NATURAL RESOURCES CASE DIGEST FOR 2ND MEETING
MACAS
7/12/2018
PALOMO V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land
covered by Executive Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the
registration of these lands and donated the same to his heirs,
Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in
April 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were
lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a
petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of
Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914
sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954 President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting
the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi
Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management,
protection and administration of the defunct Commission of
Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development. The area was never released as alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is
neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the
Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration
Act. The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the
property, paid real estate taxes thereon and introduced
improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and
coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de
Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad
Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of
P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
Issue: Whether or not forest land may be owned by private
persons.
Held: Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended
the Spanish-American War at the end of the 19th century
recognized the property rights of Spanish and Filipino citizens
and the American government had no inherent power to
confiscate properties of private citizens and declare them part
of any kind of government reservation. They allege that their
predecessors in interest have been in open, adverse and
continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years
prior to their registration in 1916-1917. Hence, the reservation
of the lands for provincial purposes in 1913 by then Governor-
general Forbes was tantamount to deprivation of private
property without due process of law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a
number of decisions of the Court of First Instance of Albay,
15th Judicial District of the United States of America which
state that the predecessors in interest of the petitioners' father
Diego Palomo, were in continuous, open and adverse
possession of the lands from 20 to 50 years at the time of their
registration in 1916.
We are not convinced.
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery
and conquest in the 16th century. Before the Treaty of Paris
in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or
forest were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the
Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could only
be acquired through royal concessions which were
documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal
Grant," (2) Concession Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo
de Compra or Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion
Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the
Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January
26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners'
predecessors in interest derived title from an old Spanish
grant. Petitioners placed much reliance upon the declarations
in Expediente No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record Decision No. 9820,
dated January 17, 1917; Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record
No. 9821, dated December 28, 1916; Expediente No. 7,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 9822, dated December 9, 1916;
Expediente No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823, dated
December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10, G.L.R.O. Record
PAULINE D.
No. 9868, dated December 9, 1916 of the Court of First
Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of
America presided by Judge Isidro Paredes that their
predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and
continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years.
The aforesaid "decisions" of the Court of First Instance,
however, were not signed by the judge but were merely
certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the
signature of the clerk of court.
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their
predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and
continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to
their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed only
in December 1913, the very same year they were acquired by
Diego Palomo. Curiously, in February 1913 or 10 months
before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo, the
government had already surveyed the area in preparation for
its reservation for provincial park purposes. If the petitioners'
predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of the
lands for a number of years prior to their registration in 1916-
1917, they would have undoubtedly known about the inclusion
of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a
trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no
right to include these properties in the reservation when the
question should have been raised 83 years ago.
As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as they
obtained the titles without government opposition, the
government is now estopped from questioning the validity of
the certificates of title which were granted. As correctly
pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle
of estoppel does not operate against the Government for the
act of its agents.
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were
really issued, the lands are still not capable of appropriation.
The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of
title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to
alienable lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not
alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by the District
Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the
subject lands were never declared as alienable and
disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up
to the present. Moreover, as part of the reservation for
provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy,
cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence
prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight
of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of
ownership in land registration cases.
Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to
the matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements
introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that
Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time the
lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo.
Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands were
covered under the reservation when they filed a petition for
reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title inasmuch
as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of Plan
II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration Office
Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the
Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated
September 11, 1948 contains the following note, "in conflict
with provincial reservation." In any case, petitioners are
presumed to know the law and the failure of the government
to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no
justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in
introducing improvements on the lots.
NATURAL RESOURCES CASE DIGEST FOR 2ND MEETING
7/12/2018
Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters
covered by TCT 3913 fall within the reservation, TCT 3913
should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid area.
Inasmuch as the bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and
subject of Civil Case T-143, were within the perimeter of the
national park, no pronouncement as to damages is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED with the modification that TCT 3913 be annulled
with respect to the 1,976 square meter area falling within the
reservation zone.
REPUBLIC V. CANDY MAKER
Facts: On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all
surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Candy Maker, Inc. for a parcel of land located below the
reglementary lake elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters
away the Laguna de Bay.Candy Maker, Inc. as applicant, filed
an application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for registration of
its alleged title over the lot.
The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within
the alienable and disposable zone. On the other hand, the
Land Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot
no. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and
intended for public use, hence, inalienable and indisposable.
On July 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed
its opposition which alleged that the lot subject of the
application for registration may not be alienated and disposed
since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake Bed, a public
land within, its jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether the property subject of the amended
application is alienable and disposable property of the State,
and if so, whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum
of evidence to prove its ownership over the property?
Held: The property subject of this application was alienable
and disposable public agricultural land. However, respondent
failed to prove that it possesses registrable title over the
property. The statute of limitations with regard to public
agricultural lands does not operate against the statute unless
the occupant proves possession and occupation of the same
after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of
ownership, such possession is not exclusive and notorious as
to give rise to presumptive grant from the state. In light of the
foregoing, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is
granted.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. The presumption is that lands of
whatever classification belong to the State.65 Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain
is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof
in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. The statute of
limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not
operate against the State unless the occupant proves
possession and occupation of the same after a claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State.
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant from the government, whether express or implied. It is
indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the State.
The rationale for the period "since time immemorial or since
June 12, 1945" lies in the presumption that the land applied
for pertains to the State, and that the occupants or possessor
claim an interest thereon only by virtue of their imperfect title
as continuous, open and notorious possession.
PAULINE D. MACAS
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, or
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.71 Until then,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. A
certification of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources stating that the land subject of an
application is found to be within the alienable and disposable
site per a land classification project map is sufficient evidence
to show the real character of the land subject of the
application.72
The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of
ownership to substantiate the claim over the land.73 Actual
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over
his own property.74 A mere casual cultivation of portions of
the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for
a claim of ownership; such possession is not exclusive and
notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the
State.75
In this case, the evidence on record shows that the property
is alienable agricultural land. Romeo Cadano of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office,
Antipolo Rizal, certified that the property "falls within the
Alienable and Disposable zone, under Land Classification
Project No. 5-A, per L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on
March 11, 1927."76 However, under R.A. No. 4850 which was
approved on July 18, 1966, lands located at and below the
maximum lake level of elevation of the Laguna de Bay are
public lands which form part of the bed of said lake. Such
lands denominated as lakeshore areas are linear strips of
open space designed to separate incompatible element or
uses, or to control pollution/nuisance, and for identifying and
defining development areas or zone. Such areas of the lake
with an approximate total area of 14,000 hectares form a strip
of the lakebed along its shores alternately submerged or
exposed by the annual rising and lowering of the lake water.
They have environmental ecological significance and actual
potential economic benefits.
CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY
Facts: President Marcos through a presidential decree
created PEA, which was tasked with the development
improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of
lands. The then president also transferred to PEA the
foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project.
Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of
land and then, years later, PEA entered into a JVA with
AMARI for the development of the Freedom Islands. These
two entered into a joint venture in the absence of any public
bidding.
Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President
Maceda denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all scams.
An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the
lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the
public domain; the certificates of title over the Freedom
Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This
prompted Ramos to form an investigatory committee on the
legality of the JVA.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner now comes and contends that the government
stands to lose billions by the conveyance or sale of the
reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full
disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the
parties.
NATURAL RESOURCES CASE DIGEST FOR 2ND MEETING
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Issue: W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer
to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate
the Constitution.
Held: Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations were
allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. But
since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, private
corporations were banned from holding, except by lease,
alienable lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution
continued this constitutional prohibition. The prevailing law
before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is
that private corporations cannot hold, except by lease,
alienable lands of the public domain. The Decision has not
annulled or in any way changed the law on this matter. The
Decision, whether made retroactive or not, does not change
the law since the Decision merely reiterates the law that
prevailed since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Thus,
De Agbayani, which refers to a law that is invalidated by a
decision of the Court, has no application to the instant case.
Likewise, Spouses Benzonan is inapplicable because it refers
to a doctrine of the Court that is overruled by a subsequent
decision which adopts a new doctrine. In the instant case,
there is no previous doctrine that is overruled by the Decision.
Since the case of Manila Electric Company v. Judge Castro-
Bartolome,6 decided on June 29, 1982, the Court has applied
consistently the constitutional provision that private
corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of
the public domain. The Court reiterated this in numerous
cases, and the only dispute in the application of this
constitutional provision is whether the land in question had
already become private property before the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution.7 If the land was already private land before
the 1973 Constitution because the corporation had possessed
it openly, continuously, exclusively and adversely for at least
thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier, then the
corporation could apply for judicial confirmation of its
imperfect title. But if the land remained public land upon the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, then the corporation could
never hold, except by lease, such public land. Indisputably,
the Decision does not overrule any previous doctrine of the
Court.
The prevailing doctrine before, during and after the signing of
the Amended JVA is that private corporations cannot hold,
except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. This is
one of the two main reasons why the Decision annulled the
Amended JVA. The other main reason is that submerged
areas of Manila Bay, being part of the sea, are inalienable and
beyond the commerce of man, a doctrine that has remained
immutable since the Spanish Law on Waters of 1886. Clearly,
the Decision merely reiterates, and does not overrule, any
existing judicial doctrine.
Even on the characterization of foreshore lands reclaimed by
the government, the Decision does not overrule existing law
or doctrine. Since the adoption of the Regalian doctrine in this
jurisdiction, the sea and its foreshore areas have always been
part of the public domain. And since the enactment of Act No.
1654 on May 18, 1907 until the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, statutory law never allowed foreshore lands
reclaimed by the government to be sold to private
corporations. The 1973 and 1987 Constitution enshrined and
expanded the ban to include any alienable land of the public
domain.
There are, of course, decisions of the Court which, while
recognizing a violation of the law or Constitution, hold that the
sale or transfer of the land may no longer be invalidated
because of "weighty considerations of equity and social
justice."8 The invalidation of the sale or transfer may also be
superfluous if the purpose of the statutory or constitutional
ban has been achieved. But none of these cases apply to
Amari.
Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino
citizen sells land to an alien who later sells the land to a
Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the
PAULINE D. MACAS
subsequent sale to a citizen.9 Similarly, where the alien who
buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship,
the sale is validated since the purpose of the constitutional
ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved.10
In short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification
of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred
to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified
party. In the instant case, however, Amari has not transferred
the Freedom Islands, or any portion of it, to any qualified party.
In fact, Amari admits that title to the Freedom Islands still
remains with PEA.11
The Court has also ruled consistently that a sale or transfer of
the land may no longer be questioned under the principle of
res judicata, provided the requisites for res judicata are
present.12 Under this principle, the courts and the parties are
bound by a prior final decision, otherwise there will be no end
to litigation. As the Court declared in Toledo-Banaga v. Court
of Appeals,13 "once a judgement has become final and
executory, it can no longer be disturbed no matter how
erroneous it may be." In the instant case, there is no prior final
decision adjudicating the Freedom Islands to Amari.
There are, moreover, special circumstances that disqualify
Amari from invoking equity principles. Amari cannot claim
good faith because even before Amari signed the Amended
JVA on March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the instant
case on April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the qualification
of Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before the
filing of this petition, two Senate Committees14 had already
approved on September 16, 1997 Senate Committee Report
No. 560. This Report concluded, after a well-publicized
investigation into PEA’s sale of the Freedom Islands to Amari,
that the Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public
domain. Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and
assuming all the attendant risks, including the annulment of
the Amended JVA.
Amari has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost
incurred by PEA in reclaiming the Freedom Islands. Amari
states that it has paid PEA only P300,000,000.0015 out of the
P1,894,129,200.00 total reimbursement cost agreed upon in
the Amended JVA. Moreover, Amari does not claim to have
even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA, or to have
started to construct any permanent infrastructure on the
Freedom Islands. In short, Amari does not claim to have
introduced any physical improvement or development on the
reclamation project that is the subject of the Amended JVA.
And yet Amari claims that it had already spent a "whopping
P9,876,108,638.00" as its total development cost as of June
30, 2002.16 Amari does not explain how it spent the rest of
the P9,876,108,638.00 total project cost after paying PEA
P300,000,000.00. Certainly, Amari cannot claim to be an
innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.
In its Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration, PEA claims
that it is "similarly situated" as the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA) which under R.A. No. 7227 is
tasked to sell portions of the Metro Manila military camps and
other military reservations. PEA’s comparison is incorrect.
The Decision states as follows:
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell
reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the
government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed
lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased
or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that
DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not
dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public
domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these
lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the
government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, these
lands are still public, not private lands.
PEA is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. PEA took the place of
NATURAL RESOURCES CASE DIGEST FOR 2ND MEETING
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Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR"
for brevity) as the government agency charged with leasing or
selling all reclaimed lands of the public domain. In the hands
of PEA, which took over the leasing and selling functions of
DENR, reclaimed foreshore lands are public lands in the same
manner that these same lands would have been public lands
in the hands of DENR. BCDA is an entirely different
government entity. BCDA is authorized by law to sell specific
government lands that have long been declared by
presidential proclamations as military reservations for use by
the different services of the armed forces under the
Department of National Defense. BCDA’s mandate is specific
and limited in area, while PEA’s mandate is general and
national. BCDA holds government lands that have been
granted to end-user government entities – the military
services of the armed forces. In contrast, under Executive
Order No. 525, PEA holds the reclaimed public lands, not as
an end-user entity, but as the government agency "primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National
Government."
In Laurel v. Garcia,17 cited in the Decision, the Court ruled
that land devoted to public use by the Department of Foreign
Affairs, when no longer needed for public use, may be
declared patrimonial property for sale to private parties
provided there is a law authorizing such act. Well-settled is
the doctrine that public land granted to an end-user
government agency for a specific public use may
subsequently be withdrawn by Congress from public use and
declared patrimonial property to be sold to private parties.
R.A. No. 7227 creating the BCDA is a law that declares
specific military reservations no longer needed for defense or
military purposes and reclassifies such lands as patrimonial
property for sale to private parties.
Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial
property, can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino
citizens or qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-called
Friar Lands acquired by the government under Act No. 1120
are patrimonial property18 which even private corporations
can acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands
of the public domain if sold or transferred to a public or
municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become
patrimonial property in the hands of the public or municipal
corporation. Once converted to patrimonial property, the land
may be sold by the public or municipal corporation to private
parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations.
We reiterate what we stated in the Decision is the rationale for
treating PEA in the same manner as DENR with respect to
reclaimed foreshore lands, thus:
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to
be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross
violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA
will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the
Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of
these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single
private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will
effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse
equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million
strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire
x x x any and all kinds of lands." This will open the floodgates
to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds, if not
thousands, of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain
under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are
private lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge
landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the
very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent.
This will completely reverse the clear direction of
constitutional development in this country. The 1935
PAULINE D. MACAS
Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more
than 1,024 hectares of public lands. The 1973 Constitution
prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind of
public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally
reiterated this prohibition.
Finally, the Office of the Solicitor General and PEA argue that
the cost of reclaiming deeply submerged areas is "enormous"
and "it would be difficult for PEA to accomplish such project
without the participation of private corporations."19 The
Decision does not bar private corporations from participating
in reclamation projects and being paid for their services in
reclaiming lands. What the Decision prohibits, following the
explicit constitutional mandate, is for private corporations to
acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no
prohibition on the directors, officers and stockholders of
private corporations, if they are Filipino citizens, from
acquiring at public auction reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain. They can acquire not more than 12 hectares
per individual, and the land thus acquired becomes private
land.
Despite the nullity of the Amended JVA, Amari is not
precluded from recovering from PEA in the proper
proceedings, on a quantum meruit basis, whatever Amari may
have incurred in implementing the Amended JVA prior to its
declaration of nullity.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motions for Reconsideration to be
without merit, the same are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
The Motion to Inhibit and for Re-Deliberation and the Motion
to Set Case for Hearing on Oral Argument are likewise
DENIED.
Notes:
ART. 12 SEC. 3-5
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited
to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may
lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not
more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead,
or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation,
ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of
agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the
size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired,
developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible,
determine, by law, the specific limits of forest lands and
national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the
ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall
be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished,
except by law. The Congress shall provide for such period as
it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered
forests and watershed areas.
Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national development policies and programs,
shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and
cultural well-being.
NATURAL RESOURCES CASE DIGEST FOR 2ND MEETING
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ALBA V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for title to
land on April 28, 1958 with the claim that the land applied for
was purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz from, from one
Eulalio Raz. The documents attached to the application are:
technical description, surveyor's certificate, certification by the
chief deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue print of Psu-
161277.
The initial hearing was scheduled for October 31, 1958 and
the certificate of publication in the Official Gazette was issued
on September 23, 1958. The certification of posting of the
notice of initial hearing was issued on October 13, 1958.
The land applied for is residential, situated in the Poblacion of
Banga, Aklan, with an area of 4,845 square meters, bounded
on the northeast by the property of the Municipality of Banga
(Sketch, Exh. "F").
The initial hearing was held on October 31, 1958. An order of
general default was issued but those who presented their
opposition, namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel and
Susana Braulio, Jose Rago, representing Apolonia Rebeco,
the Director of Lands and the Municipality of Banga
represented by the Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty (30)
days to file their written opposition.
Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed their opposition
on October 31, 1958. They opposed the registration of the
southeastern portion of the 240 square meters of the land
applied for alleging that they are the owners in fee simple and
possessors of said portion and all the improvements thereon
for not less than 70 years together with their predecessor-in-
interest deriving their title by purchase from the original
owners. They prayed for the Court to declare them the true
and absolute owners of the disputed portion of the same in
their names.
On October 31, 1958, Octabela Vda. de Raz filed her
opposition.
Jose Rago filed his opposition on November 29, 1958 as the
duly constituted attorney-in-fact of Apolonia Rebeco although
no special power of attorney was attached. He opposed the
registration of the northeastern portion of the land applied for,
with an area of 43.83 square meters. He alleged that his
principal is the owner by right of succession and is in the
possession of said portion with all its improvements for more
than 80 years together with his predecessor-in-interest,
continuously, peacefully and openly under claim of ownership.
He prayed that his principal be declared the true and absolute
owner of the disputed portion of 43.83 square meters.
On March 22, 1966, the Court issued an Order allowing the
applicant to hire another surveyor to segregate the non-
controversial portion of the land applied for and to notify the
oppositors and their counsels.
On January 12, 1970, a motion to lift the order of general
default and to admit the attached opposition of Rodolfo Alba,
Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as a motion to admit
the attached amended petition of Octabela Vda. de Raz were
filed. The Court in its order dated March 21, 1970 admitted
said opposition and set aside the order of default.
In their opposition, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba, represented
by their attorney-in-fact, Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz, alleged
that they are the co-owners of a portion of the land applied for
with an area of 2,262 square meters bounded on the north by
Januario Masigon, Nicolas Realtor, Agustina Rebeldia and
Apolonia Rebeco, on the south by Eulalio Raz and on the west
by the public market of Banga. They claimed to have inherited
the above-mentioned portion from their late father, Eufrosino
M. Alba, who purchased the same from Dionisia Regado in
1918. Hence, they have been in possession continuously,
openly and peacefully under claim of ownership of the above-
mentioned portion for not less 70 years. They prayed that the
PAULINE D. MACAS
disputed portion of 2,262 square meters be registered as their
pro-indiviso property.
In her amended opposition, Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz
opposed the registration of the southeastern portion of the
land applied for with an area of 331.44 square meters. She
claimed to have been in peaceful, continuous and open
possession together with her deceased husband, Eulalio Raz,
under claim of ownership of the above-mentioned portion for
not less than 70 years, by purchase from its owners. She
likewise opposed the registration of the western portion of the
land applied for, with an area of 676 square meters, having
purchased the same from its original owners on (sic) her
predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful and
continuous under claim of ownership for a period of not less
than 70 years. She prayed that the portion of 331.44 square
meters be registered in her name and that of the heirs of
Eulalio Raz, pro indiviso., and the other portion of 676 square
meters be registered solely in her name.
On February 25, 1970, the applicant Dr. Jose Lachica filed his
consolidated opposition and reply to the motion to lift order of
default stating that there is no reason to do so under the Rules
of Court, and that the opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes
Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as the amended opposition of
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz are without merit in law and in fact.
On March 21, 1970, the motion to lift the order of general
default was granted and the opposition of Rodolfo Alba,
Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as the opposition of
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz were all admitted.
In the hearing of March 3, 1972, applicant offered for
admission exhibits "A" to "I" and the testimonies of Pedro Ruiz
(April 20, 1971), Jose Rago (Oct. 23, 1970) and Dr. Jose
Lachica (July 16, 1971; Feb. 10, 1972). The Court admitted
the same.
On March 13, 1974, the Court issued an order appointing
Engr. Angeles Relor to act as Commissioner and delimit the
portions claimed by the three sets of oppositors and submit
an amended approved plan together with the technical
description for each portion.
The Commissioner's report and sketch was submitted on
December 4, 1974. The applicant filed his opposition to the
Commissioner's report on December 12, 1974. The Court in
its order of December 13, 1974 required the Commissioner to
submit an amended report and amended sketch.
The Commissioner's corrected report and sketch was
submitted on February 24, 1975 which the Court approved on
February 25, 1975 there being no objection from the parties.
On March 15, 1977, the Court issued an order whereby the
testimony of oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was
stricken off the record for her failure to appear in the
scheduled hearing on March 15, 1977.
Again, in its order dated May 27, 1977 the testimony of
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off record because
the latter was bedridden and can not possibly appear for
cross-examination.
Oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz substituted by her heirs
filed a formal offer of exhibits on August 24, 1988. Applicant
filed his comments thereto on August 29, 1988. The Court
admitted said exhibits and the testimony of their witness on
March 1, 1989.
In this application for title to land filed by applicant Jose
Lachica, four oppositions were filed by the following:
1. Jose Rago, in representation of Apolonia Rebeco;
2. Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio;
3. Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba,
represented by Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz; and
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4. Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.
In the hearing of October 23, 1970, counsel for oppositor Jose
Rago manifested that he would file a motion for withdrawal of
opposition and Jose Rago himself declared his conformity
(Tsn, Oct. 23, 1970, p. 5). Although no formal motion to
withdraw was actually filed, oppositor Rago has not presented
evidence on his behalf; hence, his opposition must be
disregarded.
As regards oppositor Manuel C. Braulio ans Susana Braulio,
a deed of sale supposedly executed by Susana Braulio and
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz in 1956 was identified by Felimon
Raz, a witness for the oppositors (Tsn, Sept. 29, 1977, pp. 3
to 4). However, said deed cannot be found in the records.
Even so, the Braulios have not presented evidence to show
that by the time this application was filed, they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, public,
peaceful and continuous possession of the land claimed, in
concept of owner, for at least 10 years sufficient to acquire
title thereto (Arts. 1117, 1118, 1134, Civil Code of the
Philippines). As such, the opposition of Manuel C. Braulio and
Susana Braulio must be dismissed. 2
On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by the applicant and the oppositor Raz, the court a
quo rendered judgment in favor of the applicant as stated at
the outset. In dismissing the claim of the remaining oppositors
Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented
by Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz
herself, the trial court in sum noted that said oppositors have
never offered any explanation as to the non-payment of realty
taxes for the disputed portions of the subject property from
1941 to 1958 while the respondent/applicant continuously
paid taxes under Tax Declaration No. 14181 covering said
property from 1945-1958 when the case was filed per
certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer's Office of
Banga. 3 In rendering judgment in favor of
respondent/applicant, the trial court stressed that while it is
true that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession.
Dissatisfied, petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court.
In rendering judgment in favor of private respondent, the
Court of Appeals reasoned, inter alia, as follows:
On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by the applicant, the trial court did not err in
confirming that the applicant is the absolute owner in fee
simple of the property subject of the application for registration
entitling him to register the same in his name under the
operation of PD 1529.
It is of no moment that the applicant failed to produce the
originals of those other deeds/documents of conveyances, for
he was able to present sufficient substantial secondary
evidence, in accordance with the requirements of Section 4,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, now Section 5, same
Rule of the Revised Rules on Evidence, and the doctrines in
point.
Thus, Government vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817, explained that
when the original writing is not available for one reason or
another which is the best or primary evidence, to prove its
contents is the testimony of some one who has read or known
about it. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 148, laid out
the foundation before secondary evidence is introduced, that
the due execution, delivery and reason for non-production of
the original writing must first be produced. Raylago vs. Jarabe,
22 SCRA 1247, ruled that it is not necessary to prove the loss
of the original document beyond all possibility of mistake. A
reasonable probability of its loss is sufficient and this may be
shown by a bonafide (sic) and diligent search, fruitlessly
PAULINE D. MACAS
made, for it in places where it is likely to be found. After
proving the due execution and delivery of the document,
together with the fact that the same has been lost or
destroyed, its contents may be proved, among others, by the
recollection of witnesses. And Beall vs. Dearing, 7 ala. 126;
and Bogardas vs. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. (Nn.y.) 639,
are of the view that that where the lost documents are more
than thirty (30) years old and would thus prove themselves if
produced, secondary evidence of their contents is admissible
without proof of their execution.
In the case at bar, petitioner acquired the property in 1940-
1941. He presented the Deed (Exh. G) executed by the
vendor Faustino Martirez. While he failed to present the other
deeds of sale covering the other portions of the property, he
has sufficiently established that they were notarized
documents and were taken by his mother-in-law sometime in
1956. He reported the loss to the authorities and even filed a
case of theft. He further exerted efforts and made a diligent
search of those documents from the notary public but in vain.
He presented the clerk of the Municipal Treasurer's Office of
Banga, who testified having seen those deeds as they were
presented to him by the applicant and which were used as
basis for the preparation and issuance of Tax Declaration No.
14181 in the name of the tax declarant. Tax Declaration No.
14181 (Exh. H) was presented in Court, proving that the land
was declared for tax purposes in the name of the applicant
and his wife. The applicant has been paying the realty tax
covering the property since 1945 and beyond 1958, when the
application for registration was filed in court, per certification
of the Municipal Treasurer of Banga (Exh. 1).
In resume, We find and so hold as did the trial court that Dr.
Jose Lachica is the absolute owner in fee simple of the land
described in his application for its original registration in his
name. The land contains an area of 4,845 square meters,
more or less, situated in Banga, Aklan, and
The applicant has been in public, open, continuous and
adverse possession of the property since 1940-41 up to the
present to the exclusion of all, and thereby also acquired the
property by acquisitive prescription, in accordance with
Sections 40 and 43 of Act 190, otherwise known as the "Code
of Civil Procedure", having been in actual and adverse
possession under claim of ownership for over ten (10) years,
and thus in whatever way his occupancy might have
commenced or continued under a claim of title exclusive of
any other right and adverse to all other claimants, resulted in
the acquisition of title to the land by acquisitive prescription
(Vda. de Delima vs. Tio, 32 SCRA 516).
Indeed, to borrow the apt words of the ponente in the Delima
case, such proof of ownership of, and the adverse, continuous
possession of the applicant since 1940, strongly ". . . militate
against any judicial cognizance of a matter that could have
been withheld in its ken," hence, whatever right oppositors
may have had over the property or any portion thereof was
thereby also lost through extinctive prescription in favor of the
applicant who had been in actual, open, adverse and
continuous possession of the land applied for in the concept
of owner for over 10 years when the application for registration
was filed in court.
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether or not the
private respondent/applicant is entitled to the confirmation of
his ownership in fee simple for the 4, 845 square meter parcel
of land he applied for.
Held: In sum, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
adjudicated confirmed private respondent/applicant's title to
the land on the basis of the findings that: 1.] the private
respondent/applicant purchased the land from Faustino
Martirez; 2.] the subject land is covered by Tax Declaration
No. 14181; 3.] the private respondent/applicant has paid the
realty taxes on the land from 1945 up to the filing of his
application in 1958; 4.] the private respondent/applicant has
been in actual, open and continuous possession of the subject
land in the concept of owner since 1945, and 5.] the private
respondent/applicant has acquired the land by prescription.
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As stated earlier, a review of the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals is not a function that this Court normally
undertakes 6 unless the appellate court's findings are
palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the
judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. 17 A
thorough review of the record convinces this Court that the
general rule with regard to the conclusiveness of the trial
court's and appellate tribunal's factual findings should not be
applied because there are material circumstances which,
when properly considered, would have altered the result of the
case.
First, a circumspect scrutiny of the evidence extant on record
reveals that with the exception of 620 square meters, there
has been no satisfactory showing of how private
respondent/applicant acquired the remainder of the subject
land.
As can be gathered from the discussion of the appellate court,
as well as the arguments proffered by private respondent, he
acquired the land in question from three (3) sources, namely:
a.] A Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1941 allegedly executed
by Faustino Martirez covering 840 square meters; b] 300
square meters allegedly purchased from private respondent's
father-in-law Eulalio Raz, and c.] 3,725 square meters private
respondent allegedly bought in 1940 from Eugrocino Alba.
The sale involving the first parcel of land covering 840 square
meters, was not questioned by petitioners as its technical
description delineated in the Escritura De Venta Absoluta
dated August 13, 1941, 18 to wit:
Un terreno solar residencia antes palayero regado, actuado
en el casco central del municipio de Banga, Capiz. Sin
ninguna mejora, de una extension superficial de ochocientos
cuarenta metros cuadrados (840 mts. cds.) 6 sean cuarenta
metros de frente por otros veinte y unmetrode fondo, cuyos
linderos por el Norte con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y con
Eulalio Raz; por Este con Eulalio Raz y con la carretera
provincial de Kalibo a Banga; por Sur con la misma carretera
provincial y con terreno del municipio para mercado; y por al
Oeste con al terreno del mercado municipal de Banga y con
propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y al terreno tienes sus mojones
de cemento en todos sus cuatro cantos de linderia y sin otro
limite visible de linderia mas que dichos mojones y esta
amillarado a mi nombre en una sola hoja declaratoria de
propiedad Tax No. 12374 en la Oficina del Tasador Provincial
de Capiz, cuyo valor amilarado actual es veinte pesos
(P20.00) . . .
leaves no room for doubt as to its identity, total area of 840
square meters as well as its dimensions of 40 meters in front
and 21 meters at the base. How this parcel was further
reduced to 620 square meters is explained by the fact that the
Municipal Government of Banga appropriated 220 square
meters thereof for the Banga Public Market Road.
What, however, is seriously contested are the alleged
purchases of the other two parcels from Eulalio Raz
measuring 300 square meters and from Eufrocino Alba
measuring 3,725 square meters owing to the questionable
circumstances surrounding their acquisition.
The records disclose that the subject land was originally
owned by Dionisia Regado under Tax Declaration No. 802. 19
The records further reveal that Dionisia Regado sold: [1.]
1,850 square meters of the land to the Municipality of Banga
evidenced by a Spanish document denominated as a deed of
sale dated April 29, 1914; 20 [2.] 1,320 square meters to
Eulalio Raz evidenced by a document entitled Escritura de
Venta Absoluta dated September 6, 1918, 21 and [3.] 2,938
square meters to Eufrocino Alba evidenced by a deed of
conveyance dated September 6, 1918 written in Spanish. 22
Faustino Martirez acquired a portion of 840 square meters
from Eulalio Raz on January 15, 1933. 23 Raz retained 480
square meters, however, he and his wife Octabela Alba
conveyed a 240 square meter portion thereof to Susana
PAULINE D. MACAS
Braulio on November 5, 1956. 24 Subsequently on May 29,
1969, the heirs of Eufrocino Alba sold a 676 square meter
portion of the parcel purchased by Eufrocino to Octabela Alba
Vda. de Raz. 25 The deed of conveyance was duly registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Aklan pursuant to Act No. 334
on June 17, 1969 26 and is covered by Tax Declaration No.
332 in the name of Eulalio Raz, her husband. 27
Other than the foregoing transactions involving the subject
land which are borne out by the documentary evidence on
record, private respondent/applicant did not produce the
alleged deeds of conveyances evidencing the purported
transfers made by Eulalio Raz and Eufrocino Alba in his favor.
Instead he relied chiefly on secondary evidence to prove the
existence thereof which was sustained by both the trial and
the appellate courts. Such reliance on secondary evidence
vis-a-vis the peculiar facts prevailing in this case rests on
infirm legal bases much more so in the face of the
overwhelming documentary evidence of petitioners arrayed
against it because —
. . . [a] contract of sale of realty cannot be proven by means
of witnesses, but must necessarily be evidenced by a written
instrument, duly subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent, or by secondary evidence of their contents. No other
evidence, therefore, can be received except the documentary
evidence referred to, in so far as regards such contracts, and
these are valueless as evidence unless they are drawn up in
writing in the manner aforesaid. 28
An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document
evidencing his title thereto, must prove not only the
genuineness of his title but the identity of the land therein
referred to. The document in such a case is either a basis of
his claim for registration or not at all. If, as in this case, he only
claims a portion of what is included in his title, he must clearly
prove that the property sought to be registered is included in
that title. 29
Second, there are glaring variances in the identities and
technical descriptions of the land applied for by private
respondent/applicant and the land he purportedly purchased
from Eufrocino Alba.
Private respondent/applicant alleged that he purchased the
remainder of the subject land measuring 3,725 square meters
from Eufrocino Alba sometime in 1940 averring that this parcel
is listed as Item No. 5 of his Exhibit "I" which is denominated
as an "Inventory And Appraisal Of The Properties Of The
Spouses Adela Raz De Lachica (Deceased) and Dr. Jose
Lachica." Item
No. 5 30 of the said inventory described the parcel of land
mentioned therein as follows:
5. Una parcela de terreno cocal secano, amillarado en
nombre de Eufrocino Alba bajo el Tax No. 12792 por valor de
P390.00, situado en el municipio de Banga, Capiz, que linda
el Norte con Lorenzo Retiro, y Silverio Relis; al Este con la
carretera provincial Banga-Libacao; al sur con Bienvenido M.
Alba y al Oeste con Cirilo rala y Adela Raz; con una extension
aproximada de una (1) hectarea (20) areas y (35) centiareas
poco mas o menos. (Note: Said property was purchased by
the spouses Jose Lachica and Adela Raz Lachica from
Eufrocino M. Alba in the amount of P500.00 as evidenced by
a Escritura de Compraventa executed on November 25, 1940,
at Himamaylan, Negros Occidental and notarized by Atty.
Conrado Gensiano, as Reg. Not. 122, Pag. 67, Libro VIII,
Serie 1940).
On the other hand, the land applied for is described technically
per Psu 161277 as —
A parcel of land (as shown on Plan Psu-161277), situated in
Poblacion, Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan. Bounded
on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Apolonia Rimate; on
the SE., along line 2-3, by National Road; on the SW., along
line 3-4, by property of the Mpl. Government of Banga (Public
Market); and on the NW., along line 4-1, by property of the
Municipal Government of Banga (Public Market). Beginning at
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a point marked "1" on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02' E., 423.38 m.
from B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;
thence S. 33 deg. 46' E. 87.66 m. to point "2"
thence S. 56 deg. 42" W., 63.81 m. to point "3"
thence N. 37 deg. 22' W., 59.26 m. to point "4"
thence N. 33 deg. 42' E., 73.08 m. to the point of
beginning, containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED AND FORTY FIVE (4,845) SQUARE METERS.
All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked
on the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings true date
of survey, January 25, 1957, and that of the approval, October
3, 1957. 31
It will be readily noted vis-a-vis the foregoing that: a.] the land
applied for is covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181 while the
parcel allegedly purchased from Eufrocino Alba is covered by
Tax Declaration No. 15792; b.] the land applied for is palayero
whereas the land allegedly acquired from Eufrocino Alba is
cocal secano. Palay is unhusked rice, 32 thus, the term
palayero refers to land devoted to the planting rice; cocal, on
the other hand, means coconut tree plantation 33 while
secano denotes unwatered land or a dry sand bank; 34 c.] the
land applied for has an area of 4,845 square meters whereas
the land supposedly sold by Eufrocino Alba measures 12,035
square meters; d.] the land applied for is bounded on the NE
by the Banga Public Market, on the SE by Apolinia Rimate, on
the SW by the Banga-Kalibo National Road; and on the NW
by the Banga Public market whereas the land allegedly
obtained from Eufrocino Alba is bounded on the N by Ernesto
Retino and Silverio Relis, on the E by the Banga-Libaco
Carreta Provincial, on the S by Bienvenido Alba and on the W
by the Cirilo Rala and Adela Raz. It needs be stressed in this
regard that a person who claims that he has better right to real
property must prove not only his ownership of the same but
also must satisfactorily prove the identity thereof. 35
Third, both trial and appellate courts placed undue reliance on
Tax Declaration No. 14181 considering that there is no
satisfactory explanation of how the area of land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 14181 geometrically ballooned from a
modest 620 square meter lot to a huge parcel measuring
4,845 square meters.
As pointed out by petitioners, Tax Declaration No. 14181 was
preceded by 1954 Tax Declaration No. 13578 in the name of
private respondent/applicant and his spouse which shows that
the land declared therein for taxation purposes covers an area
of 620 square meters. Tax Declaration No. 13578 was
preceded by 1953 Tax Declaration No. 13040 in the name of
Adela Raz, private respondent's wife. The land declared for
taxation purposes therein also has an area of 620 square
meters. Tax Declaration No. 134040 was preceded by 1947
Tax Declaration No. 6528 in the name of private respondent's
wife, Adela Raz. The land declared therein for taxation
purposes likewise measures 620 square meters.
It appears that the quantum leap from 620 square meters in
1947 to 4,845 square meters in 1956 came about on account
of an affidavit dated November 17, 1956 wherein private
respondent/applicant requested 36 the Municipal Assessor of
Banga to issue a revised tax declaration covering 4,845
square meters on the bare claim that "the area has been
decreased" to only 620 square meters. The timing of the
revision and its proximity to the date of filing of the application
can not but engender serious doubts on the application more
so considering that prior thereto realty tax payments covering
the period 1945 to 1956 covered an area measuring 620
square meters and private respondent/applicant is banking on
said payments to claim possession and ownership over the
same period for an infinitely larger area of 4,845 square
meters.
A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of
ownership. 37 Tax declarations for a certain number of years,
PAULINE D. MACAS
although constituting proof of claim of title to land, 38 is not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership unless they are
supported by other effective proof. 39 It was, thus, held in one
case 40 that where realty taxes covering thirty-one (31) years
were paid only a few months prior to the filing of an
application, such payment does not constitute sufficient proof
that the applicant had a bona fide claim of ownership prior to
the filing of the application. Still in another case, 41 the claim
that the applicant had been incontinuous and uninterrupted
possession of the disputed land was not given credence
because it was negated by the fact that he declared the land
for taxation purposes in October 1959 when he filed his
application for registration although he could have done so in
1937 when he allegedly purchased the land. A belated
declaration is, furthermore, indicative that the applicant had
no real claim of ownership over the subject land prior to the
declaration 42 and where there are serious discrepancies in
the tax declarations as in this case, registration must be
denied. 43 If at all, the foregoing facts only serves to
underscore private respondent/applicant's crafty attempt to
cloak with judicial color his underhanded scheme to seize the
adjoining parcels of land and to enrich himself at the expense
of its rightful owners.
Fourth, the lower court's reliance on prescription is not well-
taken given the peculiar facts prevailing in this case.
The law in force at the time an action accrues is what governs
the proceeding consistent with the fundamental dictum that
laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
proved. 44 Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance,
rule, regulation or policy shall be given retrospective effect
unless explicitly stated so. 45 Along the same vein, a court's
jurisdiction depends on the law existing at the time an action
is filed 46 and a law continues to be in force with regard to all
rights which accrued prior to the amendment thereof. 47
In this case, the controlling statute when the private
respondent/applicant filed his application for registration on
April 28, 1958 is Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended by RA Nos. 1942 and 6236, 48 which states that:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claim and issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from
Spain to the United States have applied for the purchase,
composition or other form of grant of lands of the public
domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and
have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection
therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or
for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such
applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and
cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their
applications. 49
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 50
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide
claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the
rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. 51
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A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily shows
that in the affirming the ruling of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals relied on the provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 52
in relation to the Civil Code's provision's on prescription on the
assumption that the subject land is private land. Therein lies
the flaw in the appellate court's postulate. The application for
registration of private respondent is for judicial confirmation of
an imperfect title considering that the land is presumed under
the Regalian Doctrine to be part of the public domain.
Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or
disposable lands; and, 2.] Inalienable or non-disposable
public lands. Non-disposable public lands or those not
susceptible of private appropriation include a.] Timber lands;
and, b.] Mineral lands. 53 For purposes of administration and
disposition, the lands of the public domain classified as
"disposable" or "alienable" are further sub-classified into a.]
Agricultural; b.] Residential, commercial, industrial or for
similar productive purposes; c.] Educational, charitable or
other similar purposes, and d.] Reservations for town sites
and for public and quasi-public purposes. 54
From the foregoing classifications, public agricultural land
may be defined as those alienable portions of the public
domain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. Thus the
term includes residential, commercial and industrial lands for
the reason that these lands are neither timber nor mineral
lands. 55
On the other hand, Section 19 of Act No. 496, as amended,
permits the registration of private lands claimed to be owned
by the applicant in fee simple which refer to:
1.] Lands acquired by various types of titles from the
government during the Spanish Regime by way of grants by
the Spanish crown namely the: a.] Titulo real or royal grant;
b.] Concession especial or special grant; c] Composicion con
el estado title or adjustment title; d.] Titulo de compra or title
by purchase and; e.] Informacion posesoria or possessory
information title, which could become a Titulo gratuito or a
gratuitous title; 56
2.] Lands that are claimed to be owned by accession,
i.e. accretion, avulsion, formation of islands, abandoned river
beds, as provided for in Articles 457, 461 and 464 of the Civil
Code; and
3.] Lands which have been acquired in any other
manner provided by law.
Suffice it to state that the land sought to be registered by
private respondent hardly falls under any of the latter
classifications of land referred to by Act No. 496, as amended.
Given the foregoing facts, prescription in the manner invoked
by both courts can not be pleaded to bolster private
respondent/applicant's claim because —
. . . [N]o public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied from the government; it
is indispensable that there be a showing of title from the state
. . . . 57
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the possession of public agricultural land, however,
long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto
upon the possessor. 58 The reason, to reiterate our ruling, is
because the statute of limitations with regard to public
agricultural land does not operate against the State, unless
the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the
same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years to constitute a grant from the State. 59
Fifth, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that prescription can
be applied in the manner invoked by the trial court and the
appellate court, it must be pointed out that —
PAULINE D. MACAS
. . . [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that
"(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property
are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of
ten years," this provision of law must be read in conjunction
with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that ". . .
(o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires
possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by
law." Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired
by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a
period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con
justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith). 60
The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable
belief that the person from whom he received the thing was
the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. 61 For
purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of
the recognized modes of acquisition of ownership or other real
rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit
any
right. 62
It can not be said that private respondent's possession was
con justo titulo y buena fe. On the contrary, private
respondent/applicant's act of appropriating for himself the
entire area of 4,845 square meters to the exclusion of
petitioners who have been occupying portions of the disputed
land constituted acts of deprivation tantamount to bad faith.
Indeed this Court has ruled that the —
. . . [c]oncealment and misrepresentation in the application
that no other persons had any claim or interest in the said
land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud
supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional
omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual
physical possession by another person constitutes an
allegation of actual fraud. 63 Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly
omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the
prejudice of a third person. 64
Suffice it to state in this regard that to allow private
respondent/applicant to benefit from his own wrong would run
counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio — no man
can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing. 65
It need not be overemphasized that extraordinary acquisitive
prescription can not similarly vest ownership over the property
upon private respondent/applicant because Article 1137 of the
Civil Code states in no uncertain terms that —
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables
also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty years, without need of good faith.
Needless to state, private respondent/applicant's possession
of thirteen (13) years falls way below the thirty-year
requirement mandated by Article 1137.
Sixth, petitioners/oppositors have, in stark contrast to the
secondary proof of private respondent, adduced
overwhelming evidence to prove their ownership of the
portions they claim in the subject land. The evidence on
record clearly points to the fact that private
respondent/applicant's right, if at all, is confined to only 620
square meters or what has been left of the 840 square meters
he purchased from Faustino Martirez after 220 square meters
thereof were appropriated by the Municipality of Banga for the
Public Market Road. 66
The records further bear out that the original owner of the
whole area was one Dionisia Regado who executed three (3)
deeds of sale covering certain portions of the disputed lands,
namely: 1.] the Deed of Sale dated April 29, 1914 covering
1,850 square meters executed in favor of the Municipality of
Banga; 67 2.] the Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1915 covering
1,320 square meters executed in favor of Eulalio Raz; 68 and,
3.] the Deed of Sale dated September 6, 1918 covering the
balance with an area of 2,938 square meters in favor of
Eufrocino Alba. 69
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Faustino Martirez acquired only an 840 square meter portion
of the land by purchase Eulalio Raz on January 15, 1933 as
confirmed in paragraph 2 of the Escritura De Venta Absoluta
executed by him on August 13, 1941. 70 After selling 840
square meters to Faustino Martirez, Eulalio Raz retained 480
square meters to Susana Braulio 71 leaving a balance of 240
square meters which remained undiposed.
On May 29, 1969, Virginia Alba, Inocentes Alba and Estrella
Alba, children of the deceased Eufrocino Alba, sold a 676
square meter portion of the 2,938 square meter lot purchased
by their father from Dionisia Regado to petitioner/oppositor
Octabela alba Vda. De Raz. 72 This Deeds was duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Aklan in accordance
with Act No. 3344 on June 17, 1969. 73 The land is covered
by Tax Declaration No. 332 in the name of Octabela Alba Vda.
De Raz's husband. 74
Petitioner/oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz's ownership
of the remaining 240 square meter portion which she and her
husband Eulalio Raz bought from Dionisia Regado 75 and the
676 square meter portion which they bought from the heirs of
Eufrocino Alba 76 is fully substantiated by documentary proof.
77 Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba's ownership
of a portion measuring 1,335 square meters 78 and another
portion measuring 2,262 square meters 79 is likewise backed
by documentary evidence. Susana Braulio's ownership of a
240 square meter portion 80 which she acquired from
Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz on November 11, 1956 81 is also
documented, her predecessor-in-interest having acquired the
same from Dionisia Regado on September 6, 1918. 82
The foregoing only serves to underscore the paucity of the
proof of private respondent/applicant to support his claim of
ownership over the entire 4,845 square meter area. He has
not adduced evidence to show how and when he was able to
acquire, with the exception of 840 square meters further
reduced to 620 square meters on account of 220 square
meters appropriated for the market road, the bigger area of 3,
755 square meters from anybody let alone the ancestral
owner, Dionisia Regado.
His claim is anchored mainly on Revised Tax Declaration No.
14181 which he was able to procure from the Municipal
Assessor of Banga in 1956 on the basis of a self-serving
affidavit which proffered the lame excuse that there was error
in the statement of the area of the land which he claimed to
be 4,845 square meters instead of 620 square meters —
which was the area reflected in earlier tax declarations
namely, 1954 Tax Declaration No. 13578; 1953 Tax
Declaration No. 13043; and 1947 Tax Declaration No. 6528.
Be that as it may, the Court has reservations on the propriety
of adjudicating to petitioners the contested portions of the
subject land, in view of their failure to present the technical
descriptions of these areas. Furthermore, there is no sufficient
evidence showing that petitioners have been in open,
adverse, exclusive, peaceful and continuous possession
thereof in the concept of owner, considering that the testimony
of Octabela Alba vda. De Raz was stricken off the record.
WHEREFORE, based on foregoing premises, the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1 dated
August 18, 1992 in Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC
Record No. K-15104 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1.] The 620 square meter portion on which private
respondent Jose N. Lachica's house is situated, clearly
delineating its metes and bounds, is hereby ORDERED
segregated from the parcel of land described in Psu-161277
situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga,
Province of Aklan, Philippines with an area of 4,484 square
meters, to be registered and confirmed in the name of private
respondent;
2.] A ten (10) meter road width along the National road
mentioned in the application be segregated for future road
widening programs upon the payment of just compensation to
be annotated at the back of the title.
PAULINE D. MACAS
3.] Insofar as the ownership of the remainder of the
subject land is concerned, the case is hereby REMANDED to
the court of origin for the reception of further evidence for the
petitioners to establish the other requisites for the
confirmation of title and registration in their names of the areas
they respectively claim.
REPUBLIC V. IMPERIAL
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner seeks to
reverse and set aside the (1) Resolution[1] of 30 July 1997 of
the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53972 granting
petitioner until 11 August 1997 within which to file its
appellants brief, and the (2) Resolution[2] of 29 September
1997 dismissing petitioners appeal. The appeal was taken
from the Order[3] of Branch I, Regional Trial Court of Legaspi
City in Civil Case No. 9176, which petitioner instituted to
cancel the title to some lots issued to private respondents for
the reversion thereof to the mass of the public domain.
The facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as
follows:
On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to
Decree No. 55173 of the then Court of First Instance of Albay,
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1113 of the
Cadastral Survey of Legazpi, G.L. Cad. Rec. No. 88,
containing an area of fifty eight thousand and twenty six
square meters (58,026), more or less, situated in Legazpi City.
The plaintiff seeks to judicially declare the transfer certificate
of titles described in the preceding paragraphs null and void;
to order the said defendants to surrender the owners duplicate
of their aforesaid titles to the Register of Deeds of Legazpi
City and directing [sic] the latter to cancel them as well as the
originals thereof and to declare the reversion of the lots
covered by the aforesaid titles to the mass of the public
domain.
In support of its stand, the plaintiff contends among others that
on letter request addressed to the Honorable Solicitor General
dated March 20, 1994, residents of Purok No. 1 and Bgy. 24,
Legazpi City, represented by Antonio F. Aguilar, requested
that Original Certificate of Title No. 408 (500) in the name of
Elias Imperial be cancelled and the land covered thereby
reverted back to the State on the ground that the land subject
thereof is a foreshore land. Subsequent investigation
conducted by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region V, Legazpi City, upon the request
of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disclosed that
OCT No. 408 (500), from whence the transfer certificate of
titles of the defendants were derived is null and void, and was,
thus, acquired to the prejudice of the State, considering that:
a. the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) has the
features of a foreshore land;
b. natural ground plants such as mangroves and nipas thrive
on certain portions of the land in question;
c. some portions of the same land are permanently
submerged in seawater even at low tide;
d. some portions of the same land are not anymore inundated
by seawater due to the considerable amount of improvements
built thereon and the placing of boulders and other land-filling
materials by the actual residents therein.
The plaintiff alleged that consequently on the basis of said
findings, the Director, Lands Management Bureau
recommended to the Director, Lands Services, DENR, the
cancellation of OCT No. 406 [sic] (500) as well as its derivative
titles through appropriate proceedings.
The plaintiff contended that since the land in question is a
foreshore land, the same cannot be registered under the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496, now P.D. No. 1529) in the name
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of private persons since it is non-alienable and belongs to the
public domain, administered and managed by the State for the
benefit of the general public.
The plaintiff further contended that under Public Land Act No.
141, as amended, such land shall be disposed of to private
parties by lease only and not otherwise as soon as the
President upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, now DENR, shall declare
that the same are not necessary for public services and are
open to disposition.
Within the time for pleading, defendants EANCRA
Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and Salvador Alcazar filed their
answer with cross-claim, while the rest of the defendants,
namely, Felix S. Imperial, Jr., Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S.
Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to dismiss.
The aforesaid motion to dismiss was anchored on the
following grounds: (a) the lands covered by the defendants
transfer certificate of titles which were derived from OCT No.
408 (500) was already the subject of the cadastral
proceedings in 1917 and which has been implemented by the
issuance of OCT No. 408 (500) under the Torrens system.
The adjudication by the cadastral court is binding against the
whole world including the plaintiff since cadastral proceedings
are in rem and the government itself through the Director of
Lands instituted the proceedings and is a direct and active
participant. OCT No. 408 (500) issued under the Torrens
system has long become incontrovertible after the lapse of
one year from the entry of decree of registration; (b) OCT No.
408 (500) was judicially reconstituted in 1953 in accordance
with Republic Act [No.] 26 in the then Court of First Instance
of Albay, by Jose R. Imperial Samson in Court Case No. RT-
305, entitled, The Director of Lands vs. Jose R. Imperial
Samson. The proceedings in the judicial reconstitution in said
case No. RT-305 is one in rem and has long become final and
gave rise to res judicata and therefore can no longer legally
be assailed; (c) the findings of the Director of Lands dated
February 22, 1983 [sic] from which no appeal was taken in
said administrative investigation that Lot No. 1113, Cad. 27
and a portion of it covered by Lot No. 1113-M-5 in the name
of Jose Baritua cannot be considered as part of the shore or
foreshore of Albay Gulf. This finding of the Director of Lands
has become final and thus constitute res judicata, and finally
moving defendants contended that several interrelated cases
have been decided related to OCT No. 408 (500), specifically
Civil Cases Nos. 6556, 6885, 6999 and 7104, all of the
Regional Trial Court, Legazpi City which have been brought
by several squatters [sic] family against Jose Baritua attacking
the latters title over Lot No. 1113-M-5 which was derived from
OCT No. 408 (500) which cases were all decided in favor of
Jose Baritua, hence, the decisions rendered therein have
become final and executory and constitute res judicata.
The plaintiff through the Office of the Solicitor General filed an
objection to the motion to dismiss based on the following
grounds: (1) the purported decision issued by the Court of
First Instance of Albay in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 supposedly
resulting in the issuance of OCT No. 408 (500) pursuant to
Decree No. 55173 does not constitute res judicata to the
present case; (2) the incontestable and indisputable character
of a Torrens certificate of title does not apply when the land
thus covered, like foreshore land, is not capable of
registration; (3) a certificate of title judicially reconstituted from
a void certificate of title is, likewise, void; (4) administrative
investigation conducted by the Director of Lands is not a bar
to the filing of reversion suits; and (5) the filing of the motion
to dismiss carries with it the admission of the truth of all
material facts of the complaint.[4]
After hearing the motion to dismiss, or on 9 August 1996, the
trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
judgment rendered by the cadastral court in G.R. Cad. Rec.
No. 88 and our resolution in the petition to quiet title, G.R. No.
85770, both decreed that the parcel of land covered by OCT
No. 408 (500) was not foreshore. The 1917 cadastral
proceeding was binding upon the government, which had
PAULINE D. MACAS
initiated the same and had been an active and direct
participant thereon. Likewise, the 1982 petition to cancel OCT
No. 408 (500) filed by the claimants of Lot No. 1113, Cad-47,
and resolved by the Director of Lands in his 22 February 1984
letter[5] to the effect that Original Certificate of Title No. 408
(500) 2113 in the name of Elias Imperial and its derivative
title[s] were legally issued was res judicata to the instant case.
Petitioners contention that the judicially reconstituted
certificate of title was void since the land covered by OCT No.
408 (500) was foreshore land was a mere assumption
contrary to existing physical facts. The court further
considered as forum shopping petitioners attempt to seek a
favorable opinion after it was declared in related cases
questioning the title of a certain Jose Baritua, which was also
derived from OCT No. 408(500), that the land in question was
foreshore.
On 28 October 1996, petitioner filed a notice of appeal.
On 18 April 1997, the Court of Appeals required petitioner to
file its appellants brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt
of the notice. Petitioner received said notice ten (10) days
later, or on 28 April 1997.
Due to the alleged heavy workload of the solicitor assigned to
the case, petitioner moved for an extension of thirty (30) days
from 12 June 1997, or until 12 July 1997, within which to file
the appellants brief. The Court of Appeals granted petitioners
motion for extension in a resolution dated 26 June 1997.
On the same ground of continuing heavy pressure of work,
petitioner filed, on 12 July 1997, its second motion for
extension of thirty (30) days or until 11 August 1997 within
which to file the appellants brief.
On 11 August 1997, petitioner asked for a third extension of
thirty (30) days, or until 10 September 1997, within which to
file appellants brief citing the same ground of heavy pressure
of work.
Meanwhile, on 30 July 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution, the full text of which reads:
The Office of the Solicitor General is GRANTED a LAST
EXTENSION of thirty (30) days from July 12, 1997, or until
August 11, 1997, within which to file the oppositor-appellants
brief. Failure to file said brief within the said period will mean
dismissal of the appeal.[6]
On 12 August 1997, petitioner received a copy of the
aforesaid resolution.
On 26 August 1997, petitioner moved to reconsider the 30
July 1997 resolution and, despite the appellate courts
warning, reiterated its third motion for extension of another
thirty (30) days to file the appellants brief.
On 10 September 1997, petitioner filed a manifestation and
motion requesting another extension of five (5) days, or until
15 September 1997, within which to file appellants brief,
reasoning that the brief, although finalized, was yet to be
signed by the Solicitor General.
On 15 September 1997, petitioner filed the required
appellants brief.
On 29 September 1997, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and
sustained its Resolution of 30 July 1997 dismissing the case
for failure to file the appellants brief within the extended
period.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition assailing the dismissal of
its appeal on purely technical grounds. It alleges that it has
raised meritorious grounds in support of its appeal which, if
not allowed to be laid down before the proper Court, will result
to the prejudice of, and irreparable injury to, public interest, as
the Government would lose its opportunity to recover what it
believes to be non-registrable lands of the public domain.
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Minor lapses in adherence to procedural rules should be
condoned in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus,
petitioner begs the courts indulgence, enumerating the cases
that had occupied its time and attention which prevented the
filing of the required brief within the extended periods granted
by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner maintains that our resolution of 8 May 1989 in G.R.
No. 85770 entitled Spouses Espiritu v. Baritua does not
constitute res judicata to the instant case because there is no
identity of parties, causes of action, and subject matter
between the two cases. The Supreme Court case was
instituted by Spouses Jose and Maura Espiritu and others
against Jose Baritua, while the instant case was filed by no
less than the Republic of the Philippines against herein
respondents. The former arose from a proceeding to quiet
title, while the latter is an action for reversion.
Anent the unappealed letter-decision of the Director of Lands,
petitioner contends that the same was a reversible mistake
which did not bar the filing of a reversion suit, as the
government is never estopped by the mistakes of its officials
or agents.
Petitioner also argues that the 1953 reconstitution case only
involved the restoration of the title which was supposed to
have been lost or destroyed. The issue as to the nature of the
land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was never delved into by
the court. Petitioner insists that the parcels of land in question
are foreshore lands, and hence, inalienable and incapable of
registration. Consequently, the certificates of title covering
said lands are void ab initio.
As regards the trial courts finding of forum shopping, petitioner
asserts that the same is without basis. It is the first time that
petitioner instituted an action against herein respondents
concerning the lands in question.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the dismissal of
the appeal for failure to file brief on time was not an abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner failed
to present special circumstances or good reasons to justify its
motions for extension. Moreover, that the parcels of land
involved are foreshore was confirmed in the 1917 cadastral
and 1953 reconstitution proceedings. This finding attained
finality through our resolution in the action for quieting of title
(G.R. No. 85770), and was further affirmed through the
administrative investigation conducted by the Director of
Lands. Thus, the instant case is now barred by res judicata.
We have long observed that the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) regularly presents motions for extension of time to file
pleadings, taking for granted the courts leniency in granting
the same. Instead of contributing to the swift administration of
justice as an instrumentality of the State, the OSG contributes
to needless delays in litigation. Despite the numerous cases
that need the OSGs time and attention, equal importance
should be allotted to each and every case. Deadlines must be
respected and court warnings not taken lightly.
However, after a thorough reexamination of this case, we are
of the view that the challenged resolutions should be
reconsidered.
The rules of court governing practice and procedure were
formulated in order to promote just, speedy, and inexpensive
disposition of every action or proceeding without sacrificing
substantial justice and equity considerations.[7]
The filing of appellants brief in appeals is not a jurisdictional
requirement. Nevertheless, an appeal may be dismissed by
the Court of Appeals on its own motion or on that of the
appellee upon failure of the appellant to serve and file the
required number of copies of the brief within the time provided.
[8]
If the appeal brief cannot be filed on time, extension of time
may be allowed provided (1) there is good and sufficient
cause, and (2) the motion for extension is filed before the
PAULINE D. MACAS
expiration of the time sought to be extended.[9] The courts
liberality on extensions notwithstanding, lawyers should never
presume that their motions for extension would be granted as
a matter of course or for the length of time sought; their
concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court exercised
in accordance with the attendant circumstances.[10]
What constitutes good and sufficient cause that will merit
suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court. The
court has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except
a case from their operation when compelling reasons so
warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it.[11] Among
the reasons which the court allowed in suspending application
of the rules on filing an appeal brief were the following: (1) the
cause for the delay was not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules;[12] (2) there was no objection from the State,[13] and
the brief was filed within the period requested; (3) no material
injury was suffered by the appellee by reason of the delay in
filing the brief;[14] (4) the fake lawyer failed to file the brief;[15]
(5) appellant was represented by counsel de oficio;[16] (6)
petitioners original counsel died;[17] and (7) the preparation
of the consolidated brief involved a comparative study of
many exhibits.[18]
At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land
in question are foreshore lands. Foreshore land is a part of
the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed
of only by lease and not otherwise. It was defined as that part
(of the land) which is between high and low water and left dry
by the flux and reflux of the tides.[19] It is also known as a
strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks
and is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide.[20]
The classification of public lands is a function of the executive
branch of government, specifically the director of lands (now
the director of the Lands Management Bureau). The decision
of the director of lands when approved by the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR)[21] as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the
court. The principle behind this ruling is that the subject has
been exhaustively weighed and discussed and must therefore
be given credit. This doctrine finds no application, however,
when the decision of the director of lands is revoked by, or in
conflict with that of, the DENR Secretary.[22]
There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the
Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, in the present
case. Respondents contend that the Director of Lands found
Jose Barituas land covered by TCT No. 18655, which
stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be definitely outside of the
foreshore area.[23] Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that
subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V, Legazpi
City, disclosed that the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500)
from whence the titles were derived has the features of a
foreshore land.[24] The contradictory views of the Director of
Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, on the true
nature of the land, which contradiction was neither discussed
nor resolved by the RTC, cannot be the premise of any
conclusive classification of the land involved.
The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the
lands subject of petitioners reversion efforts are foreshore
lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing
procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for
extension to file appellants brief. Petitioners appeal presents
an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest
and must then be given due course.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; the
Resolutions of 30 July 1997 and 29 September 1997 of the
Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE; petitioners appeal is
reinstated; and the instant case is REMANDED to the Court
of Appeals for further proceedings.
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DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. CA
Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General,
seeks a review of the decision dated May 27, 1988, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra
Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands," affirming in toto the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the
private respondents' application for confirmation and
registration of their title to two (2) parcels of land in LRC Cad.
Rec. 1256.
In their joint application for registration of title to two (2)
parcels of land filed on July 20,1976, the applicants Ibarra and
Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots
866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869,
respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq.
m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in barrio Gen.
Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Capiz (p.
14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those
parcels of land (p. 41, Rollo) and they had been paying the
taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).
On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director
of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application
on the grounds that:
1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-
interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee
simple of the land or lots applied for, the same not having
been acquired by any of the various types of title issued by
the Spanish Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal
grant, (2) the 'concession especial' or special grant, (3) the
'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the
'titulo de compra 'or title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion
possessoria' or possessory information under the Royal
Decree of 13 February 1894, or any other recognized mode
of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent applicable
laws.
2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of
the application.
3. The properties in question are a portion of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not
subject to private appropriation, (pp. 17-19, Record on
Appeal). (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)
On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended
application, which was approved on March 14, 1977, and
included the following allegation:
Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to
the case, they hereby apply for the benefits of Chapter 8,
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land
as owners for more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16, Rollo.)
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title
of the lots in the names of the applicants, herein private
respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful
and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under
bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years
(not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for registration,
introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts,
bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land
into productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).
On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's
decision. It held that the classification of the lots as timberland
by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of
proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land
than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron
vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this
petition, the government alleges that:
PAULINE D. MACAS
1. the classification or reclassification of public lands
into alienable or disposable agricultural land, mineral land or
forest land is a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government and not of the courts;
2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into private ownership; and
3. that an applicant for registration of title has the
burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section
48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in
question may be registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141,
as amended.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153
SCRA 351, we ruled:
As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141,
which was lifted from Act 2874, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not the courts. With these
rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the classification of lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive
Branch of the government, through the Office of the President.
Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for
respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1)
the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as
certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed
for forest purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is
needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless
and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs.
Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court
of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148
SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151
SCRA 679).
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161
[1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401
[1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power
and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the
Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA
648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We
reiterate our ruling in Amunategui that:
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant
shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the
presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public
domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as
those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years
preceding the filing of his application. (Heirs of Amunategui
vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)
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WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set
aside. The application for registration in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256
of the former Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed
without costs.
HEIRS OF MARAVILLA V. TUPAS
Indeed, the well-settled principle of immutability of final
judgments demands that once a judgment has become final,
the winning party should not, through a mere subterfuge, be
deprived of the fruits of the verdict.1 There are, however,
recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of
a final and immutable judgment, one of which is the existence
of a supervening event.2
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated May 25, 2010 seeking to
set aside the Decision3 dated November 11, 2009 and the
Resolution dated March 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
that declared null and void and set aside the Orders dated
February 2, 2009 and April 7, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Kalibo, Aklan directing the execution of the latter's
Decision dated March 31, 2003 that became final and
executory on May 21, 2007.
The facts follow.
According to respondent, he, along with the other heirs of the
late Asiclo S. Tupas, has maintained the occupation and
possession of certain portions of the property subject of this
case. Thereafter, the late Zosimo Maravilla claimed
ownership over 10,000 square meters of said property by
virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February 8, 1975, purportedly
executed between him and the late Asiclo S. Tupas. The
property situated in Diniwid, Barangay Balabag, Malay, Aklan,
is more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land situated at Barangay Balabag, Malay, Aklan
bounded on the North by Gil Aguirre, F. Flores; South by
Antonio Tupas & T. Sacapa�o, East by Asicio (sic) Tupas,
and West by Seashore L. Villanueva of approximately 1,000
hectares, assessed at P2,610.00 under Tax Declaration No.
1304, in the name of Maravilla, Ozosimo A. for the year of
1985.
Maravilla filed a case for quieting of title with recovery of
possession and damages before Branch 9 of the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan, docketed as Civil Case No. 4338. The
dispositive portion of the Decision4 reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the deed of sale (Exhs. A & 1) executed by Asiclo
Tupas in favor of plaintiff Zosimo Maravilla over one-half (�)
portion or about 5,000 sq. m. of the conjugal property of the
former as legal and valid;
2. Ordering that the portion sold be delineated from the
shoreline with a length of at least 28 m. long from the
southwestern direction traversing in a straight line towards
northeastern part between points 5-6 embracing an area of
about 5,000 sq. m., depicted in Exh. G, interpreted in relation
to amended commissioner's report and sketch plan, dated
August 25, 1992 (Exh. L) across Lots B and A; with the
northern portion of 5,000 sq. m. awarded to the defendants
and the southern portion of 5,000 sq. m. to plaintiff;
Defendants' cottages that may be found in plaintiff's one- half
portion shall be removed by the former at their expense within
30 days from the finality of this decision. The existing
muniments of the parties to the land in question like tax
declarations, certificates of title, and other related documents
are ordered modified or corrected to conform to this decision;
3. Defendants are ordered jointly and severally, to refund
plaintiff the amount of seven thousand pesos (P7,000.00),
Philippine currency, representing the consideration of the �
portion of the land in question herein awarded to them; and
PAULINE D. MACAS
4. Plaintiff is ordered to pay defendants for attorney's fees and
litigation expenses in the sum of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.5
Maravilla filed an appeal with the CA questioning the RTC's
decision that he is only entitled to � of the area sold even if
the validity of the deed of sale was upheld. The CA, in a
Decision6 dated August 28, 1996, ruled that:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo is SET ASIDE
and another judgment is issued declaring Zosimo Maravilla
the owner of 10,000 sq. m. undivided share in the 36,382 sq.
m. parcel of land of Asiclo S. Tupas and Francisca Aguirre
and directing that this land be partitioned, either extra-
judicially or judicially, and that Maravilla's portion of the
property be determined; and ordering the defendants to turn
over possession of the portion allocated to Maravilla.
Special Proceedings No. 39517 is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On October 21, 1999, Maravilla filed another case for partition
and damages before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 6, and
on March 31, 2003, it disposed of the case as follows:8
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered containing that
the one-hectare portion in the Sketch Plan [Annex B-1;
Complaint] is the rightful share of the plaintiff.
Defendants are ordered to restore possession thereof to the
plaintiff, and to pay jointly and severally the latter the agreed
monthly reasonable compensation for the use and occupation
thereof of P5,000.00 starting in 1990 until possession is fully
restored to plaintiff.
Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent appealed the decision with the CA, and in a
Decision10 dated April 13, 2007, the latter dismissed the
appeal on the ground of res judicata. The CA opined that the
first case, the one for quieting of title and the second case for
partition, both presented identity of facts and evidence and
that the truth of the matter is, part of the judgment of the first
case ordered for partition of the subject parcel of land to
delimit the portion owned by herein petitioner.
On October 31, 2008, Maravilla filed a Motion for Execution11
of the March 31, 2003 Decision of the RTC-Branch 6 of Kalibo,
Aklan.
While the motion for execution was pending before the RTC-
Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan, this Court, on October 8, 2008,
declared Boracay as government property in the consolidated
cases of The Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and Sacay, et
al. v. the Secretary of the DENR, et al. (Boracay Decision)12
On February 2, 2009, a Resolution was issued by the RTC
granting the motion for execution.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC
denied the same in an Order dated April 7, 2009.
Thus, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
assailing the Resolution and the Order issued by the RTC.
Respondent raised as an issue that the grant of the motion for
execution is not in accordance with this Court's decision in
The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and Sacay, et al. v. the
Secretary of the DENR, et al., a supervening event, and that
the RTC erred in not declaring as null and void the deed of
sale of unregistered land considering that Boracay has been
NATURAL RESOURCES CASE DIGEST FOR 2ND MEETING
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classified as an inalienable land. The CA granted the petition,
thus:
Withal, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders
dated February 2, 2009 and April 7, 2009, respectively, issued
by public respondent are hereby declared NULL and VOID
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.13
Maravilla's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated March 17, 2010, hence, the present
petition.14
Petitioners (the heirs of Maravilla) raise the following grounds:
In rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution, petitioners
most humbly submit that the Court of Appeals gravely erred
in making the following legal conclusions that warrants the
power of review and supervision by the Honorable Supreme
Court:
I. The Court of Appeals so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings when it set aside the
Orders of the Regional Trial Court granting execution of the
31 March 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in relation
to the 28 August 1996 [Decision] of the Court of Appeals, both
of which judgments have long become final and executory.
II. The Court of Appeals' finding that the Boracay Decision is
a supervening event that prevents the trial court from
implementing the writ of execution is not in accord with the
applicable decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court. The
Court of Appeals erred in finding that:
a. the Boracay Decision had a direct effect on the issue
litigated and settled with finality between the parties, and
substantially changed the rights and relations between the
parties;
b. with the declaration of Boracay as state-owned, the claim
of herein petitioners of rights to the Property is already without
basis;
c. to allow execution of the judgment would be to give undue
advantage to herein petitioners and would be a miscarriage of
justice.15
They also bring up the following arguments:
I. Petitioners are entitled as a matter of right to the execution
of the judgments that have long become final and executory.
II. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Boracay
Decision is not a supervening event:
A. The settled dispute between the parties as to who has the
better right to the Property is distinct and separate from the
issue of titling sought in the Boracay Decision;
B. The Boracay Decision does not substantially change the
rights and relations between the petitioners and respondent
that were already decided by the courts with finality;
C. Notwithstanding the Boracay Decision, it is still possible to
execute the decision regarding the partition and restoration of
the possession of Property in favor of petitioners as against
respondent;
III. The Boracay Decision does not render the execution
sought by [the] petition as unjust or inequitable that precludes
the execution of the final and executory judgments.16
Petitioners insist that the CA's Decision dated August 28,
1996 in the original case for Quieting of Title with Recovery of
Possession and Damages entitled petitioners to the
restoration of their possession of the property consisting of
10,000 sq. m. out of the 36,382 sq. m. tract of land, after the
validity of the sale to Maravilla by respondent's predecessor
PAULINE D. MACAS
has been upheld by the court with finality. They further claim
that it is well entrenched in Our rules and jurisprudence that
the prevailing party may move for the execution of a decision
that has become final and executory as a matter of right and
the issuance of the writ of execution becomes a ministerial
duty of the court.
The pronouncement in the Boracay Decision, according to
petitioners, is not a supervening event. The Boracay Decision
is simply a recognition of the right of the State to classify the
island and to pave the way for the eventual titling or
formalization of ownership claims of lands classified as
alienable and disposable, and as to whether or not petitioners
may secure title to the property is an issue that has not yet
ripened into a legal controversy between petitioners and the
State. Petitioners argue that the settled dispute between the
parties as to who has the better right to the property is distinct
and separate from the issue of titling sought in the Boracay
Decision by the claimants therein.
Furthermore, petitioners do not contest the legal status of the
land; what they assert is the satisfaction of their right to enjoy
whatever imperfect rights that their predecessors had validly
acquired from respondent's predecessor, as confirmed with
finality by the courts.
The petition lacks merit.
The basic issue to be resolved is whether or not this Court's
decision in The Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and
Sacay, et al. v. the Secretary of the DENR, et al. can be
considered as supervening event and if so, whether or not
such supervening event can prevent the execution of a
judgment that has already attained finality.
In the present case, petitioners' basis of their claim over the
subject property is the Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land that
the late Zosimo Maravilla executed with the late Asiclo S.
Tupas. This Deed of Sale has been acknowledged and
adjudged by the RTC to be binding between the parties, and
in fact, has attained finality. This Court, however, in The
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and Sacay, et al. v. the
Secretary of the DENR, et al., ruled that the entire island of
Boracay as state-owned except for lands already covered by
existing titles. To have a clearer view of the antecedents of
the said case, the following are thus quoted:
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National
Reservation Survey of Boracay Island, which identified
several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines,
as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration
of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos
later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated
September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-
82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr.,
Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.
They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them.
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Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801
and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond
the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a
tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the
lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG
countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified
as "public forest", which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3 (a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705
or the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants' reliance on
PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their
right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No.
141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession
they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG
stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants
were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay
Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut
trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees
had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were
planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-
claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax
purposes.
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution
was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any
legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in
Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit
the case for resolution upon submission of their respective
memoranda.
The RTC took judicial notice that certain parcels of land in
Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-
5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502
(RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These
lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed
before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares
that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose
no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated
to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with
the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and
to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent
Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey
does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants' right to have their
occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned
that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the
subject of disposition. The Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands. The trial court cited Sections 87 and 53 of
the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private
ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested
areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest
reserve.
The OSG moved for reconsideration, but its motion was
denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA.
PAULINE D. MACAS
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the
RTC decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case
and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be
prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since
time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly
denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400)
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side
of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way
and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,
Wilfredo Gelito, and other landowners in Boracay filed with
this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the
Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over
portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession
of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.
They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their
lands and building internationally-renowned first class resorts
on their lots.
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a
proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land.
Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. Thus,
their possession in the concept of owner for the required
period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-
claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied
portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest
land pursuant to Section 3 (a) of PD No. 705. Being public
forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and
cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable
and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation
of the two petitions as they principally involve the same issues
on the land classification of Boracay Island.17
The consolidated petitions basically raise the issue of whether
or not private individuals may acquire vested right of
ownership over the island, considering that they have been in
open and continued possession for several years. With such
factual antecedents, this Court adjudicated that Boracay is
classified as a public land, in particular, a forest land, thus:
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay
was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR 109
and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority
certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public
domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all
unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest.
Section 3 (a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass
NATURAL RESOURCES CASE DIGEST FOR 2ND MEETING
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of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject
of the present system of classification for the determination of
which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not".
Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in
Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD
No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its
effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest
land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the
present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been
partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for
commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for
local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-
million peso beach resorts on the island; that the island has
already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
island's tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks", do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land
or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a
dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of
lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One
is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a
legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate,
the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay
Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its
forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants
and other commercial establishments, it has not been
automatically converted from public forest to alienable
agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as
basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land.
However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801
issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation
classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone.
Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is
susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not
convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There
is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay
Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82
to "private lands" and "areas declared as alienable and
disposable" does not by itself classify the entire island as
agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not
only to private lands and areas but also to public forested
lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
PAULINE D. MACAS
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior
authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are
declared forest reserves.
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public
lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified by
the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA
No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then
Bureau of Forest Development's authority to declare areas in
the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and
disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the
positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable
and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify
the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President
Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain
the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island,
together with other islands, coves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA � to ensure the concentrated efforts
of the public and private sectors in the development of the
areas' tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance
in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is
aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological
purposes. It does not address the areas' alienability.
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only
Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and
peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde
Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao
and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa
and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in
Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the
designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it
alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801,
all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide
open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is
clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively
declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same
to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide
that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the
proper department head, who has the authority to classify the
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to
her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject
to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through
the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.
Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until
released and rendered open to disposition.
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares
of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural
land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer
zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which
are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the
area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants' argument, there was nothing
invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the
classification of Boracay Island made by the President
through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to
make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.18
Therefore, the island, being owned by the State, can only be
declared or made subject of private ownership by the
Government. And only the Government can determine the
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manner in which the island should be disposed of or conveyed
to private individuals, pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine as
this Court ruled in Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap:19
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.20 The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.21
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.22 Thus, all
lands that have not been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.23 Necessarily, it is up to the
State to determine if lands of the public domain will be
disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the
agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored
recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they
may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of
obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would
be ordinary acts of ownership.24
It was only in 2006 when certain parts of Boracay became
agricultural land when then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064, positively declaring
parts of Boracay as alienable and opening the same to private
ownership.
As such, the CA is then correct in ruling that with this Court's
pronouncement that Boracay is state-owned, petitioners'
claim of ownership over the subject property is negated, thus:
With the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court of
Boracay as state-owned, private respondent's ownership over
the property in dispute is defeated. As discussed at length by
the highest tribunal in the consolidated cases of The
Secretary of DENR, et al. v. Yap, et al. in G.R. No. 167707
and Sacay, et al. v. The Secretary of DENR, et al. in G.R. No.
173775, Boracay is an unclassified land of public domain.
Thus, where land is not alienable and disposable, possession
of the land, no matter how long cannot confer ownership or
possessory right.
It follows then that Asicio (sic) S. Tupas was not in a position
to sell that which he did not own in the first place. This is
because at the time the sale was entered into between private
respondent and the late Asicio (sic) S. Tupas, the land in
dispute was not alienable and subject to disposition. Since
private respondent derives title from whatever right his
predecessor-in-interest had, which unfortunately Asicio (sic)
S. Tupas had none, his claim is no longer tenable. Private
respondent cannot acquire a right greater than what his
predecessor-in-interest had. To allow the execution of
judgment would be to give undue advantage to private
respondent whose very basis of claim is no longer
tenable.25cralawred
The above reasoning of the CA has its basis on a simple logic
that one cannot dispose of a thing he does not own. In this
case, at the time of the sale of the subject property, the late
Asiclo S. Tupas had no right to sell a property that has not
been declared alienable by the State; hence, he cannot pass
unto another any right or title to own or possess the land.
Therefore, the "Sale of Unregistered Land" entered into
between the late Asiclo S. Tupas and the late Zosimo
Maravilla on February 8, 1975, previously considered valid
and legitimate and became the basis used by the RTC to
settle the dispute between the parties as to who has the better
to right to the property, has become null and void because the
subject property of the contract is a forest land and cannot be
alienated at the time the said deed of sale was executed.
Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides that only things, which
are not outside the commerce of man, including future things,
may be the objects of the contracts and Article 1409 of the
Civil Code also states that contracts whose objects are
PAULINE D. MACAS
outside the commerce of man are non-existent and void ab
initio.
With the above disquisitions, this Court's decision in The
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and Sacay, et al. v. the
Secretary of the DENR, et al. is, therefore, considered as a
supervening event that can stay the execution of a judgment
that has already attained finality. In Abrigo, et al. v. Flores, et
al.26 this Court ruled that:
Once a judgment becomes immutable and unalterable by
virtue of its finality, its execution should follow as a matter of
course. A supervening event, to be sufficient to stay or stop
the execution, must alter or modify the situation of the parties
under the decision as to render the execution inequitable,
impossible, or unfair. The supervening event cannot rest on
unproved or uncertain facts.
xxxx
We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening
event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of
a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects
the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially
changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to
render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable.27 A
supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the
judgment became final and executory, or of new
circumstances that develop after the judgment attained
finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of
prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet
in existence at that time.28 In that event, the interested party
may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the
writ of execution,29 or he may move the court to modify or
alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the
supervening event.30 The party who alleges a supervening
event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the
facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all
too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and
immutable judgment.31
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated May 25, 2010 of
petitioners heirs of Zosimo Q. Maravilla is DENIED for lack of
merit. Consequently, the Decision dated November 11, 2009
and the Resolution dated March 17, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.
MONTANO V. INSULAR GOVERNMENT LAND
Isabelo Montano presents a petition to the Court of Land
Registration for the inscription of a piece of land in the barrio
of Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery having a
superficial area of 10,805 square meters, and bounded as set
out in the petition; its value according to the last assessment
being $505.05, United States currency.
This petition was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf
of the Director of Lands, and by the entity known as Obras
Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on the ground that the
land in question belonged to the Government of the United
States, and the latter, that it was the absolute owner of all the
dry land along the eastern boundary of the said fishery.
The Court of Land Registration in its decision of December 1,
1906, dismissed the said oppositions without costs and
decreed, after a general entry by default, the adjudication and
registration of the property described in the petition, in favor
of Isabelo Montano y Marcial.
From this decision only counsel for the Director of Public
Lands appealed to this court. It is a kindred case to Cirilo
Mapa vs. The Insular Government, decided by this court on
February 19, 1908, reported in 10 Phil. Rep., 175.
As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of that
decision, it appears opportune to reaffirm the principle there
laid down. The issue was, whether the lands used as a fishery
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, for the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland some
distance from the sea, and asserted, though not clearly
proved to be overflowed at high tide could be registered as
private property on the strength of ten years' occupation,
under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 of the Phil.
Commission. The point decided was that such land within the
meaning of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was
agricultural, the reasoning leading up to the conclusion being
that congress having divided all the public lands of the Islands
into three classes it must be included in one of the three, and
being clearly neither forest nor mineral, it must of necessity
fall into two division of agricultural land. In the concurring
opinion, in order to avoid misapprehension on the part of
those not familiar with United States land legislation and a
misunderstanding of the reach of the doctrine, it was pointed
out that under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States the phrase "public lands" is held to be equivalent to
"public domain," and dos not by any means include all lands
of Government ownership, but only so much of said lands as
are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement by
homestead and other like general laws. Accordingly,
"government land" and "public domain" are not synonymous
items; the first includes not only the second, but also other
lands of the Government already reserved or devoted to
public use or subject to private right. In other words, the
Government owns real estate which is part of the "public
lands" and other real estate which is not part thereof.
This meaning attached to the phrase "public lands" by
Congress in its land legislation is settled by usage and
adjudication beyond a doubt, and without variation. It is
therefore doing the utmost violence to all rules of construction
to contend that in this law, dealing with the same subject-
matter in connection with these Islands, a different meaning
had, without indication or motive, been imported into the
words. They cannot have one meaning in any other statute
and a different and conflicting meaning in this statute. Where
property in general is referred to therein, other and apt
phrases are used in order to include it; for instance, section
12 provides "that all the property and rights which have been
acquired in the Phil. Islands by the United States ... are hereby
placed under the control of the Government of the said
Islands." Therefore, there is much real property belonging to
the Government which is not affected by statutes for the
settlement, prescription or sale of public lands. Examples in
point are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted
to municipal or other governmental uses.
Among the authorities cited in the Mapa case are two, Shively
vs. Bowlby (152 U.S., 1), and Mann vs. Tacoma Land Co.
(153 U.S., 273), in which it was held that general public land
laws did not apply to land over which the tide ebbs and flows.
Mr. Justice Gray, in Shively vs. Bowlby, which is in itself an
epitome of the American Law of Waters, speaking of the tide
lands, said:
But Congress has never undertaken by general laws to
dispose of such lands. . . .
The Congress of the United States, in disposing of the public
lands, has constantly acted upon the theory that those lands,
whether in the interior, or on the coast, above high- water
mark, may be taken up by actual occupants, in order to
encourage the settlement of the country, but that the
navigable water and the soils under them. whether within the
above the ebb and flow of the tide, shall be and remain public
highways; and being chiefly valuable for the public purposes
of commerce, navigation, and fishery, and for the
improvement necessary to secure and promote those
purposes, shall not be granted away during the period of
territorial government. (Pp. 48 and 49.)
The conclusions of the court are in part stated as follows:
Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or
improvement in the manner of lands above high-water mark.
They are of great value to the public for the purposes of
commerce, navigation, and fishery. Their improvement by
individuals, when permitted, is incidental or subordinate to the
PAULINE D. MACAS
public use and right. Therefore the title and the control of them
are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people
....
Upon the acquisition of a territory by the United States,
whether by cession from one of the States, or by treaty with a
foreign country, or by discovery and settlement, the same title
and dominion passed to the United States, for the benefit of
whole people, and in trust for the several States to be
ultimately created out of the territory . . . .
The United States, while hold the country as a territory, having
all the powers both of national and municipal government,
may grant, for appropriate purposes, titles or rights in the soil
below high-water mark of tide waters. But that have never
done so in general laws. (Pp. 57 and 58.)
In Mann vs. Tacoma Land Co., it was said by Mr. Justice
Brewer (p. 284);
It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect
to public lands does not extend to tide lands .... It provided
that the scrip might be located on the unoccupied and
unappropriated public lands. As said in Newhall vs. Sanger
(92 U.S., 761, 763.) "The words "public lands" are habitually
used in our legislation to described such as are subject to sale
or other disposal under general laws."
In Illinois Central R.R. Company vs. Illinois (146 U.S., 387)
Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
That the State holds the title tot he lands under the navigable
waters of lake Michigan within its limits, in the same manner
that the State hold title to soils under tide water, by the
common law, we have already shown, and that title
necessarily carries with it control over the waters above them
whenever the lands are subjected to use. But it is a title
different in character from that which the States holds in lands
intended for sale. It is different from the title which the United
States hold in the public lands which are open to preemption
and sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the States
that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed
from the obstruction or interference of private parties. The
interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in
commerce over them may be improved in many instances by
the erection of wharves, docks, and piers therein, for which
purpose the State may grant parcels of the submerged lands;
and so long as their disposition is made for such purposes, no
valid objections can be made to the grants .... The control of
the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost,
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the
interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without
any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands
and waters remaining .... The State can no more abdicate its
trust over property in which the whole people are interested,
like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave
them entirely under the use and control of private parties,
except in the instance of parcels mentioned for the
improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when
parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public
interest in what remains, that can abdicate its police powers
in the administration of government and the preservation of
the peace .... So with trusts connected with public property, or
property of a special character, like lands under navigable
waters, they can not be placed entirely beyond the direction
and control of the State.
The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor and the
lands under them is a subject of public concern to the whole
people of the State. The trust with which they are held,
therefore, is governmental and can not be alienated, except
in those instances mentioned of parcels used in the
improvement of the interest thus held, or when parcels can be
disposed of without detriment to the public interest in the lands
and waters remaining. . . . . (Pp. 452-455.)
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Mr. Justice Fields quotes from an opinion by Mr. Justice
Bradley, delivered in a case in the Circuit Court, speaking of
lands under water, as follows (p. 457):
Being subject to this trust, they were publici juris; in other
words, they were held for the use of the people at large. It is
true that to utilize the fisheries, especially those of shellfish, it
was necessary to parcel them out to particular operators, and
employ the rent or consideration for the benefit of the whole
people; but this did not alter the character of the title. The land
remained subject to all other public uses as before, especially
to those of navigation and commerce, which are always
paramount to those of public fisheries. It is also true that
portions of the submerged shoals and flats, which really
interfered with navigation, and could better subserve the
purposes of commerce by being filled up and reclaimed, were
disposed of to individuals for that purpose. But neither did
these dispositions of useless parts affect the character of the
title to the remainder.
These citations are thus given at length in order to make clear,
first, the lands under the ebb and flow of the tide of navigable
waters are not in America understood to be included in the
phrase "public lands" in Acts of Congress of United States;
nor, perforce, can they best understood in laws of the
Philippine Commission drawn immediately under the sanction
of those Acts; and second, that such lands are under existing
Congressional legislation the subject of private ownership,
any occupation therefore be subordinate to the public purpose
of navigation and fishery. While as well in the original thirteen
States in which there was never a national public domain to
which the land laws of Congress could apply as in States more
recently created out of that domain and which upon their
formation became masters of their own land policy the local
laws govern riparian and littoral rights, subject only to
Congressional control in matters of foreign and interstate
commerce ( U.S. vs. Mission Rock Co., 189 U. S., 391), yet,
as to the unappropriated public lands constituting the public
domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress,
which are uniformly and consistently declined to assume the
function of authorizing or regulating private appropriation of
such rights. Therefore, in the absence of specific
Congressional legislation, it is impossible for individuals to
acquire title under the ten years provision of Act No. 926 or
even through a definite grants from the local legislature of
lands beneath navigable waters in which the tide ebbs and
flows, except for wharf-age or other purposes auxiliary to
navigation or other public uses, unless in conformity with the
preexisting local law of the Archipelago.
The matter is dwelt is upon for the reason that the late
Attorney-General in his very able brief calls attention to the
effect apprehended from the extension of the words
"agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926 to include all public
lands not forest or mineral in character, specifying two acts of
the Philippine Commission, the validity of which he fears might
thereby be called into question. The first of these, Act No.
1039, dedicates to use of the Navy Department of the United
States Government certain ground and buildings in Cavite,
while the other, Act No. 1654, is a fore-shore law regulating
the control and disposal of filled Government lands. If the term
"agricultural lands" be held to include all government property
not forest or mineral in character, he suggests that these Acts,
not being in conformity with the procedure of Act No. 926, as
approved by Congress, would be invalid, and moreover, that
the Philippine Government would be seriously tied up in the
management and disposition of other lands owned by it.
Without finally passing on this question in relation to lands the
owners of which are not before us parties to this action, it is
appropriate, in answering the argument of the law officer of
the State, to point out that this consequence appears to be
avoided by the restricted sense given to the words "public
lands" or "public domain" in the Act of Congress and in Act
No. 926, as hereinbefore noted. Neither the property affected
by Act No. 1039, already in use by the Navy Department of
the United States, nor the foreshore land mentioned in Act No.
1654, which is under the ebb and flow of the tide, was, in so
far as appears in the Acts before us, part of the public domain
PAULINE D. MACAS
to be disposed of under sections 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the Act
of congress of July 1, 1902, and for that reason it is not
included in any of the three subdivisions of "public lands" as
agricultural or otherwise, although it was part of the property
acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United States by the
treaty of peace with Spain, which by section 12 of that Act was
"placed under the control of the Government of said Islands,
to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."
It would seem that the validity of the Cavite Act can not be
successfully assailed on this ground, while it may well be that
The Fore-shore Act on examination will be found to fall, as to
its general purpose, within the authorization of section 11 of
the Act of Congress, whereby the duty is imposed upon the
Island government of improving the harbors and navigable
waters in the interest of commerce.
As a consequence, it follows that The Public Land Act did not
apply to the fisheries in the Mapa case, if they are to be
regarded as constituting, in a general sense, land under tidal
waters. It becomes necessary, therefore, to refer to the
character of the lands.
Although argued at different times, five of these cases have
been presented substantially together, all being covered by
one brief of the late Attorney-General in behalf of the
Government in which, with many interesting historical and
graphic citations he describes that part of the marginal
seashore of the Philippine Islands known as manglares, with
their characteristic vegetation. In brief, it may be said that they
are mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in
which grow various kindred plants which will not live except
when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the
mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there.
These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist
naturally, but which are also, to some extent, cultivated by
man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove
and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated
thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we
are of the opinion that they can not be so regarded in the
sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in
general American Jurisprudence. The waters flowing over
them are not available for purpose of navigation, and they
"may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest
in what remains." Mr. Justice Bradley, in the passage quoted
by Mr. Justice Field, makes an exception of submerged shoals
and flats. In Railroad Company vs. Schurmeir (74 U.S., 272) ,
a Government patent of public land bordering upon a river was
held to include a parcel submerge at very high water and
separated from the mainland by a slough in which the water
ran when ordinarily high. In Mobile vs. Hallett (41 U.S., 260),
at page 266. Mr. Justice Catron remarked in his dissenting
opinion:
. . . and that a mud flat, flowed by tide water, is the subject of
grant by the Government to an individual, I think can not well
be doubted by anyone acquainted with the southern country;
when such valuable portions of it are mud flats, in the constant
course of reclamation.
In several of the older States along the Atlantic coast such
flats, either by force of ordinance, custom, judicial
construction, or local laws are held to pass under private
grants as appurtenant to the uplands. (Winslow vs. Patten, 34
Maine, 25; Litchfield vs. Scituate, 135 Mass., 39; People vs.
New York and Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y., 71; Stevens
vs. P.& N. Railroad, 5 Vroom, 34 N.J. Law, 532.) There is even
stronger reason for excepting mud flats from the rule of tide
lands in these Islands, owing to the peculiarities of their
configuration and to the nature of the tropical growth thereon,
and whatever may be action of the tide, we do not think that
in the Philippines such of the shoals covered by this
vegetation, whether spontaneously or by cultivation, as are
not available for free navigation, or required for any other
purpose of general benefit, can be considered tidal land
reserved for public use alone, under the governmental trust
for commerce and public fishery, but on the contrary, we
regard them as public property, susceptible of a sort of
cultivation and of improvement, and as such, subject to
occupation under paragraph 6 of section 54 of the Land Law.
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Instances may hereafter arise of fisheries unduly established
in what are clearly navigable waters which would constitute a
nuisance, and not be the subject of prescription or of grant. A
brief reference to the five cases under consideration in this
court, however, will serve to show that they all fairly fall within
the benefits of the law. In the Mapa case1 the property was
far from the the sea, partly occupied as fish pond, as nipa
land, and as a salt pit. It does not appear whether it was
connected with the sea by nature or by art, or whether the tide
ebbed or flowed upon it, or whether the salt was sufficient to
impart to any portion of it a mineral character. In the Santiago
case2 there was a fishery about two thousand yards from the
sea, with which it communicated by a river, and a portion of
the inclosure was dedicated to growing the aquatic tree called
bacawan. The fishery had been constructed by man, upon
land heretofore sown with this tree. In the Gutierrez case3 it
was shown that the land was partly highland, growing fruit
trees, and partly lowland , converted by the occupant of the
upland into a fishery by this labor. In the Baello case,4 the
river running to the sea was a hundred meters away, the salt
water therefrom reaching the lowland by means of an artificial
canal cut by the owner of the land when he gave up cultivating
bacawan thereon, an made it into a fishery. In the Montano
case, although there was a considerable depth of water over
the soil, yet before the fishery was made, some thirty years
before the trial, bacawan had been sown and propagated in
the mud by the owner who finally sold the entire cut when he
built the dikes.
All these lots, in their original state, whether near the sea or
at a distance from it inland, and whether bare or washed by
the tides, were not covered by waters practically navigable
and were filled, whether naturally or artificially, with vegetation
sometimes cultivated and in common use for fuel and for
building purposes, and they were all adapted to fisheries or
fish hatcheries by the labor of man introducing or regulating
the access of salt water thereto. It is obvious that that all five
cases are of the same general nature and that one rule must
be applied to them all.
In this discussion of the meaning which the Congress of the
United States attached to the phrase "public lands" in the
Philippine Bill, we have assumed that it was used in the same
sense as in other laws enacted by that body. If, however, it
can be considered as employed with reference to the peculiar
conditions of the territory to which it was to be applied and to
the local law or usage prevailing therein, the result would not
be different. In many of its general features the Spanish law
of public lands in the Philippines resembled the American.
Government property was of two kinds — first, that of public
use or service, said to be of public ownership, and second,
that of having a private character or use. (Civil Code, arts. 339
and 340.) Lands of the first class, while they retain their public
character are inalienable; those of the second are not.
By the royal decree of February 13, 1894, it was enacted that
all "the land, soil, ground not under cultivation, and forests in
the Philippine Islands should be considered saleable crown
lands," which are not included in the four exceptions stated,
among which were "those which belonged to the forest zones
which the State desires to hold for the Commonwealth." This
corresponds in the main to the American classification into
Government property, public lands, and forest reserve.
Mineral lands are elsewhere defined. It is to be noted,
however, that in the two languages terms ordinarily equivalent
are not in this relation employed in the same sense and that
lands de dominio publico signify quite a different thing from
the arbitrary English Phrases "public lands" or "public
domain."
The Law of Waters of 1866, which was the latest Spanish Law
of Waters extended to these Islands, provides that private
property can not be acquired in lands preserving the character
of public ownership (title 1, art. 1, par. 29), and among the
lands declared of public ownership and use by article 1 of
chapter 1 of title 5 of the same law are:
The seashore. — By shore is understood the land alternately
covered and uncovered by the sea in its tidal movement. Its
PAULINE D. MACAS
interior, or land limit, is the point reached by the highest and
equinoctial tides. At those places not affected by tides, the
land limit is the highest point reached by sea water in ordinary
storms or hurricanes. (Par. 3.)
So that under this legislation the same question also
presented itself as to what constituted seashore, which was
of public use and trust and therefore not alienable. This
question can not be said to have been settled by official ruling
at the time of the American occupation. From the official
records it appears that there were then pending for
registration a great number of possessory expedientes,
twenty-two of which, made before April 17, 1895, were from
the Province of Pampanga alone, in which the land was
described as manglares. Under the royal decree of 1894 such
manglares appear at the outset to have been registered and
considered alienable and numbers of them were conceded by
adjustment, including considerable tracts in the town of
Sexmoan and Lubao in Pampanga. Claims having been made
that on account of the trees growing thereon they formed part
of the forest reserve and also because, being covered and
uncovered by the tide, they were part of the shore, and in
either case were inalienable, the engineer in chief of the
forestry district of the center of Luzon addressed, on January
7, 1893, a communication to the inspector general de montes
( Forestry Department) in which he expressed an opinion that
as part of the shore they were not subject to private ownership
and asked for an early decision of the question. On November
26, 1893, the acting inspector-general notified the chief of the
district of the Visayas in Mindanao that his excellency, the
governor-general, had that they ordered all action suspended
on expedientes of manglar and nipa lands and salt marshes
until the questions involved in regard thereto should be
determined. In this condition the matter remained until the
expiration of the Spanish sovereignty.
By article 14 of the Law of Waters the right of shore fishery
was declared public, but by article 23 authority might be
granted individuals to establish shore hatcheries for fish and
shellfish, and by article 15 salt-water ponds on private ground
not communicating with the sea by water navigable by boats
were recognized as private property, while chapter 10
permitted and regulated the draining of swamps and marshes,
both of private and of public ownership.
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition
of the law the custom had grown up of converting manglares
and nipa lands into fisheries which became common feature
of settlements along the coast and at the time of the change
of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive
industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would
destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster. In our
opinion it was the object of Congress not to work such a result
but, on the contrary, in furtherance of the purposes of the
treaty of Paris, to recognize and safeguard such property.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Land Registration is
affirmed, without costs.
Torres, Mapa, and Carson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARELLANO, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the foregoing decision, but reserve my opinion as
to the scope of the phrase "public lands" in the Act of
Congress referred to.
WILLIARD, J., concurring in the result.
In the case of Mapa vs. The Insular Government ( 10 Phil.
Rep., 175 ) it is stated in the opinion, page 176, that —
The only question submitted tot he court below or to this court
by the Attorney-General is the question whether the land in
controversy is agricultural land within the meaning of the
section above quoted.
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The section quoted is section 54, paragraph 6, Act No. 926,
in which the phrase used is "agricultural public lands."
Throughout the opinion the phrase "public lands" is repeatedly
and exclusively used. The entire discussion was directed to
the question as to whether the property there in question
being "public land," it could be considered as agricultural
public land, and the conclusion reached is stated at page 182,
as follows:
In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land," as used in
Act No. 926, means those public lands acquired from Spain
which are not timber or mineral lands.
In that case the land in question was a long distance from the
sea. In fact, the entire town of Molo was between it and the
water. It could in no sense be called tidal land. Therefore, the
opinion was devoted to a consideration of not what were
"public lands" but whether this particular tract was or was not
agricultural public land. The question what the phrase "public
lands" meant neither considered nor decided in that opinion,
for its resolution was not necessary. In the concurring opinion,
however, that question was discussed and it was stated that
the phrase "public lands" used in Act No. 926 must be
interpreted according to the American understanding of the
words employed and the meaning of the terms as definitely
fixed by the decrees of the United States Supreme Court.
This statement was not necessary to the decision of the case
then under discussion and was moreover, as shall attempt to
show hereafter, not a correct statement made in that opinion,
to the effect that there may be real property belonging to the
Government which would not be included in the phrase "public
lands," there can be no doubt concerning its correctness. This
is and always has been apparent. It is indicated by articles
339 and 340 of the Civil Code, which are as follows:
ART. 339. Property of public ownership is —
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the
State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar
character.
2. That belonging exclusively to the State without
being for public use which is destined to some public service,
or to the development of the national wealth, such as walls,
fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and
mines, until concession has been granted.
ART. 340. All other property belonging to the State
which has not the conditions stated in the preceding article is
considered as private property.
Articles 24 and 25 of the Regulations for the Execution of the
Mortgage Law also indicate it. These articles are as follows:
ART. 24. All real estate and property rights thereto may be
recorded, without exception, whether belonging to private
parties, to the State, to the province, to the municipality, or to
civil or ecclesiastical corporations.
ART. 25. Exceptions to the record required by article 2 of the
law are:
First. Property which belongs exclusively to the eminent
domain of the State, and which is for the use of all, such as
the shores of the sea, islands, rivers and their borders, wagon
roads, and roads of all kinds, with the exception of railroads;
streets, parks, public promenades, and commons of towns.
provided they are not lands of common profit to the
inhabitants; walls of cities and parks, ports, and roadsteads,
any other analogous property during the time they are in
common and general use, always reserving the servitudes
established by law on the shores of the sea and borders of
navigable rivers.
Second. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic faith.
PAULINE D. MACAS
In the Mapa case it was not necessary to decide, nor was it
there decided, what the real property was which, belonging to
the government, still would not come within the phrase "public
lands," nor how private persons could acquire rights in such
property, nor whether that phrase should have the same
meaning here as it has in the United states. In the present
case, it is said in the opinion that "all these five cases are of
the same general character, and that the same rule should be
applied to all." If it was not necessary to decide in the Mapa
case the questions above mentioned, why is it necessary to
discuss and decide them here? We are all agreed (1) that
these lands are not tidal lands and are public lands, and (2)
that they are agricultural lands. Having arrived at these
conclusions, I see no reason for the question as to what the
result would be if they were tidal lands. It is apparent that
anything said upon that question is not necessary to the
decision of these cases and is obiter dictum.
Whether Act. No. 1654, relating to the reclaimed land in
Manila near the Luneta, is authorized by section 11 of the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, or by section 12, is a question
outside of the issues in the case at bar, and it seems
unnecessary now to commit the court to any definite
resolution thereof. If it is the purpose of the decision to
announce the doctrine that rights in tidal waters in the
Philippines must be governed by the principles already
announced by the Supreme Court in the decisions cited, this
objection attains greater force. Thus construed, it decides the
rights of innumerable persons in the Islands who have
reclaimed land from the sea and built upon it, none of whom
has had an opportunity to be heard before his rights are thus
decided.
These objections to the decision, on the ground that it
discusses and apparently decides questions not before the
court, and which affect parties not before it, would not be so
serious if the conclusions reached were sound. But they are,
as I believe, erroneous. The decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States cited the opinion have nothing to do either
with the question as to what rights private persons can acquire
in tidal lands in the Philippines or with the meaning which
should be given to the phrase "public lands" found in the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902.
1. Upon the first question as to private rights in tidal
lands, it has been definitely settled by the Supreme Court at
Washington in many decisions, which are collected in the
case of Shively vs. Bowlby (152 U.S., 1 ), cited in the opinion,
that the rights of private persons in such lands depend upon
the law of the State where the lands are. The court said in that
case (p. 40) :
VII. The later judgments of this court clearly establish
that the title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the
soil below high water mark of navigable waters are governed
by the local laws of the several States, subject, of course, to
the rights granted to the United States by the Constitution.
It also appears from that case that these laws vary in different
States. The court said, at page 26:
The foregoing summary of the laws of the original States
shows that there is no universal and uniform law upon the
subject; but that each State has dealt with the lands under the
tide waters within its borders according to its own views of
justice and policy, reserving its own control over such lands,
or granting rights therein to individuals or corporations,
whether owners of the adjoining upland or not, as it
considered for the best interests of the public. Great caution,
therefore, is necessary in applying precedents in one State to
cases arising in another.
In Massachusetts the owner of the upland is the owner in fee
to the low-water mark if not beyond 100 rods. In other States
he is the owner in fee only to high-water mark. In Minnesota
the owner of the upland has the exclusive right to occupy the
shore in front of his land, not only to low-water mark but even
into the water to the point of navigability, and to occupy it for
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purely private purposes. And he is so far the owner of the land
under water to the point of navigability that he can sell portions
thereof and retain himself the shore line. ( Hanford vs. St. Paul
& D.R. Co., 43 Minn., 104.) It will be observed that some of
the cases cited in support of the decision in the case at bar
arose in Massachusetts and Minnesota. The result is that
when the Supreme Court of the United States decides a case
relating to such lands it necessarily decides it according to the
law of the State from which it comes. So that if any law of
American origin is to be applied here it can not be a national
law of waters for none exists. It must be necessarily be the
law of some one of the different States. This would require a
selection of the jurisprudence of one of those States which
this court should not attempt to make.
At the cession of the Islands to the United States there was in
force here a body of laws relating to this subject. These laws
are still in force. They are found in the Law of Waters of 1866
and in articles 407 to 425 of the Civil Code. Cases which have
heretofore arisen in this court have been decided with
reference to these laws and not with reference to the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relating
to cases arising there. Among others are the cases of Ker &
Co. vs. Cuden (6 Phil. Rep., 732), and Jover vs. Insular
Government1 (No. 2674, decided March 25, 1908). That
questions relating to tidal lands should continue to be so
decided seems to me free from doubt. It may be said that the
decision does not intend to announce a contrary doctrine. If it
does not, I see no purpose, for example, in the long citation
from the case of Illinois Central R. Co. vs. Illinois (146 U.S.,
387), nor in the declaration that the purpose of the citation of
these decisions is to show in the second place that the rights
in tidal lands are not under the legislation of Congress the
subject of private property.
2. The second question relates to the meaning which
should be given to the phrase "public lands" in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902. In the concurring opinion in the
Mapa case it was stated, as has been seen, that it has the
same meaning here as in the United States. This doctrine
seems to be reiterated in the opinion in this case. After
announcing it in equivocal terms, it is said, to be sure that the
result would be the same if the words were to be construed
with reference to the local law. This would be true if the laws
of the other two jurisdictions were the same. But it is easily
demonstrated that they are not.
PAULINE D. MACAS
would amount to a repeal thereof. Such a result Congress
never could have intended. Prior to the treaty of Paris the
Spanish Government was the owner of the roads and the
beds of streams in the Philippines in trust for the benefit of the
people. The treaty itself did not change this status. On the
contrary, it preserved rights of property as they then existed.
By the treaty, the United States acquired interest which the
Spanish Government had in roads and the beds of streams. It
did not become the absolute owner thereof.
The laws of Spain relating to this matter were continued in
force by the proclamation of General Merritt. This would have
been the result even without any proclamation.(American Ins.
Co. vs. Canter, 1 Pet., 511.) They are in force now, and the
Government is still the owner of roads and the beds of rivers
unless Congress by the use of the phrase "public lands" in the
Act of July 1, 1902, has repealed the articles of the Civil Code
above cited. I do not think that such an intention can be
attributed to it . It is more reasonable to say that it is intended
to give to the phrase the meaning which was given to it by the
laws in force in the territory where the Act was to take effect.
And this intention is more apparent when we consider that
there then existed article 340 of the Civil Code, which
contained a complete definition of these lands belonging to
the Government, which it had the right to dispose of as private
property. It had no intention of disposing of property which it
held in trust. The property which the Commission intended to
dispose of by Act No. 926 was undoubtedly the private
property of the State as defined by article 340.
To say that Congress had a different purpose would be to
attribute to it an intention to discriminate against the
Philippines and to impose upon the Islands laws other than
those there in force, a thing which it has never done when
legislating in regard to its land situated within a particular
State. As we have seen, it has always allowed each State to
determine for itself the laws which shall govern real State to
determine for itself the laws which shall govern real estate
within its borders. When this court is called upon to define the
phrase "public lands" as used in the Act of Congress and in
Act No. 926, it should in my opinion say that it includes the
property described in article 340 of the Civil Code.
For the reasons above stated, I agree with the result in this
case, but I dissent from those parts of the opinion which I have
discussed.

With reference to tidal lands, we have seen that in some of

the States private persons are the owners of the land between
high and low water mark. By the Law of Waters of 1866, and
article 339 of the Civil Code, the shore or beach is public
property. It not only does not belong to private persons, but it
is not even the private property of the State.

The difference between the two systems is more marked

when we consider public roads and streets and the beds of
non-navigable rivers. By the common law of England, which
has been followed by and is now in force in a great many of
the States, the beds of such rivers belong to the owners of the
adjoining land. But by the law here in force (arts. 339 and 407,
Civil Code) they are public property and can not be considered
even as the private property of the State. The same is true of
streets and roads. (Arts. 339 and 344, Civil Code.) When the
United States issues a patent for public land owned by it
situated in the State of Minnesota, for example, and bounded
by a non-navigable river. the patentee becomes the owner of
one-half of the bed of the river. When the Spanish
Government issued a patent for land in the Philippines
bounded by river, the patentee did not become the owner of
the bed of the river. His ownership extended only to low-water
mark.

What has been said of rivers is true of roads. If the phrase

"public lands" be given the meaning here that it has in the
United States, whenever the Director of Public Lands grants
a patent for land bounded by a non-navigable river or road the
patentee will become the owner of one-half of the bed of the
river and one-half of the road. This result would be in direct
conflict with the articles of the Civil Code above cited, and