Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15388 January 31, 1961

DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, oppositor-appellant.

Ponce Enrile, S. Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for petitioner-appellee.

Lazaro A. Marquez and J. D. Quirino for oppositor-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special

Proceedings No. 29636 authorizing the special administrator of the testate estate
of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins to sell at public auction certain personal
properties left by the deceased.

It appears that said special proceedings were commenced on May 10, 1956, by a
petition presented by Dora Perkin Anderson for the probate of the supposed last
will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins, who died in Manila on April
28, 1956 allegedly possessed of personal and real properties with a probable value
of P5,000,000. On the same date of the filing of the aforesaid petition, petitioner
Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso
Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the court
issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administrator upon
his posting of a bond in the amount of P50,000. On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade
Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to the probate of
the will presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. On September 28, 1956
the special administrator submitted an inventory of all the assets which have come
to his knowledge as belonging to the deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time
of his death.

About two years later, or on September 4, 1958, the special administrator

submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some
charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left
by the deceased, such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which
were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order to avoid their
further deterioration and to save whatever value migh be obtained in their
disposition. When the motion was heard on September 25, 1958, the court required
the administrator to submit a specification of the properties sought to be sold,
and in compliance therewith, the special administrator, on October 21, 1958,
submitted to the court, in place of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the
personal properties belonging to the estate with the items sought to be sold
marked with a check in red pencil, with the statement that said items were too
voluminous to enumerate.

On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposetion to the proposed sale.
Reasons, for the opposition were that (1) most of the properties sought to be sold
were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that
unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been
made.

The opposition notwithstanding, the lower court, on December 2, 1958, approved

the proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same.
Oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins moved to reconsider this order on the grounds (1)
that said order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire
personal estate of the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, section 2. Rules of Court; (2)
that said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought to
be sold were perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the
personalty sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of
oppositor; (4) that there is evidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals
from the properties of the estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot would
prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed; and (5) that there is
also evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial part of the
personal estate.

On February 23, 1959, the lower court denied the above motion for
reconsideration. Whereupon, oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins appealed to this
court.

Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be sold not being
perishable, the special administrator has no legal authority to sell them. This
argument is untenable, because section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court,
specifically provides that the special administrator "may sell such perishable and
other property as the court orders sold", which shows that the special
administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable" property only.

It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and

preserve the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed
(sec. 2, Rule 81; De Gala v. Gonzales, 53 Phil. 104; Collins v. Henry, 118 S.E. 729, 155
Ga. 886; Sqydelko v. Smith's Estate, 244 N.W. 149, 259 Mich. 519). But it is not
alone the specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as
well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator of
perishable property (Cao vs. Cascade Silver Mines & Mills, et al., 213 P. 109 66
Mont. 488). It is in line with this general power of the special administrator to
preserve not only the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule
81, also empowers such administrator to sell "other proerty as the court ordered
sold;" .

There is, however, a serious obstacle to the proposed sale, namely, the vigorous
opposition presented thereto the appellant, the surviving spouse of the deceased,
on the ground that she is allegedly entitled to a large portion of the personal
properties in question, either because the were conjugal property of herself and
the deceased, or because they are her own, exclusive, personal property. Indeed
the records show that up to the time the propose sale was asked for and judicially
approved, no proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate the
alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of the estate
supposedly left by the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property
of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of the
ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the
conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with a
appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind
being sold to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all,
most of the items sought to be sold — pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner
ware, electrical appliances, various gadget and books — can easily be protected and
preserved with proper care and storage measures in either or both of two
residential houses (in Manila and in Baguio City left by the deceased, so that no
reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong
opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner
of a substantial portion of the personal estate in question.

The special administrator claims in his brief that t oppositor-appellant should have
indicated the alleged "fine furniture" which she did not want sold and that her
refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious claim. But it does not appear
that appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to point out which items in the
inventory she did not want sold. In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale and
later her motion for reconsideration to the order approving the same were
overruled by the court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her
opposition were not well-founded; the records do not even show that an inquiry was
made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of December 2, 1958 authorizing the special
administrator to sell certain personal properties of the estate is set aside, with
costs against the special administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and petition-appellee
Dora Perkins Anderson.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes and
Dizon, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez David, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 160671 April 30, 2008

LUIS L. CO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City, ELIZABETH RACHEL CO,
ASTRID MELODY CO-LIM, GENEVIEVE CO-CHUN, CAROL CO, KEVIN CO,
EDWARD CO and the ESTATE OF LIM SEE TE, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court questioning the October 28, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 72055.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

On March 4, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) OF Makati City, Branch 66, in Sp.
Proc. No. M-4615, appointed petitioner and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special
administrators of the estate of the petitioner’s father, Co Bun Chun.2However, on
motion of the other heirs, the trial court set aside petitioner’s appointment as
special co-administrator.3Petitioner consequently, nominated his son, Alvin Milton
Co (Alvin, for brevity), for appointment as co-administrator of the estate.4 On
August 31, 1998, the RTC appointed Alvin as special co-administrator.5

Almost four years thereafter, the RTC, acting on a motion6 filed by one of the
heirs, issued its January 22, 2002 Order7 revoking and setting aside the
appointment of Alvin. The trial court reasoned that Alvin had become unsuitable to
discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator because his capacity,
ability or competence to perform the functions of co-administrator had been
beclouded by the filing of several criminal cases against him, which, even if there
was no conviction yet, had provided the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to
handle the subject estate with utmost fidelity, trust and confidence.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but this
was denied in the RTC Order8 of May 14, 2002.

Subsequently, petitioner brought the matter to the CA on petition

for certiorari under Rule 65. In the aforesaid challenged October 28, 2003
Decision,9 the appellate court affirmed the revocation of the appointment and
dismissed the petition. Thus, the instant petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.

The petition is bereft of merit.

We affirm the appellate court’s ruling that the trial court did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in revoking Alvin’s appointment as special co-administrator.
Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal
of regular administrators. 10 Courts may appoint or remove special administrators
based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their
discretion.11 As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher
courts will not interfere with it. 12 This, however, is no authority for the judge to
become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his
passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on
reason, equity, justice and legal principles.13

Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court
finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in
withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.14 The special
administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and
control and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate,
especially with respect to its smooth administration and earliest settlement. 15

In this case, we find that the trial court’s judgment on the issue of Alvin’s removal
as special co-administrator is grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal
principle. It is not characterized by patent and gross capriciousness, pure whim and
abuse, arbitrariness or despotism, as to be correctible by the writ
of certiorari.16 In fact, the appellate court correctly observed that:

In ruling to revoke the appointment of Alvin Milton Co, the lower court took
into consideration the fiduciary nature of the office of a special
administrator which demands a high degree of trust and confidence in the
person to be appointed. The court a quo observed that, burdened with the
criminal charges of falsification of commercial documents leveled against
him (sic), and the corresponding profound duty to defend himself in these
proceedings, Alvin Milton Co’s ability and qualification to act as special co-
administrator of the estate of the decedent are beclouded, and the recall of
his appointment is only proper under the attendant circumstances. Such
reasoning by the court a quo finds basis in actual logic and probability.
Without condemning the accused man (sic) as guilty before he is found such
by the appropriate tribunal, the court merely declared that it is more
consistent with the demands of justice and orderly processes that the
petitioner’s son, who is already bidden to defend himself against criminal
charges for falsification in other fora be relieved of his duties and functions
as special administrator, to avoid conflicts and possible abuse.

The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion attending such ruling, as it was
reached based on the court a quo’s own fair assessment of the
circumstances attending the case below, and the applicable laws.17

As a final note, the Court observes that this prolonged litigation on the simple
issue of the removal of a special co-administrator could have been avoided if the
trial court promptly appointed a regular administrator. We, therefore, direct the
trial court to proceed with the appointment of a regular administrator as soon as
practicable.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The

October 28, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72055
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11435 December 27, 1957

HON. MATEO L. ALCASID, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of

Albay, ANTONIO CONDA, as regular administrator of the estate of Jose V.
Samson, JOSEFINA N. SAMSON, GLENDA SAMSON, MANUEL SAMSON
and FELIX SAMSON, petitioners,
vs.
AMADO V. SAMSON, JESUS V. SAMSON, PURIFICACION SAMSON
MORALES; DOLORES SAMSON-ACAYAN and PAZ SAMSON-
YOROBE, respondents.

Moises C. Kallos for petitioners.

Ramon C. Fernandez for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

On October 18, 1954, herein respondents filed an application in the Court of First
Instance of Albay for the issuance of letters of administration in favor in one of
them, Jesus V. Samson, for the estate of the late Jose V. Samson. On the same
date, Jesus V. Samson was appointed special administrator of the estate.
The application was opposed by petitioners Josefina N. Samson, the widow of Jose
V. Samson and her three minor children Glenda N. Samson, Manuel N. Samson and
Felix N. Samson. They asked for the granting of letters of administration in favor
of Josefina N. Samson, in the place of Jesus V. Samson. After hearing that
dragged for almost two years, Judge Alcasid, on March 12, 1956, issued an order
appointing Antonio Conda, Municipal Treasurer of Libon, Albay, as regular
administrator. In that order the special administrator Jesus V. Samson was
instructed at the same time, the "twenty (20) days from the receipt of this order
he shall turn over all the properties and funds of the estate in his possession to
the regular administrator as soon as the latter qualified." Antonio Conda put up the
bond fixed by the court and, on March 19,1956, letters of administration were
issued in his favor. On April 3, 1956, upon motion of the widow, the court issued an
order requiring the special administrator to "deliver the properties and funds of
the estate now in his possession to the regular administrator within three (3) days
from receipt of this order" (Annex B).

It also appears that on March 27, 1956, respondents filed an appeal from the
order of the court granting letters of administration in favor of Antonio Conda and
their record on appeal was approved on April 17, 1956. On April 20, 1956, they
filed a motion seeking to set aside the approval of the bond posted by Antonio
Conda as well as the letters of administration issued in his favor. This motion
having been denied through an order issued on May 9, 1956, respondents resorted
to the appellate courts.

The Court of Appeals upon certiorari applied for by the special administrator and
the heirs siding with him, held that, on the authority of our decision in Cotia vs.
Pecson, 1 49 Off. Gaz., 4313, the order appointing Antonio Conda as regular
administrator was stayed by the appeal taken against it, and thereafter, Conda
should not have been allowed to qualify in the meantime, unless execution pending
appeal should be ordered for special reasons pursuant to Rule 39, section 2 of the
Rules of Court; and that "should the special administrator be found, after due
process of law, unfit to continue", he "could be dismissed and another appointed to
look after the interests of the estate until the appeal filed against Conda's
appointment is finally disposed of". For these reasons, the Court of Appeals set
aside the appointment of Conda and annulled his bond.

Against this decision, the interested parties applied to this Court for a review. We
granted certiorari.lawphi1.net
This Court has repeatedly decided that the appointment and removal of a special
administrator are interlocutory proceedings incidental to the main case, and lie in
the sound discretion of the court. (Roxas vs. Pecson, 2 46 Off. Gaz. 2058; Junquera
vs. Barromeo, 3 52 Off. Gaz., 7611; DeGala vs. Gonzales, 53 Phil. 106; Garcia vs.
Flores, 101 Phil. 781, 54 Off. Gaz., 4049).

Thus, in Roxas vs. Pecson, supra, this Court ruled:

It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred

right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under section
1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an
executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2,
Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. (21
Am. Jur., 833; De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 106). As the law
does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the
qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in
the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound,
that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.

It is well to mark that, in the present case, the special administrator was not
actually removed by the court, but that he was superseded by the regular
administrator by operation of law. Rule 81, section 3, of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that—

When letters testamentary or of administration are granted on the estate

of the deceased, the power of the special administrator shall cease, and
shall forthwith deliver to the executor or administrator the goods, chattels,
money and estate of the deceased in his hands. lawphi1.net

No question of abuse of discretion can therefore arise on account of the order of

April 8, 1956, requiring Jesus V. Samson to turn over the administration to the
regular administrator, such result being ordained by law. Upon the other hand, the
conditions of the estate justified the appointment and qualification of a regular
administrator, because the special administration had lasted nearly two years, and
the prompt settlement of the estate had been unduly delayed. The Albay court
said in its order of March 12:

. . . It is also the sense of this Court that the appointment of any of their
immediate relations would not end the bitter conflict that has so far raged
 as can be seen from the voluminous records of this case which have
accumulated within a very short time. The appointment of a disinterested
person as regular administrator would be conducive to a smooth and peaceful
administration of the properties of the estate. At any rate, the appointment
of Jesus V. Samson as special administrator was but done in a state of
emergency.

These reasons were supplemented by the order of May 9, 1956:

It is certainly against the interests of justice and a frustration of the policy

of those rules to extend unduly the time within which estates should be
administered and to keep thereby the property from the possession and use
of those who are entitled thereto. The view advanced by counsel for the
special administrator that the appointment of regular administrator cannot
be effective until after the appeal interposed by the special administrator is
finally determined by the appellate court is contrary to the spirit of the
policy of the Rules of court above referred to and would unduly delay the
prompt settlement of the estate of the deceased Jose V. Samson, specially
considering that this special proceeding was commenced as far back as
October 18, 1954, or more than one and one-half years ago, and that the
notice of the creditors, as provided in section 1, Rule 87, of the Rules of
Court, cannot be even issued until after letters of administration have been
granted by the court to the regular administrator. (Decision, Ct. App., p.4) .

Even assuming that the rule in Cotia vs. Pecson, 49 Off. Gaz., 4313 (tho it actually
dealt with the removal of a regular administrator) is applicable to the case at bar,
in the sense that the appointment of a new administrator should be made effective
pending appeal only if Rule 39, section 2 (execution pending appeal) is complied
with, such compliance exists in the present case, for the order of April 3, 1956
(issued upon motion of herein petitioners) that required the special administrator
to turn over the properties and funds of the estate to the regular administrator,
was in effect a special order for the carrying out of the regular administration
notwithstanding the of respondents that was not perfected until April 12, 1956;
while the special reasons for immediately carrying the order into effect are given
in the order of March 12, as supplemented by that of May 9, 1956, heretofore
quoted. We find these reasons sufficient (cf. De Borja vs. Encarnacion, Phil., 239).

The fact that these reasons were not expressed in the very order of April 3, 1956,
is not by itself fatal or constitutive of abuse of discretion; for while Rule 39,
section 2, prescribes that execution pending appeal may issue for good reasons to
be stated in a special order, this Court has decided that the element that gives
validity to an order of immediate execution is the existence of good reasons, if
they may be found distinctly somewhere in the record, altho not expressly stated
in the order of execution itself (Lusk vs. Stevens, 54 Phil. 154; Guevarra vs. Court
of First Instance of Laguna, 70 Phil. 48; People's Bank vs. San Jose, 96 Phil., 895,
51 Off. Gaz., [6] 2918; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court [1957 ed.,] Vol. I, p.
540).

All told, the case boils down to this: The removal of the special administrator is at
the court's sound discretion, and the orders of March 12, and May 9, 1956 show
that there were good reasons to terminate the special administration. This being
so, the heirs can not seek to prolong the tenure of the removed special
administrator by appealing Conda's appointment as regular administrator. It may
be argued that during the appeal, the estate should be under special
administration; but it does not appear that Amadeo Samson and his partisans have
so asked the court nor have they proposed another administrator and therefore,
their complaint against the court's action is unmeritorious.

A minor procedural point must be noted. In special proceedings, the judge whose
order is under attack is merely a nominal party; wherefore, a judge in his capacity
should not be made to appear as a party seeking reversal of a decision that is
unfavorable to the action taken by him. A decent regard for the judicial hierarchy
bars a judge from suing against the adverse opinion of a higher court and counsel
should realize the fact and not include the Judge's name in ulterior proceedings.

We see no abuse of discretion in the orders of the Court of First Instance

complained of. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the original
petition for certiorari filed by the special administrator is ordered dismissed, and
the writ denied, with costs against the respondents in this Court, Jesus V. Samson
at al. So ordered.