Romania: The Ability to Surprise

Author(s): Adrian Foreman

Source: The World Today, Vol. 48, No. 8/9 (Aug. - Sep., 1992), pp. 166-168
Published by: Royal Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40396429
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 Romania: the ability to surprise
Adrian Foreman

Romania has again been demonstrating what, to many observers, challenged the West's comfortable predictions of where centres
is a lack of enthusiasm for democracy. New general elections of stability will develop. Even predictions of economic progress
have been promised since September 1991, when coal-miners now look less certain; Romania's comparatively well-developed
led anti-austerity protests to bring down the elected Nationalneighbour, Hungary, is now seen to need several years before it
Salvation Front government. Yet it took months of pleadingbecomes
and self-standing as a market economy.1
cajoling by the interim, non-party Prime Minister, TheodorThis makes Romania less of an also-ran in the competition for
essential Western investment in restructuring. Bickering in
Stolojan, with warnings of delays in vital Western aid and invest-
Parliament and poor party discipline have delayed much neces-
ment, for Parliament finally to set an election date. After over-
sary legislation, and bureaucratic resistance and simple laziness
turning several proposals, it passed legislation for presidential
have slowed the implementation of what has become law. But
and parliamentary elections on 27 September - a full year after
the ouster of the elected government. this also allowed the Romanian government to introduce painful
The many who doubt Romania's stated commitment to without the déstabilisation inherent in doing everything at
reform
democracy saw the announcement of an election date when once.
it Major devaluation of the Romanian leu in November 1991,
leading to fourfold price increases, and the reduction of subsidies
finally came less as a victory for reformists than as further proof
on basic commodities in May 1992, happened without the
that Romania is in the grip of powerful forces intent on slowing
reform. Indeed, the dominant positions retained by former demonstrations predicted by some observers.
Communists, the snail's pace of privatisation of the economy and The law to privatise the once all-embracing state enterprises,
the logjam of reform legislation delayed by Parliament, have oneledof the few framework reform laws so far promulgated, has
to a conventional view of Romania as a basket-case among been the in force since August 1991 without a single state company
emerging democracies; its new democracy unstable, its commit- being privatised. However, more than 6,000 state enterprises now
ment to reform suspect, its moribund economy - the poorest operate
in with joint-stock or limited-liability status. Equity-like
Europe after Albania - unable to attract Western investment. ownership certificates are beginning to be issued to the public.
Yet Romania is a country known to spring the unexpected. This 'commercialisation' of the state sector is, for once, ahead of
Nicolae Ceausescu astonished the West by successfully oppos- other emerging democracies, and should allow the development
ing the diktat from Moscow, even condemning the 1968 Soviet- of a robust private sector when full privatisation begins.
led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Ceausescu's nightmarish regime Private owners are now titularly in charge of more than 80 per
looked like surviving 1989, when Communist authoritycent col-of Romania's plentiful acres of farmland. The tiny amount
lapsed elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. Suddenly, atofthedirect private investment in Romania from abroad - a paltry
very end of the year, he went in the bloodiest of the region's$323m
rev- between the start of 1990 and March 1992 - masks the
olutions. So can Romania again challenge the conventional view,
largest number of individual foreign investors in the emerging
this time to produce a stable democracy and a relatively inviting
democracies; joint-venture seed corn, despite the inactive shell
market economy? The answer is, very possibly, because today companies, from which a private entrepreneurial sector is begin-
(as in the past) many general assumptions about Romania are ning to grow. A comparatively big and well-educated population
made on too cursory a reading of the runes. of 23m offers both a skilled workforce and a largely untapped
Ceausescu's resistance to Moscow's line challenged only themarket. The tortoise may be starting to catch up with the hare and
monolithic view of Soviet-led Communism. Ceausescu's prede- offer serious investment potential.
cessor, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, defied Stalin to develop heavy That conclusion, of course, begs several questions. Romania
industry. Ceausescu was simply consolidating his leadership, emerged from the December 1989 revolution way back in the
achieving hero status in a 'Latin island' among Slavs and field. A private sector, outlawed under Communism, had to be
Magyars, a country of strong nationalist traditions. The West established from scratch, an undertaking too large for quick suc-
regarded Ceausescu's essentially idiosyncratic behaviour as Apart from considerably underdeveloped tourism and
cess.
something more, pouring loans into Romania. Ceausescu, seem- under-productive agriculture, the state sector produces little that
ingly secure and perceiving Western influence as too strong, others want to buy, and certainly not at prices which would allow
pushed his population to starvation to pay all the money back.
the overabundance of inefficient heavy industry to run unsub-
Despite the adulation heaped on him during the November 1989 sidised. The political and social cost of simply closing such
Romanian Communist Party Congress, his ouster just one month unprofitable ventures as the pollution-making Slatina aluminium
later had already been signalled by a number of regional demon-
smelter and the Deva copper mines (let alone some of the Jiu
strations and increasingly public dissent from important Valley
state coal-mines, the miners' principal power-base) makes it
personalities, including Romania's most respected Communist likely that, despite current brave assertions, Romanian govern-
ideologist, Silviu Brucan. The 1907 peasant revolt (although ments will be propping up a state sector for a long time to come.
unsuccessful) had already shown that Romanians are not simplyLow productivity, poor output quality and general infrastructural
fodder for demagogues. deficiencies must be resolved. All this is not the stuff from which
Romania's underlying position looks healthier than its stunted
rapid progress is made.
achievements indicate. For a start, other countries in formerHowever, Romania has an additional, although so far only
Communist Eastern Europe have not achieved such rapid potential, engine of development - oil. It produces small quanti-
progress as suggested by their quick passage of reform legisla-
ties and has spare refining capacity at Ploiesti. But now
tion. They are sagging under the economic, political and social
America's Amoco, Canada's Occidental, Britain's Enterprise
consequences of attempting quick reform. Government crises Oil,in
and Shell (through its newly established local subsidiary) are
Poland and, in particular, the division of Czechoslovakia have
finalising Romania's first post-Communist exploration deal, on

166

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 ROMANIA THE WORLD TODAY 1 67

four of about a dozen identified sites.

The revolution produced an explosionEverything
in the number of polit- d
results of future test drilling. But
ical parties. About 100 new
parties competed oil
in the 1990 strikes
French-style
commercial viability would boost
elections, diluting Romania
opposition as Front
to the National Salvation a pote
player, strategically located between
which, as vanguard north
of the revolution, took 355 of theand sout
506 seats in
candidate for major aid theandHouse of investment.
Deputies and the Senate. TheRomania
largest opposition w
have to prove its determination
party, with 41 seats, was to avoid
a regional umbrellatheparty, the'Dutc
oil revenues strengthening its
Hungarian Democratic currency
Alliance, until o
thanks to its ethnic power-base
become uncompetitive,in so Transylvania.
as not The National
to Liberal Party (38 seats), thethe
discourage
National Peasant
aid and investment essential for Partybalanced
(13 seats) and the Social Democratic
restructur
As with the economy, so
Party even
(2 seats), more
keen to return with
to national politic
prominence from hav-
ventional view is of failure tounder
ing been banned produce stable
Communism, retreated demo
in their disap-
ing the demonstrable sea-change
pointment inside
into recrimination or extra-Parliamentary the
activity like co
Romania has, after all, street
shown demonstrations.a propensity to shoot
foot. Anti-Communists joined New parties gave clues forces with
as to which voters former
the three historical
parties had failed
after the revolution to form the to reach. The Ecological Movement
National (13 seats)
Salvation F
ically declaring an end and Party to tyranny.
(9 seats), the anti-Hungarian RomanianYet Nationalwithin
Unity
Ceausescu and his wife, PartyElena, were
(11 seats), the pro-rural executed
Democratic Agrarian Party (9by f
seats), and the
after a show trial so blatant Hungarian Romania's
that Alliance itself, were all candidates
newly for sta
ment to Western values looked
opposition suspect.
alliance-making, to harry the Front In May 199
in this Parliament
by then a competitor in and strive to take control in the next. system,
a multiparty The Civic Alliance, a over
won both presidential andresponse to Czechoslovakia's successful Civic Forum,
parliamentary formed
elections,
validate the revolutionitselfin which
in November more
1990 to promote than
anti-Communist 1,000
alliances
been killed. But after just
both within one month
and outside in office
Parliament, a somewhat disappointing the
tration, faced with large anti-government
experiment which led a broad faction to set up its own street
party a de
made a panic-stricken yearpublic
later. The electorate appeal
was not impressed for help.
by opposition per- Th
formance. In theby
coal-miners duly responded December 1991 referendum, five of thethroug
rampaging main
parliamentary
indiscriminately assaulting and opposition parties called on voters to reject
terrorising the
citizens
French-style
opposition premises - with new Constitution, sponsored
official sanction. by the Front, as anti-
Major aid donors pulled democratic. Inback, publicly
a low turnout, voters questi
accepted it approximately
Front's commitment to six to four.
reform. President Ion Ilies
senior Communist official who
But with thanked
local elections approaching, thethe miners f
message eventually
struck home.
lic-spiritedness, overnight Of 84 parties competing
achieved in the elections, pariah
virtual exactly
from which he may never fully
half formed alliances. The recover;
three historical parties,for month
together with
central Bucharest resounded to chants of 'Down with Iliescu' the Hungarian Democratic Alliance and the Ecological Party,
and 'Down with Communism' from regular anti-Front demon- which had all opposed the Constitution, joined forces together
with the Civic Alliance Party and eight other non-parliamentary
strations. Just as potential investors began to return to Bucharest,
the miners went back on the rampage in September 1991, ironi- organisations to form the Democratic Convention, strongest of
cally staging their own anti-government demonstration to bring seven separate electoral pacts. In the 41 county capitals, the
down the Front government of the Prime Minister, Petre Roman, Democratic Convention was first or second in most. In particu-
lar, it had clear wins in Bucharest, where 10 per cent of the
in protest at his monetarist policies for fast reform. Since then,
government has been by a caretaker coalition, with Parliament national electorate lives, and in Timisoara, the birthplace of the
continually delaying legislation for new elections. revolution.
Parliament, slow to deal with a queue of draft reform legislation,Only the politically less sophisticated village vote - nearly
half
was quick to pass an intrusive national security law - well before a of the electorate is rural - saved the Front from humiliation.
new constitution which, when it eventually emerged late in 1991, The Front polled 22 per cent of the national vote against the
gave considerable power to Iliescu as President. As with Iliescu,Convention's second-place 15.6 per cent in the first round; in the
second round play-off, the Front managed 38 per cent, against
others from the former Communist elite still retain power and influ-
ence in government, Parliament, the civil service, the judiciary,the
andConvention's 29.6 per cent. The Liberal Party's later deci-
in the Romanian Information Service (successor to the disbanded sion to stand by itself in parliamentary elections dampened spec-
Securitate), all without the balance of any prominent anti- ulation that the Convention might itself be poised to take over
Communist in power. Many Romanians now see the revolution as
power.
a stage-managed palace coup. At least the army has shown no signsBut the Front, beset by the bickering which had made a mock-
ery of its large parliamentary majority, had lost its self-confi-
of moving from its barracks. But all this is not the stuff from which
stable democracies are made. But now for the sea-change. dence. The local election failures brought into the open a damag-
First, and against the general trend in the emerging democra- ing rift over the pace of reform between Petre Roman, the party
cies, Romanians are retaining enthusiasm for the democratic pro- leader, and President Ion Iliescu. At the March party congress,
cess. In the first round of local elections in February 1992, theRoman, accused by conservatives of being too radical and right-
first vote for mayors and local councillors since the adventwing, of demanded a clearer break with Communism and refused to
Communism, 65 per cent of Romania's 16,6m electors turned endorse Iliescu in the next presidential election. Roman's reform
wing salvaged 154 of the Front's 355 elected deputies and
out.2 It suggests that turnout in the general election will be high.
senators; 120 others formed a new party, the Democratic
Unlike in the 1990 general election, all parties accepted the local
results as fair. This augurs well for the future. EnthusiasmNational
is Salvation Front, stressing social democracy and support
buoyed by fundamental developments in party politics. There foris Iliescu and opposing Roman as right-wing and demagogic.
now a real prospect of Romania passing one of the biggest tests Those remaining went elsewhere, formed splinter factions, or
were undeclared.
of a democracy: alternation through free and fair elections
between government and opposition. Romania thus goes into general elections with a much more

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 1 68 THE WORLD TODAY AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1 992

mature party spectrum than its democratic failures suggest. stumble over the remaining hurdles
There are catch-all parties on the centre-right - the pro-Western, as a relatively mature democracy w
reformist Front and the non-Communist Liberals, now part of the market economy, and a proven f
interim coalition government - and on the centre-left, the pro- depending on its luck with oil, a pros
Iliescu Democratic Front. The anti-Communist Democratic al power. But Romania needs highe
Convention, now the broadest church of all, has both left- and
investment soon to improve its ch
right-wing appeal, suggesting that the process of realignment luck,is the money could now be forth
yet to be completed. Other parties represent regional, factionalAt or the end of May, the United St
issue-related interests - no longer in competition for overall State, Lawrence Eagleburger, signed
power outside coalitions. The elections on 27 September should Romania. He urged American comp
be lively, with much dead wood disappearing. spoke of 'ever closer' bilateral relat
President Iliescu has also been recognising the realities. IMF agreed a new $500m loan. Not
Recently he has been portraying his break with Ceausescu port, in the largely elusive apart from hum
1970s as a break with Communism itself. He distanced himself tance, now forthcoming; there was
from the coal-miners, ignoring his promise to hold talks with Romania's delay in holding new ele
them after the Roman government's downfall. He has been its commitment to democracy. Dom
recovering Romania's reputation with Western governmentscourse, by been assessed, but external f
supervising pro- Western foreign policies at some cost to the play. To Romania's west, Yugosla
domestic economy, especially backing the anti-Saddam Hussein east, what had been the Soviet Uni
coalition and keeping Romania's distance from its neighbourunsettled.
and A stable, peaceful and
traditional ally, Serbia. He has been restrained in his use of Romania
his was becoming of strategic
from northern Europe, through B
strong constitutional powers - little different, in fact, from those
of the French President. He has spoken out strongly for liberalMiddle East.
democracy and the market economy, and against anti-Semitism Current chances of Romania not joining the instability which
and nationalist extremism. Iliescu remains favourite in the presi-
straddles it are good. Sizeable ethnic fighting inside Romania has
dential election; his re-election will not have such negative involved
con- only Transylvania, home for 2m or so ethnic
sequences for Romania's image as hitherto. Hungarians. The region is currently quiet; the Hungarian
Meanwhile, the interim government has put the coal-miners Democratic Alliance has been moderate in pressing its demands
in their place. It has continued the economic reform programme for greater ethnic autonomy, while the government has held itself
of its elected predecessor, refused the miners pay risesaloof and from virulently anti -Hungarian outbursts in Parliament,
threatened them with prosecution. The Prime Minister, Theodor meanwhile developing confidence-building measures with
Stolojan, a former Finance Minister tipped for a senior job Hungary.3
with Romania has also shown restraint over the increasing-
the World Bank who has dismissed standing for election himself,ly serious conflict in former Soviet Moldova, which Stalin
has been consistently calling for parliamentary legislationannexed
for from Romania's Bessarabia and which retains a 60 per
early elections. He successfully balanced the demands of major cent ethnic Romanian majority. While Russia develops its fence
aid donors in his regular negotiations with the trades unions; around its rival, Ukraine, by supporting the Russian-speaking
industrial action has been minimal, while bullish pronounce- separatist enclave in Trans-Dniestria, Romania has reiterated its
ments on Romania have come from the International Monetary recognition of sovereign borders, has put on ice its original idea
Fund (IMF). The Iliescu-Stolojan administration has achieved for the German-style unification of Moldova with Romania, and
several months of peace and stability without compromising has ruled out direct military involvement,4 instead promoting
democratic values. cease-fire mechanisms. It has also offered its mediation as a neu-
In today's Romania, anti -government street demonstrations, tral in the Yugoslav conflict.
once regular, are unusual. But as they dwindled, growing calls However, this could all unravel if the West is inept.
for the return of former King Michael showed how anti-govern-Reformists in Romania have repeatedly warned of the probable
ment sentiment could coalesce into doubts about the democratic consequences of too much stick and not enough carrot - the West
system the Front had established. King Michael, exiled by will come to be seen as too disinterested to help ease the pain of
Communism, was twice prevented from returning after the revo- the restructuring it has demanded, and nationalists and other less
lution by authorities fearing his potential as a focus of dissent. reformist, less manageable forces will come to the fore. The
The Front's state Constitution, modelled on the current French unpalatable consequences of that for the West probably now out-
Fifth Republic, was pushed through the December 1991 referen- weigh the debate over how strong are the real risks. It would be
dum with a clause making the republic irreversible. But leading far safer to help the existing authorities pull Romania up by the
opposition parties, crying foul with noticeable public support, bootstraps.
continued to press for a referendum specifically on the return of
the monarchy.
NOTES
In April 1992 a way forward was found. King Michael
1 . Moeen Qureshi, Vice-President in charge of operations at the World Bank,
accepted treatment as a commoner and arrived with his family on in an interview with the author, 19 November 1991.
short-term visitors' visas on what was billed as a strictly private 2. All election results from the Central Electoral Commission, Bucharest.
visit; the authorities looked the other way as crowds in excess of 3. A number of ethnic incidents in Transylvania culminated in several days of
100,000 gave the former royal family an ecstatic welcome to rioting in Turgu Mures in March 1990, and a low ebb in Romanian-Hungarian
Bucharest. Anti-government sloganising was noticeably absent.relations. In October 1991, a parliamentary report, incriminating ethnic
Hungarians for early incidents in Covasna and Harghita provinces, was heatedly
Further visits were predicted. The King spoke of his hope for a debated live on Romanian television. But earlier, in May 1991, Hungary and
permanent return without voicing any claim to his throne. The Romania had signed the world's first open-skies agreement, allowing observa-
authorities remained silent. This is but the start of a process andtion overflights of each other's territory, and relations since have been low-key.
can hardly prove democratic maturity. It is, however, a signal The Hungarian Democratic Alliance has meanwhile limited itself to parliamen-
tary calls for Hungarian language and education rights in Transylvania.
that maturation is fast taking place.
4. Romania has, however, reserved its right to help Moldova establish its
So the surprise could be that, while others in Central Europe national army.

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