Mossesgeld vs.

CA
G.R. No. 111455
December 23, 1998

Pardo, J

 Appeal via certiorari from decision of CA affirming RTC which dismissed petition of putative
father to compel civil registrar to register birth certificate of illegitimate child using surname of
presumed father

 Marissa Mossesgeld gave birth

 Presumed father Eleazar Calasan signed birth certificate
 Both signed dorsal side of the birth certificate
 Calasan executed affidavit admitting paternity

 Person in charge refuses to place presumed father’s surname.

 Petitioner submitted certificate to office of local civil registrar

 Municipal treasurer rejected such alleging that that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of
their mother

 Calasan filed with RTC mandamus but was denied

 Court of Appeals affirmed

Issue:
 whether mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth
of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity

No. Article 176 provides that “illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code.” This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity

Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of
an illegitimate child using the father’s surname, even with the consent of the latter

Leonardo vs. CA
G.R. No. 125485
September 13, 2004

Corona, J

 Petitioner Restituta Leonardo is the only legitimate child of late Tomasina Paul and Balbino
Leonardo.
 Private respondents all surnamed Sebastian are the illegitimate children of Tomasina with Jose
Sebastian after she separated from Balbino Leonardo

 Petitioner alleged that respondent Corazon and Julieta, and certain Bitang, came to petitioner’s
house to persuade her to sign extrajudicial partition of estate of Tomasina and Jose
 Petitioner insisted to wait for her husband to translate the document written in English but was
assured by respondents that her share was included
 Petitioner claimed that no joint settlement of the estate of Jose Sebastian and Tomasina Paul
could be effected since what existed between them was co-ownership, not conjugal
partnership. They were never married to each other. The extrajudicial partition was therefore
unlawful and illegal
 Petitioner also claimed that consent was vitiated
  Resondent alleged lack of cause of action. That the document was valid and binding as they
appeared before Judge Austria. Petitioner denies such.
 That petitioner is estopped by signing the document and proper action should have been
annulment not declaration of nullity.

 RTC dismissed, duress not proven

 CA affirmed

Issue:
 Whether or not consent was voluntarily given

No. It is the concurrence of the minds of the parties on the object and the cause which
constitutes the contract - the acceptance by one of the offer made by the other.

To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites: (a) it should be intelligent, (b) it
should be free and (c) it should be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error;
freedom by violence, intimidation or undue influence; and spontaneity by fraud.

Mistake, on the other hand, in order to invalidate consent “should refer to the substance of the
thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved
one or both parties to enter into the contract.

Article 1332
The provision states that “[w]hen one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a
language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the
contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former

One who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid consent to a contract must establish the
same by full, clear and convincing evidence, not merely by preponderance of evidence.

In this case, the presumption of mistake or error on the part of petitioner was not sufficiently
rebutted by private respondents. Private respondents failed to offer any evidence to
prove that the extrajudicial settlement of estate was explained in a language known
to the petitioner. Petitioner only finished Grade 3.

Granting arguendo, however, that Judge Austria did indeed explain the provisions of the
agreement to them, the records do not reflect that he explained it to petitioner in a language
or dialect known to her.

SC reversed and annulled the contract

Teotico vs. Val

G.R. No. L-18753
March 26, 1965

Bautista-Angelo, J

 Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died leaving properties worth 600,000
 Left a will written is Spanish
 Stated that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could freely
dispose of all her estate
 In favor of Rene Teotico, married to testatrix’s niece Josefina Mortera

 Ana del Val Chan claims to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
same testatrix.
 Opposed the will since it does not conform with the law, testatrix was physically and mentally
incapable , and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
  Probate court declared disposition to Rene Teotico void.
 Petitioner Vicente Teotico filed motion for reconsideration which was denied

Issues:
 WON Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or
as a claimant of the estate

Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir,
executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will,
because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee
of any portion of the estate

The law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both
Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is
prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father

Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; ...

oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the
adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law.

 Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate

The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will was
duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the
notary public in the manner provided for by law.

 Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of
the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico

Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained
in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been
executed in accordance with the requirements of the law

Lazatin vs. Campos

G.R. No. L-43955-56
July 30, 1979

Teehankee, J.

 Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted
twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon, married to respondent Bernardo de Leon, and
respondent Irma Lazatin, married to Francisco Veloso
 Margarita de Asis commenced an intestate proceeding

 Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne, illegitimate with Helen Munoz, intervened. Lily, another
illegitimate also intervened
  Margarita also died leaving legacy to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter, Rodolfo
Gallardo, a son of her late sister, Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias
Renato Sta. Clara
 Nora de Leon, daughter, could open the safety deposit box and removed shares of stock,
adoption papers, and jewelry. She claimed to be in good faith and held jointly. She just
withdrew stock certificates and other small items but was not allowed to close the deposit box
without court authorization so she removed everything

 Petitioner and petitioner’s son intervened for the first time, as an admitted illegitimate child
and to examine contents of the box, respectively.

 Probate court ordered respondent Nora L. de Leon to deliver the properties taken from the
safety deposit box. However, only 2 keys to a new safety deposit box was delivered which
could only be opened upon order of the court

Found to be in contempt

 Hearing for petitioner’s motion to intervene as an adopted son. No decree of adoption was
presented but attempted to prove that he had been supported, was only compelled to change
last name to Sta. Clara, transferred to deceased spouses residence, and photographs.
 Court ruled that adoption was failed to be established.

Issue:
 Whether or not correct

Yes. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.

Only adoption made through Court is valid in this jurisdiction, else null.

The absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-
existence

Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and
because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. But,
in proving an adoption, there is a better proof available and it should be produced. Before
such is admitted, there must be competent evidence.

Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were
actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is
as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if
necessary in the discretion of the court.

Petitioner cannot intervene. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that
he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who
has a claim against the estate like a creditor.

A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor by adoption unless the act of
adoption has been done in strict accord with the statute.

Burden of proof lies to one claiming relationship

Lahom vs. Sibulo
G.R. No. 143989
July 14, 2003

Vitug, J.

 Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita’s nephew Jose Melvin
Sibulo and to bring him up as their own
 Fancied adopting Jose Melvin and filed a petition to adopt him
 Petition granted

 Mrs. Lahom filed a petition to rescind the adoption

 Respondent refuses to change surname
 Petitioner being alone, respondent remains indifferent
 Respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner’s nephews and nieces

 Prior to institution Domestic Adoption Act took effect which reads:

“…may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a)
repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone
counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d)
abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations

Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code.”

 RTC dismissed

Issue:
Whether or not adopter may still rescind the adoption

 Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action

The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process
that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action, it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of
a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become
vested.

Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.

 It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated
and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a
decree of adoption.

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to
rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura
lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is
still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an
adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Santos vs. Republic
G.R. No. L-22523
September 29, 1967

Angeles, J

 Spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos filed the petition before the court praying
that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their (petitioner’s) son by
adoption
 petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the City of Manila
 do not have a child of their own blood

 Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are
the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos and the minor

 Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with-business interest in a textile development enterprise and
the IBA electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry, Inc. and the secretary-treasurer
of Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner-wife,
is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning of about P300.00

 RTC dismissed as the adoption will result in an incongruous situation

Issue:
Whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother

 Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been
shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from adopting.
 Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose
adoption is under consideration, is not ones of those excluded by the law
 Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or
mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the
step-father or step-mother

 To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to
each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among
relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which
in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted
should be of paramount consideration.

 With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case will result in a dual rela-
tionship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting
elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other
is by fiction of law.

The relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not
extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law.
Cervantes vs. Fajardo
G.R. No. 79955
January 27, 1989

Padilla, J

 Angelie Anne Cervantes was born of respondent Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are
common-law husband and wife
 Offered to Gina’s sister for adoption
 RTC granted petition

 Adopter received letter from respondent demanding 150,000 else they would get their child.
Responded refused
 While petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her
"yaya" at the petitioners' residence

 Petitioners demanded return but respondent she had no desire to give up her child for
adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully
explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will, however, return the child to
the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00

Custody of the child

 In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare
is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5)
years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
 Consideration is moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account
the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents.
 His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that
desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded
person
 Petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially
capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother
who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely
give her

Republic vs. Alarcon Vergara

G.R. No. 95551
March 20, 1997

Romero, J

 Spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition to adopt Maricel R. Due
and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina
 Samuel is an American citizen and Rosalina became naturalized American
 They have 2 children
 Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the
adoption

 RTC granted the petition disregarding the 16 year age gap requirement of law on the
ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the very philosophy behind
adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child

Whether or not correct

No. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article
184 of the Family Code which states
 He does not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by the law

 A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

 One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
 One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter

Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint adoption by
husband and wife
 When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
 When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other."

Republic vs CA (227SCRA 401)

G.R. No. 100835
October 26, 1993

Vitug, J

 James Anthony Hughes, natural born American Citizen married Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a
Filipino citizen, who herself was later naturalized.
 Spouses filed petition to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Mario, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece
and nephews of Lenita
 RTC granted

Whether or not qualified to adopt

 No. James not qualified

Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:

1. The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts
rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation;
2. Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
3. An alien, except:
a. A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
b. One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his of her Filipino spouse; or
c. One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or
her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law."

While Lenita qualified, still not possible because 185 provides that husband and wife must
jointly adopt except

 When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child

 hen one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other

Duncan vs. CFI

G.R. No. L-30576
February 10, 1976

Esguerra, J.

 Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan, british, and Maria Lucy Christensen, American, filed a
petition to adopt Colin Berry Christensen
  Court dismissed because the consent given is improper and falls short of the express
requirement of the law. Written consent is necessary from the guardian. The attorney client
privilege is also improper, it does not exist
 A child, less than a week old was given to petitioners for them to adopt by Atty. Corazon de
Leon Velasquez.
 The latter received the infant from the child's unwed mother who told the former never to
reveal her (the mother's) identity because she wanted to get married and did not want to
destroy her future
 Atty Corazon as de facto guardian gave written consent
 Court learning that the natural mother is still alive pressed the witness to reveal the name.
Corazon refused because of attorney client privilege.

Issue:
 Whether or not the person who gave consent is the proper person

Art. 340. The written consent of the following to adoption shall be necessary:

1. The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;

2. The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.

Under Art. 340 of the Civil 'Code, the "parent, guardian or person in charge of the person to
be adopted" while the other one is that mentioned in Section 3, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court,
describing it as each of the known living parents "who has not abandoned such child." The
father's consent here is out of the question as the child is illegitimate and unrecognized.

Said mother had completely and absolutely abandoned her child. There appears to be no
more legal need to require the written consent of such parent of the child to the adoption.

Since there was no guardian ad litem appointed by the court and the child not being in the
custody of an orphan asylum, children's home or any benevolent society, there could not have
been anyone other than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be called
the guardian of said infant.

If we are now to sustain the decision of the court below, this Tribunal will be doing a graver
injustice to all concerned particularly to said spouses, and worse, it will be imposing a cruel
sanction on this innocent child and on all other children who might be similarly situated

Isabel De La Puerta vs. CA

G.R. No. 77867
February 6, 1990

Cruz, J.

 Dominga Revuelta died testate hree surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all
surnamed de la Puerta
 Isabel was given the free portion apart from her legitime
 Opposed by brother averring their mother is already senile

 Alfredo died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor

 Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt
Carmelita de la Puerta. Granted but appealed by Isabel

 Carmelita filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged
natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. GRANTED

 CA affirmed
  Petitioner argues that Carmelita was the legitimate child of Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan,
who were legally or presumably married
The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having been destroyed, it became
necessary for the petitioner to submit additional proof to show that the two were legally
married. She did not.
Issue:

May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and successional rights to the estate of Dominga
Revuelta

Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is

raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited

No. The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the
second is that Carmelita is a spurious child

In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following
cases: first, when the person represented dies before the testator; second, when the person
represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person represented is
disinherited by the testator.

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.

If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter cannot represent the
former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is
not related to the deceased in that case, because the filiation created by fiction of law is
exclusively between the adopter and the adopted

In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia

G.R. No. 148311
March 31, 2005

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J

 Petitioner Honorato Catindig filed petition to adopt minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. Stephanie is using her mother’s middle name and surname
 He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia,” her mother’s
surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his surname
 RTC granted but named Stephanie Nathy Catindig

 Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration to allow the use of surname of natural mother
 RTC denied

Issue:
 Whether or not illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father

OSG contends:
 necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother
 no law expressly prohibiting. What the law does not prohibit, it allows
 customary for every Filipino to have a middle name

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname
or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or
 at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Considered only, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above

Republic vs CA and Bobiles

G.R. No. 92326
January 24, 1992

Regalado, J

 Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat (6yo), living with them for four
months
 RTC granted

 Petitioner appealed
 Petition for adoption was filed by private respondent when the law applicable is PD 603 (a
petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them). When the
decision is rendered, FC took effect (joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory)

Issue:
 Whether or not FC retroacted

Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions
thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events
foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest
which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or
an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable
title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created
after the right has vested.

When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right
under said law. Her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot
be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

When respondent filed her petition the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance
with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is
that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.

 Whether or not adoption should only be in favour of respondent

There is affidavit of consent. The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory
testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner
Tamargo vs. CA
G.R. No. 85044
June 3, 1992

Feliciano, J.

 Adelberto Bundoc, 10 yo, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death
 Petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and
Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents filed civil case against respondent spouses Victor
and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents

 Petition for adoption of Adelberto Bundoc was filed by spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura
granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer
 Spouses Bundoc claimed that the adopting parent Spouses Rapisura were the indispensable
parties. Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing
and granting of a petition for adoption

 RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were
not indispensable parties to the action.
 Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal

Issue:
 Whether or not petitioners lost right to appeal

Petition not having complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule
15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and
suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the motions, not having
contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which did
not interrupt the reglementary period.

Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure ought not be
applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure not
override, substantial justice.

 Whether or not respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for
damages caused by the acts of their minor child

The law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

Imputed negligence is where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but
also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the
minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of
the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages

Respondent avers that decree of adoption shall be effective at the date petition was filed
(Art36) and that it shall dissolve authority vested in natural parents.
 Under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the
relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and
over whom, the law presumes

We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to
impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no
actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given
to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to
burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they
could not have prevented is unfair

Landingin vs. Republic

G.R. No. 164948
June 27, 2006

Callejo, Sr., J

 Diwata Ramos Landingin, US citizen of Filipino parentage, filed petition to adopt minors Elaine
Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos (natural children of Manuel Ramos,
petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos)
 Landingin alleged that when Manuel died, the children were left to paternal grandmother as
their mother went to Italy but subsequently remarried.
 Maria (grandmother) passed away.
 Petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent; she is
qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her
own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives
alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her
children gave their written consent9 to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother,
Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to
support the minors while in petitioner’s custody
 RTC granted
 The court subsequently ordered case study. The result showed eligibility for adoption

However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption

 OSG then appealed

 CA reversed and held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of
Amelia Ramos, the children’s natural mother

Issues:
 Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos

After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her
approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:

a. The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

b. The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
c. The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
 d. The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with
said adopter and the latter’s souse, if any;
e. The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption

abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a conduct
which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. The term means neglect and
refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support.

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
an abandonment.35 To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be
shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

 Whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s

children sufficiently complies with the law

As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not comply with the afore-
cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.47

Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the
written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence

 Whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

Doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing
the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age