Higher Education 46: 61–92, 2003.

61
© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Organisational climate and strategic change in higher education:

Organisational insecurity

D.K. ALLEN
Leeds University Business School, The University of Leeds. Leeds LS2 9JT, UK
(E-mail: david-k-allen@1c24.net)

Abstract. This research introduces the concept of organisational climate and contributes to
an understanding of the recursive relationship between organisational climate and strategic
change initiatives. In the 1990s there was recognition that higher education worldwide was
moving through a period of rapid change. Alterations in the external environment were put
forward as rationales for universities to reconsider the way they organised from their tradi-
tional governance and management structures through to the way in which they performed
their primary activities of research, teaching and learning. A common approach to this adapta-
tion or change has been through an increased emphasis upon strategic planning. This was
accompanied by discourses rooted in technological determinism and the unquestioning belief
in the rightness of a particular brand of corporate management. This research focused on
one such approach to strategic change: the development of information strategies in 12 UK
Higher Education Institutions. Using a grounded approach to theory generation, it highlights
the influence of different styles of management on organisational climate. The paper discusses
the antecedents and influence of one of the dimensions of organisational climate identified:
insecurity/ security. It establishes that that climates of insecurity (or security) can exist within
an HEI and can be shared on an organisational level, or can be rooted in sub-cultures. Six
issues were identified which affected the climate of insecurity or security within the different
HEIs. These issues related to perceptions of change management and its frequency, predicta-
bility, openness, degree of participation, discontinuous or incremental nature of change, and
whether or not decisions are implemented by use of persuasive power or coercive power. The
paper goes on to discuss the multi-dimensional nature of insecurity. It notes that ‘managerial’
approaches are more likely to create highly insecure environments which reinforce a vicious
circle: staff being de-motivated, cautious, less willing to take risks or exercise discretion and
are more likely to resist change. In contrast, in environments where a more ‘collegial’ approach
had been used, a virtuous cycle was created, whereby there was a willingness to be open and
share information, there was a greater degree of cognitive conflict, and more positive inter-
personal relationships. These factors helped create consensus, the widespread understanding
of decisions (acceptance of their legitimacy) and commitment to both the strategic decisions
and the university. The paper concludes by arguing that a more sophisticated approach to
strategic planning and change should be utilised reflecting the need to view the HEI as a
symbiotic community.

Keywords: insecurity, information strategy, managerialism, strategic change

62 D.K. ALLEN

1. Introduction
The motivation behind this research lies in the author’s interest in the changes
occurring in the higher education system in the UK. Whilst others have
focused on the academic response to these changes (Trowler 1997, Trowler
1998), I was interested in the process by which these strategic changes were
taking place. I was also puzzled by the approach to strategic change promul-
gated by government and many practitioners, which assumed that a hard
managerialist approach to strategic change was more effective than traditional
models of collegial debate and decision-making used in universities. Gibbons
et al., for example, stated of Polytechnics and corporate HEIs that:
First, they offer more effective managerial models; in them, unlike the
old universities, strategic planning is not inhibited by collegial govern-
ment, nor tough choices obfuscated by the need to secure consensus.
Second, they promise greater flexibility of response to fast-changing intel-
lectual and professional needs; they seem to belong to a forward-looking
enterprise culture sceptical of the traditional demarcations, taxonomies,
hierarchies that clutter the old academic culture. (Gibbons and others
1994: 82)

While this view seemed to have become the orthodoxy, and was largely
unchallenged, it was rooted in skilfully worded assertion rather than in empir-
ical research. The opportunity to study the development of such strategies
came with the publishing of the Follett Report (Follett 1993) which recom-
mended that HEIs develop information strategies. The Joint Information
Systems Committee reinforced this recommendation in 1995 (JISC 1995).
Survey research undertaken by Allen and Wilson (Allen 1995, 1996) indi-
cated that most HEIs responded to this recommendation and started to
develop information strategies. The remit of information strategies was very
broad. They were intended to subsume information systems of information
technology strategies and could potentially address any aspect of information
control, production, handling or management in an institution. The topics
that they addressed ranged from issues about the ownership of electronic
teaching and learning materials through to the devolution or centralisation of
the ownership and management of information technology. For many insti-
tutions they were seen as catalysts for radical change. They were inevitably
contentious and problematic. In some institutions they had a dramatic impact,
whilst in others their impact was less significant. The phenomenon researched
was the information strategy process.
This phenomenon was explored through a longitudinal study of twelve
Higher Education Institutions between 1994 and 1998. As the research
progressed it became increasingly obvious that beliefs held by individuals and
 ORGANISATIONAL INSECURITY 63

groups about the identity, purpose, and character of the process, the organisa-
tion, and its environment strongly affected organisational actions. These
beliefs were seen as being produced and reproduced by social processes of
story telling and most easily accessed through organisational sagas, legends,
myths and stories. These belief structures are seen as being significant at the
collective or group level, (Sproull 1981) and at the individual level as they
form a ‘conceptual lens’ (Gioia and others 1994) influencing the possibilities
that were open to the strategic planners. The way in which the researcher
conceptualised these belief structures was through the idea of organisational
climate.

1.1. Organisational climate

With few exceptions (Borum 1995; Joyce and Slocum 1990) the concept of
organisational climate has been neglected. It remains, however, an important
perspective. Much of the research on organisational climate has its roots
in the seminal work by Litwin and Stringer (1968) on climate and motiva-
tion, and Lewinian (Lewin 1951) field theory (Denison 1996). The concept
of organisational climate is, however, a contested one (Verbeke, Volgering
and Hessels 1998) and is often conflated with the concept of organisational
culture (c.f., Schneider, Brief and Guzzo 1996). Alvesson and Berg go as far
as to state that a “. . . considerable proportion of what is currently regarded as
corporate culture could benefit from being characterised as corporate climate
instead” (Alvesson and Berg 1992: 89). There are many different, competing
definitions. For the purpose of this paper the following distinctions will be
used:
. . . organisational climate is a reflection of the way people perceive
and come to describe the characteristics of their environment, and . . .
organisational culture reflects the way things are done in an organisation.
(Verbeke, Volgering and Hessels 1998: 320)

Alvesson and Berg state that organisational climate research concentrates on

the:
. . . experiences which culture – and/or other organisational circumstances
– produce in individuals. Thus, climate is comparatively close to experi-
ence, and is superficial and readily accessible. It concerns attitudes rather
than (deeper) values. (Alvesson and Berg 1992: 88–89)

Despite the fact that climate studies were the precursor to cultural studies
(Verbeke, Volgering and Hessels 1998) the concepts have developed ‘in
parallel rather than in tandem’ (Reichers and Schneider 1990: 24). A partial
64 D.K. ALLEN

Table 1. Contrasting organisational culture and organisational climate research perspective:

adapted from Denison (1996: 625)

Differences Culture literature Climate literature

Epistemology Contextualized and ideographic Comparative and nomothetic

Point of view Emic (native point of view) Etic (researcher’s viewpoint)

Etic (researcher’s viewpoint)

Methodology Primarily qualitative field observations Primarily quantitative survey data

Temporal Historical evolution Ahistorical snapshot

orientation

Theoretical Social construction; symbolic interac- Lewinian field theory

foundations tionism; critical theory

Discipline Sociology and anthropology Gestalt psychology and social psychology

explanation of this lack of communication between the two traditions of

organisational culture and organisational climate studies is that they have
roots in theoretical and methodological positions that are polar opposites.
The roots of the climate studies are in Gestalt psychology and latterly
social psychology, whilst the concept of organisational culture emerged from
symbolic interactionism and anthropology (Reichers and Schneider 1990).
The result of this is that, with few exceptions (Poole and McPhee 1983),
climate studies tend to come from realist traditions and focus on measuring
climate using quantitative positivistic methodologies. On the other hand, the
dominant paradigm in cultural studies comes from an idealist tradition and
focuses on understanding culture using qualitative methodologies. With a few
notable exceptions (Hofstede 1998; Hofstede, Bond and Luk 1993) culture
researchers tend not to use quantitative methodologies. Indeed, attempts to
use quantitative methodologies have been seen as controversial (Rousseau
1990). Climate researchers, on the other hand, do not tend to use qualitative
approaches. The differences between the two fields are show in Table 1.
Attempts to synthesise or merge paradigms have been few-and-far
between (Rentsch 1990). Recent calls for integration (Denison 1996) take a
naive pragmatic perspective ignoring the incommensurability of the different
paradigm or take a functionalist, managerialist perspective (Barker 1994).
Yet, the separation of the two sets of researchers into separate camps, which
do not communicate, is unfortunate. As Reichers and Schneider note:
Both climate and culture deal with the ways by which organisation
members make sense of their environment. These sense-making attempts
manifest themselves as shared meanings that form the basis for action.
 ORGANISATIONAL INSECURITY 65

Both climate and culture are learned, largely through the socialisa-
tion process and through symbolic interaction among group members.
Climate and culture are at the same time both monolithic constructs
and multidimensional ones. Thus, we can correctly speak of organisa-
tional climates, cultures, and subcultures. Culture exists at a higher level
of abstraction than climate, and climate is a manifestation of culture.
(Reichers and Schneider 1990: 29)

This view is contested as Denison (1996) for example concludes that the
two research traditions can be viewed as different interpretations rather than
differences in the phenomena. The perspective taken in this research follows
Reichers and Schneider viewing them as different constructs. An analytical
opening for the study of these constructs is found in the work of Moran and
Volkwein (1992).
Moran and Volkwein describe four conceptual approaches to the concept
of organisational climate. The first of these is the structural perspective
whereby climate is seen as a manifestation of the organisational structures.
As members of the organisation are exposed to common structural character-
istics, they develop similar perceptions of the organisation. These perceptions
represent their own climate. From this perspective climate is regarded as
an objective manifestation. One of the more significant climate researchers
working from this perspective was Payne (Mansfield and Payne 1977; Payne
and Pugh 1976; Payne and Mansfield 1977; Payne and Pheysey 1977).
The second perceptual perspective of climate views it as a psychologically
processed description of organisational conditions as individuals respond in
a way in which is meaningful to them. It locates climate in the individual
rather than in organisational structures. Exemplars of this perspective have
been presented by James and colleagues (James, James and Ashe 1990;
James and others 1978) and Jackofsky and Slocum (1988). This approach
explicitly draws upon cognitive psychology and could be better categorised
as a cognitive approach. The third approach is the interactive perspective
where the interaction of individuals in responding to the same situation is seen
creating shared agreements which become the basis of organisational climate.
Moran and Volkwein identify two intellectual traditions within this stream of
research: phenomenology based in the work of Husserl and symbolic inter-
actionism based in Mead. Moran and Volkwein argue that both traditions
draw upon Berger and Luckman’s concept of social construction.
The final perspective is the cultural one, which is the view that organisa-
tional climate is:
. . . created by a group of interacting individuals who share a common,
abstract frame of reference, i.e., the organisation’s culture, as they come
66 D.K. ALLEN

to term with situational contingencies, i.e. the demands imposed by

organisational conditions. This approach to the origins of climate shifts
the focus away from individual perceptions as a source of climate formu-
lation and emphasises the interaction of the organisation’s members (a
view which it shares with the interactive approach). (Moran and Volkwein
1992: 35)

As such the concept of climate can be seen as being ‘. . . the basic concepts of
an organisation, and as such . . . at the heart of the culture . . .’ (Brown 1990).
The perspective taken in this research is grounded in a symbolic interactionist
perspective, such as that taken by Poole and McPhee (Poole and McPhee
1983).
In Moran and Volkewein’s model, climate is seen as evolving out of the
same elements as culture but as being more shallow, forming more quickly
and altering more rapidly. It operates on the level of attitudes and values,
which are the elements most immediately experienced by individuals and can
be easily articulated by actors in the organisation. In contrast, organisational
culture is informed by the more stable, deeper forms, is more resistant to
change as a result of short-term variations in the environment. They state
that:
. . . organisational climate is a created response which an interacting
group of individuals, who are informed and constrained by a common
organisational culture, make to the demands and contingencies arising
from the organisation’s internal and external environments . . . (Moran
and Volkwein 1992: 39)

This approach views climate as:

. . . informed by a set of conceptions (perceptions, values, and assump-
tions) existing at successively deeper levels of consciousness. Culture
here is not cults and customs but structures of meaning through which
human beings give shape to their experience. Organisations are not simply
hierarchies and goals but one of the principle arenas in which structures
publicly unfold . . . It is in these terms that an understanding of climate
as a focal point for describing organisations as systems of meaning and
symbolic action becomes apparent. (Moran and Volkwein 1992: 40)

Three dimensions of climate were identified in this research. They were

labelled as: insecurity vs. security, trust vs. mistrust, optimism vs. cynicism.
This paper dictate deals with only one of these dimensions: insecurity vs.
security. It is hoped that the other dimensions will be dealt with in future
publications.
 ORGANISATIONAL INSECURITY 67

The next section presents the study’s theoretical grounding. This is

followed by the research methodology which includes a discussion of data
collection and analysis. The main body of the paper consists of a description
of the antecedents of climates of security or insecurity and an analysis of the
influence of different climates. The paper concludes with a presentation of
the main findings.

2. Theoretical grounding and methodology

The epistemological position taken in the research was interpretive. Inter-
pretive approaches to research have been used in higher education (Tierney
1987, 1988, 1989), strategic change (Isabela 1990) and information systems
research (Walsham 1993). Interpretive researchers have drawn upon a range
of philosophical positions and theories: indeed, Klein and Meyer (Klein and
Myers 1999) refer to the interpretive paradigm as a collection of paradigms
rather than a single paradigm. The approach used in this study, draws upon
contextualism (Pettigrew 1985, 1997). Pettigrew (1995) argues that much
of the research on organisational change has ignored historical, process, or
organisational context. His approach attempts to focus on these issues in a
holistic manner dealing with content and process within context. Pettigrew
describes this as follows:
. . . Outer context refers to the social, economic, political, and competi-
tive environment in which the firm operates. Inner context refers to the
structure, corporate culture, and political context within through which
ideas for change have to proceed. Content refers to the particular areas of
transformation under examination . . . The process of change refers to the
actions, reactions, and interactions from the various interested parties as
they seek to move the firm from its present to its future state. (Pettigrew
1987: 658)
In using contextualism, the research adopts a theoretical approach to ontology
and human nature described by Garnsey (1992) (as cited by Walsham 1993)
as ‘constitutive process’ theories. Walsham outlines this as being “concerned
with the processes whereby social actors are engaged in producing and repro-
ducing the social systems of which they form part” (Walsham 1993: 224).
Pettigrew (1995: 93) has drawn upon the work of Stephen Pepper (1942,
1966) in his approach and therefore places more emphasis upon context-
determining action. However, in contrast to Pettigrew this work will draw
upon Strauss’s (1993) view that “phenomena do not just automatically unfold
nor are they straightforwardly determined by social, economic, political,
cultural, or any other circumstances; rather they are in part shaped by the
interactions of concerned actors” (Strauss 1993: 53–54).
68 D.K. ALLEN

In line with the theoretical and methodological position the research was
a longitudinal field study of strategic change. This approach has long been
seen as of high value higher education research (Tierney 1987). Following
Pettigrew, the practicalities of the process of selection of research sites could
best be described as planned opportunism. The approach can be described
using Pettigrews (1995) decision rules:
1. An attempt was made to choose sites in which the phenomenon of
strategic planning for information was transparently observable. Sites
were chosen where respondents stated that they would co-operate and
that they were developing an information strategy.
2. An attempt was made to select sites that were polar ‘types’ and represen-
tative types. Universities with different governance styles were included,
as were HEIs of different sizes. More specific information cannot be
attributed to the case studies without the risk of allowing the identification
of the HEIs.
3. An attempt was made to select sites that were expected to have high
experience levels of the phenomena under study.
In-depth interviews were conducted with approximately twenty informants
in each organisation. Interviewees were visited on an iterative basis between
1994 and 1998. Informants were selected because they were perceived as
taking lead positions in their organisation, lead positions in the change
process, or as being perceived as significantly affected by the change. Inform-
ants ranged from the heads of information services (Library, Management
Information Services, Computer Centre) to senior managers (Deans, Pro-Vice
Chancellors, Heads of Finance, Personnel, Planning and Vice Chancellors).
Senior academics and all members of the strategy group or committee
were interviewed. Strategy documents (working papers, bulletins for staff,
internal documentation) were gathered and, where possible, strategy meetings
attended.
Collecting data was complicated by the reluctance of some of the respond-
ents to openly discuss the process because of its highly political nature. This
was overcome by assuring anonymity to all participants, and by emphasising
that I was independent and uninvolved in the strategy process. All names of
HEIs have been changed and all names of individuals have been omitted. As
a result of the pressures to protect the participants, I have been more vague
about details of events than would have been preferred. This approach isn’t
unusual in case study research (Watson 1994) as it allows the gathering of
data that would otherwise be unavailable. The HEIs are referred to using a
letter from the Greek Alphabet (Alpha to Mu).
Analysis of the data suggested that in relation to insecurity there were
three main ‘clusters’ of universities. The first cluster consists of Epsilon,
 ORGANISATIONAL INSECURITY 69

Delta, and Theta universities. These were HEIs where respondents involved
in the change process reported and behaved in a manner, which indicated
high levels of security. All three are traditional universities established before
1960 and all had maintained a collegial approach to the management of
the institution. Delta and Epsilon universities were also noticeable as being
geographically isolated and being of relatively small size.
The second cluster consists of Kappa, Iota, Beta, Gamma, and Mu HEIs.
This cluster can be characterised as red brick universities which were moving
(or had moved) from a collegial to a more managerial approach to the
management of the institution. In all five of these universities there was
polarisation between groups involved in the change process which reported
and behaved in a manner that indicated that they were working in a climate
that was judged to be relatively secure and others within the university judged
to be extremely insecure. This cluster can be divided into two subsections.
The first consists of Kappa and Iota and the second consists of Beta, Gamma,
and Mu HEIs. The first group shared the common characteristics of insecurity
being noted within only one function within the HEIs and the change being
led by a senior member of the management team. In the second group the
change was led by the Vice-Chancellor and more than one function responded
in an insecure manner. It is important to note that within both groups the
degree of change was not seen as differing significantly.
The third cluster consists of Zeta, Eta, and Alpha HEIs. In each of these
HEIs all involved in the change process reported high levels of insecurity.
These HEIs shared a managerial approach to the management of the insti-
tution. Zeta and Alpha were large new universities and Eta was a college of
HE.
For the sake of brevity, each site studied will not be described in detail.
Instead, the advice of Pettigrew et al. has been followed in that this paper
will be based on data selected from sites where extreme situations, critical
incidents and social dramas took place (Pettigrew, Ferlie and McKee 1992:
30). Therefore, in this paper data were utilised from three HEIs: Epsilon,
Gamma, and Alpha.
Within this longitudinal and interpretive research design, the core focus
is on actors as creating and being constrained by organisational meaning.
Meaning is seen as being transmitted, reproduced and created through
symbols and language. These constructs are the most easily accessed
through organisational sagas, legends, myths and stories. They illuminate the
organisational climate and power relations and allow one to glimpse the belief
systems in operation in the organisation. The focus of the interviews was upon
illuminating and exploring these deep structures. It was recognised, however,
that “stories of disagreement and resistance must be heard along side the
70 D.K. ALLEN

legitimised stories of organisational power holders” (Rhodes 1996). Much

of the work which has been undertaken on story telling within an HE context
has focused on story telling by senior managers (Quong, Walker and Body-
cott 1999). Storytelling was, thus seen as “. . . the preferred sense-making
currency of human relationships” (Boje 1991: 106). The different approaches
and critiques of the use of stories in understanding organisation is recognised
(c.f. Boje, Alvarez, and Schooling 2001). It is also recognised that the produc-
tion and attempted legitimisation of stories has an overtly political dimension
in that it “. . . is an attempt to privilege one voice and to suppress other voices
which might offer counter – interpretations of actions and events” (Brown
1998: 38).
Organisational ‘stories’ were used as a way in which I could uncover the
competing histories of the organisation. The approach taken to the interview
was that conversation was a political act, a production of a partial view
of the phenomena. The stories recounted in interviews were not seen as a
direct representation, rather they were analysed sensitively in light of their
historical, cultural, political and contextual factors (Silverman 1993: 6).

2.1. Insecurity

Job insecurity was widely assumed (OECD 1998), to have increased substan-
tially over the last decade. Indeed, Beck argues, “around the world, flexible
work and insecure terms of employment are growing faster than any other
form of work” (Beck 2000: 84). It is, however, only recently that detailed
research has been undertaken which deals with the nature and impact this
phenomenon (Burchell and others 1999). As Burchell et al. (1999) note, there
is a lack of empirical research in this area. At the same time, job insecurity
and the stress that it causes within the higher education sector has become an
issue of primary concern for many of the professional associations and trade
unions. This is especially significant in relation to new employment practices
(AUT 1999; Editorial 1999) Job insecurity has also become one of public
debate (Swain 1999; Utley 1998). In a recent press release, the Association
of University Teachers (AUT) noted the relationship between job insecurity
and the growth in the use of short-term contracts by universities.
Insecurity of employment due to fixed-term contracts is now the biggest
issue facing higher education staff today. Throughout the UK, the propor-
tion of academic staff employed on such contracts has now reached an
astonishing 43%, while in some institutions up to a third of technicians
are now ‘casualised’. (AUT 1998)

Although the AUT’s concern was primarily for academic members of staff
they described job insecurity as an issue which affected most forms of
 ORGANISATIONAL INSECURITY 71

employment within the HE sector. The issue discussed in this paper is,
how is the organisational climate of security (or insecurity) influenced by
the different approaches to strategic planning, and, in turn, how does the
organisational climate influence the process of strategic planning?
Within the different HEIs studied, radically different climates of security
and insecurity were observed. The data suggest that job insecurity or security
on the basis perception of fear of job loss was, in some institutions, an
important issue that influenced behaviour. A more significant issue was
insecurity, based on the fear of the loss of valued job features, such as the
loss of status within the organisation or loss of opportunity for promotion.
This is described as multi-dimensional job insecurity (Burchell and others
1999).
Recent research (Burchell and others 1999) has identified a link between
multi-dimensional job insecurity and organisational motivation. Burchell
(1999) has argued that job insecurity is negatively correlated with self-
reported motivation levels. Other research has also pointed to the link
between increased insecurity, particularly in the public sector, and its
negative impact on employees’ loyalty, morale, and motivation (Thomas and
Dunkerley 1999; Worrall and Cooper 1998) The impact of this, for any
strategic change initiative, is profound, as lack of employee participation,
commitment and motivation are significant barriers to strategic organisational
change (Zeffane 1996).
Within the HEIs studied, insecurity or security was seen as linked to
the legacies of past change initiatives. In turn, the way these past change
initiatives had been dealt with, strongly affected the perceived quality and
competence of senior management control. It is important to note that, in
common with Worrall and Coopers findings (Worrall and Cooper 1998), there
was a significant difference between the perceptions of those close to the top
of the organisational hierarchy and middle or junior managers. The effects of
past change initiatives were perceived much more negatively by those people
lower in the organisational hierarchy. It was also noticeable that different
levels of insecurity were observed within particular groups in each University.
High levels of insecurity across the whole organisation were rare, and where
found, were strongly related to the political environment within the university
and the perception of the external environment held by members of staff.
Within the HE environment levels of security or insecurity were related to
change management and its:
• frequency;
• predictability;
• openness;
• degree of participation;
72 D.K. ALLEN

• discontinuous or incremental nature; and

• whether or not the normal mode of decision implementation is based on
persuasive power or coercive power.
Each of these elements will be described in further detail in the next section of
this paper. It is important to note that consistent with the interpretive paradigm
in which this research is grounded, this model is developed as a sense-making
exercise by the researcher. As Pidgeon, Turner and Blockley point out:
From this perspective it becomes less important to seek the one ‘true’
or valid model. Rather, we should accept that all models are constructed
from a particular point of view. Consequently the question of the status of
models becomes less one of whether a particular interpretation model is
ultimately valid (or biased) . . . (Pidgeon, Turner and Blockley 1991: 170)

The model is a rhetorical construct in that “. . . it was designed not just to

inform but to persuade, and that inevitably it is the author’s voice, not the
research participants’, that is most privileged” (Brown 1998: 40). The model
does not present the ‘reality as it is’, rather its purpose is to explain and
present the researchers’ subjective interpretation of the phenomena.

2.1.1. Frequency
The first issue, which was noted as contributing to organisational insecurity
or security, was the frequency of change initiatives. In Alpha, for example,
many of the members of this HEI described the HEI as undergoing a continual
cycle of transformation. The Head of Learning Services noted that there were
frequent cycles of what he termed ‘purges’ of middle and senior management.
A senior academic described this as:
. . . a continual process of change and reorganisation, well no, not
continuous but sporadic, every couple of years it seems that the whole
place is thrown up in the air, at least the senior bit of it, and reconfigured.

Indeed, I observed that within the six months between September 1994
and March 1995, no less than ten Strategy documents, each suggesting
a significant change to the HEI structure, were published. Each time the
organisational structures and systems were changed the changes needed time
to be assimilated, as one member of the strategy group noted:
We used to have a much larger executive team than we have now. The
reorganisation of management led to thirteen Executive Director posts
being reduced to five. It’s taken a while for that new system to bed-in.

Many of those interviewed noted that the cycle of changes was so rapid that
there was not sufficient time for changes to ‘bed in’. The frequency of these
 ORGANISATIONAL INSECURITY 73

changes was demonstrated to me, by the short period for which each new
edition of the organisational charts for Alpha was seen as valid. During each
visit to the HEI, I would ask one of the managers for an organisational chart.
On every occasion, it was noticeable that each time a chart was produced the
interviewee then amended it by hand, or significant changes to the chart were
described to me. One manager, off tape, noted that the management structure
was being changed so often that he felt that the organisational charts were
‘out of date by the time they are printed’.

2.2. Predictability

This insecurity in Alpha was exacerbated by the fact that many of the
respondents felt that organisational history would not help them understand
the nature of the changes, or to predict how the changes would affect the
organisation. The impact of this issue can be seen in relationship to the
perception in Alpha and Epsilon of the impact of environmental turbulence.
Both HEIs had similar perceptions of the threatening and turbulent nature of
the external environment in which they existed; yet, they had very different
reactions to this turbulence.
In Alpha, external turbulence seems to have been translated into internal
organisational turbulence. Significantly, members of the organisation felt
unable to predict how the changes would affect their role within the organisa-
tion. They did not know what would be next, or who would be the next to lose
his/her position. The changes were seen as discontinuous, unpredictable, and
a reaction the turbulent external environment. As the Chair of the Information
Strategy Group (ISG) noted:
But no Universities have really been in this position before, have they?
No one knows how to react because they haven’t been there before. It is
bizarre – unlike anything that has gone before.

Many of the respondents in Epsilon shared this perception of a threatening

and turbulent external environment but this was not translated into fragmen-
tation and insecurity within the HEI. Indeed, this fear of the rapidly changing
and threatening external environment seemed to drive members of the HEI
closer together. As the Director of the Computing Services stated:
People were pulling together to produce a strategy which would help us
overcome our difficulties of size and location.

In Epsilon there was a feeling that ‘we sink or swim together’ and that the
resolution of problems should be achieved through participative decision-
making. Critical to the maintenance of this environment, was the fact
74 D.K. ALLEN

that teams maintained positive interpersonal relationships. Amason and

Schweiger (1994) have described this phenomenon as ‘affective acceptance’
and research (Korsgaard, Schweiger and Sapienza 1995) suggests that this has
a critical impact on decision making. Amason and Schweiger, for example,
state that:
To consistently produce and reach consensus on high-quality decisions,
the members of a top management team must maintain interpersonal rela-
tionships that allow them to continue to work together . . . Continuing
affective acceptance among a team’s members . . . is important to
organisational performance because maintaining an adequate level of
affective acceptance sustains a team’s ability to function. (Amason and
Schweiger 1994: 242).
In Epsilon, these positive interpersonal relationships, were based on one level,
on a clear understanding of the mutual inter-dependence of the different func-
tions of the HEI. This interdependence seemed to be based on a strong sense
of mutual respect. As a Senior Academic stated:
I think what you’ve to appreciate is that in a College like this, there are
few of us or few people on campus, and I don’t include myself in this,
who are technically all that competent. We rely very much on people
like (X an academic member of staff), who has had training, got obvious
expertise and people like (the Director of Computing Services), but for
instance, in the Library we’ve got (Y) who has limited expertise in the
IT field. He fronts the operation for the Library, but I think he would be
the first to admit, he has got limited expertise. I’m very much in the same
position myself. I make use of the computer system particularly here, but
I wouldn’t regard myself as being technically all that competent, not all
that familiar with new developments, and I think what we’ve found, what
I’ve found particularly useful, was being able to talk to people like (these)
...
This interdependence seemed to be based on a symbiotic relationship. The
mutual exchange was based on strong inter-personal relationships and high
levels of trust. As the Director of Learning Resources pointed out about the
relationship between the Computing Centre and the Library:
Well, very similar to what my relationship is with them, is that there is
now real link between them, it’s just again based on favours and actually
asking again – ‘will you give me a hand to do so and so’ . . .
This interdependence, mutual respect and trust reinforced the levels of
security because those involved in the strategic change initiative felt valued
and secure in their positions as members of an academic community.
 ORGANISATIONAL INSECURITY 75

2.3. Openness

Gamma HEI offered another dimension to the issue of organisational

insecurity. In Gamma one department, in particular, operated in an insecure
environment. Much of this insecurity stemmed from a lack of openness of
senior managers. The importance of relaying regular, systematic and accurate
information has been identified as a significant issue in the reduction of
insecurity (Lim 1996), as has clear and rapid communication (Burchell and
others 1999).
In Gamma the senior managers were insecure and lacked trust in the
service managers, therefore they were unwilling to allow service managers
access to information which would support autonomous decision-making.
Yet, they expected that service managers take autonomous decisions in line
with the strategic plan. The Director of the Computing Service, described for
example, a situation, where he had to make a multi-million pound purchase,
but he was unable to get any form of formal confirmation from the HEI that
he should proceed with the purchase. At the same time the Vice-Chancellor
told him orally and informally that he must go ahead with the purchase. This
manager stated in an interview a day before the purchase was made:
Christ, I am slightly nervous of this, and I am trying to make sure that I
am covered, in a professional sense, in that I follow all the procedures. I
did specifically ask for a written statement from the finance office of what
the budget was, and they just sort of laughed.

Lack of information caused organisational insecurity and decreased the

manager’s willingness to take a risk. This particular example also demon-
strates the lack of trust between service managers and senior managers in
Gamma.
Epsilon had much in common with Gamma: they were of a similar
size, geographically isolated, highly specialised, and had a common percep-
tion of a turbulent and hostile environment. Both were organisations where
many decisions were made on an informal basis and autonomous decision-
making was encouraged. Epsilon, however, provides an interesting contrast
to Gamma in that individuals involved in change processes were willing to
share information, ideas, and perspectives. They were also willing to share
differences in assumptions and interpretations. These issues have been linked
at a team level to effectiveness of decision-making (Amason and Schweiger
1994; Korsgaard, Schweiger and Sapienza 1995; Schweiger, Sandberg and
Rechner 1989). This difference in behaviour within the two HEIs can be
linked to the openness and communication within the HEIs.
76 D.K. ALLEN

2.4. Participation in past change initiatives

Organisational insecurity or security was also affected by the nature of the

decision making process and the political system. In Alpha the political
environment was seen as ‘autocratic’ with power being centralised within
a small cabal of extremely powerful individuals, led by the Vice-Chancellor:
The lead has come primarily from the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-
Chancellor has been enthusiastic and evangelical about changes in HE
and has taken a fairly firm hand over the steering of the institution. As
far as responsibility with the executive team is concerned – the drive is
coming mainly from the top with the Academic Planning Officer as well.
The Finance Officer who is responsible for the resources tends to play a
more cautious role, as we might expect.

Another respondent noted that although the Vice-Chancellor spoke of

‘participatory decision making’ and ‘empowering staff’, changes to the
organisation were devised and developed by the Vice-Chancellor and a small
Executive Team:
The real power lies with the Vice-Chancellor. One example of this is the
major re-organisation, two years ago, which was instigated by the Vice-
Chancellor. He works very closely with two of the other Senior Managers;
the Executive Director and the Development Director as a team.

In this environment of fear and insecurity the lack of the chance to partici-
pate in decision-making reduced trust in the management and increased
insecurity. Whitener et al. (1998) suggest that sharing control of decision
making increases trust because employees have greater control over decisions
that affect them and, therefore, can protect their own interests.
In Epsilon the approach to the control of decision-making was based on a
participative approach. A small central group of individuals formed a senior
management team which co-ordinated activities. They worked in a highly
consensual manner formulating and implementing decisions through commit-
tees and working parties. Interestingly, the committee members tended to
comprise of individuals who were either elected representatives or appointed
for their particular expertise of knowledge. Individuals within the HEI were
not appointed or excluded merely because of their position within the HEI’s
hierarchy. One of the leading members of the information services committee,
who was at that point a senior lecturer, pointed out:
I put my name forward for election to the Information Services
Committee, because I personally felt that as a department we ought to
 ORGANISATIONAL INSECURITY 77

be represented since we are one of the principal users of the computer

system . . .

A positive attempt was made to including both the service directors and
academics within the decision making process. An insight was given into
the decision-making processes in the HEI by one lecturer who (off tape)
explained that because of the particularly isolated position, and small size
of Epsilon there was a strong sense of community. Members of the HEI
lived within close proximity, socialised together, and met regularly within
their working environment. Thus, informal relationships were often far more
important than formal positions within the HEI. It was clear that there were
strong co-operative working relationships within the HEI. The Chair of the
Information Strategy pointed out:
I think you’ve probably met many of the members of the Committee . . .
We are rather different to large institutions, in that we all know each other
anyway. My feeling is that everybody has done all that could have been
expected of them . . . in that sense and everybody has produced the goods
when it’s been asked of them . . .

Here it was clear that the ability to become involved in the process acted as a
form of social reward (Whitener and others 1998) affirming the standing and
worth in the organisation of those who were asked to be involved.

2.5. Discontinuous or incremental nature of the change initiatives

The changes that were initiated in Alpha were seen as being discontinuous
and often initiated in response to a crisis:
. . . when there was a sort of budgetary crisis, the Vice-Chancellor decided
that almost all the committees would just be abolished at a stroke. You
know, like that and they were gone, which he had the power to do.

This quotation also illustrates the fact that many of the managers perceived
the change initiatives as ‘knee-jerk’ reactions to financial crisis. The Senior
Management Team (SMT) often explicitly linked many of the major initi-
atives to the desire to save money in an attempt to justify the change
initiatives.
Another manager illustrated the radical and rapid way in which the Vice-
Chancellor removed the divisional structures within the HEI. In the late
1980s, the divisions had been quite powerful within the HEI. The representa-
tives of the divisions were members of the SMT and represented an academic
78 D.K. ALLEN

voice in senior management, and an academic role in decision making beyond

the department:
It is a new structure and it is much leaner than it was twelve months ago,
because we now have 4 executives, whereas before we had fourteen and
the VC decided that, for various reasons, that was too many. I have only
been in this position from May of last year i.e., six months and the struc-
ture has changed quite rapidly. The other thing that changed is there was a
strong intermediate structure between the base level, the eighteen schools
if you like, and the executive arm and that was what we called divisions
(in a traditional University you would call them Faculties). There were
four Divisions each with a powerful Executive Director with budgetary
powers and resources to distribute down to the Schools. That Divisional
level is still there but it is much weaker now. We have Divisional Chairs
but they do not have executive powers, they do not have major budgets,
the budgets are devolved down to the School level, so to some extent it is
a bit of an anachronism, to many activities it is not strictly relevant.

In Epsilon, whilst the HEI had embraced many innovations (such as the
routine use of video-conferencing in teaching) it had changed in an incre-
mental rather than discontinuous manner. For example, the service directors
had relative autonomy within their own spheres, as one of the academics
noted:
In the past, the Computer Service, although it has sought advice from
academics and academic departments, has in a sense made its own
decisions . . .

With this autonomy, came the ability to innovate with ideas and concepts,
which could have a strategic impact on the HEI. It is important to note that
members of the services were fully integrated into the academic community
and there was a great deal of collaboration between members of the services
and academic departments. An example of this is the use of interactive
web-based teaching materials. The Director of the Multi-Media services, in
collaboration with academic colleagues, developed these materials. He had
strong links with teaching staff and was, himself, involved in teaching. The
Director saw his role as providing an environment in which, in partnership
with academic colleagues, he could focus on developing and implementing
innovative applications for the use of the technology within the HEI. Funda-
mental to the success of this was that, within the secure environment which
the HEI provided, members of staff felt able to take risks and innovate.
 ORGANISATIONAL INSECURITY 79

2.6. Persuaded or coerced

Within the management of Alpha there seemed to be a feeling that, not only
you did not know who would be removed from office next, but also anyone,
however senior, could be affected. There was also a view that whenever there
was a crisis, staff in managerial positions would lose their jobs. Further more
there was a belief that that the Vice-Chancellor would personally decide
who should lose their jobs. This was demonstrated when Vice-Chancellor
announced the HEI’s response to a crisis in funding in the mid-1990s. He
stated that the first thing to change would be the senior management structure.
He then went on to state that ‘the overall Leadership Team is going to be
reduced in size’ and that it will ‘bear a heavy proportion of the overall staffing
cuts’. He stated that he disliked doing this but felt that there was no alternative
to ‘such direct action’. This statement makes it clear that this was a personal
decision of the Vice-Chancellor and that the first group to be affected by cuts
would be the management. A leading member of the strategy group recounted
a story of a change which illustrates this point:
When it comes to decisions like that it comes down to the VC, he
instigated the process which resulted in the shakedown of the senior
management team of the institution, even to the extent that the person that
was working in the role of Deputy VC, the next level down . . . actually
had to leave the institution.

Other respondents recounted different versions of this story. Although there

were slight differences to the stories, they all illustrated the fact that the
Vice-Chancellor was ‘all-powerful’, could not be resisted and that managers’
positions, however senior, were tenuous and insecure. This was emphasised
by a respondent who noted that:
People in the Senior Management Team are in, if they support him and
the Senior Management Team essentially does what he wants, as far as I
can see, and those who do not, disappear.

The timing of the announcement was also interesting, as there was some delay
between the Vice-Chancellor announcing the cuts and the Vice-Chancellor
providing information about the new structure. It can be hypothesised that
this delay increased insecurity and also reinforced the perspective that it was
‘knee jerk’ reaction.
In Epsilon the participative and negotiated approach to decision making
ensured that members of the HEI felt that they had ‘ownership’ of decisions.
In this way major decisions were not seen as being imposed, and collective
decision-making resulted in collective responsibility being taken for the
80 D.K. ALLEN

possible outcome of a decision. The language used by members of the HEI

when referring to strategy documents was particularly revealing as it was
common to hear interviewees describe a particular strategy as belonging to
them: as ‘our strategy’. The consensual approach ensured that opposing opin-
ions had been explored before any controversial decision was made and that
the majority of groups within the HEI would be supportive of the decision.
The Director of the Multi-Media Service spoke of this when he stated that,
for example, in the ISG:
I know there were confrontations, but we needed those confrontations to
bring us together, I believe by doing that I think we have a foundation
there . . .

The way in which the information strategy document was written exemplified
this participative approach. The Director of Learning Resources noted that for
the information strategy:
It was a consensus. I wrote on the Multi-Media side, then we had another
person on the Computer side, the Librarian and then we had the Pro-Vice-
Chancellor, he did a synopsis of the whole thing and put it all together.
Yes we all had our bit to play in it, we all had our bit to put in and all that
was put in to the strategy then. . . .

It is important to note that although the document represented consensus it did

not avoid controversial issues. It included, for example, recommendations for
the introduction of a HEI-wide module. The implementation of this module
was particularly controversial because it would draw funding away from
academic departments. Consensus, based both on the clear understanding
of the implications of their decisions and commitment to the decision has
been described as a issue which supports the ‘quality’ of a decision (Amason
and Sapienza 1997; Amason and Schweiger 1994; Korsgaard, Schweiger and
Sapienza 1995; Schweiger, Sandberg and Rechner 1989).

2.7. Responses to the climates of insecurity/security

Most of the respondents in Alpha noted that they were working in an insecure
environment. This widespread insecurity was openly recognised by the SMT.
The perspective of the Chair of the Information Strategy, was particularly
open on this issue, arguing that that his colleagues felt insecure and uncom-
fortable with the changes because they had not comprehended the nature of
the turbulent and hostile environment in which the HEI had to exist:
A lot of the more senior people feel very uncomfortable because they
haven’t necessarily come face to face with the economic realities that lie
 ORGANISATIONAL INSECURITY 81

Figure 1. Job insecurity and self-reported motivation levels taken from Burchell et al. (1999).

behind some of the changes that are happening. They live a very, very,
sheltered existence. They do not necessarily understand why it has come
about.

Yet, this rationale was greeted with cynicism and seen as illegitimate. A
Senior Professor in Alpha commented:
I suspect it’s a kind of distractive ploy to the fact that things are not
working as well as they might be, unless there is this kind of pathological
need to tinker with things, sort of rebuild the railway set on the floor, you
know, everyday into a different pattern. I do not know, something like that
perhaps.

The adverse affects on employees caused by such frequent changes has been
documented by a number of researchers (McHugh 1996). Burchell (1999), for
example, demonstrates that job insecurity and self-reported motivation levels
is a negative rather than a positive one. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
The managers who were currently ‘in position’ at the start of the infor-
mation strategy process in Alpha were survivors of what were described as
‘purges’ by managers and ‘downsizing’ by senior managers. Much of their
later behaviour could be explained by their reaction to these past changes.
This can be seen as the ‘psychological legacy’ of the change initiatives based
upon the breaking of ‘psychological contracts’ (Andersson 1996; Feldman
1991; Morrison and Robinson 1997; Robinson and Rousseau 1994; Turnley
and Feldman 1998) with the organisation. The term psychological contract
refers to “. . . individuals’ beliefs about the terms and conditions of a recip-
rocal exchange agreement between that person and another party” (Robinson
1996: 575). Psychological contract breach is also seen as often occurring as a
result of organisational restructuring (Turnley and Feldman 1998). Indeed,
it can be seen as an explanation for the high levels of insecurity within
HEIs (such as Alpha) where there were frequent attempts to restructure
the organisation. Psychological contract breach has an impact on the level
82 D.K. ALLEN

of insecurity (Turnley and Feldman 1998) and trust (Robinson 1996).The

frequency of the changes, the lack of continuity, the fact that these changes
had all come under different managerial banners, and that that they seemed to
be fire fighting rather than anticipatory, undermined the image of the senior
management control as being planned or coherent.
This negative view of the senior management and lack of trust in their
general competence further reinforced insecurity. The staff became insecure
not just about the future of their own position within the organisation, but also
increasingly insecure about the future survival of the HEI. Thornhill et al.
(1996) note that the survivors of such changes often react in a manner which
is unfavourable for the organisation. These reactions can include mistrust,
insecurity, and a lower commitment to the organisation. Employees, there-
fore, can become more cautious and less willing to take risks or exercise
discretion. Widespread organisational insecurity in Alpha was often alluded
to as the explanation for the particularly strong levels of organisational inertia.
One of the members of the strategy group noted that:
People are generally reluctant to enter into debate, they like the status
quo. There is a reticence of people to get involved in this process because
they feel threatened.

In Alpha respondents in explanation of their reluctance to become involved,

and their lack of motivation in any change process told stories of the restruc-
turing of senior management. Respondents pointed to the link between this
insecurity and the information strategy process, noting that there was ‘resist-
ance’ to the strategy process because it was seen as possibly leading to further
changes in the organisational structures:
The Information Strategy is beginning to question the structures of
the University and structures of Departments within the University and
peoples seemingly secure place within these structures.

This insecurity related to past reorganisations is described by Burchell as

being particularly “. . . noticeable in organisations where senior management
had made a concerted effort to delayer their employment structures, eliminate
existing job demarcations and flatten their managerial hierarchies” (Burchell
and others 1999: 3).
In Epsilon the effects of an organisational climate of security was multi-
faceted, it led to a willingness to be open and share information and to have
robust discussion within the HEI. This increased levels of commitment to the
organisation (and to organisational decisions), and consensus on decisions.
The literature suggests, however, that there is a paradox, in that:
 ORGANISATIONAL INSECURITY 83

Figure 2. Epsilon and decision making.

. . . many of the factors that enhance decision quality appear also to

undermine consensus and affective acceptance. At the same time, factors
that enhance consensus or positive affect appear to also curtail decision
quality. A dilemma results where teams must choose between pursuing
higher quality decisions which cannot be implemented versus imple-
menting lower quality decisions. (Amason and Sapienza 1997: 495)

Amason and colleagues (Amason and Sapienza 1997; Amason and

Schweiger 1994) suggest that this paradox is partly resolved by distin-
guishing between cognitive conflict (based on ideas) and affective conflict
(based on personalities). They have argued that intra-group cognitive conflict
enhances decision quality whilst affective conflict reduces it. Although some
researchers have argued that the use of intra-group conflict to increase
decision quality is dubious (Tompson 1997), most seem to agree with this
argument (Korsgaard, Schweiger and Sapienza 1995). The case of Epsilon
is certainly supportive of the prior research. Indeed, in Epsilon a mutually
reinforcing relationship was observed between, on one hand the high levels
of security and, on the other hand their propensity to be open with informa-
tion, to have candid discussion and their positive personal relationships. This
created an environment in which there were high levels of cognitive conflict
in the decision-making processes, but low levels of affective conflict. This in
turn led to a clear understanding of the impact of decisions that were made, a
commitment to the decisions and consensus. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
As Korsgaard et al. argue:
. . . the manner in which team leaders elicit, receive, and respond to
team members’ input affects their attitudes towards the decisions them-
selves and towards the other members of the teams, including the leaders.
(Korsgaard et al. 1995: 76)
84 D.K. ALLEN

They point out that two elements must be in place for a decision process
to be perceived as fair. The first is that individuals must perceive that they
have been given the opportunity to present information relevant to a decision.
The second is that the contributor must feel that the decision-maker shows
consideration of their input. Indeed, this second issue becomes particularly
important when the contributor’s voice is ignored and the contributor does not
perceive the outcome of the decision as favourable. Korsgaard et al. (1995)
have found that where strong consideration of members input the process was
perceived as fairer and consequently team members had greater attachment to
the team, greater commitment to the decision and greater trust in the leader.
This link between perceived procedural justice and trust has been reinforced
by Brockner et al. (1997).

2.8. Conclusion

In this paper the concept of job insecurity within the HEI environment
has been explored. It has established that levels of insecurity are linked to
individuals, or groups, perceptions of the organisational environment. The
concept that climates of insecurity (or security) which can exist within a
HEIs and can be shared on an organisational level (as described in Alpha
and Epsilon HEIs), or can be rooted in sub-cultures (as seen in Gamma) has
also been established. Six issues were identified which affected the climate
of insecurity or security within the different HEIs these related to perceptions
of change management and its frequency, predictability, openness, degree of
participation, discontinuous or incremental nature of change, and whether or
not decisions are implemented by use of persuasive power or coercive power.
Levels of insecurity or security within HEIs are affected by the perception
by individuals or groups that they are respected. In environments, such as
the Gamma, where specific groups felt that they were not respected, they
were much more insecure. This was, however, affected by the quality of
interpersonal relationships. In Epsilon, for example, the high quality of inter-
personal relationships among those involved in the process led to a greater
sense of security. Linked to this was the extent to which the members of the
HEI saw themselves as part of a community and understood their mutual
interdependence and stated and acted in a way which reflected their respect
for each others’ professional skills. HEIs where there were distinct cultures
with strong boundaries between them were often typified by a lack of a sense
of interdependence and climates of insecurity. The research also exposed a
strong link between multi-dimensional job insecurity and organisational trust.
This link was also identified by Burchell et al. (1999), who reported that lack
of trust was strongly associated with feelings of job insecurity.
 ORGANISATIONAL INSECURITY 85

One of the primary observations drawn from this research is that the
existing models provide a partial perspective for the governance and manage-
ment of HEIs. I would suggest that an HEI can more profitably be viewed
through the metaphor of a community. It may be a community composed of
different ‘academic tribes’ (Becher 1993), and professional groups, but at its
most effective it is still a community bound together by a commitment to the
HEI.
Earlier research has discussed the significance of commitment by
academics to the institution and to their students. Trow, for example, states
that:
. . . almost everything in a HEI depends on the inner motivations of
teachers – their sense of pride, their intellectual involvement with their
subjects, their professional commitments to the role of teacher, their love
of students, or of learning . . . And these motivation are usually quite inde-
pendent of unpredictable external assessments, and the remote incentives
and punishments that can be attached to them. (Trow 1993: 11)

In this view, whilst the governance system may have moved from a collegial
system to a professional bureaucracy (Heiskanen, Newman and Saarinen
1998; Heiskanen, Newman and Similä 2000) the assumption is that the HEI
decisions should still be made by academics. This view permeated the atti-
tudes and behaviour of many of the senior academics interviewed. These
academics spoke of ‘putting the information services in their place’, resented
the involvement of service directors in decision-making, and resented
expenditure on the provision of central services. The services were perceived
as a separate and alien element ‘stitched on to’ the HEI and, as such, as
having no place in the governance of the HEI. This clearly described in the
case of Gamma HEI. The result seemed to be a mutual lack of trust and
increased organisational insecurity. Strategic change initiatives were resisted,
partially because they were perceived as attacks on the professional identity
of members of the information services. In HEIs, information service staff
assume that they would have involvement and control over various aspects
of planning for the IT infrastructure in which they had areas of expertise.
Their exclusion from the strategic decision process can be interpreted as
psychological contract violation.
In contrast the managerial perspective inverts the collegial power relation-
ship and suggests a view of the HEI as being properly led and managed
by professional managers. The current drive for a more business-like and
managerial approach fragments the HEI. It has, for example, set academics
against professional managers and alienated members of the university (as in
Alpha). The change that is occurring seems to be accompanied by conflict,
86 D.K. ALLEN

as academics take industrial action over pay (c.f., Maslen on the Australian
situation 1999), and changing working conditions and raise concerns about
academic freedom (Allport 1999). Fuelled by a number of high profile scan-
dals in Huddersfield, Portsmouth (Dearlove 1999), and Swansea (Davies
1994) Universities there is concern about the opportunities that managerial
structures afford for the abuse of power.
This research resonates with the findings of Sporn (Sporn 1996, 1999) that
“successful processes and structures for adaptation can only be implemented
through joint activities of administration and faculty” (Sporn 1999). I would
suggest that a more sophisticated view of governance and management in the
HEI should be taken, one that recognises both the social nature of the context,
and process, of strategic change. The HEI should be treated as a symbiotic
community based on mutual interdependence of different groups. This is not a
suggestion that we should go ‘back to the future’: back to collegial structures.
This is neither desirable nor possible.
This study, in common with those of Prichard and Willmott (1997) and
Trowler (1997), suggests that a note of caution be sounded in respect to the
claims that the transition from collegialism to managerialism (Parker and
Jary 1995) is inevitable, cannot be resisted, or is being implemented ‘as
intended’. Indeed, as Prichard and Willmott state, “. . . localised practices and
existing discursive regimes have a strong mediating effect on the reception
and articulation of ‘management disciplines’ ” (Prichard and Willmott 1997:
311). In the HEIs observed, rather than forming a web into which all members
of the organisation were trapped (a web that reproduces certain power rela-
tions) managerialist ideology actually resulted in those who introduced the
concepts losing legitimacy. Yet, the rejection of managerialism does not mean
the rejection of management values. Becher and Kogan note:
Management values in higher education are not intrinsically hostile
to professional values. A particular strand of governmental ideology,
however – that which promotes such values above those of the academic
enterprise which management is meant to serve – is in conflict with
academic norms. (Becher and Kogan 1992: 179)

It is not the introduction of management ideology that proves unpalatable, but

the introduction of a particular brand of management thought and its use to
re-order power within the HEI. This has also been observed in studies of the
implementation of technologies or systems for management of technology
in Higher Education (Allen and Kern 2001, 2002). Similarly, in this study
attempts to introduce managerial language offered an alien jarring note into
the academic discourse. Its application is increasingly being questioned and
rejected:
 ORGANISATIONAL INSECURITY 87

Long after the wave has passed in the business world, why have words like
‘vision’, ‘mission’, and ‘excellence’ become omnipresent in the rhetoric
of university presidents and administrators? (Atkinson-Grosjean 1998)

Not only is this language rejected because it was perceived as either already
being obsolete in the mainstream of management thought, or used without
understanding: it was also, rejected because of the absolute nature of these
managerial discourses. Rather than leaping from one managerial fad to
another in a frantic race for efficiency, we should be focusing on developing
approaches to management and administration which are particular to the
higher education sector.
I would argue that higher education in the UK seems to be reaching a crisis
point, a point at which it could truly start to feel the impact of neo-liberal
economic policies, information technology, and globalised competition. We
will be in the Brave New World of Work (Beck 2000) where risk and
insecurity are the norm rather than the exception. We may have to radically
transform the way we work, just as the banking, insurance, telecommu-
nications industries have. This research suggests that it is of fundamental
importance that HEIs manage this change process using techniques which
reflect the complex nature of Higher Education Institutions: techniques which
reduce organisational job insecurity and bond the organisation together as a
community.

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