Name: Jerwin C.

Tiamson

Case Title: Executive Secretary v. CA, G.R. No. 131719, 25 May 1994

Topic: Preliminary Injunction – Against Whom Issued

Principle:

Preliminary injunction will not lie against a government agency in the implementation of a law
passed by Congress on the ground of the chilling effect that may result thereof.

Facts:

A law was passed to eradicate illegal recruiters. A great number of duly licensed recruitment
agencies questioned the said law for being unconstitutional and that it had placed licensed and
authorized recruitment agencies on equal footing with illegal recruiters. These recruitment
agencies that had stopped or suspended their business operations asked for a preliminary
injunction in the court for fear that their officers and employees would be indicted and
prosecuted under the penal provisions of the law and meted excessive penalties,

Issue:

Can a preliminary injunction be issued against a government agency to implement the laws
passed by Congress on the ground of the chilling effect that may result thereof?

Answer:

No.

It is a settled in our jurisprudence that the possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face,
does not of itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a
showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable
relief. The on its face invalidation of statutes has been described as manifestly strong medicine,
to be employed sparingly and only as a last resort, and is generally disfavored. To be entitled to a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the
party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and
must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor.

In the case at bar, the fear or chilling effect of the assailed penal provisions of the law on the
members of the respondent does not by itself justify prohibiting the State from enforcing them
against those whom the State believes in good faith to be punishable under the laws. Just as the
incidental chilling effect of such statutes does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so
the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of certain laws on the statute
books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out the important and
necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in
good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution.