Professional Documents
Culture Documents
the Origins of Three-Dimensional
Computer Modeling
branko mitrovi
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
B
uildings are three-dimensional objects, but architec- spatial disposition of objects (real or imaginary) that the
tural communication about them occurs primarily in drawing represents. Fifty years ago, architecture schools
the two-dimensional medium of drawings.1 The use taught descriptive geometry as the mathematical discipline
of drawings to communicate about buildings goes back to that enabled architects to achieve such systematic represen-
ancient times; however, the idea of basing a systematic rela- tations, resolve difficult spatial relationships between ele-
tionship between a building’s shape and its two-dimensional ments, and develop their ability to visualize the buildings
representations on quantification is much more recent. and spaces they designed. Presumably, modern three-
Systematic here refers to the assumption that a complete dimensional computer modeling, which relies on the same
two-dimensional visual representation (for instance, a set of assumption that quantification can guarantee the consistency
drawings) of a three-dimensional object can be formulated and completeness of two-dimensional representations of
by means of a clearly defined and consistently applied math- three-dimensional shapes, has made this training obsolete.
ematical procedure. This procedure may be, for instance, a In this article I will consider the first theoretical articula-
perspectival or orthogonal projection, but it must be consis- tion of the idea of a systematic and consistent representation
tently applicable: once the shape of the object is known, one of three-dimensional shapes in a two-dimensional medium
should be able to produce its two-dimensional representa- in the history of architecture. It should not be surprising that
tions from any given side. The procedure must also enable Leon Battista Alberti was the first to formulate the idea—or
one to depict the complete shape of the three-dimensional that his formulation cuts deep in some of the central assump-
object using a set of two-dimensional representations—the tions that architects necessarily make about space as the
way, for instance, modern three-dimensional computer mod- medium in which they operate.
eling enables one to “rotate” the shape of an object on a
computer screen. Finally, the procedure must not be mis-
leading. The resulting representations must not suggest the Mental Rotation 1
existence of things they are not meant to represent—all I will start by considering the best-known case of noncom-
points and lines in a drawing must be representations of their puter three-dimensional modeling, mental rotation. Being
spatial equivalents. There should be no point or line in a able to see an object on a computer screen from different
drawing that does not represent some point or line in the sides—to rotate the object—clearly parallels imagining an
object from different sides, the procedure that psychologists
Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 74, no. 3 (September 2015), call “mental rotation.” In other words, a picture on a com-
312–322. ISSN 0037-9808, electronic ISSN 2150-5926. © 2015 by the Society puter screen can show an object only from a single side; one
of Architectural Historians. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for
needs a series of images that show the object from different
permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University
of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.ucpress- sides in order to be able to describe its three-dimensional
journals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/jsah.2015.74.3.312. properties—which is equivalent to imagining the object from
312
Thinking about the three-dimensional properties of
objects ultimately consists in imagining them visually from
various sides. The procedure fundamentally relies on the fact
that the limits of human visual imagination coincide with the
limits of Euclidean geometry. One can visually imagine a
centaur or a physically impossible event, but one cannot visu-
alize a geometrically impossible object, such as a pentagonal
square or two points connected with more than one
straight line. In this sense, too, mental and computer three-
dimensional modeling are similar: no three-dimensional
modeling software makes it possible to visualize on the
screen a sphere whose intersection with a plane is a hexagon.
There are good reasons for this. A non-Euclidean room may
have, for instance, an infinite number of ceilings, all parallel to
and equidistant from the floor. No builder could build it, and
the number of clients who would need a computer model of
such a room is unlikely to motivate commercial software firms.
It is much harder to explain why human visual imagina-
tion is subject to Euclidean geometry.3 Visual imagination
and mental rotation became serious topics of psychological
research in the 1970s. In an experiment that has become
famous, Roger Shepard presented subjects with images of
similar spatial figures (Figure 1).4 The subjects were asked to
determine in which cases the images showed different com-
positions of cubes and in which cases they showed the same
compositions rotated (seen at different angles). Most subjects
Figure 1 Roger Shepard used drawings like these to test mental solved these problems without difficulty, but for Shepard’s
rotation (technical preparation of drawing by Peter McPherson). team the important point was how much time the subjects
needed to respond. It turned out that the amount of time
needed was directly proportional to the angle of rotation.
different sides in one’s mind. Modern computers perform The subjects needed twice as much time to respond to an
this task faster and with greater accuracy than the human image rotated by 120 degrees as they did for one rotated by
brain, but the principle is the same: the shape of an object is 60 degrees. They also reported that they solved the problems
represented by means of two-dimensional visual images. by rotating the objects in their imaginations.5
These images show what the object looks like from different The important aspect of mental rotation—the one care-
sides. This information defines the object’s shape; one is able fully imitated by various computer programs for three-
to grasp a building’s spatial properties by considering the dimensional computer modeling—is that it cannot yield a
building’s appearance from different sides. It is assumed that geometrically impossible result. Ultimately, our implicit
the geometrical properties of the building can be conveyed knowledge of geometry enables us to imagine what a thing
fully and unequivocally by means of visual images—that the looks like from different sides; without our implicit assump-
geometry of visual perception can guarantee accurate tions about the geometrical properties of spatial objects we
communication about the geometry of physical objects.2 would not be able to perform mental rotation. But is this
(Conveying the way a building smells from different sides knowledge acquired or inborn? In three-dimensional model-
will not get us very far; the same applies to other senses as ing programs it is built into the software. About four decades
well, and even the sense of touch is of little use when it comes ago, Stephen Kosslyn suggested that geometry is constitutive
to large or complex objects.) When considering an object’s of the medium in which human visual imagination operates.
shape, one does not think by means of scripts or the equa- He proposed treating visual imagination as equivalent to the
tions of analytic geometry that can be used to define the cathode-ray tube (CRT) display used in the television sets of
object’s shape. Rather, when such nonvisual representations that time.6 Obviously, Kosslyn was not suggesting that peo-
are involved, one has to think in terms of their visual inter- ple have TVs in their heads; rather, he was asserting that
pretation in order to establish what the object would be human visual imagination is comparable to a TV screen.
like spatially. In other words, when images represent spatial objects, the
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Figure 2 Detail of the Ionic order (Andrea
Palladio, I quattro libri dell’architettura [Venice:
Domenico de Franceschi, 1570], 34; Collection
Centre Canadien d’Architecture/Canadian Centre
for Architecture, Montreal).
objects because the geometry of visual imagination is the ninety-three times in Alberti’s architectural treatise. In all its
same as the geometry of architectural space. The question occurrences, it can be translated into English as “shape,” and
is, when did the geometry of space start to guarantee it is generally clear that Alberti meant something like “shape
the validity of visual representations in architectural as (geometrically) defined by lines.”15 In the opening of the
communication? first book of his treatise Alberti directly explained that linea-
ments are immaterial and that we perceive the same linea-
ments on different buildings when we perceive that individual
Alberti and the Geometry of Architectural Works parts, their placement, and their order mutually correspond
in all angles and lines.16 Similarly, in De statua Alberti
More than a century before Palladio published his drawing, described instruments that one can use to copy sculptures by
Leon Battista Alberti wrote that a work of architecture “con- measuring their shapes and reproducing “the lineaments and
sists of lineaments and matter.”13 Interpretive debates about the position and collocation of parts.”17
the meaning of Alberti’s technical term lineamenta started as Like the English word shape, lineamenta may refer to the
early as the sixteenth century. 14 The word occurs shape imagined in the mind of the architect, the shape
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and other capacities of the soul.35 In De memoria Aristotle arrive from a position to the left of that from which the light
says that the affection produced by sensation in the soul rays from the table reach my eyes. For this explanation to
is a picture (zographema) and that it is like an image (typos) of work, one must postulate straight light rays traveling from
the thing perceived; perception is comparable to the impres- the object to the eye. But Aristotle’s explanation leaves no
sion of a signet ring into wax. 36 In the next paragraph space for light rays—and, as a result, Aristotelian optics de
he starts his explanation of the intentionality of mental visual facto cannot explain why things are perceived where they
representations by saying, “Assuming that there is in us are.41 There is nothing in Aristotle’s account that would
something like an image [typos] or a drawing [graphe].”37 ensure that I perceive the chair to the left of the table, if it is
Since the standard translation of zographema is “picture” and really there. Such a theory of vision is certainly unsatisfactory,
that of graphe is “drawing,” the implication is that phantasms especially for Alberti, who concentrated his efforts on defin-
are two-dimensional representations. It may be argued that ing a geometry-based pictorial account of the shapes and
the term typos, “imprint,” suggests three-dimensionality spatial distances between objects. In classical antiquity, we
because of the reference to the impression of a signet ring find a comprehensive mathematical treatment of human
into wax. (Alternatively, it is plausible that Aristotle is talking vision in Euclid’s Optics.42 Starting from the assumption that
about imprinting merely in order to describe how such light rays are straight lines, Euclid described how the
representations come about.) But even if typos is understood perceived size of an object (the size of its visual angle)
three-dimensionally, as a kind of relief, when it comes to the depends on its distance from the viewer.43 This was basically
representation of architectural works, such reliefs would the geometrical version of the central problem that the early
function in the same way as two-dimensional representa- Renaissance theorists of perspective endeavored to resolve:
tions: a set of such representations, showing the object from the relationship between the distance of an object from the
different sides, would be needed to represent the three- viewer and the object’s perceived size. However, Euclid, as a
dimensional shape of a building. One would still encounter mathematician, never contemplated, and was probably not
the same problems that result from the need to define geo- interested in, the implications of his theorems for the visual
metrically the relationship between a three-dimensional depiction of objects by means of drawings. He mathemati-
shape and a set of drawings depicting it. De memoria would cally articulated the way the perceived size of an object
have been available to Alberti in a medieval translation by changes with distance, but he did not bother to ask how his
James of Venice that also emphasizes the two-dimensionality mathematical description could be applied in drawing. 44
of phantasms.38 In the medieval Latin rendering it is figura In simple words, Aristotle talked about images but conceived
that is imprinted into wax, while the second sentence cited of them as independent of the geometry of light; Euclid
above discusses figura and pictura.39 Figura could be under- described the geometry of light but had no interest in images.
stood as three-dimensional, but, as mentioned, this three- The pictorial application of the geometry of human visu-
dimensionality is the three-dimensionality of a relief; pictura ality to visual representations is Alberti’s important topic in
is definitely two-dimensional. Alberti’s understanding of per- De pictura. The starting point of his account is the observa-
scriptiones as two-dimensional representations thus fits well tion that every surface can be defined through the specifica-
in the mainstream of Renaissance Aristotelian psychology. tion of the size, position, and length of lines.45 The statement
directly contradicts Aristotle’s view that we primarily
perceive colors and, consequently, surfaces.46 For Alberti,
Geometrical Consistency of Two-Dimensional surfaces are defined by lines.47 He then proceeds by observ-
Representations ing that light rays travel in straight lines; since they connect
This is, however, also the point at which Alberti departs from the eye and the object, the perception of every line on the
Aristotle. Even in the writings that preceded De re aedificatoria object can be analyzed geometrically—it can be defined by
he followed the long tradition of Greek, Arab, and medieval means of a triangle whose base is the line mentioned and the
optical theorists rather than the Aristotelian account of opposing point of which is the human eye.48 Taken together,
human visuality. There were indeed good reasons to avoid such triangles make up the pyramid of sight.49 This reason-
Aristotle’s account of human vision. In Aristotle’s view, light ing implies that the totality of human visual experience can
is the actualization of the medium of vision—which pre- be described geometrically. A picture is a section through the
cludes the existence of light rays that travel in straight lines.40 pyramid of sight—it is a plane that shows what we would see
The problem with this view is that it makes it impossible to through a window located at the place of the picture plane.50
explain why we perceive things where they are, their relative In other words, there is the eye and there is the object
positions, and their spatial relationships to each other. For depicted in perspective; the light rays that reach the eye from
instance, if a chair is to the left of a table, I perceive it there the object travel in straight lines. One could place a window
because the light rays that reach my eyes from the chair between the object and the eye and draw on the glass the
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be articulated consistently in mental rotation. An even more content of every possible visual experience, seeing or imagin-
fundamental problem is that, according to Aristotle, math- ing a thing, is quantifiable and geometrically describable.
ematical thinking is, ultimately, a job of the intellect—a stratum The principle seems obvious enough to us today—but we
of the soul above the imagination. If mental rotation were to have seen that this was not necessarily always the case, and it
produce geometrically accurate results in the imagination, was certainly not the case with Aristotle. Alberti’s principle
the imagination would have to follow the instructions it that the totality of human visual experience is quantifiable is
received from the intellect. In Aristotle’s cognitive scheme, the fundamental assumption of architectural practice. This
however, the intellect extracts the essence of the thing from principle makes three-dimensional computer modeling soft-
the phantasm, but there is no account of any (mathematical) ware possible. One can only try to imagine what architectural
feedback that it may provide to the imagination. It is conse- work would be like today if it were impossible to describe by
quently not clear how imagination can solve the geometrical means of geometry the shapes of buildings as one perceives
problems that arise from imagining a three-dimensional them.
object from different sides in a series of two-dimensional In other words, without Alberti’s principle, there would
phantasms. be no modern architectural practice. It should be noted,
Alberti does not have a solution for this problem, and, however, that the principle comes prepackaged with a strong
arguably, he does not need to have one. His treatises pertain claim on universality: everywhere where light rays are
to visual arts and architecture, not cognitive psychology. But straight lines the geometry of human vision is going to be
his use of specific terms (and avoidance of others) shows that the same. As Alberti himself put it, parts of a sculpture can
he was aware of the problem. The standard Aristotelian tech- be reproduced at different places and subsequently put
nical terms that could lead to the articulation of the problem, together as long as the system of measurement used is the
such as intellectus or imaginatio, do not appear once in the same across the locations.63 Alberti’s theory of visual repre-
De re aedificatoria. Three crucial psychological terms, or sentation relies on assumptions about space that Ernst
mental capacities, are mentioned in this work: mens, animus, Cassirer and Erwin Panofsky have called homogeneity: it is
and ingenium.58 The last of these is the capacity for invention, a space in which geometry functions the same everywhere
the ability to create new things.59 Spatial thinking, including and in which it is possible to draw identical geometrical
the ability to interpret two-dimensional perscriptiones three- figures in every direction.64 Since Panofsky suggested, almost
dimensionally, happens, Alberti says, in animo et mente.60 The a century ago, that the early Renaissance understanding of
two terms seem to be interchangeable in his writing.61 In space as homogeneous enabled the discovery of the geo-
the Aristotelian psychological tradition, animus and mens are metrical construction of perspective, it has often been
the most general names for the rational capacities of the soul asserted that space was not conceived as homogeneous
and pertain to the totality of the human rational soul. In the before the quattrocento. Some more radical authors have
context of Alberti’s architectural treatise, animus refers to the even suggested that we do not inhabit homogeneous space
cognitive soul in general—it is not limited to the intellect but and that we are merely culturally conditioned to think that
also includes imagination, common sense, and memory. It we do.65 Considering Cassirer’s and Panofsky’s definition of
thus comprises both the intellect and the lower, perishable, homogeneous space, such theses are hard to defend: in a non-
strata of the rational soul. Mens is used the same way, but not homogeneous space it is not possible to draw the same figure
so often. The two terms are often used conjointly: Alberti from every point in every direction. A figure can be a simple
says that we imagine buildings in animo et mente and that we line (or a rectangle whose width is zero), and claiming that
can contemplate forms independent of matter in animo et the people of the past could not have conceived of space as
mente.62 Alberti, one may surmise, was aware of the problem, homogeneous boils down to saying that they did not assume
and he avoided it by using the most general Aristotelian that they could draw the same line from point A to point B
terms that refer to the rational soul, without committing and from B to A. Had architects started understanding space
himself to the particularities of the Aristotelian psychological as homogeneous only in the Renaissance, before the Renais-
account. sance they would not have known that the length of a wall
must be the same regardless of the end of the wall from which
it is measured. This was not the case. What changed at the
Epilogue beginning of the Renaissance was not the understanding of
A discussion of the possibilities (or limits) of the use of geom- space. Rather, the Italian urban environments of the era were
etry in the representation of architectural works is ultimately characterized by close social interactions between artisans
a discussion about the nature of space and the nature of and intellectuals that made it possible for them to articulate
architectural works. Alberti articulated first (most directly in dilemmas pertaining to visual representation as mathemati-
Elementa picturae, as mentioned) the important thesis that the cal problems and resolve them in ways that were consistent
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form of two-dimensional perscriptiones. Similar understanding is proposed 32. Aristotle, De anima, 426b8–427a17.
by the Russian commentator Vasily Pavlovich Zubov, who translates this 33. Ibid., 429a10–430a10.
section as “ 34. Ibid., 429a10–431b14.
35. Ibid., 427a17–429a9; Aristotle, De memoria, 449b4–451a18.
36. “ .” Aristotle, De memoria, 450a29. “
.” Leon Battista Alberti, .” Ibid., 450a30.
(Desyat knig o zodchestve) (De re aedificatoria), 37. “ .” Ibid., 450b16.
2 vols., trans. (vol. 1) and commentary (vol. 2) by Vasily Pavlovich Zubov (Note that “ ” is not merely “if” in this context; it introduces the clause
(Moscow: Vsesoyuznaya Akademiya Arhitekturi 1935-37 ), 1:12. Zubov thus that explains the argument.)
translates perscriptio as “plan” ( ) and therefore understands it as two- 38. For the history of Latin medieval translations of De anima, see Pieter
dimensional, while in the commentary (2:279) he warns that lineamenta are De Leemans, “Parva naturalia, Commentaries on Aristotle’s,” in Encyclo-
three-dimensional. pedia of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Dordrecht: Springer,
21. See the systematic survey of Alberti’s use of these terms in Mitrovi , 2011), 917–23. See also S. D. Wingate, The Mediaeval Latin Versions of the
Serene Greed, 37–38, 183–85. Aristotelian Scientific Corpus (London: Courier Press, 1931), 46–47.
22. Ibid., 183–85. 39. The translation by James of Venice states at 450a29 “passionem factam
23. Alberti, De re aedificatoria, 97 (20v), 861 (174v.29). per sensum in anima . . . velut picturam quadam,” at 450a30 “factus enim
24. Mario Carpo, The Alphabet and the Algorithm (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT motus imprimit velut figuram quandam sensibilis sicut sigillantes annulis,”
Press, 2011), 26, 28. and at 450b16 “si est simile sicut figura aut pictura in nobis huius ipsius
25. Lineament, as he points out, is immaterial: “Neque habet lineamentum sensus.” Cited according to Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros De sensu
in se, ut materiam sequatur.” Alberti, De re aedificatoria, 17–19 (4v.5). It is et sensato De memoria et reminiscentia commentarium, ed. Raymund Spiazzi
conceived by the mind: “Erit ergo lineamentum certa constansque per- (Turin: Marietti 1973), 95. See also Aristoteli libri omnes ad animalium cog-
scriptio concepta animo facta lineis et angulis perfectaque animo et ingenio nitionem attinentes cum Averrois Cordubiensis variis in eosdem commentariis
erudito.” Ibid., 21 (4v.13–14). At the same time, it is “periti artificis manus, (Venice: Apud Iunctas, 1562), vol. 6, part 2, 18v and 18r.
quae lineamentis materiam conformaret.” Ibid., 15 (3v.31–32). 40. Aristotle’s main account of human vision is in De anima, 418a27–419b3.
26. “Nam aedificium . . . lineamentis veluti alia corpora constaret et materia.” Aristotle bases his account on the existence of the transparent medium
Ibid., 15 (3v.29). For a discussion of the relationship between Alberti’s (“ ”; ibid., 418b3). Light is then the actualization of the
lineamenta and Aristotelian form (essence), see Mitrovi , Serene Greed, 52–57. transparent medium as transparent (“
27. See Mitrovi , Serene Greed, 52–56. ”; ibid., 418b9). It would be wrong to say that
28. “[Lineamentum] est huiusmodi, ut eadem plurimis in aedificiis esse light travels, Aristotle says; such movements could escape our observa-
lineamenta sentiamus, ubi . . . eorum partium singularum situs atque tion in a small intervening space, but not at such great distances as the
ordines se conveniant totis angulis totisque lineis.” Alberti, De re aedificatoria, ultimate points in the East and West. Ibid., 418b21–26. See also Aristo-
21 (4v.9–10). I have shown that the word translates as “shape” in all the tle, De sensu, 438a27, 446b27. However, there are sections in Aristotle
contexts in which Alberti used it; Mitrovi , Serene Greed, 177–83. that contradict this account of visual perception; see David Lindberg,
29. On the wide influence of Aristotle’s De anima during the Middle Ages, Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: Chicago University
see F. Edwards Cranz, “The Renaissance Reading of De anima,” in Platon Press, 1976), 217n39.
et Aristote a la renaissance (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1976), 41. As Lindberg points out, “For example, how, on the Aristotelian theory,
360; Katharine Park and Eckhard Kessler, “The Concept of Psychology,” can individual parts of the visual field be distinguished? If colored bodies
in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles Schmitt and produce qualitative changes in all parts of a transparent medium to which
Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 458; Peter they have rectilinear access, how do we see one object here and another
Lautner, “Status and Method of Psychology according to the Late Neopla- object over there? What is the nature or source of the directional capabili-
tonists and Their Influence during the Sixteenth Century,” in The Dynam- ties of sight? Aristotle’s theory of vision provides no answer to these ques-
ics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century, tions.” Lindberg, Theories of Vision, 58–59.
ed. Cees Leijenhorst, Christoph Lüthy, and Johannes M. M. H. Thijssen 42. As C. D. Brownson notes, “The Optics is primarily associated with the
(Leiden: Brill, 2002), 81–108. On De anima as required reading in European concern to find a mathematical formulation of the laws of sight, while lin-
universities, see Park and Kessler, “Concept of Psychology,” 457. ear perspective has been employed only for the construction of pictures.”
30. Aristotle’s crucial treatment of the imagination is in De anima, 427a17– The important difference is that “Euclid’s Optics studies the apparent size,
429a9; see also Aristotle, De memoria, 449b31–451a18. J. Freudenthal’s shape, and position of objects from a point of observation, while the central
Begriff des Wortes bei Aristoteles (Göttingen: Universitäts-Druckerei, problem for linear perspective is determining the relative size, shape, and
1863) is still considered to be an important summary of the topic. See also placement of objects in a scene as they appear at a picture plane.” C. D.
D. A. Rees, “Aristotle’s Treatment of Phantasia,” in Essays in Ancient Greek Brownson, “Euclid’s Optics and Its Compatibility with Linear Perspective,”
Philosophy, ed. John P. Anton with George L. Kustas (Albany: State Uni- Archive for History of Exact Sciences 26 (1982), 188, 165.
versity of New York Press, 1971), 491–504; Malcolm Schofield, “Aristotle 43. (Pseudo?)-Euclid, Optics, theorem 8, cited according to Euclid, Optics,
on Imagination,” in Articles on Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm in Euclidis opera omnia, vol. 7, ed. Johann Ludwig Heiberg (Leipzig: Taubner,
Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), 1973). See also Euclid, Optics of Euclid, trans. Harry Edwin Burton, Journal
103–31; Victor Caston, “Why Aristotle Needs Imagination,” Phronesis 61 of the Optical Society of America 35 (1945), 357–71.
(1996), 20–55; Victor Caston, “Aristotle and the Problem of Intentional- 44. This is what psychologists call proximal perception. See Hershenson,
ity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998), 249–98. Visual Space Perception, 118.
31. Aristotle, De anima, 431a17, 431b3, 432a8; Aristotle, De memoria, 45. “Lineae plures quasi fila in tela aducta si cohaereant, superficiem
449b49. For a survey of the view that thinking is inseparable from language, ducent.” Alberti, De pictura, 1.2.
see Michael Losonsky, Linguistic Turns in Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: 46. Aristotle, De anima, 418a28, 419a1.
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 47. Alberti, De pictura, 1.2.
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