Professional Documents
Culture Documents
81 CONTENTS
Editorial collective
Chris Arthur, Ted Benton, Nadine Cartner,
COMMENTARY
Andrew Collier, Diana Coole, Peter Dews, Coming In: Lesbian and Gay Politics in the Nineties
Roy Edgley, Gregory Elliott, Howard
Feather, Jean Grimshaw, Kathleen Lennon, Angela Mason ................................................................................................ 2
Joseph McCarney, Kevin Magill, Peter
Osborne, Stella Sandford, Sean Sayers,
Kate Soper ARTICLES
Issue editor Gilles Deleuze and the Redemption from Interest
Kevin Magill
Peter Hallward ............................................................................................... 6
Reviews editor
Sean Sayers Unhewn Demonstrations
Andrew Collier ............................................................................................. 22
Contributors
Angela Mason is Executive Director The Culture of Polemic:
of Stonewall, the lesbian and gay rights Misrecognizing Recognition
pressure group. Alexander García Düttmann ...................................................................... 27
Peter Hallward is based at Yale
University, working on contemporary Poor Bertie
literature and philosophy. Jonathan Rée ............................................................................................... 35
Andrew Collier teaches philosophy at
the University of Southampton and is the
author of Critical Realism (Verso). REVIEWS
Alexander Düttmann is the author of
At Odds with Aids (Stanford University István Mészáros, Beyond Capital
Press, 1996) and The Memory of Thought: Chris Arthur .................................................................................................. 41
An Essay on Heidegger and Adorno
(forthcoming from Athlone Press). Keith Burgess-Jackson, Rape: A Philosophical Investigation
Jonathan Rée teaches philosophy at Sue Lees, Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial
Middlesex University. His next book David Archard............................................................................................... 44
is The Voice: A Philosophical History
(forthcoming from HarperCollins). Morwenna Griffiths, Feminisms and the Self: The Web of Identity
Meena Dhanda............................................................................................. 46
Typing (WP input) by Jo Foster
Tel: 0181 341 9238 Alan D. Schrift, Nietzscheʼs French Legacy
Layout by Petra Pryke David Macey................................................................................................. 47
Tel: 0171 243 1464
Chris Hables Gray, ed., The Cyborg Handbook
Copyedited and typeset by Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston, eds, Posthuman Bodies
Robin Gable and Lucy Morton
Tel: 0181 318 1676 John Armitage ............................................................................................. 48
Design by Peter Osborne Cairns Craig, Out of History: Narrative Paradigms in Scottish and
British Culture
Printed by Russell Press, Radford Mill,
Norton Street, Nottingham NG7 3HN Stephen Cowley .......................................................................................... 49
Adriana Cavarero, In Spite of Plato: A Feminist Rewriting of
Bookshop distribution Ancient Philosophy
UK: Central Books,
99 Wallis Road, London E9 5LN Stella Sandford ............................................................................................ 50
Tel: 0181 986 4854 Bill Martin, Humanism and its Aftermath
USA: Bernard de Boer, 113 East Centre
Street, Nutley, New Jersey 07100, Gideon Calder .............................................................................................. 51
Tel: 201 667 9300; Ubiquity Distributors Ulrich Beck, Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk
Inc., 607 Degraw Street, Brooklyn, Ulrich Beck, Ecological Enlightenment
New York 11217, Tel: 718 875 5491; Fine
Print Distributors, 500 Pampa Drive, Austin, Matthew David and Iain Wilkinson ........................................................... 52
Texas 78752-3028. Tel: 512-452-8709
William E. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization
Cover: Vit Hopley and Yve Lomax, from Chris Erickson .............................................................................................. 53
ʻTropeʼ 1996
Coming in
Lesbian and gay politics in the nineties
Angela Mason
A
s the countdown to the general election begins, there is a rising tide of expecta-
tion among lesbians and gay men in Britain. This time we can surely expect a
new government to sweep away discrimination and finally give lesbians and gay
men the same rights and recognition enjoyed by other citizens in our society. But nothing,
of course, is that simple. Here I want to offer an assessment of where the lesbian and gay
movement stands now, the nature of our political project, the forces that will help us win
change, and the obstacles and barriers that are still to be overcome.
The turning point for the lesbian and gay movement today was undoubtedly the
passing of Section 28 of the Local Government Act, which made it unlawful for a local
authority or local education authority intentionally to promote homosexuality or teach in
schools the acceptability of homosexuality as a ʻpretend family relationshipʼ. The clause
was an attempt by the Conservative government to use the ʻgay cardʼ against ʻloony
leftʼ councils, and it played with considerable success. Within the Labour Party, ʻgaysʼ
were blamed for losing the pensionersʼ vote. Whether this was true or not, the passing
of Clause 28 marked a new beginning for lesbian and gay politics in Britain, involving a
new strategy for change and a new relationship with all the three main political parties.
The enormous anger that Clause 28 generated remobilized the lesbian and gay
community, bringing many into politics for the first time. Having resisted the first
terrible backlash against AIDS, we began to feel a growing confidence that something
could be done. Perhaps unconsciously borrowing from the concept of niche marketing,
at the same time we developed ways of organizing that recognized political differences
within our community. Stonewall and Outrage were set up almost contemporaneously:
Stonewall to create a cross-party political lobby for lesbian and gay rights, and Outrage
to keep these issues on the front pages through peaceful direct action. Although at times
both groups have wrongly sought hegemony, intense discussion about tactics has always
belied an underlying unity on the fight for equality. Indeed, legal discrimination in this
country is so universal and extreme that it is impossible for any lesbian or gay group not
to demand equality. Of course, there are differences about priorities, and it is quite clear
that over issues like marriage or gays in the military there are conflicting philosophies.
But whilst we are unequal, the egalitarian agenda is the most powerful force unifying a
community that contains so many differences in social class, race and gender.
Moreover, in the context of lesbian and gay politics the demand for equality, for human
rights, also sends a powerful message about sexual identity. The despised status of homosexu-
ality has meant literally living outside society, an existence in the demimonde, the ʻtwilight
zonesʼ. The partial decriminalization of homosexuality in 1967 did not fundamentally chal-
lenge that status. It was precisely the difference between homosexuals and other men that
was used to justify reform. Leo Abse, one of the architects of the Sexual Offences Act, said
that ʻIt was only by insisting that compassion was needed by a totally separate group, quite
A growing recognition
The modern lesbian and gay movement dates from the Stonewall riot of 1969, and the Gay
Liberation Movement to which it gave rise has precisely been about a refusal to accept
ʻprivacyʼ as a tolerable settlement, and the demand for public status and recognition. In this
sense, ʻqueerʼ theory and politics are as much a part of that aspiration as campaigns for an
equal age of consent. The right to be recognized for who we are, not tolerated or pitied in
practice, unites the queer activists and the lobbyists campaigning for civil rights. They might
understand different things about their sexuality, yet they both demand the right to be out
and recognized. Breaking down the closet doors, demanding public status, necessarily also
involves an appeal to universalistic human values, equality under the law, the right to free
expression.
But translating these aspirations into the discourse of British party politics was not
easy. The absence of a written constitution also made it difficult to challenge discrimi-
nation through the courts. Prior to 1988 much of the original force of gay liberation
politics had been lost. Lesbians largely worked in the womenʼs movement; despite many
successes, the Campaign for Homosexual Equality was not able to operate successfully
at a national political level. Much was going on. Gay News – a national lesbian and gay
weekly – was established; national counselling and self-help groups like Icebreakers and
Friend were set up. There were the beginnings of gay organization within the political
parties, but national politics remained relatively uninfluenced.
A breakthrough seemed to come when the London Labour Party recaptured the
Greater London Council, and under the leadership of Ken Livingstone embarked on
radical programmes which gave sexual politics and lesbians and gay men a central
position. Equal opportunity units seemed to provide opportunities for funding and, more
importantly, to change political practice to acknowledge the needs of lesbians and gay
men. Lesbian and gay activists flocked to join local government and the Labour Party.
However, the change was shortlived. The unthinkable happened. The GLC was closed
down by the Thatcher government, and the political backlash which led to the passing of
Section 28 left municipal socialism and the Labour Party in defensive retreat. Lesbians
and gay men had certainly achieved a new visibility. However, the débâcle of Section
28 showed how dangerous it can be for a cause to be hitched exclusively to one political
party – and, indeed, one political tendency. Lesbians and gay men were not going to be
able to piggy-back change by capturing sections of the Labour Party. It became clear
both that we were going to have to rely on our own organization and strength and that,
by whatever means, we had to win a broader basis of support and understanding through-
out society.
So how has this strategy fared? I think few would deny its success. Public awareness
of lesbian and gay issues has never been greater. Support for what I have called the
public status of lesbians and gay men is growing. A Guardian/ICM poll in 1996 found
that over 70 per cent of respondents thought that ʻa declared homosexual living in a
stable relationship with a partnerʼ should be a allowed a job in teaching, the Church, the
police, and as an MP. The number of people who admit to personally knowing lesbians
and gay men has also increased dramatically. ʻComing outʼ does work. Numerous
surveys also show major generational changes. Speaking in the House of Lords in the
age-of-consent debate, Lord Russell, with a distinctive historical flourish, said that his
students found the idea of discriminating against lesbians and gay men as inconceivable
as a proposal to burn heretics.
Deleuze writes a redemptive philosophy. In conjunction impersonal, asignificant).2 This transcendence is the
with its mainly artistic allies, it is designed to save its enabling gesture of Deleuzeʼs entire project. It is also,
readers from a situation contaminated by ʻconscious- perhaps, the source of its ultimate incoherence.
nessʼ, ʻrepresentationʼ, ʻanalogyʼ, ʻrepressionʼ, ʻlackʼ, and For Deleuze as much as for Spinoza or Suhrawardî,
ʻthe Other [autrui]ʼ. Redemption from these things, Being is defined by its singularity or univocity. ʻThere
according to Deleuze, provides immediate access to has only ever been one ontological proposition: Being
a very different kind of situation – a situation defined is univocalʼ, and ʻthe One expresses in a single
by its radical self-sufficiency, its literal, absolute, all- meaning all of the multiple.ʼ3 The Real is that which
inclusive immanence to itself. In a whole variety of creates what it perceives (or conceives, in both senses).
ways, Deleuze writes the passage from our given, Here, ʻdesire and its object are one and the same
contaminated situation, to the purer, more primordial thingʼ, and ʻthere is only one kind of production, the
situation. production of the real.ʼ4 But we, ourselves ʻproducedʼ,
Just how this self-sufficiency allows itself to be so are somehow led to distinguish between ʻrealʼ and
contaminated is the first question which Deleuze, like ʻunrealʼ (either ʻimaginaryʼ or ʻsymbolicʼ). We are
so many other redemptive writers, must confront. Like led to figure the literally true. If Real is self-constitu-
Spinoza, most obviously – but also, like the Christian ent, self-sufficient and self-expressive – originally and
St Paul or the Muslim Suhrawardî1 – Deleuzeʼs work immediately determinant – such knowledge that we
begins with the problem of an all-powerful, all-deter- have of this immanent determining force is derivative,
mining ontological principle somehow repressed or, second-order, the product of an eventual mastery. The
denied through its own power of creation. Consider- Real, in other words, is immediate but not given. What
ation of this problem throws into question some of is first given to us is a worldly condition governed
our most cherished assumptions about Deleuzeʼs work by mediation, a world ruled by plurivocal relations
– his alleged subversions of authority and the subject, between perceptions and perceived, between subjects
his refusal of ʻtotalizingʼ knowledges, and his affirm- and objects, between transcendent and transcended
ation of a radical pluralism or ʻdifferenceʼ. forces. For Deleuze as much as for Paul and Spinoza,
I will argue that Deleuze, like Spinoza, Suhrawardî the great task is to overcome such relations, to over-
or Paul, writes a relentless attack on specific, worldly come a worldly or interested mediation, so as to return
knowledges and worldly differences, in favour of an to a wholly immanent immediacy.
other-worldly redemptive force. This force is defined
by its absolute power to negate or transcend relation Models of redemption
as such. If Deleuzeʼs radical philosophy of imma- Consider briefly the more familiar models of redemp-
nence of course entails the critique of transcendence tion associated with Paul, Suhrawardî and Spinoza. If
just as it implies the refusal of negation, this very Spinozaʼs example is the most important for Deleuze,5
critique obtains only through a preliminary trans- the logic of salvation is comparable in each case. For
cendence of what might be called the ʻGivenʼ (relative, all, it follows from the definition of an all-powerful
worldly, specific, human, significant) as opposed to the God that, in Paulʼs words, ʻall that may be known of
ʻRealʼ (absolute, other-worldly, singular, inhuman or God by men lies plain before their eyes; indeed God
Compell the Reasoner to Demonstrate with unhewn spontaneously, when we are not making experiments.
Demonstrations. How can such experiments yield such knowledge,
Let the Indefinite be explored, and let every Man be rather than just the knowledge of what happens in the
Judged
experiments themselves? And why is it necessary to
By his own Works. Let all Indefinites be thrown
force nature in this way, rather than just observe what
into Demonstrations,
To be pounded to dust & melted in the Furnaces of nature would do without our interference?
Affliction. Bhaskarʼs answer, which forms the basis of
He who would do good to another must do it in critical realism, is that an experiment isolates one
Minute Particulars: mechanism of nature from the others. Under normal
General Good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite (non-experimental) conditions, the course of events is
& flatterer. co-determined by a number of mechanisms working
For Art & Science cannot exist but in minutely
together. By preventing some of these mechanisms
organized Particulars
from working, or keeping their operation constant, or
And not in generalizing Demonstrations of the Ra-
tional Power. measuring and discounting their operation, an experi-
William Blake, ʻJerusalemʼ1 ment isolates one mechanism, and shows what it is.
We may assume that when no experiment is going
This article is intended as a contribution to criti- on, the same mechanism works, but in conjunction
cal realist philosophy, not a criticism of it, but my with others.
starting point is a paradox about the critical realist An experiment, in other words, abstracts from
corpus, and my conclusion a rather surprising practi- certain mechanisms to identify others. It does not
cal consequence of it. Indeed the conclusion involves just do so in thought, but makes the abstraction real.
incorporating into a scientific realist position some It gives rise therefore to abstract laws – laws which
views which are normally associated with romantic would predict how something behaves other things
or Green critiques of science, though there is nothing being equal, but do not predict how anything will
essentially anti-scientific about them.2 behave in the real world where other things never are
The motivation of critical realist work has mainly equal. Other things are only equal when we artificially
been the rectification of method in the human sciences. make them equal – and that is just what an experi-
Roy Bhaskar in particular is explicit about his desire ment is. Experiments give rise to what may be called
that critical realism shall do this underlabouring not the abstract sciences, since they are each about one
only for the work of science but for the work of human set of laws which we have discovered by abstraction.
emancipation. This could hardly be claimed if critical They are not about particular entities of one sort or
realism limited itself to theorizing the natural sciences, another. Physics is not specially about the physical
and indeed it has been in the human sciences that world; chemistry is equally about the physical world.
critical realism has had most impact. Yet the central Chemistry is not about ʻchemicalsʼ in the sense that the
and most fundamental argument of critical realism has chemical industry produces chemicals. It is about the
been an argument from the possibility and necessity of chemical aspect of the whole physical world, including
experiment in science – and there are no experiments living organisms, for instance.
in the human sciences. Bhaskarʼs argument confirms and explains the
The central argument to which I refer goes as importance of experiments for the abstract sciences,
follows. In experiments, we make nature do what it but it also shows that the laws defining those sciences
would otherwise not have done. We do so in order to are not actualized; nothing is more fundamental to the
find out how nature produces the effects that it does physical sciences than the law of inertia, which states
One would like to be recognized as this or that indi- overcoming subject: they neither conceive the limits of
vidual, according to this or that description, since this subject nor seek its transformation.
recognition promises to overcome the splitting of what For this subject and this theory of recognition the
is to be recognized, to facilitate the incorporation question arises as to how, where and when such recog-
of what is split into some unified identity or unified nition can be recognized. When can one say, and when
life-context. According to María Zambrano in her can one know, that an individual or a group has indeed
book The Agony of Europe, first published in 1945, been recognized? That the group or the individual is
ʻEuropean manʼ strives ceaselessly towards a projected no longer recognized? Or is yet to be recognized? Is
self that is yet to be, while fleeing constantly from recognition intrinsically bound to a shared experi-
another self that still continues to lead a shadowy ence, to a regulated practice, to certain gestural or
existence within him. That is why we can supposedly specifically linguistic conventions and rules, to legal
describe European history as the story of a heresy entitlements and socio-political institutions? Or does
which procures the birth of the European individual. the process of recognition perhaps evince resistance to
The human being who splits apart into a doubled self its own recognizability, to the subject and the theory
(a given self and a projected self) is a ʻEuropeanʼ of recognition which would seek conceptually to grasp
because he or she decides to exist, to exist inde- that process? Might the struggle for recognition be
pendently of every already prevailing order. This self permanently bound to a testimony which cannot be
is grounded in a deficiency, in an absence, in a lack: measured through recourse to unambiguous criteria?
it represents a violence of existing.1
From the perspective of reflections such as these one ‘We’re queer, we’re here, so get fuckin’ used
might also understand the demand for recognition, and to it’
not merely the confession of which Zambrano speaks, Take the slogan currently circulating in North America,
as a historical attempt to overcome that splitting and ʻWeʼre queer, weʼre here, so get fuckinʼ used to itʼ, at
diremption of the human being which results from this once elliptical and utterly unambiguous. As long as
resolute decision to exist. The limits of recognition it works as a slogan, a caesura which cannot simply
would then constitute the limits of decision and of be bridged over by transferring and integrating the
resolution, because a resolute and decisive existence offensively and polemically intended phrase into a
always presupposes a self which decides to exist, a legitimate, legitimated and legitimating discourse, this
self which constitutes itself precisely in and through exclamation effectively testifies to a struggle for recog-
this founding act. There is a double limit here: first, nition. But if this slogan, this phrase, this exclamation
the limit of the birth and death of the historical or works merely as a provocation, one which ultimately
ʻEuropeanʼ subject as the limit of two comprehensive lives, like every provocation, off a secret complicity
orders (pre- and post-historical); second, the limit and solidarity with what it seeks to provoke; if those
inherent in any recognition which would enable the self who proclaim this slogan bear an already presup-
successfully to overcome its splitting into a given self posed identity, confess themselves as such bearers
and a projected self. Projects directed towards success- and thereby direct themselves toward bearers of a
fully ʻaccomplishedʼ recognition only perpetuate the different identity, precisely in order to secure equality
history of the deciding, projecting, recognizing and of treatment and status for themselves through legal,
Jonathan Rée
In the dark midwinter of 1916, Londoners had an as the Bismarckian state itself, and the young Rus-
unusual opportunity to see radical philosophical prin- sellʼs conclusion was that the only hope for ʻcommon
ciples applied to the urgent issues of the day. The peace justice and common humanityʼ was some kind of
campaigner and feminist C.K. Ogden had hired the synthesis between liberalism and socialism.
Caxton Hall for a series of eight weekly lectures on Just a century later, the young Russellʼs view of the
politics, to be given by Bertrand Russell. It was a risky prospects of Marxist politics may appear far-sighted;
venture, both financially and intellectually. Russell but it was not deeply considered and he attached
was a small-voiced weedy-looking man; although he little importance to it. He was determined to devote
was still in his early forties, he was grey-faced and his attention to mathematical logic instead, and to
grey-haired, and wore old-fashioned dark clothes. The founding a British tradition of ʻlogical analysisʼ which
fact that he was also a philosopher and mathematical would at last bring ʻscientific methodʼ to bear on
logician and Fellow of the Royal Society was not the problems of philosophy. He interrupted himself
guaranteed to compensate for his inexperience as a briefly in 1907, to stand for the National Union of
public lecturer on politics. Womenʼs Suffrage Societies in a parliamentary by-
The monumental Principia Mathematica (written election in Wimbledon. (He won a remarkable 3,000
with A.N. Whitehead) had been published in three votes, compared with 10,000 for the Tory.) He also
huge volumes between 1910 and 1913, but, as Russell took an interest in Fabian and Liberal affairs, though
knew, very few people could understand it, and most his involvement took the form of supper parties with
of them lived in France, Poland or Germany anyway. Beatrice and Sidney Webb or the philosophical prime
On the other hand, its sheer impenetrability could minister Arthur Balfour, rather than rubbing shoulders
give Russell (like Einstein a little later) a bankable with a broad political public.
reputation as a symbol of absolute braininess. Russell But by the end of 1914, apart from feeling burnt-out
himself, though, was haunted by doubts (he had been as a logician, Russell was galvanized into action by the
shaken by Wittgensteinʼs criticisms); and in any case Great War – or rather, not so much by the war itself as
he thought he had lost his capacity for doing original by the bloodthirsty relish with which it was welcomed
work in logic. So with Ogdenʼs help, he was going to by the people of Britain. He soon became an activist
launch himself on a new career, earning his living in the Union for Democratic Control and the No-Con-
as a freelance political commentator rather than a scription Fellowship, and in 1915 took a period of leave
mathematician and fellow of a Cambridge college. from Cambridge to pursue his political activities, and
He had dabbled in politics before of course; indeed prepare for the Caxton Hall lectures in January 1916.
he had been brought up political, in the home of the ʻI have something important to say on the phil-
great Victorian reforming prime minister, Lord John osophy of life and politics,ʼ Russell thought; ʻsome-
Russell, who was his grandfather. And in 1896, when thing appropriate to the times.ʼ He needed to present
he was 24, he had published a book about revolu- an account of the origins of war in general, an attack
tionary socialism called German Social Democracy. on the war then being waged against Germany, and
His experiences as a political tourist in Germany and a sketch of the prospects of socialism, liberalism and
his interviews with Liebknecht and Bebel had led feminism; and it all had to be permeated by the author-
him to fear that the nascent Marxist movement might ity of a great logician. Russell was naturally nervous;
eventually prove as violent, repressive and illiberal but in the event he was pleased with the response:
*Philip Ironside, The Social and Political Thought of Bertrand Russell: The Development of an Aristocratic
Liberalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995. 280 pp., £30.00 hb., 0 521 47383 7.
**Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude, Jonathan Cape, London, 1996. xx + 695 pp., £25.00
hb., 0 224 03026 4.
Capital futures
István Mészáros, Beyond Capital, The Merlin Press, London, 1995. xxvi + 994 pp., £45.00 hb., £14.95 pb.,
0 85036 454 X hb., 0 85036 432 9 pb.
It is now a quarter of a century since István Mészáros Lukács. Mészáros brilliantly underscores the continu-
had his first big success in Britain with Marxʼs Theory ity in the latterʼs outlook right up to the late essay
of Alienation. In the Preface to the third edition (1971) on democratization; he also shows that to the end
he promised to complement that masterly work of Lukács stuck to the Stalinist shibboleths of ʻsocialism
conceptual excavation with a study of actually exist- in one countryʼ and ʻtheʼ party as the sole agent of
ing capitalism and socialism. Other work intervened transformation. Mészáros explores Marxʼs theoretical
(notably a study of Sartre), but finally the promise difficulties, highlighting epigraphically an important
is redeemed. Beyond Capital is the first substantial unnoticed reservation expressed by Marx himself:
restatement of the case against capital, and for social- ʻwill revolution in Europe not be necessarily crushed
ism, since ʻthe fallʼ (indeed, for a good while longer), in this little corner of the world, since on a much larger
and very welcome on that account. In the face of those terrain the development of bourgeois society is still
who preach ʻthe end of historyʼ, and the dogma that in the ascendant?ʼ Today the world market predicted
ʻthere is no alternativeʼ, Mészáros remains intransi- by Marx is finally being established; for the first time
gent. He subjects capital in all its manifestations to we now live in one world (as Mészáros says, talk of
merciless critique, exposing the crying contradictions a ʻThird Worldʼ is nonsense), with all the attendant
of its apologists and the vacuity of the nostrums of its economic, ecological and ideological consequences.
would-be ʻsavioursʼ. However, it is not just a matter of Any coherent socialist project must encompass this
forcefully restating known truths (such as the fact that reality. Accordingly, the crucial question is this: under
capitalism is still founded on an alienated, and alienat- what conditions can the process of capital-expansion
ing, power, consequent on the structural subordination come to a close on a truly global scale, bringing with
of labour to capital), but pushing the argument further, it necessarily the end of crushed and perverted revo-
to overcome the limitations of Marxʼs own work and lutions, opening thereby the new historic phase of an
assess the significance of contemporary trends. Here irrepressible socialist offensive?ʼ
Mészáros has much to offer. Although deeply rooted in Part Three explores the present structural crisis of
the Marxist tradition, his thinking incorporates the new the capitalist system in detail. Here Mészáros demon-
determinants of development in the postwar period. strates the devastating effect of the ʻdecreasing rate of
The title of the present volume must be under- utilisationʼ, including its bizarre manifestation in the
stood in three senses. First it means ʻgoing beyond military-industrial complex. As he rightly points out,
capital as such and not merely beyond capitalismʼ much of the debate over ʻgrowthʼ ignores the relevance
(this important idea I will take up later); second, it of the fantastic wastefulness inherent in the capital
means going beyond what Marx himself managed to system. While the necessity of the socialist alterna-
achieve; finally, it means going beyond the original tive is reasserted, the reasons for the collapse of the
Marxian project, formulated when the full range of USSR are not evaded. As Mészáros correctly says, ʻthe
capitalʼs powers of adaptation lay beyond the horizon tragedy of Soviet type post-capitalist societies was that
of its century. they followed the line of least resistance by positing
This huge sprawling work has three main parts. socialism without radically overcoming the material
Part One analyses the nature of capital and debunks presuppositions of the capital system.ʼ In contrast, ʻthe
the claims of its apologists (e.g. Hayek). Part Two radical negation of the capitalist state and the like-
meditates on the legacy of the Russian Revolution, wise negative “expropriation of the expropriators” was
notably theorizations formulated in its shadow: here always considered by Marx only the necessary first step
History and Class Consciousness is exemplary and we in the direction of the required social transformation.ʼ
are offered what is virtually a book-length critique of He insisted that the hegemonic alternative to capitalʼs
These two books form an admirably complementary draw attention to serious problems that attend this
pair. Burgess-Jacksonʼs is a jurisprudential study of simple definition.
what the crime of rape is, why it is a crime, the forms Burgess-Jackson in fact disputes the view that there
it can take, and the defences that may be offered. is a single understanding of rape. He argues that there
Leesʼs is a study of how, in practice, rape cases are can be – and is – deep disagreement about what is
handled by the police and the judiciary, from their and is not rape, and suggestions that there are several
initial reporting through to the conduct of any even- conceptions of rape. The conservative theory construes
tual trial. Both authors are feminists and both studies rape as a trespass upon the property of the man, the
provide good reasons to be dissatisfied with the way wrong done being to he who owns the woman violated.
in which the law does deal with rape. Both write The liberal theory regards rape as an unconsented
against the background of sustained public debate sexual battery, the wrong done being to the individual
about what should and should not be regarded as rape woman whose own choices with regard to her body
at law. This debate has, in Britain, been prompted by are denied. The radical theory regards rape as but
a number of celebrated recent cases – most notably, one instance of the subordination of women by men,
the acquittal of the student Austen Donnellan and the wrong done being to the gender as a whole whose
the conviction of the solicitor Angus Diggle. It has entitlement to equal respect and consideration is dis-
also been fuelled by claims, mainly made in the con- honoured. Burgess-Jackson claims not to endorse any
servative press, that men are now being stigmatized one of these three conceptions (though his sympathies
as rapists merely for misreading sexual cues in a are clearly with the last). He does seek to show how
world where communication between the genders if their application yields different conclusions as to
fraught with difficulties and ambiguities. However, whether some act is one of rape, what makes rape
the debate has also heard contributions from feminists wrongful, and what may serve as a defence to the
worried about the overextension of the term ʻrapeʼ, the charge of rape. Some of his analyses are exemplary.
representation of women as perpetual victims, and the The chapter on ʻMarital Rapeʼ, for instance, exposes
overdramatization of the offence if unaccompanied and rebuts, with admirable clarity and conciseness,
by violence. all of the various arguments that might be offered
Both writers regard rape as a sexual crime. This to the conclusion that a husband cannot be guilty of
does not imply that it is in some sense a less serious raping his wife.
crime. Nor does it imply that rape occupies a place A problem with Burgess-Jacksonʼs approach is that,
on a continuum of behaviours which extends to con- although he is surely right to display the differences
sensual sexual interaction. Nor does it imply that between the views of the conservative, liberal and
sexual pleasure is the sole end of the rapist. Nor does radical, it is not always clear on his account whether
it imply that a number of all too familiar stereotypical these really do differ about what rape is, or only about
assumptions about the sexual character of men and what makes it wrong. If rape is unconsented sex, then
women, and about the nature of heterosexual inter- it is possible to disagree about what is wrong with
action between men and women, are true. It does mean unconsented sex for being unconsented. And this need
that rape is other than simple assault. It also requires not be a trivial dispute. But it is not a dispute about
that the crime of rape be clearly distinguished from all what rape is. We can have a single concept of rape
other kinds of sexual encounters, however unwanted, – unconsented sex – and various conceptions of rape.
regretted, unsatisfactory, or loveless some of these These conceptions can be distinguished in two regards
may be. Evidently, the matter of consent is central – how they understand consent and its absence; and
to the crime of rape. Rape is unconsented sex. What what it is about the lack of consent which makes rape
distinguishes rape from sexual intercourse is lack of morally problematic. The liberal may be wrong to
consent. However, both books, in their different ways, think that rape is only wrong for being the violation
If a book can be heaped with praise for the scale of tative philosophersʼ. In her terms, philosophy is simply
its ambition, then this one deserves mountains of it. another language, and she inhabits the community of
It aspires to convince the reader of the incapacities of philosophers just as she inhabits other communities.
the Anglo-Saxon tradition of philosophy in the fields In re-creating herself as a feminist philosopher, she is
of ʻepistemology, ethics, mind and politicsʼ, while involved in a politics informed by an understanding
simultaneously engaging us in a process of renewal of how judgements are validated by a new community
and reconstruction. The move we are enjoined to and get into circulation. Indeed, it is her view that one
make is from the ʻfalse universalisation inherent in is theorizing, in a sense, ʻsimply by publishingʼ.
mainstream philosophy towards a situated abstractionʼ Is one also doing philosophy simply by publishing?
(p. 70), particularly in discussions of personal identity Manifestly not. The mistake lies in identifying phil-
and the self. osophy as another language, rather than as an activity
Mainstream philosophy is ʻrepresentedʼ by Williams, of unravelling the grammars of languages. It is the
Parfit, Nagel and Dennett. Griffiths warns feminists not politically structured character of their involvement
to expect the work of these philosophers to illuminate with these languages that marks the exclusionary/
their concerns with the question of ʻwho or what I inclusionary features of the philosophical activity of
amʼ. In the absence of a credible analysis of their male/female, white/black, Western/Eastern philoso-
views, her warning amounts to advocating the view phers. It follows that the activity of philosophy cannot
of ʻknowledge by testimonyʼ in traditional terms. But be seriously undertaken if one fails to listen to those
it can also be redescribed as ʻtrusting othersʼ judge- who have been set up as the Other. Here the Other
mentsʼ in a certain sort of feminist terminology. This is the ʻmaleʼ philosopher. Richard Rorty is criticized
supports implicitly a dismissive attitude towards ʻmaleʼ for valorizing fear and cruelty in self-creation, when
philosophers, disappointing in a book which is duly the whole point of his work is to show how a liberal
self-conscious of its diverse audience. ironist can fulfil his only clearly articulated desire
In other contexts, trust, co-operation, love and of preventing the actual and possible humiliation of
acceptance are indeed attractive notions from most others. It may have been more appropriate to differ
feminist perspectives and, in this book, form the with him about how the job of opening oneself to
guiding pattern for a conceptual revision of the notion the pain of others is accomplished, in particular by
of self-identity as self-creation. Several good argu- questioning his commendation of the private–public
ments are offered for accepting these notions as politi- division. Ironically, his preference for literature rather
cal values. The most crucial one is that fear debilitates, than philosophy in forging human solidarity is echoed
and therefore any commitment to increasing autonomy in Griffithsʼ own use of critical autobiography. More-
for self-creation must recognize the need for ʻgenerous over, her commitment to vigilance about oppression is
patterns of cultural and political life, and the reduction not very different from Rortyʼs plea that ʻwe should
of fearʼ (p. 143). To this end, we are provided with an stay on the lookout for marginalized people.ʼ
absorbing description of how emotions and feelings are Charles Taylorʼs communitarianism is likewise
socially and interpersonally constructed in a politically found wanting for its insufficient attention to the politi-
structured environment, which opens the way for self- cal. While it is true that Taylor does not specifically
creation via a ʻpolitics of the selfʼ. focus on feminist concerns, to extend this charge to
This, for me, is where a problem emerges. If the accusation that his view is ʻnot about political
politics is about creating public spaces where fearless individualsʼ is intriguing. Once again insufficient argu-
exchanges can occur between more or less autono- ment leaves one dissatisfied. Paul Gilroy is quoted
mous selves, and these public spaces are constituted with approval; however, the claim to ʻgo beyondʼ him
by various languages of expression and communica- is made without warrant.
tion, what exactly is the role of philosophy in this The merit of Griffithsʼ constructive arguments
political process? ʻMainstream/academic philosophyʼ is seriously threatened by her brief and ineffective
is frequently derided in this book, while the author attempts to critique the position of others. Comparable
continues to identify herself as one of ʻus argumen- preceding accounts, such as Jonathan Gloverʼs on self-
There is growing interest in the human body as a cybernetic organisms, or cyborgs, which began with
subject of investigation within philosophy. Although Donna Harawayʼs powerful essay ʻA Manifesto for
primarily driven by the traditions of phenomenology Cyborgsʼ (1985). Since then, cyborgism has become a
and poststructuralism, significant contributions have central concept for many postmodern, ʻcyberfeministʼ
been made by radical feminists and in the developing philosophers and cultural critics like Anne Balsamo,
queer literature. Allucquere Rosanne Stone and Sadie Plant.
The Cyborg Handbook, however, is really concerned The Cyborg Handbook is a collection of articles
with the relationship between the body and new cyber- which attempt to define and explore these ques-
netic and prosthetic technologies like virtual reality. tions. It brings together the most important historical
For the evolution of technology renders the possibility and theoretical documents on cyborgs, particularly
of substituting physical operations and attributes, to with respect to their development in space, warfare,
restore and enhance the functioning of the body. This medicine, politics, anthropology and the technological
is achieved by assembling synthetic appliances and imaginary. It suggests that there is not just one type
modifying individual competencies through facilities of cyborg but many different types, ranging from the
contrived to heighten human effectiveness. The tech- merely ʻrestorativeʼ (i.e. replacing lost functions/limbs)
nologized body is thus furnished with a redesigned through to the ʻenhancedʼ jet pilots of the Gulf War.
exterior made up of precisely modelled electronic The editor argues that the distinction between humans
instruments, robotics and machinic devices. Not and machines is now almost imperceptible. Indeed, for
surprisingly, there has been a considerable amount him, humanity is on the threshold of a new stage of
of fascination with the philosophical significance of human-machine evolution; a stage which brings with it
Stephen Cowley
Friendly fire
The hoaxing of Social Text
W
hen the editorial committee of the US journal Social Text chose ʻScience Warsʼ
as the title for last yearʼs special double issue (nos 46–47, Spring/Summer
1996), they could hardly have guessed how apt it would prove to be – not as
a description of its contents, but of the furore it would provoke. For with this issue of
Social Text, a new front was opened up in the ʻculture warsʼ which rage in the USA over
the disputed terrain where academic discourse meets mainstream politics in the distorting
mirror of the media: a complex and treacherous battlegound of ʻscienceʼ, where political
allies can be swiftly transformed into ideological foes in a hail of friendly fire.
The spark was the revelation that Social Text had been subjected to a carefully
managed hoax. Several months previously, Alan Sokal, a professor of physics at New
York University, had submitted an article, ʻTransgressing the Boundaries: Toward a
Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravityʼ, claiming to offer support from
recent physics for various ʻpostmodernʼ epistemological positions. After some hesitation,
Social Text decided to carry it in their special issue on science. However, the day after
it appeared, another article by Sokal was published in the bimonthly Lingua Franca, in
which he exposed his own Social Text piece as a ʻparodyʼ of cultural studies of science,
intended to unmask its ʻshoddy scholarshipʼ.
His method, Sokal revealed, was to structure the article around ʻthe silliest quotes
about mathematics and physicsʼ from ʻthe most prominent academicsʼ, ʻinventing an argu-
ment praising them and linking them together.ʼ All of which, he claimed, was ʻvery easyʼ,
since he ʻwasnʼt obliged to respect any standards of evidence and logicʼ – although it will
have taken considerable industry, since the text is liberally referenced, being accompanied
by over twenty-one pages of notes and bibliography. Furthermore, Sokal argued, he had
perpetrated his hoax on behalf of the Left: specifically, that section of the Left increas-
ingly fed up with the ʻtrendyʼ obscurantism and wrong-headedness of a postmodern
cultural studies which, it believes, is undermining the prospect for ʻprogressive social
critiqueʼ by insisting upon the ʻsocial constructionʼ of reality. Nowhere are its idiocies
more apparent, so the argument runs, than in the ʻculturalʼ treatment of physical theory.
We were thus presented with a set-piece confrontation between a new, culturally-based
academic Left and its scientifically-oriented predecessor, in which the latter, apparently,
worsts the former by publicly revealing the illusory character of its clothing (intellectual
standards), and gains a rare opportunity to show off its own sense of humour into the
bargain.
The media had a field-day. The story made the cover of The New York Times (18/5/96);
it was picked up in Britain by The Observer (19/5/96); it became a subject of debate on
National Public Radio; and follow-up articles and exchanges appeared in everything from
Newsweek (3/6/96), the THES (7 & 21/6/96) and The Village Voice (21/6/96) to a host
of smaller US Left periodicals such as Tikkun and In These Times. Letters columns were
clogged with competing voices, with Sokal comically complaining about the number of
Stanley Fishʼs column-inches in the NYT (38) and refusing to continue playing there when
his own 12-incher was cut down to ʻ7.3ʼ by the lettersʼ editor (7.3!). Sokal chose instead
to post his reply on the Internet (with commentary on his threatened inches), although
how many inches it can be said to have occupied there is anyoneʼs guess. Sokal was not
alone in making use of the Internet, though, and its communities of interest have played a
Misplaced solidarity
For Sokal and his supporters, there is little doubt (they have few doubts): it demonstrates
the bogus intellectual credentials of ʻpostmodernʼ cultural studies and reaffirms the
need for the Left to turn away from ʻwishful thinking, superstition and demagogueryʼ,
to reclaim its Enlightenment roots in the ʻscientific worldviewʼ (Sokal, talk at the NYU
Forum, 30/10/96). For the editors of Social Text, matters are predictably more complex.
Clearly, they regret the publication of Sokalʼs essay and acknowledge it to have been an
error of editorial judgement. But, they argue, it was a mistake generated by a misplaced
sense of cultural-political solidarity, rather than any particular intellectual affinity with the
offending piece –as its comparison with any of the sixteen other articles in the ʻScience
Warsʼ issue (by the likes of Steve Fuller, Sandra Harding, Ruth Hubbard, Joel Kovel,
Emily Martin, Les Levidow and Hilary Rose) shows.
Both stylistically and in tone, Sokalʼs essay stands out as an anomaly, but in Andrew
Rossʼs words: ʻthe editors considered that it might be of interest to readers as a “docu-
ment” of that time-honoured tradition in which modern physicists have discovered har-
monic resonances with their own reasoning in the field of philosophy and metaphysics.ʼ
And in its own perverse way, it undoubtedly is. According to Robbins (the other main
editor of the journal, besides Ross): ʻSocial Text was hoaxed not because it liked Sokalʼs
jargon-filled references to postmodern authorities – in fact we asked him to cut them out
– but because we thought he was a progressive scientist, a physicist who was willing to be
publicly critical of scientific orthodoxies.ʼ
The mistake was thus to allow the lure of an ally within the scientific establishment
to dictate judgment about the piece; to allow political convenience to suspend intellectual
judgment. In this respect, for some, it was a representative error, whatever oneʼs concep-
tion of physics, and however much one may disagree with Sokalʼs views about science:
representative of an overly strategic approach to intellectual matters, characteristic of that
section of the cultural Left to which Social Text, broadly speaking, belongs. (Although it
should be noted that it also represents a certain cultural Marxism, which is one reason it
fell for the hoax in the first place. It takes science seriously; seriously enough to be scepti-
cal of its conventional self-understanding.) But what of the politics of the hoax itself?
Media Wars
One of the most salient aspects of the affair has been Sokalʼs recourse to the mainstream
media to conduct an ideological campaign against another section of the Left. Sokal has
used the media skilfully, both to register his hoax and to
generalise its point into a full-scale attack on ʻcultural studies
of scienceʼ and ʻpostmodern cultural studiesʼ (which he tends to
treat as equivalents). And for many on the Left, his hoax was
a welcome public counter to the attention-grabbing ʻrelativismʼ
of much recent cultural theory. Yet Sokal has also provided
the press with an ideal occasion to prosecute two of its favour-
ite pastimes – disparaging intellectualism, of any kind, and
travestying the Left – while bolstering the sagging image of
the ʻscientistʼ as a figure of authority and a man of reason and
good sense. (Relishing the ʻimpenetrable hodge-podge of jargon
[and] buzzwordsʼ in Sokalʼs hoax essay, the New York Times
(18/5/96) selected ʻhegemonyʼ and ʻepistemologicalʼ for especial
derision ... postmodern nonsense indeed!)
This was Sokalʼs major media card: his status as an ʻexpertʼ
in modern physics legitimated his views about the philosophy
of science, and thereby about the cultural study of science,