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Ninal vs Bayadog

Ninal vs. Bayadog

328 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline,
Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985
leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together
for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19,
1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma
alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage after his
death?

HELD:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even
though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of
Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed.
Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not
the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even
after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Manzano vs Sanchez

Manzano vs. Sanchez

AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001

FACTS:

Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in
San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted
another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were “separated” thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and
bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their
families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.

ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing
marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.

HELD:

Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering
that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both “separated” is
an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage.
Republic vs Quintero-Hamano

Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano

GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004

FACTS:

Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a
Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in
Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of
1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.

In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to
Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two
months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In
1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.

Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently,
in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was
granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general
circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from
publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.

ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.

HELD:

The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity
of the marriage.

Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some
kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly
helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could have
been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due
to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
Sin vs Sin

Sin vs. Sin

GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001

FACTS:

Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in
September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented
their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and
throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a
manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively
participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in
the proceedings.

HELD:

Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial
court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons
for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the
State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial

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