be paid back to her in
cash and, as payment thereof, issued to her, inter alia, a postdated check dated May 3, 2002
in the similar amount of ₱450,000.00 (subject check). However, when Ylagan presented the
subject check for payment on August 27, 2002, it was dishonored and returned to her for the
reason "Account Closed." As verbal and written demands made on Yalong to pay her loan
proved futile, Ylagan was constrained to file the instant criminal case.8
In her defense, Yalong averred that she already paid her loan but did not require Ylagan to
issue a receipt or acknowledge the same. Likewise, she claimed that the subject check
belonged to her husband and that while she knew that the said check was not covered by
sufficient funds, it was already signed by her husband when she handed it to Ylagan.9
The MTCC Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings
On August 24, 2006, the MTCC rendered its Judgment10 (MTCC Decision), finding Yalong
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of BP 22 and accordingly sentenced
her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of one year and ordered her to pay
Ylagan the amount of ₱450,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum from October 10,
2002, including ₱25,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of suit.11
The MTCC found all the elements of the crime charged to have been duly established. It did
not give credence to Yalong’s defense that she did not own the checking account and that
she was not the one who issued the subject check. On this score, it cited the case of Ruiz v.
People12 wherein it was held that "BP 22 is broad enough to include, within its coverage, the
making and issuing of a check by one who has no account with a bank, or where such
account was already closed when the check was presented for payment."13 Further, it
observed that Yalong failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she has
completely paid the loan and thus, such defense must likewise fail.14
Yalong filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Recall the Warrant of
Arrest15 dated October 15, 2006 which the MTCC treated as an original motion for
reconsideration. The said motion was, however, denied in an Order16 dated December 5,
2006.
Consequently, Yalong filed a Notice of Appeal17 dated January 2, 2007 which was denied due
course in an Order18dated January 19, 2007, considering that the judgment against her was
promulgated in absentia on account of her unjustified absence.
Dissatisfied, Yalong filed a Petition for Relief from Order and Denial of Appeal19 which was
dismissed in an Order20dated July 25, 2007 on the ground that Yalong had lost the remedies
available to her under the law when she: (a) failed to appear without justifiable reason at the
scheduled promulgation of the MTCC Decision; (b) did not surrender within 15 days from the
date of such promulgation; (c) did not file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies

under the law; and (d) remained at large. Yalong moved for reconsideration21 which was,
however, denied in an Order22 dated October 25, 2007. Aggrieved, Yalong filed a Petition for
Certiorari with Petition for Bail (certiorari petition), docketed as Civil Case No. 8278, before
the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 7 (RTC).23
The RTC Ruling
In a Resolution24 dated April 2, 2008 (RTC Resolution), the RTC denied Yalong’s certiorari
petition, finding the promulgation of the MTCC Decision in absentia to be valid as Yalong was
duly notified of the scheduled date of promulgation on October 6, 2006 and yet failed to
appear thereat.25 Furthermore, the RTC observed that Yalong did not make any effort to
surrender within the time allowed by the rules and thus, lost the remedies available to her
under the law.26
Yalong filed a motion for reconsideration on April 30, 200827 which was eventually denied in
an Order28 dated May 27, 2008. As such, on June 26, 2008, she filed the subject petition for
review before the CA.29
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution30 dated August 1, 2008, the CA dismissed the subject petition for review on
the ground that the "Order of the RTC was issued in the exercise of its original jurisdiction –
where appeal by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC – and not a petition for review is the
proper remedy."
Yalong filed a motion for reconsideration dated November 20, 200831 which was, however,
denied in a Resolution32dated March 10, 2009. Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA properly dismissed the subject
petition for review on the ground of improper appeal.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
While the Rules of Court (Rules) do not specifically state that the inappropriate filing of a
petition for review instead of a required notice of appeal is dismissible (unlike its converse,
i.e., the filing of a notice of appeal when what is required is the filing of a petition for
review),33 Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules nonetheless provides that appeals to the CA in
cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the latter court. The said provision reads:
29
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –
(a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, records reveal that Yalong filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC and
that the latter court rendered a Resolution dated April 2, 2008 dismissing the same. It is
fundamental that a petition for certiorari is an original action34 and, as such, it cannot be
gainsaid that the RTC took cognizance of and resolved the aforesaid petition in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction. Hence, based on the above-cited rule, Yalong should have filed a
notice of appeal with the RTC instead of a petition for review with the CA. As a consequence
of Yalong’s failure to file a notice of appeal with the RTC within the proper reglementary
period, the RTC Decision had attained finality which thereby bars Yalong from further
contesting the same.
In this relation, it must be pointed out that Yalong’s contention that a petition for review may
be treated as a notice of appeal since the contents of the former already include the required
contents of the latter cannot be given credence since these modes of appeal clearly remain
distinct procedures which cannot, absent any compelling reason therefor, be loosely
interchanged with one another. For one, a notice of appeal is filed with the regional trial
court that rendered the assailed decision, judgment or final order, while a petition for review
is filed with the CA. Also, a notice of appeal is required when the RTC issues a decision,
judgment or final order in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, while a petition for review is
required when such issuance was in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, owing to
these differences, Yalong’s filing of the subject petition for review cannot be simply accorded
the same effect as the filing of a notice of appeal.
Verily, jurisprudence dictates that the perfection of an appeal within the period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such requirements is
considered fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. To be
sure, the rules on appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable to
forestall or avoid unreasonable delays in the administration of justice, to ensure an orderly
discharge of judicial business, and to put an end to controversies. Though as a general rule,
rules of procedures are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the
manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very
exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations, which are not present in the instant
case.35 As it stands, the subject petition for review was the wrong remedy and perforce was
properly dismissed by the CA.
 30

Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong’s appeal still remains
dismissible on the ground that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 45414. It is well-settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as
transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto
occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court
wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the
same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory
crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed.36 Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in
any of the places where any of its elements occurred – in particular, the place where the
check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.37

In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued, and delivered in
Manila, records reveal that Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment at the
LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its dishonor.38 As such, the MTCC correctly
took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as it had the territorial jurisdiction to try and
resolve the same. In this light, the denial of the present petition remains warranted.

As the Court finds the above-stated reasons already sufficient to deny the present petition, it
is unnecessary to delve on the other ancillary issues in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Resolutions dated August 1, 2008 and
March 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 104075 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Same; Criminal Procedure; Venue; The court wherein any of the crime’s essential and
material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood
that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.―It is well-settled that
violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that
the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some
occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material
acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the
first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person
charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case
for violation of BP 22 maybe filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred in
particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188694 February 12, 2014
RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the Decision2 dated November 28, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30650 which affirmed the Decision3 dated June
8, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 01-
197425 and 01-197426, finding petitioners Ricardo L. Atienza (Atienza) and Alfredo A. Castro
(Castro) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public
Document.
The Facts
Atienza and Castro (petitioners) are employees of the CA, particularly assigned to its Budget
Division and holding the positions of Budget Officer I and Utility Worker I,4 respectively, at
the time material to this case.
On March 20, 1995, at about past noon,5 Juanito Atibula (Atibula), Records Officer I and
Custodian of the CA Original Decisions in the CA Reporter’s Division, was invited by Castro to
attend Atienza’s birthday party somewhere along Bocobo Street, Ermita, Manila. At the
party, Atienza introduced Atibula to a certain Dario and asked him to assist the latter in
searching for the CA decision6 in the case entitled "Mateo Fernando v. Heirs of D. Tuason,
Inc."7 (Fernando), docketed as CA-G.R. No. 36808-R.8
Thereafter, Atibula returned to the office – followed a few minutes later by Dario – and
searched for the aforementioned decision which was found compiled in Volume 260 of the
CA Original Decisions. As Dario was scanning through the said volume, Atibula observed that
he was comparing its pages9 to the discolored papers he was holding.10 Dario likewise
scanned Volumes 265 and 267,11 and placed check marks on the papers he was holding.12
On March 24, 1995, after office hours, Atibula saw Dario outside the CA compound along
Maria Orosa Street.13 As they walked side by side towards the jeepney stop, Dario requested
Atibula to insert a Decision dated September 26, 1968 in one of the volumes of the CA
Original Decisions. However, Atibula refused and immediately left. 14
31
On April 21, 1995, Atienza offered Atibula the amount of ₱50,000.00 in exchange for Volume
260,15 which the latter turned down. Atienza then ridiculed him saying, "duwag ka, pera na
nga ito ayaw mo pa," to which Atibula retorted, "ikaw ang duwag dahil nagpapakita ka ng
kabuktutan."
Disturbed by the situation, Atibula reported the incident to Atty. Arnel Macapagal16 (Atty.
Macapagal), the Assistant Chief of the CA Reporter’s Division, who then instructed him
(Atibula) to hide Volumes 260, 265 and 26717 in a safe place.18
On May 9, 1995, Atibula discovered that Volume 26619 covering the period from January 28
to February 12, 1969 was missing20 and, hence, immediately reported the same to Atty.
Macapagal. Two days after the discovery of the loss, Atibula encountered Atienza near the
canteen,21 shouting "[p]utang ina mo, Juaning, pinahirapan mo kami!"22
On May 18, 1995, a certain Nelson de Castro, Clerk IV detailed at the CA Reporter’s
Division,23 handed to Atibula a bag containing a gift-wrapped package which turned out to be
the missing Volume 266. He claimed that it was Castro who asked him to deliver the said
package to Atibula.24
Having been notified of Volume 266’s return, Atty. Macapagal then directed Atibula to
ascertain who borrowed the volume. Records, however, disclosed no one.25 Separately,
Atibula compared the contents of Volume 266 with the index of the decisions and noticed
that there were two new documents inserted therein,26 namely: (a) a Resolution27dated
February 11, 1969 (subject resolution), ostensibly penned by Associate Justice Juan P.
Enriquez (Justice Enriquez) and concurred in by Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan and
Edilberto Soriano, recalling and setting aside the Entry of Judgment earlier issued in the
Fernando case; and (b) a Decision28 dated April 16, 1970 (subject decision), also ostensibly
penned by Justice Enriquez and concurred in by Associate Justices Jesus Y. Perez and Jose M.
Mendoza, amending the original decision dated September 26, 1968 in the aforementioned
case. Consequently, Atibula reported his findings to Atty. Macapagal who, in turn, informed
Atty. Gemma Leticia F. Tablate (Atty. Tablate), then Chief of the CA Reporter’s Division, of the
same. They tried to verify the genuineness, authenticity and existence of the subject
resolution and decision, and found that the compilation of the duplicate original
decisions/resolutions of Justice Enriquez did not bear the said promulgations. Atty. Tablate
reported the incident to then CA Presiding Justice Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr.29 who
immediately requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation
on the matter.30
Laboratory analysis and comparative examination of the subject resolution and decision31 as
well as of a decision in another case found in pages 906 to 922 of Volume 266 of the CA
Original Decisions were conducted by the NBI.32As a result, it issued its Questioned
Documents Report No. 937-1295,33 finding that: (a) Volume 266 had indeed been
altered;34 and (b) the signatures of the CA Justices in the subject resolution and decision
(questioned signatures) and their standard/sample signatures "were not written by one and

the same person,"35 leading to the conclusion that the questioned signatures were
forgeries.36
Meanwhile, sometime in the second week of July 1995, an inspection of the air-conditioning
units at the office of the CA Reporter’s Division was conducted, whereby it was discovered
that the improvised angle bar supporting the air conditioning unit at the right most end from
the main door was corroded with rust and the portion of the wall holding the same was
broken ("may bak-bak na").37 NBI Agents, Atty. Daniel D. Daganzo38 (Atty. Daganzo) and
Norman R. Decampong39 then conducted an ocular inspection of the premises, and, in the
course thereof, interviewed several personnel of the CA Maintenance Division. Said
investigation yielded the following findings: (a) there were no signs of forcible entry;40 (b) the
perpetrators gained entry to the office of the CA Reporter’s Division "by passing through the
hole on the concrete wall after removing the air conditioning unit" 41 located on the right
most [sic] end from the main door;42 (c) there was conspiracy to commit the crime of
Falsification of Public Document between Atienza and Dario in view of their "concerted
efforts through previous or simultaneous acts and deeds;"43 and (d) Castro assisted Atienza
and Dario "to profit from the effects of the crime by returning safely the missing volume to
the [CA Reporter’s Division]."44 Consequently, a criminal complaint was filed by the NBI and
the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman against Atienza,
Castro, and Dario before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the OMB,
docketed as OMB-0-97-2054,45 charging them for the following crimes: (a) Falsification of
Public Document; (b) violation of Section 3(a)46 of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,47 as amended;
and (c) violation of Section 848 of RA 6713.49
After investigation, the charges involving the pertinent provisions of RAs 3019 and 6713 were
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence,50 but it was contrarily determined that there existed
probable cause to charge Atienza, Castro, and Dario51 for the crimes of Robbery under Article
299(a)(1)52 of the Revised Penal Code53 (RPC), as amended, and of Falsification of Public
Document under Article 172(1)54 in relation to Article 171(6)55 of the same code. Thus, the
corresponding Informations,56 respectively docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 01-197425 and
01-197426, were filed before the RTC. Petitioners posted bail57 and, thereafter, pleaded "not
guilty"58 to the charges during their arraignment, while Dario remained at large.
In his defense, Atienza denied having anything to do with the questioned incidents59 as he
was not even summoned by the CA Clerk of Court or the Chief of the Reporter’s
Division,60 and became aware of the incident only when he and Castro were subpoenaed by
the NBI Special Investigators.61 Further, he gave the alibi that he was out of the office 4 days
a week during the months of April to June 1995,62 reporting only on Fridays,63 since he had to
perform his duties as Budget Officer I of the CA Budget Division and Liaison Officer to the
Department of Budget and Management, the Committee on Appropriation of the Congress,
Committee on Appropriation of the lower house, and the Committee on Finance of the
Senate and the GSIS.
On the other hand, Castro did not endeavor to refute the allegations in the Informations filed
against him and the other accused.64
32
The RTC Ruling
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision65 on June 8, 2006, finding petitioners
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Robbery under Article 299(a)(1) of the RPC
and Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(6) of the
RPC, and sentenced them to each suffer: (a) the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and
one (1) day, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, for the first crime; and (b) the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day, as
minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of ₱5,000.00 for
the second crime.
In convicting petitioners, the RTC found that "the evidence x x x of the prosecution is replete
with situations and/or events to prove [petitioners’] guilt,"66 namely: (a) Atienza requested
Atibula to take out Volumes 260, 265 and 267 of the CA Original Decisions from the CA
Reporter’s Division, which the latter rejected despite offer of remuneration; (b) Volume 266
was subsequently discovered to be missing; (c) access to the missing volume appears to have
been acquired by entering through an opening in the premises of the CA’s Reporter’s Division
because the air conditioning unit occupying the space thereat was taken out for repair
earlier; (d) Castro returned Volume 266 after its loss;67 (e) Volume 266 bore badges of
tampering evidenced by the "non-continuity of the front and the back cover flaps x x x and
the pages of the book/volume differences in the cutting marks on the sides of the volume
and the presence of artificial aging on [its] sides";68 and (f) two (2) new documents which
materially amended the original decision and resolution in the Fernando case were inserted
in the said volume.69 The RTC further added that the manner by which petitioners committed
the felonious acts reveals a community of criminal design, and thereby held that conspiracy
exists.70
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed their conviction to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision71 dated November 28, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC’s judgment of conviction
in toto. It held that while there is no direct evidence showing that the petitioners committed
the crimes charged, the testimonies of Atibula and NBI Agent Atty. Daganzo with respect to
what had transpired before and after Volume 266 was taken from its shelf, when viewed
together with the other circumstances in the case, constitute circumstantial evidence which
sufficiently point to the guilt of petitioners.72 In addition, it found that Atienza’s defenses
were self-serving negative evidence which cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence
clearly establishing his participation,73 adding too that while there was no proof of previous
agreement between petitioners to unlawfully take Volume 266 out of the office of the CA
Reporter’s Division and falsify the subject documents, their conspiracy may be inferred from
the fact that Castro was in possession of the missing Volume 266 which was eventually
discovered to have been falsified.74

Undaunted, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration75 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution76 dated July 7, 2009, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not petitioners’ conviction for the
crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document should be upheld on account of the
circumstantial evidence in this case proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which
the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience.77 It is
sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must
constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. Stated differently, the test
to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the
accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other
and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused’s guilt and
inconsistent with his innocence.78
Applying these principles to the facts that appear on record, the Court finds that no sufficient
circumstantial evidence was presented in this case to establish the elements of Robbery
under Article 299(a)(1)79 of the RPC and Falsification of Public Documents under Article
172(1) in relation to Article 171(6)80 of the same code, or of petitioners’ supposed conspiracy
therefor.
To this end, the Court examines the participation of and evidence against each petitioner and
forthwith explains its reasons for reaching the foregoing conclusions.
A. The Participation of and Evidence Against Castro
Notwithstanding Castro’s failure to refute the charges against him, the Court finds no
evidence to link him to the commission of the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public
Document, contrary to the conclusions reached by the RTC and concurred in by the CA. To
begin with, it is essential to note that Castro’s purported possession and eventual return of
Volume 266 was only premised upon the statement of one Nelson de Castro (Nelson), i.e.,
the Sinumpaang Salaysay81 dated August 9, 1995, who averred that on May 18, 1995, at
33
around 11:50 in the morning, Castro told him to pass by his office and there handed him a
bag which, as it turned out, contained the missing Volume 266, viz.:82
Noong Mayo 18, 1995 bandang 11:50 ng tanghali ay tumawag sa telepono si ALFREDO
CASTRO, ng Budget Division, at sinabihan ako na dumaan sa kanyang opisina dahil mayroon
daw siyang ibibigay para sa opisina namin. Pumunta po naman ako kaagad kay ALFREDO
CASTRO sa opisina at iniabot sa akin ang isang bag na malaki kulay parang pink at may laman
at sinabihan pa niya ako na buksan ko na lang daw ang bag pagdating sa opisina. Pagdating
ko sa opisina ay tinawag ko si Mr. ATIBULA at doon ay binuksan naming dalawa ang bag.
Nakita ko sa loob ang isang bagay na nakabalot sa isang gift wrap at ng buksan namin o alisin
ang gift wrap ay ang Original Decisions, Volume 266 na nawawala mga ilang linggo na ang
nakakaraan.
Nelson was not, however, presented before the RTC during trial, hence, was not subjected to
any in-court examination. It is settled that while affidavits may be considered as public
documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public (here, a public officer authorized
to administer oaths), they are still classified as hearsay evidence unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon and the adverse party is
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine them.83 With the prosecution’s failure to present
Nelson to affirm his statement that Castro caused the return of Volume 266,84 the
prosecution’s evidence on the matter should be treated as hearsay and, thus, inadmissible to
establish the truth or falsity of the relevant claims. Consequently, there exists no sufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove Castro’s guilt.
B. The Participation of and Evidence Against Atienza
In similar regard, the prosecution’s evidence on the circumstances in this case do not
sufficiently establish Atienza’s guilt for the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public
Document.
While records show that Atienza was positively identified by Atibula as having attempted to
bribe him to take out Volume 260 of the CA Original Decisions from the Reporter’s
Division,85 the fact is that the alleged intercalation actually occurred in a different document,
that is Volume 266.
The discrepancy of accounts on the very subject matter of the crimes charged dilutes the
strength of the evidence required to produce a conviction. At best, the bribery attempt may
be deemed as a demonstration of interest on the part of Atienza over said subject matter
and in this regard, constitutes proof of motive. However, it is well-established that mere
proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction, most
especially if there is no other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be deduced
that the accused was the malefactor.86

In fact, even if Atienza’s bribery attempt is taken together with the other circumstance
couched as a relevant link by the prosecution in this case – i.e., his averred encounter with
Atibula, on May 11, 1995, or two (2) days after the discovery of the loss of Volume 266,
wherein the latter uttered
"[p]utang ina mo, Juaning, pinahirapan mo kami"87 – the Court still finds the evidence to be
lacking. This allegation, even if proven as true, does not indicate that Atienza howsoever
affirmed the taking or even the falsification of Volume 266. Clearly, the utterance was made
by Atibula who did not bother to state Atienza’s response thereto or any other subsequent
action connected therewith so as to bolster a finding of guilt. Neither can this circumstance
be properly linked to the act of Castro inviting Atibula to Atienza’s party. It would be a stretch
to conclude that this mere invitation, without any other proof of Castro’s participation, was
instrumental or, at the very least, reasonably connected to Atienza and his own alleged
participation in the above-stated crimes.
In this relation, it may not be amiss to debunk the claim that petitioners conspired in this
case.1âwphi1 While direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as it may be inferred
from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime
which point to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of
interests,88 records are, however, bereft of any showing as to how the particular acts of
petitioners figured into the common design of taking out the subject volume and inserting
the falsified documents therein. Hence, the prosecution’s theory of conspiracy does not
deserve any merit.
All told, the prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked constitute an
unbroken chain of events which lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioners are,
to the exclusion of the others, indeed the culprits. As such, their conviction, tested under the
threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt, was not warranted. To be sure, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is the degree of proof that, after investigation of the whole record,
produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the accused’s culpability.89 Such moral
certainty is, however, lacking in this case due to the insufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence presented.
C. Jurisdictional Defect: Falsification Case
Also, it bears mentioning that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of Criminal
Case No. 01-197426 (i.e., the falsification case) since Falsification of Public Document under
Article 172(1)90 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years91) and a fine
of not more than ₱5,000.00, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts pursuant to Section
32(2)92 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,93 otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980," as amended by RA 7691.94While petitioners raised this jurisdictional
defect95 for the first time in the present petition, they are not precluded from questioning
the same. Indeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution
34
or the law and cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the
parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The rule is well-settled that lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Hence,
questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.96
D. A Final Word
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such
presumption of innocence, failing which, the presumption of innocence prevails and the
accused should be acquitted.97 This, despite the fact that his innocence may be doubted, for
a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the
weakness or even absence of defense. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction, as in this case. Courts should be guided
by the principle that it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of
the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.98
Accordingly, there being no circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a conviction, the
Court hereby acquits petitioners, without prejudice, however, to any subsequent finding on
their administrative liability in connection with the incidents in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30650 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Ricardo L.
Atienza and Alfredo A. Castro are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of Robbery and
Falsification of Public Document on the ground of reasonable doubt, without prejudice to any
subsequent finding on their administrative liability in connection with the incidents in this
case. The bail bonds posted for their provisional liberty are consequently cancelled and
released.
SO ORDERED.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; The rule is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The RTC did not have
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Criminal Case No. 01-197426 (i.e., the falsification case)
since Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1) of the RPC, which is punishable by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (or imprisonment for 2 years,
487months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts pursuant to Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise known
as the „Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,‰ as amended by RA 7691. While petitioners
raised this jurisdictional defect for the first time in the present petition, they are not
 35

precluded from questioning the same. Indeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law and cannot be acquired through a waiver or
enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The
rule is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings. Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the
first time on appeal.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third
Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed
against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A.
3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded
by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation
of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and
President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile
(Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable
cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no
longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable
cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as
follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO
ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in
conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine
International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
36
criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was
awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under
Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on
Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of
PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation
to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO
while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the
Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause
why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his
alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case. 5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he
filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that
the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person,
because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on
the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended
that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any
official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it
appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged
co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court,
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash
and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed. 9

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON
THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN
RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE
IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION
AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government.11
37
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting
graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as
enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private
respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein
respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior
to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public
officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent
may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with
whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that
the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile
is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of
the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death
of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A.
3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy
with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all
instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public
officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has
already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for
conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them
pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are
jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done by any of the
conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been
said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is
alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.17 The death of one of two or more

conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this Court
held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The
crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow
that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-
conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be
found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he
(respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-
conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the
legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute
graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the
prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-
Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature
of and the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is
instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except
when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition.
The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the
Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of
morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their
malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the
public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or
more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the
determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in
criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to
commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the
existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when
considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the
consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.
38
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the
commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the
sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object,
whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each
individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the
whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one
is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit
a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is
clearly explained in one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the
separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and
inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they
all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of
the act and intent which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of the
band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the
actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime.
Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be
drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral
ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out
the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the
crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this
light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for
collectivizing criminal liability.
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved,
all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-
principals. This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of
conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common
purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such
criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with
Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature
and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is
better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce
evidence to prove or disprove its presence.

Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to
Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with
the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering
into another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement
subject of the present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB,
through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground
that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned
the said SB Resolution before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court
denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became
final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution
in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in
G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a
Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's
contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the
act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount
to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a
warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the
jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person
at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory
plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex
rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so
seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise,
he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of
objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives
the court jurisdiction over the person."
39
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not
confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other
matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be
heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the
jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only
came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a
contract entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the
SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as
amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is
being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary
Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been
charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of
the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not
follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case
involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to
decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other
factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in
the main case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a
referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main
case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2,
2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition
of Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; The rule is well settled that the act of an
accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Respondent should be reminded
that prior to this Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional
liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation in Criminal Case No. 28091. The
 40

Court agrees with petitioner’s contention that private respondent’s act of posting bail and
filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is
well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative
relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it has
been held that: When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by
virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the
jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person
at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory
plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex
rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

Same; Same; Same; Courts; Sandiganbayan; The Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court
which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic Act(R.A.)
3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1606
as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. The SB is a special criminal court
which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249.
This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law,
both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by
the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be
done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already
divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To
rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be
based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the
alleged offenders.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015
JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MONICA
NEALIGA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated August 31, 2011 and its Resolution2 dated January 31, 2012 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32363. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders dated 14 October 2008 and 12
February 2009 of Branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila, in Criminal Case No. 01-197750,
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case
be REMANDED to Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, for further appropriate
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.3cralawlawlibrary
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46 of the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938).4 The accusatory portion of
the Information filed against her reads:
That on or about July 27, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, and as such, have a complete control and exclusively manage the
entire business of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously acquires, in violation of her duty as such
and the confidence reposed on her, personal interest or equity adverse to A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative by then and there entering into a
contract with Coca Cola Products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative in her own personal capacity when in truth and in fact as the said accused fully
well knew, the sale of Coca-Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-
Purpose Cooperative should have accrued to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-
Purpose Cooperative to the damage and prejudice of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers
Multi-Purpose Cooperative.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
41
Upon her arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution sought to prove that petitioner, then Chairperson of the A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, had entered into an exclusive
dealership agreement with Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., (Coca Cola) for the sale of
softdrink products at the same school. By virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement between
the school and the Cooperative, Dr. Nora T. Salamanca, the school principal, directed
petitioner to submit her financial reports during her tenure as Chairperson. Instead,
petitioner claimed that the principal had no business and authority to require her to produce
financial statements, and that the said reports had been posted on the school bulletin board.
The school principal then created an audit committee to look into the financial reports of the
Cooperative. The committee was composed of Aurora Catabona (Chairperson), Monica
Nealiga (member), with Noemi Olazo (Chairperson-auditor) and Sylvia Apostol (auditor), who
later executed their respective affidavits in support of the charge against petitioner. Based on
the documents obtained from Coca-Cola, including the records of actual deliveries and sales,
and the financial statements prepared by petitioner, the audit committee found that
petitioner defrauded the Cooperative and its members for three (3) years in the following
amounts: School Year (S.Y.) 1998-1999 - P54,008.00; S.Y. 1999-2000 - P40,503.00; and S.Y.
2000-2001 - P8,945.00. Despite requests for her to return to the Cooperative the amounts
she had allegedly misappropriated, petitioner failed and refused to do so. Thus, the
Cooperative issued a Board Resolution authorizing the filing of criminal charges against
petitioner.
After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved to dismiss
the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among other
matters, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction
over the case, as the crime charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it
a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable.
On October 14, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, thus:
Considering that the MeTCs, MTC, MCTCs have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine,
and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offense or predicated thereon, and considering that violation of [Sec] 46 of
R.A. 6938 would be punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more
than one (1) year and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the Court, this Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the instant
case which properly pertains to the first level courts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and holds that it has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged. Accordingly, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED. This Court having no
jurisdiction, further discussions over the defense' allegation that there was a violation of the
principle of primary jurisdiction and that the private complainants used a falsified resolution
to purposely empower them to file the instant case become moot and academic.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
On February 12, 2009, the RTC denied for lack of merit the private prosecutor's motion for a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal.7 The RTC held:
Nowhere in said [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 does it provide for penal sanctions/liability for violation
of acts or omission prescribed therein. If ever, the liability is only for damages and for double
the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative. It is a fundamental rule
in law that an act or omission is not a crime unless there is a law making it so and providing a
penalty therefor. Otherwise put, the facts charged in the information do not charge an
offense. And even assuming arguendo that they do constitute an offense, the penalty
therefor is that provided under paragraph 4 of [Section] 124 of R.A. [6938] which is
"imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not
less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court," which falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the first, not the second level court.
Another factor which strongly militates against the cause of the prosecution is the
undisputed fact that before this case was filed in Court, conciliation/mediation process for
the amicable settlement of the dispute was not availed of by the private complainants who
are all members (directors) of the A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative in accordance with the by-laws of the Cooperative and the Cooperative Code
itself and the Guidelines for the Implementation of Conciliation/Mediation of Cooperative
dispute (Memo Circular No. 2007-05, Series of 2007). The dispute involving the parties is
certainly a dispute and issue between and among directors, officers or members of the A.
Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative which is governed by the
Guidelines.
Prior availment and exhaustion of administrative remedies until the Office of the President as
outlined in the Cooperative Code and in its implementing rules not having been resorted to
by the complainants, the rule on primary jurisdiction was violated and this Court acquired no
jurisdiction to hear and determine the present case.8cralawlawlibrary
Dissatisfied, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed the order of dismissal to the CA.
On August 31, 2011, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the RTC Orders
dated October 14, 2008 and February 12, 2009 and remanded the case records to the RTC for
further proceedings. On January 31, 2012, the CA denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of its decision.9
Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER IN REVERSING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S DECISION OF DISMISSAL, HAS THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAN, UNAMBIGUOUS
AND CATEGORICAL PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF [SECTION] 124 OF RA-6938 IN
REFERENCE TO THE PENAL SANCTION FOR VIOLATION OF [SEC] 46 OF THE COOPERATIVE
42
[CODE], RA-6938 AND ADOPTING FOR ITS DECISION ONE DERIVED FROM ITS
INTERPRETATION OF A SUPPOSED STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION WHICH INTERPRETATION,
EVEN SUBJECT PETITIONER TO A HIGHER PENALTY OF 5 YEARS TO 10 YRS. WHICH WAS TO
JUSTIFY THAT TFIE RTC SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE CASE AND USED IT AS A GROUND
TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
2. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE OTHER GROUNDS ASSIGNED FOR
THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGE OTHER THAN THE VIOLATION OF [SECTION] 46 OF
RA-6938, (COOPERATIVE CODE). THAT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON PRIMARY
JURISDICTION - EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN THE COOPERATIVE LEVEL
BEFORE GOING TO COURT.
3. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS' ORDER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IGNORED THE RULE THAT DISMISSAL
OF THE CHARGE ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL, AND THE
DISMISSAL IS NOT APPEALABLE.
4. WHETHER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS SUBJECT THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND TO HIGHER
PENALTY HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED.
5. [WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT A NEW AND AMENDED COOPERATIVE
CODE RA-9520 COULD POSSIBLE APPLY TO THIS CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, VIOLATIVE
OF EXPOSE (SIC) FACTO LAW.]
The petition has no merit.
Prefatorily, the Court notes that petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, instead of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, which
the OSG points out as the proper remedy to assail the CA decision.
Petitioner asserts that she filed the petition pursuant to Rule 65, because the assailed CA
decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. She posits that the Court ordered the
exclusion of the CA as one of the party respondents, and considered the petition as one filed
under Rule 45, since the focal issue raised in the petition is a question of law calling for an
interpretation of Sections 46 and 124 of RA 6938, in relation to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg.
129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA 7691. She adds that had
she chosen to file an appeal by certiorari, the Court would be faced with the same question
of law.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.11 In Mercado v. Court of Appeals,12 the Court had
again stressed the distinction between the remedies provided for under Rule 45 and Rule 65,
to wit:

xxx [T]he proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a
petition for review under Rule 45, which is not identical to a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any
case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to
us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process
over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an
independent action based on the specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule,
cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that
to be taken under Rule 45. xxx.
In Artistica Ceramica, Inc., v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's Association, Inc.,14 the Court
explained that one of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper,
even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. It is also well settled that a party
cannot file a petition both under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court because said
procedural rules pertain to different remedies and have distinct applications. The remedy of
appeal under Rule 45 and the original action for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Thus, when petitioner adopts an improper
remedy, petition may be dismissed outright.
However, the Court may set aside technicality for justifiable reasons as when the petition
before it is clearly meritorious and filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65.15 In accordance
with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the
Court may treat the petition as having been filed under Rule 45. Here, no justifiable reasons
were proffered by petitioner for a more liberal interpretation of procedural rules. Although it
was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65, the petition at bench lacks substantive merit
and raises only questions of law which should have been duly made in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.16
On the substantive issue of which court has jurisdiction over petitioner's criminal case for
violation of Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members) of RA 6938,
the Court affirms the CA ruling that it is the RTC, not the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
which has jurisdiction over her case.
In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the
complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the
complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time
of its commission.17 Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the MeTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years,
irrespective of the amount of fine:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. - Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
43
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis added)
Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of
fine, fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, in accordance with Section 20 of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended:
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Petitioner insists that Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members) of
RA 6938 provides only for a civil liability but not a criminal sanction, hence, the MeTC has
jurisdiction over her criminal case which is punishable under paragraph 4 of Section 124:
Section 124. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting cooperatives are
hereby prohibited:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(4) Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no penalty is imposed shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a
fine of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court.
(Emphasis added)
Petitioner argues that the provisions of Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and
Committee Members), Section 47 (Compensation) and Section 124 (Penal Provisions) of RA
6938, are plain, unambiguous, and categorical. She submits that statutory construction of
such clear provisions, especially if prejudicial to her rights as an accused and would subject
her to higher penalty, should not be allowed.
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioner's case
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 124 of RA 6938:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(3) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions of Section 47
(liability of directors, officers and committee members), Section 50 (disloyalty of a director)
and Section 51 (illegal use of confidential information) shall upon conviction suffer a fine of
not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5)
years but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion; (Emphasis
supplied)
The OSG points out that Section "47" in the above-quoted provision is a clerical error
because the "liability of directors, officers and committee members" is undisputedly
governed by Section 46 of RA 6938, while Section 47 thereof deals with the compensation of
directors, officers and employees, to wit:
Section 46. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. - Directors, officers and
committee members, who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts
or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or
acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors,

officers or committee member shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages or profits
resulting therefrom to the cooperative, members and other persons.
When a director, officer or committee member attempts to acquire or acquires, in violation
of his duty, any interest or equity adverse to the cooperative in respect to any matter which
has been reposed in him in confidence, he shall, as a trustee for the cooperative, be liable for
damages and for double the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative.
Section 47. Compensation. - (1) In the absence of any provision in the by-laws fixing their
compensation, the directors shall not receive any compensation except for reasonable per
diem: Provided, That any compensation other than per diems may be granted to directors by
a majority vote of the members with voting rights at a regular or special general assembly
meeting specifically called for the purpose: Provided further, that no additional
compensation other than per diems shall be paid during the first year of existence of any
cooperative.
The Court sustains the OSG's contention. Petitioner failed to present any compelling reason
to warrant a departure from the exhaustive CA ruling on why the RTC, not the MeTC, has
jurisdiction over her criminal case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, thus:
The Court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, may correct clerical
errors, mistakes or misprints which, if uncorrected, would render the statute meaningless,
empty or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation, so long as the
meaning intended is apparent on the face of the whole enactment and no specific provision
is abrogated. To correct the error or mistake is to prevent the nullification of the statute and
give it a meaning and purpose. For it is the duty of the court to give a statute a sensible
construction, one that will effectuate legislative intent and avoid injustice or absurdity. It is
its duty to arrive at the legislative intent and in doing so, it should not adopt an arbitrary rule
under which it must be held without variance or shadow of turning the legislature intended
to make a typographical error, the result of which would be to make nonsense of the act, and
not to carry out the legislative scheme, but to destroy it.
Clearly, the accused-appellee cannot insist that reference to [Sec] 124, paragraph 4, as the
trial court did, is necessary and therefore, warranted the dismissal of the criminal case for
lack of jurisdiction. To reiterate, [Sec] 46 of the Code, entitled "Liability of Directors, Officers,
and Committee Members," provides for violations under which the said officers could be
held liable for, and the corresponding liability for damages and profits from the said
violations. Since the said [section] does not provide for penal sanction, an application of [Sec]
124, paragraph 3 should follow as the said provision evidently refers to the penal sanction on
erring directors, officers and committee members. It would make no sense if we were to
follow what clearly appears to be a clerical error, that is, applying [Sec] 124, paragraph 4
instead, just because paragraph 3 of the same [section] refers to [Sec] 47, which upon
examination of the Code provides for the "Compensation" of the directors, officers and other
employees of the cooperative.
44
We, thus, agree with the contention of the People that [Section] 124 (3) should refer to
"[Section] 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members, [Section] 49 (Disloyalty
of a Director) and [Section] 51 (Illegal use of confidential information)." Following this
interpretation, violation of [Sec] 46, therefore, is punishable by a fine of not less than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more
than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion, which under B.P. Blg. 129, shall be within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
It may not be amiss to point out that the clerical error noted by the OSG in Section 124 (3) of
RA 6938 on the liability of directors, officers and committee members, has been recognized
and duly corrected when the legislature enacted RA 9520, entitled "An Act Amending the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines to be known as the Philippine Cooperative Code of
2008." Pertinent portions of the corrected provision read:
ART. 45. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. - Directors, officers and
committee members, who are willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful
acts or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
cooperative or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such
directors, officers or committee members shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages
or profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative, members, and other persons.
ART. 140. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting cooperatives are
hereby prohibited:
(5) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions of Article 45 on the
Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members, Article 48 on the Disloyalty of a
Director, and Article 49 on the Illegal Use of Confidential Information shall upon conviction
suffer a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but
not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion; [Emphasis added]
On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated when the
Cooperative filed a criminal case against petitioner without undergoing
conciliation/mediation proceedings pursuant to the Cooperative Code and the By-laws of the
Cooperative, the Court rules in the negative. Conciliation or mediation is not a pre-requisite
to the filing of a criminal case for violation of RA 6938 against petitioner, because such case is
not an intra-cooperative dispute. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
Neither can the accused-appellee insist that this is an intra-cooperative dispute and should
have been resolved at the cooperative level. As aptly argued by the People, this is not an
intra-cooperative dispute. Intra-cooperative dispute is a dispute arising between or among
members of the same cooperative. The instant case is a dispute between the Cooperative
and its former chairperson, the accused-appellee. The Board Resolution authorizing the filing
of the criminal complaint by the Board of Directors, for and in behalf of the Cooperative, is
proof that this is not an intra-cooperative dispute, and within the jurisdiction of the regular
court.19cralawlawlibrary

Moreover, it is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil
liability, and her role in the prosecution of the offense is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution.20 In petitioner's criminal case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, the State is
the real offended party, while the Cooperative and its members are mere private
complainants and witnesses whose interests are limited to the civil aspect thereof. Clearly,
such criminal case can hardly be considered an intra-cooperative dispute, as it is not one
arising between or among members of the same cooperative.
On whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts
to an acquittal, hence, final and unappealable, the Court rules in the negative.
In Gutib v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court stressed that demurrer to the evidence is an
objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to
sustain a verdict. The Court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a
demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence
to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
In People v. Sandiganbayan,22 the Court explained the general rule that the grant of a
demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the
prosecution had rested its case" and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of
the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double
jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there. 23cralawlawlibrary
In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not
for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably,
the RTC did not decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt
or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case, the
October 14, 2008 RTC Order of dismissal does not operate as an acquittal, hence, may still be
subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.24 As aptly noted by the CA:
The accused-appellee is also of a mistaken view that the dismissal of the case against her is
an acquittal. It should be emphasized' that "acquittal is always based on the merits, that is,
the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that the defendant's guilt is
beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the
defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not
a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is
not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc."
45
On whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated her right against double
jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Court rules in
the negative and upholds the CA in ruling that the dismissal having been granted upon
petitioner's instance, double jeopardy did not attach, thus:
The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon
this appeal. It must be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon
her filing of a demurrer to evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court that
it is bereft of jurisdiction.
The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint
or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the
charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the accused-
appellee's consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to
evidence. As correctly argued by the People, where the dismissal was ordered upon or with
express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived his protection against doubly
jeopardy. In this case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners. Double
jeopardy, thus, did not attach.
The Court also finds no merit in petitioner's new argument that the prosecution of her case
before the RTC for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 07-197750 is
barred by res judicatabecause the MeTC of Manila, Branch 22, in a Resolution27 dated August
13, 2012, granted her demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for
falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR.28 In support of her
flawed argument, petitioner points out that the private complainants [officers and directors
of the Cooperative] and the subject matter [unreported sales profits of Coca-Cola products]
of both cases are the same, and that the case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 is actually
and necessarily included in the case for falsification of private documents.
At the outset, res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal
proceedings.29 At any rate, petitioner's argument is incidentally related to double jeopardy
which embrace's a prohibition against being tried for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Section 730 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy
may prosper. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first
jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.31 As to the first requisite, the first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was
acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.32

In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites of double jeopardy are
present in view of the MeTC Resolution33 dated August 13, 2012 which granted petitioner's
demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of private
document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR. Petitioner's argument dwells on whether the
third requisite of double jeopardy — a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first
— is present. Such question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by
examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are
set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offense involved.34
Thus, the remaining question to be resolved is whether the offense charged in the
information for Section 46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is necessarily included in a
crime for falsification of private document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended (RPC). The test to determine whether an offense necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other is provided under Section 5, Rule .120 of the Rules of Court:
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute
the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
After a careful examination of the Informations filed against petitioner for falsification of
private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR and for violation of Section 46, RA 6938
in Criminal Case No. 01-197750, the Court holds that the first offense for which petitioner
was acquitted does not necessarily include and is not necessarily included in the second
offense.
The Information for falsification of private document, on the one hand, alleged that
petitioner, being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary
School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, as part of her duty to prepare financial reports,
falsified such report for the School Year 1999-2000, in relation to the sales profits of Coca-
Cola products in violation of Article 172 (2)35 of the RPC. The elements of falsification of
private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171;36(2) that
the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused
damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such
damage.
The Information for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 alleged, on the other hand, that being
then such officer and director of the Cooperative, petitioner willfully acquired personal
interest or equity adverse to it, in violation of her duty and of the confidence reposed upon
her, by entering into a contract with Coca-Cola in her own personal capacity, knowing fully
well that the sales profits of such products should have accrued to the Cooperative. The
essential elements of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 are (1) that the offender is a director,
officer or committee member; and (2) that the offender willfully and lcnowingly (a) votes for
or assents to patently unlawful acts; (b) is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing
the affairs of the cooperative; or (c) acquires any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict
with their duty as such directors, officers or committee member.
46
Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes of
falsification of private document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of
Section 46 of RA 6938, as alleged in the Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of
the said crimes can be said to necessarily include or is necessarily included in the other, the
third requisite for double jeopardy to attach—a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in
the first—is, therefore, absent. Not only are their elements different, they also have a
distinct nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as what makes it a felony is criminal intent on
the part of the offender, while the latter is malum prohibitum, as what makes it a crime is the
special, law enacting it.
Moreover, in People v. Doriguez,37 the Court held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the
same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional
fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where
two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one
of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the
same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.
Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate, and distinct offenses as
discussed above—the first against' Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second
against Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA 6938)—one cannot be pleaded as a bar to
the other under the rule on double jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an
accused may be charged with as many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these arose
from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but said act
constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by
a special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the prosecution against one is not
an obstacle to the prosecution of the other.39
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals Decision
dated August 31, 2011 and its Resolution dated Jan. 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of
the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938).
 47

The prosecution sought to prove that the accused had entered into an exclusive dealership
agreement with Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., (Coca Cola) for the sale of softdrink
products at the same school. The school principal then created an audit committee to look
into the financial reports of the Cooperative. Based on the documents obtained from Coca-
Cola, including the records of actual deliveries and sales, and the financial statements
prepared by Asistio, the audit committee found that Asistio defrauded the Cooperative and
its members for three (3) years. Despite requests for her to return to the Cooperative the
amounts she had allegedly misappropriated, Asistio failed and refused to do so. Thus, the
Cooperative issued a Board Resolution authorizing the filing of criminal charges against her.
Trial ensued and after the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, Asistio
moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She
argued, among other matters, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, does not have
jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not
carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the charge against the accused on demurrer to
evidence amounts to an acquittal, hence, final and unappealable.
Held:
No. The dismissal of the charge by RTC does not amount to an acquittal.
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is “filed after the
prosecution had rested its case,” and when the same is granted, it calls “for an appreciation
of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused.” Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double
jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to
the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty
provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. Section 32 of B.P. Blg.
129, as amended, provides that the MeTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of fine: Sec. 32.
Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (2)Exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; Offenses punishable with imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, irrespective of the amount of fine, fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), in accordance with Section 20 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, as amended. Offenses punishable with imprisonment
exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of fine, fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC, in accordance with Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended: Section
20.Jurisdiction in criminal cases. RegionalTrial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or
body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.

In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not
for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably,
the RTC did not decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of Asistio’s guilt or
innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case, the RTC
Order of dismissal does not operate as an acquittal, hence, may still be subject to ordinary
appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law
prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided
by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. In criminal cases, the jurisdiction

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182926 June 22, 2015
ANA LOU B. NAVAJA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, or the Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC Jagna-Garcia-
Hernandez, DKT PHILS., INC., represented by ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated August 28, 2007 and the Resolution2 dated May 7, 2008 rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 02353, which affirmed the Order dated September 21,
2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, in SP Civil Action No.
0356.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit3 filed by private respondent DKT
Philippines, Inc., represented by Atty. Edgar Borje, against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja,
alleging that while she was still its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it
appear that she incurred meal expenses in the amount of ₱1,810.00, instead of the actual
amount of ₱810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for it.
Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No.
2904. The accusatory portion of the Information filed against her reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of
Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to prejudice a juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by
making an alteration or intercalation in the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN
PESOS (₱810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (₱1,810.00) and thereafter
accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc. represented
by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the amount of 1,810.00 to her
own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved
during trial. Acts committed contrary to the provision of Article 172, No. 2, in relation to
Article 171, No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
48
Tagbilaran City, (for Jagna, Bohol) February 10, 2005.4
On August 1, 2005, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment5 on the ground
that none of the essential elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred
in Jagna, Bohol, hence, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to
improper venue.
In the Order dated November 2,2005, the MCTC denied the motion to quash and set the case
for arraignment, the decretal portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED, but considering however that accused has already
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court by filing cash bond for their respective
temporary liberty, set this case for ARRAIGNMENT on November 22, 2005, at 10:00 o'clock in
the morning at the Session Hall, 10th MCTC, Jagna, Bohol.
The previous Court Order setting these cases for arraignment on November 09, 2005, is
hereby set aside.
SO ORDERED.6
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 2005 Order, but the MCTC
denied it in a Resolution7dated January 24, 2006.
Navaja filed a petition for certiorari8 before the RTC, assailing the November 2, 2005 Order
and January 24, 2006 Resolution of the MCTC for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
On September 21, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for certiorari for lack
of legal basis or merit.9On Navaja's contention that the case for falsification of private
document against her was filed with the MCTC which has no jurisdiction due to wrong venue,
hence, the RTC ruled:
The contention of the petitioner is untenable. As correctly pointed out by the MCTC, the
improper venue was already resolved squarely by the Regional State Prosecutor when he
held that "there are sufficient evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification took place in
Jagna".
This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn
statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who narrated that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja,
the latter borrowed her pen and in her presence wrote something on the said receipt. The
Regional State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement "describes an
apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after issuance. The borrowing of the

cashier's pen and the use thereof must have been intended to create an impression that the
receipt was prepared by the cashier herself."
In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which
categorically states that Ms. Navaja was in Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.
If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for
reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or
indication that the falsification was done in Cebu City. In other words, the said contention
would necessarily result in a "neither here no there" situation.10
Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA.
In the Decision dated August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed Navaja's appeal and affirmed in toto
the September 21, 2006 RTC Order.
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it in the Resolution dated May 7,
2008. Aggrieved, she filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following
issues: I. THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA, BOHOL[,] DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
OVER THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.
i. Not one of the essential elements of the alleged crime of falsification of a private
document was committed in Jagna, Bohol.
ii. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and cannot be presumed or established
from the alleged acts of the petitioner on a totally different and unrelated time and
occasion.
iii. The strict rules on venue in criminal cases were established for the protection of
the rights of the accused and to prevent undue harassment and oppression.
II. HEREIN PETITIONER PROPERLY AVAILED OF THE REMEDY OF FILING A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN QUESTIONING IMPROPER VENUE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
III. SETTLED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE CLEARLY PERMITS THE FILING OF
A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO
QUASH.11
The petition lacks merit.
On the substantive issue of whether the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has jurisdiction over her case
for falsification of a private document, Navaja argues that not one of the three (3) essential
49
elements12 of such crime was shown to have been committed in Jagna, Bohol. She insists that
there is no showing in the Information, or even in the complaint-affidavit and the annexes
thereto that the crime of falsification of a private document was committed or consummated
in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the allegation in the complaint-affidavit that the subject receipt
was issued by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol, cannot determine the venue because the place of
issuance of the receipt is not an element of the said crime. It was also impossible for her to
have committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol, because the alleged request for reimbursement
under the Weekly Travel Expense Report for September 29 to October 4, 2003, was prepared
and submitted on October 6, 2003 in Cebu City, while the subject receipt was issued on
October 2, 2003 by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol. She further insists that at the time of the
issuance of the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent,
hence, there is no crime of falsification of private document to speak of. She explains that
any damage that private respondent could have suffered would only occur when it pays the
request for reimbursement in the Travel Expense Report submitted on October 6, 2003, but
not before that date, much less at time of the issuance of the said receipt.
Navaja's arguments are misplaced.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.13 This principle was explained
by the Court in Foz, Jr. v. People,14 thus:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of
a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.15
In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which
has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred.
Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:
Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be
understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential

ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular
place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is
necessary for its identification.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. People,16 the Court said that both provisions categorically
place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense
was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words,
the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information
states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is
actually falsified, to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless
whether or not the falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for which it was
intended.17
Contrary to Navaja's argument that the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has no jurisdiction over the
case because not one of the essential elements of falsification of private document was
committed within its jurisdiction, the allegations in the Information and the complaint-
affidavit make out a prima faciecase that such crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol. In
particular, the Information clearly alleged that she committed such crime thereat, to wit:
That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of
Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to prejudice a juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by
making an alteration or intercalation in the said receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN
PESOS (₱810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (₱1,810.00) and thereafter
accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc. represented
by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the amount of 1,810.00 to her
own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved
during trial. xxx18 Likewise, the Complaint-Affidavit dated February 18, 2004 alleged that the
she committed the said crime in Jagna, Bohol, viz:
"4. Among the expenses she reimbursed from DKT is the amount of Php1,810.00 she
supposedly incurred at Garden's Cafe, Jagna branch. Photocopy of the receipt dated 02
October 2003 she sent to the DKT office in Metro Manila is hereto attached as Annex "C".
5. However, upon recent field investigation of Navaja's expenses in Bohol, it was found that
the actual amount she incurred at Garden's (sic) Cafe is only Php810.00 Photocopy of the
duplicate original official receipt (pink copy) certified true and correct by the cashier of
Garden's Cafe, Jagna is hereto attached as Annex "D".
50
6. Evidently, Navaja falsified the receipt in Bohol upon receiving it with the intent of causing
damage to DKT."19
Guided by the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations
of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof20, the Court holds that
Navaja's case for falsification of private document falls within the territorial jurisdiction of
the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol.
Meanwhile, Navaja's defense that it was impossible for her to have committed the crime in
Jagna, Bohol, cannot be sustained at this point where the prosecution has yet to present
evidence to prove the material allegations of the charge against her, which include the place
where the subject receipt was falsified. However, given that the defense of lack of
jurisdiction due to improper venue may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, the Court
stresses that if the evidence adduced during the trial would show that the crime was indeed
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction, the MCTC should dismiss the case based on
such ground.
On Navaja's claim that there is no crime of falsification of private document to speak of
because at the time of the issuance of the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of
damage was absent, the Court sustains the RTC ruling that such damage need not be present,
as Article 172 (2)21 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that mere intent to cause
such damage is sufficient.22
Navaja further contends that the CA's reliance on the findings of the Regional State
Prosecutor as to the sworn statement of a certain Cheryl Labarro23 for purposes of
determining venue was misplaced, as her sworn statement pertains to an incident in
Miravilla Resort in Tagbilaran City, which was entirely separate and distinct from the facts
material to the case. She adds that the CA's reliance on the said statement in upholding the
venue of the case clearly runs afoul with the provisions of Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.24 She submits that nowhere in the Rules of Court is it allowed that the actions of the
accused on a different occasion maybe used to confer venue in another case, since venue
must be determined solely and exclusively on the facts obtaining in the instant case and
cannot be inferred or presumed from other collateral allegations.
The Court finds no merit in Navaja's foregoing contentions which boil down to the factual
issue of whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna,
Bohol or in Cebu City.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari "shall
raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People, et
al.,25 the Court held:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law.
Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on

what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to
determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the
evidence, the question posed is one of fact.
Whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in
Cebu City, is a question of fact. Indeed, in the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not
a trier of facts and, subject to certain exceptions, it does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the parties during trial.26In certain exceptional
cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues, viz:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 27
51
Navaja failed to show that any of these circumstances is present.
It also bears emphasis that the factual findings of the appellate court generally are
conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial
court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. 28 In this case,
the CA, the RTC and the MCTC all agree that the issue of improper venue was already
resolved by the Regional State Prosecutor when he held that "there are sufficient evidences
(sic) indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna."29 The Court perceives no compelling
reason to disturb such factual finding.
Anent Navaja's claim that the MCTC simply made reference to the findings of the Regional
State Prosecutor without specifying the factual and legal bases of its resolution, the Court
finds that the RTC had squarely addressed such issue as follows:
This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn
statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who narrated that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja,
the latter borrowed her pen and in her presence wrote something on the said receipt. The
Regional State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement "describes an
apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after issuance. The borrowing of the
cashier's pen and the use thereof must have been intended to create an impression that the
receipt was prepared by the cashier herself."
In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which
categorically states that Ms. Navaja was in Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.
If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for
reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol, would likewise give no showing or
indication that the falsification was done in Cebu City. In other words, the said contention
would necessarily result in a "neither here no there" situation.30
On Navaja's argument that the CA's reliance on Labarro's31 aforesaid statement in upholding
the venue of the case violates Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,32 the Court holds
that such evidentiary rule has no bearing in determining the place where the crime was
committed for purposes of filing a criminal information which merely requires the existence
of probable cause. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr.,33 the Court expounded on the concept of
probable cause in this wise:
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual and positive
cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to

procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed by the suspects.1âwphi1 It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.34
Also, Navaja insists that the rule on venue should have been construed liberally in favor her
favor as the accused, and strictly against private respondent, given its purpose of preventing
harassment and inconvenience by compelling the accused to appear in a different court from
that of the province where the crime was committed. Yet, private respondent willfully chose
to prosecute separately the other cases for falsification of private document against her in
different jurisdictions, namely, Cebu City, Bacolod City, Iloilo City and Tagbilaran, Bohol, to
harass and drain her financial resources, when all these criminal cases, involving minimal
amounts of actual damages,35 should have been filed in one(1) criminal jurisdiction to avoid
multiplicity of actions.
The Court overrules Navaja's assertions, and upholds the RTC's sound ruling thereon:
The petitioner's insistence that all the criminal complaints filed against her should be filed in
one jurisdiction would be a blatant violation of the law on jurisdiction as one cannot file a
criminal case other than where the offense was allegedly committed.
In short, if it so happens that several offenses are alleged to have been committed in
different venues, then it is just unfortunate that whatever complaints have to be filed, will
have to filed in those different venues. To do otherwise would be procedurally fatal. 36
To stress, in criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in
criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.37 Unlike in a civil case where venue may
be waived, this could not be done in a criminal case because it is an element of jurisdiction.
Thus, one cannot be held to answer for any crime committed by him except in the
jurisdiction where it was committed. Be that as it may, Section 5 (4), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides that the Court has the power to order a change of venue or place of
trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, where there are serious and weighty
reasons present, which would prevent the court of original jurisdiction from conducting a fair
and impartial trial, the Court has been mandated to order a change of venue so as to prevent
a miscarriage of justice.38 That private respondent filed several criminal cases for falsification
in different jurisdictions, which unduly forced Navaja to spend scarce resources to defend
52
herself in faraway places can hardly be considered as compelling reason which would
prevent the MCTC from conducting a fair and impartial trial.
Besides, it is erroneous for Navaja to argue that the separate filing of the falsification cases
she allegedly committed in different jurisdictions would result in multiplicity of actions. Such
separate filing of cases is only consistent with the principles that there are as many acts of
falsification as there are documents falsified39 and that the venue of such cases is where the
document was actually falsified40.
The Court now resolves the second and third procedural issues.
On the second issue, Navaja states that she did not commit a grave procedural error in filing
a petition for certiorari from the denial of her motion to quash. She posits that venue is an
element of the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of a criminal proceeding, and
that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be interposed at any stage of the
proceeding. Thus, even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, the accused may still
question the jurisdiction of the court later on, and such objection may be raised or
considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceeding or on appeal.
On the third issue, Navaja asserts that the Supreme Court has allowed the filing of a petition
for certiorari to question the denial of a motion to quash in cases where grave abuse of
discretion was patently committed, or when the lower court acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. She claims that not only did the lower court commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to quash, but there is likewise the issue of improper venue that need to
be settled with finality and dispatch. In support of her assertion, she cites a ruling41 that
when the court has no jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court should
dismiss the case, instead of ordering its transfer.
Apropos to the second and third procedural issues is Querijero v. Palmes-Limitar42 where the
Court reiterated the fundamental principle that an order denying a motion to quash is
interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for
certiorari, thus:
In Zamoranos v. People, this Court emphasized that "a special civil action for certiorari is not
the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established
rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to
resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an
unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law."
On a number of occasions, however, Court had sanctioned a writ of certiorari as an
appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order in the following circumstances:
(1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion;

(2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief;
(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;
(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and
(5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to
proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof.43
As can be gleaned from the Court's discussion on the substantive issue of the case, Navaja
failed to prove that any of the said special circumstances obtains in this case, let alone the
grave abuse of discretion she imputed against the MCTC. Hence, the CA did not err in
affirming the RTC ruling that the MCTC correctly denied her motion to quash.
Finally, the remaining factual issues raised by the parties need not be discussed further, as
they are properly resolved in due course of the proceedings in the instant case before the
MCTC and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner
authorized by law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 28,
2007 and the Resolution dated May 7, 2008 in CA G.R. SP No. 02353 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Criminal Procedure; Venue; Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. This principle was explained by
the Court in Foz, Jr. v. People,603 SCRA 124 (2009), thus: It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is
so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
53
Same; Same; In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the
court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides: (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. In determining the venue
where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it,
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: (a) Subject
to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality
or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred. Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently
states: Place of commission of the offense.· The complaint or information is sufficient if it can
be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular
place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is
necessary for its identification.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Venue; In criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of
jurisdiction because venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. To stress,
in criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in criminal
cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Unlike in a civil case where venue may be
waived, this could not be done in a criminal case because it is an element of jurisdiction.
Thus, one cannot be held to answer for any crime committed by him except in the
jurisdiction where it was committed. Be that as it may, Section5(4), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides that the Court has the power to order a change of venue or place of
trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, where there are serious and weighty
reasons present, which would prevent the court of original jurisdiction from conducting a fair
and impartial trial, the Court has been mandated to order a change of venue so as to prevent
a miscarriage of justice. That private respondent filed several criminal cases for falsification in
different jurisdictions, which unduly forced Navaja to spend scarce resources to defend
herself in faraway places can hardly be considered as compelling reason which would
prevent the MCTC from conducting a fair and impartial trial. Besides, it is erroneous for
Navaja to argue that the separate filing of the falsification cases she allegedly committed
indifferent jurisdictions would result in multiplicity of actions. Such separate filing of cases is
only consistent with the principles that there are as many acts of falsification as there are
documents falsified and that the venue of such cases is where the document was actually
falsified.
 54

THIRD DIVISION Criminal Case No. 337902

G.R. No. 198270, December 09, 2015 That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto, in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw and issue to
ARMILYN MORILLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RICHARD
AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by
NATIVIDAD, Respondent.
ARMILYN MORILLO to apply on account or for value the check described below:

DECISION Check No. : 2960203217

PERALTA, J.: Drawn

: Metrobank
Against
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution2 dated In the :
August 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 which reversed and set amount Php434,430.00
aside the Decision3 dated February 23, 2009 and Order4 dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which, in turn, affirmed the Joint Postdated : October 20,
Decision5 dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Criminal Case / Dated 2003
Nos. 337902-03.
Payable
: AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
The antecedent facts are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary to

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said accused did not have
Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil,
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount
introducing themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name and
of such check upon its presentment which check when presented for payment within ninety
style of RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction materials for their project inside
(90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the
the Subic Freeport Zone from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General
reason "Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the said accused
Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the
failed lo pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full
purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first delivery and the remaining eighty
payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of which shall
be via postdated checks.6
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting to a total
Criminal Case No. 337903
of P500,054.00 at the construction site where respondent and his partners were undertaking
their project. After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2)
That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto, in the City of Makati, Metro
post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner attempted to deposit the checks in
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw and issue to
her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City. They were, however,
AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by
dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the
ARMILYN MORILLO to apply on account or for value the check described below:
dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for payment. Again, respondent
issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured petitioner that they will be
honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Check No. : 2960203218
Branch, the checks were once again dishonored for the reason that the account from which
they were drawn was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several Drawn
: Metrobank
demands from respondent and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a complaint Against
with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City.7 Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2) Informations
were filed against respondent and Milo Malong, the accusatory portions of which read: In the :

amount Php13,032.00
Postdated : October 20,
/ Dated 2003
Payable
: AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
to
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said accused did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount
of such check upon its presentment which check when presented for payment within ninety
(90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason "Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the said accused
failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full
payment thereof within five (5) banking days alter receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On September 15, 2004, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending
that respondent and his partners be charged in court with the crime of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code as well as for Violation of Batas Pambansa No.
22 (BP 22), which was later docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.
On September 3, 2008, the MeTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that the prosecution
had proven all the elements of violation of BP 22 as against respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 337902-03 finding the accused,
RICHARD NATIVIDAD, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and is sentenced to pay a fine equivalent to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php200,000.00), for Check No. 2960203217 and Thirteen Thousand Thirty-Two Pesos for
Check No. 2960203218 or a total penalty of Two Hundred Thousand Thirteen Thousand
Thirty Two Pesos (Php213,032.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
However, accused MILO MALONG, is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Both
accused Malong and Natividad are ordered to jointly pay the private complainant the total
sum of Four Hundred Forty-Seven Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Two Pesos (Php447,462.00)
which are the face value of the two (2) checks issued, subject of these cases, with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum and three percent (3%) penalty per month as stipulated in
the invoices, reckoned from the date of receipt of the demand on February 28, 2004, until
the amount is fully paid, plus the costs of suit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondent appealed the decision of the MeTC to the RTC arguing that the MeTC of Makati
City had no jurisdiction over the case. He asserted that since the subject checks were issued,
drawn, and delivered to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was improperly laid for
none of the elements of the offense actually transpired in Makati City. Respondent also
55
pointed out that during the retaking of petitioner's testimony on March 14, 2008, the records
of the case did not show that the public prosecutor manifested his presence in court and that
he delegated the prosecution of the case to the private prosecutor. Thus, since there was no
appearance for the public prosecutor, nor was there a proper delegation of authority, the
proceedings should be declared null and void.10
On February 23, 2009, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in the following wise:
Since accused Natividad failed to raise before the court [a quo] the issue of authority of the
private prosecutor to present witness Morillo in the absence of the public prosecutor during
the March 14, 2008 proceeding, and only did so after obtaining an adverse judgment, it
would be an injustice if all the proceedings had in the case would be set aside.
The second issue raised on appeal also holds no ground. A violation of BP 22 is a continuing
or transitory offense, which is oft-repeated in our jurisprudence. Under this doctrine,
jurisdiction may be had in several places where one of the acts material to the crime
occurred.
Accused Natividnd postulates that since the checks were presented suid dishonored in
Makati City, which is not the place where it was issued and delivered, the court [a quo]
lacks jurisdiction. This argument is, at best, specious. The fact remains that the bank where
it was presented lor payment is in Makati City. These checks passed through this bank for
clearance, confirmation, and or validation processes. Moreover, the eventual dishonour
indeed took place or was completed at the end of the collecting bank in Makati City, where
the private complainant maintains her account over which the court [a quo] has
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, finding no merit on accused-appellant Natividad's appeal, the same is hereby
dismissed. Accordingly, the appealed decision of the court [a quo] is hereby AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, in its January 18, 2011 Decision, reversed the
lower courts' rulings and dismissed the case without prejudice to its refiling in the proper
venue, the pertinent portions of said Decision state:
In this case, records will reveal that the first element of the offense happened in Pampanga.
It was indisputably established that the subject checks were issued to private complainant at
petitioner's office in Pampanga. Said checks were drawn from petitioner's account in
Metrobank, Pampanga branch.
The second element of the offense or the knowledge of dishonor of the checks by the maker
also transpired in Pampanga. After private complainant was informed of the dishonor of the
checks, she immediately proceeded to petitioner's office in Pampanga, personally informed
him and his companions of the dishonor of the checks and tendered a demand letter for the
payment of the construction materials.
Finally, the third element or dishonor of the checks by the drawee bank also happened in
Pampanga. Upon maturity of the subject checks, private complainant deposited the same

in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch. Subsequently, she was
informed by the latter bank that the subject checks were dishonored by the drawee bank,
Metrobank, Pampanga branch.
Clearly, all the essential elements of the offense happened in Pampanga. Consequently,
the case can only be filed in said place. Unfortunately, private complainant filed the case in
Makati City, under the erroneous assumption that since she deposited the subject checks
in Equitable PCI Bank, Makati City, and was informed of lite dishonor of the checks by the
same bank, the case may be filed in Makati City. However, as correctly argued by the OSG,
the act of depositing the check is not an essential clement of BP 22. Likewise, the fact that
private complainant was informed of the dishonor of the checks at her bank in Makuti City
did not vest the MeTC, Makati City with jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. To
reiterate, a transitory crime can only be tiled in any of the places where its constitutive
elements actually transpired. And, knowledge of the payee of the dishonor of the checks is
not an element of BP 22. The law speaks only of the subsequent dishonor of the checks by
the drawee bank and the knowledge of the fact of dishonor by the maker. Consequently,
none of the elements of the offense can be considered to have transpired in Makati City.
Thus, the venue of the instant case was improperly laid.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant action invoking the following argument:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT OF MAKATI CITY DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE DESPITE A CLEAR
SHOWING THAT THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF SAID
COURT.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner maintains that the MeTC of Makati City, the place where the dishonored checks
were deposited, had jurisdiction over the instant case. In support of her contention,
petitioner cites the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,14 wherein it was held that since the
check drawn in violation of BP 22 was deposited and presented for encashment with the
Angeles City Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the RTC of Pam.pa.nga clearly had
jurisdiction over the crime of which accused therein was charged.15 Thus, petitioner asserts
that the appellate court erred in ruling that the Makati MeTC did not have jurisdiction to try
the instant case. That none of the essential elements of the crime of violation of BP 22
occurred in the City of Makati is belied by the Nieva doctrine recognizing the jurisdiction of
the court of the place where the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment.
Petitioner went on lo state that all the elements of violation of BP 22 were duly proven
beyond reasonable doubt. First, the prosecution sufficiently established that the respondent
issued the subject checks as shown by the documentary evidence submitted. They were
issued for value, as payment for the construction supplies and materials which petitioner
delivered to the accused.
As to the second and third elements, petitioner posits that it was clearly shown that
respondent had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank,
which subsequently dishonored the subject checks. Section 2 of BP 22 provides that "the
dishonor of a check when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check shall
56
be prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee." In this case, petitioner states that
the prosecution was able to sufficiently show that the subject checks were presented within
the time period required by law. In fact, written demand relaying the fact that the drawee
bank dishonored the subject checks was even personally delivered by petitioner to
respondent as evidenced by the demand letter signed by respondent. Thus, respondent
cannot deny that he had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in his account with the
drawee bank and that the subject checks were subsequently dishonored for the reason that
the account from which they were drawn was already a closed account.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the State, is in line with
the appellate court's and respondent's stance that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the
instant case. According to the OSG, the act of depositing the check is not an essential
element of the offense under the Bouncing Checks Law. Citing the ruling in Rigor v.
People,16 the OSG posited that the place of deposit and the place of dishonor are distinct
from each other and that the place where the check was issued, delivered, and dishonored is
the proper venue, not the place where the check was deposited, viz.:
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural
Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila. x x x The check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan
Branch, Metro Manila. x x x The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place
of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information. Although the check was dishonored by the
drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at
RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential
part of the offense, was also overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes
committed in San Juan are triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the basis of the pronouncement in Rigor, the OSG thus claimed that the MeTC of Makati
City did not have jurisdiction over the instant case for none of the essential elements of
violation of BP 22 occurred therein.
The contention is untenable.
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing
crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such
cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in
part committed.18
The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that "the Supreme Court
regarded the place of deposit and the place of dishonor as distinct from one another and
considered the place where the check was issued, delivered and dishonored, and not where

the check was deposited, as the proper venue for the filing of a B.P. Blg. 22 case." The Court,
however, cannot sustain such conclusion.
In said case, She accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro
Manila, and in payment thereof, he issued a check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac.
Thereafter, Rural Bank deposited the check at PS Bank, San Juan, but the same was returned
for the reason that it had been dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac. When all other
efforts to demand the repayment of the loan proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against
the accused for violation of BP 22 at the RTC of Pasig City, wherein crimes committed in. San
Juan are triable. The accused, however, contends that the RTC of Pasig had no jurisdiction
thereon since no proof had been offered to show that his check was issued, delivered,
dishonored or that knowledge of hmrfficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San
Juan. The Court, however, disagreed and held that while the check was dishonored by the
drawee. Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, evidence clearly showed that the accused had
drawn, issued and delivered it at Rural Bank, San Juan, viz.:
Lastly, positioner contends thai the Regional Trial Court of Pasig h;ui no jurisdiction over this
case since no proofhas been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that
knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The contention is untenable.
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural
Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila on November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was
dated February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was deposited with PS Bank,
San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check
can be filed in any of the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is,
where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored. x x x
The information at bar effectively charges San Jisars as the place of drawing and issuing.
The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information. Although, the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated
Baisk, sit its Tariac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan.
The place of issue airul delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of she
offense, was also overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes
committed in November, 1989 in San Juan arc triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short
both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon the RTC in Pasig
City.
The bone of contention in Rigor, therefore, was whether the prosecution had offered
sufficient proof that the check drawn in violation of BP 22 was issued, delivered, dishonored
or that lcnowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, thereby
vesting jurisdiction upon the RTC of Pasig City. Nowhere in the cited case, however, was it
held, cither expressly or impliedly, that the place where the check was deposited is not the
proper venue for actions involving violations of BP 22, it is true thai the Court, in Rigor,
acknowledged the feet that the check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San
57
Juan, while the same was deposited wilts the PS Bank of San Juan. But such differentiation
cannot be taken as basis sufficient enough to conclude that the court of the place of deposit
cannot exercise jurisdiction over violations of BP 22. In the absence, thereiore, of any ground,
jurisprudential or otherwise, to sustain the OSG's arguments, the Court cannot take
cognizance of a doctrine that is simply inapplicable to the issue at hand.
In contrast, the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals20 cited by petitioner is more squarely
on point with the instant case. In Nieva, the accused delivered to Ramon Joven a post-dated
check drawn against the Commercial Bank of Manila as payment for Joven's dump truck. Said
check was deposited in the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of Philippine Islands, joven was
advised, however, that the Commercial Bank of Manila returned the check for the reason
that the account against which the check was drawn is a "closed account." Consequently, the
accused was charged with violation of BP 22 before the RTC of Pampanga. On the contention
of the accused that said court had no jurisdiction to try the case, the Court categorically
ruled:
As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga has no jurisdiction
to try the cases charged herein as none of the essential elements thereof took place in
Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has no basis. The evidence discloses that
the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of
the Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional
Trial Court of Pampanga over the crimes of which petitioner is charged. It must be noted
that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes and so is the
crime of estafa. The rule is that a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried
in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
In fact, in the more recent Yalong v. People,22 wherein the modes of appeal and rules of
procedure were the issues at hand, the Court similarly inferred:
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong's appeal still remains
dismissible on the ground that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 45414. It is welksedled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as
transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto
occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court
wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the
same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory
crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be tiled in
any of the places where any of its elements occurred - in particular, the place where the
check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.
In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued, and delivered
in Manila, records reveal that Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment at
the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its dishonor. As such, the MTCC [of
Batangas City] correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as It had the territorial

jurisdiction to try and resolve the same. In this light, the denial of the present petition
remains warranted.
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of
the place where the check was deposited or presented for encashment; can be vested with
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of
the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati
MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject check was
deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PC IBank. The
MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its
decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be dismissed outright due to
certain procedural infirmities. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. Specifically, it shall
represent the Government in all criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals.24 Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or
if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the
Solicitor General on behalf of the State.
There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended party to file an
appeal without the intervention of the OSG, such as when the offended party questions the
civil aspect of a decision of a lower court,26 when there is denial of due process of law to the
prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State
and the private offended party,27 when there is grave error committed by the judge, or when
the interest of substantial justice so requires.28
Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed
not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the
assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting the aggrieved
party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused in double jeopardy,29 in violation of
the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. This is because a judgment of
acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing
lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.30
Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is one for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not under Rule 65, and was not filed by the OSG representing
the interest of the Republic, the same should be summarily dismissed. The unique and
special circumstances attendant in the instant petition, however, justify an adjudication by
the Court on the merits and not solely on technical grounds.
58
First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court's dismissal of the case is not an
acquittal of respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an
acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed
by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a
criminal case against the accused will not result in his acquittal.31 In the oft-cited People v.
Salico,32 the Court explained:
This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal
and acquittal. Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt;
but dismissal does tint decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not gniity.
Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does noi show that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient
in form and substance, etc.The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not
correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has
presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves for me dismissal and the court dismisses the
ease on the ground that the evidence tails to show beyond a reasonable doubt thai the
defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is
decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not
an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before
the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant
may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the
MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits,
let alone resolve the issue of respondent's guilt or innocence based on the evidence
proffered by the prosecution.34 The appellate court merely dismissed the case on the
erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed within the lower
court's jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to show
respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not
operate as an acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be repudiated only by a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, showing a grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, petitioner's resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as improper.
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law
because the Court, in its exercise of its power of review, is not a trier of facts. There is a
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of
facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties-litigants.35 In De Vera v. Spouses Santiago,36 the Court categorically
ruled that the issue of whether the appellate court erred in annulling the RTC Decision for
lack of jurisdiction is a question of law, to wit:
Undeniably, the issue whether the CA erred in annulling the RTC Decision for lack of
jurisdiction is a question of law. The resolution of such issue rests solely on what the law

[B.P. Blg. 129, as amended] provides on the given set of circumstances as alleged in
petitioners' complaint for reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages.
In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely "whether the Court of
Appeals erred when it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have
jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing that the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of said court." Evidently, therefore, the instant petition was filed within the
bounds of our procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances insofar as the commission of the crime of BP 22 is concerned.
In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the
complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the
complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time
of its commission.38 Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and
jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed
therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under
Rule 45.39
More importantly, moreover, since the dismissal of the instant case cannot be considered as
an acquittal of respondent herein, he cannot likewise claim that his constitutional right to
protection against double jeopardy will be violated. In Paulin v. Hon. Gimenez,40 the Court
held:
Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions thereto which finds application
to the case at bar has been laid down by this Court as follows:
. . . However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal
case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made
upon motion, or with the express consent of the defendant; (2) the dismissal is not an
acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3)
the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the
dismissal he found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
A cursory review of the records would readily reveal the presence of the foregoing
requisites. First, as early as the stage of respondent's appeal of the MeTC's decision to the
RTC, respondent had already been moving for the dismissal of the case alleging the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the CA's dismissal on said ground can rightly be considered
to have been with respondent's express consent. Second, as earlier mentioned, the dismissal
herein is not an acquittal or based upon a consideration of the merits. Third, the question
raised in this case is based purely on a question of law. In view therefore of the presence of
all three requisites, the Court finds that petitioner's appeal of the appellate court's dismissal
cannot be barred by double jeopardy.
As to the issue of petitioner's legal standing to file the instant petition in the absence of the
OSG's participation, the circumstances herein warrant the Court's consideration. In Narciso v.
Sta. Romana-Cruz,42 the Court gave due regard to the ends of substantial justice by giving
due course to a petition filed before it by the private offended party, viz.:
59
Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v. Calo, however, provided an exception to the
above doctrines in this manner:
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or
defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the
State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals (Republic vs.
Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and
the issues in this action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive
manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case, private
petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid grievance against Judge Adao's order
granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private petitioner's) father.
The ends of substantial justice indeed require the affirmation of the appellate court's ruling
on this point. Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot confer
any right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a
court of justice.
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to rectify the
public injustice brought about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the standing
to file administrative charges for ignorance of the law against the judge and the
prosecutor. A party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.
In a similar manner, the Court finds that in the interest of substantial justice, it must give due
course to the instant petition and consequently rule on the merits of the same. The
circumstances surrounding this case left petitioner with no other suitable recourse but to
appeal the case herself. Not only was there an absence of support from the OSG, said
government office also took a position in contrast to the rights and interests of petitioner.
Moreover, as discussed above, the arguments which ran counter to petitioner's interest as
well as the grounds used to support them were simply inapplicable to the issue at hand. In
fact, these erroneous contentions were adopted by the appellate court in their entirety,
dismissing the instant case in a manner not in accord with law and applicable jurisprudence.
For the Court, now, to apply procedural rules in their strict and literal sense by similarly
dismissing, as the CA had, petitioner's action poses serious consequences tantamount to a
miscarriage of justice. To rule that the accused can postpone criminal prosecution and delay
the administration of justice at petitioner's expense on the erroneous ground of lack of
jurisdiction would create a hazardous precedent and open loopholes in our criminal justice
system.44
Indeed, the unique and exceptional circumstances in the instant case demand that the Court
forego a rigid application of the technicalities under
the law so as to prevent petitioner from suffering a grave injustice. As disclosed by the
records, petitioner had already fulfilled her end of the agreement in giving respondent, as
early as in the year 2003, construction materials amounting to half a million pesos and yet up
until now, she has not been paid therefor. In feet, after having sufficiently proven to the

satisfaction of both the MeTC and the RTC her right allegedly violated by respondent, the CA
simply dismissed, albeit without prejudice to the re-filing of the case with the appropriate
court, her action for the incorrect ground of wrong venue. On the mistaken reasoning that
the MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the instant case, the CA, without
providing any legal or jurisprudential basis, would have petitioner start from the very
beginning and refile her complaint before the same court which already had jurisdiction in
the first place.
Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict procedural matters, the Court
cannot turn a blind eye thereto lest the administration of justice be derailed by an overly
stringent application of the rules.45 Rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a
fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of
achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of
due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed. 46 Dismissal of
appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to
encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not
override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court
to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the
ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to
the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in
more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.47
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 18, 2011 and Resolution dated August 9, 2011 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32723 are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 23, 2009 and Order dated
July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which affirmed
the Joint Decision dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Case
Nos. 337902-03 are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil,
introducing themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name and
style of RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction materials for their project inside
the Subic Freeport Zone from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General
Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the
purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first delivery and the remaining eighty
percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of which shall
be via postdated checks. Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction
materials amounting to a total of P500,054.00 at the construction site where respondent and
his partners were undertaking their project. After the last delivery, respondent paid
P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga
60
branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner attempted
to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City.
They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner
communicated the dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for payment.
Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured petitioner that
they will be honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI
Bank, Makati Branch, the checks were once again dishonored for the reason that the account
from which they were drawn was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner made
several demands from respondent and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a
complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City. Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2)
Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong.
Issue: Whether or not MeTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Yes. It is well settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing
crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or
territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s
essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it
being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.
Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried
in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these
principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of
its elements occurred – in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered,
or dishonored.
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of
the place where the check was deposited or presented for encashment; can be vested with
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of
the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati
MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject check was
deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PC IBank. The
MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its
decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court’s dismissal of the case is not an
acquittal of respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an
acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed
by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a
criminal case against the accused will not result in his acquittal. In the oft-cited People v.
 61

Salico, the Court explained: This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the
legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the
defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant’s guilt is beyond complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time
a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the of its commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and
defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed
a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is Rule 45.
not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is
commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the
prosecution has presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the
court dismisses the ease on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal
because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense
was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the
dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again
prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case,
the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent
jurisdiction.

Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the
MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits,
let alone resolve the issue of respondent’s guilt or innocence based on the evidence
proffered by the prosecution. The appellate court merely dismissed the case on the
erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed within the lower
court’s jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to show
respondent’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not
operate as an acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be repudiated only by a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, showing a grave abuse of discretion. Thus,
petitioner’s resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law
because the Court, in its exercise of its power of review, is not a trier of facts. There is a
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of
facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties-litigants.

In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely “whether the Court of
Appeals erred when it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have
jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing that the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of said court.” Evidently, therefore, the instant petition was filed within the
bounds of our procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances insofar as the commission of the crime of BP 22 is concerned.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201363 March 18, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an appeal from the May 25, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31320 which affirmed in toto the December 11, 2007 Decision2
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 123 (RTC), convicting appellant Nazareno
Villareal y Lualhati (appellant) of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
91653 (RA 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of
₱300,000.00.
The Factual Antecedents
On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de
Leon) was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a
distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of
shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, a member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit
(SAID-SOU) in Caloocan City, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant
whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession.4
Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the
help of a tricycle driver. Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able
to board appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his
possession. Thereafter, PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the 9th Avenue Police Station to fix
his handcuffs, and then they proceeded to the SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon marked
the seized plastic sachet with "RZL/NV 12-25-06," representing his and appellant’s initials and
the date of the arrest.5
Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as the person of
appellant to the investigator, PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito) who, in turn, executed an
acknowledgment receipt6 and prepared a letter request7 for the laboratory examination of
the seized substance. PO2 Hipolito personally delivered the request and the confiscated item
62
to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, which were received by Police
Senior Inspector Albert Arturo (PSI Arturo), the forensic chemist.8
Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of white
crystalline substance, tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.9
Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs in an Information10 which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of December, 2006 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control, METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.03 gram which,
when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result of METHYLAMPHETAMIME
HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged.11
In his defense, appellant denied PO3 de Leon’s allegations and instead claimed that on the
date and time of the incident, he was walking alone along Avenida, Rizal headed towards 5th
Avenue when someone who was riding a motorcycle called him from behind. Appellant
approached the person, who turned out to be PO3 de Leon, who then told him not to run,
frisked him, and took his wallet which contained ₱1,000.00.12
Appellant was brought to the 9th Avenue police station where he was detained and mauled
by eight other detainees under the orders of PO3 de Leon. Subsequently, he was brought to
the Sangandaan Headquarters where two other police officers, whose names he recalled
were "Michelle" and "Hipolito," took him to the headquarters’ firing range. There, "Michelle"
and "Hipolito" forced him to answer questions about a stolen cellphone, firing a gun right
beside his ear each time he failed to answer and eventually mauling him when he continued
to deny knowledge about the cellphone.13 Thus, appellant sustained head injuries for which
he was brought to the Diosdado Macapagal Hospital for proper treatment.14
The following day, he underwent inquest proceedings before one Fiscal Guiyab, who
informed him that he was being charged with resisting arrest and "Section 11."15 The first
charge was eventually dismissed.
The RTC Ruling
 63

After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant as charged upon a finding that all the Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on
elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been established, to wit: lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
(1) the appellant is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may,
consciously possesses said drug. Finding no ill motive on the part of PO3 de Leon to testify without a warrant, arrest a person:
falsely against appellant, coupled with the fact that the former had previously arrested the
latter for illegal possession of drugs under Republic Act No. 642516 (RA 6425), the RTC gave
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
full faith and credit to PO3 de Leon’s testimony. Moreover, the RTC found the plain view
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
doctrine to be applicable, as the confiscated item was in plain view of PO3 de Leon at the
place and time of the arrest.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
On the other hand, the RTC gave scant consideration to the defenses of denial and frame-up
arrested has committed it; and
proffered by the appellant, being uncorroborated, and in the light of the positive assertions
of PO3 de Leon. It refused to give credence to appellant’s claim that PO3 de Leon robbed him
of his money, since he failed to bring the incident to the attention of PO3 de Leon’s superiors (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
or to institute any action against the latter. establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Consequently, the RTC sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of
₱300,000.00. For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
The CA Ruling
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.19 On the other hand,
paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an
In its assailed Decision, the CA sustained appellant’s conviction, finding "a clear case of in offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of
flagrante delicto warrantless arrest"17 as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.20
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The CA held that appellant "exhibited an overt act or strange
conduct that would reasonably arouse suspicion,"18aggravated by the existence of his past
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
criminal citations and his attempt to flee when PO3 de Leon approached him.
offense is absolutely required. Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime
while under paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
Citing jurisprudence, the appellate court likewise ruled that the prosecution had adequately
shown the continuous and unbroken chain of custody of the seized item, from the time it
In sustaining appellant’s conviction in this case, the appellate court ratiocinated that this was
was confiscated from appellant by PO3 de Leon, marked at the police station, turned over to
a clear case of an "in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest" under paragraphs (a) and (b) of
PO2 Hipolito and delivered to the crime laboratory, where it was received by PSI Arturo, the
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as above-quoted.
forensic chemist, up to the time it was presented in court for proper identification.

The Court disagrees.

The Issue

A punctilious assessment of the factual backdrop of this case shows that there could have
The sole issue advanced before the Court for resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming
been no lawful warrantless arrest. A portion of PO3 de Leon’s testimony on direct
in toto the RTC’s Decision convicting appellant of the offense charged.
examination in court is revelatory:

The Ruling of the Court

FISCAL LARIEGO: While you were there at 5th

The appeal is meritorious.

Avenue, was there anything unusual that transpired?

PO3 DE LEON: Yes Ma’am.
Q: What was this incident?
A: While I was on board my motorcycle on my home, I saw a man looking at the shabu in his
hand, Ma’am.
Q: And exactly what time was this?
A: Around 11:30 in the morning, Ma’am.
Q: How far were you from this person that you said was verifying something in his hand?
A: Eight to ten meters, Ma’am.
Q: What exactly did you see he was verifying? A: The shabu that he was holding, Ma’am.
Q: After seeing what the man was doing, what did you do next?
A: I alighted from my motorcycle and approached him, Ma’am.
Q: In the first place why do you say that what he was examining and holding in his hand was
a shabu?
A: Because of the numerous arrests that I have done, they were all shabu,
Ma’am.21 (Underscoring supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon,
even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy,
from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a
negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet
allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving
shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellant’s
hands was indeed shabu.
Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act
could be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon
that he (appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for
the acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in one’s hands cannot in
any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or
strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been
sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a)
of Section 5, Rule 113.
64
Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of
Section 5, Rule 113 have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
appellant had committed it.
The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal
knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough
that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a
crime; a crime must in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3
de Leon was merely impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s previous
charge22 for the same offense. The CA stressed this point when it said:
It is common for drugs, being illegal in nature, to be concealed from view.1âwphi1 PO3
Renato de Leon saw appellant holding and scrutinizing a piece of plastic wrapper containing a
white powderly substance. PO3 Renato de Leon was quite familiar with appellant, having
arrested him twice before for the same illegal possession of drug. It was not just a hollow
suspicion. The third time around, PO3 de Leon had reasonably assumed that the piece of
plastic wrapper appellant was holding and scrutinizing also contained shabu as he had
personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record. He would
have been irresponsible to just ‘wait and see’ and give appellant a chance to scamper away.
For his part, appellant being, in fact, in possession of illegal drug, sensing trouble from an
equally familiar face of authority, ran away. Luckily, however, PO3 de Leon caught up with
him through the aid of a tricycle driver. Appellant’s act of running away, indeed, validated
PO3 de Leon’s reasonable suspicion that appellant was actually in possession of illegal drug. x
x x23
However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not
suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to
justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime
had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring
to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and
unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests
based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory
the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.
It was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellant’s arrest based
on "personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record," as
this is unquestionably not what "personal knowledge" under the law contemplates, which
must be strictly construed.24
Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not
be construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.25It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other

circumstances,26 for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight,
including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses,
and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. 27 Thus, appellant’s attempt to
run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have meant
guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.
In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even
if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same
offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create
probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted.
"Probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 28 Specifically with respect to
arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested,29 which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.
Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of
the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize
the nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his
liberty,30 it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised without unduly compromising a
citizen’s constitutionally-guaranteed right to liberty. As the Court succinctly explained in the
case of People v. Tudtud:31
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or
is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on
arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by
law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated
and so deserving of full protection.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from
appellant is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must
be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and ordered immediately released from detention,
unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
65
Facts:
In the morning of December 25, 2006, Police officer Renato de Leon was driving his
motorcycle. From a distance of 8 to 10 meters he saw the appellant Villareal, holding a plastic
sachet of shabu. When Villareal saw him, he immediately ran away. When de Leon caught
Villareal, he was brought to the police station where he was arrested and the alleged shabu
was turned over to be marked as evidence. The substance was tested and was proven to be a
0.03gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The appellant was
charged with the violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. During the trial de Leon claimed that the appellant had previous criminal
charges for the same offense and that he arrested the appellant because when he saw that
the appellant was holding a powdery white substance, it immediately gave him suspicion as
to the matter thereof.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest based on the police officers
personal knowledge of the criminal record of the appellant.
Held:
No, there was no valid warrantless arrest. A lawful warrantless arrest exists when either of
the following circumstances are present: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that he person to be arrested has committed it, and
(c)when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is service final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Based on
the distance and the amount of the powdery substance it is insufficient to conclude, even
with clear vision that such substance constitutes as shabu. The act of the appellant of
examining the substance is not tantamount to arouse suspicion of a commission or possible
commission of a crime even if he has previous criminal history on the same offense. Personal
knowledge is not defined as knowledge of a person’s criminal record, but personal
knowledge as to the actual commission of the crime. The act of running away from authority
also does not automatically imply guilt on the accused. There are various reasons to run
away from authority, and commission of a crime is just one of the possible reasons. Because
there is an absence of overt act there is no justification for the appellant’s warrantless arrest.
Hence, it cannot be presented as evidence in court as it is a fruit of the poisonous tree.
People v. Villareal, 2013363, 18 March 2013
PO3 De Leon was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw
appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a
 66

plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de eon, a member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special
Operation Unit (SAID-SOU), alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant
whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession.

ISSUE: Whether the arrest without warrant was lawful?

NO.The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal
knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough
that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a
crime; a crime must in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.

However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not
suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to
justify a lawful warrantless arrest. “Personal knowledge” of the arresting officer that a crime
had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret “personal knowledge” as referring
to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and
unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests
based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory
the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 201443 April 10, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BETTY SALVADOR y TABIOS, MONICO SALVADOR, MARCELO LLANORA, JR. y BAYLON,
ROBERT GONZALES y MANZANO, RICKY PEÑA y BORRES @ RICK, ROGER PESADO y PESADO
@ GER, JOSE ADELANTAR y CAURTE, LOWHEN ALMONTE y PACETE, JUBERT BANATAO y
AGGULIN @ KOBET, and MOREY DADAAN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal1 from the Decision2 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on February 25,
2011 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03279 affirming, albeit with modifications, the conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 219 of Betty Salvador y Tabios (Betty),
Monico Salvador (Monico), Marcelo Llanora, Jr. y Baylon (Marcelo), Robert Gonzales y
Manzano (Robert), Ricky Peña y Borres @ Rick (Ricky), Roger Pesado y Pesado @ Ger (Roger),
Jose Adelantar y Caurte (Jose), Lowhen Almonte y Pacete (Lowhen), Jubert Banatao y Aggulin
@ Kobet (Jubert), and Morey Dadaan (Morey) (herein accused-appellants) for having
conspired in kidnapping Albert Yam y Lee (Albert) for the purpose of extorting ransom. The
RTC sentenced the accused-appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered them to solidarily pay Albert the amount of PhP 100,000.00 as moral damages.3The
CA Decision dated February 25, 2011 concurred with the RTC’s factual findings but expressly
stated in its dispositive portion the accused-appellants’ non-eligibility for parole. The CA
further ordered the accused-appellants to solidarily pay Albert PhP 50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and PhP 100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The RTC and the CA, however,
acquitted accused-appellants of kidnapping a certain Pinky Gonzales (Pinky), who, from the
account of some of the prosecution witnesses, was likewise taken with Albert during the
same abduction incident.
The charges against the accused-appellants stemmed from the following Informations dated
April 15, 2002:
(a) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108834 against Betty, Monico, Marcelo, Robert, Ricky, Roger
and nine other John Does for the kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Pinky allegedly
lasting for six days, the Information, in part, reads:
That on or about April 7, 2002 at around 7:30 in the evening, in the vicinity of the Cainta
Cockpit Arena, Cainta, Rizal, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with the use of firearms, threats and intimidation did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away PINKY GONZALES y TABORA
67
against her will; That in the process, she was forced to board a Toyota Hi-Ace van which
transported her, until finally she was brought to an undisclosed location in Caloocan City
where she was kept for six (6) days; That she was finally rescued on April 12, 2002 by police
operatives from the Philippine National Police.4
(b) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108835 against Jose, Lowhen, Betty, Monico, Morey, Jubert,
Marcelo, Robert, Ricky, Roger and nine other John Does for the kidnapping of and demanding
from Albert USD 1,000,000.00 as ransom money, the Information states:
That on or about April 7, 2002 at around 7:30 in the evening, in the vicinity of the Cainta
Cockpit Arena, Cainta, Rizal, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with the use of firearms, threats and intimidation did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away ALBERT YAM y LEE; That in
the process, he was forced to board a Toyota Hi-Ace van which transported him, passing
through the areas of U.P. Balara and Fairview in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, until finally he was brought to an undisclosed location in Caloocan City
where he was kept for six (6) days; That ransom in the amount of $1,000,000.00 was
demanded in exchange for his safe release until he was finally rescued on April 12, 2002 by
police operatives from the Philippine National Police.5
During arraignment, the accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges.
On June 14, 2002, pre-trial was terminated without the parties having entered into
stipulations.
The Case for the Prosecution
During the trial, the prosecution witnesses, with their corresponding testimonies, were:
(a) Albert, married to Evangeline Lim-Yam (Evangeline), holds a Marketing degree from De La
Salle University. He also took some units under the Ateneo de Manila University’s Masters in
Business Administration program. He is engaged in printing and financing business. He is also
a breeder of fighting cocks and race horses. On February 2002, he took over, with a partner,
the operations of the New Cainta Coliseum (Coliseum), a cockpit arena.
Albert testified6 that the lens grade of his eye glasses is 275. With eye glasses on, his vision is
normal. Without the glasses, he can clearly see objects one to two meters away from him,
but beyond that, his vision becomes blurry.7
On April 7, 2002, at around 7:30 p.m., Albert rode his Toyota Prado (Prado) with Plate No.
UTJ-112 and drove out of the Coliseum’s parking lot. Ahead was a white Honda Civic car
(Civic), while behind was a Toyota Hi-Ace van (Hi-Ace). Upon reaching Imelda Avenue, the Hi-
Ace overtook the Civic. Albert was about to follow suit, but the Hi-Ace suddenly stopped and
blocked the Civic. Six men with long firearms alighted from the Hi-Ace. Jubert and Morey

approached the Civic, which was just about two to two and a half meters away from
Albert,8 pointed their guns at the driver, who turned out to be Pinky,9 and motioned for her
to step out of the car and ride the Hi-Ace. Two men ran after the "watch-your-car" boy in a
nearby parking lot, but Albert no longer noticed if the two still returned to the Hi-
Ace.10 Roger and Robert came near the Prado and gestured for Albert to likewise alight from
the vehicle and ride the Hi-Ace.
When Albert rode the Hi-Ace, he saw Marcelo in the driver’s seat and beside him was Ricky.
Morey was behind the driver. So too were Jubert. Roger and Robert rode the Hi-Ace after
Albert did.
Albert and Pinky were handcuffed together and made to wear dark sunglasses. The men took
Albert’s wallet containing PhP 9,000.00, his driver’s license and other documents. They also
took his Patek Philippe watch which costs PhP 400,000.00.
While inside the Hi-Ace, Albert and Pinky were ordered to duck their heads. Notwithstanding
the position, Albert saw the lights emanating from the blue eagle figure at the Ateneo gym.
He also heard one of the men telling the driver to pass by Balara. After around 20 minutes,
Albert also noticed having passed by the vicinity of SM Fairview. They arrived in their
destination 10 to 15 minutes after and were handcuffed separately. Albert and Pinky stayed
in the house and were fed food mostly bought from Jollibee until they were rescued on April
12, 2002.
Albert described the house as "half constructed".11 They were made to stay in the basement
around three and a half by four meters in size, with a stairway, small sofa, bed, table and four
chairs. Behind the table was a sink and a comfort room. There was a large window about
three by five feet in size, but it was covered with a blanket and a plastic sack. Albert
identified Monico as the person who was beside him, pulling him up when he fell while
descending the basement stairs.12 Albert claimed that he was still handcuffed then and was
made to wear dark eye glasses. The kidnappers allowed him to remove the dark eye glasses
when he laid down in bed on the first night of their detention.13 On April 8, 2002, his own eye
glasses were returned to him upon his request.14
Albert told the men that he was the only person they should talk to if they wanted ransom
money. The men inquired how much he can give. Albert replied that he can shell out PhP
500,000.00. The men asked for Albert’s phone and pin number to be able to call the latter’s
wife. He was ordered to write a letter to his wife informing her that he was abducted and
indicating therein the names of persons from whom she could borrow money to be paid to
the accused-appellants as ransom. Albert also claimed that he got to talk, through the
telephone, to the person, whom the accused-appellants seemed to consider as their boss.
The boss demanded USD 1,000,000.00 for Albert’s release. One of the persons posted as
guards in the safehouse threatened Albert that the latter would be killed unless ransom
money be paid by Friday, April 12, 2002.15
68
Albert had seen Jose a few times in the Coliseum. Albert also recalled that immediately prior
to his abduction, Jose accompanied him to his Prado and had asked for "balato".16 Albert
identified Jose as the "tipster" who acted as a look-out during the abduction
incident.17 Albert likewise stated that he had seen Ricky in the Coliseum on April 7, 2002 and
on several other instances as the latter worked as a "kristo" or bet taker.18 Albert recognized
Marcelo as a bettor.
Albert identified Betty as the person who brought them food and who, in one occasion, had
inquired from the guard how Albert and Pinky were faring in the basement. 19
On April 11, 2002, at around 6:00 a.m.,20 seven persons came down to the basement to
threaten Albert and Pinky.21 Albert later identified them as Jubert and Morey,22 Marcelo,
Ricky, Lowhen and Jose,23 and Nelson Ocampo y Ruiz @ Joselito Estigoy24 (Nelson).
Thereafter, the men left behind Nelson and Lowhen to remain as guards, who took their
posts in the stairway.25 At around lunch time, Betty gave food to one of the guards, who in
turn handed the same to Albert and Pinky. Albert was then sitting in the sofa, which was just
a little over a meter away from the stairway.26
Albert remembered having stayed in the basement until the early hours of April 12, 2002. On
that day, he heard the ferocious barking of a dog, footsteps in the second floor, and then a
gun shot. Albert and Pinky stayed inside the comfort room until a uniformed man brought
them out. One person, who acted as among those guarding Albert and Pinky while they were
detained, was killed in the rescue operations. He was subsequently identified as Nelson.
Another guard left in the evening of April 10, 2002 and he never went back.27 Albert did not
see Betty and Monico in the premises of the safehouse on the day the rescue operations
were conducted by the police. He only saw the couple in Camp Crame around 5:00 p.m.
while the former was making a statement.28
Albert and Pinky were brought to Camp Crame between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. of April 12,
2002. Some time after lunch, a police line-up with about 15 men was presented.29 Albert
identified seven persons, to wit, Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Morey, Jose, Robert and Roger, as
among his abductors. At that time, he was not yet able to pinpoint the rest of the accused-
appellants because they were not presented to him in the police line-up.30
(b) Senior Inspector Arnold Palomo (S/Insp. Palomo), who is assigned at the Anti-Organized
Crime for Businessmen’s Concern Division of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG), Camp Crame, testified that on April 12, 2002, at around 6:30 a.m., he was in the
vicinity of No. 3, Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City, where they had just
rescued Pinky, a victim of kidnapping. Around an hour later, Betty arrived and introduced
herself as the owner of the house. She inquired why the police officers were shooting at her
house. She was invited by the police to Camp Crame to answer queries anent why a crime
was committed in her house. While in Camp Crame, Albert and Pinky identified her as the
person who brought them food while they were detained in the safehouse. Betty was thus
arrested.31

(c) Police Inspector Marites Bugnay (P/Insp. Bugnay), Assistant Chief of the Firearms
Identification Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, testified that
at around 9:30 a.m. of April 12, 2002, she and her team, with six members, went to Amparo
Subdivision where a rescue operation had just taken place. They recovered a 5.56 mm Elisco
rifle without serial number, a 9 mm Chinese made pistol, two long and three short magazines
for a caliber 5.56 mm rifle, 188 live ammunitions, 24 pieces of cartridges fired from four
different caliber 5.56 mm rifles, two lifted latent prints, among others. She made a Spot
Report of the physical evidence recovered by her team. P/Insp. Bugnay, however, stated that
some of the police officers, who participated in the rescue operations, also carried caliber
5.56 mm firearms.32
(d) Evangeline, Albert’s wife, testified33 having received seven phone calls34 between April 7,
2002 and April 11, 2002 from the kidnappers informing her that they took Albert and
demanding USD 1,000,000.00 as ransom money.35 On April 11, 2002, she was instructed by
the kidnappers to go to Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe. The kidnappers were supposed to
hand to her a letter from her husband. A police operative acted as her driver. She and the
police operative got to the place between 11:30 and 11:45 in the morning.36 The kidnappers
called her and ordered her driver to go to the restrooms to retrieve a letter taped in one of
the toilet bowls. Evangeline went back to her car. While she was inside, three men tried to
forcibly open her car. She panicked, bowed down and screamed. She was, however, only able
to see the suspects from theirs chests down.37 Thereafter, P/Insp. Ferdinand Vero (Major
Vero) approached the car and informed her that they were able to apprehend three
suspects. She went home. The next morning, she received a call, got to talk to Albert, and
thereafter proceeded to Camp Crame.
(e) PO1 Paul Pacris (PO1 Pacris) stated that he and four other police officers from the CIDG
were the ones who assisted Evangeline when she met with Albert’s kidnappers in Jollibee
along EDSA Guadalupe. They arrived in the area at around 11:00 a.m. and after about two
hours, they arrested Ricky, Jose and Marcelo who tried to forcibly open Evangeline’s car.
They recovered from Jose a .38 caliber Armscor with six live ammunitions. The policemen
frisked the three without opposition from the latter.38
(f) PO3 Manuel Cube (PO3 Cube) corroborated39 PO1 Pacris’ testimony relative to the arrest
of Ricky, Jose and Marcelo. PO3 Cube further stated that while it was not his team which
arrested the suspects, after Jose and Ricky were turned over to them, they brought the two
to Camp Crame.40 While in the investigation room, he heard Jose and Ricky admit knowledge
of Albert’s abduction.41 Jose and Ricky were then not assisted by counsel.42 Chief Police
Superintendent Zolio M. Lachica (Col. Lachica) briefed PO3 Cube and the other policemen
that the arrested suspects divulged an information that the Hi-Ace with Plate No. WNW-180
used in
Albert’s abduction was going to pass by Road C-5, Commonwealth Avenue on April 12,
2002.43 PO3 Cube, Major Vero and other police officers riding four to five vehicles went to
the place. At around 5:45 a.m., they spotted the Hi-Ace, chased it and blocked it with a police
69
car.44 Robert and Roger were inside the Hi-Ace, and the former had a shotgun. After the
policemen drew their guns, the suspects surrendered.
(g) PO2 Arvin Garces (PO2 Garces), a field operative and an in-house bomb technician
assigned at the CIDG’s Anti-Organized Crime and Businessmen’s Concern Division,
testified45 that on April 12, 2002, between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., he and 20 policemen
went to Sitio GSIS, Barangay San Martin de Porres, Parañaque to arrest Lowhen, Jubert and
Morey. Their team leader knocked on the door of the target house, which was partially open.
Lowhen came out. Jubert and Morey were in the adjacent room, which was about five
meters away from where Lowhen was.46 PO2 Garces was uncertain though if the said
adjacent room was part of the same house where Lowhen was found.47 The three suspects
were informed that they were being implicated for Albert’s kidnapping and would thus be
taken for investigation.
Following were among the object evidence likewise offered by the prosecution: (a) sketches
prepared by Albert depicting the (1) exact location where the kidnapping took place,48 (2)
positions of Albert and Pinky relative to the kidnappers while inside the Hi-Ace,49 and (3)
interior of the basement room where Albert and Pinky were detained; 50 (b) dark glasses
wrapped with black tape and handcuffs worn by Albert and Pinky while they were
detained;51 (c) Albert’s handwritten note dated April 10, 2002 addressed to "Vangie" and
signed by "Boogs";52 and (d) Sinumpaang Salaysay53 and Supplemental Affidavit54 executed
by Albert on April 13, 2002 and April 15, 2002, respectively.
The Case for the Defense
The defense witnesses with their testimonies were:
(a) Marcelo, resident of Sta. Ana Compound, Manila East Road, Taytay, Rizal, testified that he
owns a beer house and a billiard hall. He also renders mechanical services. He claimed that
from 12:00 noon until 9:00 p.m. of April 7, 2002, he was repairing a motor bike at home.
Marcelo was with a certain Bogs, the owner of the motor bike, and Jober, the former’s
helper.55
From April 8 to 9, 2002, Marcelo just stayed home with his daughter.56
On April 10, 2002, at around 7:00 a.m., Marcelo was in his bedroom making an accounting of
the earnings of his beer house. He heard knocks at the door of his billiard hall. Thereafter,
around six unidentified men entered, punched, tied him up, and threw him at the back of a
white Revo without a plate. Even when Rosario, Marcelo’s daughter, was slapped and kicked
by the unidentified men after she inquired about their identities, she insisted that she be
taken with her father. Marcelo and Rosario were brought to Camp Crame. They were made
to sit down in a room with a hazy glass window. Rosario was thereafter ordered to leave the
room and when she refused, she was dragged out. The men started showing Marcelo
photographs and asking him questions. When he denied knowing any of the persons in the

photographs, he was blindfolded with a packing tape and got kicked every time he refused to
answer the men’s queries. A plastic bag was likewise placed over his head making it difficult
for him to breathe. His ordeal lasted for an hour, after which somebody told him that if he
had PhP 100,000.00, he would be released.57
At around 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m., Marcelo asked Rosario to go home and look for a lawyer.
At around 10:00 a.m. of the following day, April 11, 2002, Rosario came back with a certain
Atty. Platon. Marcelo narrated to Atty. Platon the circumstances surrounding his
arrest.58 Atty. Platon informed Marcelo that the latter was being charged of
kidnapping.59 Not long after, at around 10:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m., a certain Dr. Arnold de Vera
(Dr. de Vera) arrived and conducted an examination of Marcelo’s injuries and
bruises.60 Marcelo asked Atty. Platon if he can file a complaint against the men who mauled
him. Atty. Platon replied in the affirmative, but as of even date, no complaint had been filed
yet as Marcelo had to attend to other pressing matters relative to the kidnapping
case.61 Atty. Platon and Dr. de Vera left while Marcelo and Rosario stayed in Camp Crame for
two nights.62
On April 12, 2002, at around 3:00 p.m. or 4:00 p.m., Marcelo was brought to a building in
Camp Crame and was made to stand up alongside nine people with whom he was not
acquainted. There were cameras around and a Chinese man and a woman started pointing at
them.63
Marcelo denied personal acquaintance with Albert,64 PO1 Pacris,65 Jubert, Monico and
Betty.66 He admitted having been to the Coliseum as he was into cock fighting. The Coliseum,
located in Cainta, is only about two kilometers away from Taytay.67
Marcelo offered the testimony of Dr. de Vera,68 a plastic surgeon from St. Luke’s Medical
Center, Quezon City, to prove that in the morning of April 11, 2002, the former was already
under the CIDG’s custody. The foregoing is contrary to the prosecution’s claim that between
11:30 a.m. and 12:00 noon of the said date, Marcelo was arrested in Jollibee along EDSA
Guadalupe while trying to forcibly open Evangeline’s car. Dr. de Vera stated that in the
afternoon of April 10, 2002, Marcelo’s daughter called asking for his help as her father was
allegedly being manhandled. Dr. de Vera went to the CIDG office in the morning of April 11,
2002. He made a visual examination of Marcelo’s body and saw hematoma in the sternum
and fresh abrasions in both hands of the latter, but he did not reduce his observations into
writing.69 To stop Marcelo’s manhandling, Dr. de Vera sought audience with the PNP Chief,
but the latter was not around.70
During cross-examination, Dr. de Vera stated that once in a while, he sings and drinks in
Marcelo’s beer house in Taytay.71
SPO2 Eduardo Peñales’ testimony was dispensed with since the parties stipulated that he
was the officer who, on April 10, 2002, at around 8:35 a.m., received and recorded in the
logbook of the Taytay Police Station a report from a certain Jover Porras y Perla that Marcelo
was abducted by unidentified men earlier at 7:20 a.m.72
70
(b) Ricky is a "kristo" or bet taker in Araneta Coliseum and U-Cap Cockpit in Mandaluyong,
and "mananari" or gaffer residing in San Luis Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.73 He was still
asleep in bed with his wife on April 10, 2002, at around 9:45 a.m.74 when he heard somebody
knocking on the door. When he opened it, a man pointed a gun at him and told him not to
ask any questions but just to go with them. There were two men and they brought him to a
white Revo where he saw three other people. The owner of the house saw Ricky being
taken.75
Ricky was brought to Camp Crame, was asked if he knew certain persons from the
photographs shown to him, and was mauled when he replied in the negative.76
In the morning of April 12, 2002 while still detained in Camp Crame, one of the men, who
forcibly took Ricky from his rented room on April 10, 2002, informed the latter that if he had
PhP 20,000.00, he would be released. In the afternoon of April 12, 2002, Ricky was
handcuffed and placed in a police line-up without being informed of the reason for his
inclusion therein.77
Ricky denied being among those who abducted Albert on April 7, 2002 and being present in
the safehouse in Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002.78 He did not
know Albert personally and had not seen him before. However, Ricky admitted having been
to the Coliseum and knowing that Albert was renting the same.79Ricky was unaware of any
grudge Albert, PO1 Pacris or PO3 Cube may have against him.80 Ricky did not have any
document to prove that he was detained in Camp Crame on April 10, 2002 and his Booking
and Arrest Sheet were both dated April 12, 2002.81
Ricky’s wife, May, testified82 that after the former was taken by the unidentified men, she
went to Valenzuela Police Station and an officer opined that her husband may be in Camp
Crame.83 She went as suggested and found her husband, who assured her that he would be
released.84 She went home but got back to Camp Crame at 12:00 noon of April 11, 2002,
during which time she was not anymore allowed to talk to Ricky.85 She stayed in Camp Crame
until past 10:00 p.m. and saw from TV Patrol that Ricky was involved in a kidnapping incident.
She got to talk to her husband only on April 13, 2002.86
During cross-examination, May stated that Ricky was with her at around 7:00 p.m. of April 7,
2002.87
Ritchelda Tugbo (Tugbo), a 63-year old widow and Ricky’s landlady, testified88 that at around
9:30 a.m. of April 10, 2002, while she was eating breakfast, three unidentified men entered
her house and took Ricky from his rented room.89
Sabina Poliquit (Poliquit), an unemployed 50-year old widow, and Rodolfo Buado (Buado), a
60-year old retired employee, who were both Ricky’s neighbors, corroborated Tugbo’s
statements.90

(c) Jose is a trainer gaffer, breeder of fighting cocks, part-time private martial during derbies,
and a resident of San Isidro, Fairview, Quezon City. During the trial, he stated91 that in the
evening of April 9, 2002, he went to U-Cap Cockpit in Mandaluyong, where a derby
sponsored by a certain Pol Estrellado was being held, to find prospective buyers of fighting
cocks and to place bets.92 He left the place at around 1:00 a.m. of April 10, 2002. While
waiting for a cab, a white Revo stopped in front of him, and three gun-toting men alighted
therefrom.93 He was shoved in the front seat in between the driver and another man. While
inside the Revo, Jose’s eyes were covered with packing tape. His wallet, money, watch,
necklace and ring were taken, and the men stepped on his head to keep him down. A plastic
bag was placed over his head making it difficult for him to breathe, and he was repeatedly
punched when he denied involvement in Albert’s kidnapping.94
When Jose regained consciousness, he did not know where he was but there was a boy of
around 16 years of age removing the packing tape from his eyes. Adelantar only learned that
he was in Camp Crame when he was brought to a room with a police line-up at around 6:00
p.m. of April 12, 2002.95 He insisted that from April 10, 2002 onwards, he was held by the
police in Camp Crame, hence, he could not have been present at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002
in the safehouse where Albert was detained, and at 11:00 a.m. of the same day in Jollibee
along EDSA Guadalupe.96The boy who removed the packing tape from his eyes could attest
to the foregoing, but Jose did not know his name and had not seen him anymore.97 Further,
Jose had never been to the Coliseum and had not personally met Albert and Pinky. 98 Jose
alleged that he and the rest of the accused-appellants were mere fall guys.99 Jose claimed
that he only met Marcelo after they were both placed in the police line-up and in the same
detention cell.100 Jose admitted that he was acquainted with Ricky, whom he had
recommended to be a
"kristo" in Araneta Cockpit.101 Out of fear, Jose had neither informed his lawyer that he was
mauled by the policemen nor filed any action against them.102
(d) Betty and her husband Monico have been residing for about 33 years in 224 Malanting
Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City. Betty, an elementary school graduate, is a
housewife tending a sari-sari store and a piggery. Monico is a drilling contractor and
plumber. Betty and Monico own the house in Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan
City, where Albert and Pinky were detained from April 7 to 12, 2002.
Betty testified103 that due to her busy schedule, she had not visited their house in Lumbang
Street during the alleged period of Albert and Pinky’s detention. Betty and Monico had
rented out for PhP 3,000.00 per month the said house to Roger since the late afternoon of
April 7, 2002.
Roger was recommended to the spouses by a certain Pidok Igat (Igat), their acquaintance.
Betty saw Roger once but the latter was wearing sunglasses.104
Betty stated that from April 7 to 12, 2002, Monico was contracted to build a deep well in
Narra Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City. In the morning of April 12, 2002, Igat told
71
her that the house in Lumbang Street was being fired at by the policemen. She first
instructed Monico to report the incident to the police, then, she ran towards the said house.
She was still at a certain distance from the house when the policemen held her by the arms
after finding out that she owned it. She denied knowledge of the kidnapping incident, but she
was still invited by the police officers to go with them to Camp Crame.105
Betty was not allowed to go home but was detained by the police in Camp Crame. At around
6:00 p.m. of April 12, 2002, after Albert and Pinky arrived, Betty, Roger, Jose, Marcelo, Ricky
and other suspects were placed in a police line-up composed of ten people. Monico, Jubert
and Morey were not among those in the line-up yet. Albert and Pinky did not pinpoint Betty
from the line-up, but a police officer insisted that she be included because she owned the
safehouse. Betty identified the officer as SPO1 Polero, but she was uncertain of the name,
albeit describing the latter as the one who took Albert and Pinky’s statements.106 Betty did
not see Albert and Pinky being brought out of the house during the rescue operations on
April 7, 2002. Betty did not personally know Albert, but first saw him in Camp Crame in the
evening of April 12, 2002.107
During cross-examination, Betty stated that Monico and Jubert were included in the police
line-up.108
(e) Monico stated109 that he received PhP 3,000.00 from Roger and handed it to Betty as
rental for their house in Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City. The said house
is about four streets away from Betty’s sari-sari store and piggery in Malanting Street. The
amount was a mere deposit and he was promised that before the end of the month, PhP
6,000.00 would be paid as rental.110 Monico did not visit the house from April 7 to 11, 2002,
hence, he did not know if Roger actually occupied it. Within the same period, Monico was
not able to talk to Igat, who was the person who referred Roger to him and Betty.111
Monico testified that he was in Betty’s store in the night of April 7, 2002 and denied having
assisted Albert in descending to the basement of the safehouse.112
When their house in Lumbang Street was fired at by the police in the early morning of April
11, 2002, he was instructed by Betty to report the matter to the authorities. He went to the
Novaliches Police, but was informed that Amparo Subdivision is not within the said station’s
jurisdiction. Monico got to Bagong Silang Police Station at around 9:00 a.m., and an officer
took notes while talking to him, but the former was not sure if it was a blotter. Monico was
instructed to wait. At around 3:00 p.m., a superior officer arrived, asked Monico questions
and informed the latter that he knew about the shooting incident. He stayed in the police
station until 6:00 p.m. The officer told Monico that the latter would be brought to Camp
Crame to be interviewed and will be allowed to go home after.113 In Camp Crame, Monico
was informed that he was being implicated in Albert and Pinky’s kidnapping. Although he and
Betty denied any involvement in the charges against them, to date, for lack of opportunity on
their part as they are both detained, no complaints had been filed against the officers who
implicated them.114

(f) Jubert, a carpenter and a college undergraduate from Asibanglan, Pinukpok, Kalinga
Province, testified115 that he came to Manila to look for a job on January 2002.116 For two
months, from February to March 2002, he was among those who worked in constructing the
Globe Telecommunications tower in Sucat. He resided in the house of his uncle, Daniel
Balanay (Balanay), in Bicutan, Taguig.117
Jubert met Lowhen, a resident of Parañaque, while applying for a job to make cabinets for
Perma Wood Industries on March 27, 2002.118
At around 4:00 p.m. of April 11, 2002, Jubert went to Lowhen’s house to inquire about the
requirements in applying as a security guard, but the latter was not home yet. Lowhen
arrived at around 5:00 p.m. Morey, whom Jubert met for the first time, was also there.
Lowhen bought drinks for the three of them and Jubert stayed overnight in the house of
Morey, which was just about 50 meters away. While they were sleeping, men barged in,
ordered them to lay face down, and handcuffed them. Jubert and Morey were taken out of
the house where they saw Lowhen, who was likewise boarded into a car. Out of fear of the
men who seemed angry, Lowhen, Jubert and Morey were no longer able to ask why they
were being taken. They were brought to Camp Crame. Jubert denied being among those who
abducted Albert and Pinky on April 7, 2002, and guarding the latter two who were detained
in the basement of Betty and Monico’s house in Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City.119 Jubert
insisted that on April 7, 2002, he was fixing the house of his uncle, Balanay, in Bicutan,
Taguig, and with him were the latter’s brother and two ladies.120 However, none of the
mentioned persons executed affidavits to corroborate Jubert’s claim as to his whereabouts
on April 7, 2002.121 Jubert vehemently denied having seen Albert prior to April 12, 2002, the
day the former was arrested.122
(g) Robert, a farmer from Isabela, a driver since 1986, and resident of Western Bicutan,
Taguig since 1990, alleged123 that on April 7, 2002, he was in Bontoc, Mountain
Province.124 From March 4 to April 8, 2002, he was driving for Engineer Raymundo Vargas, Sr.
(Engr. Vargas), a contractor engineer.125 Robert offered as evidence a certification, dated
November 6, 2003, issued by the Pines Community Developers and General Services
Corporation, signed by Engr. Vargas, stating that he was employed from February 10, 1987 to
April 8, 2002, and five cash vouchers showing that he was paid for his services.126 The cash
voucher for the payment of PhP 2,500.00, dated April 8, 2002, which was allegedly received
by Robert himself,127 contained erasures. Engr. Vargas justified the erasures by stating that
the typewriter, which was initially used, did not yield very clear impressions on
paper.128Copies of the cash vouchers were, however, secured by his wife only much later
upon his lawyer’s instructions.129
On April 11, 2002, Robert was arrested in his house in Bicutan by CIDG officers contrary to
the prosecution’s claim that he was riding the Hi-Ace with Roger and carrying a shotgun
when seized by the police in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City on April 12,
2002.130 Robert is not engaged in cockfighting.
72
Angelita Alto (Alto), a member of the Barangay Auxiliary Force of Western Bicutan, Taguig,
testified131 that at around 7:45 a.m. of April 11, 2002, a van parked in the corner of Sunflower
and Calantas Streets, Western Bicutan, Taguig, and persons clad in dark suits alighted
therefrom.132 They proceeded to Robert’s house where Alto’s cousin stays as a boarder. The
men kicked and broke the door, handcuffed, blindfolded and took Robert to the van. Alto
was about three meters away from where the events transpired. When the van left, Alto
took two pictures of the broken door, called up Robert’s wife and recorded the events in
page 1056 of the barangay’s logbook.133
Engr. Vargas from Baguio City corroborated134 Robert’s claim that they were together in
Bontoc, Mountain Province from February 10 to April 8, 2002. It takes 12 to 14 hours to
reach Manila from Bontoc.135 Robert was with Engr. Vargas on April 7, 2002, but the former
went to Baguio at 10:00 a.m. of the following day supposedly to collect rentals. Robert said
he would be back in two days, but no longer showed up after. Engr. Vargas only found out in
October 2003 that Robert was being implicated in a kidnapping incident after being informed
by the latter’s wife.136
(h) Roger, a businessman residing in Signal Village, Bicutan, Taguig, claimed137 that on April
11, 2002, at around 6:00 a.m., he was walking along Bravo Street in Signal Village.138 He was
on his way to his brother’s wake when he was taken by four armed men wearing civilian
clothes, whom he later found out were police officers from the CIDG.139 He only met his co-
accused-appellants in Camp Crame on April 11, 2002.140 He saw Albert for the first time on
April 12, 2002 when the police line-up was presented to the latter.141
(i) Morey, a warehouse care taker from Barangay Sinakbat, Bacong, Benguet, stated142 that
he was in Burnham, Baguio City tending coconuts on April 7, 2002. The warehouse closed at
6:00 p.m., after which he went to his uncle’s house in Trinidad, Benguet.143
At 1:00 p.m. of April 8, 2002, Morey and a certain Harris Batawang (Batawang) left Baguio for
Manila. Morey was contracted to watch over a house bought by Batawang in GSIS Village,
Parañaque. They got to Manila at around 9:00 p.m., spent the night in Parañaque, and the
following morning, Batawang called Lowhen and introduced him to Morey.144
On April 10, 2002, Morey and Batawang bought materials for the repair of the latter’s house.
At 2:00 p.m. of the following day, Batawang returned to Baguio to recruit workers to help
Morey in repairing the former’s house.145
In the evening of April 11, 2002, Lowhen called Morey and informed him that the latter has a
province mate who was staying in the former’s house. Lowhen was referring to Jubert.
Morey went to Lowhen’s house. The three drunk the gin bought by Lowhen. Lowhen slept at
11:00 p.m., leaving Morey and Jubert behind. Morey and Jubert slept in Batawang’s house.
The following day, men barged into Batawang’s house and handcuffed Morey and Jubert.
The men asked if the two knew a certain Lito, ordered them to surrender their guns, and
ransacked Batawang’s house. Lowhen, Morey and Batawang were boarded into a Revo and
brought to Camp Crame.146

Morey denied being acquainted with the other accused-appellants apart from Lowhen and
Morey. Morey initially saw Albert during the first day of hearing of the kidnapping case.147
(j) Lowhen, a resident of Parañaque City, stated148 that he had been employed by Regioner
Security and Investigation Agency (Regioner) as a guard since 1993. He was posted in Perma
Wood Industries Corporation in Marian Road 2, Parañaque from March 4 to April 11, 2002.
He worked on a 24-hour shift, usually starting at 7:00 a.m.149
On April 10, 2002, Lowhen reported for work in Perma Wood Industries at 7:30 a.m.150 He
offered an uncertified photocopy of his daily time record (DTR) from March 16 to 31, 2002
with his signature on it.151 Anent the DTR from April 1 to 15, 2002, it was unsigned by
Lowhen because at that time, he was already arrested by CIDG officers.152Logbook entries
signed by Lowhen and a certain "S/G Pacete RA," the outgoing guard, indicating that the
former assumed his posts at 7:00 a.m. of April 4, 6, 8 and 10, 2002 were likewise
presented.153 Lowhen got off from work at 7:45 a.m. of April 11, 2002,154 but was no longer
able to assume duties the next day because he was already taken by the CIDG officers.155 He
just walked and got home at 8:00 a.m., ate breakfast and went to visit a certain Roger
Batersal (Batersal) in Malugay Street, Parañaque to have a picture frame repaired. Batersal,
Lowhen’s brother-in-law, was then having coffee, so Lowhen went inside the house, laid
down in the sofa, turned on the television and slept till 4:00 p.m. The picture frame was
already assembled and Lowhen went home where he saw Jubert waiting for him.156 Jubert
asked Lowhen about the requirements in applying for a security guard position. Lowhen
bought gin and while the two were drinking, he found out that Jubert speaks Kalinga and
Ilocano. Lowhen called Morey, who hailed from Baguio and who was then a boarder in the
house of the former’s brother. Morey joined the drinking session but Lowhen left at around
11:00 p.m. as the latter was already dizzy and still had to assume his post at 7:00 a.m. of the
following day.157
At 6:30 a.m. of April 12, 2002, Lowhen’s wife woke him up, but he went back to sleep.
Thereafter, Lowhen heard noises from the gate of the house, then somebody shouted
ordering for men to get out. When Lowhen opened his eyes, a man wearing black was
pointing a long firearm at him. Lowhen went out of the house and was directed to place his
hands behind his head and lie face down on the floor. The men searched Lowhen’s house.
Lowhen, Morey and Jubert were taken to the nearby United Parañaque Subdivision and after
about 15 to 20 minutes, they were boarded into a green Revo without a plate. Lowhen’s wife
wanted to tag along but she was informed that she could no longer be accommodated in the
Revo, but she could just proceed on her own to Camp Crame.158
When they reached Camp Crame, Lowhen, Jubert and Morey were separated from each
other.159 Lowhen was brought into a room and a police officer asked him if he knew a certain
Lito. Lowhen replied in the negative, then he was questioned if he knew that a man and a
woman had been kidnapped. The officer stepped out of the room, but he came back later
with a bald Chinese man.160 The Chinese man stood near the door, looked at the officer,
shook his head, then left. The officer tapped Lowhen’s shoulder and asked the latter to
cooperate with the police by being a star witness, for which he would be paid PhP 10,000.00
73
a month, or be hanged. The officer typed an affidavit, but Lowhen refused to receive it.
Lowhen told the officer that he could not do what was demanded of him, then the latter left.
Lowhen remained in the room until 6:30 p.m. of April 12, 2002 when he was put alongside
more than 10 other persons in a police line-up.161 Albert did not point at Lowhen in the line-
up.162 Prior to April 11, 2002, Lowhen did not personally know Albert.163
During cross-examination, Lowhen stated that he was on duty in the early morning of April
11, 2002, hence, he could not have been in the basement of the safehouse where Albert was
detained at around the same time.164
Redentor Pacete (Pacete), a construction worker who used to work as a reliever guard at
Regioner, testified165 that he met Lowhen when they were both assigned in Perma Wood
Industries.166 Pacete’s signatures were affixed in Regioner’s logbook indicating the times he
assumed his posts before or after Lowhen.
Domingo De Guzman (De Guzman), Lowhen’s supervisor in Regioner, was called by the
defense to the witness stand to point out to the court that he was the one who photocopied
the logbook entries and the DTR referred to by Lowhen and Pacete in their
testimonies.167 However, the originals cannot anymore be presented to the court because
Regioner had ceased its operations in 2004 and the records were no longer available.168 De
Guzman brought two index cards, prepared by Regioner’s secretary, indicating Lowhen’s
assignments from April 27, 1993 to April 11, 2002,169 and 27 payroll sheets likewise including
Lowhen’s name covering the period from February 1, 2000 to April 15, 2002.170
The testimony171 of Elsie Batersal (Elsie), Lowhen’s sister, to the effect that her brother went
to her house at around 8:30 a.m. of April 11, 2002 and slept there until 4:00 p.m., was
dispensed with after the prosecution agreed to stipulate and admit the same.
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rendered a Decision172 on September 27, 2007. In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108834,
the accused-appellants were acquitted from the charges of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention of Pinky. The accused-appellants were, however, convicted of conspiring the
kidnapping of, and demanding of ransom from Albert in Criminal Case No. Q-02-108835. The
RTC imposed upon the accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a solidary
obligation to pay Albert the amount of PhP 100,000.00 as moral damages. The RTC
ratiocinated that:
Very critical in this case is the testimony of Albert Yam. He testified about how the
kidnapping was perpetrated; he testified that a Toyota Hi-Ace van with eight (8) occupants
blocked the path of the Honda Civic car colored white driven by Pinky Gonzales; he (Albert
Yam) was driving a Toyota Prado vehicle that was behind the Honda Civic car of Pinky
Gonzales; Albert Yam identified and named before this court four (4) of those who alighted
from the van; he testified that accused Morey Dadaan and accused Jubert Banatao after

going down from their van, approached the Honda Civic car of Pinky Gonzales; he also
identified and named Roger Pesado accompanied by Robert Gonzales who went down from
their van and approached his car; he testified that it was Roger Pesado who told him (Albert
Yam) to come out of his vehicle; he further testified about he and Pinky Gonzales being
boarded in the Toyota Hi-Ace van and identified accused Marcelo Llanora as the driver of the
van, Ricky Peña who is seated beside the driver x x x. Albert Yam also testified that after their
kidnapping ordeal, he learned that accused Jose Adelantar acted as look out when they were
being kidnapped along the road coming from the Cainta cockpit; x x x he also testified that
when the ransom was being demanded, seven (7) of their kidnappers went down to talk to
him and in court gave the name[s] of six (6) of the accused, namely: Jubert Banatao, Morey
Dadaan, Marcelo Llanora, Ricky Peña, Jose Adelantar and Lowhen Almonte; Albert also
testified that at the instance when he fell down the steps of the stairs, it was the accused
Monico Salvador who was escorting him and held him; in his testimony, he stated that
accused Betty Salvador brought the food that they ate and on one occasion, saw her asking
another accused about their condition; x x x Albert Yam testified that the ransom demanded
by the accused is in the amount of One Million Dollars and there were possibly fifteen (15)
people who were involved in the kidnapping; he further testified about the rescue operation
and was able to identify seven (7) of the accused in the police line-up but mentioned in his
testimony the names of eight (8) accused as among those whom he identified in the police
line-up; x x x Albert Yam explained in his testimony that he also identified the accused
Lowhen Almonte after the police line-up because said accused was not among those included
during the police line-up and this is in accordance with a Supplemental Affidavit which Albert
Yam identified in court. x x x The Court was able to deduce from the testimony of Albert Yam
that Monico Salvador and Betty Salvador who are admittedly the owners of the place where
Albert Yam and Pinky Gonzales were kept during the kidnapping ordeal, were not present at
the precise time that the rescue was conducted by the police.
Where there is no evidence, as in this case, to indicate that the prosecution witness was
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he is not so actuated and that his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Also jurisprudence holds that if an accused had
really nothing to do with a crime, it would be against the natural order of events and human
nature and against the presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely
testify against him. x x x
Direct Proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove
conspiracy. It may be deduced from the mode, method and manner in which the offense is
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest. x x x
Here, we find a closeness of personal association and a concurrence towards a common
unlawful purpose. x x x
x x x There were very minor loose ends in the chain of events and the testimony of these
other witnesses besides Albert Yam completed the narration of facts for the prosecution.
These other witnesses, most of whom are police officers, provided the proofs for the
74
prosecution as to how the kidnapping case was solved and why the accused were
apprehended.
Denial is a self-serving negative defense that cannot be given greater weight than the
declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. x x x
Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of
positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. x x x
Among the documentary evidence presented which gives credence to the testimony of
Albert Yam are the three (3) sketches which he prepared x x x for the prosecution. x x x Two
(2) pieces of dark glasses wrapped with black tape x x x, the two sets of handcuffs x x x, and
the handwritten note of Albert Yam addressed to his wife x x x. Elisco 5.56 mm rifle, 9mm
pistol, Armscor cal. 38 revolver, a shotgun, magazines for the firearms, live
cartridges/ammunition and spent shells x x x.
x x x It must be emphasized that Pinky Gonzales never testified in court so how could the
prosecution establish that she is indeed a kidnap victim. x x x173 (Citations omitted and
underscoring ours)
The Appeals Filed Against the RTC Decision and the Office of the Solicitor General’s (OSG)
Opposition Thereto
The accused-appellants interposed separate appeals174 essentially reiterating their respective
factual claims, which were in turn refuted175 by the OSG.
The OSG argued that the supposed eye defect ascribed to Albert was not severe as to hinder
his ability to identify his kidnappers. The dark eye glasses, which the kidnappers had ordered
Albert to put on, were loose and even slipped as he descended the basement stairs, giving
him the chance to see Monico. Besides, Albert’s eye glasses were returned to him on April 8,
2002. Further, it is settled that when thrust into exceptional circumstances, victims of crimes
strive to remember the important details and to see the faces of their assailants. Anent Betty
and Monico’s claim that it was unnatural for a person involved in the commission of an
offense to proceed to the scene and report the matter to the police, the OSG interpreted the
foregoing as defensive acts intended to mislead the authorities in the conduct of the
investigation.
Jubert offered no corroborative testimonies regarding his whereabouts from April 7 to 11,
2002.
Robert’s alibi that he was in Bontoc, Mountain Province driving for Engr. Vargas should be
supported by clear and convincing evidence. The said alibi weighs weaker vis-á-vis Albert’s
positive testimony relative to Robert’s participation in the abduction. Engr. Vargas only

testified on Robert’s employment. Alto merely witnessed the circumstances of Robert’s
arrest on April 11, 2002.
Lowhen’s post in Perma Wood Industries was not that far from the locations where the acts
of kidnapping were committed, hence, no physical impossibility to get from one place to the
other. The logbook, index cards and payroll sheets offered by Lowhen had no evidentiary
value for being mere photocopies. Lowhen claimed that Albert did not identify him from the
police line-up. However, Albert testified that he did not see Lowhen from the line-up.
Besides, even if Lowhen was indeed included in the line-up, Albert, at that time, had just
been rescued, thus, stressed and confused. Albert had modified his initial lapse by
categorically stating in his amended affidavit that Lowhen was among those who went to the
basement in the early morning of April 11, 2002.
The OSG emphasized that Albert remained unfazed and unwavering in his testimony and so
were the rest of the prosecution witnesses. The OSG likewise stressed that the RTC’s
evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and should be
upheld in the absence of proof that the said court had overlooked facts which if duly
regarded, may alter the result of the case.
The Ruling of the CA
On February 25, 2011, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision denying the appeal of
the accused-appellants. However, the CA modified the RTC ruling by expressly stating the
accused-appellants’ non-eligibility for parole. Further, the accused-appellants were ordered
to solidarily pay Albert PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 100,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The CA declared that:
The crucial issue in this case involves the assessment of credibility of witnesses. Could the
version succinctly narrated by the victim, his wife and the police officers who participated in
the operation for the rescue of the kidnap victims possibly be concocted as so alleged by the
appellants?
x x x Unless otherwise specifically required, the testimony of a single eyewitness if credible
and trustworthy is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. And since
the determination of credibility is within the province of the trial court which has the
opportunity to examine and observe the demeanor of witnesses, appellate courts will not
generally interfere in this jurisdiction. x x x
The most crucial evidence submitted in this case was the positive testimony of kidnap victim
Albert Yam recognizing appellants as his abductors. Common experience tells us that when
extraordinary circumstances take place, it is natural for persons to remember many of the
important details. x x x The most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to
see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is
committed.
75
Yam positively identified appellants as his captors. x x x
The evidence also shows that the accused-appellants acted in concert in perpetrating the
kidnapping. x x x
x x x The fact that accused Betty Salvador’s role was limited to giving victims their food is
immaterial whether she acted as a principal or as an accomplice because the conspiracy and
her participation therein have been established. In fact, she was the owner of the safehouse
where the victims were kept. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and the
conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime.
x x x Police officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official
functions in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary or proof that they
were moved by ill will. x x x.176 Citations omitted and underscoring ours)
Incidents after the Rendition of the CA Decision
The records of this case were elevated to us pursuant to the Resolution177 issued by the CA
on February 9, 2012 giving due course to the notices of appeal filed by the accused-
appellants, except Betty and Monico.
In compliance with our Resolution178 dated July 2, 2012, a Supplemental Brief179 was filed by
the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) in behalf of the accused-appellants, except Betty and
Monico. In lieu of a supplemental brief, the OSG filed a Manifestation180 stating that it is
adopting the arguments it had previously raised in the Consolidated Brief181filed with the CA.
The Issue
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom despite the prosecution’s failure to
overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in their favor.182
The Supplemental Brief filed by the PAO once again presented the accused-appellants’
factual claims in the proceedings below relative to the alleged mauling, irregular arrests and
extortion attempts committed by CIDG officers against Marcelo and Ricky. The PAO stressed
anew the alibis that on April 7, 2002, Morey was in his uncle’s warehouse in Baguio, Robert
was in Bontoc, Mountain Province driving for Engr. Vargas, while Lowhen assumed his
security guard duties in Perma Wood Industries in Parañaque. The PAO also maintained that
Roger was arrested at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002 in Bicutan, and not on April 12, 2002 in
Commonwealth Avenue.
Our Ruling

The instant appeal lacks merit. The CA correctly found that the essential elements comprising
the crime of kidnapping for ransom were present and that the accused- appellants conspired
in its commission.
People v. Uyboco,183 enumerated the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom, viz:
In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of
the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made; or (d) the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the
purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.184
In the case at bar, the accused-appellants, who were indicted for forcibly abducting Albert,
are all private individuals. Albert was taken on April 7, 2002 and his detention lasted for six
days, during which period, threats to kill him and demand for ransom were made.
In affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, we are guided by four-settled doctrines
enunciated in People v. Martinez,185 viz:186
(a) The trial court[‘]s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded great
respect owing to its opportunity to observe and examine the witnesses conduct and
demeanor on the witness stand;
(b) When there is no evidence to show that the prosecution witness is actuated by an
improper motive, identification of the accused-appellants as the offenders should be given
full faith and credit;187
(c) Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof of prior agreement by the parties to
commit a crime but that it may be inferred from the acts of the accused-appellants before,
during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to a joint purpose,
concerted action and community of interest; and
(d) The respective alibis proffered by the accused-appellants cannot prevail over the
unequivocal testimony of the victim categorically and positively pointing to them as his
abductors, and for the defense of alibis, to be given full credit, they must be clearly
established and must not leave room for doubt.188
76
The accused-appellants all denied being personally acquainted with Albert or having
knowledge of any grudge which the latter may harbour against them. The RTC and the CA
found Albert’s testimony on the participation of the accused-appellants as conspirators in the
kidnapping incident, and the manner by which he had subsequently identified them, as clear
and categorical.
Albert testified:
PROS. FADULLON:
Q: Mr. Witness, will you please tell this Honorable Court where you were on April 7, 2002
between the hours of 7:00 and 7:30 in the evening?
A: I was at the New Cainta Coliseum.
Q: Will you please tell us, Sir, if you recall if there was anything unusual that happened that
evening as you were leaving the New Cainta Coliseum on your way home?
A: I was kidnapped that evening.
Q: Now, Sir, will you please tell this Honorable Court what happened when you notice that
the Toyota Hi-Ace van stopped abruptly the path of the Honda Civic car?
A: I saw six (6) men coming down from the Hi-Ace with long firearms.
Q: Now tell us, Sir, what happened when six (6) men armed with long firearms alighted from
the vehicle, Toyota Hi-Ace van?
A: I saw two (2) of those people went to the white car and motioned the driver with a gun
pointed motioning the driver of the white vehicle to go down.
Q: You mentioned earlier that there were six (6) armed men who alighted. You accounted
for, two (2) went to the driver side of the white Honda Civic car, what about the others, do
you know what happened?
A: They were there and two (2) of them I think ran after the watch-your-car boy and two of
them went to my car, Sir.189
When asked to identify the two men who approached the Civic, Albert pointed to Jubert and
Morey. Albert named those who approached his Prado as Roger and Robert. Roger and
Robert gestured for him to alight from the Prado and brought him to the Hi-Ace, where he
saw Marcelo in the driver’s seat and Ricky in the front passenger’s seat.190

At around 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002, seven men went to the basement of the safehouse
where Albert and Pinky were detained. They threatened Albert with bodily harm should he
not accede to their demand for ransom. Albert identified them as Jubert, Morey, Marcelo,
Ricky, Lowhen, Jose and Nelson. Five of the men left but Nelson and Lowhen were left behind
to guard Albert and Pinky.191
The overt acts of the accused-appellants Jubert, Morey, Marcelo, Ricky, Robert, Roger,
Lowhen and Jose were undoubtedly geared towards unlawfully depriving Albert of his liberty
and extorting ransom in exchange for his release.
Albert was able to identify Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Morey, Jose, Lowhen, Robert and Roger
from a police line-up of around 15 persons presented to him in Camp Crame on April 12,
2002.192 During cross-examination, Albert clarified that Lowhen was not among the seven
persons he had identified as among his captors from the initial police line-up of 15 persons
presented to him. Albert justified the omission by stating that he saw Lowhen only after the
line-up was presented and after he had already executed his April 12, 2002 affidavit.193
In their defense, Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Robert, Morey, Lowhen, Jose and Roger offered their
respective alibis, which fail to persuade.
Marcelo claimed that from 12:00 noon to 9:00 p.m. of April 7, 2002, he was at home
repairing a motor bike. On his part, Jubert insisted that he was fixing his uncle’s house in
Bicutan, Taguig on the same day. Morey averred that he was in a coconut warehouse in
Burnham, Baguio City, and he left the place at around 6:00 p.m. to go to his uncle’s house in
Trinidad, Benguet. Noticeably, Marcelo, Jubert and Morey offered no corroborative evidence
to support their bare allegations.
Ricky and his wife, May, alleged that they were likewise at home on April 7, 2002. However,
May’s testimony does not carry much weight in view of her relation to Ricky.
Robert posited that he was in Bontoc, Mountain Province driving for Engr. Vargas from
February 10, 2002 to April 8, 2002. Robert left at 10:00 a.m. of April 8, 2002 on the pretext
that he would just collect rentals in Baguio. He informed Engr. Vargas that he would be back
in two days. Robert testified and Alto corroborated his statement that the former was
arrested by CIDG officers in Bicutan, Taguig on April 11, 2002.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in
conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind; whatever is
repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance.194 It
defies logic to figure out why Engr. Vargas was informed that Robert was implicated in
Albert’s kidnapping only on October 2003, or around one and a half years after the latter’s
indictment. If Robert’s alibi were true, it would have been more in accord with human
experience if he promptly told Engr. Vargas about his predicament for the latter was then in
the best position to corroborate the former’s allegations. It is likewise perplexing why
77
Robert, who had been driving for Engr. Vargas for five years, was in Taguig on April 11, 2002
and so lightly regarded his commitment to the latter that he would be back in two days. No
explanations were offered to justify Robert’s unreasonable omissions.
Lowhen insisted that he assumed his 24-hour duty in Perma Wood Industries in Parañaque
from 7:00 a.m. of April 10, 2002 to 7:45 a.m. of April 11, 2002. He got home at 8:00 a.m., ate
breakfast, and thereafter proceeded to his sister Elsie’s house where he slept in the sofa until
4:00 p.m. The testimonies of Pacete, De Guzman and Elsie were offered to support Lowhen’s
claims. However, we find more credence in the positive and categorical statements of Albert,
against whom no ill motive was ascribed by the defense, on one hand, than in the
testimonies of persons, who are in one way or another are related to Lowhen. Further, there
is no proof of absolute physical impossibility for Lowhen to be in Amparo Subdivision in the
morning of April 11, 2002, considering that Parañaque is not very far off. In Albert’s
testimony, he merely made an estimate of the time in the morning of April 11, 2002, when
Lowhen, along with six other men, went to the basement. Although Albert testified that it
was around 6:00 a.m., he could have miscalculated the time considering that he no longer
had a watch and they were in a basement. Besides, Lowhen was the link between Jubert and
Morey, whose participations in the kidnapping incident on April 7, 2002 were clearly
established. This renders dubious Lowhen’s claim of having introduced Jubert and Morey to
each other only on April 11, 2002, or four days after the latter two had taken part in the
abduction of Pinky and Albert near the Coliseum.
Jose and Roger proffered nary an explanation anent where they were on April 7, 2002. Jose
anchored his defense upon his presence at U-Cap Cockpit in Mandaluyong from the night of
April 9, 2002 until 1:00 a.m. of April 10, 2002. While waiting for a cab going home, Jose
claimed that CIDG officers arrested him and brought him to Camp Crame where he remained
under the police’s custody. He thus claimed that contrary to Albert’s claim, he could not have
been in the basement of the safehouse at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002. On the other hand,
Roger alleged that at around 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002, while he was walking along Bravo
Street, Signal Village,Bicutan, Taguig on his way to his brother’s wake, he was arrested by
CIDG officers. However, like in the cases of Marcelo, Jubert and Robert, Jose and Roger’s
averments were bare and unsupported by any corroborative evidence.
All told, we find that the RTC and the CA did not overlook essential facts or circumstances
which may otherwise justify the acquittal of Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Robert, Morey, Lowhen,
Jose and Roger for having conspired in kidnapping Albert for the purpose of extorting
ransom. That no ransom was actually paid does not negate the fact of the commission of the
crime, it being sufficient that a demand for it was made.195
We note Marcelo, Ricky, Jose and Lowhen’s claims of having been subjected to mauling,
illegal arrest, intimidation and extortion attempts committed by the police authorities.
It is settled that irregularities attending the arrest of the accused-appellants should have
been timely raised in their respective motions to quash the Informations at any time before

their arraignment, failing at which they are deemed to have waived their rights to assail the
same.196 No such motions were filed by the accused-appellants.
Further, without meaning to downplay or take the allegations of the accused-appellants
lightly, we, however, note that these were unsubstantiated as to the identities of the
offenders and uncorroborated by other pieces of evidence. To date, no complaints against
the supposed abusive police officers had yet been filed by the accused-appellants. If the
abuses were indeed committed, we exhort the accused-appellants to initiate the proper
administrative and criminal proceedings to make the erring police officers liable. We stress
that while the criminal justice system is devised to punish the offenders, it is no less the
State’s duty to ensure that those who administer it do so with clean hands.
Betty and Monico are to be held as co-conspirators because they knowingly provided the
venue for Albert’s detention. In implicating Monico, Albert testified:
PROS. FADULLON:
Q: And you said you were first handcuffed according to you, you were handcuffed with Miss
Gonzales and removed it and a new set of handcuffs were placed on you. Will you please tell
us what happened after that?
A: So with my both hands handcuffed, this time I was asked to get out of the vehicle and I
was led to a sort of like underground house something like that, I had to go down a couple of
steps.
Q: What happened, Sir, as you were going down, as you were led inside, what you claimed to
be an underground house and as you were going down several steps?
A: Because I was handcuffed and I didn’t know where to go to pass at that time, I fell and a
person held on my arm.
Q: What happened to your glasses as you claimed you fell as you were going downstairs?
A: My glasses went down also, Sir.
Q: And you said that there was a person who held on to you, how close or how far that
person from you, Sir?
A: He was just beside me, Sir.
Q: And this person can you give us his description?
A: About 50s, about 5’9" and has a [sic] very coarse hands, Sir.
78
Q: This person whom according to you held on to you as you slipped you were being led
downstairs, if you will see him again, will you be able to recognize him, Sir?
Witness pointed to Monico in the courtroom.
Q: What happened, Sir, when you slipped and this person now identified as accused Monico
Salvador held on to you, what happened after that?
A: He held me up and led me to the stairway proceeding down to the house,
Sir.197 (Underscoring ours)
When asked during cross examination about what transpired while he was descending the
basement stairs, Albert stated:
ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: Now, immediately after you catch [sic] the glasses, what exactly did you do?
A: I told him, "Pare, alalayan mo naman ako ng maayos pababa pala tayo nun."
Q: You told him that you should be carefully assisted. You told him that because you were
not in a position to see where you were walking?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, did you try to get hold of the hands of Monico Salvador after the incident?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you found out that the hands were "magaspang"?
A; Yes, Sir.
Q: And that would make you very sure that he was the one who assisted you?
A: Even more sure because I saw him also.
Q: Now, after you get [sic] hold of that [sic] glasses you said to him, "Alalayan mo naman
ako."?
A: Because I fell already. So, I said, "Pare alalayan mo naman ako ng maayos." That was when
he was here beside me.
 79

Q: Besides [sic] you? A: April 11, 2002, Sir.

A: Yes. Q: April 11 at around lunch time a woman brought down your food?

Q: I thought that he was at your back holding your armpit? A: Yes, Sir.

A: He was here beside me. How do you carry somebody? Q: Where were you at that time, Mr. Witness, when this woman according to you came
down and brought down your food?
Q: If he was beside you, you were only able to recognize the left portion of his face?
A: At the sofa, Sir.
A: I was able to see his face, Sir.
Q: Tell us, Mr. Witness, what happened when this woman brought down your food?
Q: The whole face?
A: She gave the food to the guard and the guard gave the food to us, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How far away from this woman Sir when you saw her handing the foods to one of the
Q: I thought that he was beside you? guards?

A: He was beside me. A: The stairway was just beside the sofa so you can see her, Sir.

Q: Did you go in front of him and tried to look at the features of his face? Q: That would be again approximately 2 meters or little over a meter?

A: I can see him even on my side. A: Yes, Sir.

Q: My question is, did you go in front of the person who assisted you? Q: Can you give us the description of this woman Sir who according to you came down and
brought down handed over your food in [sic] one of the guards?
A: No, I did not face him.198 (Underscoring ours)
A: She was in her 50’s, Sir.
When asked who handed him the food that he ate while in detention, Albert answered:
[Yam pointed to Betty in the courtroom.]
PROS. FADULLON:
PROS. CHUA CHENG:
Q: Now Mr. Witness, on that day, April 11, 2002, right after in the early morning, do you
remember if there was any other incident that happened in that place where you and Miss Q: Do you know, Mr. Witness, what kind of food that this accused you identified as Betty
Gonzales were being kept? Salvador served that lunch time?

A: At lunch time, I saw a woman who brought down some foods, A: Jollibee, Sir.

Sir. Q: Tell us, Sir when for the first time you see accused Betty Salvador?

Q: Lunch time of what date? A: The night before, Sir.


Q: The night before referring to what date, Sir?
A: April 10, Sir.
Q: Could you tell us under what circumstances did you see the accused Betty Salvador?
A; I was having a conversation with the guard who was at the stairway at that time when I
heard a woman asking questions to the guard, Sir.
Q: What question did she ask to the guard if you remember, Sir?
A: "Kumusta sila?".
Q: After that, what happened?
A: She gave the food to the guard, Sir.
Q: What food was this given to you that evening?
A: That was the only time Jollibbe was not served, it was corned beef, Sir.
PROS. FADULLON:
Q: That would be dinner time of April 10, 2002?
A: Yes, Sir.199 (Underscoring ours)
During cross examination, Albert testified having seen Betty, thus:
ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: Now, how did you see her at the time that she uttered the words, "Kumusta na sila?"
A: She was in front of me.
Q: Right in front of you?
A: I mean, she was going up the stairway. I can see her.
Q: So you want to tell us that she went down?
80
A: I did not say she went down. She was up there in the stairway coming down and she was
about to talk to the guard who was guarding us. So, when she saw the guard and said,
"Kumusta sila?", I was right there at the edge of the, at the foot of the stairway. So, I saw her.
Q: So you saw her?
A: Yes, sir.200
Albert categorically stated that on the night of April 7, 2002, Monico assisted him in
descending the stairs leading to the basement of the safehouse. Albert likewise named Betty
as the woman who brought him and Pinky corned beef for dinner on April 10, 2002, and food
items from Jollibee for lunch on April 11, 2002.
This Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive
to see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is
committed.201 It is also settled that the victim’s in-court identification is more than sufficient
to establish the identities of accused-appellants as among the malefactors,202 and previously
executed affidavits are generally considered inferior to statements that the victim gives in
open court.203 Hence, we hold that notwithstanding Albert’s failure to identify Betty and
Monico from the police line-up presented on April 12, 2002, in which the spouses were
allegedly included,
no reasonable doubt is cast upon the complicity of the latter two in the kidnapping. Further,
Betty and Monico’s postulation that if they were indeed involved, they should not have
proceeded to the scene of the rescue operations and to the police station, likewise deserves
scant consideration. There is no established doctrine to the effect that, in every instance,
non-flight is an indication of innocence.204 It is possible for the culprits to pursue unfamiliar
schemes or strategies to confuse the police authorities.205
We stress though that conspiracy transcends companionship.206 Mere presence at the locus
criminis cannot by itself be a valid basis for conviction, and mere knowledge, acquiescence to
or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent
any active participation in the commission of the crime.207
In the case at bar, Monico’s assistance extended to Albert when the latter descended the
basement stairs and Betty’s visit to the safehouse to bring food could not automatically be
interpreted as the acts of principals and conspirators in the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
People of the Philippines v. Garcia208 is instructive anent the distinctions between a
conspirator and an accomplice, viz:
In People v. De Vera, we distinguished a conspirator from an accomplice in this manner –

Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the
criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves
have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the
principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its
execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely
concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely
assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a
crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
x x x As we have held in Garcia v. CA, "in some exceptional situations, having community of
design with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an
accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking,
of a minor character." x x x.209 (Citations omitted)
Monico’s assistance to Albert when the latter descended the basement stairs and Betty’s visit
to the safehouse to bring Jollibee food items were not indispensable acts in the commission
of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. If to be solely considered, these acts, being of minor
importance, pertain to those committed by mere accomplices. Betty and Monico were not
among those persons who forcibly abducted Albert while the latter was in the vicinity of the
Coliseum. Neither did the spouses perform positive acts to actively detain Albert. What spells
the difference on why we still find the Betty and Monico as principals and co-conspirators in
the kidnapping is the circumstance that their acts coincide with their ownership of the
safehouse.
Absent his knowledge, consent or concurrence in the criminal design, the owner of a place,
which was used to detain kidnapped victims, cannot necessarily be considered as either a
conspirator or an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However, in the case of
Betty and Monico, their claim of ignorance relative to Albert’s detention in the basement of
the safehouse is belied by their presence therein. Albert positively and repeatedly testified
on the matter.
In a conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the place where the victim is
to be detained is logically a primary consideration. In the case of Betty and Monico, their
house in Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision has a basement. It can be reasonably inferred
that the house fitted the purpose of the kidnappers. Albert's detention was accomplished not
solely by reason of the restraint exerted upon him by the presence of guards in the
safehouse, but by the circumstance of being put in a place where escape became highly
improbable. In other words, Betty and Monico were indispensable in the kidnapping of
Albert because they knowingly and purposely provided the venue to detain Albert. The
spouses' ownership of the safehouse, Monico's presence therein during Albert's arrival on
the evening of April 7, 2002 and Betty's visits to bring food reasonably indicate that they
were among those who at the outset planned, and thereafter concurred with and
participated in the execution of the criminal design.
81
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the
Decision dated February 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03279 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as the amount of civil indemnity awarded to
Albert Yam y Lee, to be solidarily paid by the accused-appellants, is increased from PhP
50,000.00 to PhP 75,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence210
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
1. This is an appeal from the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03279 affirming, albeit with modifications, the conviction by the RTC herein accused-
appellants for having conspired in kidnapping Albert Yam y Lee (Albert) for the purpose of
extorting ransom. The RTC sentenced the accused-appellants to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordered them to solidarily pay Albert the amount of PhP 100,000.00
as moral damages. The CA Decision dated February 25, 2011 concurred with the RTC’s factual
findings but expressly stated in its dispositive portion the accused-appellants’ non-eligibility
for parole.
2. The Case for the Prosecution: Albert rode his Toyota Prado and drove out of the
Coliseum’s parking lot. Ahead was a white Honda Civic car while behind was a Toyota Hi-Ace
van. Upon reaching Imelda Avenue, the Hi-Ace overtook the Civic. Albert was about to follow
suit, but the Hi-Ace suddenly stopped and blocked the Civic. Six men with long firearms
alighted from the Hi-Ace. Jubert and Morey approached the Civic, pointed their guns at the
driver, who turned out to be Pinky, and motioned for her to step out of the car and ride the
Hi-Ace. Roger and Robert came near the Prado and gestured for Albert to likewise alight from
the vehicle and ride the Hi-Ace.
3. When Albert rode the Hi-Ace, he saw Marcelo in the driver’s seat and beside him was
Ricky. Morey was behind the driver. So too were Jubert. Roger and Robert rode the Hi-Ace
after Albert did.
4. Albert and Pinky were handcuffed together and made to wear dark sunglasses. The men
took Albert’s wallet containing PhP 9,000.00, his driver’s license and other documents. They
also took his Patek Philippe watch which costs PhP 400,000.00.
5. While inside the Hi-Ace, Albert and Pinky were ordered to duck their heads.
Notwithstanding the position, Albert saw the lights emanating from the blue eagle figure at
the Ateneo gym. He also heard one of the men telling the driver to pass by Balara. After
around 20 minutes, Albert also noticed having passed by the vicinity of SM Fairview. They
arrived in their destination 10 to 15 minutes after and were handcuffed separately. Albert

and Pinky stayed in the house and were fed food mostly bought from Jollibee until they were
rescued on April 12, 2002.
6. Albert told the men that he was the only person they should talk to if they wanted ransom
money. The men inquired how much he can give. Albert replied that he can shell out PhP
500,000.00. The men asked for Albert’s phone and pin number to be able to call the latter’s
wife. He was ordered to write a letter to his wife informing her that he was abducted and
indicating therein the names of persons from whom she could borrow money to be paid to
the accused-appellants as ransom. Albert also claimed that he got to talk, through the
telephone, to the person, whom the accused-appellants seemed to consider as their boss.
The boss demanded USD 1,000,000.00 for Albert’s release. One of the persons posted as
guards in the safehouse threatened Albert that the latter would be killed unless ransom
money be paid by Friday, April 12, 2002.
7. Albert and Pinky were brought to Camp Crame between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. of April
12, 2002. Some time after lunch, a police line-up with about 15 men was presented. Albert
identified seven persons, to wit, Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Morey, Jose, Robert and Roger, as
among his abductors. At that time, he was not yet able to pinpoint the rest of the
accusedappellants because they were not presented to him in the police line-up.
8. Evangeline, Albert’s wife, testified33 having received seven phone calls34 between April 7,
2002 and April 11, 2002 from the kidnappers informing her that they took Albert and
demanding USD 1,000,000.00 as ransom money. On April 11, 2002, she was instructed by the
kidnappers to go to Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe. The kidnappers were supposed to hand
to her a letter from her husband. A police operative acted as her driver. She and the police
operative got to the place between 11:30 and 11:45 in the morning. The kidnappers called
her and ordered her driver to go to the restrooms to retrieve a letter taped in one of the
toilet bowls. Evangeline went back to her car. While she was inside, three men tried to
forcibly open her car. She panicked, bowed down and screamed. She was, however, only able
to see the suspects from their chests down. Thereafter, P/Insp. Ferdinand Vero (Major Vero)
approached the car and informed her that they were able to apprehend three suspects. She
went home. The next morning, she received a call, got to talk to Albert, and thereafter
proceeded to Camp Crame.
9. The Case for the Defense: Marcelo was in his bedroom making an accounting of the
earnings of his beer house. He heard knocks at the door of his billiard hall. Thereafter,
around six unidentified men entered, punched, tied him up, and threw him at the back of a
white Revo without a plate. Marcelo was brought to Camp Crame. Marcelo denied personal
acquaintance with Albert, PO1 Pacris, Jubert, Monico and Betty.66 He admitted having been
to the Coliseum as he was into cock fighting.
82
10. Marcelo offered the testimony of Dr. de Vera, a plastic surgeon from St. Luke’s Medical
Center, Quezon City, to prove that in the morning of April 11, 2002, the former was already
under the CIDG’s custody. Dr. de Vera made a visual examination of Marcelo’s body and saw
hematoma in the sternum and fresh abrasions in both hands of the latter, but he did not
reduce his observations into writing. To stop Marcelo’s manhandling, Dr. de Vera sought
audience with the PNP Chief, but the latter was not around.
11. One of the men, who forcibly took Ricky from his rented room on April 10, 2002,
informed the latter that if he had PhP 20,000.00, he would be released. Ricky was handcuffed
and placed in a police line-up without being informed of the reason for his inclusion therein.
Ricky denied being among those who abducted Albert. He did not know Albert personally
and had not seen him before. However, Ricky admitted having been to the Coliseum and
knowing that Albert was renting the same.
12. Jose while waiting for a cab, a white Revo stopped in front of him, and three gun-toting
men alighted therefrom. A plastic bag was placed over his head making it difficult for him to
breathe, and he was repeatedly punched when he denied involvement in Albert’s
kidnapping. Further, Jose had never been to the Coliseum and had not personally met Albert
and Pinky. Jose alleged that he and the rest of the accused-appellants were mere fall guys.
Jose claimed that he only met Marcelo after they were both placed in the police lineup and in
the same detention cell.100 Jose admitted that he was acquainted with Ricky, whom he had
recommended to be a "kristo" in Araneta Cockpit. Out of fear, Jose had neither informed his
lawyer that he was mauled by the policemen nor filed any action against them.
13. Betty and Monico own the house in Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City,
where Albert and Pinky were detained. Betty testified that due to her busy schedule, she had
not visited their house in Lumbang Street during the alleged period of Albert and Pinky’s
detention. Betty and Monico had rented out for PhP 3,000.00 per month the said house to
Roger. She denied knowledge of the kidnapping incident, but she was still invited by the
police officers to go with them to Camp Crame
14. Jubert and Morey were taken out of the house where they saw Lowhen, who was
likewise boarded into a car. Out of fear of the men who seemed angry, Lowhen, Jubert and
Morey were no longer able to ask why they were being taken. They were brought to Camp
Crame. Jubert denied being among those who abducted Albert and Pinky. Jubert insisted that
on April 7, 2002, he was fixing the house of his uncle, Balanay, in Bicutan, Taguig, and with
him were the latter’s brother and two ladies. However, none of the mentioned persons
executed affidavits to corroborate Jubert’s claim as to his whereabouts on April 7, 2002.
15. Morey denied being acquainted with the other accused-appellants apart from Lowhen
and Morey. Morey initially saw Albert during the first day of hearing of the kidnapping case.

16. During cross-examination, Lowhen stated that he was on duty in the early morning of
April 11, 2002, hence, he could not have been in the basement of the safehouse where
Albert was detained at around the same time.
17. The Ruling of the RTC: The RTC rendered a Decision, the accused-appellants were
acquitted from the charges of kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Pinky. The
accusedappellants were, however, convicted of conspiring the kidnapping of, and demanding
of ransom from Albert.
18. The RTC ratiocinated that: Very critical in this case is the testimony of Albert Yam. He
testified about how the kidnapping was perpetrated; he testified that a Toyota Hi-Ace van
with eight (8) occupants blocked the path of the Honda Civic car colored white driven by
Pinky Gonzales; he (Albert Yam) was driving a Toyota Prado vehicle that was behind the
Honda Civic car of Pinky Gonzales; Albert Yam identified and named before this court four (4)
of those who alighted from the van; he testified that accused Morey Dadaan and accused
Jubert Banatao after going down from their van, approached the Honda Civic car of Pinky
Gonzales; he also identified and named Roger Pesado accompanied by Robert Gonzales who
went down from their van and approached his car; he testified that it was Roger Pesado who
told him (Albert Yam) to come out of his vehicle; he further testified about he and Pinky
Gonzales being boarded in the Toyota Hi-Ace van and identified accused Marcelo Llanora as
the driver of the van, Ricky Peña who is seated beside the driver x x x. Albert Yam also
testified that after their kidnapping ordeal, he learned that accused Jose Adelantar acted as
look out when they were being kidnapped along the road coming from the Cainta cockpit; x x
x he also testified that when the ransom was being demanded, seven (7) of their kidnappers
went down to talk to him and in court gave the name[s] of six (6) of the accused, namely:
Jubert Banatao, Morey Dadaan, Marcelo Llanora, Ricky Peña, Jose Adelantar and Lowhen
Almonte; Albert also testified that at the instance when he fell down the steps of the stairs, it
was the accused Monico Salvador who was escorting him and held him; in his testimony, he
stated that accused Betty Salvador brought the food that they ate and on one occasion, saw
her asking another accused about their condition; x x x Albert Yam testified that the ransom
demanded by the accused is in the amount of One Million Dollars and there were possibly
fifteen (15) people who were involved in the kidnapping; he further testified about the
rescue operation and was able to identify seven (7) of the accused in the police line-up but
mentioned in his testimony the names of eight (8) accused as among those whom he
identified in the police line-up; x x x Albert Yam explained in his testimony that he also
identified the accused Lowhen Almonte after the police line-up because said accused was not
among those included during the police line-up and this is in accordance with a Supplemental
Affidavit which Albert Yam identified in court. x x x The Court was able to deduce from the
testimony of Albert Yam that Monico Salvador and Betty Salvador who are admittedly the
owners of the place where Albert Yam and Pinky Gonzales were kept during the kidnapping
ordeal, were not present at the precise time that the rescue was conducted by the police.
83
19. The Ruling of the CA: The CA rendered the herein assailed Decision denying the appeal of
the accused-appellants. However, the CA modified the RTC ruling by expressly stating the
accused-appellants’ non-eligibility for parole. The most crucial evidence submitted in this
case was the positive testimony of kidnap victim Albert Yam recognizing appellants as his
abductors. Common experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take place, it
is natural for persons to remember many of the important details. The most natural reaction
of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants and
observe the manner in which the crime is committed.
Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom despite the prosecution’s failure to
overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in their favor.
Held: The instant appeal lacks merit. The CA correctly found that the essential elements
comprising the crime of kidnapping for ransom were present and that the accused-
appellants conspired in its commission.
1. People v. Uyboco, enumerated the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom, viz: In
order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely:
a. the offender is a private individual;
b. he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
c. the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and
d. in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present:
i. the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days;
ii. it is committed by simulating public authority;
iii. serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made; or
iv. the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration of his detention is
immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
2. In affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, we are guided by four-settled
doctrines enunciated in People v. Martinez, viz:

a. The trial court[‘]s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses must be accorded great respect
owing to its opportunity to observe and examine the witnesses conduct and demeanor on
the witness stand;
b. When there is no evidence to show that the prosecution witness is actuated by an
improper motive, identification of the accused-appellants as the offenders should be given
full faith and credit;
c. Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof of prior agreement by the parties to
commit a crime but that it may be inferred from the acts of the accusedappellants before,
during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to a joint purpose,
concerted action and community of interest; and
d. The respective alibis proffered by the accused-appellants cannot prevail over the
unequivocal testimony of the victim categorically and positively pointing to them as his
abductors, and for the defense of alibis, to be given full credit, they must be clearly
established and must not leave room for doubt.
3. The accused-appellants all denied being personally acquainted with Albert or having
knowledge of any grudge which the latter may harbour against them. The RTC and the CA
found Albert’s testimony on the participation of the accused-appellants as conspirators in the
kidnapping incident, and the manner by which he had subsequently identified them, as clear
and categorical.
4. The overt acts of the accused-appellants Jubert, Morey, Marcelo, Ricky, Robert, Roger,
Lowhen and Jose were undoubtedly geared towards unlawfully depriving Albert of his liberty
and extorting ransom in exchange for his release.
5. In their defense, Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Robert, Morey, Lowhen, Jose and Roger offered
their respective alibis, which fail to persuade.
6. The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in
conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind; whatever is
repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance.
7. All told, we find that the RTC and the CA did not overlook essential facts or circumstances
which may otherwise justify the acquittal of Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Robert, Morey, Lowhen,
Jose and Roger for having conspired in kidnapping Albert for the purpose of extorting
ransom. That no ransom was actually paid does not negate the fact of the commission of the
crime, it being sufficient that a demand for it was made.
84
8. If the abuses were indeed committed, we exhort the accused-appellants to initiate the
proper administrative and criminal proceedings to make the erring police officers liable. We
stress that while the criminal justice system is devised to punish the offenders, it is no less
the State’s duty to ensure that those who administer it do so with clean hands.
9. This Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive
to see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is
committed. It is also settled that the victim’s in-court identification is more than sufficient to
establish the identities of accused-appellants as among the malefactors, and previously
executed affidavits are generally considered inferior to statements that the victim gives in
open court.Hence, we hold that notwithstanding Albert’s failure to identify Betty and Monico
from the police line-up presented on April 12, 2002, in which the spouses were allegedly
included, no reasonable doubt is cast upon the complicity of the latter two in the kidnapping.
10. In People v. De Vera, we distinguished a conspirator from an accomplice in this manner –
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the
criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves
have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the
principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its
execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely
concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely
assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a
crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
11. In a conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the place where the victim
is to be detained is logically a primary consideration. Albert's detention was accomplished
not solely by reason of the restraint exerted upon him by the presence of guards in the
safehouse, but by the circumstance of being put in a place where escape became highly
improbable.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Irregularities attending the arrest of the accused-
appellants should have been timely raised in their respective motions to quash the
Informations at any time before their arraignment, failing at which they are deemed to have
waived their rights to assail the same.·It is settled that irregularities attending the arrest of
the accused-appellants should have been timely raised in their respective motions to quash
the Informations at any time before their arraignment, failing at which they are deemed to
have waived their rights to assail the same. No such motions were filed by the accused-
appellants. Further, without meaning to downplay or take the allegations of the accused-
appellants lightly, we, however, note that these were unsubstantiated as to the identities of
the offenders and uncorroborated by other pieces of evidence. To date, no complaints

against the supposed abusive police officers had yet been filed by the accused-appellants. If
the abuses were indeed committed, we exhort the accused-appellants to initiate the proper
administrative and criminal proceedings to make the erring police officers liable. We stress
that while the criminal justice system is devised to punish the offenders, it is no less the
State’s duty to ensure that those who administer it do so with clean hands.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 190318 November 27, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO VELASCO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
We resolve the present appeal from the Decision1 dated August 25, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03315, entitled People of the Philippines v. Roberto Velasco
which affirmed with modification the Decision2dated March 5, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13 in Criminal Cases No. 3579-M-2002, 3580-M-2002,
3581-M-2002 and 145-M-2003. The trial court found appellant Roberto Velasco guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of three counts of rape under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code as charged in Criminal Cases No. 3579-M-2002, 3580-M-2002 and 3581-
M-2002. The trial court also found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 145-M-2003.
The pertinent portions of the three Informations charging appellant with one count each of
the felony of rape in Criminal Cases No. 3580-M-2002, 3581-M-2002 and 145-M-2003 read as
follows:
[Criminal Case No. 3580-M-2002]
That on or about the 27th day of December 2001, in the municipality of Malolos, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being the stepfather of [Lisa3], a minor 14 years of age, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his
stepdaughter [Lisa] against her will and without her consent.4
[Criminal Case No. 3581-M-2002]
85
That on or about the 28th day of December, 2001, in the municipality of Malolos, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being the stepfather of [Lisa], a minor 14 yrs. of age, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his
stepdaughter [Lisa] against her will and without her consent.5
[Criminal Case No. 145-M-2003]
That on or about the 29th day of December, 2001, in the municipality of Malolos, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being the stepfather of [Lisa], a minor 14 years of age, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his
stepdaughter [Lisa] against her will and without her consent.6
On the other hand, the accusatory portion of the Information charging appellant with the
felony of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 3579-M-2002 stated:
That on or about the 21st day of December, 2002, in the municipality of Malolos, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, taking advantage of his moral ascendancy and influence over his stepdaughter
[Lisa], a 15-year old child, with lewd designs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously by means of force and intimidation kiss and touch the private parts of
complainant against her will and consent.7
Appellant was arraigned for the two charges of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 3580-M-2002 and
3581-M-2002; and one charge of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 3579-M-2002 on
February 3, 2003 to which he entered a plea of not guilty on all charges.8 He was later
arraigned on March 12, 2003 for the third charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 145-M-2003 to
which he likewise pleaded "not guilty."9
After pre-trial, the cases were consolidated and the trial court conducted joint hearings on
the merits. The prosecution intended to present the victim "Lisa" and Dr. Ivan Richard Viray,
the medico-legal officer who examined her. However, after "Lisa" completed her testimony,
the presentation of Dr. Viray was dispensed with upon the defense’s admission of the due
execution of the medical certificate and the stipulation of the prosecution that the cause of
the victim’s non-virgin state was not determined by Dr. Viray.10 The defense, in turn,
presented appellant and his nephew, Roderick Palconet.
The material facts according to the prosecution and restated in the Appellee’s Brief are:
Appellant is the live-in partner of [AAA], the mother of private complainant [Lisa]. [Lisa]
stayed with them in their house in x x x, Malolos, Bulacan since she was fourteen (14) years
old.

On December 27, 2001, at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, [Lisa] was at the sala
watching television. Momentarily, appellant approached her and thereafter, removed his
shorts and underwear as well as that of [Lisa’s]. He then mounted [Lisa] and inserted his
penis into her vagina. He warned her not to report the incident to anybody, otherwise, he
will kill both [Lisa] and her mother. After satisfying his lust, appellant left without saying a
word. At the time of the incident, [Lisa] and [appellant] were alone in the house as [Lisa’s]
brother and mother were out for work.
The following day, or on December 28, 2001, appellant again approached [Lisa] and removed
both their shorts and underwear. He went on top of her and inserted his penis into her
vagina. She was again threatened not to tell anyone of the incident. The incident took place
outside the family’s bedroom at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning while [Lisa’s] mother
and brother were not in the house.
The next day, or on December 29, 2001, also at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, [Lisa]
was raped for the third consecutive time by appellant while they were alone in the house.
[Lisa] testified that white fluid came out of appellant’s penis. Like in previous incidents, she
was threatened not to tell anyone of the incident.
A year thereafter, or on December 21, 2002, at midnight, when the other members of the
family were asleep, appellant attempted to insert his penis into [Lisa’s] vagina while the
latter was sleeping on her folding bed. This time, [Lisa] cried. Although appellant succeeded
in touching and kissing [Lisa’s] private parts, he did not push through with his intention of
raping her for fear of getting caught by the other family members who were sleeping just a
few feet away from them. The medico legal report submitted by public physician Richard Ivan
Viray states that [Lisa] is in a non-virgin state; that she had shallow healed hymenal
lacerations at 2 and 3 o’clock positions and deep healed lacerations at 6 and 7 o’clock
positions.11 (Citations omitted.)
Conversely, the defense offered a different version of events which was retold in the
Appellant’s Brief in this wise:
For six (6) days a week in December 2001 and December 2002, [appellant] was working as a
mason in Barangay Caingin, Malolos, Bulacan. He leaves their house at 7:00 o’clock in the
morning to go to work and arrives at 5:30 in the afternoon.
He was [the] live-in partner of [Lisa’s] mother. He was at work on the 27th, 28th and 29th of
December 2001 with his nephew Roderick Palconet while he was at home on the 21st of
December 2002. The accusations against him were instigated by [Lisa’s] father who was mad
at him for having a live-in relationship with [Lisa’s] mother.
RODERICK PALCONET, the [appellant’s] nephew and co-worker at Caingin, Malolos, Bulacan,
averred that from 8:00 o’clock in the morning to 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the 27th,
28th and 29th of December 2001, he was with [appellant].12 (Citations omitted.)
86
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court convicted appellant on all the charges leveled against
him. The dispositive portion of the March 5, 2008 Decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, given the foregoing, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape on three (3) counts as charged in Crim. Case Nos. 3579-M-02,
3580-M-02, and 3581-M-02 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count (total: three reclusion perpetua).
The Court likewise finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness in Crim. Case No. 145-M-03, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of
prision correccional as maximum.
The accused is likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱150,000.00.13
Appellant elevated his case to the Court of Appeals which denied his appeal and affirmed
with modification the trial court judgment in a Decision dated August 25, 2009, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as follows:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 3579-M-02, 3580-M-02 and 3581-M-02, appellant Roberto
Velasco is held liable to pay the victim ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00
moral damages; and ₱25,000.00 exemplary damages for each count of rape in
addition to the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. In Criminal Case No. 145-M-03, appellant Roberto Velasco is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to
four (4) years of prision correccional as maximum for the act of lasciviousness. He is
also held liable to pay the victim ₱30,000.00 moral damages and ₱20,000.00 civil
indemnity.14
Hence, appellant resorted to the present appeal, putting forward the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS ILLEGAL.
II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S
RIGHTS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF
PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS
THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE VIOLATED.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.15
The petition is without merit.
Appellant essentially focuses his defense on two issues: first, the preliminary issue
surrounding the validity of his warrantless arrest; and, second, the substantive issue
concerning the evidence used to convict him for three counts of rape and one count of acts
of lasciviousness.
With regard to purported irregularities that attended appellant’s warrantless arrest, we are
of the same persuasion as the Court of Appeals which ruled that such a plea comes too late
in the day to be worthy of consideration.
Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest
if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.16
Nevertheless, even if appellant’s warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a
scenario would still not provide salvation to appellant’s cause because jurisprudence also
instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.17
Having disposed of the issue concerning appellant’s warrantless arrest, we now undertake to
resolve the more crucial issue involving the weight and sufficiency of the evidence used to
convict appellant of the felonies he was charged with in these consolidated cases.
87
Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously gave probative weight and credence to the
alleged victim’s incredible and uniform testimony which casts doubt on her truthfulness. He
also contends that the medico-legal report’s conclusion which states that the "subject is in a
non-virgin state physically" did not prove that the victim was indeed raped. Moreover, he
claims that the alleged victim’s failure to resist or to wake her brother and mother
immediately after the alleged sexual molestation on December 21, 2002 or to shout for help
from their neighbors who were in close proximity to their house negated the credibility of
her accusations.
Appellant also reasons that the alleged victim’s willingness to live in the same house with him
despite what he allegedly did to her, taken together with her failure to immediately report
the alleged sexual assaults to the authorities, further eroded the reliability of the victim’s
statements. Finally, he points out that he could not have possibly committed the crimes
attributed to him because, during the times and dates the alleged criminal acts took place, he
claims to be somewhere else.
In short, appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. However, after a careful review of the records of this case, we can safely conclude
that such an assertion of innocence cannot be upheld.
It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things.18 Furthermore, it is axiomatic that when
it comes to evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses, great respect is
accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better position to observe the
demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide who
among them is telling the truth.19 Lastly, in order for a discrepancy or inconsistency in the
testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the
innocence of the appellant for the crime charged since the credibility of a rape victim is not
diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.20
In the case at bar, we are in full agreement with the Court of Appeals that no fact or
circumstance exists to warrant a reversal of the trial court’s assessment that the victim’s
testimony is credible and worthy of belief. We also concur with the findings of the appellate
court that the testimony of the victim was made in a candid and straightforward manner,
even on extensive cross-examination. In sum, the alleged discrepancies in the victim’s
testimony were not significant enough to successfully tilt the scales of justice in favor of
appellant.
With regard to appellant’s argument that the findings of the medico-legal report do not
support the allegation that the victim was indeed raped, we cannot give any credit to such
claim in light of established jurisprudence holding that a medical certificate is not necessary
to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape.21

We have also recently reiterated that the failure of the victim to shout for help does not
negate rape and the victim’s lack of resistance especially when intimidated by the offender
into submission does not signify voluntariness or consent.22 Furthermore, it is doctrinally
settled that "delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence,
cannot be taken against the victim"23 because "delay in reporting an incident of rape is not
an indication of a fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of
the complainant."24 It is likewise settled in jurisprudence that human reactions vary and are
unpredictable when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault, thus,
not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of
everyone.25
Thus, on the basis of the foregoing doctrines, we cannot uphold appellant’s assertion that
the victim’s lack of resistance; delay in reporting the rape incidents; and continued residence
in appellant’s place of dwelling even after she was raped numerous times militates against a
finding that the allegations of rape are true.
We likewise conclude that the lower courts’ imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua
in each charge of rape was proper, notwithstanding the mention in the Informations of the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. As the Court of Appeals noted, the
appellant’s relationship to the victim, as her stepfather, was not proven since there was no
evidence of a valid marriage between appellant and the victim’s mother.
Anent the charge of one count of acts of lasciviousness, we declare that the prosecution was
able to sufficiently prove that appellant did commit the same.
The elements of this crime under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) it is done under any of the following
circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age;
and (3) the offended party is another person of either sex.26 Furthermore, there is
jurisprudence which says that in case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the
offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.27
In the case at bar, we agree with the Court of Appeals’ finding that the testimony of the
victim was made in a straightforward and convincing manner.1âwphi1 Her testimony in this
regard detailed how she was forced and intimidated by appellant on December 21, 2002 and
how appellant succeeded in molesting her by kissing and touching her private parts, thus,
satisfying the required elements of the crime charged.
As his principal defense against all these criminal charges, appellant provided an alibi. He
maintains that, at the time of the three rape incidents as well as the one instance of acts of
lasciviousness, he was working at a construction site in Barangay Caingin, Malolos City,
Bulacan with his nephew Roderick Palconet who was the only witness he presented in court
in order to corroborate his alibi.
88
Time and again, we have repeated the legal doctrine that for alibi to prosper, it must be
proved that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.28 Furthermore, we have also
established in jurisprudence that, in order for a corroboration of an alibi to be considered
credible, it must necessarily come from disinterested witnesses.29
In the case at bar, the testimony of appellant’s sole corroborating witness reveals that the
distance between the construction site and the appellant’s house where the instances of
rape and acts of lasciviousness occurred is relatively short and can be covered by a mere five-
minute travel by motor vehicle. The relevant portion of said testimony reads as follows:
[FISCAL JOSON]
Q When you said Caingin, it was a barangay of Malolos City?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you can reach Barangay Caingin from the place of the house of Mr. Velasco up to Brgy.
Caingin, it will take only five (5) minutes ride?
A It can be if there is no traffic, sir.30
Moreover, the testimony of appellant’s nephew, which is undoubtedly coming from a close
relative, cannot, in any way, be described as disinterested and unbiased. Therefore,
considering these factual circumstances, appellant’s defense of alibi certainly cannot prosper.
In view of the foregoing, we therefore affirm the conviction of appellant for three counts of
the felony of simple rape and for one count of the felony of acts of lasciviousness. The award
of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of simple
rape is correct in addition to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, the award of
exemplary damages for each count of simple rape shall be increased to ₱30,000.00 pursuant
to prevailing jurisprudence.31 The award of ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as
moral damages for acts of lasciviousness is proper in addition to the penalty of an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years
of prision correccional as maximum.
However, before we conclude, we clarify an oversight in the assignment of case numbers to
the corresponding felonies charged which was committed by the trial court in the dispositive
portion of its March 5, 2008 Decision and repeated by the Court of Appeals in its August 25,
2009 Decision. In both rulings, the criminal charge of acts of lasciviousness was erroneously
attributed to Criminal Case No. 145-M-2003 when, in fact, the Information filed for said case
explicitly indicated the criminal charge of rape. On the other hand, the corresponding
Information as well as the evidence presented in Criminal Case No. 3579-M-2002 clearly
points to a criminal charge of acts of lasciviousness. Thus, the correct attribution of criminal

cases vis a vis crimes charged should be Criminal Case Nos. 3580-M-2002, 3581-M-2002 and
145-M-2003 were for rape; and Criminal Case No. 3579-M-2002 was for acts of
lasciviousness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 25, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03315, finding appellant Roberto Velasco GUILTY in Criminal
Case Nos. 3580-M-2002, 3581-M-2002 and 145-M-2003 for a total of three (3) counts of rape
for which he is to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, as well as, in
Criminal Case No. 3579-M-2002 for one count of acts of lasciviousness for which he is to
suffer the indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four
(4) years of prision correccional as maximum, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS
that:
(1) The exemplary damages to be paid by appellant Roberto Velasco for each count
of simple rape is increased from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) to
Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00);
(2) Appellant Roberto Velasco is ordered to pay the private offended party interest
on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila was appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan, after having been found guilty of
unlawfully selling “shabu,” in violation of Section 15 of Article III in relation to Section 2(e-2),
(f), (m), and (o) of Article 1 of “The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972” (R.A. 6425).
Velasco was apprehended in a buy-bust operation in the afternoon of June 28, 1991. Velasco
was caught in flagrante delicto as she was handing shabu to a designated poseur-buyer. Five
more decks were found in her pockets.
Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting the said decks of shabu as evidence
against her since those were acquired through a warrantless arrest. Hence, its inadmissibility.
Secondly, appellant questions the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case given the quantity allegedly
obtained in her possession.
ISSUES:
89
1.) Whether or not the decks of shabu are inadmissible as evidence for having been acquired
through a warrantless arrest.
2.) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
1.) Yes. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that an arrest
when done lawfully either by a peace officer or any private person may be done if the person
to be arrested is actually committing, has committed or attempting to commit an offense.
Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto thus her denial and defense of frame-up cannot be
justified under the said provision. Moreover, appellant failed to establish that the members
of the buy-bust team are policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous caprice when
they entrapped her.
2.) Yes. The enforcement of R.A. 7659, which amended the penalty provided for in R.A. 6425,
agrees with the appellants argument that under the foregoing directive, since the amount of
shabu involved in the instant case is only 0.8020 gram, the proper imposable component
penalty is prision correccional to be applied in its medium period, in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum shall be taken from the medium of prision correccional, which is two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor, the range of
which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.”
R.A. 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The said act vested these courts with exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years.
However, R.A. 7691 shows that retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not
yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be
understood as having retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the
Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity. RTC’s jurisdiction to proceed to the final
determination of the cause is not affected by the new legislation.
At the time that the case against appellant was filed, the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction
over the offense charged in as much as Section 39 of R.A 6425. In fine, the jurisdiction of the
trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in
force (R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the information was filed. Jurisdiction attached
upon the commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691

reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is,
to stress, prospective in nature.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is
estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move
for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment.
Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest
if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Nevertheless,
even if appellant’s warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario
would still not provide salvation to appellant’s cause because jurisprudence also instructs us
that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185719 June 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
MARCELINO COLLADO Y CUNANAN, MYRA COLLADO Y SENICA, MARK CIPRIANO Y ROCERO,
SAMUEL SHERWIN LATARIO Y ENRIQUE,* AND REYNALDO RANADA Y ALAS**, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Mere allegations and self-serving statements will not overcome the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties accorded to police officers. There must be a
showing of clear and convincing evidence to successfully rebut this presumption.
On appeal is the February 28, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 02626 which affirmed with modification the December 7, 2005 Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 154 in Criminal Case Nos. 13781-D, 13783-D and
13784-D. The RTC convicted the appellants and several other accused for violations of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and imposed
upon them the penalty of imprisonment and payment of fine in each of their respective
cases.
90
Factual Antecedents
On October 14, 2004, appellants Marcelino Collado (Marcelino) and Myra Collado (Myra)
were charged with the crimes of sale of dangerous drugs and maintenance of a den, dive or
resort in violation of Sections 5 and 6 of Article II, RA 9165 docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
13781-D and 13782-D, respectively, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13781-D
On or about October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Richard N. Noble, a
police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3)
centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.3
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13782-D
On or about or immediately prior to October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of
them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously maintain a den, dive or resort located at No. 32 R. Hernandez St., Brgy. San
Joaquin, Pasig City, where x x x dangerous drugs are used or sold in any form, in violation of
the said law.
Contrary to law.4
Marcelino was also charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11,
Article II of the same law docketed as Criminal Case No. 13783-D, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13783-D
On or about October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody
and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing six centigrams (0.06
gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found to be positive to the test for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.5

On the other hand, appellants Mark Cipriano (Cipriano), Samuel Sherwin Latario (Latario),
Reynaldo Ranada (Ranada), together with co-accused Melody Apelo (Apelo), Marwin Abache
(Abache), Michael Angelo Sumulong (Sumulong), and Jay Madarang (Madarang), were
charged with possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Section 14, Article II of RA 9165,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 13784-D, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13784-D
On or about October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, each being in the proximate company of two (2) persons and in
conspiracy with one another, without having been duly authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and
control the following paraphernalias [sic], fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering or introducing any dangerous drug into the body, to wit:
a. one (1) strip aluminum foil containing traces of white crystalline substance
marked as Exh-D;
b. one (1) improvised glass tooter containing traces of white crystalline substance
marked as Exh-D1;
c. one (1) pack transparent plastic sachet marked as Exh-D2;
d. two (2) plastic disposable lighters marked as Exhs. "G-H";
e. one (1) tape-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3) rolled
aluminum foil marked as Exh. D5;
f. five (5) unsealed transparent plastic sachets marked as Exh. D6;
g. one (1) stainless scissor marked as Exh. D7;
h. one (1) rectangular glass marked as Exh. D8; and
i. one (1) roll of aluminum foil marked as Exh. D9.
[Specimens] marked as Exh-D and Exh-D1 were found positive to the test for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.6
91
Upon arraignment on November 4, 2004, all the appellants and the other accused pleaded
not guilty.7 Pre-trial and joint trial on the merits subsequently ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented as witnesses PO2 Richard Noble (PO2 Noble) and SPO2 Bernardo
Cruz (SPO2 Cruz) who were involved in the buy-bust operation that led to the arrest of the
appellants. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On October 9, 2004, PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses
Marcelino and Myra were engaged in selling shabu and that drug users, including out-of-
school youth, were using their residence in 32 R. Hernandez St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, for
their drug sessions.8 After recording the report in the police blotter, PO2 Noble relayed the
information to his superior, P/Insp. Earl B. Castillo (P/Insp. Castillo), who in turn ordered the
conduct of a surveillance operation.9 PO2 Noble, SPO2 Cruz and PO1 Anthony Bitbit,
conducted a surveillance on the couple’s residence. After confirming the reported activities,
SPO2 Cruz looked for an asset who could introduce them to Marcelino and Myra in the
ensuing buy-bust operation.10
A buy-bust operation team was thereafter formed. After coordinating with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency as evidenced by a Pre-Operation Report,11 the team proceeded to
Marcelino’s and Myra’s residence on board two private vehicles. Upon reaching the target
area, the asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular buyer of shabu. 12 When
asked how much shabu he needed, PO2 Noble replied, "dalawang piso," which means
₱200.00 worth of drugs. But when PO2 Noble was handing over the marked money to
Marcelino, the latter motioned that the same be given to his wife, Myra, who accepted the
money. Marcelino then took from his pocket a small metal container from which he brought
out a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and gave the same to PO2
Noble. While PO2 Noble was inspecting its contents, he noticed smoke coming from a table
inside the house of the couple around which were seven persons.13 When PO2 Noble gave
the pre-arranged signal, the backup team rushed to the scene. Simultaneously, PO2 Noble
introduced himself as a policeman and arrested Marcelino. He frisked him and was able to
confiscate the metal container that contained another sachet of white crystalline substance.
PO2 Noble wrote the markings "MCC-RNN October 9, 2004" on both the plastic sachets of
white substance sold to him by Marcelino and the one found inside the metal container.
Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the house of Marcelino and
Myra, where they found Apelo, Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and Latario
gathered around a table littered with various drug paraphernalia such as an improvised
water pipe, strips of aluminum foil with traces of white substance, disposable lighters, and
plastic sachets. A strip of aluminum foil used for smoking marijuana was recovered from
Ranada. The buy-bust team arrested all these persons, advised them of their constitutional
rights, and brought them to police headquarters for investigation and drug testing.

A chemistry report14 on all the seized items yielded positive results for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride. Another chemistry report15 showed Marcelino, Apelo, Cipriano, and Ranada
positive for drug use while Myra, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang, and Latario were found
negative.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented the testimonies of Marcelino, Myra, and Ranada, who all essentially
put up the defense of denial. The following is their version of the story.
Marcelino and Myra owned an electronics and appliance repair shop annexed to their house.
In the evening of October 9, 2004, Marcelino was in the living room with his children and
nieces fixing a VCD player. Apelo, their househelp, was in the kitchen preparing food while
Ranada, their repairman, was outside the house fixing Sumulong’s motorcycle. Cipriano and
Madarang were also present at the shop, the former to redeem his car stereo and the latter
to borrow a play station CD. Latario, a housemate of Marcelino and Myra, was also present at
the time.
Marcelino suddenly heard someone say "Walang tatakbo!" Four armed men rushed inside
the house and pointed their guns at him and said "Wag ka nang pumalag." He was thereafter
dragged outside where he saw the other accused already in handcuffs. Marcelino was later
informed that they were being arrested for selling shabu. Marcelino protested and
disclaimed any knowledge about drugs. When the officers frisked all the accused, Marcelino
claimed that nothing illegal nor incriminating was recovered from them.
When Myra arrived at the scene, she was shocked to see her husband being arrested. The
police officers then brought all the accused to the police station for further questioning.
At the police station, PO2 Noble asked Marcelino for ₱50,000.00 as settlement of their case.
Marcelino, Apelo, Cipriano, and Ranada were also made to drink water that according to
Marcelino tasted bitter.16 They were then brought to Camp Crame for medical examination
and drug tests. Those who drank the bitter water tested positive for drugs use while the
others, who did not drink, tested negative.
Marcelino surmised that their arrest was due to a misunderstanding he had with a former
police officer named Rey who bought a VCD player from his shop. He specifically instructed
Rey not to let anyone repair the VCD player should it malfunction. However, when the VCD
player malfunctioned, Rey had it repaired by somebody else, hence Marcelino refused to
accept the VCD player and return Rey’s money. This earned the ire of Rey who threatened
him with the words "Humanda ka pagbalik ko."17
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision18 dated December 7, 2005, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:
92
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In Crim. Case No. 13781-D, finding the accused MARCELINO COLLADO y Cunanan and MYRA
COLLADO y Senica GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5 of
R.A. 9165 (sale of dangerous drug) and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
Additionally, the two accused are ordered to pay a fine of ONE MILLION PESOS
(₱1,000,000.00) EACH.
In Crim. Case No. 13782-D, judgment is rendered finding the accused MARCELINO COLLADO y
Cunanan and MYRA COLLADO y Senica NOT GUILTY of the crime of violation of Section 6.
In Crim. Case No. 13783-D, finding the accused MARCELINO COLLADO y Cunanan GUILTY of
the offense of violation of Section 11 of R.A. 9165 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN
(15) YEARS.
The accused Marcelino Collado is also ordered to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱300,000.00).
In Crim. Case No. 13784-D, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused MELODY APELO
y Roman, MARK CIPRIANO y Rocero, MARWIN ABACHE y Aquilino, MICHAEL ANGELO
SUMULONG y Belarmino, JAY MADARANG y Gomez, SAMUEL SHERWIN LATARIO y Enrique
and REYNALDO RANADA y Alas GUILTY of the offense of violation of Section 14 of R.A. 9165
and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, EIGHT
(8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS imprisonment. Each of them is also ordered
to pay a fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00).
Let the shabu and paraphernalia alleged to be the subject[s] of the Information be turned
over and delivered immediately to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for
proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.19
Accused Apelo, Abache, Sumulong and Madarang applied for probation.20 Hence, only
Marcelino, Myra, Cirpriano, Latario and Ranada appealed to the CA.21
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court found the warrantless arrest of the appellants to be lawful considering
that they were caught in the act of committing a crime.22 Thus, the CA affirmed the
conviction of Marcelino and Myra for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 (sale of dangerous

drugs), as well as the conviction of Marcelino for violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal
possession of dangerous drugs). Anent the violation of Section 14 of RA 9165 (possession of
drug paraphernalia), the CA affirmed the conviction of Ranada as he was caught having
custody and control of a drug paraphernalia intended for smoking and injecting illegal drugs
into one’s body.23 As regards Cipriano and Latario, as well as the other accused Apelo,
Abache, Sumulong and Madarang, the CA found them guilty not as principals but only as
accessories.
Thus, the appellate court affirmed with modification the trial court’s Decision through a
Decision24 dated February 28, 2008, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with respect to the conviction and
imposition of the respective penalties against the following: (A) appellants Marcelino Collado
and Myra Collado in Crim. Case No. 13781-D25 for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA No.
9165; (B) appellant Marcelino Collado in Crim. Case No. 13783-D for violation of Section 11,
Article II, RA No. 9165; (C) appellant Reynaldo Ranada in Crim. Case No. 13784-D for violation
of Section 14, Article II, RA No. 9165.
In Crim. Case No. 13784-D, MODIFICATION is hereby ordered as to appellants Mark Cipriano
and Samuel Sherwin Latario, including co-accused Melody Apelo, Marwin Abache, Michael
Angelo Sumulong and Jay Madarang – insofar as they were found GUILTY, not as principals,
but as ACCESSORIES in the offense of violation of Section 14, Article II of RA No. 9165, in
relation to the aforecited provision of the Revised Penal Code. Each of them shall suffer the
straight penalty of Four (4) Months of arresto mayor. The fine of Ten Thousand Pesos already
imposed by the trial court upon each of them is MAINTAINED.
SO ORDERED.26
Not satisfied, the appellants are now before this Court arguing that irregularities attended
their arrest and detention as well as the procedure in handling the specimen allegedly seized
from them. Because of these, they assert that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
Our Ruling
The appealed Decision should be affirmed, with modification.
The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties must
be upheld in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overturn the
same.
93
Appellants question the validity of the buy-bust operation and point out the following
irregularities which they claim attended its conduct: (1) lack of warrant of arrest; (2) non-
compliance with the procedures laid down under Section 21 of RA 9165; and, (3) the alleged
extortion of money from them by PO2 Noble in exchange for dropping the charges against
them. Due to these irregularities, appellants argue that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties accorded to police officers does not apply in this case.
Lack of a warrant of arrest
Appellants argue that the arrest, search, and seizure conducted by the police were illegal
since it was not supported by a valid warrant. They thus posit that their right to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated.27
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides for lawful warrantless arrests, viz:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest
to be valid, two requisites must concur: "(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer."28 A common example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after conducting a
buy-bust operation.
This is precisely what happened in the present case. The arrest of the appellants was an
arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The
arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2
Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal drug
paraphernalia. Thus, there is no other logical conclusion than that the arrest made by the

police officers was a valid warrantless arrest since the same was made while the appellants
were actually committing the said crimes.
Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they can no
longer question the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected to the same
before their arraignment. Neither did they take steps to quash the Informations on such
ground.29 They only raised this issue upon their appeal to the appellate court. By this
omission, any objections on the legality of their arrest are deemed to have been waived by
them.30
Anent their claim of unreasonable search and seizure, it is true that under the Constitution,
"a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it
becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding."31 This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, one of which
is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.32
The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a]
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant." The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after
appellants were lawfully arrested. Pursuant to the above-mentioned rule, the subsequent
search and seizure made by the police officers were likewise valid. Hence, appellants’ claim
of unreasonable search and seizure must fail.1âwphi1
Extortion
Appellants aver that PO2 Noble tried to extort money from them in exchange for dropping
the drug charges against them.
The defense of extortion and/or frame-up is often put up in drugs cases in order to cast
doubt on the credibility of police officers. This is a serious imputation of a crime hence clear
and convincing evidence must be presented to support the same. There must also be a
showing that the police officers were inspired by improper motive. In this case, we find such
imputation unfounded.
In People v. Capalad,33 this Court held thus:
Charges of extortion and frame-up are frequently made in this jurisdiction. Courts are, thus,
cautious in dealing with such accusations, which are quite difficult to prove in light of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’ duties. To substantiate
such defense, which can be easily concocted, the evidence must be clear and convincing and
should show that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive
or were not properly performing their duty. Otherwise, the police officers’ testimonies on
the operation deserve full faith and credit.
94
Here, aside from Marcelino’s self-serving testimony, appellants’ claim of extortion is not
substantiated by other convincing evidence. Neither was it established during trial that PO2
Noble or the other members of the buy-bust team were impelled by improper motive.
Appellants’ allegation that PO2 Noble and his team arrested them because of Marcelino’s
previous misunderstanding with a certain retired policeman named Rey deserves no
credence. No evidence was presented to show any connection between Rey and the buy-
bust team. It was not even shown by the defense who this person Rey really is. Also, it is
highly unlikely that a team of police officers would pursue a surveillance, conduct a buy-bust
operation, and arrest all the accused for a measly ₱1,000.00 VCD player. In view of these,
appellants’ allegation of extortion and improper motive deserves no credence.
Chain of Custody
Appellants argue that the procedure laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 was not followed.
They specifically harp on the fact that the confiscated drugs were not photographed and
inventoried. Moreover, they contend that the police officers who handled the seized
specimen were not presented in court to testify on the condition in which they received the
said specimen. For the appellants, these defects constitute a clear break in the chain of
custody and, consequently, the prosecution failed to establish corpus delicti. 34
The Court, however, finds this argument unmeritorious.
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165 provides for the custody and disposition of the
confiscated drugs, to wit:
(1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
This rule is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of RA 9165, viz:
a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/ team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizure; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these

requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the above-cited provisions, this Court has consistently ruled that the failure of
the police officers to inventory and photograph the confiscated items are not fatal to the
prosecution’s cause,35 provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
substance were preserved, as in this case. Here, PO2 Noble, after apprehending Marcelino
and confiscating from him the sachets of shabu, immediately placed his markings on them.
He testified thus:
PROSECUTOR PAZ:
Q: What did you do with that sachet containing white substance that was bought from
Marcelino and the one that you were able to confiscate from him?
A: I put my markings.
Q: What were those markings?
A: MCC-RNN October 9, 2004.36
In the Request for Laboratory Examination37 the seized items were listed and inventoried.
After the conduct of the laboratory examination, Chemistry Report No. D-807-0438 revealed
that the contents of the said sachets tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.
Moreover, it is of no moment that Forensic Chemist Alejandro De Guzman who conducted
the laboratory examination was not presented as a witness. The non-presentation as
witnesses of other persons who had custody of the illegal drugs is not a crucial point against
the prosecution.39 There is no requirement for the prosecution to present as witness in a
drugs case every person who had something to do with the arrest of the accused and the
seizure of the prohibited drugs from him.40 To stress, the implementing rules are clear that
non-compliance with the requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.41
Criminal Case No. 13784-D
With regard to Criminal Case No. 13784-D for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, we
find it imperative to re-examine the findings of both the RTC and the CA.
The RTC’s findings are as follows:
95
The evidence for the prosecution clearly shows that certain things or paraphernalia which are
fit or intended [for] smoking shabu were found in the house of the accused Marcelino and
Myra Collado on the same occasion that the said spouses were arrested by the police
officers. This fact makes all the accused without exception liable for violation of Section 14.
While it was only Reynaldo Ranada who was caught having in his possession an item used in
smoking marijuana, i.e., a strip of aluminum foil x x x and nothing was found in the
possession of the other accused, this fact nonetheless does not render Reynaldo Ranada the
only person liable for violation of Section 14. [Take note] that the law speaks not only of
possession but also of having under one’s control the paraphernalia intended for smoking. In
the instant case, the paraphernalia were found by the police on top of the table around
which the accused were gathered. Hence, even if the x x x accused other than Ranada did not
have in their possession any of the paraphernalia, it can, however, be said that the
paraphernalia found on top of the table were under their control. x x x42
Thus, the RTC found Ranada, Cipriano, Latario, Apelo Abache, Sumulong and Madarang all
equally guilty of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia.
On appeal, however, the CA found Ranada guilty as principal while Cipriano, Latario, Apelo,
Abache, Sumulong and Madarang were adjudged as accessories only for the crime of illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia. The CA ratiocinated thus:
On the one hand, we sustain the conviction of Rañada in Crim. Case 13784-D. He was actually
caught having custody and control of the confiscated drug paraphenalia intended for
smoking, injecting, etc. into one’s body. It was also indubitably shown that he failed to
present authority to possess the prohibited articles, much less, an explanation of his
possession thereof. However, as regards the other accused who were seen in the company of
Rañada, the evidence of conspiracy against them was insufficient.
To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Responsibility of a
conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but
extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.
It may be that appellants Mark Cipriano and Samuel Sherwin Latario and co-accused Melody
Apelo, Marwin Abache, Michael Angelo Sumulong, Jay Madarang were in close proximity [to]
Rañada at the time and place of the incident. But mere presence at the scene of the crime
does not imply conspiracy. The prosecution failed to show specific overt acts that would link
these accused to Ranada’s possession of the said contrabands. As to why they were there [in]
the vicinity of the crime scene was not explained. They could be mere innocent onlookers
although they were aware of the illegality of the principal’s acts.
In any event, appellants Cipriano and Latario and the rest of the accused cannot be totally
exonerated.1âwphi1 [However, we] downgrade their culpability corresponding to their
criminal design and participation. Evidently, they are guilty as accessories who, according to
 96

paragraph 1, Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, are criminally liable by ‘profiting Q: Where was this smoke coming from?
themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime’.43
A: I did not see where the smoke [was] coming from because some of the persons were
We find that the CA erred in convicting Cipriano, Latario, Apelo, Abache, Sumulong and blocking [my view].
Madarang as accessories. As pointed out by Justice Arturo D. Brion:
Q: About how many persons were inside who were seated and who were standing?
"[I]llegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs during parties, social gatherings or meetings under Section 14 of R.A. No. A: Seven (7).
9165 is a crime of malum prohibitum, that is, the act is made wrong or evil because there is a
law prohibiting it. x x x
Q: Will you tell us if they are male or female or both?

Since violation of Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165 is a crime of mala prohibita, the degree of
A: Six (6) male persons and one (1) female.
participation of the offenders is not considered. All who perpetrated the prohibited act are
penalized to the same extent. There is no principal or accomplice or accessory to consider. In
short, the degree of participation of the offenders does not affect their liability, and the Q: What are these persons who were seated inside the house doing?
penalty on all of them are the same whether they are principals or merely accomplices or
accessories.44 A: They were allegedly engaged in drug session.

In addition, Section 98 of RA 9165 specifically provides that "[n]otwithstanding any law, rule COURT:
or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3814), as
amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor offenders. Q: What do you mean allegedly?
Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death
provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to death." It is therefore clear that the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 19 on Accessories, cannot be applied in A: Because there was smoke and I did not see what they were using.
determining the degree of participation and criminal liability of Ranada’s co-accused.
PROSECUTOR PAZ:
At any rate, this Court is convinced that only Ranada should be held liable for violation of
Section 14 of RA 9165. It is clear that it was only Ranada who was caught having in his Q: What about those who were standing, what were they doing?
possession an aluminum foil intended for using dangerous drugs.45 As to the other co-
accused, namely Apelo, Abache, Cipriano, Latario, Madarang, and Sumulong, not one drug A: The persons who were standing were looking at the persons who were sitting. I could not
paraphernalia was found in their possession. The police officers were only able to find the see them clearly because some of them were blocking my view.
other drug paraphernalia scattered on top of a table. It is already established that there was
no conspiracy between Ranada and the other co-accused. As the CA correctly held, mere
Q: How far were they, those who were seated and those who were standing?
presence at the scene of the crime does not imply conspiracy.46

A: They were close to each other.

PO2 Noble, when placed on the witness stand, only testified as follows:

Q: How long did you take a look at these persons inside the house?
A: While I was checking the item that I bought, I saw several persons inside their house.

A: Only for a while, only for a glance, sir.47

Q: What were these persons doing?

On the other hand, SPO2 Bernardo Cruz testified that it was only Ranada who was caught
A: Some were seated, some were standing and there was x x x smoke.
holding the aluminum foil, viz:
 97

Q: How about the aluminum foil that you recovered from another?
A: I saw him holding the strip of aluminum foil, sir.
Q: So, nothing was confiscated in the person of all other accused except for Ranada?
A: Yes, sir.48
Therefore, Apelo, Abache, Cipriano, Latario, Madarang, and Sumulong should be acquitted of
the charge of violation of Section 14, RA 9165 on possession of equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs.
officer. A common example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after conducting a
buy-bust operation. This is precisely what happened in the present case. The arrest of the
appellants was an arrest inflagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. The arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of
selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody
illegal drug paraphernalia. Thus, there is no other logical conclusion than that the arrest
made by the police officers was a valid warrantless arrest since the same was made while the
appellants were actually committing the said crimes.

All told, this Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
by the police officers involved in this case. The defense was not able to show by clear and
convincing evidence why the presumption should be overturned. The prosecution, on the
other hand, was able to establish that Marcelino, Myra and Ranada committed the crimes
imputed against them, they having been caught in flagrante delicto. This Court, being
convinced that the guilt of Marcelino, Myra, and Ranada have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, must uphold their conviction.

As to Apelo, Abache, Cipriano, Latario, Madarang, and Sumulong, the Court finds that they
should be acquitted of the offense of violation of Section 14, Article II, RA 9165, since the
prosecution was not able to clearly show specific overt acts that would prove that they were
in possession of drug paraphernalia.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The February 28, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02626 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants Mark
Cipriano and Samuel Sherwin Latario, including co-accused Melody Apelo, Marwin Abache,
Michael Angelo Sumulong, and Jay Madarang are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of
violation of Section 14, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. They are ordered released unless
they are being lawfully held for some other cause.

SO ORDERED.

Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrests; Section 5(a) is
what is known as arrest inflagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and,
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.―Section
5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be
valid, two requisites must concur: „(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting

SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2336 November 12, 2014
(Formerly A.M. OCA-IPl No. 11-3695-RTJ)
ESTHER P. MAGLEO, Complainant,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT ATTY.
ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a sworn Complaint-Affidavit,1 dated July 12, 2011,
filed by Esther P. Magleo (complainant) charging respondents Judge Rowena De Juan-
Quinagoran (respondent judge) and Atty. Adonis A. Laure, Clerk of Court V (respondent CoC),
both of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 166, Pasig City (RTC), with Gross Misconduct, Gross
Partiality, Acts Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciciary, Violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, and Conduct Unbecoming a Court Personnel relative to Criminal Case No. 137860-
PSG, entitled People of the Philippines v. Esther Magleo y Pampolina, for Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Complainant is the accused in the aforementioned criminal case. She averred that in an
Order, dated May 13, 2010, Judge Nicanor Manalo, Jr. (Judge Manalo)granted her demurrer
to evidence and acquitted her of the charge of estafa. Thereafter, the prosecutor filed a
motion to inhibit Judge Manalo from the case which was later re-raffled to Branch 166, RTC,
Pasig City, presided over by respondent judge.
Complainant avers that, instead of motu proprio dismissing the case on ground of double
jeopardy, respondent judge through her Order, dated November 4, 2010, overturned the
order of acquittal and set the case for reception of defense evidence on February 23,
2011.2 Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by respondent
judge in her February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order.
On February 11, 2011, complainant filed a petition for certiorari (With Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order) before the Court of Appeals (CA)questioning the propriety of the Omnibus
Order.3 Complainant asserts that the November 4, 2010 and February2, 2011 orders of
respondent judge were indicative of her gross partiality and lack of knowledge of the existing
laws and jurisprudence, violating complainant’s right against double jeopardy.
She further stated that she did not receive a notice of hearing for June 8, 2011.4 Despite such
omission, respondent judge still issued a warrant of arrest on June 9, 2011. She was surprised
when agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) forcibly arrested her on June 15,
98
2011. She added that while on her way to the NBI office, a lady agent called the personnel of
Branch 166, RTC, Pasig City, to inquire on the amount of the complainant’s bail, but the
personnel said that there was no bail indicated. The personnel was said to be reluctant in
giving any information and asked, "Nadampot ninyo na ba, nadampot nyo na ba siya."5
According to complainant, she examined the order of arrest and it appeared that the amount
of bail recommended was erased to bar her from posting the bond for her temporary liberty.
She claimed that on the same day, she instructed her bondsman to proceed to Branch 166 to
inquire about the proper amount of bail. Respondent CoC and the staff, however, treated the
bondsman with hostility, annoyance and indifference.6
The next day, on June 16, 2011, complainant’s son and her lawyer talked to respondent judge
and the latter agreed to fix the amount of bail at ₱40,000.00. Respondent judge, however,
initially refused to sign the order and advised them to file a motion to lift the warrant of
arrest. Complainant averred that when her son inquired why the same was not signed, the
court secretary arrogantly said, "Huwag mo na ako tanungin, yun ang order ni Judge
makikipagtalo ka pa e sumunod ka na lang, wala ka namang magagawa."7 Thereafter, upon
filing of an ex-parte Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest, respondent judge granted the same and
complainant was released from NBI custody around 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon of the same
day. To aggravate her ordeal, police officers proceeded to complainant’s house on June 27,
2011 to enforce anew the warrantof arrest, but her counsel sent an e-mail to the arresting
officer, furnishing him a copy of the order lifting the order of arrest.8
Complainant avers that these acts show how cruel,ignorant and unorganized respondent
judge is in running her office. It would also show that respondent clerk of court and the court
staff exhibited hostility, partiality and wanton disregard of respect.
In their Joint Comment,9 dated August 10, 2011, the respondents stated that when the case
was re-raffled to Branch 166, RTC, Pasig City, in view of the inhibition of Judge Manalo, there
was a pending motion for reconsideration of the May 13, 2010 Order granting complainant’s
Demurrer to Evidence. In her February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order, respondent judge
emphasized the reasons for overturning the order granting the demurrer to evidence. In its
pertinent parts, the Omnibus Order reads:
Clearly, when the accused filed the demurrer to evidence, the prosecution has not rested its
case yet. Thus, the granting of the demurrer to evidence is not proper considering that it was
filed prematurely.
The reason why the defense is not allowed to file a demurrer to evidence before the
prosecution rests its case is best articulated in the case of Valencia vs. Sandiganbayan. The
Supreme Court discussed that:
[a] demurrer to evidence tests the sufficiency or insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence.
As such, a demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file the same must be filed after the

prosecution rests its case. But before an evidence may be admitted, the rules require that
the same be formally offered, otherwise, it cannot be considered by the court. A prior formal
offer of evidence concludes the case for the prosecution and determines the timeliness of
the filing of a demurrer to evidence.
As held in Aquino v. Sison [G.R. No. 86025, November 28, 1989, 179 SCRA 648, 651,-652], the
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence filed by the accused after the conclusion of
the cross examination of the witness for the prosecution, is premature because the latter is
still in the process of presenting evidence. The chemistry report relied upon by the court in
granting the motion to dismiss was disregarded because it was not properly identified or
formally offered as evidence. Verily, until such time that the prosecution closed its evidence,
the defense cannot be considered to have seasonably filed a demurrer to evidence or a
motion for leave to file the same.
Thus, the filing of the demurrer to evidence before the prosecution could rest its case and
the subsequent granting thereof effectively denied the prosecution’s right to due
process.10 [Emphases supplied]
The complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the
November 4,2010 and February 2, 2011 Orders, but it was dismissed by said appellate court
on August 15, 2011 for lack of merit.11
The respondents further stated that contrary to the allegations of complainant, the latter and
her counsel were duly notified of the hearing on June 8, 2011, as evidenced by: (1) the
February 23, 2011 Constancia12 with return card13showing that the notice was duly received
by complainant and her counsel; (2) the court calendar for June 8, 2011;14and (3) the
certification issued by the post office.15
The respondents also averred that complainant failed to identify the court personnel who
allegedly said "Nadampot ninyo na ba, nadampot nyo na ba siya." Moreover, they claimed
that there was nothing wrong even if the court personnel indeed asked the same. 16 With
respect to the allegation that the court personnel treated the bondsman with hostility, they
claimed that no bondsman went to their branch that day. Even assuming that the bondsman
indeed went to their branch, the court personnel were justified in not divulging any
information due to the confidentiality of the court records.17
The respondents likewise stressed that the order of arrest did not state a bond for
complainant’s temporary liberty because she jumped bail by failing to appear in court for the
June 8, 2011 hearing. Thus, the original bail bond in the amount of ₱40,000.00 was forfeited
and an order of arrest was issued.18
Respondent judge explained that she did not immediately sign the draft order granting bail
because she could not motu proprio lift the warrant of arrest as there was no motion filed by
the complainant’s lawyer.19 When complainant’s lawyer, however, filed the proper motion to
99
lift the order of arrest, she promptly acted on the motion and complainant was released
immediately from NBI custody. She alsostated that it was already beyond the control of the
court if the PNP officers attempted to serve the warrant of arrest despite the order lifting the
same.
In her 31 August 2011 Reply,20 complainant reiterates the allegations she made in her
complaint, claiming she did not receive any copy of the notice of the hearing for 08 June
2011. In their 07 September 2011 Joint Rejoinder,21respondents counters that complainant
was duly informed of the 08 June 2011 hearing. On September 16, 2011, the OCA received
complainant’s Comment22 on the Joint Rejoinder withthe attached affidavit of Ronald P.
Magleo, her son, narrating the 15th and 16th June 2011 incidents. On September 23, 2011,
the OCA received the Joint Reply23to the Comment (on the Joint Rejoinder filed by the
respondents). Finally, on October 4, 2011, complainant’s Comment24 on Respondent Judge
Joint Rejoinder was filed with the OCA.
The OCA then recommended that the administrative case be referred to the Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals, who shall cause the same to be raffled among the Justices of the said
Court, for investigation, report and recommendation.25
The Court's Ruling
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed transgressions in the
performance of their duties warranting the imposition of disciplinary penalties.
The Court rules in the negative.
At the outset, this Court finds that there is no need to refer the administrative case to the CA
as the facts and arguments stated in the pleadings are sufficient for properadjudication of
this case. Claim of Gross Partiality for reversing an Order Granting the Demurrer to Evidence
Complainant asserts that respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law and
evident partiality when she overturned the order granting the demurrer to evidence because
it would constitute as a violation to her constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Complainant argues that a dismissal due to such order is considered as acquittal which bars a
subsequent opening of the criminal case.
This Court is convinced that respondent judge acted in accordance with the law and
jurisprudence. It was the February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order26 which elucidated the clear legal
basis why respondent judge continued the criminal casedespite the earlier order granting the
demurrer to evidence. Generally, if the trial court finds that the prosecution evidence is not
sufficient and grants the accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on the
merits of the casewhich is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be appealed.27

The current scenario, however, is an exception to the general rule. The demurrer to evidence
was premature because it was filed before the prosecution rested its case. The RTC had not
yet ruled on the admissibility of the formal offer of evidence of the prosecution when
complainant filed her demurrer to evidence.28 Hence, respondent judge had legal basis to
overturn the order granting the demurrer to evidence as there was no proper acquittal. The
complainant elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certioraribut it sustained her
ruling.29 The CA decision reads:
Indubitably, an order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the
caseon the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the
accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.
To this general rule, however, the Court has previously made some exceptions.30
People v. Tan31 eruditely instructs that double jeopardy will not attach when the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as
where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was
a sham. In addition, in People v. Bocar,32 this Court rule that there is no double jeopardy
when the prosecution was not allowed to complete its presentation of evidence by the trial
court.
The circumstances obtaining in this controversy placed it within the realm of the exception.
The records demonstrate that the prosecution, with respondent Oilink International
Corporation as private complainant, had not yet rested its case when the Demurrer to
Evidence was filed and eventually granted by the RTC Branch 161.
The RTC Branch 161 should have ruled on the prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence before
acting on petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence. Having failed to do so, there is nary a doubt that
no double jeopardy attached. Petitioner’s blind insistence that she is made to face trial after
having been acquitted carries no conviction.33
Though the CA decision has not reached finality, it only goes to show that the respondent
judge acted in good faith as she merely followed precedents.
Claim of Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for not serving the Notice of Hearing
In the February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order of respondent judge, it was stated that the next
scheduledhearing was on February 23, 2011.34 On the said date, however, respondent judge
was on leave of absence due to an illness. The Constancia, dated February 23, 2011, stated
that the trial was to resume on June 8, 2011.
Complainant asserts that she did not receive the February 23, 2011 Constancia and, for said
reason, she was not able to attend the June 8, 2011 hearing. The respondents, however,
were able to submit numerous documentary proofs stating that complainant indeed received
100
the notice of hearing, to wit: (1) Certified true copy of the subject Constancia, dated February
23, 2011; together with the two return cards pasted on the back thereof; (3) the certified
true copy of the court calendar for June 8, 2011; and (4) the Post Office Certification that
complainant and her counsel were notified about the said hearing date.
Between the bare allegations of complainant that she did not receive the Constancia and the
substantiated claim of the respondents that the notices were served, the Court tends
tobelieve the latter.Thus, complainant has no acceptable excuse to be absent on the June 8,
2011 hearing. Her failure to attend now seems to be a deliberate attempt to ignore such
important trial date and the consequences of her absence are attributable to her alone.
Claim of Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for issuing a Bench Warrant
It must be noted that complainant was only granted provisional liberty when she applied for
bail. Such provisional liberty could be taken away if she would violate any of the undertakings
stated therein. One of the conditions for bail is that the accused shall appear before the
proper court whenever required by the court or the Rules of Court.35
As a consequence of failing to attend the trial when so required, a bench warrant was issued
against complainant.1âwphi1A bench warrant is defined as a writ issued directly by a judge
toa law-enforcement officer, especially for the arrest of a person who has beenheld in
contempt, has disobeyed a subpoena, or has to appearfor a hearing or trial.36 The provision
on bench warrant is expressed under Section 9, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which states
that "[w]hen a respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing,
the court may issue another order of arrest or may order the bond for his appearance to be
forfeited and confiscated, or both." (Underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence dictates that the primary requisite before a bench warrant shall be issued is
that the absent-party was duly informed of the hearing date but unjustifiably failed to attend
so.37 As stated above, complainant was undeniably notified of the June 8, 2011 hearing but
she failed to attend.
Complainant also averred that respondent judge committed erroneous conduct (1) when she
issued a bench warrant without specifically stating the amount of bail bond and (2) for not
motu proprio lifting the bail bond when complainant’s son and lawyer showed their
willingness to apply for bail.
According to respondent judge, the June 9, 2011 order of arrest failed to state a bail bond
because complainant jumped bail by failing to appear in court for hearing on June 8, 2011.
The Court finds this acceptable because when an accused fails toappear in person as
required, the bond shall be declared forfeited.38 Also, it is not required by the Rules of Court
that the amount of new bail bond be stated in the bench warrant. The Court cannot chastise
respondent judge for an act notrequired by the Rules. Absent any abuse of discretion, it is
sufficient that the bail bond was fixed after complainant was arrested. Such would bethe

proper time for the judge to consider whether to increase, decrease or retain the amount of
bail based on the guidelines.39
Moreover, there is nothing in the Rules which mandates a judge to motu proprio lift the
bench warrant once the accused expresses his intent to be released on bail. Without any
provision to the contrary, Section 1, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court40 governs such that a
motion must be filed to seek affirmative relief. In the present case, respondent judge acted
within the scope of her authority when she required complainant’s son and lawyer to file an
ex parte motion to lift the order of arrest. When the motion was filed and the prosecutor did
not express any objection, respondent judge deemed it fit to impose the same amount ofbail
at ₱40,000.00. Respondent judge immediately entertained complainant’s son and lawyer
when they came to her branch despite her scheduled hearing and as a result, complainant
was released on that same day.
In the absence of a showing that the acts complained of were done with malice or intention
to violate the law or disregard the Rules of Court or for some corrupt motive, they would, at
best, constitute errors of judgment which do not amount to serious misconduct.41
Claim of Performing Acts Unbecoming of a Judge and Court Personnel due to the court
personnel’s discourtesy
Complainant claims that respondent CoC and some court personnel were disrespectful in
conversing with her bondsman, her son, and her lawyer. During her arrest, one of the court
personnel said "Nadampot ninyo na ba, nadampot nyo na ba siya." When the bondsman
visited the branch, he claimed to have been snubbed by the personnel. Also, complainant’s
son received an arrogant remark from the court secretary stating "Huwag mo na ako
tanungin, yun ang order ni Judge makikipagtalo ka pa e sumunod ka na lang, wala ka namang
magagawa." On the other hand, the respondents denied that their court personnel made
those rude remarks, and claimed that even assuming that those remarks wereindeed made,
these were justified remarks under the circumstances of the situation.42
While the allegations of complainant were not fully substantiated, the Court disagrees with
the respondents that disrespectful remarks made by court personnel should be tolerated and
even considered "justified remarks." The respondents, and all court personnel for that
matter, should be reminded that the image of the Judiciary is mirrored in the kind of
conduct, official or otherwise, which the personnel within its employ display, from the judge
to the lowliest clerk. Impolite language and improper tone should be avoided.
Professionalism, respect for the rights of others, good manners and right conduct are
expected of all judicial officers and employees. Thus, all employees are required to preserve
the Judiciary's good name and standing as a true temple of justice.43 For such improper
remarks, the respondents and their court personnel are admonished.
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondents Judge Rowena De Juan-Quinagoran and
Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Adonis Laure is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
101
Respondents and their court personnel, however, are hereby ADMONISHED to be always
courteous in dealing with litigants and the public in the performance of official duties.
SO ORDERED.
Same; Same; Bail; One of the conditions for bail is that the accused shall appear before the
proper court whenever required by the court or the Rules of Court. It must be noted that
complainant was only granted provisional liberty when she applied for bail. Such provisional
liberty could be taken away if she would violate any of the undertakings stated therein. One
of the conditions for bail is that the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever
required by the court or the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Bench Warrant; The provision on bench warrant is expressed under Section 9,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which states that „[w]hen a respondent released on bail fails to
appear on the day fixed for the hearing, the court may issue another order of arrest or may
order the bond for his appearance to be forfeited and confiscated, or both.‰·As a
consequence of failing to attend the trial when so required, a bench warrant was issued
against complainant. A bench warrant is defined as a writ issued directly by a judge to a law
enforcement officer, especially for the arrest of a person who has been held in contempt, has
disobeyed a subpoena, or has to appear for a hearing or trial. The provision on bench
warrant is expressed under Section 9, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which states that „[w]hen
a respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing, the court may
issue another order of arrest or may order the bond for his appearance to be forfeited and
confiscated, or both.‰ (Underscoring supplied) Jurisprudence dictates that the primary
requisite before a bench warrant shall be issued is that the absent party was duly informed of
the hearing date but unjustifiably failed to attend so. As stated above, complainant was
undeniably notified of the June 8, 2011 hearingbut she failed to attend.
Same; Same; Same; There is nothing in the Rules which mandates a judge to motu proprio
lift the bench warrant once the accused expresses his intent to be released on bail. There is
nothing in the Rules which mandates a judge to motu proprio lift the bench warrant once the
accused expresses his intent to be released on bail. Without any provision to the contrary,
Section 1, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court governs such that a motion must be filed to seek
affirmative relief. In the present case, respondent judge acted within the scope of her
authority when she required complainant’s son and lawyer to file an ex parte motion to lift
the order of arrest. When the motion was filed and the prosecutor did not express any
objection, respondent judge deemed it fit to impose the same amount of bail at P40,000.00.
Respondent judge immediately entertained complainant’s son and lawyer when they came
to her branch despite her scheduled hearing and as a result, complainant was released on
that same day.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191260 November 24, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MELCHOR D. BRITA, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the November 18, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03561 that denied the appeal filed therewith and affirmed the April 15,
2008 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 70, Taguig City finding appellant
Melchor D. Brita alias "Boboy" (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
Factual Antecedents
On October 24, 2002, two separate Informations3 were filed against appellant before the RTC
of Pasig City. One was for selling 0.19 gram of shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II of RA
9165, as amended, and the other for illegal possession of 1.56 grams of shabu, in violation of
Section 11, Article II of the same law. The cases were raffled to Branch 165 of the said RTC
(RTC-Pasig, Branch 165).
Immediately after his arraignment on February 11, 2003 wherein he pleaded not guilty to
both charges, appellant filed a Petition for Bail.4 During the bail hearing, the prosecution
presented PO2 Archibald Tejero (PO2 Tejero) and PO3 Edgar Orias (PO3 Orias). Their
testimonies5 revealed that in the afternoon of October 23, 2002, upon being told by a
confidential informant that a certain "Boboy" (later identified as the appellant) was engaged
in rampant selling of illegal drugs in Western Bicutan, Taguig, Police Inspector Eduardo
Paningbatan (P/Insp. Paningbatan), Chief of the Taguig Police Station, Drug Enforcement
Unit, set up a buy-bust team. PO2 Tejero was designated asthe poseur-buyer and was given
₱500.00 as buy-bust money marked with "AT."
At about 4:30 p.m. of the same day, the buy-bust team went to the house of appellant. The
informant, together with PO2 Tejero, called appellant who thereupon came out of his house
and approached them. After having been introduced by the informant to the appellant as a
potential buyer of shabuworth ₱500.00, PO2 Tejero gave appellant the marked money. In
return, appellant took from his right pocket a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance and handed the same to PO2 Tejero. PO2 Tejero then executed the pre-arranged
signal by lighting a cigarette. Thereupon, PO3 Orias and the rest of the team rushed to the
102
scene. Alarmed, appellant went inside his house but was caught by the police officers. After
he was placed under arrest, PO2 Tejero recovered from appellant the buy-bust money. Anent
the white crystalline substance he bought from appellant, PO2 Tejero marked the plastic
sachet thereof with "MDB-1."
Meanwhile, PO3 Orias frisked appellant and found in his possession two plastic sachets
containing suspected shabu. PO3 Orias marked the recovered plastic sachets with "MDB-2"
and "MDB-3."
Thereafter, the team brought appellant and the confiscated items to the Taguig Police
Station. The seized items were turned over to P/Insp. Paningbatan, who in turn gave the
same to the investigator/evidence custodian. After preparing the request for laboratory
examination of the specimen, PO2 Tejero and the investigator brought the specimen to the
PNP Crime Laboratory. Per Physical Science Report No. D-1542-02,6 the substance tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
In support of his Petition for Bail, appellant offered the testimonies of Maygene Fernandez
(Fernandez), the daughter-in-law of appellant’s common-law wife, and Olivia Duhaylongsod
(Duhaylongsod), a neighbor. Their testimonies aimed to establish that when appellant was
arrested, no buy-bust operation was actually conducted and that no shabuwas recovered
from him.
Fernandez testified that at the time of the alleged buy-bust operation, appellant was actually
sleeping in a roomat the second floor of their house. Suddenly, police officers entered their
house. When appellant emerged from the room and saw them, he asked for a
searchwarrant. The police officers, however, did not respond and instead immediately
handcuffed appellant. Fernandez further testified that appellant was not frisked and that she
did not see any sachet of drugs at the time of the incident.7
For her part, Duhaylongsod testified that she saw two men enter an opening in the back
portion of appellant’s house. She did not see appellant or his commonlaw wife when the
men made their entry.8
The RTC-Pasig, Branch 165, however, did not resolve the Petition for Bail until after the
prosecution rested its case9and appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence10 with prior leave.11 In
an Omnibus Order12 dated December 28, 2004, RTC-Pasig, Branch 165 denied both
appellant’s Petition for Bail and Demurrer to Evidence as it found the evidence against
appellant for the charge of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 strong. However, it
dismissed the case for violation of Section 11, Article II of the same law as itfound that the
guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Subsequently, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Transfer/Re-Raffle13 which was granted by
RTC-Pasig, Branch 165 in an Order14 dated October 12, 2005. Accordingly, the casewas re-
raffled to RTC-Taguig, Branch 70. RTC Taguig, Branch 70, after finding that the evidence of

the prosecution was not that strong, reconsidered and set aside the RTC-Pasig, Branch 165’s
Omnibus Order of December 28, 2004 and allowed appellant to post bail in an Order15dated
October 31, 2006.
Meanwhile, appellant, for his defense, proffered denial. He claimed that there was no buy-
bust operation and that hewas – merely a victim of frame-up.
In a Decision16 dated April 15, 2008, RTC-Taguig, Branch 70 adjudged appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00. It gave credence to the
testimonies of the police officers who were presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner. RTC-Taguig, Branch 70 ruled that the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, coupled with the object evidence consisting of the seized substance that tested
positive for shabu, sufficiently established the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the said RTC Decision through a Decision17 dated November 18,
2009.
Hence, the present appeal.
Appellant claims that the presumption of innocence cannot be overcome by the disputable
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Besides, there is reason to
doubt the credibility of the police officers as prosecution witnesses since there were
inconsistencies in their testimonies. He further argues that the grant of bail in his favor
means that the evidence of guilt is not strong. He also questions the chain of custody of the
seized specimen.
The contentions of appellant deserve scant consideration.
The Court agrees with the CA that the testimonies of PO2 Tejero and PO3 Orias established
beyond reasonable doubtappellant’s culpability. Their narrations of what really transpired
inthe afternoon of October 23, 2002, from the moment the confidential informant disclosed
to their chief the illegal activities of appellant up to the time ofhis arrest, deserve great
respect and credence as the same emanated from the direct account of law enforcement
officers who enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. It should
be noted that "[u]nless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the
buybust team were inspired by any improper motive or [did] not properly [perform] their
duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit."18 Moreover, while
appellant iscorrect that the presumption of regularity should not by itself prevail over the
presumption of innocence, still, he must be able to present a viable defense. Here, what
appellant interposed is merely denial and a claim of frame-up. "[F]or the claim of frame-up to
prosper, the defense must be able to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome
[the] presumption of regularity,"19 which it failed to do. Hence, the Court finds no error on
the part of the courts below in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance
103
of duty of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Anent the alleged
inconsistencies20 pointed out by appellant, the same were too trivial and inconsequential.
They did not deal with the central fact of the crime. It has been repeatedly held that "a few
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details
and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility."21
Appellant asserts that the grant of bail bolsters his claim that the evidence of the prosecution
is not strong enough toprove his guilt. The Court is not convinced. "[A] grant of bail does not
prevent [thetrial court, as] the trier of facts, x x x from making a final assessment of the
evidenceafter full trial on the merits."22 As the Court ruled in People v. Baldoz,23 "[s]uch
appreciation [of evidence] is at best preliminary and should not prevent the trial judge from
making a final assessment of the evidence beforehim after full trial. It is not an uncommon
occurrence that anaccused person granted bail is convicted in due course."24
Finally, appellant makes much of the factthat the police operatives failed to comply with the
requirements of the law with regard the handling of evidence, specifically the absence of the
required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to Section
21, par. 1, Article II of RA 9165 as implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of its Implementing
Rules and Regulations.25 However, it must be pointed out that it was only during appeal that
appellant raised these alleged breaches in the custody and handling of the seized evidence.
During trial, the item object of the sale was duly marked, subjected to rigid examination, and
eventually offered as evidence. Yet, at no instance did appellant manifest or even hint that
there were lapses in its safekeeping which affected its admissibility, integrity and evidentiary
value. Indeed, such failure to raise this issue during trial is fatal to the case of the defense as
held by this Court in People v. Sta. Maria26 and in subsequent cases.27 Besides, mere lapses in
procedures need not invalidate a seizure if the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items can be shown to have been preserved.28 In this regard, the Court quotes with favor the
CA' s disquisition on chain of custody, viz:
Appellant sold one (1) sachet of shabu to P02 Archibald Tejero in the buy-bust
operation.1âwphi1 P02 Tejero, after the arrest of appellant, marked the sachet "MDB-1"
before turning it over to Police Inspector Eduardo Paningbatan. Back at the station, Police
Inspector Paningbatan prepared the necessary documents for the transmittal of the sachet,
particularly the letter-request for laboratory examination. He then handed the request and
the sachet to PO 1 Saez who, together with P02 Archibald Tejero, delivered them to the PNP
Crime Laboratory. At the laboratory, the sachet was received by Police Inspector Lourdeliza
Gural, who found the sachet positive for point nineteen (.19) [gram] of Methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. The same sachet was identified in open court by P02 Tejero.29
Hence, like the courts below, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to adequately
show the unbroken chain of custody/possession of the seized item from the moment the sale
was consummated, until it was tested in the crime laboratory, and up to the time it was
offered in evidence. Clearly, its integrity and evidentiary value have not been compromised
at any stage. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of
 104

the Court of Appeals dated November 18, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03561 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Same; Criminal Procedure; Bail; A grant of bail does not prevent the trial court, as the trier of
facts, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits. Appellant
asserts that the grant of bail bolsters his claim that the evidence of the prosecution is not
strong enough to prove his guilt. The Court is not convinced. „[A] grant of bail does not
prevent [the trial court, as the trier of facts, x x x from making a final assessment of the
evidence after full trial on the merits.‰ As the Court ruled in People v. Baldoz, 369 SCRA 690
(2001), such appreciation [of evidence] is at best preliminary and should not prevent the trial
judge from making a final assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is not an
uncommon occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an
incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the
Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing
harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the
accused appears at trial.1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and
annul the resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along
with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion
To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion
and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). 4 On
June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and
Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should
probable cause be found against him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after
the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly
on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet
then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
105
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to
Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
General Hospital following his medical examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and his
Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July
8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail
because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was
strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be
reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and
physical condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile’s
Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall
have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can
he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix
the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has
not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged
with plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion
temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as
amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily
surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper
penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a
flight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the
factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained

above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing
that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated July
7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s
motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right.
Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two
(2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and
(ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he
would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled
to bail as a matter of right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of
Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of
right; th at it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that
Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail;
that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age
and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing
that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight
risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his
social standing.
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is
charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and
that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant
circumstances.
106
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,19 and further binds the court
to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at
the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or
during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court , as
follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at
the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with
death.25

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by
the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of
Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his
guilt is strong.26 Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to
bail shall be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are
bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter
of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not
strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC
has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua
is subject to judicial discretion
107
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court
has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or
not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be
allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has
been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.31The indispensability of the hearing with
notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs.
Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused
who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing
on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or
comment, as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole
basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently
witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned
ruling was intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the
persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each
individual accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on
whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence
of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to
due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and
reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the
evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not
the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other
cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can
appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present
nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court,
should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on

what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left
to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70
years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily
surrendered.35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the
Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that –
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon
Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice
it to state that the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration
that the Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an
offense punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that
has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the
accused’s favor.36
108
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the
presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime
alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply because the
determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at
the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the
Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged
in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that
the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment
for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes
of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had
been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced
a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during
the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation
in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment
of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the

medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following
conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug
therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral
artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter
monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes
2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the
Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes
3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
109
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on
recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose
significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could
lead to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because
it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions;
(3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could
indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of
ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat,
humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with
asthma or COPD.43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health
required special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his
own instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist
doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that
hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES: The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement
of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO: No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES: Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued
confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital ?
PSUPT. JOCSON: No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES: Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON: Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.
JUSTICE MARTIRES: At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator
Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused
vis a vis the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO: Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES: That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO: Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if
the condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor. 45

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail
despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already
held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the
prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law
makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ;47
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the
petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis,
and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen similar cases,
later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any
avail;" taking into consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by
the People’s Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not
active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People’s Court in sending the petitioner
to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his
lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in
order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said
People’s Court has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-
quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324)
and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were released on bail on
the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be
injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that
the People’s Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner
on bail.48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to
have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of
his defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is
to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances
110
decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is
properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of
justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at
the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to
be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to
ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the
clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion,
as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of
certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the
PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon
posting of a cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate
release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some
other lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and several others with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion
and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Upon
voluntary surrender, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and
his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled
to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly
and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted
of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come
forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he
should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of
90, his medical condition, and his social standing. In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends
 111

that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be
granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is
strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the
imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
ISSUE: Is Enrile entitled to bail? If YES, on what ground(s)?
HELD: YES, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian grounds.
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an
incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the
Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing
harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the
accused appears at trial.
been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced
a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during
the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in
both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of
him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
N.B.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail
despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.

The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee
the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is
further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from
the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged
in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that
the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment
for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes
of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had