G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973 Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr.
y: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT
ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,
PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION
PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and
RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING
MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of
the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano
de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and
Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first
shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and
third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their
proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin
M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of
facts of the parties — parties —
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected
mass demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00
PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to
4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about
11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the
department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2)
Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio
Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said
projected mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO
thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel,
confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or
rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do
with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel
manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of
the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S.
de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the
first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by
the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of
the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning
(March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of
the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was
convoked Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel
was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu
and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969,
Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while
all workers may join the Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the
first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the
demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in
the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA,
particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All those who
will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon
reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable
being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel countered
that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram
to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents
of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY
SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.'
(Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded
with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that
the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be
utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969,
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4,
1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other
employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of
Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of
Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by
the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B",
pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated
April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting
Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did
not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company
prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech
against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed
against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the
parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969,
found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein
petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion
Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and
Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair
labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their
status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56,
rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the
aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969,
because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for
reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that
it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days
within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of
the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63,
rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on
September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September
15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22,
1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for
reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two
(2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs.
Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-
day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed
before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written
arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for
reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the
motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it
was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex
"J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196
(pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was
released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties
(pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as
amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for
reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its
decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of
the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a
petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that
their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to
excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the
petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto
the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-
2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order
dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with
the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which
underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and
worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal
article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts
and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality
and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the
passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill
of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights
to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted
to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."4 Laski proclaimed
that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the
criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its
power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to
petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign
people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas
that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates
insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to
benefit the majority who refuse to listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently
stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one
are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only
civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life,
to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public
officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the
appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as
well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers
and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized.8 Because these freedoms
are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as
the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights
are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government
and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political,
economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such
priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the
fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed
by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which
restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or
valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil
which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main
opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by
the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr.
Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas,
Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the
freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and
women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies
on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the
improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. —
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their
"concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein
petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the
collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles
governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The
demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was
against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer,
herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely
an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of
assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before
appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police
officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political
rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm
to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of
local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to
rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that
they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its
productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even
offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing
peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by
the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its
workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the
position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been
all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further
indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right
of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom,
the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting
for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights.
The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by
reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2
o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the
difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its
management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality —
abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace
officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the
employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter
that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their
families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-
can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the
scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish
for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression,
of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over
property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet
as a coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth
of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened
civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any
meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods
that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against
police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and
therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the
employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect
imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The
strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated
working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration
against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny
over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender
ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could
not have been legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be
trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of
Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration
was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial
dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary
stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to
participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that
only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work
in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed
appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a
labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as
their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the
maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately
action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with
jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation
is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are
reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised
by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more
persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence
of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of
disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued
alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two
days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could
have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might
sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in
this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift
employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request
the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the
morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43,
rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part
of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for
the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as
a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police,
not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because
the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and
workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and
the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service
constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-
1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the
employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or
protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their
rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the
workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid
and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was
interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such
common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police
indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the
workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass
demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent
means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at
least equal protection as the concerted action of employees in giving
publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality,
nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of
ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank
case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of
Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of
their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order
of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while
expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of
the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that
"any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that
workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous
leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for
work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because
such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of
dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass
demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the
local police, were more important to them because they had the courage to
proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most
that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their
absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means
much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they
were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration
would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management
was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right
of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to
demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted
on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such
abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having
jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be
referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and
action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found
that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not
make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss
or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits
for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties
were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day
of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the
customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its
own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to absence of its
workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable
amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water
and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply
compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by
reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the
employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for
proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from
work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which
guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV
of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...".
Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under
obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional
guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional
safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter."
Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined
to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by
encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-
organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion
of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in
the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very
governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and
failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d'etre — as
ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right
divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null
and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at
the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas
corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus,
habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is
convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his
constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right
to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due
process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served sentence for
twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched
upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord
preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the
aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police.
Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of
Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it
issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such
freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well
as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which
must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court
Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when
even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment
of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms.
The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the
printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing
immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient
whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced,
inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of
Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for
appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a
contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses
because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his
interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial
resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for
reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days from
notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed
within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for
reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were
promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative
delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven
(7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September
15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it
on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2)
days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly
and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court
of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to
a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer
should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy
to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human
rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic
tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any
statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural
reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right
over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity
should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in
this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional
rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial
Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative
delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by
the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved
workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a
period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re
hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule
56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was
not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of
Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated
September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to be
reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced
during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days
within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the
Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.);
although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on
October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period
required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing
of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on
October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the
motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the
reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is
filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed
beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of
Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of29-
a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these cases, the
constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not
involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses
presently available must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer;
so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is
deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time,
even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the
constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis
mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete
determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural
rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional
right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial
Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional
rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair
labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no
less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a
Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-
a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to
"suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his
concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle
and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations
without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with
the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided
that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially
impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-
versa. In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the records
before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the
error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and
there render the appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this
doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to
strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of
its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any
error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a
flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on
whether or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of
Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court
would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said
decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere
mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to
avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for the sole
purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis
supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations
rule in this particular case at bar would an unreasoning adherence to
"Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose
basic human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according
supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm which has been
given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no
actual material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its
property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the
Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial
Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with
resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It
should be stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of the
Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it
subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light
of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial
Relations rules with reference to the case at is also authorized by Section 20
of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court
of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by
Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan,
etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the
motion for new trial is not "newly discovered," as such term is understood
in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion
is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt
its, rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain
to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation
and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any
duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged from the
rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not
even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue
such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future
disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila
Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We
believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent
court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners
constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical
meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil.
315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic
rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can
ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of
human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because
their counsel — erroneously believing that he received a copy of the
decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his
motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only
one day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they
ceased to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules
have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr.
Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-
f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16
Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register
of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of
Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2
SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its
proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that
norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco
v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the
interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice the ends justice."
While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities" view them in their
entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance with
which courts have organized and function, but as means conducive to the
realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We
have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice
Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of
sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of
justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As
succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities
of the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v.
Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27,
1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of
Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure substantial justice."
(Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to
be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the employment of the
petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence
from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a
sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees
who are members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the
intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not
officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13)
officers were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice
charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief;
Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm
insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the
demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers
were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20,
respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and
regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a
consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain
any damage.
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have
been simply to charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick
leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most
cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages
for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside
from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time
strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who
consciously seek to destroy our system of Government, but from men of
goodwill — good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the
fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must
remember, however, is thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on
motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress
or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal
is a constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of
liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the
demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle
over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are
protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel
secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we
must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less
fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a
complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who
claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was
more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist
its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged
petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such
opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company
assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and
implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs.
C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for
having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank
president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism
in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the
promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents.
Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote
the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that
includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court.
For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a
small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a
concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary
that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents
to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it
calls the respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge.
To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited
(Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of
the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of
Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The
Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely
against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of
self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's
conduct, identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-
organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain
collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and
intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis
supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor
unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed
the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition
and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are
rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar,
where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its
officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and

(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full
back pay from the date of their separation from the service until re instated,
minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from
other sources during their separation from the service.

With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.

G.R. No. 87698 September 24, 1991
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and OSCAR IRINEO, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
This case treats of an employee of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), who was
dismissed from his work on August 23, 1967 on the basis of the findings
and recommendations of a Fact Finding Panel, submitted on August 11,
1967 after an investigation commenced in July, 1967 in coordination with a
well known accounting firm.1 The Fact Finding Panel recommended the
criminal prosecution of the employee, Oscar Irineo, together with four
others, namely: Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco, Jacinto Macatol and
Jesus Saba, on account of complicity in irregular refunds of international
plane tickets.2
On the basis of the panel's report, and the testimony of witnesses taken in
the course of the investigation, criminal proceedings were also initiated
against four of the PAL employees above named, namely: Oscar Irineo,
Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco, and Jacinto Macatol. They were
prosecuted for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, under an information filed by the Provincial
Fiscal on September 25, 1968.3 The case resulted in the conviction after due
trial of all the accused on March 1, 1976; this, despite the fiscal's having
earlier moved for the dismissal of the charges as against Irineo and
Macatol.4
All four (4) defendants filed motions for reconsideration and/or new trial.
All the motions were denied except Macatol's. After due hearing on said
motions, the Trial Court rendered an amended decision dated September 23,
1977 absolving Macatol of any liability for the offense charged, "for lack of
sufficient evidence." The other three appealed.5
On July 6, 1978 — about twelve (12) years after his dismissal from
employment — Macatol filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL
in the Department of Labor. His complaint was however dismissed by the
Labor Arbiter on the ground that his right of action had prescribed. That
dismissal was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission in a
decision promulgated on May 30, 1980. The Commission ruled that "the
running of the prescriptive period ... commenced on the date ... (Macatol's)
cause of action accrued;" that such cause of action did not accrue "upon the
termination of the criminal case," but upon "his dismissal, the legality or
illegality of which could be determined soon after it was effected ... (and a)
suit to contest its legality could proceed independently of any criminal
proceedings;" that "if no criminal case was instituted, following the logic of
the complainant's argument, the cause of action would not and could not
have accrued at all; ... (and) the institution of the criminal action did not bar
the complainant from filing a complaint for illegal dismissal." 6
On the other hand, the appeal taken by Oscar Irineo, Rogelio Damian,
Antonio Rabasco, resulted in a decision promulgated on September 23,
1983 by the Intermediate Appellate Court,7 affirming the judgment of
conviction only as regards Rogelio Damian, but acquitting Irineo and
Rabasco "on grounds of reasonable doubt." 8
On May 10, 1984, seventeen (17) years after the termination of his
employment on August 23, 1967, Irineo filed a complaint against PAL for
reinstatement and back wages on the claim that that termination was illegal.
It is the action thus instituted that has given rise to the proceedings now
before this Court.
Irineo's action eventuated in a decision of the Labor Arbiter dated
November 12, 1985,9 decreeing his reinstatement to his position in 1967
without loss of seniority rights and the payment to him of back wages "from
August 13, 1967 up to his actual reinstatement," as well as moral damages
in the amount of P300,000.00.
The Arbiter overruled the defense of prescription asserted by PAL, among
others. The Arbiter held that since there was a PAL circular dated June 15,
1966 to the effect that "(a)n employee charged with any crime inimical to
the company's interest shall be placed under preventive suspension until the
final adjudication of his case," and there was, too, a standing order by the
Court of Industrial Relations at that time forbidding the dismissal of any
employee by PAL without court authority, the termination by PAL of
Irineo's employment on August 23, 1967 merely "amounted to a suspension
per (said) PAL IRD Circular No. 66-11." According to the Arbiter, said IRD
Circular No. 66-11 was not raised in issue in the earlier case instituted by
Macatol, supra,10 and this serves to distinguish Macatol's case from Irineo's,
precluding reaching a conclusion in the latter similar to that in the former
(i.e., that the claim was barred by prescription). The Arbiter held, in fine,
that in view of said Circular No. 66-11, PAL's termination of Irineo's
employment should be deemed only as an act by which "Irineo was placed
under preventive suspension until his (criminal) case was finally
adjudicated, for after all, the arbitration branch of the Commission should
put meaning to the law between the parties and unless such law between the
parties are (sic) implemented the same would become useless." The Arbiter
concluded with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing PAL to terminate the
suspension of Irineo which it imposed on August 23, 1967 and to reinstate
him to his position without loss of seniority rights and with backwages from
August 13, 1967 up to his actual reinstatement.
Lastly, moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00 is (sic)
awarded to complainant.
PAL appealed to the NLRC but failed to obtain reversal of the Arbiter's
judgment. In a Resolution promulgated on February 28, 1989, the Third
Division of the NLRC upheld all the Arbiter's conclusions.11 The NLRC
agreed with the Arbiter that "applying the mandate of IRD Circular No. 66-
11 which respondent PAL itself solely promulgated," Irineo was never
dismissed from employment but "was merely under preventive suspension;"
and that PAL's termination of Irineo's work was violative of the "Injunction
Order dated September 3, 1963 in CIR Case No. 43-IPA" (forbidding,
during the pendency of said case, the dismissal of any employee by PAL
without court authority), even though that order "lost its efficacy when the
parties concerned entered into a valid Certified Bargaining Agreement" (on
December 7, 1965, according to petitioner PAL12 ). It also affirmed the
award of moral damages.
PAL is now before this Court, praying for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari to nullify and set aside the NLRC Resolution of February 28,
1989 as constituting "a plain case of patent abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of the same — an exemplary example of
power arbitrarily exercised without due regard to the rule of law." The
Court issued a temporary restraining order on April 26, 1989 prohibiting
enforcement or implementation of the challenged resolution. 13
Required to comment in public respondent's behalf, the Office of the
Solicitor General begged to be excused, declaring that "(a)fter an exhaustive
and judicious scrutiny of the records of the case, as well as the applicable
law and jurisprudence on the issues involved, ... (it could not), without
violating the law, espouse the position taken by the respondent ... (NLRC)
..." Comments were filed by private respondent14 and the Senior Research
Attorney of the NLRC in the latter's behalf,15 which the Court resolved to
treat as their answers to PAL's petition.
In light of the material facts above set out, it is not indeed possible, as the
Solicitor General holds, to defend the decision of the respondent
Commission or that of the Labor Arbiter.
That there should be care and solicitude in the protection and vindication of
the rights of workingmen cannot be gainsaid; but that care and solicitude
can not justify disregard of relevant facts or eschewal of rationality in the
construction of the text of applicable rules in order to arrive at a disposition
in favor of an employee who is perceived as otherwise deserving of
sympathy and commiseration.
The letter to Oscar Irineo of then PAL President Benigno P. Toda, Jr. dated
August 23, 1967, based evidently on the investigation and report of the fact
finding panel, leaves no doubt that Irineo's employment was being ended;
the language is plain and categorical. It reads pertinently as follows:16
To: Oscar Ireneo
Comptroller's Department
For being involved in the irregular refund of tickets in the
international service to the damage and prejudice of the
company, you are dismissed from the service effective immediately.
 The acts committed being criminal, resulting in the swindling of belief in the soundness of the theory. His claim must thus be rejected as
the company, the Legal Department is directed to file immediately time-barred, as being unpardonably tardy.
the corresponding criminal cases against you.
Premises considered, it appears clear to the Court that the respondent
To say, as both the Arbiter and the respondent Commission do, that that Commission's conclusions are flawed by errors so serious as to constitute
declaration, "you are dismissed from the service effective immediately," grave abuse of discretion and should on this account be struck down.
should be construed merely as a suspension, not a dismissal, from
employment, is illogical if not downright ludicrous. They attempt to justify WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and issues the writ of
this conclusion by adverting to a PAL circular dated June 15, 1966 to the certiorari prayed for, NULLIFYING AND SETTING ASIDE the
effect that "(a)n employee charged with any crime inimical to the company's respondent Commission's Resolutions promulgated on February 28, 1989
interest shall be placed under preventive suspension until the final and on March 20, 1989, MAKING PERMANENT the temporary
adjudication of his case," and construe this as a complete foreclosure or restraining order issued by this Court on April 26, 1989, and DISMISSING
prohibition of any alternative or concurrent action on PAL's part, such as private respondent's complaint. No costs.
the imposition of administrative sanctions or penalties; in other words, any
disciplinary action against an erring employee was absolutely dependent on
SO ORDERED.
the outcome of the criminal action against the latter, no disciplinary
measure of any nature being permissible against the employee "until the
final adjudication" of his criminal case. It is a construction that has nothing
to support it, is contrary to common sense, and one certainly not justified by
the recorded facts.

The attempt to sustain the strained theory of dismissal-qua-suspension by

referring to a standing order by the Court of Industrial Relations at that time
forbidding the dismissal of any employee by PAL without court authority, is
equally indefensible. That prohibition was imposed only in relation to a
labor dispute then pending before the Court of Industrial Relations. That
dispute however ended when the parties entered into a collective bargaining
agreement two (2) years or so before Irineo was fired on August 23, 1967.
In other words, when Irineo's employment was terminated, the CIR
injunction adverted was already functions officio and could no longer have
any relevance to that event.

There is moreover, nothing in the record to excuse respondent Irineo's

omission to impugn his termination of employment by PAL — in line with
the respondent commission's theory, i.e., that under existing PAL rules and
the CIR injunction, he could only be placed under preventive suspension
and therefore his dismissal was illegal. His assertion thereof after seventeen
(17) years from his discharge from employment can only mean that he slept
on his rights or that his counsel did not share the respondent Commission's
G.R. No. 151379 January 14, 2005
UNIVERSITY of IMMACULATE, CONCEPCION, INC., petitioner,
vs. The HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE UIC
TEACHING and NON-TEACHING PERSONNEL AND
EMPLOYEES UNION, LELIAN CONCON, MARY ANN DE
RAMOS, JOVITA MAMBURAM, ANGELINA ABADILLA,
MELANIE DE LA ROSA, ZENAIDA CANOY, ALMA
VILLACARLOS, JOSIE BOSTON, PAULINA PALMA GIL,
GEMMA GALOPE, LEAH CRUZA, DELFA DIAPUEZ, respondent.
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals and the
resolution denying reconsideration thereof. The principal issue to be
resolved in this recourse is whether or not the Secretary of Labor, after
assuming jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving an employer and the
certified bargaining agent of a group of employees in the workplace, may
legally order said employer to reinstate employees terminated by the
employer even if those terminated employees are not part of the bargaining
unit.
This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations between
petitioner University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. (UNIVERSITY) and
respondent The UIC Teaching and Non-Teaching Personnel and Employees
Union (UNION). The UNION, as the certified bargaining agent of all rank
and file employees of the UNIVERSITY, submitted its collective
bargaining proposals to the latter on February 16, 1994. However, one item
was left unresolved and this was the inclusion or exclusion of the following
positions in the scope of the bargaining unit:
a. Secretaries
b. Registrars
c. Accounting Personnel
d. Guidance Counselors 1
This matter was submitted for voluntary arbitration. On November 8, 1994,
the panel of voluntary arbitrators rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Panel hereby resolves to exclude
the above-mentioned secretaries, registrars, chief of the accounting
department, cashiers and guidance counselors from the coverage of the
bargaining unit. The accounting clerks and the accounting staff member are
hereby ordered included in the bargaining unit.2
The UNION moved for the reconsideration of the above decision. Pending,
however, the resolution of its motion, on December 9, 1994, it filed a notice
of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of
Davao City, on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor
practice. During the thirty (30) day cooling-off period, two union members
were dismissed by petitioner. Consequently, the UNION went on strike on
January 20, 1995.
On January 23, 1995, the then Secretary of Labor, Ma. Nieves R. Confessor,
issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute. The
dispositive portion of the said Order states:
WHEREFORE, ABOVE PREMISES CONSIDERED, and pursuant to
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, this Office hereby assumes
jurisdiction over the entire labor dispute at the University of the Immaculate
Concepcion College.
Accordingly, all workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four
(24) hours upon receipt of this Order and for Management to accept them
back under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike.
Parties are further directed to cease and desist from committing any or all
acts that might exacerbate the situation.
Finally, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective position
papers within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.3
On February 8, 1995, the panel of voluntary arbitrators denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by the UNION. The UNIVERSITY then furnished
copies of the panel’s denial of the motion for reconsideration and the
Decision dated November 8, 1995 to the individual respondents herein:
1. Lelian Concon – Grade School Guidance Counselor
2. Mary Ann de Ramos – High School Guidance Counselor
3. Jovita Mamburam – Secretary to [the] Vice President for
Academic Affairs/ Dean of College
4. Angelina Abadilla – Secretary to [the] Vice President for
Academic Affairs/ Dean of College
5. Melanie de la Rosa – Secretary to [the] Dean of [the] College of
Pharmacy/ Academic Affairs/ Dean of College
6. Zenaida Canoy – Secretary to [the] Vice President for Academic
Affairs/ Dean of College
7. Alma Villacarlos – Guidance Counselor (College)
8. Josie Boston – Grade School Psychometrician
9. Paulina Palma Gil – Cashier
10. Gemma Galope – High School Registrar
11. Leah Cruza – Guidance Counselor (College)
12. Delfa Diapuez – High School Psychometrician 4
Thereafter, the UNIVERSITY gave the abovementioned individual
respondents two choices: to resign from the UNION and remain employed
as confidential employees or resign from their confidential positions and
remain members of the UNION. The UNIVERSITY relayed to these
employees that they could not remain as confidential employees and at the
same time as members or officers of the Union. However, the individual
respondents remained steadfast in their claim that they could still retain their
confidential positions while being members or officers of the Union. Hence,
on February 21, 1995, the UNIVERSITY sent notices of termination to the
individual respondents.1a\^/phi1.net
On March 10, 1995, the UNION filed another notice of strike, this time
citing as a reason the UNIVERSITY’s termination of the individual
respondents. The UNION alleged that the UNIVERSITY’s act of
terminating the individual respondents is in violation of the Order of the
Secretary of Labor dated January 23, 1995.
On March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor issued another Order reiterating
the directives contained in the January 23, 1995 Order. The Secretary also
stated therein that the effects of the termination from employment of these
individual respondents be suspended pending the determination of the
legality thereof. Hence, the UNIVERSITY was directed to reinstate the
individual respondents under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior
to the labor dispute.
The UNIVERSITY, thereafter, moved to reconsider the aforesaid Order on
March 28, 1995. It argued that the Secretary’s Order directing the
reinstatement of the individual respondents would render nugatory the
decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators to exclude them from the
collective bargaining unit. The UNIVERSITY’s motion was denied by the
Secretary in an Order dated June 16, 1995, wherein the Secretary declared
that the decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators to exclude the
individual respondents from the collective bargaining unit did not authorize
the UNIVERSITY to terminate their employment. The UNIVERSITY filed
a second motion for reconsideration, which was again denied in an Order
dated July 19, 1995. Undeterred, the UNIVERSITY filed a third motion for
reconsideration. In the Order dated August 18, 1995, then Acting Secretary
Jose S. Brilliantes denied the third motion for reconsideration, but modified
the two previous Orders by adding:
xxx
Anent the Union’s Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would
not warrant the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated
employees. Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under payroll
reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. 5
xxx
Still unsatisfied with the Order of the Secretary of Labor, the UNIVERSITY
filed a petition for certiorari with this Court on September 15, 1995.
However, its petition was referred to the Court of Appeals, following the
ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. Court of Appeals . 6
On October 8, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision,
affirming the questioned Orders of the Secretary of Labor. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:
7 Industries, Inc. v. Roldan-Confessor ,13 this Court declared that it recognizes
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The UNIVERSITY then moved for the reconsideration of the
abovementioned Decision,8 but on January 10, 2002, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion on the ground that no new matters were raised therein
that would warrant a reconsideration.9
Hence, this petition.
The UNIVERSITY assigns the following error:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE ORDERS OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR THAT
SUSPENDED THE EFFECTS OF THE TERMINATION OF TWELVE
EMPLOYEES WHO WERE NOT PART OF THE BARGAINING
UNIT INVOLVED IN A LABOR DISPUTE OVER WHICH THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR ASSUMED JURISDICTION.10
The Court of Appeals relied upon the doctrine in St. Scholastica’s College
v. Torres.11 In the case therein, this Court, citing International
Pharmaceuticals Incorporated v. the Secretary of Labor,12 declared that:
x x x [T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, the
authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and
extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases
over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.
The UNIVERSITY contends that the Secretary cannot take cognizance of
an issue involving employees who are not part of the bargaining unit. It
insists that since the individual respondents had already been excluded from
the bargaining unit by a final and executory order by the panel of voluntary
arbitrators, then they cannot be covered by the Secretary’s assumption
order.
This Court finds no merit in the UNIVERSITY’s contention. In Metrolab
the exercise of management prerogatives and it often declines to interfere
with the legitimate business decisions of the employer. This is in keeping
with the general principle embodied in Article XIII, Section 3 of the
Constitution,14 which is further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor
Code.15 However, as expressed in PAL v. National Labor Relations
Commission,16 this privilege is not absolute, but subject to exceptions. One
of these exceptions is when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over
labor disputes involving industries indispensable to the national interest
under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. This provision states:
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest,
the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as
specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken
place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. x x x
When the Secretary of Labor ordered the UNIVERSITY to suspend the
effect of the termination of the individual respondents, the Secretary did not
exceed her jurisdiction, nor did the Secretary gravely abuse the same. It
must be pointed out that one of the substantive evils which Article 263(g) of
the Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the
further detriment of the national interest. In her Order dated March 28,
1995, the Secretary of Labor rightly held:
It is well to remind both parties herein that the main reason or rationale for
the exercise of the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s power under
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, is the maintenance and
upholding of the status quo while the dispute is being adjudicated. Hence,
the directive to the parties to refrain from performing acts that will
exacerbate the situation is intended to ensure that the dispute does not get
out of hand, thereby negating the direct intervention of this
office.l^vvphi1.net
The University’s act of suspending and terminating union members and the
Union’s act of filing another Notice of Strike after this Office has assumed
jurisdiction are certainly in conflict with the status quo ante. By any
standards[,] these acts will not in any way help in the early resolution of the
labor dispute. It is clear that the actions of both parties merely served to
complicate and aggravate the already strained labor-management
relations.17
Indeed, it is clear that the act of the UNIVERSITY of dismissing the
individual respondents from their employment became the impetus for the
UNION to declare a second notice of strike. It is not a question anymore of
whether or not the terminated employees, the individual respondents herein,
are part of the bargaining unit. Any act committed during the pendency of
the dispute that tends to give rise to further contentious issues or increase
the tensions between the parties should be considered an act of exacerbation
and should not be allowed.
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout.l^vvphi1.netThe phrase "under the same terms and conditions"
makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. This is consistent with
the idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can
be detrimental to the national interest.
In ordering payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement, then Acting
Secretary of Labor Jose S. Brillantes said:
Anent the Union’s Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would
not warrant the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated
employees. Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under payroll
reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. 18
As an exception to the rule, payroll reinstatement must rest on special
circumstances that render actual reinstatement impracticable or otherwise
not conducive to attaining the purposes of the law.19
The "superseding circumstances" mentioned by the Acting Secretary of
Labor no doubt refer to the final decision of the panel of arbitrators as to the
confidential nature of the positions of the twelve private respondents,
thereby rendering their actual and physical reinstatement impracticable and
more likely to exacerbate the situation. The payroll reinstatement in lieu of
actual reinstatement ordered in these cases, therefore, appears justified as an
exception to the rule until the validity of their termination is finally
resolved. This Court sees no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Acting Secretary of Labor in ordering the same. Furthermore, the issue has
not been raised by any party in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8,
2001 and its Resolution dated January 10, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61693
are AFFIRMED.

With respect to the Secretary’s Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead

of actual reinstatement for the individual respondents herein, an amendment
to the previous Orders issued by her office, the same is usually not allowed.
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers
must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them
G.R. No. 140518 December 16, 2004
MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES’ UNION, petitioner,
vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and THE MANILA DIAMOND
HOTEL, respondents.
AZCUNA, J.:
This petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals arose out of a
dispute between the Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc. ("Hotel"),
owner of the Manila Diamond Hotel, and the Manila Diamond Hotel
Employees’ Union ("Union"). The facts are as follows:
On November 11, 1996, the Union filed a petition for a certification election
so that it may be declared the exclusive bargaining representative of the
Hotel’s employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. The petition
was dismissed by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on
January 15, 1997. After a few months, however, on August 25, 1997, the
Union sent a letter to the Hotel informing it of its desire to negotiate for a
collective bargaining agreement.1 In a letter dated September 11, 1997, the
Hotel’s Human Resources Department Manager, Mary Anne Mangalindan,
wrote to the Union stating that the Hotel cannot recognize it as the
employees’ bargaining agent since its petition for certification election had
been earlier dismissed by the DOLE.2 On that same day, the Hotel received
a letter from the Union stating that they were not giving the Hotel a notice
to bargain, but that they were merely asking for the Hotel to engage in
collective bargaining negotiations with the Union for its members only and
not for all the rank and file employees of the Hotel. 3
On September 18, 1997, the Union announced that it was taking a strike
vote. A Notice of Strike was thereafter filed on September 29, 1997, with
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for the Hotel’s
alleged "refusal x x x to bargain" and for alleged acts of unfair labor
practice. The NCMB summoned both parties and held a series of dialogues,
the first of which was on October 6, 1997.
On November 29, 1997, however, the Union staged a strike against the
Hotel. Numerous confrontations between the two parties followed, creating
an obvious strain between them. The Hotel claims that the strike was illegal
and it had to dismiss some employees for their participation in the allegedly
illegal concerted activity. The Union, on the other hand, accused the Hotel
of illegally dismissing the workers. What is pertinent to this case, however,
is the Order issued by the then Secretary of Labor and Employment
Cresenciano B. Trajano assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute. A
Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction was filed by the Union on April 2,
1998. Thereafter, the Secretary of Labor and Employment issued an Order
dated April 15, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] this Office CERTIFIES the
labor dispute at the Manila Diamond Hotel to the National Labor
Relations Commission, for compulsory arbitration, pursuant to
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.
Accordingly, the striking officers and members of the Manila
Diamond Hotel Employees Union --- NUWHRAIN are hereby
directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours upon
receipt of this Order and the Hotel to accept them back under the
same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. The
parties are enjoined from committing any act that may exacerbate
the situation.
The Union received the aforesaid Order on April 16, 1998 and its members
reported for work the next day, April 17, 1998. The Hotel, however, refused
to accept the returning workers and instead filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Secretary’s Order.
On April 30, 1998, then Acting Secretary of Labor Jose M. Español, issued
the disputed Order, which modified the earlier one issued by Secretary
Trajano. Instead of an actual return to work, Acting Secretary Español
directed that the strikers be reinstated only in the payroll.4 The Union moved
for the reconsideration of this Order, but its motion was denied on June 25,
1998. Hence, it filed before this Court on August 26, 1998, a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Secretary of Labor for modifying its earlier
order and requiring instead the reinstatement of the employees in the
payroll. However, in a resolution dated July 12, 1999, this Court referred
the case to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to the principle embodied
in National Federation of Labor v. Laguesma.5
On October 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing
the Union’s petition and affirming the Secretary of Labor’s Order for
payroll reinstatement. The Court of Appeals held that the challenged order
is merely an error of judgment and not a grave abuse of discretion and that
payroll reinstatement is not prohibited by law, but may be "called for" under
certain circumstances.6
Hence, the Union now stands before this Court maintaining that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SECRETARY OF LABOR’S
UNAUTHORIZED ORDER OF MERE "PAYROLL
REINSTATEMENT" IS NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION7
The petition has merit.
The Court of Appeals based its decision on this Court’s ruling in University
of Santo Tomas (UST) v. NLRC.8 There, the Secretary assumed jurisdiction
over the labor dispute between striking teachers and the university. He
ordered the striking teachers to return to work and the university to accept
them under the same terms and conditions. However, in a subsequent order,
the NLRC provided payroll reinstatement for the striking teachers as an
alternative remedy to actual reinstatement. True, this Court held therein that
the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in providing for the
alternative remedy of payroll reinstatement. This Court found that it was
merely an error of judgment, which is not correctible by a special civil
action for certiorari. The NLRC was only trying its best to work out a
satisfactory ad hoc solution to a festering and serious problem.
However, this Court notes that the UST ruling was made in the light of one
very important fact: the teachers could not be given back their academic
assignments since the order of the Secretary for them to return to work was
given in the middle of the first semester of the academic year. The NLRC
was, therefore, faced with a situation where the striking teachers were
entitled to a return to work order, but the university could not immediately
reinstate them since it would be impracticable and detrimental to the
students to change teachers at that point in time.
In the present case, there is no showing that the facts called for payroll
reinstatement as an alternative remedy. A strained relationship between the
striking employees and management is no reason for payroll reinstatement
in lieu of actual reinstatement. Petitioner correctly points out that labor
disputes naturally involve strained relations between labor and management,
and that in most strikes, the relations between the strikers and the non-
strikers will similarly be tense.9 Bitter labor disputes always leave an
aftermath of strong emotions and unpleasant situations. Nevertheless, the
government must still perform its function and apply the law, especially if,
as in this case, national interest is involved.
After making the distinction between UST and the present case, this Court
now addresses the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the Secretary did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in ordering
payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement. This question is
answered by the nature of Article 263(g). As a general rule, the State
encourages an environment wherein employers and employees themselves
must deal with their problems in a manner that mutually suits them best.
This is the basic policy embodied in Article XIII, Section 3 of the
Constitution,10 which was further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor
Code.11 Hence, a voluntary, instead of compulsory, mode of dispute
settlement is the general rule.
However, Article 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, which allows the
Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving an
industry indispensable to the national interest, provides an exception:
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to
the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the
same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such
assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified
in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken
place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or
 locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the
employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout. x x x
This provision is viewed as an exercise of the police power of the State. A
prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy and,
therefore, the situation is imbued with public necessity and involves the
right of the State and the public to self-protection.12
on the asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective, the same will not
be maintained if the intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated.13
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated October 19, 1999 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Order dated April 30, 1998 issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment modifying the earlier Order dated April 15, 1998, is likewise
SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

Under Article 263(g), all workers must immediately return to work and all
employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. This Court must point out that the
law uses the precise phrase of "under the same terms and conditions,"
revealing that it contemplates only actual reinstatement. This is in keeping
with the rationale that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular
industry can be inimical to the national economy. It is clear that Article
263(g) was not written to protect labor from the excesses of management,
nor was it written to ease management from expenses, which it normally
incurs during a work stoppage or slowdown. It was an error on the part of
the Court of Appeals to view the assumption order of the Secretary as a
measure to protect the striking workers from any retaliatory action from the
Hotel. This Court reiterates that this law was written as a means to be used
by the State to protect itself from an emergency or crisis. It is not for labor,
nor is it for management.

It is, therefore, evident from the foregoing that the Secretary’s subsequent
order for mere payroll reinstatement constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Indeed, this Court has always
recognized the "great breadth of discretion" by the Secretary once he
assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute. However, payroll reinstatement in
lieu of actual reinstatement is a departure from the rule in these cases and
there must be showing of special circumstances rendering actual
reinstatement impracticable, as in the UST case aforementioned, or
otherwise not conducive to attaining the purpose of the law in providing for
assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in a
labor dispute that affects the national interest. None appears to have been
established in this case. Even in the exercise of his discretion under Article
236(g), the Secretary must always keep in mind the purpose of the law.
Time and again, this Court has held that when an official by-passes the law
G.R. No. L-49046 January 26, 1988
SATURNO A. VICTORIA, petitioner, vs. HON. AMADO G.
INCIONG, DEPUTY MINISTER, and FAR EAST BROADCASTING
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
Petition for review of the Order of the then Acting Secretary of Labor
Amado G. Inciong dated June 6, 1978, in NLRC Case No. RB-1764-75,
reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated
November 17, 1976 and holding that, under the law and facts of the case,
there was no necessity for private respondent to obtain a clearance for the
termination of petitioner's employment under Article 257 [b] of the Labor
Code, as amended, and that a mere report of such termination was
sufficient, under Section 11 [f]. Rule XIV of the Rules and Regulations
implementing said Code.
Petitioner Saturno Victoria was employed on March 17, 1956 by private
respondent Far East Broadcasting Company, Incorporated as a radio
transmitter operator. Sometime in July 1971, he and his co-workers
organized the Far East Broadcasting Company Employees Association.
After registering their association with the then Department of Labor, they
demanded recognition of said association by the company but the latter
refused on the ground that being a non-profit, non-stock, non-commercial
and religious corporation, it is not covered by Republic Act 875, otherwise
known as the Industrial Peace Act, the labor law enforced at that time.
Several conciliation meetings were held at the Department of Labor and in
those meetings, the Director of Labor Relations Edmundo Cabal advised the
union members that the company could not be forced to recognize them or
to bargain collectively with them because it is a non-profit, non-commercial
and religious organization. Notwithstanding such advice, the union
members led by Saturno Victoria as its president, declared a strike and
picketed the company's premises on September 6, 1972 for the purpose of
seeking recognition of the labor union.
As a countermeasure, the company filed a case for damages with
preliminary injunction against the strikers before the then Court of First
Instance of Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 750-V. Said court issued an
injunction enjoining the three-day-old strike staged against the company.
The complaint was later amended seeking to declare the strike illegal.
Upon the declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972 and the
promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 21 creating the National Labor
Relations Commission, the ad hoc National Labor Relations Commission
took cognizance of the strike through NLRC Case No. 0021 entitled "Far
East Broadcasting Company Employees Association, complainant versus
Far East Broadcasting Company, respondent" and NLRC Case No. 0285
entitled "Generoso Serino, complainant, versus Far East Broadcasting
Company, respondent", both cases for reinstatement due to the company's
return to accept the union's offer to return to work during the pendency of
the case in the Court of First Instance.
On December 28, 1972, Arbitrator Flavio Aguas rendered a joint decision in
the two cases mentioned above recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, the dispositive portion reading as follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, and in the interest of justice and equity, it is hereby
directed that:
1. That striking members of the Far East Broadcasting Company Employees
Association return to their respective positions in the corporation;
2. The respondent Far East Broadcasting Company Incorporated to accept
back the returning strikers without loss in rank seniority or status;
3. The workers shall return to work within [10] days from receipt of this
resolution otherwise they shall be deemed to have forfeited such right;
4. The respondent shall report compliance with this decision within fifteen
[15] days from receipt hereof.
This Order shall, however, be without prejudice to whatever decision the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan may promulgate in Civil Case No. 750-V
and to the requirements the existing order may need of people working with
the mass media of communications.
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 1
The decision of the arbitrator was successively appealed to the ad
hoc National Labor Relations Commission, the Secretary of Labor and the
Office of the President of the Philippines, and was affirmed in all instances.
On April 23, 1975, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan rendered
judgment, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Making injunction against defendants permanent;
2. Declaring that this Court has jurisdiction to try and hear the instant case
despite Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 2;
3. Declaring that plaintiff Far East Broadcasting Company is a non-profit
organization since it does not declare dividends;
4. Declaring that the strike admitted by the defendants to have been declared
by them is illegal inasmuch as it was for the purpose of compelling the
plaintiff-company to recognize their labor union which could not be legally
done because the plaintiffs were not covered by Republic Act 875;
5. Declaring that the evidence presented is insufficient to show that
defendants caused the damage to the plaintiff consequent on the destruction
of its relays and its antennas as well as its transmission lines.
SO ORDERED. 2
On April 24, 1975, by virtue of the above decision, the company notified
Saturno Victoria that he is dismissed effective April 26, 1975. Thereupon,
he filed Case No. RB-IV-1764 before the National Labor Relations
Commission, Regional Branch IV against the company alleging violation of
article 267 of the Labor Code which requires clearance from the Secretary
of Labor for every shutdown of business establishments or dismissal of
employees. On February 27, 1976, Labor Arbiter Manuel B. Lorenzo
rendered a decision in petitioner's favor declaring the dismissal to be illegal,
thereby ordering reinstatement with fun backwages. On appeal, the arbiter's
decision was aimed by the National Labor Relations Commission. But when
the commission's decision was in turn appealed to the Secretary of Labor, it
was set aside and in lieu thereof the questioned Order dated June 6, 1978
was issued.
In view of its brevity and for a better understanding of the reasons behind it,
We quote the disputed Order in full:
ORDER
This is an appeal by respondent from the Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission, dated November 17, 1976.
The Commission upheld the Decision of the labor arbiter dated February 27,
1976 ordering respondent to reinstate with full backwages herein
complainant Saturno A. Victoria based on the finding that respondent did
not file any application for clearance to terminate the services of
complainant before dismissing him from his employment.
Briefly the facts of this case are as follows:
Complainant Saturno Victoria is the president of the Far East Broadcasting
Company Employees Union. On September 8, 1972, the said union declared
a strike against respondent company. On September 11, 1972, respondent
filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Civil Case No. 750-V, for
the issuance of an injunction and a prayer that the strike be declared illegal.
On October 24, 1972, complainant together with the other strikers filed with
the ad hoc National Labor Relations Commission Case Nos. 0021 and 0285
for reinstatement. The Arbitrator rendered a decision in said case on
December 28, 1972, wherein he ordered respondent to reinstate
complainants subject to the following condition:
"This Order shall, however, be without prejudice to whatever decision the
Court of First Instance may promulgate on Civil Case No. 750-V and to the
requirements the existing order may need of people working with the mass
media of communications."
Since said decision was affirmed by the NLRC, the Secretary of Labor, and
the Office of the President of the Philippines, complainants were reinstated
pursuant thereto.
In a Decision dated April 23, 1975, in Civil Case No. 750-V, promulgated
by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the strike staged by herein
complainant and the other strikers was declared illegal. Based on said
Decision, respondent dismissed complainant from his employment. Hence,
complainant filed the instant complaint for illegal dismissal.
Under the aforecited facts, we do not agree with the ruling of the
Commission now subject of this appeal that an application for clearance to
terminate herein complainant is mandatory on the part of respondent before
terminating complainant's services. We believe that what would have been
necessary was a report as provided for under Section 11 [f] Rule XIV, Book
V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. Moreover,
even if an application for clearance was flied, this Office would have treated
the same as a report. Otherwise, it would render nugatory the Decision of
the Arbitrator dated December 28, 1972 in Case Nos. 0021 and 0285 which
was affirmed by the Commission, the Secretary of Labor and the Office of
the President of the Philippines, ordering his temporary reinstatement,
subject to whatever Decision the CFI of Bulacan may promulgate in Civil
Case No. 750-V. It could be clearly inferred from said CFI Decision that if
the strike is declared illegal, the strikers will be considered to have lost their
employment status under the then existing laws and jurisprudence,
otherwise strikers could stage illegal strike with impunity. Since the strike
was declared illegal, respondent acted in good faith when it dispensed with
the services of herein complainant.
For failure of respondent to file the necessary report and based on equitable
considerations, complainant should be granted separation pay equivalent to
one-half month salary for every year of service.
WHEREFORE, let the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated November 17, 1976 be, as it is hereby, set aside and a
new judgment is entered, ordering respondent to give complainant
separation pay equivalent to one-half month salary for every year of service.
SO ORDERED. 3
Petitioner elevates to Us for review on certiorari the aforequoted Order
seeking to persuade this Court that then Acting Secretary of Labor Amado
G. Inciong committed reversible error in holding that, under the law and
facts of this case, a mere report of the termination of the services of said
petitioner was sufficient. Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I
WHETHER OR NOT A CLEARANCE FROM THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR IS STILL NECESSARY BEFORE THE PETITIONER HEREIN
COULD BE DISMISSED CONSIDERING THE RESTRICTIVE
CONDITION IN THE DECISION OF THE COMPULSORY
ARBITRATOR IN NLRC CASE NOS. 0021 AND 0285.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BULACAN IN CIVIL CASE NO. 750-V IPSO FACTO
GAVE THE RESPONDENT COMPANY AUTHORITY TO DISMISS
HEREIN PETITIONER WITHOUT ANY CLEARANCE FROM THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR. 4
The substantive law on the matter enforced during the time of petitioner's
dismissal was Article 267 [b] of the Labor Code [in conjunction with the
rules and regulations implementing said substantive law.] Article 267 reads:
No employer that has no collective bargaining agreement may shut down
his establishment or dismiss or terminate the service of regular employees
with at least one [1] year of service except managerial employees as defined
in this book without previous written clearance from the Secretary of Labor.
Petitioner maintains that the abovecited provision is very clear. It does not
make any distinction as to the ground for dismissal. Whether or not the
dismissal sought by the employer company is for cause, it is imperative that
the company must apply for a clearance from the Secretary of Labor.
In a recent case 5 penned by Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento promulgated on
June 30, 1987, we had occasion to rule in agreement with the findings of
then Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs Ronaldo Zamora that the
purpose in requiring a prior clearance from the Secretary of Labor in cases
of shutdown or dismissal of employees, is to afford the Secretary ample
opportunity to examine and determine the reasonableness of the request.
The Solicitor General, in relation to said pronouncement and in justification
of the Acting Labor Secretary's decision makes the following observations:
It is true that article 267 [b] of the Labor Code requires that before any
business establishment is shut down or any employee is dismissed, written
clearance from the Secretary of Labor must first be obtained. It is likewise
true that in the case of petitioner, there was no written clearance in the usual
form. But while there may not have been strict compliance with Article 267
there was substantial compliance. The Secretary of Labor twice manifested
his conformity to petitioner's dismissal.
The first manifestation of acquiescence by the Secretary of Labor to the
dismissal of petitioner was his affirmance of the decision of the arbitrator in
NLRC Case Nos. 0021 and 0285. The arbitrator ordered the reinstatement
of the strikers but subject to the decision of the CFI of Bulacan in Civil
Case No. 750-V. The Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the
arbitrator. In effect, therefore, the Secretary of Labor issued a carte
blanche to the CFI of Bulacan to either dismiss or retain petitioner.
The second manifestation was his decision in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-1764-
65 wherein he said that clearance for the dismissal of petitioner was not
required, but only a report; that even if an application for clearance was
filed, he would have treated it as a mere report. While this is
not prior clearance in the contemplation of Article 267, it is at least
a ratification of the dismissal of petitioner. 6
We agree with the Solicitor General. Technically speaking, no clearance
was obtained by private respondent from the then Secretary of Labor, the
last step towards full compliance with the requirements of law on the matter
of dismissal of employees. However, the rationale behind the clearance
requirement was fully met. The Secretary of Labor was apprised of private
respondent's intention to terminate the services of petitioner. This in effect
is an application for clearance to dismiss petitioner from employment. The
affirmance of the restrictive condition in the dispositive portion of the labor
arbiter's decision in NLRC Case Nos. 0021 and 0285 by the Secretary of
Labor and the Office of the President of the Philippines, signifies a grant of
authority to dismiss petitioner in case the strike is declared illegal by the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Consequently and as correctly stated by
the Solicitor General, private respondent acted in good faith when it
terminated the employment of petitioner upon a declaration of illegality of
the strike by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Moreover, the then
Secretary of Labor manifested his conformity to the dismissal, not once, but
twice. In this regard, the mandatory rule on clearance need not be applied.
The strike staged by the union in 1972 was a futile move. The law then
enforced, Republic Act 875 specifically excluded respondent company from
its coverage. Even if the parties had gone to court to compel recognition, no
positive relief could have been obtained since the same was not sanctioned
by law. Because of this, there was no necessity on the part of private
respondent to show specific acts of petitioner during the strike to justify his
dismissal.
This is a matter of responsibility and of answerability. Petitioner as a union
leader, must see to it that the policies and activities of the union in the
conduct of labor relations are within the precepts of law and any deviation
from the legal boundaries shall be imputable to the leader. He bears the
responsibility of guiding the union along the path of law and to cause the
union to demand what is not legally demandable, would foment anarchy
which is a prelude to chaos.
Petitioner should have known and it was his duty to impart this imputed
knowledge to the members of the union that employees and laborers in non-
profit organizations are not covered by the provisions of the Industrial Peace
Act and the Court of Industrial Relations [in the case at bar, the Court of
First Instance] has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions of labor unions or
organizations of said non-profit organizations for certification as the
exclusive bargaining representatives of said employees and laborers. 7
As a strike is an economic weapon at war with the policy of the Constitution
and the law at that time, a resort thereto by laborers shall be deemed to be a
choice of remedy peculiarly their own and outside of the statute, and as
such, the strikers must accept all the risks attendant upon their choice. If
they succeed and the employer succumbs, the law will not stand in their
way in the enjoyment of the lawful fruits of their victory. But if they fail,
they cannot thereafter invoke the protection of the law for the consequences
of their conduct unless the right they wished vindicated is one which the
law will, by all means, protect and enforce. 8

We further agree with the Acting Secretary of Labor that what was required
in the case of petitioner's dismissal was only a report as provided under
Section 11 [f] of Rule XIV of the Rules and Regulations implementing the
Labor Code which provides:

Every employer shall submit a report to the Regional Office in accordance

with the form presented by the Department on the following instances of
termination of employment, suspension, lay-off or shutdown which may be
effected by the employer without prior clearance within five [5] days
thereafter:

xxx xxx xxx

[f] All other terminations of employment, suspension, lay-offs or

shutdowns, not otherwise specified in this and in the immediately preceding
sections.

To hold otherwise would render nugatory the conditions set forth in the
decision of Labor Arbiter Aguas on the basis of which petitioner was
temporarily reinstated.

Inasmuch as there was a valid and reasonable ground to dismiss petitioner

but no report as required by the implementing rules and regulations of the
Labor Code was filed by respondent Company with the then Department of
Labor, petitioner as held by the Acting Secretary of Labor, is entitled to
separation pay equivalent to one-half month salary for every year of service.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The decision of the acting

Secretary of Labor is AFFIRMED in toto.
G.R. No. 181531 July 31, 2009 Arbiter Ma. Simonette Calabocal to decide which among those votes would
be opened and tallied. Eleven (11) votes were initially segregated because
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS they were cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal
AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES- MANILA PAVILION HOTEL was still pending before the Court of Appeals. Six other votes were
CHAPTER, Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND segregated because the employees who cast them were already
EMPLOYMENT, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HOLIDAY occupying supervisory positions at the time of the election. Still five other
INN MANILA PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION AND ACESITE votes were segregated on the ground that they were cast
PHILIPPINES HOTEL CORPORATION, Respondents. by probationary employees and, pursuant to the existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot vote. It bears noting
early on, however, that the vote of one Jose Gatbonton (Gatbonton), a
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
probationary employee, was counted.
National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries –
Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter (NUWHRAIN-MPHC), herein petitioner, By Order of August 22, 2006, Med-Arbiter Calabocal ruled for the opening
seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals November 8, 2007 Decision1 and of 17 out of the 22 segregated votes, specially those cast by the 11
dismissed employees and those cast by the six supposedly supervisory
of the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s January 25, 2008
employees of the Hotel.
Resolution2 in OS-A-9-52-05 which affirmed the Med-Arbiter’s Resolutions
dated January 22, 20073 and March 22, 2007.4
Petitioner, which garnered 151 votes, appealed to the Secretary of Labor
A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among the rank- and Employment (SOLE), arguing that the votes of the probationary
employees should have been opened considering that probationary
and-file employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel (the
employee Gatbonton’s vote was tallied. And petitioner averred that
Hotel) with the following results:
respondent HIMPHLU, which garnered 169 votes, should not be
immediately certified as the bargaining agent, as the opening of the 17
EMPLOYEES IN VOTERS’ LIST = 353 segregated ballots would push the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 +
169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169 votes which HIMPHLU garnered would be
TOTAL VOTES CAST = 346 one vote short of the majority which would then become 169.
NUWHRAIN-MPHC = 151
By the assailed Resolution of January 22, 2007, the Secretary of Labor and
HIMPHLU = 169 Employment (SOLE), through then Acting Secretary Luzviminda Padilla,
affirmed the Med-Arbiter’s Order. It held that pursuant to Section 5, Rule
NO UNION = 1 IX of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code on exclusion and
inclusion of voters in a certification election, the probationary employees
SPOILED = 3 cannot vote, as at the time the Med-Arbiter issued on August 9, 2005 the
Order granting the petition for the conduct of the certification election, the
SEGREGATED = 22 six probationary employees were not yet hired, hence, they could not vote.

In view of the significant number of segregated votes, contending unions, The SOLE further held that, with respect to the votes cast by the 11
petitioner, NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and respondent Holiday Inn Manila dismissed employees, they could be considered since their dismissal was
Pavillion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU), referred the case back to Med- still pending appeal.
As to the votes cast by the six alleged supervisory employees, the SOLE
held that their votes should be counted since their promotion took effect
months after the issuance of the above-said August 9, 2005 Order of the
Med-Arbiter, hence, they were still considered as rank-and-file.
Respecting Gatbonton’s vote, the SOLE ruled that the same could be the
basis to include the votes of the other probationary employees, as the
records show that during the pre-election conferences, there was no
disagreement as to his inclusion in the voters’ list, and neither was it timely
challenged when he voted on election day, hence, the Election Officer could
not then segregate his vote.
The SOLE further ruled that even if the 17 votes of the dismissed and
supervisory employees were to be counted and presumed to be in favor of
petitioner, still, the same would not suffice to overturn the 169 votes
garnered by HIMPHLU.
In fine, the SOLE concluded that the certification of HIMPHLU as the
exclusive bargaining agent was proper.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by the SOLE by
Resolution of March 22, 2007, it appealed to the Court of Appeals.
By the assailed Decision promulgated on November 8, 2007, the appellate
court affirmed the ruling of the SOLE. It held that, contrary to petitioner’s
assertion, the ruling in Airtime Specialist, Inc. v. Ferrer Calleja 5 stating that
in a certification election, all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent, are entitled to vote, is
inapplicable to the case at bar. For, the appellate court continued, the six
probationary employees were not yet employed by the Hotel at the time the
August 9, 2005 Order granting the certification election was issued. It thus
held that Airtime Specialist applies only to situations wherein the
probationary employees were already employed as of the date of filing of
the petition for certification election.
Respecting Gatbonton’s vote, the appellate court upheld the SOLE’s finding
that since it was not properly challenged, its inclusion could no longer be
questioned, nor could it be made the basis to include the votes of the six
probationary employees.
The appellate court brushed aside petitioner’s contention that the opening of
the 17 segregated votes would materially affect the results of the election as
there would be the likelihood of a run-off election in the event none of the
contending unions receive a majority of the valid votes cast. It held that the
"majority" contemplated in deciding which of the unions in a certification
election is the winner refers to the majority of valid votes cast, not the
simple majority of votes cast, hence, the SOLE was correct in ruling that
even if the 17 votes were in favor of petitioner, it would still be insufficient
to overturn the results of the certification election.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of
January 25, 2008, the present recourse was filed.
Petitioner’s contentions may be summarized as follows:
1. Inclusion of Jose Gatbonton’s vote but excluding the vote of the
six other probationary employees violated the principle of equal
protection and is not in accord with the ruling in Airtime
Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja;
2. The time of reckoning for purposes of determining when the
probationary employees can be allowed to vote is not August 9,
2005 – the date of issuance by Med-Arbiter Calabocal of the Order
granting the conduct of certification elections, but March 10, 2006
– the date the SOLE Order affirmed the Med-Arbiter’s Order.
3. Even if the votes of the six probationary employees were
included, still, HIMPHLU could not be considered as having
obtained a majority of the valid votes cast as the opening of the 17
ballots would increase the number of valid votes from 321 to 338,
hence, for HIMPHLU to be certified as the exclusive bargaining
agent, it should have garnered at least 170, not 169, votes.
Petitioner justifies its not challenging Gatbonton’s vote because it was
precisely its position that probationary employees should be allowed to
vote. It thus avers that justice and equity dictate that since Gatbonton’s vote
was counted, then the votes of the 6 other probationary employees should
likewise be included in the tally.
Petitioner goes on to posit that the word "order" in Section 5, Rule 9 of
Department Order No. 40-03 reading "[A]ll employees who are members of
the appropriate bargaining unit sought to be represented by the petitioner at
the time of the issuance of the order granting the conduct of certification
election shall be allowed to vote" refers to an order which has already
become final and executory, in this case the March 10, 2002 Order of the
SOLE.
Petitioner thus concludes that if March 10, 2006 is the reckoning date for
the determination of the eligibility of workers, then all the segregated votes
cast by the probationary employees should be opened and counted, they
having already been working at the Hotel on such date.
Respecting the certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining
agent, petitioner argues that the same was not proper for if the 17 votes
would be counted as valid, then the total number of votes cast would have
been 338, not 321, hence, the majority would be 170; as such, the votes
garnered by HIMPHLU is one vote short of the majority for it to be certified
as the exclusive bargaining agent.
The relevant issues for resolution then are first, whether employees on
probationary status at the time of the certification elections should be
allowed to vote, and second, whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the
required majority for it to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent.
On the first issue, the Court rules in the affirmative.
The inclusion of Gatbonton’s vote was proper not because it was not
questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a
certification election. The votes of the six other probationary employees
should thus also have been counted. As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-
Calleja holds:
In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote.
This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states
that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective
bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment
relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all
employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees,
probationary or permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the
bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their
employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for
certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the
bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to
belong to the "bargaining unit." (Emphasis supplied)
Rule II, Sec. 2 of Department Order No. 40-03, series of 2003, which
amended Rule XI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
provides:
Rule II
Section 2. Who may join labor unions and workers' associations. - All
persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises,
including employees of government owned or controlled corporations
without original charters established under the Corporation Code, as well as
employees of religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions
whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization
and to form, join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective
bargaining: provided, however, that supervisory employees shall not be
eligible for membership in a labor union of the rank-and-file employees but
may form, join or assist separate labor unions of their own. Managerial
employees shall not be eligible to form, join or assist any labor unions for
purposes of collective bargaining. Alien employees with valid working
permits issued by the Department may exercise the right to self-organization
and join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining if they
are nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino
workers, as certified by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
For purposes of this section, any employee, whether employed for a definite
period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible
for membership in any labor organization.
All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the
self-employed, rural workers and those without any definite employers may
form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection and other
legitimate purposes except collective bargaining. (Emphasis supplied)
The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from
voting cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of workers to
self-organization, as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules on certification elections and jurisprudence thereon.
A law is read into, and forms part of, a contract. Provisions in a contract are
valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy.6
Rule XI, Sec. 5 of D.O. 40-03, on which the SOLE and the appellate court
rely to support their position that probationary employees hired after the
issuance of the Order granting the petition for the conduct of certification
election must be excluded, should not be read in isolation and must be
harmonized with the other provisions of D.O. Rule XI, Sec. 5 of D.O. 40-
03, viz:
Rule XI
Section 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. - All employees who
are members of the appropriate bargaining unit sought to be represented by
the petitioner at the time of the issuance of the order granting the conduct of
a certification election shall be eligible to vote. An employee who has been
dismissed from work but has contested the legality of the dismissal in a
forum of appropriate jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the order for
the conduct of a certification election shall be considered a qualified voter,
unless his/her dismissal was declared valid in a final judgment at the time of
the conduct of the certification election. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Section 13. Order/Decision on the petition. - Within ten (10) days from the
date of the last hearing, the Med-Arbiter shall issue a formal order granting
the petition or a decision denying the same. In organized establishments,
however, no order or decision shall be issued by the Med-Arbiter during the
freedom period.
The order granting the conduct of a certification election shall state the
following:
(a) the name of the employer or establishment;
(b) the description of the bargaining unit;
(c) a statement that none of the grounds for dismissal enumerated
in the succeeding paragraph exists;
(d) the names of contending labor unions which shall appear as
follows: petitioner union/s in the order in which their petitions
were filed, forced intervenor, and no union; and
(e) a directive upon the employer and the contending union(s) to
submit within ten (10) days from receipt of the order, the certified
list of employees in the bargaining unit, or where necessary, the
payrolls covering the members of the bargaining unit for the last
three (3) months prior to the issuance of the order. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 21. Decision of the Secretary. - The Secretary shall have fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the entire records of the petition within which to decide
the appeal. The filing of the memorandum of appeal from the order or
decision of the Med-Arbiter stays the holding of any certification election.
The decision of the Secretary shall become final and executory after ten
(10) days from receipt thereof by the parties. No motion for reconsideration
of the decision shall be entertained. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the immediately-quoted provisions, and prescinding from the
principle that all employees are, from the first day of their employment,
eligible for membership in a labor organization, it is evident that
the period of reckoning indetermining who shall be included in the list of
eligible voters is, in cases where a timely appeal has been
filed fromthe Order of the Med-
Arbiter, the date when the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
, whether affirmingor denying the appeal, becomes final and executory.
The filing of an appeal to the SOLE from the Med-Arbiter’s Order stays its
execution, in accordance with Sec. 21, and rationally, the Med-Arbiter
cannot direct the employer to furnish him/her with the list of eligible voters
pending the resolution of the appeal.
During the pendency of the appeal, the employer may hire additional
employees. To exclude the employees hired after the issuance of the Med-
Arbiter’s Order but before the appeal has been resolved would violate the
guarantee that every employee has the right to be part of a labor
organization from the first day of their service.
In the present case, records show that the probationary employees, including
Gatbonton, were included in the list of employees in the bargaining unit
submitted by the Hotel on May 25, 2006 in compliance with the directive of
the Med-Arbiter after the appeal and subsequent motion for reconsideration
have been denied by the SOLE, rendering the Med-Arbiter’s August 22,
2005 Order final and executory 10 days after the March 22, 2007
Resolution (denying the motion for reconsideration of the January 22 Order
denying the appeal), and rightly so. Because, for purposes of self-
organization, those employees are, in light of the discussion above, deemed
eligible to vote.
A certification election is the process of determining the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, refers to the
negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the
employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.7
The significance of an employee’s right to vote in a certification election
cannot thus be overemphasized. For he has considerable interest in the
determination of who shall represent him in negotiating the terms and
conditions of his employment.
Even if the Implementing Rules gives the SOLE 20 days to decide the
appeal from the Order of the Med-Arbiter, experience shows that it
sometimes takes months to be resolved. To rule then that only those
employees hired as of the date of the issuance of the Med-Arbiter’s Order
are qualified to vote would effectively disenfranchise employees hired
during the pendency of the appeal. More importantly, reckoning the date of
the issuance of the Med-Arbiter’s Order as the cut-off date would render
inutile the remedy of appeal to the SOLE.1avvph!1
But while the Court rules that the votes of all the probationary employees
should be included, under the particular circumstances of this case and the
period of time which it took for the appeal to be decided, the votes of the six
supervisory employees must be excluded because at the time the
certification elections was conducted, they had ceased to be part of the rank
and file, their promotion having taken effect two months before the election.
As to whether HIMPHLU should be certified as the exclusive bargaining
agent, the Court rules in the negative. It is well-settled that under the so-
called "double majority rule," for there to be a valid certification election,
majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union
must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.
Prescinding from the Court’s ruling that all the probationary employees’
votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the supervisory employees
should be excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would
increase – from 321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union
obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the
appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is
168.5 + 1 or at least 170.
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly,
HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a majority vote. The position of both the
SOLE and the appellate court that the opening of the 17 segregated ballots
will not materially affect the outcome of the certification election as for, so
they contend, even if such member were all in favor of petitioner, still,
HIMPHLU would win, is thus untenable.
It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of
valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required
majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections. The
opening of the segregated but valid votes has thus become material. To be
sure, the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to
determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority
representation of the bargaining representative, if the employees desire to be
represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the determination of who
between two or more contending unions won, but whether it effectively
ascertains the will of the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they
want to be represented and which union they want to represent them.

Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted

obtained the required majority, it follows that a run-off election must be
held to determine which between HIMPHLU and petitioner should
represent the rank-and-file employees.

A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving

the two (2) highest number of votes in a certification or consent election
with three (3) or more choices, where such a certified or consent election
results in none of the three (3) or more choices receiving the majority of the
valid votes cast; provided that the total number of votes for all contending
unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast. 8 With 346
votes cast, 337 of which are now deemed valid and HIMPHLU having only
garnered 169 and petitioner having obtained 151 and the choice "NO
UNION" receiving 1 vote, then the holding of a run-off election between
HIMPHLU and petitioner is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November

8, 2007 and Resolution dated January 25, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
affirming the Resolutions dated January 22, 2007 and March 22, 2007,
respectively, of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in OS-A-9-52-05
are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The Department of Labor and Employment-Bureau of Labor Relations is

DIRECTED to cause the holding of a run-off election between petitioner,
National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries-
Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter (NUWHRAIN-MPC), and respondent
Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU).
G.R. No. 211145, October 14, 2015
SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN SHIPYARD REP. BY
ITS PRESIDENT, ALFIE ALIPIO, Petitioner, v. BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS, HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND
CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD. (HHIC-PHIL.), Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
The right to self-organization is not limited to unionism. Workers may also
form or join an association for mutual aid and protection and for other
legitimate purposes.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside
the July 4, 2013 Decision1 and the January 28, 2014 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123397, which reversed the
November 28, 2011 Resolution3 of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
and reinstated the April 20, 2010 Decision4 of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Regional Director, cancelling the registration of
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard (Samahan) as a worker's
association under Article 243 (now Article 249) of the Labor Code.
The Facts
On February 16, 2010, Samahan, through its authorized representative,
Alfie F. Alipio, filed an application for registration5 of its name "Samahan
ng Mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard" with the DOLE. Attached to the
application were the list of names of the association's officers and members,
signatures of the attendees of the February 7, 2010 meeting, copies of their
Constitution and By-laws. The application stated that the association had a
total of 120 members.
On February 26, 2010, the DOLE Regional Office No. 3, City of San
Fernando, Pampanga (DOLE-Pampanga), issued the corresponding
certificate of registration6 in favor of Samahan.
On March 15, 2010, respondent Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction
Co., Ltd. Philippines (Hanjin), with offices at Greenbeach 1, Renondo
Peninsula, Sitio Agustin, Barangay Cawag, Subic Bay Freeport Zone, filed
a petition7 with DOLE-Pampanga praying for the cancellation of
registration of Samahan's association on the ground that its members did not
fall under any of the types of workers enumerated in the second sentence of
Article 243 (now 249).
Hanjin opined that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural workers, self-
employed, and those without definite employers may form a workers'
association. It further posited that one third (1/3) of the members of the
association had definite employers and the continued existence and
registration of the association would prejudice the company's goodwill.
On March 18, 2010, Hanjin filed a supplemental petition, 8 adding the
alternative ground that Samahan committed a misrepresentation in
connection with the list of members and/or voters who took part in the
ratification of their constitution and by-laws in its application for
registration. Hanjin claimed that Samahan made it appear that its members
were all qualified to become members of the workers' association.
On March 26, 2010, DOLE-Pampanga called for a conference, wherein
Samahan requested for a 10-day period to file a responsive pleading. No
pleading, however, was submitted. Instead, Samahan filed a motion to
dismiss on April 14, 2010.9
The Ruling of the DOLE Regional Director
On April 20, 2010, DOLE Regional Director Ernesto Bihis ruled in favor of
Hanjin. He found that the preamble, as stated in the Constitution and By-
Laws of Samahan, was an admission on its part that all of its members were
employees of Hanjin, to wit:
KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa HANJIN Shipyard (SAMAHAN) ay
naglalayong na isulong ang pagpapabuti ng kondisyon sa paggawa at
katiyakan sa hanapbuhay sa pamamagitan ng patuloy na pagpapaunlad ng
kasanayan ng para sa mga kasapi nito. Naniniwala na sa pamamagitan ng
aming mga angking lakas, kaalaman at kasanayan ay anting maitataguyod
at makapag-aambag sa kaunlaran ng isang lipunan. Na mararating at
makakamit ang antas ng pagkilala, pagdakila at pagpapahalaga sa mga
tulad naming mga manggagawa.
x x x10
The same claim was made by Samahan in its motion to dismiss, but it failed
to adduce evidence that the remaining 63 members were also employees of
Hanjin. Its admission bolstered Hanjin's claim that Samahan committed
misrepresentation in its application for registration as it made an express
representation that all of its members were employees of the former. Having
a definite employer, these 57 members should have formed a labor union for
collective bargaining.11 The dispositive portion of the decision of the Dole
Regional Director, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
Consequently, the Certificate of Registration as Legitimate Workers
Association (LWA) issued to the SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA
SA HANJIN SHIPYARD (SAMAHAN) with Registration Numbers
R0300-1002-WA-009 dated February 26, 2010 is hereby CANCELLED,
and said association is dropped from the roster of labor organizations of this
Office.
SO DECIDED.12
The Ruling of the Bureau of Labor Relations
Aggrieved, Samahan filed an appeal13 before the BLR, arguing that Hanjin
had no right to petition for the cancellation of its registration. Samahan
pointed out that the words "Hanjin Shipyard," as used in its application for
registration, referred to a workplace and not as employer or company. It
explained that when a shipyard was put up in Subic, Zambales, it became
known as Hanjin Shipyard. Further, the remaining 63 members signed
the Sama-Samang Pagpapatunay which stated that they were either
working or had worked at Hanjin. Thus, the alleged misrepresentation
committed by Samahan had no leg to stand on.14
In its Comment to the Appeal,15 Hanjin averred that it was a party-in-
interest. It reiterated that Samahan committed misrepresentation in its
application for registration before DOLE Pampanga. While Samahan
insisted that the remaining 63 members were either working, or had at least
worked in Hanjin, only 10 attested to such fact, thus, leaving its 53
members without any workplace to claim.
On September 6, 2010, the BLR granted Samahan's appeal and reversed the
ruling of the Regional Director. It stated that the law clearly afforded the
right to self-organization to all workers including those without definite
employers.16 As an expression of the right to self-organization, industrial,
commercial and self-employed workers could form a workers' association if
they so desired but subject to the limitation that it was only for mutual aid
and protection.17 Nowhere could it be found that to form a workers'
association was prohibited or that the exercise of a workers' right to self-
organization was limited to collective bargaining.18
The BLR was of the opinion that there was no misrepresentation on the part
of Samahan. The phrase, "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin
Shipyard" if translated, would be: "We, the workers at Hanjin Shipyard."
The use of the preposition "at" instead of "of " would indicate that "Hanjin
Shipyard" was intended to describe a place.19 Should Hanjin feel that the
use of its name had affected the goodwill of the company, the remedy was
not to seek the cancellation of the association's registration. At most, the use
by Samahan of the name "Hanjin Shipyard" would only warrant a change in
the name of the association.20 Thus, the dispositive portion of the BLR
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Order of DOLE
Region III Director Ernesto C. Bihis dated 20 April 2010 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard shall
remain in the roster of legitimate workers' association.21
On October 14, 2010, Hanjin filed its motion for reconsideration. 22
In its Resolution,23 dated November 28, 2011, the BLR affirmed its
September 6, 2010 Decision, but directed Samahan to remove the words
"Hanjin Shipyard" from its name. The BLR explained that the Labor Code
had no provision on the use of trade or business name in the naming of a
worker's association, such matters being governed by the Corporation Code.
According to the BLR, the most equitable relief that would strike a balance
between the contending interests of Samahan and Hanjin was to direct
Samahan to drop the name "Hanjin Shipyard" without delisting it from the
roster of legitimate labor organizations. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, our Decision dated 6 September 2010
is hereby AFFIRMED with a DIRECTIVE for SAMAHAN to remove
"HANJIN SHIPYARD" from its name.
SO RESOLVED.24
Unsatisfied, Samahan filed a petition for certiorari25 under Rule 65 before
the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123397.
In its March 21, 2012 Resolution,26 the CA dismissed the petition because
of Samahan's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
November 28, 2011 Resolution.
On April 17, 2012, Samahan filed its motion for reconsideration27 and on
July 18, 2012, Hanjin filed its comment28 to oppose the same. On October
22, 2012, the CA issued a resolution granting Samahan's motion for
reconsideration and reinstating the petition. Hanjin was directed to file a
comment five (5) days from receipt of notice. 29
On December 12, 2012, Hanjin filed its comment on the petition,30 arguing
that to require Samahan to change its name was not tantamount to
interfering with the workers' right to self-organization.31 Thus, it prayed,
among others, for the dismissal of the petition for Samahan's failure to file
the required motion for reconsideration.32
33
On January 17, 2013, Samahan filed its reply.
On March 22, 2013, Hanjin filed its memorandum. 34
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 4, 2013, the CA rendered its decision, holding that the registration
of Samahan as a legitimate workers' association was contrary to the
provisions of Article 243 of the Labor Code. 35 It stressed that only 57 out of
the 120 members were actually working in Hanjin while the phrase in the
preamble of Samahan's Constitution and By-laws, "KAMI, ang mga
Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard" created an impression that all its
members were employees of HHIC. Such unqualified manifestation which
was used in its application for registration, was a clear proof of
misrepresentation which warranted the cancellation of Samahan's
registration.
It also stated that the members of Samahan could not register it as a
legitimate worker's association because the place where Hanjin's industry
was located was not a rural area. Neither was there any evidence to show
that the members of the association were ambulant, intermittent or itinerant
workers.36
At any rate, the CA was of the view that dropping the words "Hanjin
Shipyard" from the association name would not prejudice or impair its right
to self-organization because it could adopt other appropriate names. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the BLR's directive,
ordering that the words "Hanjin Shipyard" be removed from petitioner
association's name, is AFFIRMED. The Decision dated April 20, 2010 of
the DOLE Regional Director in Case No. R0300-1003-CP-001, which
ordered the cancellation of petitioner association's registration is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.37
Hence, this petition, raising the following
ISSUES
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT SAMAHAN CANNOT FORM A WORKERS' ASSOCIATION
OF EMPLOYEES IN HANJIN AND INSTEAD SHOULD HAVE
FORMED A UNION, HENCE THEIR REGISTRATION AS A
WORKERS' ASSOCIATION SHOULD BE CANCELLED.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ORDERING
THE REMOVAL/DELETION OF THE WORD "HANJIN" IN THE
NAME OF THE UNION BY REASON OF THE COMPANY'S
PROPERTY RIGHT OVER THE COMPANY NAME "HANJIN."38
Samahan argues that the right to form a workers' association is not exclusive
to intermittent, ambulant and itinerant workers. While the Labor Code
allows the workers "to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing" for the purpose of collective bargaining, it does not prohibit them
from forming a labor organization simply for purposes of mutual aid and
protection. All members of Samahan have one common place of work,
Hanjin Shipyard. Thus, there is no reason why they cannot use "Hanjin
Shipyard" in their name.39
Hanjin counters that Samahan failed to adduce sufficient basis that all its
members were employees of Hanjin or its legitimate contractors, and that
the use of the name "Hanjin Shipyard" would create an impression that all
its members were employess of HHIC.40
Samahan reiterates its stand that workers with a definite employer can
organize any association for purposes of mutual aid and protection. Inherent
in the workers' right to self-organization is its right to name its own
organization. Samahan referred "Hanjin Shipyard" as their common place of
work. Therefore, they may adopt the same in their association's name. 41
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
Right to self-organization includes right to form a union, workers'
association and labor management councils
More often than not, the right to self-organization connotes unionism.
Workers, however, can also form and join a workers' association as well as
labor-management councils (LMC). Expressed in the highest law of the land
is the right of all workers to self-organization. Section 3, Article XIII of the
1987 Constitution states:
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. xxx
[Emphasis Supplied]
And Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution also states:
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
In relation thereto, Article 3 of the Labor Code provides:
Article 3. Declaration of basic policy. The State shall afford protection to
labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless
of sex, race or creed and regulate the relations between workers and
employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work. [Emphasis Supplied]
As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right to self-
organization includes the right to form, join or assist labor organizations for
the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose
for their mutual aid and protection. This is in line with the policy of the
State to foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united
labor movement as well as to make sure that workers participate in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare.42
The right to form a union or association or to self-organization
comprehends two notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, that is, the
absence of restraint which guarantees that the employee may act for himself
without being prevented by law; and (b) the power, by virtue of which an
employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. 43
In view of the revered right of every worker to self-organization, the law
expressly allows and even encourages the formation of labor organizations.
A labor organization is defined as "any union or association of employees
which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or
of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of
employment."44 A labor organization has two broad rights: (1) to bargain
collectively and (2) to deal with the employer concerning terms and
conditions of employment. To bargain collectively is a right given to a
union once it registers itself with the DOLE. Dealing with the employer, on
the other hand, is a generic description of interaction between employer and
employees concerning grievances, wages, work hours and other terms and
conditions of employment, even if the employees' group is not registered
with the DOLE.45
A union refers to any labor organization in the private sector organized for
collective bargaining and for other legitimate purpose, 46 while a workers'
association is an organization of workers formed for the mutual aid and
protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective
bargaining.47
Many associations or groups of employees, or even combinations of only
several persons, may qualify as a labor organization yet fall short of
constituting a labor union. While every labor union is a labor organization,
not every labor organization is a labor union. The difference is one of
organization, composition and operation.48
Collective bargaining is just one of the forms of employee participation.
Despite so much interest in and the promotion of collective bargaining, it is
incorrect to say that it is the device and no other, which secures industrial
democracy. It is equally misleading to say that collective bargaining is the
end-goal of employee representation. Rather, the real aim is employee
participation in whatever form it may appear, bargaining or no bargaining,
union or no union.49 Any labor organization which may or may not be a
union may deal with the employer. This explains why a workers' association
or organization does not always have to be a labor union and why employer-
employee collective interactions are not always collective bargaining. 50
To further strengthen employee participation, Article 255 (now 261) 51 of the
Labor Code mandates that workers shall have the right to participate in
policy and decision-making processes of the establishment where they are
employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits
and welfare. For this purpose, workers and employers may form LMCs.
A cursory reading of the law demonstrates that a common element between
unionism and the formation of LMCs is the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. Where neither party is an employer nor an employee
of the other, no duty to bargain collectively would exist. 52 In the same
manner, expressed in Article 255 (now 261) is the requirement that such
workers be employed in the establishment before they can participate in
policy and decision making processes.
In contrast, the existence of employer-employee relationship is not
mandatory in the formation of workers' association. What the law simply
requires is that the members of the workers' association, at the very least,
share the same interest. The very definition of a workers' association speaks
of "mutual aid and protection."
Right to choose whether to form or join a union or workers' association
belongs to workers themselves
In the case at bench, the Court cannot sanction the opinion of the CA that
Samahan should have formed a union for purposes of collective bargaining
instead of a workers' association because the choice belonged to it. The
right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to
refuse or refrain from exercising the said right. It is self-evident that just as
no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no
one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. 53 Also inherent
in the right to self-organization is the right to choose whether to form a
union for purposes of collective bargaining or a workers' association for
purposes of providing mutual aid and protection.
The right to self-organization, however, is subject to certain limitations as
provided by law. For instance, the Labor Code specifically disallows
managerial employees from joining, assisting or forming any labor union.
Meanwhile, supervisory employees, while eligible for membership in labor
organizations, are proscribed from joining the collective bargaining unit of
the rank and file employees.54 Even government employees have the right to
self-organization. It is not, however, regarded as existing or available for
purposes of collective bargaining, but simply for the furtherance and
protection of their interests.55
Hanjin posits that the members of Samahan have definite employers, hence,
they should have formed a union instead of a workers' association. The
Court disagrees. There is no provision in the Labor Code that states that
employees with definite employers may form, join or assist unions only.
The Court cannot subscribe either to Hanjin's position that Samahan's
members cannot form the association because they are not covered by the
second sentence of Article 243 (now 249), to wit:
Article 243. Coverage and employees' right to self-organization. All
persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and
in religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions, whether
operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to
form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes
of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers,
self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite
employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and
protection. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980)
[Emphasis Supplied]
Further, Article 243 should be read together with Rule 2 of Department
Order (D.O.) No. 40-03, Series of 2003, which provides:
RULE II
COVERAGE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
Section 1. Policy. - It is the policy of the State to promote the free and
responsible exercise of the right to self-organization through the
establishment of a simplified mechanism for the speedy registration of labor
unions and workers associations, determination of representation status and
resolution of inter/intra-union and other related labor relations disputes.
Only legitimate or registered labor unions shall have the right to represent
their members for collective bargaining and other purposes. Workers'
associations shall have the right to represent their members for purposes
other than collective bargaining.
Section 2. Who may join labor unions and workers' associations. - All
persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises,
including employees of government owned or controlled corporations
without original charters established under the Corporation Code, as well as
employees of religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions
whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization
and to form, join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective
bargaining: provided, however, that supervisory employees shall not be
eligible for membership in a labor union of the rank-and-file employees but
may form, join or assist separate labor unions of their own. Managerial
employees shall not be eligible to form, join or assist any labor unions for
purposes of collective bargaining. Alien employees with valid working
permits issued by the Department may exercise the right to self-organization
and join or assist labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining if they
are nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino
workers, as certified by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
For purposes of this section, any employee, whether employed for a definite
period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible
for membership in any labor organization.
All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the
self-employed, rural workers and those without any definite employers may
form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection and other
legitimate purposes except collective bargaining.
[Emphases Supplied]
Clearly, there is nothing in the foregoing implementing rules which
provides that workers, with definite employers, cannot form or join a
workers' association for mutual aid and protection. Section 2 thereof even
broadens the coverage of workers who can form or join a workers'
association. Thus, the Court agrees with Samahan's argument that the right
to form a workers' association is not exclusive to ambulant, intermittent and
itinerant workers. The option to form or join a union or a workers'
association lies with the workers themselves, and whether they have definite
employers or not.
No misrepresentation on the part of Samahan to warrant cancellation of
registration
In this case, Samahan's registration was cancelled not because its members
were prohibited from forming a workers' association but because they
allegedly committed misrepresentation for using the phrase, "KAMI, ang
mga Manggagawa sa HAN JIN Shipyard."
Misrepresentation, as a ground for the cancellation of registration of a labor
organization, is committed "in connection with the adoption, or ratification
of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification, the list of members who took part in the ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, and those in connection
with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list
of voters, xxx."56
In Takata Corporation v. Bureau of Relations,57 the DOLE Regional
Director granted the petition for the cancellation of certificate of registration
of Samahang Lakas Manggagawa sa Takata (Salamat) after finding that the
employees who attended the organizational meeting fell short of the 20%
union registration requirement. The BLR, however, reversed the ruling of
the DOLE Regional Director, stating that petitioner Takata Corporation
(Takata) failed to prove deliberate and malicious misrepresentation on the
part of respondent Salamat. Although Takata claimed that in the list of
members, there was an employee whose name appeared twice and another
was merely a project employee, such facts were not considered
misrepresentations in the absence of showing that the respondent
deliberately did so for the purpose of increasing their union membership.
The Court ruled in favor of Salamat.
In S.S. Ventures International v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union,58 the petition
for cancellation of certificate of registration was denied. The Court wrote:
If the union's application is infected by falsification and like serious
irregularities, especially those appearing on the face of the application and
its attachments, a union should be denied recognition as a legitimate
labor organization. Prescinding from these considerations, the issuance to
the Union of Certificate of Registration No. RO300-00-02-UR-0003
necessarily implies that its application for registration and the supporting
documents thereof are prima facie free from any vitiating irregularities.
Another factor which militates against the veracity of the allegations in
the Sinumpaang Petisyon is the lack of particularities on how, when and
where respondent union perpetrated the alleged fraud on each
member. Such details are crucial for in the proceedings for cancellation
of union registration on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation, what
needs to be established is that the specific act or omission of the union
deprived the complaining employees-members of their right to choose.
[Emphases Supplied]
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that misrepresentation, to be a
ground for the cancellation of the certificate of registration, must be done
maliciously and deliberately. Further, the mistakes appearing in the
application or attachments must be grave or refer to significant matters. The
details as to how the alleged fraud was committed must also be indubitably
shown.
The records of this case reveal no deliberate or malicious intent to commit
misrepresentation on the part of Samahan. The use of such words "KAMI,
ang mga Manggagawa sa HANJIN Shipyard" in the preamble of the
constitution and by-laws did not constitute misrepresentation so as to
warrant the cancellation of Samahan's certificate of registration. Hanjin
failed to indicate how this phrase constitutes a malicious and deliberate
misrepresentation. Neither was there any showing that the alleged
misrepresentation was serious in character. Misrepresentation is a devious
charge that cannot simply be entertained by mere surmises and conjectures.
Even granting arguendo that Samahan's members misrepresented
themselves as employees or workers of Hanjin, said misrepresentation does
not relate to the adoption or ratification of its constitution and by-laws or to
the election of its officers.
Removal of the word "Hanjin Shipyard" from the association's name,
however, does not infringe on Samahan's right to self-organization
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the BLR that "Hanjin Shipyard" must
be removed in the name of the association. A legitimate workers'
association refers to an association of workers organized for mutual aid and
protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective
bargaining registered with the DOLE.59 Having been granted a certificate of
registration, Samahan's association is now recognized by law as a legitimate
workers' association.
According to Samahan, inherent in the workers' right to self-organization is
its right to name its own organization. It seems to equate the dropping of
words "Hanjin Shipyard" from its name as a restraint in its exercise of the
right to self-organization. Hanjin, on the other hand, invokes that "Hanjin
Shipyard" is a registered trade name and, thus, it is within their right to
prohibit its use.
As there is no provision under our labor laws which speak of the use of
name by a workers' association, the Court refers to the Corporation Code,
which governs the names of juridical persons. Section 18 thereof provides:
No corporate name may be allowed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission if the proposed name
is identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing
corporation or to any other name already protected by law or is patently
deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing laws. When a change in the
corporate name is approved, the Commission shall issue an amended
certificate of incorporation under the amended name.

[Emphases Supplied]
The policy underlying the prohibition in Section 18 against the registration
of a corporate name which is "identical or deceptively or confusingly
similar" to that of any existing corporation or which is "patently deceptive"
or "patently confusing" or "contrary to existing laws," is the avoidance of
fraud upon the public which would have occasion to deal with the entity
concerned, the evasion of legal obligations and duties, and the reduction of
difficulties of administration and supervision over corporations. 60

For the same reason, it would be misleading for the members of Samahan to
use "Hanjin Shipyard" in its name as it could give the wrong impression that
all of its members are employed by Hanjin.

Further, Section 9, Rule IV of D.O. No. 40-03, Series of 2003 explicitly

states:
The change of name of a labor organization shall not affect its legal
personality. All the rights and obligations of a labor organization under its
old name shall continue to be exercised by the labor organization under its
new name.
Thus, in the directive of the BLR removing the words "Hanjin Shipyard,"
no abridgement of Samahan's right to self-organization was committed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 4,

2013 Decision and the January 28, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The September 6, 2010
Resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations, as modified by its November
28, 2011 Resolution, is REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 171153 September 12, 2007
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION–
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (SMCEU–PTGWO), petitioner,
vs. SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES
UNION–PAMBANSANG DIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO
(SMPPEU–PDMP), respondent1.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, petitioner SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES
UNION-PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (SMCEU-PTGWO) prays that this Court reverse and set
aside the (a) Decision2 dated 9 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 66200, affirming the Decision3 dated 19 February 2001 of the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) which upheld the Certificate of Registration of
respondent SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES
UNION–PAMBANSANG DIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO
(SMPPEU–PDMP); and (b) the Resolution4 dated 16 January 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in the same case, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision.
The following are the antecedent facts:
Petitioner is the incumbent bargaining agent for the bargaining unit
comprised of the regular monthly-paid rank and file employees of the three
divisions of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), namely, the San Miguel
Corporate Staff Unit (SMCSU), San Miguel Brewing Philippines (SMBP),
and the San Miguel Packaging Products (SMPP), in all offices and plants of
SMC, including the Metal Closure and Lithography Plant in Laguna. It had
been the certified bargaining agent for 20 years – from 1987 to 1997.
Respondent is registered as a chapter of Pambansang Diwa ng
Manggagawang Pilipino (PDMP). PDMP issued Charter Certificate No. 112
to respondent on 15 June 1999.5 In compliance with registration
requirements, respondent submitted the requisite documents to the BLR for
the purpose of acquiring legal personality. 6 Upon submission of its charter
certificate and other documents, respondent was issued Certificate of
Creation of Local or Chapter PDMP-01 by the BLR on 6 July
1999.7 Thereafter, respondent filed with the Med-Arbiter of the DOLE
Regional Officer in the National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR), three
separate petitions for certification election to represent SMPP, SMCSU, and
SMBP.8 All three petitions were dismissed, on the ground that the separate
petitions fragmented a single bargaining unit.9
On 17 August 1999, petitioner filed with the DOLE-NCR a petition seeking
the cancellation of respondent's registration and its dropping from the rolls
of legitimate labor organizations. In its petition, petitioner accused
respondent of committing fraud and falsification, and non-compliance with
registration requirements in obtaining its certificate of registration. It raised
allegations that respondent violated Articles 239(a), (b) and (c) 10 and
234(c)11 of the Labor Code. Moreover, petitioner claimed that PDMP is not
a legitimate labor organization, but a trade union center, hence, it cannot
directly create a local or chapter. The petition was docketed as Case No.
NCR-OD-9908-007-IRD.12
On 14 July 2000, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Maximo B. Lim issued an
Order dismissing the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and
irregularity in the submission of documents by respondent. Regional
Director Lim further ruled that respondent is allowed to directly create a
local or chapter. However, he found that respondent did not comply with the
20% membership requirement and, thus, ordered the cancellation of its
certificate of registration and removal from the rolls of legitimate labor
organizations.13 Respondent appealed to the BLR. In a Decision dated 19
February 2001, it declared:
As a chartered local union, appellant is not required to submit the
number of employees and names of all its members comprising at
least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to
operate. Thus, the revocation of its registration based on non-
compliance with the 20% membership requirement does not have
any basis in the rules.
Further, although PDMP is considered as a trade union center, it
is a holder of Registration Certificate No. FED-11558-LC issued
 by the BLR on 14 February 1991, which bestowed upon it the
status of a legitimate labor organization with all the rights and
privileges to act as representative of its members for purposes of
collective bargaining agreement. On this basis, PDMP can charter
or create a local, in accordance with the provisions of Department
Order No. 9.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
decision of the Regional Director dated July 14, 2000, canceling
the registration of appellant San Miguel Packaging Products
Employees Union-Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(SMPPEU-PDMP) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
shall hereby remain in the roster of legitimate labor
organizations.14
While the BLR agreed with the findings of the DOLE Regional Director
dismissing the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and in upholding
that PDMP can directly create a local or a chapter, it reversed the Regional
Director's ruling that the 20% membership is a requirement for respondent
to attain legal personality as a labor organization. Petitioner thereafter filed
a Motion for Reconsideration with the BLR. In a Resolution rendered on 19
June 2001 in BLR-A-C-64-05-9-00 (NCR-OD-9908-007-IRD), the BLR
denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed its Decision dated 19
February 2001.15
Invoking the power of the appellate court to review decisions of quasi-
judicial agencies, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 66200. The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 9
March 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of the BLR,
ruling as follows:
In Department Order No. 9, a registered federation or national
union may directly create a local by submitting to the BLR copies
of the charter certificate, the local's constitution and by-laws, the
principal office address of the local, and the names of its officers
and their addresses. Upon complying with the documentary
requirements, the local shall be issued a certificate and included in
the roster of legitimate labor organizations. The [herein
respondent] is an affiliate of a registered federation PDMP, having
been issued a charter certificate. Under the rules we have reviewed,
there is no need for SMPPEU to show a membership of 20% of the
employees of the bargaining unit in order to be recognized as a
legitimate labor union.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the assailed decision and resolution of the
BLR are AFFIRMED, and the petition is DISMISSED.16
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated 16 January 2006, the Court of Appeals
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned
Decision.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court where petitioner raises the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS NOT REQUIRED TO
SUBMIT THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AND NAMES OF
ALL ITS MEMBERS COMPRISING AT LEAST 20% OF THE
EMPLOYEES IN THE BARGAINING UNIT WHERE IT SEEKS
TO OPERATE.
The present petition questions the legal personality of respondent as a
legitimate labor organization.
Petitioner posits that respondent is required to submit a list of members
comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit before it
may acquire legitimacy, citing Article 234(c) of the Labor Code which
stipulates that any applicant labor organization, association or group of
unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the
rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon
issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following
requirements:
 a. Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
b. The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address
of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational
meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such
meetings;
c. The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent
(20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to
operate;
d. If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more
years, copies of its annual financial reports; and
e. Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant
union, minutes of its adoption or ratification and the list of the
members who participated in it.17
Petitioner also insists that the 20% requirement for registration of
respondent must be based not on the number of employees of a single
division, but in all three divisions of the company in all the offices and
plants of SMC since they are all part of one bargaining unit. Petitioner
refers to Section 1, Article 1 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA),18 quoted hereunder:
ARTICLE 1
SCOPE
Section 1. Appropriate Bargaining Unit. The appropriate
bargaining unit covered by this Agreement consists of all regular
rank and file employees paid on the basis of fixed salary per month
and employed by the COMPANY in its Corporate Staff Units
(CSU), San Miguel Brewing Products (SMBP) and San Miguel
Packaging Products (SMPP) and in different operations existing in
the City of Manila and suburbs, including Metal Closure and
Lithography Plant located at Canlubang, Laguna subject to the
provisions of Article XV of this Agreement provided however, that
if during the term of this Agreement, a plant within the territory
covered by this Agreement is transferred outside but within a
radius of fifty (50) kilometers from the Rizal Monument, Rizal
Park, Metro Manila, the employees in the transferred plant shall
remain in the bargaining unit covered by this Agreement.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner thus maintains that respondent, in any case, failed to meet this
20% membership requirement since it based its membership on the number
of employees of a single division only, namely, the SMPP.
There is merit in petitioner's contentions.
A legitimate labor organization19 is defined as "any labor organization duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any
branch or local thereof."20 The mandate of the Labor Code is to ensure
strict compliance with the requirements on registration because a legitimate
labor organization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code, 21 and
are involved in activities directly affecting matters of public interest.
Registration requirements are intended to afford a measure of protection to
unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-
by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or use the
labor organization for illegitimate ends.22 Legitimate labor organizations
have exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised by non-
legitimate unions, one of which is the right to be certified as the exclusive
representative23 of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining
unit for purposes of collective bargaining.24 The acquisition of rights by any
union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition for
certification election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not the
labor organization has attained the status of a legitimate labor
organization.25
A perusal of the records reveals that respondent is registered with the BLR
as a "local" or "chapter" of PDMP and was issued Charter Certificate No.
112 on 15 June 1999. Hence, respondent was directly chartered by PDMP.
The procedure for registration of a local or chapter of a labor organization is
provided in Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, as
amended by Department Order No. 9 which took effect on 21 June 1997,
and again by Department Order No. 40 dated 17 February 2003. The
Implementing Rules as amended by D.O. No. 9 should govern the
resolution of the petition at bar since respondent's petition for certification
election was filed with the BLR in 1999; and that of petitioner on 17 August
1999.26
The applicable Implementing Rules enunciates a two-fold procedure for the
creation of a chapter or a local. The first involves the affiliation of an
independent union with a federation or national union or industry union.
The second, finding application in the instant petition, involves the direct
creation of a local or a chapter through the process of chartering.27
A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local or
chapter by submitting to the DOLE Regional Office or to the BLR two
copies of the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union
indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and
the principal office of the local/chapter; and
(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; Provided, That
where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as
that of the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated
accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under
oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and
attested to by its President.28
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a local or chapter may be directly
created by a federation or national union. A duly constituted local or
chapter created in accordance with the foregoing shall acquire legal
personality from the date of filing of the complete documents with the
BLR.29 The issuance of the certificate of registration by the BLR or the
DOLE Regional Office is not the operative act that vests legal personality
upon a local or a chapter under Department Order No. 9. Such legal
personality is acquired from the filing of the complete documentary
requirements enumerated in Section 1, Rule VI.30
Petitioner insists that Section 3 of the Implementing Rules, as amended by
Department Order No. 9, violated Article 234 of the Labor Code when it
provided for less stringent requirements for the creation of a chapter or
local. This Court disagrees.
Article 234 of the Labor Code provides that an independent labor
organization acquires legitimacy only upon its registration with the BLR:
Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or
workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the
rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based
on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address
of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational
meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such
meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty
percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it
seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more
years, copies of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant
union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the
members who participated in it. (Italics supplied.)
It is emphasized that the foregoing pertains to the registration of an
independent labor organization, association or group of unions or workers.
However, the creation of a branch, local or chapter is treated differently.
This Court, in the landmark case of Progressive Development Corporation
v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment,31 declared that when
an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter, some of the
aforementioned requirements for registration are no longer necessary or
compulsory. Whereas an applicant for registration of an independent union
is mandated to submit, among other things, the number of employees and
names of all its members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the
bargaining unit where it seeks to operate, as provided under Article 234 of
the Labor Code and Section 2 of Rule III, Book V of the Implementing
Rules, the same is no longer required of a branch, local or chapter. 32 The
intent of the law in imposing less requirements in the case of a branch or
local of a registered federation or national union is to encourage the
affiliation of a local union with a federation or national union in order to
increase the local union's bargaining powers respecting terms and
conditions of labor.33
Subsequently, in Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano 34 where the validity of
Department Order No. 9 was directly put in issue, this Court was
unequivocal in finding that there is no inconsistency between the Labor
Code and Department Order No. 9.
As to petitioner's claims that respondent obtained its Certificate of
Registration through fraud and misrepresentation, this Court finds that the
imputations are not impressed with merit. In the instant case, proof to
declare that respondent committed fraud and misrepresentation remains
wanting. This Court had, indeed, on several occasions, pronounced that
registration based on false and fraudulent statements and documents confer
no legitimacy upon a labor organization irregularly recognized, which, at
best, holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labor
organization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights. 35
This Court emphasizes, however, that a direct challenge to the legitimacy of
a labor organization based on fraud and misrepresentation in securing its
certificate of registration is a serious allegation which deserves careful
scrutiny. Allegations thereof should be compounded with supporting
circumstances and evidence. The records of the case are devoid of such
evidence. Furthermore, this Court is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine
applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative
agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, such as the BLR, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only great respect but even finality.36
Still, petitioner postulates that respondent was not validly and legitimately
created, for PDMP cannot create a local or chapter as it is not a legitimate
labor organization, it being a trade union center.
Petitioner's argument creates a predicament as it hinges on the legitimacy of
PDMP as a labor organization. Firstly, this line of reasoning attempts to
predicate that a trade union center is not a legitimate labor organization. In
the process, the legitimacy of PDMP is being impugned, albeit indirectly.
Secondly, the same contention premises that a trade union center cannot
directly create a local or chapter through the process of chartering.
Anent the foregoing, as has been held in a long line of cases, the legal
personality of a legitimate labor organization, such as PDMP, cannot be
subject to a collateral attack. The law is very clear on this matter. Article
212 (h) of the Labor Code, as amended, defines a legitimate labor
organization37 as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE,
and includes any branch or local thereof."38 On the other hand, a trade
union center is any group of registered national unions or federations
organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members; for assisting
such members in collective bargaining; or for participating in the
formulation of social and employment policies, standards, and programs,
and is duly registered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III, Section 2
of the Implementing Rules.39
The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed
registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its
certificate of registration. Once a certificate of registration is issued to a
union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack.40 It may be
questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance
with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules. The
aforementioned provision is enunciated in the following:
Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers'
association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal
personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration.
Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral
 attack, but may be questioned only in an independent petition for
cancellation in accordance with these Rules.
PDMP was registered as a trade union center and issued Registration
Certificate No. FED-11558-LC by the BLR on 14 February 1991. Until the
certificate of registration of PDMP is cancelled, its legal personality as a
legitimate labor organization subsists. Once a union acquires legitimate
status as a labor organization, it continues to be recognized as such until its
certificate of registration is cancelled or revoked in an independent action
for cancellation.41 It bears to emphasize that what is being directly
challenged is the personality of respondent as a legitimate labor
organization and not that of PDMP. This being a collateral attack, this Court
is without jurisdiction to entertain questions indirectly impugning the
legitimacy of PDMP.
Corollarily, PDMP is granted all the rights and privileges appurtenant to a
legitimate labor organization,42 and continues to be recognized as such until
its certificate of registration is successfully impugned and thereafter
cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation.
We now proceed to the contention that PDMP cannot directly create a local
or a chapter, it being a trade union center.
This Court reverses the finding of the appellate court and BLR on this
ground, and rules that PDMP cannot directly create a local or chapter.
After an exhaustive study of the governing labor law provisions, both
statutory and regulatory,43 we find no legal justification to support the
conclusion that a trade union center is allowed to directly create a local or
chapter through chartering. Apropos, we take this occasion to reiterate the
first and fundamental duty of this Court, which is to apply the law. The
solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not
include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written
therein.44
Presidential Decree No. 442, better known as the Labor Code, was enacted
in 1972. Being a legislation on social justice,45 the provisions of the Labor
Code and the Implementing Rules have been subject to several
amendments, and they continue to evolve, considering that labor plays a
major role as a socio-economic force. The Labor Code was first amended by
Republic Act No. 6715, and recently, by Republic Act No. 9481.
Incidentally, the term trade union center was never mentioned under
Presidential Decree No. 442, even as it was amended by Republic Act No.
6715. The term trade union center was first adopted in the Implementing
Rules, under Department Order No. 9.
Culling from its definition as provided by Department Order No. 9, a trade
union center is any group of registered national unions or federations
organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members; for assisting
such members in collective bargaining; or for participating in the
formulation of social and employment policies, standards, and programs,
and is duly registered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III, Section 2
of the Implementing Rules.46 The same rule provides that the application for
registration of an industry or trade union center shall be supported by the
following:
(a) The list of its member organizations and their respective
presidents and, in the case of an industry union, the industry where
the union seeks to operate;
(b) The resolution of membership of each member organization,
approved by the Board of Directors of such union;
(c) The name and principal address of the applicant, the names of
its officers and their addresses, the minutes of its organizational
meeting/s, and the list of member organizations and their
representatives who attended such meeting/s; and
(d) A copy of its constitution and by-laws and minutes of its
ratification by a majority of the presidents of the member
organizations, provided that where the ratification was done
simultaneously with the organizational meeting, it shall be
sufficient that the fact of ratification be included in the minutes of
the organizational meeting.47
Evidently, while a "national union" or "federation" is a labor organization
with at least ten locals or chapters or affiliates, each of which must be a duly
certified or recognized collective bargaining agent;48 a trade union center,
on the other hand, is composed of a group of registered national unions or
federations.49
The Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9, provide
that "a duly registered federation or national union" may directly create a
local or chapter. The provision reads:
Section 1. Chartering and creation of a local/chapter. – A duly
registered federation or national union may directly create a
local/chapter by submitting to the Regional Office or to the Bureau
two (2) copies of the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union
indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and
the principal office of the local/chapter; and
(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; provided that
where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as
that of the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated
accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under
oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and
attested to by its President.50
Department Order No. 9 mentions two labor organizations either of which is
allowed to directly create a local or chapter through chartering – a duly
registered federation or a national union. Department Order No. 9 defines a
"chartered local" as a labor organization in the private sector operating at
the enterprise level that acquired legal personality through a charter
certificate, issued by a duly registered federation or national union and
reported to the Regional Office in accordance with Rule III, Section 2-E of
these Rules.51
Republic Act No. 9481 or "An Act Strengthening the Workers'
Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending for the Purpose
Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines" lapsed52 into law on 25 May 2007 and became
effective on 14 June 2007.53 This law further amends the Labor Code
provisions on Labor Relations.
Pertinent amendments read as follows:
SECTION 1. Article 234 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
ART. 234. Requirements of Registration. — A federation, national union or
industry or trade union center or an independent union shall acquire legal
personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law
to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of
registration based on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the
labor organization, the minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of
the workers who participated in such meetings;
(c) In case the applicant is an independent union, the names of all its
members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in
the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies
of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union,
minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the members who
participated in it.
SECTION 2. A new provision is hereby inserted into the Labor Code as
Article 234-A to read as follows:
ART. 234-A. Chartering and Creation of a Local Chapter. — A duly
registered federation or national union may directly create a local chapter
by issuing a charter certificate indicating the establishment of the local
chapter. The chapter shall acquire legal personality only for purposes of
filing a petition for certification election from the date it was issued a
charter certificate.
The chapter shall be entitled to all other rights and privileges of a legitimate
labor organization only upon the submission of the following documents in
addition to its charter certificate:
(a) The names of the chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal
office of the chapter; and
(b) The chapter's constitution and by-laws: Provided, That where the
chapter's constitution and by-laws are the same as that of the federation or
the national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
The additional supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the
secretary or treasurer of the chapter and attested by its president. (Emphasis
ours.)
Article 234 now includes the term trade union center, but interestingly, the
provision indicating the procedure for chartering or creating a local or
chapter, namely Article 234-A, still makes no mention of a "trade union
center."
Also worth emphasizing is that even in the most recent amendment of the
implementing rules,54 there was no mention of a trade union center as being
among the labor organizations allowed to charter.
This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Under this maxim of statutory interpretation, the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. When certain persons or
things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all
others from its operation may be inferred. If a statute specifies one
exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain
provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded. 55 Where the terms are
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to other matters.56 Such is the case here. If its
intent were otherwise, the law could have so easily and conveniently
included "trade union centers" in identifying the labor organizations allowed
to charter a chapter or local. Anything that is not included in the
enumeration is excluded therefrom, and a meaning that does not appear nor
is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed
therein.57 The rule is restrictive in the sense that it proceeds from the
premise that the legislating body would not have made specific
enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning
and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.58 Expressium facit
cessare tacitum.59 What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Casus
omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted must
have been omitted intentionally.
Therefore, since under the pertinent status and applicable implementing
rules, the power granted to labor organizations to directly create a chapter or
local through chartering is given to a federation or national union, then a
trade union center is without authority to charter directly.
The ruling of this Court in the instant case is not a departure from the policy
of the law to foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and
united labor movement,60 and thus assure the rights of workers to self-
organization.61 The mandate of the Labor Code in ensuring strict
compliance with the procedural requirements for registration is not without
reason. It has been observed that the formation of a local or chapter
becomes a handy tool for the circumvention of union registration
requirements. Absent the institution of safeguards, it becomes a convenient
device for a small group of employees to foist a not-so-desirable federation
or union on unsuspecting co-workers and pare the need for wholehearted
voluntariness, which is basic to free unionism. 62 As a legitimate labor
organization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code and involved
in activities directly affecting public interest, it is necessary that the law
afford utmost protection to the parties affected.63 However, as this Court has
enunciated in Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary of
Department of Labor and Employment, it is not this Court's function to
augment the requirements prescribed by law. Our only recourse, as
previously discussed, is to exact strict compliance with what the law
provides as requisites for local or chapter formation. 64
In sum, although PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor
organization, it has no power to directly create a local or chapter. Thus,
SMPPEU-PDMP cannot be created under the more lenient requirements for
chartering, but must have complied with the more stringent rules for
creation and registration of an independent union, including the 20%
membership requirement.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 09

March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 66200
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Certificate of Registration of San
Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union–Pambansang Diwa ng
Manggagawang Pilipino is ORDERED CANCELLED, and SMPPEU-
PDMP DROPPED from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations.

Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177024 October 30, 2009
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA (OWNED AND OPERATED BY
GRAND PLAZA HOTEL CORPORATION)Petitioner,
vs. PINAG-ISANG GALING AT LAKAS NG MGA MANGGAGAWA
SA HERITAGE MANILA (PIGLAS-HERITAGE),Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a company’s objections to the registration of its rank and
file union for non-compliance with the requirements of its registration.
The Facts and the Case
Sometime in 2000, certain rank and file employees of petitioner Heritage
Hotel Manila (petitioner company) formed the "Heritage Hotel Employees
Union" (the HHE union). The Department of Labor and Employment-
National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) later issued a certificate of
registration1 to this union.
Subsequently, the HHE union filed a petition for certification election 2 that
petitioner company opposed. The company alleged that the HHE union
misrepresented itself to be an independent union, when it was, in truth, a
local chapter of the National Union of Workers in Hotel and Restaurant and
Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN). The company claimed that the HHE union
intentionally omitted disclosure of its affiliation with NUWHRAIN because
the company’s supervisors union was already affiliated with it.3 Thus, the
company also filed a petition for the cancellation of the HHE union’s
registration certificate.4
Meanwhile, the Med-Arbiter granted the HHE union’s petition for
certification election.5 Petitioner company appealed the decision to the
Secretary of Labor but the latter denied the appeal.6 The Secretary also
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, prompting the company to
file a petition for certiorari7 with the Court of Appeals.
On October 12, 2001 the Court of Appeals issued a writ of injunction
against the holding of the HHE union’s certification election, effective until
the petition for cancellation of that union’s registration shall have been
resolved with finality.8 The decision of the Court of Appeals became final
when the HHE union withdrew the petition for review that it filed with this
Court.9
On December 10, 2003 certain rank and file employees of petitioner
company held a meeting and formed another union, the respondent Pinag-
Isang Galing at Lakas ng mga Manggagawa sa Heritage Manila (the
PIGLAS union). This union applied for registration with the DOLE-
NCR10 and got its registration certificate on February 9, 2004. Two months
later, the members of the first union, the HHE union, adopted a resolution
for its dissolution. The HHE union then filed a petition for cancellation of
its union registration.11
On September 4, 2004 respondent PIGLAS union filed a petition for
certification election12 that petitioner company also opposed, alleging that
the new union’s officers and members were also those who comprised the
old union. According to the company, the employees involved formed the
PIGLAS union to circumvent the Court of Appeals’ injunction against the
holding of the certification election sought by the former union. Despite the
company’s opposition, however, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for
certification election.13
On December 6, 2004 petitioner company filed a petition to cancel the
union registration of respondent PIGLAS union.14 The company claimed
that the documents submitted with the union’s application for registration
bore the following false information:
(a) The List of Members showed that the PIGLAS union had 100
union members;15
(b) The Organizational Minutes said that 90 employees attended
the meeting on December 10, 2003;16
(c) The Attendance Sheet of the meeting of December 10, 2003
bore the signature of 127 members who ratified the union’s
Constitution and By-Laws;17 and
 (d) The Signature Sheet bore 128 signatures of those who attended
that meeting.18
Petitioner company alleged that the misrepresentation was evidenced by the
discrepancy in the number of union members appearing in the application
and the list as well as in the number of signatories to the attendance and
signature sheets. The minutes reported that only 90 employees attended the
meeting. The company further alleged that 33 members of respondent
PIGLAS union were members of the defunct HHE union. This, according to
the company, violated the policy against dual unionism and showed that the
new union was merely an alter ego of the old.
On February 22, 2005 the DOLE-NCR denied the company’s petition to
cancel respondent PIGLAS union’s registration for the reason that the
discrepancies in the number of members stated in the application’s
supporting documents were not material and did not constitute
misrepresentation. As for the charge of dual unionism, the same is not a
ground for canceling registration. It merely exposed a union member to a
possible charge of disloyalty, an internal matter. Here, the members of the
former union simply exercised their right to self-organization and to the
freedom of association when they subsequently joined the PIGLAS union. 19
On appeal, the Bureau of Labor Relation (BLR) affirmed the ruling of the
DOLE-NCR. It reasoned that respondent PIGLAS union’s organization
meeting lasted for 12 hours. It was possible for the number of attendees to
have increased from 90 to 128 as the meeting progressed. Besides, with a
total of 250 employees in the bargaining unit, the union needed only 50
members to comply with the 20 percent membership requirement. Thus, the
union could not be accused of misrepresentation since it did not pad its
membership to secure registration.
As for the issue of dual unionism, it has become moot and academic, said
the BLR, because of the dissolution of the old union and the cancellation of
its certificate of registration.20
Petitioner company filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals,21 assailing the order of the BLR. But the latter court dismissed the
petition, not being accompanied by material documents and portions of the
record.22 The company filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching parts of
the record that were deemed indispensable but the court denied it for lack of
merit.23 Hence, the company filed this petition for review under Rule 45.
Issues Presented
The petition presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition for certiorari before it for failure of petitioner company to
attach certain material portions of the record;
2. Whether or not the union made fatal misrepresentation in its
application for union registration; and
3. Whether or not "dual unionism" is a ground for canceling a
union’s registration.
The Rulings of the Court
First. While the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the company’s
petition initially for failure to attach material portions of the record, the
court should have bended back a little when petitioner company
subsequently attached those missing materials to its motion for
reconsideration. As a general rule, petitions for certiorari that lack copies of
essential pleadings and portions of the record may be dismissed but this rule
has not been regarded as absolute. The omission may be cured. 24
The Court of Appeals has three courses of action when the annexes to the
petition are insufficient. It may dismiss the petition, 25 require the
submission of the relevant documents, or order the filing of an amended
petition with the required pleadings or documents. A petition lacking in
essential pleadings or portions of the record may still be given due course,
or reinstated if earlier dismissed, upon subsequent submission of the
necessary documents or to serve the higher interest of justice. 26
Second. Since a remand of the case to the Court of Appeals for a
determination of the substantive issues will only result in more delays and
since these issues have been amply argued by the opposing sides in the
various pleadings and documents they submitted to this Court, the case may
now be resolved on the merits.
Did respondent PIGLAS union commit fraud and misrepresentation in its
application for union registration? We agree with the DOLE-NCR and the
BLR that it did not. Except for the evident discrepancies as to the number of
union members involved as these appeared on the documents that supported
the union’s application for registration, petitioner company has no other
evidence of the alleged misrepresentation. But those discrepancies alone
cannot be taken as an indication that respondent misrepresented the
information contained in these documents.
The charge that a labor organization committed fraud and misrepresentation
in securing its registration is a serious charge and deserves close scrutiny. It
is serious because once such charge is proved, the labor union acquires none
of the rights accorded to registered organizations. Consequently, charges of
this nature should be clearly established by evidence and the surrounding
circumstances.27
Here, the discrepancies in the number of union members or employees
stated in the various supporting documents that respondent PIGLAS union
submitted to labor authorities can be explained. While it appears in the
minutes of the December 10, 2003 organizational meeting that only 90
employees responded to the roll call at the beginning, it cannot be assumed
that such number could not grow to 128 as reflected on the signature sheet
for attendance. The meeting lasted 12 hours from 11:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m.
There is no evidence that the meeting hall was locked up to exclude late
attendees.1 a vv p h i 1
There is also nothing essentially mysterious or irregular about the fact that
only 127 members ratified the union’s constitution and by-laws when 128
signed the attendance sheet. It cannot be assumed that all those who
attended approved of the constitution and by-laws. Any member had the
right to hold out and refrain from ratifying those documents or to simply
ignore the process.
At any rate, the Labor Code28 and its implementing rules29 do not require
that the number of members appearing on the documents in question should
completely dovetail. For as long as the documents and signatures are shown
to be genuine and regular and the constitution and by-laws democratically
ratified, the union is deemed to have complied with registration
requirements.
Petitioner company claims that respondent PIGLAS union was required to
submit the names of all its members comprising at least 20 percent of the
employees in the bargaining unit. Yet the list it submitted named only 100
members notwithstanding that the signature and attendance sheets reflected
a membership of 127 or 128 employees. This omission, said the company,
amounted to material misrepresentation that warranted the cancellation of
the union’s registration.
But, as the labor authorities held, this discrepancy is immaterial. A
comparison of the documents shows that, except for six members, the
names found in the subject list are also in the attendance and signature
sheets. Notably, the bargaining unit that respondent PIGLAS union sought
to represent consisted of 250 employees. Only 20 percent of this number or
50 employees were required to unionize. Here, the union more than
complied with such requirement.
Labor laws are liberally construed in favor of labor especially if doing so
would affirm its constitutionally guaranteed right to self-
organization.30 Here, the PIGLAS union’s supporting documents reveal the
unmistakable yearning of petitioner company’s rank and file employees to
organize. This yearning should not be frustrated by inconsequential
technicalities.
Third. The fact that some of respondent PIGLAS union’s members were
also members of the old rank and file union, the HHE union, is not a ground
for canceling the new union’s registration. The right of any person to join an
organization also includes the right to leave that organization and join
another one. Besides, HHE union is dead. It had ceased to exist and its
certificate of registration had already been cancelled. Thus, petitioner’s
arguments on this point may also be now regarded as moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations in BLR-A-26-3-05 dated May 26,
2006.
G.R. No. 178989 March 18, 2010
EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, Petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EAGLE RIDGE EMPLOYEES
UNION (EREU), Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Eagle Ridge Golf & Country
Club (Eagle Ridge) assails and seeks to nullify the Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated April 27, 20071 and June 6, 2007,2 issued in CA-
G.R. SP No. 98624, denying a similar recourse petitioner earlier interposed
to set aside the December 21, 2006 Decision3 of the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), as reiterated in a Resolution4 of March 7, 2007.
Petitioner Eagle Ridge is a corporation engaged in the business of
maintaining golf courses. It had, at the end of CY 2005, around 112 rank-
and-file employees. The instant case is an off-shot of the desire of a number
of these employees to organize themselves as a legitimate labor union and
their employer’s opposition to their aspiration.
The Facts
On December 6, 2005, at least 20% of Eagle Ridge’s rank-and-file
employees—the percentage threshold required under Article 234(c) of the
Labor Code for union registration—had a meeting where they organized
themselves into an independent labor union, named "Eagle Ridge
Employees Union" (EREU or Union),5 elected a set of officers,6and
ratified7 their constitution and by-laws.8
On December 19, 2005, EREU formally applied for registration 9 and filed
BLR Reg. Form No. I-LO, s. 199810 before the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Regional Office IV (RO IV). In time, DOLE RO IV
granted the application and issued EREU Registration Certificate (Reg.
Cert.) No. RO400-200512-UR-003.
The EREU then filed a petition for certification election in Eagle Ridge
Golf & Country Club, docketed as Case No. RO400-0601-RU-002. Eagle
Ridge opposed this petition,11 followed by its filing of a petition for the
cancellation12 of Reg. Cert. No. RO400-200512-UR-003. Docketed as
RO400-0602-AU-003, Eagle Ridge’s petition ascribed misrepresentation,
false statement, or fraud to EREU in connection with the adoption of its
constitution and by-laws, the numerical composition of the Union, and the
election of its officers.
Going into specifics, Eagle Ridge alleged that the EREU declared in its
application for registration having 30 members, when the minutes of its
December 6, 2005 organizational meeting showed it only had 26 members.
The misrepresentation was exacerbated by the discrepancy between the
certification issued by the Union secretary and president that 25 members
actually ratified the constitution and by-laws on December 6, 2005 and the
fact that 26 members affixed their signatures on the documents, making one
signature a forgery.
Finally, Eagle Ridge contended that five employees who attended the
organizational meeting had manifested the desire to withdraw from the
union. The five executed individual affidavits or Sinumpaang Salaysay13 on
February 15, 2006, attesting that they arrived late at said meeting which
they claimed to be drinking spree; that they did not know that the
documents they signed on that occasion pertained to the organization of a
union; and that they now wanted to be excluded from the Union. The
withdrawal of the five, Eagle Ridge maintained, effectively reduced the
union membership to 20 or 21, either of which is below the mandatory
minimum 20% membership requirement under Art. 234(c) of the Labor
Code. Reckoned from 112 rank-and-file employees of Eagle Ridge, the
required number would be 22 or 23 employees.
As a counterpoint, EREU, in its Comment,14 argued in gist:
1) the petition for cancellation was procedurally deficient as it does
not contain a certification against forum shopping and that the
same was verified by one not duly authorized by Eagle Ridge’s
board;
2) the alleged discrepancies are not real for before filing of its
application on December 19, 2005, four additional employees
 joined the union on December 8, 2005, thus raising the union
membership to 30 members as of December 19, 2005;
3) the understatement by one member who ratified the constitution
and by-laws was a typographical error, which does not make it
either grave or malicious warranting the cancellation of the union’s
registration;
4) the retraction of 5 union members should not be given any
credence for the reasons that: (a) the sworn statements of the five
retracting union members sans other affirmative evidence
presented hardly qualify as clear and credible evidence considering
the joint affidavits of the other members attesting to the orderly
conduct of the organizational meeting; (b) the retracting members
did not deny signing the union documents; (c) following, Belyca
Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja15 and Oriental Tin Can Labor
Union v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,16 it can be presumed
that "duress, coercion or valuable consideration" was brought to
bear on the retracting members; and (d) citing La Suerte Cigar and
Cigarette Factory v. Director of Bureau of Labor
Relations,17 Belyca Corporation and Oriental Tin Can Labor
Union, where the Court ruled that "once the required percentage
requirement has been reached, the employees’ withdrawal from
union membership taking place after the filing of the petition for
certification election will not affect the petition," it asserted the
applicability of said ruling as the petition for certification election
was filed on January 10, 2006 or long before February 15, 2006
when the affidavits of retraction were executed by the five union
members, thus contending that the retractions do not affect nor be
deemed compelling enough to cancel its certificate of registration.
The Union presented the duly accomplished union membership
forms18 dated December 8, 2005 of four additional members. And to rebut
the allegations in the affidavits of retraction of the five union members, it
presented the Sama-Samang Sinumpaang Salaysay19 dated March 20, 2006
of eight union members; another Sama-Samang Sinumpaang
Salaysay,20 also bearing date March 20, 2006, of four other union members;
and the Sworn Statement21 dated March 16, 2006 of the Union’s legal
counsel, Atty. Domingo T. Añonuevo. These affidavits attested to the
orderly and proper proceedings of the organizational meeting on December
6, 2005.
In its Reply,22 Eagle Ridge reiterated the grounds it raised in its petition for
cancellation and asserted further that the four additional members were
fraudulently admitted into the Union. As Eagle Ridge claimed, the
applications of the four neither complied with the requirements under
Section 2, Art. IV of the union’s constitution and by-laws nor were they
shown to have been duly received, issued receipts for admission fees,
processed with recommendation for approval, and approved by the union
president.
Moreover, Eagle Ridge presented another Sinumpaang Salaysay23 of
retraction dated March 15, 2006 of another union member. The membership
of EREU had thus been further reduced to only 19 or 20. This same member
was listed in the first Sama-Samang Sinumpaang Salaysay24 presented by
the Union but did not sign it.
The Ruling of the DOLE Regional Director
After due proceedings, the DOLE Regional Director, Region IV-A,
focusing on the question of misrepresentation, issued on April 28, 2006 an
Order25 finding for Eagle Ridge, its petition to cancel Reg. Cert. No.
RO400-200512-UR-003 being granted and EREU being delisted from the
roster of legitimate labor organizations.
Aggrieved, the Union appealed to the BLR, the recourse docketed as BLR
A-C-30-5-31-06 (Case No. RO400-0602-AU-003).
The Ruling of the BLR
Initially, the BLR, then headed by an Officer-in-Charge (OIC),
affirmed26 the appealed order of the DOLE Regional Director.
Undeterred by successive set backs, EREU interposed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that:
 1) Contrary to the ruling of the BLR OIC Director, a certificate of
non-forum shopping is mandatory requirement, under Department
Order No. (DO) 40-03 and the Rules of Court, non-compliance
with which is a ground to dismiss a petition for cancellation of a
certificate of registration;
2) It was erroneous for both the Regional Director and the BLR
OIC Director to give credence to the retraction statements of union
members which were not presented for reaffirmation during any of
the hearings of the case, contrary to the requirement for the
admission of such evidence under Sec. 11, Rule XI of DO 40-03.
In a Decision dated December 21, 2006, the BLR, now headed by Director
Rebecca C. Chato, set aside the July 28, 2006 order of the BLR OIC
Director, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED and
our Resolution dated 28 July 2006 is hereby VACATED. Accordingly, the
Eagle Ridge Employees Union (EREU) shall remain in the roster of
legitimate organizations.
In finding for the Union, the BLR Director eschewed procedural
technicalities. Nonetheless, she found as without basis allegations of
misrepresentation or fraud as ground for cancellation of EREU’s
registration.
In turn aggrieved, Eagle Ridge sought but was denied reconsideration per
the BLR’s Resolution dated March 7, 2007.
Eagle Ridge thereupon went to the CA on a petition for certiorari.
The Ruling of the CA
On April 27, 2007, the appellate court, in a terse two-page
Resolution,27 dismissed Eagle Ridge’s petition for being deficient, as:
1. the questioned [BLR] Decision dated December 21, 2006 and
the Resolution dated March 7, 2007 Resolution [appended to the
petition] are mere machine copies; and
2. the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was
subscribed to by Luna C. Piezas on her representation as the legal
counsel of the petitioner, but sans [the requisite] Secretary’s
Certificate or Board Resolution authorizing her to execute and sign
the same.
The CA later denied, in its second assailed resolution, Eagle Ridge’s motion
for reconsideration, albeit the latter had submitted a certificate to show that
its legal counsel has been authorized, per a board resolution, to represent the
corporation.
The Issues
Eagle Ridge is now before us via this petition for certiorari on the
submissions that:
I.
[THE CA] COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE COMPANY’S PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND DENYING ITS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION CONSIDERING THAT THE COMPANY’S
PREVIOUS COUNSEL WAS AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT THE
COMPANY IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BEFORE
THE [CA];
II.
IN ORDER NOT TO FURTHER PREJUDICE THE COMPANY, IT IS
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT
COULD TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE MERITS OF THIS CASE AND
RESOLVE THAT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THERE
WAS FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION AND/OR FALSE STATEMENT
WHICH WARRANT THE CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE OF
REGISTRATION OF EREU.28
The Court’s Ruling
We dismiss the petition.
Procedural Issue: Lack of Authority
Certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never issued as a
matter of right.29 Accordingly, the party who seeks to avail of it must
strictly observe the rules laid down by law.30
Petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require a "sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 46."31 Sec. 3, paragraphs 4 and 6 of Rule 46 pertinently
provides:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements. — x x x x
xxxx
xxxx
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn
certification that he has not theretofore commenced any action
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals x x
x, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or
proceeding, he must state the status of the same x x x.
xxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, the Rules requires the petitioner, not his counsel, to sign under
oath the requisite certification against non-forum shopping. Such
certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal
party, an assurance to the court that there are no other pending cases
involving basically the same parties, issues, and cause of action. 32
In the instant case, the sworn verification and certification of non-forum
shopping in the petition for certiorari of Eagle Ridge filed before the CA
carried the signature of its counsel without the requisite authority.
Eagle Ridge tried to address its faux pas by submitting its board secretary’s
Certificate33 dated May 15, 2007, attesting to the issuance on May 10, 2007
of Board Resolution No. ERGCCI 07/III-01 that authorized its counsel of
record, Atty. Luna C. Piezas, to represent it before the appellate court.
The CA, however, rejected Eagle Ridge’s virtual plea for the relaxation of
the rules on the signing of the verification and certification against forum
shopping, observing that the board resolution adverted to was approved
after Atty. Piezas has signed and filed for Eagle Ridge the petition for
certiorari.
The appellate court’s assailed action is in no way tainted with grave abuse
of discretion, as Eagle Ridge would have this Court believed. Indeed, a
certification of non-forum shopping signed by counsel without the proper
authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the
petition.34
The submission of the board secretary’s certificate through a motion for
reconsideration of the CA’s decision dismissing the petition for certiorari
may be considered a substantial compliance with the Rules of Court. 35 Yet,
this rule presupposes that the authorizing board resolution, the approval of
which is certified to by the secretary’s certification, was passed within the
reglementary period for filing the petition. This particular situation does not,
however, obtain under the premises. The records yield the following
material dates and incidents: Eagle Ridge received the May 7, 2007
resolution of the BLR Director on March 9, 2007, thus giving it 60 days or
up to May 8, 2007 to file a petition for certiorari, as it in fact filed its
petition on April 18, 2007 before the CA. The authorization for its counsel,
however, was only issued in a meeting of its board on May 10, 2007 or a
couple of days beyond the 60-day reglementary period referred to in filing a
certiorari action. Thus, there was no substantial compliance with the Rules.
As with most rules of procedure, however, exceptions are invariably
recognized and the relaxation of procedural rules on review has been
effected to obviate jeopardizing substantial justice. 36 This liberality stresses
the importance of review in our judicial grievance structure to accord every
party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of
his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.37 But concomitant to a
liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part
of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by
the rules.381avvphi1
To us, Eagle Ridge has not satisfactorily explained its failure to comply. It
may be true, as Eagle Ridge urges, that its counsel’s authority to represent
the corporation was never questioned before the DOLE regional office and
agency. But EREU’s misstep could hardly lend Eagle Ridge comfort. And
obviously, Eagle Ridge and its counsel erred in equating the latter’s
representation as legal counsel with the authority to sign the verification and
the certificate of non-forum shopping in the former’s behalf. We note that
the authority to represent a client before a court or quasi-judicial agency
does not require an authorizing board resolution, as the counsel-client
relationship is presumed by the counsel’s representation by the filing of a
pleading on behalf of the client. In filing a pleading, the counsel affixes his
signature on it, but it is the client who must sign the verification and the
certification against forum shopping, save when a board resolution
authorizes the former to sign so.
It is entirely a different matter for the counsel to sign the verification and
the certificate of non-forum shopping. The attestation or certification in
either verification or certification of non-forum shopping requires the act of
the principal party. As earlier indicated, Sec. 3 of Rule 46 exacts this
requirement; so does the first paragraph of Sec. 5 of Rule 7 pertinently
reading:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action
or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed. (Emphasis added.)
It is, thus, clear that the counsel is not the proper person to sign the
certification against forum shopping. If, for any reason, the principal party
cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly
authorized.39
In addition, Eagle Ridge maintains that the submitted board resolution,
albeit passed after the filing of the petition was filed, should be treated as a
ratificatory medium of the counsel’s act of signing the sworn certification of
non-forum shopping.
We are not inclined to grant the desired liberality owing to Eagle Ridge’s
failure to sufficiently explain its failure to follow the clear rules.
If for the foregoing considerations alone, the Court could very well dismiss
the instant petition. Nevertheless, the Court will explore the merits of the
instant case to obviate the inequity that might result from the outright denial
of the petition.
Substantive Issue: No Fraud in the Application
Eagle Ridge cites the grounds provided under Art. 239(a) and (c) of the
Labor Code for its petition for cancellation of the EREU’s registration. On
the other hand, the Union asserts bona fide compliance with the registration
requirements under Art. 234 of the Code, explaining the seeming
discrepancies between the number of employees who participated in the
organizational meeting and the total number of union members at the time it
filed its registration, as well as the typographical error in its certification
which understated by one the number of union members who ratified the
union’s constitution and by-laws.
Before their amendment by Republic Act No. 9481 40 on June 15, 2007, the
then governing Art. 234 (on the requirements of registration of a labor
union) and Art. 239 (on the grounds for cancellation of union registration)
of the Labor Code respectively provided as follows:
ART. 234. REQUIREMENTS OF REGISTRATION. –– Any applicant
labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire
legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by
law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of
registration based on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address
of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational
meetings and the list of workers who participated in such
meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty
percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit
where it seeks to operate;
xxxx
(e) Four copies (4) of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant
union, minutes of its adoption or ratification and the list of the
members who participated in it.41
xxxx
ART. 239. GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION OF UNION
REGISTRATION. –– The following shall constitute grounds for cancellation
of union registration:
(a) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection
with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-
laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the
list of members who took part in the ratification;
xxxx
(c) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection
with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers,
the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together
with the list of the newly elected/appointed officers and their postal
addresses within thirty (30) days from election. 42 (Emphasis
supplied.)
A scrutiny of the records fails to show any misrepresentation, false
statement, or fraud committed by EREU to merit cancellation of its
registration.
First. The Union submitted the required documents attesting to the
facts of the organizational meeting on December 6, 2005, the
election of its officers, and the adoption of the Union’s constitution
and by-laws. It submitted before the DOLE Regional Office with
its Application for Registration and the duly filled out BLR Reg.
Form No. I-LO, s. 1998, the following documents, to wit:
(a) the minutes of its organizational meeting43 held on
December 6, 2005 showing 26 founding members who
elected its union officers by secret ballot;
(b) the list of rank-and-file employees44 of Eagle Ridge
who attended the organizational meeting and the election
of officers with their individual signatures;
(c) the list of rank-and-file employees45 who ratified the
union’s constitution and by-laws showing the very same
list as those who attended the organizational meeting and
the election of officers with their individual signatures
except the addition of four employees without their
signatures, i.e., Cherry Labajo, Grace Pollo, Annalyn
Poniente and Rowel Dolendo;
(d) the union’s constitution and by-laws46 as approved on
December 6, 2005;
 (e) the list of officers47 and their addresses;
(f) the list of union members48 showing a total of 30
members; and
(g) the Sworn Statement49 of the union’s elected president
and secretary. All the foregoing documents except the
sworn statement of the president and the secretary were
accompanied by Certifications50by the union secretary
duly attested to by the union president.
Second. The members of the EREU totaled 30 employees when it
applied on December 19, 2005 for registration. The Union thereby
complied with the mandatory minimum 20% membership
requirement under Art. 234(c). Of note is the undisputed number of
112 rank-and-file employees in Eagle Ridge, as shown in the
Sworn Statement of the Union president and secretary and
confirmed by Eagle Ridge in its petition for cancellation.
Third. The Union has sufficiently explained the discrepancy
between the number of those who attended the organizational
meeting showing 26 employees and the list of union members
showing 30. The difference is due to the additional four members
admitted two days after the organizational meeting as attested to by
their duly accomplished Union Membership forms. Consequently,
the total number of union members, as of December 8, 2005, was
30, which was truthfully indicated in its application for registration
on December 19, 2005.
As aptly found by the BLR Director, the Union already had 30
members when it applied for registration, for the admission of new
members is neither prohibited by law nor was it concealed in its
application for registration. Eagle Ridge’s contention is flawed
when it equated the requirements under Art. 234(b) and (c) of the
Labor Code. Par. (b) clearly required the submission of the minutes
of the organizational meetings and the list of workers who
participated in the meetings, while par. (c) merely required the list
of names of all the union members comprising at least 20% of the
bargaining unit. The fact that EREU had 30 members when it
applied for registration on December 19, 2005 while only 26
actually participated in the organizational meeting is borne by the
records.
Fourth. In its futile attempt to clutch at straws, Eagle Ridge assails
the inclusion of the additional four members allegedly for not
complying with what it termed as "the sine qua non requirements"
for union member applications under the Union’s constitution and
by-laws, specifically Sec. 2 of Art. IV. We are not persuaded. Any
seeming infirmity in the application and admission of union
membership, most especially in cases of independent labor unions,
must be viewed in favor of valid membership.
The right of employees to self-organization and membership in a
union must not be trammeled by undue difficulties. In this case,
when the Union said that the four employee-applicants had been
admitted as union members, it is enough to establish the fact of
admission of the four that they had duly signified such desire by
accomplishing the membership form. The fact, as pointed out by
Eagle Ridge, that the Union, owing to its scant membership, had
not yet fully organized its different committees evidently shows the
direct and valid acceptance of the four employee applicants rather
than deter their admission—as erroneously asserted by Eagle
Ridge.
Fifth. The difference between the number of 26 members, who
ratified the Union’s constitution and by-laws, and the 25 members
shown in the certification of the Union secretary as having ratified
it, is, as shown by the factual antecedents, a typographical error. It
was an insignificant mistake committed without malice or
prevarication. The list of those who attended the organizational
meeting shows 26 members, as evidenced by the signatures beside
their handwritten names. Thus, the certification’s understatement
by one member, while not factual, was clearly an error, but neither
a misleading one nor a misrepresentation of what had actually
happened.
Sixth. In the more meaty issue of the affidavits of retraction
executed by six union members, we hold that the probative value
of these affidavits cannot overcome those of the supporting
affidavits of 12 union members and their counsel as to the
proceedings and the conduct of the organizational meeting on
December 6, 2005. The DOLE Regional Director and the BLR
OIC Director obviously erred in giving credence to the affidavits
of retraction, but not according the same treatment to the
supporting affidavits.
The six affiants of the affidavits of retraction were not presented in
a hearing before the Hearing Officer (DOLE Regional Director), as
required under the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code
covering Labor Relations. Said Rules is embodied in Department
Order No. (DO) 40-03 which was issued on February 17, 2003 and
took effect on March 15, 2003 to replace DO 9 of 1997. Sec. 11,
Rule XI of DO 40-03 specifically requires:
Section 11. Affirmation of testimonial evidence. – Any affidavit
submitted by a party to prove his/her claims or defenses shall be
re-affirmed by the presentation of the affiant before the Med-
Arbiter or Hearing Officer, as the case may be. Any affidavit
submitted without the re-affirmation of the affiantduring a
scheduled hearing shall not be admitted in evidence, except
when the party against whom the affidavit is being offered admits
all allegations therein and waives the examination of the affiant.
It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence,
since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another
who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statement,
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one
writing them.51 The above rule affirms the general requirement in
adversarial proceedings for the examination of the affiant by the
party against whom the affidavit is offered. In the instant case, it is
required for affiants to re-affirm the contents of their affidavits
during the hearing of the instant case for them to be examined by
the opposing party, i.e., the Union.
For their non-presentation and consonant to the above-quoted rule,
the six affidavits of retraction are inadmissible as evidence against
the Union in the instant case. Moreover, the affidavit and joint-
affidavits presented by the Union before the DOLE Regional
Director were duly re-affirmed in the hearing of March 20, 2006
by the affiants. Thus, a reversible error was committed by the
DOLE Regional Director and the BLR OIC Director in giving
credence to the inadmissible affidavits of retraction presented by
Eagle Ridge while not giving credence to the duly re-affirmed
affidavits presented by the Union.
Evidently, the allegations in the six affidavits of retraction have no
probative value and at the very least cannot outweigh the rebutting
attestations of the duly re-affirmed affidavits presented by the
Union.
Seventh. The fact that six union members, indeed, expressed the
desire to withdraw their membership through their affidavits of
retraction will not cause the cancellation of registration on the
ground of violation of Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code requiring the
mandatory minimum 20% membership of rank-and-file employees
in the employees’ union.
The six retracting union members clearly severed and withdrew
their union membership. The query is whether such separation
from the Union can detrimentally affect the registration of the
Union.
We answer in the negative.
Twenty percent (20%) of 112 rank-and-file employees in Eagle
Ridge would require a union membership of at least 22 employees
(112 x 205 = 22.4). When the EREU filed its application for
registration on December 19, 2005, there were clearly 30 union
members. Thus, when the certificate of registration was granted,
there is no dispute that the Union complied with the mandatory
20% membership requirement.
Besides, it cannot be argued that the six affidavits of retraction
retroact to the time of the application of registration or even way
back to the organizational meeting. Prior to their withdrawal, the
six employees in question were bona fide union members. More
so, they never disputed affixing their signatures beside their
handwritten names during the organizational meetings. While they
alleged that they did not know what they were signing, it bears
stressing that their affidavits of retraction were not re-affirmed
during the hearings of the instant case rendering them of little, if
any, evidentiary value.
With the withdrawal of six union members, there is still
compliance with the mandatory membership requirement under
Art. 234(c), for the remaining 24 union members constitute more
than the 20% membership requirement of 22 employees.
Eagle Ridge further argues that the list of union members includes
a supervisory employee. This is a factual issue which had not been
raised at the first instance before the DOLE Regional Director and
cannot be appreciated in this proceeding. To be sure, Eagle Ridge
knows well who among its personnel belongs or does not belong to
the supervisory group. Obviously, its attempt to raise the issue
referred to is no more than an afterthought and ought to be
rejected.
Eighth. Finally, it may not be amiss to note, given the factual
antecedents of the instant case, that Eagle Ridge has apparently
resorted to filing the instant case for cancellation of the Union’s
certificate of registration to bar the holding of a certification
election. This can be gleaned from the fact that the grounds it
raised in its opposition to the petition for certification election are
basically the same grounds it resorted to in the instant case for
cancellation of EREU’s certificate of registration. This amounts to
a clear circumvention of the law and cannot be countenanced.
For clarity, we reiterate the following undisputed antecedent facts:
(1) On December 6, 2005, the Union was organized, with
26 employees of Eagle Ridge attending;
(2) On December 19, 2005, the Union filed its formal
application for registration indicating a total of 30 union
members with the inclusion of four additional members
on December 8, 2005 (Reg. Cert. No. RO400-200512-
UR-003 was eventually issued by the DOLE RO IV-A);
(3) On January 10, 2006, the Union filed before the
DOLE RO IV-A its petition for certification election in
Eagle Ridge;
(4) On February 13, 2006, Eagle Ridge filed its Position
Paper opposing the petition for certification election on
essentially the same grounds it raised in the instant case;
and
(5) On February 24, 2006, Eagle Ridge filed the instant
case for cancellation of the Union’s certificate of
registration on essentially the same grounds it raised in its
opposition to the Union’s petition for certification
election.
Evidently, as the Union persuasively argues, the withdrawal of six member-
employees from the Union will affect neither the Union’s registration nor its
petition for certification election, as their affidavits of retraction were
executed after the Union’s petition for certification election had been filed.
The initial five affidavits of retraction were executed on February 15, 2006;
the sixth, on March 15, 2006. Indisputably, all six were executed way after
the filing of the petition for certification election on January 10, 2006.
In Eastland Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Noriel,52 the Court
emphasized, and reiterated its earlier rulings,53 that "even if there were less
than 30% [the required percentage of minimum membership then] of the
employees asking for a certification election, that of itself would not be a
bar to respondent Director ordering such an election provided, of course,
there is no grave abuse of discretion."54 Citing Philippine Association of
Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations,55 the Court emphasized
that a certification election is the most appropriate procedure for the desired
goal of ascertaining which of the competing organizations should represent
the employees for the purpose of collective bargaining.56
Indeed, where the company seeks the cancellation of a union’s registration
during the pendency of a petition for certification election, the same
grounds invoked to cancel should not be used to bar the certification
election. A certification election is the most expeditious and fairest mode of
ascertaining the will of a collective bargaining unit as to its choice of its
exclusive representative.57 It is the fairest and most effective way of
determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force.
It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if given
expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to
make their choice, is controlling.58

The Court ends this disposition by reproducing the following apt excepts
from its holding in S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor
Union (SSVLU) on the effect of the withdrawal from union membership
right before or after the filing of a petition for certification election:

We are not persuaded. As aptly noted by both the BLR and CA, these
mostly undated written statements submitted by Ventures on March 20,
2001, or seven months after it filed its petition for cancellation of
registration, partake of the nature of withdrawal of union membership
executed after the Union’s filing of a petition for certification election on
March 21, 2000. We have in precedent cases said that the employees’
withdrawal from a labor union made before the filing of the petition for
certification election is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the
filing of such petition is considered to be involuntary and does not
affect the same. Now then, if a withdrawal from union membership
done after a petition for certification election has been filed does not
vitiate such petition, is it not but logical to assume that such withdrawal
cannot work to nullify the registration of the union? Upon this light, the
Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the BLR did not abuse its
discretion nor gravely err when it concluded that the affidavits of retraction
of the 82 members had no evidentiary weight.59 (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the instant petition for

lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169717 March 16, 2011
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER), ZACARRIAS
JERRY VICTORIO-Union President,Petitioner,
vs. CHARTER CHEMICAL and COATING
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The right to file a petition for certification election is accorded to a labor
organization provided that it complies with the requirements of law for
proper registration. The inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor
organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file
employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization.
We apply these principles to this case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the
Court of Appeal’s March 15, 2005 Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58203,
which annulled and set aside the January 13, 2000 Decision2 of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) in OS-A-6-53-99 (NCR-
OD-M-9902-019) and the September 16, 2005 Resolution3 denying
petitioner union’s motion for reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
On February 19, 1999, Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical
Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms
(petitioner union) filed a petition for certification election among the regular
rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation
(respondent company) with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE,
National Capital Region.
On April 14, 1999, respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to
Dismiss4 on the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor
organization because of (1) failure to comply with the documentation
requirements set by law, and (2) the inclusion of supervisory employees
within petitioner union.5
Med-Arbiter’s Ruling
On April 30, 1999, Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin issued a
Decision6 dismissing the petition for certification election. The Med-Arbiter
ruled that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because the
Charter Certificate, "Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization,"
and "Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-
ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas" were not executed under oath and
certified by the union secretary and attested to by the union president as
required by Section 235 of the Labor Code7 in relation to Section 1, Rule VI
of Department Order (D.O.) No. 9, series of 1997. The union registration
was, thus, fatally defective.
The Med-Arbiter further held that the list of membership of petitioner union
consisted of 12 batchman, mill operator and leadman who performed
supervisory functions. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, said
supervisory employees are prohibited from joining petitioner union which
seeks to represent the rank-and-file employees of respondent company.
As a result, not being a legitimate labor organization, petitioner union has
no right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of
collective bargaining.
Department of Labor and Employment’s Ruling
On July 16, 1999, the DOLE initially issued a Decision8 in favor of
respondent company dismissing petitioner union’s appeal on the ground that
the latter’s petition for certification election was filed out of time. Although
the DOLE ruled, contrary to the findings of the Med-Arbiter, that the
charter certificate need not be verified and that there was no independent
evidence presented to establish respondent company’s claim that some
members of petitioner union were holding supervisory positions, the DOLE
sustained the dismissal of the petition for certification after it took judicial
notice that another union, i.e., Pinag-isang Lakas Manggagawa sa Charter
Chemical and Coating Corporation, previously filed a petition for
certification election on January 16, 1998. The Decision granting the said
petition became final and executory on September 16, 1998 and was
remanded for immediate implementation. Under Section 7, Rule XI of D.O.
No. 9, series of 1997, a motion for intervention involving a certification
election in an unorganized establishment should be filed prior to the finality
of the decision calling for a certification election. Considering that
petitioner union filed its petition only on February 14, 1999, the same was
filed out of time.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the DOLE reversed its earlier
ruling. In its January 13, 2000 Decision, the DOLE found that a review of
the records indicates that no certification election was previously conducted
in respondent company. On the contrary, the prior certification election filed
by Pinag-isang Lakas Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical and Coating
Corporation was, likewise, denied by the Med-Arbiter and, on appeal, was
dismissed by the DOLE for being filed out of time. Hence, there was no
obstacle to the grant of petitioner union’s petition for certification
election, viz:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED and
the decision of this Office dated 16 July 1999 is MODIFIED to allow the
certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Charter
Chemical and Coating Corporation with the following choices:
1. Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical-Solidarity of
Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reform (SMCC-
SUPER); and
2. No Union.
Let the records of this case be remanded to the Regional Office of origin for
the immediate conduct of a certification election, subject to the usual pre-
election conference.
SO DECIDED.9
Court of Appeal’s Ruling
On March 15, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Resolution dated January 13, 2000 and February 17, 2000 are hereby
[ANNULLED] and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.10
In nullifying the decision of the DOLE, the appellate court gave credence to
the findings of the Med-Arbiter that petitioner union failed to comply with
the documentation requirements under the Labor Code. It, likewise, upheld
the Med-Arbiter’s finding that petitioner union consisted of both rank-and-
file and supervisory employees. Moreover, the CA held that the issues as to
the legitimacy of petitioner union may be attacked collaterally in a petition
for certification election and the infirmity in the membership of petitioner
union cannot be remedied through the exclusion-inclusion proceedings in a
pre-election conference pursuant to the ruling in Toyota Motor Philippines
v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union. 11 Thus, considering
that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization, it has no legal
right to file a petition for certification election.
Issues
I
Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in granting the respondent
[company’s] petition for certiorari (CA G.R. No. SP No. 58203) in spite of
the fact that the issues subject of the respondent company[’s] petition was
already settled with finality and barred from being re-litigated.
II
Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in holding that the alleged
mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employee[s] of petitioner [union’s]
membership is [a] ground for the cancellation of petitioner [union’s] legal
personality and dismissal of [the] petition for certification election.
III
Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in holding that the alleged
failure to certify under oath the local charter certificate issued by its mother
federation and list of the union membership attending the organizational
meeting [is a ground] for the cancellation of petitioner [union’s] legal
personality as a labor organization and for the dismissal of the petition for
certification election.12
Petitioner Union’s Arguments
Petitioner union claims that the litigation of the issue as to its legal
personality to file the subject petition for certification election is barred by
the July 16, 1999 Decision of the DOLE. In this decision, the DOLE ruled
that petitioner union complied with all the documentation requirements and
that there was no independent evidence presented to prove an illegal
mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in petitioner union.
After the promulgation of this Decision, respondent company did not move
for reconsideration, thus, this issue must be deemed settled.
Petitioner union further argues that the lack of verification of its charter
certificate and the alleged illegal composition of its membership are not
grounds for the dismissal of a petition for certification election under
Section 11, Rule XI of D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, as amended, nor are they
grounds for the cancellation of a union’s registration under Section 3, Rule
VIII of said issuance. It contends that what is required to be certified under
oath by the local union’s secretary or treasurer and attested to by the local
union’s president are limited to the union’s constitution and by-laws,
statement of the set of officers, and the books of accounts.
Finally, the legal personality of petitioner union cannot be collaterally
attacked but may be questioned only in an independent petition for
cancellation pursuant to Section 5, Rule V, Book IV of the Rules to
Implement the Labor Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tagaytay
Highlands International Golf Club Incoprorated v. Tagaytay Highlands
Empoyees Union-PTGWO.13
Respondent Company’s Arguments
Respondent company asserts that it cannot be precluded from challenging
the July 16, 1999 Decision of the DOLE. The said decision did not attain
finality because the DOLE subsequently reversed its earlier ruling and, from
this decision, respondent company timely filed its motion for
reconsideration.
On the issue of lack of verification of the charter certificate, respondent
company notes that Article 235 of the Labor Code and Section 1, Rule VI of
the Implementing Rules of Book V, as amended by D.O. No. 9, series of
1997, expressly requires that the charter certificate be certified under oath.
It also contends that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization
because its composition is a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code. Respondent
company maintains that the ruling in Toyota Motor Philippines vs. Toyota
Motor Philippines Labor Union14 continues to be good case law. Thus, the
illegal composition of petitioner union nullifies its legal personality to file
the subject petition for certification election and its legal personality may be
collaterally attacked in the proceedings for a petition for certification
election as was done here.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The issue as to the legal personality of petitioner union is not barred by the
July 16, 1999 Decision of the DOLE.
A review of the records indicates that the issue as to petitioner union’s legal
personality has been timely and consistently raised by respondent company
before the Med-Arbiter, DOLE, CA and now this Court. In its July 16, 1999
Decision, the DOLE found that petitioner union complied with the
documentation requirements of the Labor Code and that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that there was an illegal mixture of supervisory and
rank-and-file employees in its membership. Nonetheless, the petition for
certification election was dismissed on the ground that another union had
previously filed a petition for certification election seeking to represent the
same bargaining unit in respondent company.
Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner union on January 13, 2000,
the DOLE reversed its previous ruling. It upheld the right of petitioner
union to file the subject petition for certification election because its
previous decision was based on a mistaken appreciation of facts. 15 From this
adverse decision, respondent company timely moved for reconsideration by
reiterating its previous arguments before the Med-Arbiter that petitioner
union has no legal personality to file the subject petition for certification
election.
The July 16, 1999 Decision of the DOLE, therefore, never attained finality
because the parties timely moved for reconsideration. The issue then as to
the legal personality of petitioner union to file the certification election was
properly raised before the DOLE, the appellate court and now this Court.
The charter certificate need not be certified under oath by the local union’s
secretary or treasurer and attested to by its president.
Preliminarily, we must note that Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No.
948116 which took effect on June 14, 2007.17 This law introduced
substantial amendments to the Labor Code. However, since the operative
facts in this case occurred in 1999, we shall decide the issues under the
pertinent legal provisions then in force (i.e., R.A. No. 6715,18 amending
Book V of the Labor Code, and the rules and regulations 19 implementing
R.A. No. 6715, as amended by D.O. No. 9,20
series of 1997) pursuant to our ruling in Republic v. Kawashima Textile
Mfg., Philippines, Inc.21
In the main, the CA ruled that petitioner union failed to comply with the
requisite documents for registration under Article 235 of the Labor Code
and its implementing rules. It agreed with the Med-Arbiter that the Charter
Certificate, Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization, and
Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at
Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas were not executed under oath. Thus,
petitioner union cannot be accorded the status of a legitimate labor
organization.
We disagree.
The then prevailing Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules of Book
V, as amended by D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, provides:
Section 1. Chartering and creation of a local chapter — A duly registered
federation or national union may directly create a local/chapter by
submitting to the Regional Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of the
following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union
indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapter’s officers, their addresses, and
the principal office of the local/chapter; and
(c) The local/chapter’s constitution and by-laws provided that
where the local/chapter’s constitution and by-laws [are] the same
as [those] of the federation or national union, this fact shall be
indicated accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by
the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by its
President.
As readily seen, the Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization and
Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at
Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas are not among the documents that need to be
submitted to the Regional Office or Bureau of Labor Relations in order to
register a labor organization. As to the charter certificate, the above-quoted
rule indicates that it should be executed under oath. Petitioner union
concedes and the records confirm that its charter certificate was not
executed under oath. However, in San Miguel Corporation (Mandaue
Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue Packing Products Plants-San
Miguel Corporation Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW (MPPP-SMPP-
SMAMRFU-FFW),22 which was decided under the auspices of D.O. No. 9,
Series of 1997, we ruled –
In San Miguel Foods-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Hon. Laguesma, 331 Phil.
356 (1996), the Court ruled that it was not necessary for the charter
certificate to be certified and attested by the local/chapter officers. Id. While
this ruling was based on the interpretation of the previous
Implementing Rules provisions which were supplanted by the 1997
amendments, we believe that the same doctrine obtains in this case.
Considering that the charter certificate is prepared and issued by the
national union and not the local/chapter, it does not make sense to have
the local/chapter’s officers x x x certify or attest to a document which
they had no hand in the preparation of.23 (Emphasis supplied)
In accordance with this ruling, petitioner union’s charter certificate need not
be executed under oath. Consequently, it validly acquired the status of a
legitimate labor organization upon submission of (1) its charter
certificate,24 (2) the names of its officers, their addresses, and its principal
office,25 and (3) its constitution and by-laws26— the last two requirements
having been executed under oath by the proper union officials as borne out
by the records.
The mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in petitioner union
does not nullify its legal personality as a legitimate labor organization.
The CA found that petitioner union has for its membership both rank-and-
file and supervisory employees. However, petitioner union sought to
represent the bargaining unit consisting of rank-and-file employees. Under
Article 24527 of the Labor Code, supervisory employees are not eligible for
membership in a labor organization of rank-and-file employees. Thus, the
appellate court ruled that petitioner union cannot be considered a legitimate
labor organization pursuant to Toyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation Labor Union28 (hereinafter Toyota).
Preliminarily, we note that petitioner union questions the factual findings of
the Med-Arbiter, as upheld by the appellate court, that 12 of its members,
consisting of batchman, mill operator and leadman, are supervisory
employees. However, petitioner union failed to present any rebuttal
evidence in the proceedings below after respondent company submitted in
evidence the job descriptions29 of the aforesaid employees. The job
descriptions indicate that the aforesaid employees exercise recommendatory
managerial actions which are not merely routinary but require the use of
independent judgment, hence, falling within the definition of supervisory
employees under Article 212(m)30 of the Labor Code. For this reason, we
are constrained to agree with the Med-Arbiter, as upheld by the appellate
court, that petitioner union consisted of both rank-and-file and supervisory
employees.
Nonetheless, the inclusion of the aforesaid supervisory employees in
petitioner union does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor
organization. The appellate court’s reliance on Toyota is misplaced in view
of this Court’s subsequent ruling in Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg.,
Philippines, Inc.31 (hereinafter Kawashima). In Kawashima, we explained at
length how and why the Toyota doctrine no longer holds sway under the
altered state of the law and rules applicable to this case, viz:
R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect any violation of the
prohibition [on the co-mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file
employees] would bring about on the legitimacy of a labor
organization.
It was the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715 (1989
Amended Omnibus Rules) which supplied the deficiency by introducing the
following amendment to Rule II (Registration of Unions):
"Sec. 1. Who may join unions. - x x x Supervisory employees and security
guards shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of
the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own; Provided, that those supervisory employees
who are included in an existing rank-and-file bargaining unit, upon the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715, shall remain in that unit x x x.
(Emphasis supplied) and Rule V (Representation Cases and Internal-Union
Conflicts) of the Omnibus Rules, viz:
"Sec. 1. Where to file. - A petition for certification election may be filed
with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of
the employer. The petition shall be in writing and under oath.
Sec. 2. Who may file. - Any legitimate labor organization or the employer,
when requested to bargain collectively, may file the petition.
The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization, shall contain,
among others:
xxxx
(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit
unless circumstances otherwise require; and provided further, that the
appropriate bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees shall not
include supervisory employees and/or security guards. (Emphasis
supplied)
By that provision, any questioned mingling will prevent an otherwise
legitimate and duly registered labor organization from exercising its right to
file a petition for certification election.
Thus, when the issue of the effect of mingling was brought to the fore
in Toyota, the Court, citing Article 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 6715, held:
"Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization composed of both
rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It
cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not
being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and
supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate
labor organization, including the right to file a petition for certification
election for the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes necessary,
therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification
election, to inquire into the composition of any labor organization
whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis
of Article 245 of the Labor Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, as respondent union's membership list contains the names
of at least twenty-seven (27) supervisory employees in Level Five positions,
the union could not, prior to purging itself of its supervisory employee
members, attain the status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being one,
it cannot possess the requisite personality to file a petition for certification
election." (Emphasis supplied)
In Dunlop, in which the labor organization that filed a petition for
certification election was one for supervisory employees, but in which the
membership included rank-and-file employees, the Court reiterated that
such labor organization had no legal right to file a certification election to
represent a bargaining unit composed of supervisors for as long as it
counted rank-and-file employees among its members.
It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election involved
in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November 26, 1992 and September 15,
1995, respectively; hence, the 1989 Rules was applied in both cases.
But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further
amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended
Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989
Amended Omnibus Rules – that the petition for certification election
indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been
mingled with supervisory employees – was removed. Instead, what the 1997
Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain description of the bargaining
unit, thus:
Rule XI Certification Elections
xxxx
Sec. 4. Forms and contents of petition. - The petition shall be in writing and
under oath and shall contain, among others, the following: x x x (c) The
description of the bargaining unit.
In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano, the Court had occasion to uphold the
validity of the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules, although the specific
provision involved therein was only Sec. 1, Rule VI, to wit:
"Section. 1. Chartering and creation of a local/chapter.- A duly registered
federation or national union may directly create a local/chapter by
submitting to the Regional Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of the
following: a) a charter certificate issued by the federation or national union
indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter; (b) the names
of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the
local/chapter; and (c) the local/ chapter's constitution and by-laws; provided
that where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that of
the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by
the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by its
President."
which does not require that, for its creation and registration, a local or
chapter submit a list of its members.
Then came Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands
Employees Union-PGTWO in which the core issue was whether mingling
affects the legitimacy of a labor organization and its right to file a petition
for certification election. This time, given the altered legal milieu, the Court
abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlopand reverted to its
pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition against the
mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor
organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof. Thus,
the Court held that after a labor organization has been registered, it may
exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any
mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its
membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds
for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about
by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the
Labor Code.
In San Miguel Corp. (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue
Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Packaging Products-San Miguel
Corp. Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW, the Court explained that since
the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules does not require a local or chapter to
provide a list of its members, it would be improper for the DOLE to deny
recognition to said local or chapter on account of any question pertaining to
its individual members.
More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor
Relations, which involved a petition for cancellation of union registration
filed by the employer in 1999 against a rank-and-file labor organization on
the ground of mixed membership: the Court therein reiterated its ruling
in Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union of disqualified
employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion
is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
All said, while the latest issuance is R.A. No. 9481, the 1997 Amended
Omnibus Rules, as interpreted by the Court in Tagaytay Highlands, San
Miguel and Air Philippines, had already set the tone for
it. Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold sway in the present altered state of the
law and the rules.32 [Underline supplied]
The applicable law and rules in the instant case are the same as those
in Kawashima because the present petition for certification election was
filed in 1999 when D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, was still in effect.
Hence, Kawashimaapplies with equal force here. As a result, petitioner
union was not divested of its status as a legitimate labor organization even if
some of its members were supervisory employees; it had the right to file the
subject petition for certification election.
The legal personality of petitioner union cannot be collaterally attacked by
respondent company in the certification election proceedings.
Petitioner union correctly argues that its legal personality cannot be
collaterally attacked in the certification election proceedings. As we
explained in Kawashima:
Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere
bystander to any petition for certification election; such proceeding is non-
adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine
which organization will represent the employees in their collective
bargaining with the employer. The choice of their representative is the
exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan
interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by
filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation
that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are
actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to
block the certification election. The employer's only right in the proceeding
is to be notified or informed thereof.
The amendments to the Labor Code and its implementing rules have
buttressed that policy even more.33
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 15, 2005 Decision
and September 16, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 58203 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 13, 2000
Decision of the Department of Labor and Employment in OS-A-6-53-99
(NCR-OD-M-9902-019) is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 163532 March 10, 2010
YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs. YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The petition challenges the 16 January 2004 Decision2 and 12 May
2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65460. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the 12 March4 and 3 May5 2001 Resolutions of
the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) in BLR-A-C-7-2-05-01, reversing the
18 December 2000 Decision6 of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga (Regional
Office), in Case No. RO300-0001-CP-002.
Yokohama Employees Union (YEU) is the labor organization of the rank-
and-file employees of Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. (YTPI). YEU was
registered as a legitimate labor labor union on 10 September 1999.
YEU filed before the Regional Office a petition for certification election.
YTPI filed before the Regional Office a petition7 dated 24 January 2000 for
the revocation of YEU’s registration. YTPI alleged that YEU violated
Article 239(a)8 of the Labor Code: (1) YEU fraudulently included the
signature of a certain Ronald O. Pineda (Pineda) in the organizational
documents; (2) Pineda was not aware of any election of union officers; (3)
YEU fraudulently obtained the employees’ signatures by making them
believe that they were signing a petition for a 125% increase in the
minimum wage, not a petition for registration; (4) the employees did not
belong to a single bargaining unit; and (5) YEU fraudulently stated in its
organizational meeting minutes that its second vice president was Bernard
David, not Bernardo David.
In its 18 December 2000 Decision, the Regional Office granted the 24
January 2000 petition. The Regional Office held that YEU committed
misrepresentation: (1) YEU failed to remove Pineda’s signature from the
organizational documents despite instructions to do so; and (2) YEU
declared that it conducted an election of union officers when, in truth, it did
not.
YEU appealed the 18 December 2000 Decision to the BLR. In its 12 March
2001 Resolution, the BLR reversed the 18 December 2000 Decision. The
BLR found that (1) Pineda did not approach any officer of YEU to have his
signature removed from the organizational documents; (2) Pineda’s
affidavit that no election of officers took place was unreliable and
inconsistent with his earlier written statement; (3) the affidavit of a certain
Rachelle Gonzales (Gonzales) that no election of officers took place was
unreliable and inconsistent with her earlier resignation letter; (4) the
affidavit of a certain Arthur Calma (Calma) did not state that no election of
officers took place; (5) at least 82 other members of YEU did not question
the legality of YEU’s organization; and (6) 50 YEU members executed
a Sama-Samang Pahayag9 stating that:
3. Noong ika-25 ng Hulyo 1999, kami ay dumalo sa isang pulong para sa
pag-oorganisa ng aming Unyon at pagraratipika ng Saligang Batas at
Alituntunin nito. x x x
xxxx
5. Walang katotohanan ang alegasyon ng Yokohama na walang naganap
na pagpupulong kaugnay ng pag-oorganisa o pagtatayo namin ng
Unyon. Nakakatuwa ring isipin ang alegasyon ng kompanya na hindi namin
lubos na naiintindihan ang aming kapasyahang magtayo at sumapi sa
aming Unyon.
6. Malinaw na ginagawa ng kompanya ang lahat ng paraan upang
hadlangan ang aming karapatan sa pag-oorganisa at kilalanin bilang
kinatawan ng lahat ng mga regular na manggagawa para sa sama-samang
pakikipagtawaran.
7. Sa kabila ng lahat ng ito, kami ay lubos pa ring naninindigan sa aming
Unyon at patuloy na ipaglalaban ang aming karapatan sa pag-oorganisa at
sa sama-samang pakikipagtawaran;10
The BLR also held that (1) YTPI was estopped from questioning the fact
that the Sama-Samang Pahayag was an unsworn document since it filed the
24 January 2000 petition for the revocation of YEU’s registration based on
unsworn documents; (2) the fact that there was no express mention of an
election of union officers in the Sama-Samang Pahayag did not necessarily
mean that no election occurred; (3) there was an organizational meeting and
an organizational meeting may include an election of union officers; (4) any
infirmity in the election of union officers may be remedied under the last
paragraph11 of Article 241 of the Labor Code and under Rule XIV of DOLE
Department Order No. 9; and (5) cancellation of union registration must be
done with great caution.
YTPI filed before the BLR a motion12 for reconsideration. In its 3 May
2001 Resolution, the BLR denied the motion for lack of merit.
YTPI filed before the Court of Appeals a petition13 for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. In its 16 January 2004 Decision, the Court of
Appeals denied the petition and held that the BLR did not commit grave
abuse of discretion: (1) Pineda’s affidavit that no election of officers took
place was unreliable and inconsistent with his earlier written statement; (2)
Gonzales’ affidavit that no election of officers took place was unreliable and
inconsistent with her earlier resignation letter; (3) Calma’s affidavit was
unreliable because he admitted that he stayed at the organizational meeting
for only 20 minutes; (4) the affidavit of a certain Bernardino David (David)
that no election of officers took place was unreliable and inconsistent with
his earlier sinumpaang salaysay; (5) David’s affidavit was only filed before
the BLR when YTPI filed its motion for reconsideration of the BLR’s 12
March 2001 Resolution; (6) Pineda did not approach any officer of YEU to
have his signature removed from the organizational documents; (7)
the Sama-Samang Pahayag was entitled to credit even if it was an unsworn
document; (8) the allegation that the signatures of a certain Denry
Villanueva (Villanueva) and a certain Apolinar Bognot (Bognot) in
the Sama-Samang Pahayag were forged was only raised for the first time
before the BLR when YTPI filed its motion for reconsideration of the
BLR’s 12 March 2001 Resolution; (9) Villanueva and Bognot were not
signatories to YEU’s organizational documents; (10) cancellation of union
registration must be done with great caution; (11) YTPI, in filing the
petition for revocation of YEU’s registration, had the burden of proving that
YEU committed fraud and misrepresentation; and (12) YTPI failed to prove
that YEU committed fraud and misrepresentation.1avvphi1
YTPI filed before the Court of Appeals a motion14 for reconsideration. In its
12 May 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack
of merit.
Hence, the present petition. YTPI raises as issues that (1) the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that YEU did not commit fraud or
misrepresentation, and (2) the Court of Appeals erred in holding that YTPI
had the burden of proving that YEU committed fraud and
misrepresentation.
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Court of Appeals found that YEU did not commit fraud or
misrepresentation:
Anent whether an election of officers was conducted or not, the petitioner
relied largely on the affidavit of Pineda to substantiate its claim that no
election of officers was held by the union. However, respondent BLR
Director accorded greater credence to Pineda’s handwritten statement,
wherein he made references to at least 2 meetings he had attended during
which he had signed the organizational documents, than to Pineda’s
later affidavit, whereby he denied any knowledge of the holding of an
election. A perusal of the affirmative handwritten statement easily explains
why the public respondent preferred it to the negating affidavit, to wit:
Noong unang araw na pumirma ako galing ako sa graveyard. Pagkatapos
yung pangalawang meetinggraveyard din ako, pinapirma ako doon sa
siyam (9) na pirasong papel noong umagang pag-uwi namin. x x x
July 25, 99 - Unang Pirmahan
July 26, 99 - Pinirmahan ko ang siyam na piraso
July 27, 99 - Pinatatanggal ko ang aking pangalan sa listahan
The petitioner also relied on the affidavit of Ma. Rachelle Gonzales attesting
that there was no election of officers, but respondent BLR Director
dismissed the affidavit as nothing but the petitioner’s belated attempt to
establish its claim about the election being held considering that Gonzales
did not even intimate such matter in her handwritten resignation letter to
YEU.
Another affidavit, that of Arthur Calma, stated that no election was held,
but, again, respondent BLR Director gave Calma’s affidavit scant
consideration because the affiant admittedly remained in the YEU office for
only 20 minutes. In contrast, the public respondent accorded more weight to
the sama-samang pahayag executed by 50 YEU members who averred
about the holding of an organizational meeting. The public respondent
justifiably favored the latter, deeming the meeting to include the holding of
an election of officers, for, after all, Art. 234, (b), Labor Code, does not
itself distinguish between the two.
Respondent BLR Director is further assailed for not taking into
consideration the affidavit asserting that no election of officers was ever
conducted, which Bernardino David, YEU’s second vice president,
executed. The omission is not serious enough, however, because
the affidavit was submitted only when the petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the questioned decision, and because the affidavit was
even inconsistent with David’s earlier sinumpaang salaysay, whereby he
attested to his attendance at the organizational meeting and to his election
thereat as vice president.
As to the inclusion of Pineda’s signature in the organizational documents,
the BLR Director correctly ruled that evidence to prove the participation of
YEU in the failure to delete Pineda’s signature from the organizational
documents was wanting. It is not deniable that Pineda never approached any
officer of YEU; and that Pineda approached a certain Tonton whom he
knew to be a union organizer but who was not an officer of the union nor an
employee of the company.
If the petitioner was [sic] sincere and intent on this imputed error, its effort
to show so does not [sic] appear in the record. What appears is its abject
failure to establish Tonton’s actual identity. The petitioner seemed content
in making the insinuation in the petition for certiorari that Tonton was
widely recognized as the organizer behind the creation of YEU. That was
not enough.
In sum, the BLR Director was neither capricious nor whimsical in his
exercise of judgment, and, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. For certiorari to lie, more than mere abuse of discretion is
required to be established by the petitioner. Herein, no degree of abuse of
discretion was attendant.15
YTPI claims that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that YEU did not
commit fraud or misrepresentation. YTPI stated that:
There was evidence that respondent committed fraud and misrepresentation
in its failure to omit the name of Ronald Pineda prior to the filing of the
respondents organizational documents with the Department of Labor and
Employment. On the other hand, the Regional Director held that there
was no election of officers that had taken place during respondent’s
alleged organizational meeting as there was no proof of such
election.16(Emphasis in the original)
The Court is not convinced. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court should include only questions of law — questions
of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers
on what the law is on a certain set of facts, while a question of fact exists
when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. There is a
question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need
of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. Once the issue invites a
review of the evidence, the question is one of fact.17
Whether YEU committed fraud and misrepresentation in failing to remove
Pineda’s signature from the list of employees who supported YEU’s
application for registration and whether YEU conducted an election of its
officers are questions of fact. They are not reviewable.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Court. Absent
grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not disturb the Court of Appeals’
factual findings.18 In Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court held that,
"unless there is a clearly grave or whimsical abuse on its part, findings of
fact of the appellate court will not be disturbed. The Supreme Court will
only exercise its power of review in known exceptions such as gross
misappreciation of evidence or a total void of evidence." YTPI failed to
show that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion.
The Court of Appeals held that YTPI had the burden of proving that YEU
committed fraud and misrepresentation:
The cancellation of union registration at the employer’s instance, while
permitted, must be approached with caution and strict scrutiny in order that
the right to belong to a legitimate labor organization and to enjoy the
privileges appurtenant to such membership will not be denied to the
employees. As the applicant for cancellation, the petitioner naturally had the
burden to present proof sufficient to warrant the cancellation. The petitioner
was thus expected to satisfactorily establish that YEU committed
misrepresentations, false statements or fraud in connection with the election
of its officers, or with the minutes of the election of officers, or in the list of
votes, as expressly required in Art. 239, (c), Labor Code. But, as the
respondent BLR Director has found and determined, and We fully agree
with him, the petitioner simply failed to discharge its burden. 20
YTPI claims that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that YTPI had the
burden of proving that YEU committed fraud and misrepresentation. YTPI
stated that:
Did respondent PIGLAS union commit fraud and misrepresentation in its
application for union registration? We agree with the DOLE-NCR and the
BLR that it did not. Except for the evident discrepancies as to the number of
union members involved as these appeared on the documents that supported
the union’s application for registration, petitioner company has no other
evidence of the alleged misrepresentation. But those discrepancies alone
cannot be taken as an indication that respondent misrepresented the
information contained in these documents.
The charge that a labor organization committed fraud and
misrepresentation in securing its registration is a serious charge and
deserves close scrutiny. It is serious because once such charge is proved,
the labor union acquires none of the rights accorded to registered
organizations. Consequently, charges of this nature should be clearly
established by evidence and the surrounding
circumstances.23 (Emphasis supplied)

5.5 In the Decision dated 16 January 2004, the Honorable Court of Appeals WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 16 January 2004
upheld the BLR Director’s ruling that the petitioner had the burden of Decision and 12 May 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
proving that subject election of officers never took place. SP No. 65460.

5.6 However, the petitioner does not have the burden of proof vis-à-vis SO ORDERED.
whether or not the said elections took place. The respondent has the
burden of proof in showing that an election of officers took
place.21 (Emphasis in the original)

The Court is not convinced. YTPI, being the one which filed the petition for
the revocation of YEU’s registration, had the burden of proving that YEU
committed fraud and misrepresentation. YTPI had the burden of proving the
truthfulness of its accusations — that YEU fraudulently failed to remove
Pineda’s signature from the organizational documents and that YEU
fraudulently misrepresented that it conducted an election of officers.

In Heritage Hotel Manila v. Pinag-Isang Galing at Lakas ng mga

Manggagawa sa Heritage Manila,22 the employer filed a petition to revoke
the registration of its rank-and-file employees’ union, accusing it of
committing fraud and misrepresentation. The Court held that the petition
was rightfully denied because the employer failed to prove that the labor
union committed fraud and misrepresentation. The Court held that:
G.R. No. 196276 June 4, 2014
TAKATA (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS and SAMAHANG LAKAS
MANGGAGAWA NG TAKATA (SALAMAT),Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner TAKATA
Philippines Corporation assailing the Decision1 dated December 22, 2010
and the Resolution2 dated March 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 112406.
On July 7, 2009, petitioner filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Regional Office a Petition3for Cancellation of the
Certificate of Union Registration of Respondent Samahang Lakas
Manggagawa ng Takata (SALAMA1) on the ground that the latter is guilty
of misrepresentation, false statement and fraud with respect to the number
of those who participated in the organizational meeting, the adoption and
ratification of its Constitution and By-Laws, and in the election of its
officers. It contended that in the May 1, 2009 organizational meeting of
respondent, only 68 attendees signed the attendance sheet, and which
number comprised only 17% of the total number of the 396 regular rank-
and-file employees which respondent sought to represent, and hence,
respondent failed to comply with the 20% minimum membership
requirement. Petitioner insisted that the document "Pangalan ng mga Kasapi
ng Unyon" bore no signatures of the alleged 119 union members; and that
employees were not given sufficient information on the documents they
signed; that the document "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi" was not
submitted at the time of the filing of respondent's application for union
registration; that the 119 union members were actually only 117; and, that
the total number of petitioner's employees as of May 1, 2009 was 470, and
not 396 as respondent claimed.4
Respondent denied the charge and claimed that the 119 union members
were more than the 20% requirement for union registration. The document
"Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi sa Unyon" which it presented in its
petition for certification election5 supported their claim of 119 members.
Respondent also contended that petitioner was estopped from assailing its
legal personality as it agreed to a certification election and actively
participated in the pre-election conference of the certification election
proceedings.6 Respondent argued that the union members were informed of
the contents of the documents they signed and that the 68 attendees to the
organizational meeting constituted more than 50% of the total union
membership, hence, a quo rumexisted for the conduct of the said meeting. 7
On August 27, 2009, DOLE Regional Director, Atty. Ricardo S. Martinez,
Sr., issued a Decision8 granting the petition for cancellation of respondent's
certificate of registration, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the respondent Union Certificate of Registration
No. RO400A-2009-05-01-UR-LAG, dated May 19, 2009 is hereby
REVOCKED (sic) and /or CANCELLED pursuant to paragraph (a) & (b),
Section 3, Rule XIV of Department Order No. 40-03 and the Samahang
Lakas ng Manggagawa ng TAKATA (SALAMAT) is hereby delisted from
the roll of legitimate labor organization of this office. 9
In revoking respondent's certificate of registration, the Regional Director
found that the 68 employees who attended the organizational meeting was
obviously less than 20% of the total number of 396 regular rank-and-file
employees which respondent sought to represent, hence, short of the union
registration requirement; that the attendance sheet which contained the
signatures and names of the union members totalling to 68 contradicted the
list of names stated in the document denominated as "Pangalan ng mga
Kasaping Unyon." The document "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi" was
not attached to the application for registration as it was only submitted in
the petition for certification election filed by respondent at a later date. The
Regional Director also found that the proceedings in the cancellation of
registration and certification elections are two different and entirely separate
and independent proceedings which were not dependent on each other.
Dissatisfied, respondent, through Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(BMP) Paralegal Officer, Domingo P. Mole, filed a Notice and
Memorandum of Appeal10 with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
However, on September 28,2009, respondent, through its counsels, Attys.
Napoleon C. Banzuela, Jr. and Jehn Louie W. Velandrez, filed an Appeal
Memorandum with Formal Entry of Appearance 11 to the Office of the
DOLE Secretary, which the latter eventually referred to the BLR. Petitioner
filed an Opposition to the Appeals12 praying for their dismissal on the
ground of forum shopping as respondent filed two separate appeals in two
separate venues; and for failing to avail of the correct remedy within the
period; and that the certificate of registration was tainted with fraud,
misrepresentation and falsification.
In its Answer,13 respondent claimed that there was no forum shopping as
BMP's Paralegal Officer was no longer authorized to file an appeal on
behalf of respondent as the latter's link with BMP was already terminated
and only the Union President was authorized to file the appeal; and that it
complied with Department Order No. 40-03.
On December 9, 2009, after considering respondent's Appeal Memorandum
with Formal Entry of Appearance and petitioner's Answer, the BLR
rendered its Decision14 reversing the Order of the Regional Director, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of Regional
Director Ricardo S. Martinez, Sr., dated 27 August 2009, is hereby
REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Samahang Lakas Manggagawa ng TAKATA (SALAMAT)
shall remain in the roster of labor organizations. 15
In reversing, the BLR found that petitioner failed to prove that respondent
deliberately and maliciously misrepresented the number of rank-and-file
employees. It pointed out petitioner's basis for the alleged noncompliance
with the minimum membership requirement for registration was the
attendance of 68 members to the May 1, 2009 organizational meeting
supposedly comprising only 17% of the total 396 regular rank-and-file
employees. However, the BLR found that the list of employees who
participated in the organizational meeting was a separate and distinct
requirement from the list of the names of members comprising at least 20%
of the employees in the bargaining unit; and that there was no requirement
for signatures opposite the names of the union members; and there was no
evidence showing that the employees assailed their inclusion in the list of
union members.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the BLR
in a Resolution16 dated January 8, 2010.
Undaunted, petitioner went to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
After the submission of the parties' respective pleadings, the case was
submitted for decision.
On December 22, 2010, the CA rendered its assailed decision which denied
the petition and affirmed the decision of the BLR. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated March 29, 2011.
Hence this petition for review filed by petitioner raising the following
issues, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND
SERIOUS ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT BLR AND NOT FINDING ANY VIOLATION BY
SAMAHANG LAKAS MANGGAGAWA SA TAKATA (SALAMAT) OF
THE RULE ON FORUM SHOPPING IN THE FILING OF TWO
VERIFIED APPEALS FOR AND ITS BEHALF. BOTH OF THE
APPEALS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHT BY
PUBLIC RESPONDENT BLR, ON GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF
SAMAHANG LAKAS MANGGAGAWA SA TAKATA (SALAMAT)
WAS COMPLIANT WITH THE LAW. CONSIDERING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING IN THE REGISTRATION OF
SALAMAT, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SAME IS TAINTED WITH
FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION AND FALSIFICATION. SALAMAT
DID NOT POSSESS THE REQUIREDNUMBER OF MEMBERS AT
THE TIME OF FILING OF ITS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION,
HENCE, IT SHOULD BE HELD GUILTY OF MISREPRESENTATION,
AND FALSE STATEMENTS AND FRAUD IN CONNECTION
THEREWITH.17
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that respondent had filed two
separate appeals with two different representations at two different venues,
in violation of the rule on multiplicity of suits and forum shopping, and
instead of dismissing both appeals, the appeal erroneously filed before the
Labor Secretary was the one held validly filed, entertained and even
granted; that it is not within the discretion of BLR to choose which between
the two appeals should be entertained, as it is the fact of the filing of the two
appeals that is being prohibited and not who among the representatives
therein possessed the authority.
We are not persuaded.
We find no error committed by the CA in finding that respondent
committed no forum shopping. As the CA correctly concluded, to wit:
It is undisputed that BMP Paralegal Officer Domingo P. Mole was no
longer authorized to file an appeal on behalf of union SALAMAT and that
BMP was duly informed that its services was already terminated.
SALAMAT even submitted before the BLR its "Resolusyon Blg. 01-2009"
terminating the services of BMP and revoking the representation of Mr.
Domingo Mole in any of the pending cases being handled by him on behalf
of the union. So, considering that BMP Paralegal Officer Domingo P. Mole
was no longer authorized to file an appeal when it filed the Notice and
Memorandum of Appeal to DOLE Regional Office No. IV-A, the same can
no longer be treated as an appeal filed by union SALAMAT. Hence, there is
no forum shopping to speak of in this case as only the Appeal Memorandum
with Formal Entry of Appearance filed by Atty. Napoleon C. Banzuela, Jr.
and Atty. Jehn Louie W. Velandrez is sanctioned by SALAMAT. 18
Since Mole's appeal filed with the BLR was not specifically authorized by
respondent, such appeal is considered to have not been filed at all. It has
been held that "if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is
not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed.
An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect." 19
Respondent through its authorized representative filed its Appeal
Memorandum with Formal Entry of Appearance before the Labor Secretary,
and not with the BLR. As the appeal emanated from the petition for
cancellation of certificate of registration filed with the Regional Office, the
decision canceling the registration is appealable to the BLR, and not with
the Labor Secretary. However, since the Labor Secretary motu propio
referred the appeal with the BLR, the latter can now act on it. Considering
that Mole's appeal with the BLR was not deemed filed, respondent’s appeal,
through Banzuela and Associates, which the Labor Secretary referred to the
BLR was the only existing appeal with the BLR for resolution. There is,
therefore, no merit to petitioner's claim that BLR chose the appeal of
Banzuela and Associates over Mole's appeal.
The case of Abbott Laboratories Philippines, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories
Employees Union20 cited by petitioner is not at all applicable in this case as
the issue therein is the authority of the Labor Secretary to review the
decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over decision of the Regional Director in cases
involving cancellations of certificate of registration of labor unions. We
found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Secretary of Labor in
not acting on therein petitioner's appeal. The decision of the Bureau of
Labor Relations on cases brought before it on appeal from the Regional
Director are final and executory. Hence, the remedy of the aggrieved party
is to seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
and the Rules of Court. In this case, after the Labor Secretary motu propio
referred respondent's appeal filed with it to the BLR which rendered its
decision reversing the Regional Director, petitioner went directly to the CA
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
As to the second issue, petitioner seeks the cancellation of respondent's
registration on grounds offraud and misrepresentation bearing on the
minimum requirement of the law as to its membership, considering the big
disparity in numbers, between the organizational meeting and the list of
members, and so misleading the BLR that it obtained the minimum required
number of employees for purposes of organization and registration.
We find no merit in the arguments.
Art. 234 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 234. Requirements of Registration. - A federation, national union or
industry or trade union center or an independent union shall acquire legal
personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law
to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of
registration based on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (₱50.00)registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address
of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational
meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such
meetings;
(c) In case the applicant is an independent union, the names of all
its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the
employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more
years, copies of its annual financial reports; and
(e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant
union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the
members who participated in it."
And after the issuance of the certificate of registration, the labor
organization's registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of
registrati on proceedings in accordance with Articles 238 and 239 of the
Labor Code. And the cancellation of union certificate of registration and the
grounds thereof are as follows:
ART. 238. Cancellation of Registration. - The certificate of registration of
any legitimate labor organization, whether national or local, may be
cancelled by the Bureau, after due hearing, only on the grounds specified in
Article 239 hereof.
ART. 239. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration. - The following
may constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration:
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with
the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or
amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of
members who took part in the ratification;
(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with
the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the
list of voters;
(c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.
Petitioner's charge that respondent committed misrepresentation and fraud
in securing its certificate of registration is a serious charge and must be
carefully evaluated. Allegations thereof should be compounded with
supporting circumstances and evidence.21 We find no evidence on record to
support petitioner's accusation.
Petitioner's allegation of misrepresentation and fraud is based on its claim
that during the organizational meeting on May 1, 2009, only 68 employees
attended, while respondent claimed that it has 119 members as shown in the
document denominated as "Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng Unyon;" hence,
respondent misrepresented on the 20% requirement of the law as to its
membership.
We do not agree.
It does not appear in Article 234 (b) of the Labor Code that the attendees in
the organizational meeting must comprise 20% of the employees in the
bargaining unit. In fact, even the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Labor Code does not so provide. It is only under Article 234 (c) that
requires the names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent
(20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate.
Clearly, the 20% minimum requirement pertains to the employees’
membership in the union and not to the list of workers who participated in
the organizational meeting. Indeed, Article 234 (b) and (c) provide for
separate requirements, which must be submitted for the union's registration,
and which respondent did submit. Here, the total number of employees in
the bargaining unit was 396, and 20% of which was about 79. Respondent
submitted a document entitled "Pangalan ng Mga Kasapi ng Unyon"
showing the names of 119 employees as union members, thus respondent
sufficiently complied even beyond the 20% minimum membership
requirement. Respondent also submitted the attendance sheet of the
organizational meeting which contained the names and signatures of the 68
union members who attended the meeting. Considering that there are 119
union members which are more than 20% of all the employees of the
bargaining unit, and since the law does not provide for the required number
of members to attend the organizational meeting, the 68 attendees which
comprised at least the majority of the 119 union members would already
constitute a quorum for the meeting to proceed and to validly ratify the
Constitution and By-laws of the union. There is, therefore, no basis for
petitioner to contend that grounds exist for the cancellation of respondent's
union registration. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for
cancellation of union registration under Article 239 of the Labor Code, the
nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling
enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members. 22
Petitioner's claim that the alleged union members signed documents without
adequate information is not persuasive. The one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.23 In fact, we note
that not one of those listed in the document denominated as "Pangalan ng
Mga Kasaping Unyon" had come forward to deny their membership with
respondent. Notably, it had not been rebutted that the same union members
had signed the document entitled "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi,"
thus, strengtheningtheir desire to be members of the respondent union.
Petitioner claims that in the list of members, there was an employee whose
name appeared twice and another employee who was merely a project
employee. Such could not be considered a misrepresentation in the absence
of showing that respondent deliberately did so for the purpose of increasing
their union membership. In fact, even if those two names were not included
in the list of union members, there would still be 117 members which was
still more than 20% of the 396 rank-and-file employees.
As to petitioner's argument that the total number of its employees as of May
1, 2009 was 470, and not396 as respondent claimed, still the 117 union
members comprised more than the 20% membership requirement for
respondent's registration.
In Mariwasa Siam Ceramics v. Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment,24 we said:
For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent, it must be
shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in
connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws
or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification; or, in connection with
the election of officers, the minutes of the election of officers, the list of
voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the
newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.
The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who
participated in the organizational meeting would not, to our mind, provide a
valid reason to cancel respondent’s certificate of registration. The
cancellation of a union’s registration doubtless has an impairing dimension
on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to
be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code, the
nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling
enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.1âwphi1
In this case, we agree with the BLR and the CA that respondent could not
have possibly committed misrepresentation, fraud, or false statements. The
alleged failure of respondent to indicate with mathematical precision the
total number of employees in the bargaining unit is of no moment,
especially as it was able to comply with the 20% minimum membership
requirement. Even if the total number of rank-and-file employees of
petitioner is 528, while respondent declared that it should only be 455, it
still cannot be denied that the latter would have more than complied with
the registration requirement.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.
The Decision dated December 22, 2010 and the Resolution dated March 28,
2011 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 112406, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208986, January 13, 2016
HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. EPIFANIO P.
MEJARES, REMEGIO C. BALURAN, JR., DANTE SAYCON, AND
CECILIO CUCHARO, REPRESENTED BY NAMABDJERA-
HRC, Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 assails the 29 August 2012 Decision2 and the 13
August 2013 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
04058-MIN. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Resolutions
dated 29 June 2009 and 16 December 2009 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC No. MIC-03-000229-08 (RAB XI-09-
00774-2007), and remanded the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch,
Region XI, Davao City for further proceedings.
The Facts
Respondents Epifanio P. Mejares, Remegio C. Baluran, Jr., Dante Saycon,
and Cecilio Cucharo (respondents) were among the complainants,
represented by their labor union named "Nagkahiusang Mamumuo ng Bit,
Djevon, at Raquilla Farms sa Hijo Resources Corporation"
(NAMABDJERA-HRC), who filed with the NLRC an illegal dismissal case
against petitioner Hijo Resources Corporation (HRC).
Complainants (which include the respondents herein) alleged that petitioner
HRC, formerly known as Hijo Plantation Incorporated (HPI), is the owner
of agricultural lands in Madum, Tagum, Davao del Norte, which were
planted primarily with Cavendish bananas. In 2000, HPI was renamed as
HRC. In December 2003, HRC's application for the conversion of its
agricultural lands into agri-industrial use was approved. The machineries
and equipment formerly used by HPI continued to be utilized by HRC.
Complainants claimed that they were employed by HPI as farm workers in
HPI's plantations occupying various positions as area harvesters, packing
house workers, loaders, or labelers. In 2001, complainants were absorbed by
HRC, but they were working under the contractor-growers: Buenaventura
Tano (Bit Farm); Djerame Pausa (Djevon Farm); and Ramon Q. Laurente
(Raquilla Farm). Complainants asserted that these contractor-growers
received compensation from HRC and were under the control of HRC. They
further alleged that the contractor-growers did not have their own
capitalization, farm machineries, and equipment.
On 1 July 2007, complainants formed their union NAMABDJERA-HRC,
which was later registered with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE). On 24 August 2007, NAMABDJERA-HRC filed a petition for
certification election before the DOLE.
When HRC learned that complainants formed a union, the three contractor-
growers filed with the DOLE a notice of cessation of business operations. In
September 2007, complainants were terminated from their employment on
the ground of cessation of business operations by the contractor-growers of
HRC. On 19 September 2007, complainants, represented by
NAMABDJERA-HRC, filed a case for unfair labor practices, illegal
dismissal, and illegal deductions with prayer for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees before the NLRC.
On 19 November 2007, DOLE Med-Arbiter Lito A. Jasa issued an
Order,4 dismissing NAMABDJERA-HRC's petition for certification
election on the ground that there was no employer-employee relationship
between complainants (members of NAMABDJERA-HRC) and HRC.
Complainants did not appeal the Order of Med-Arbiter Jasa but pursued the
illegal dismissal case they filed.
On 4 January 2008, HRC filed a motion to inhibit Labor Arbiter Maria
Christina S. Sagmit and moved to dismiss the complaint for illegal
dismissal. The motion to dismiss was anchored on the following arguments:
(1) Lack of jurisdiction under the principle of res judicata; and (2) The
Order of the Med-Arbiter finding that complainants were not employees of
HRC, which complainants did not appeal, had become final and executory.
The Labor Arbiter's Ruling

On 5 February 2008, Labor Arbiter Sagmit denied the motion to inhibit.
Labor Arbiter Sagmit likewise denied the motion to dismiss in an Order
dated 12 February 2008. Labor Arbiter Sagmit held that res judicata does
not apply. Citing the cases of Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc. v.
IAC5 and Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. v. Pepito,6 the Labor Arbiter ruled that
the decision of the Med-Arbiter in a certification election case, by the nature
of that proceedings, does not foreclose further dispute between the parties as
to the existence or non-existence of employer-employee relationship
between them. Thus, the finding of Med-Arbiter Jasa that no employment
relationship exists between HRC and complainants does not bar the Labor
Arbiter from making his own independent finding on the same issue. The
non-litigious nature of the proceedings before the Med-Arbiter does not
prevent the Labor Arbiter from hearing and deciding the case. Thus, Labor
Arbiter Sagmit denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the parties to file
their position papers.
HRC filed with the NLRC a petition for certiorari with a prayer for
temporary restraining order, seeking to nullify the 5 February 2008 and 12
February 2008 Orders of Labor Arbiter Sagmit.
The Ruling of the NLRC
The NLRC granted the petition, holding that Labor Arbiter Sagmit gravely
abused her discretion in denying HRC's motion to dismiss. The NLRC held
that the Med-Arbiter Order dated 19 November 2007 dismissing the
certification election case on the ground of lack of employer-employee
relationship between HRC and complainants (members of
NAMABDJERA-HRC) constitutes res judicata under the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment, and thus, warrants the dismissal of the case.
The NLRC ruled that the Med-Arbiter exercises quasi-judicial power and
the Med-Arbiter's decisions and orders have, upon their finality, the force
and effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata.
On the issue of inhibition, the NLRC found it moot and academic in view of
Labor Arbiter Sagmit's voluntary inhibition from the case as per Order
dated 11 March 2009.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found the ruling in the Sandoval case more applicable
in this case. The Court of Appeals noted that the Sandoval case, which also
involved a petition for certification election and an illegal dismissal case
filed by the union members against the alleged employer, is on all fours
with this case. The issue in Sandoval on the effect of the Med-Arbiter's
findings as to the existence of employer-employee relationship is the very
same issue raised in this case. On the other hand, the case of Chris
Garments Corp. v. Hon. Sto. Tomas7 cited by the NLRC, which involved
three petitions for certification election filed by the same union, is of a
different factual milieu.
The Court of Appeals held that the certification proceedings before the
Med-Arbiter are non-adversarial and merely investigative. On the other
hand, under Article 217 of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases. Although the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter are also described as non-litigious, the
Court of Appeals noted that the Labor Arbiter is given wide latitude in
ascertaining the existence of employment relationship. Thus, unlike the
Med-Artbiter, the Labor Arbiter may conduct clarificatory hearings and
even avail of ocular inspection to ascertain facts speedily.
Hence, the Court of Appeals concluded that the decision in a certification
election case does not foreclose further dispute as to the existence or non-
existence of an employer-employee relationship between HRC and the
complainants.
On 29 August 2012, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
Resolutions dated June 29, 2009 and December 16, 2009 of the National
Labor Relations Commission are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Let NLRC CASE No. RAB-XI-09-00774-0707 be remanded to the
Regional Arbitration Branch, Region XI, Davao City for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
The Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the NLRC ruling and
remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
There is no question that the Med-Arbiter has the authority to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties in a
petition for certification election. As held in M. Y. San Biscuits, Inc. v.
Acting Sec. Laguesma:9
Under Article 226 of the Labor Code, as amended, the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), of which the med-arbiter is an officer, has the following
jurisdiction –
"ART. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. - The Bureau of Labor Relations
and the Labor Relations Divisionfs] in the regional offices of the
Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at
their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-
union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems
arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces
whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the
implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which
shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before
it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties." (Italics supplied)
From the foregoing, the BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to inter alia, decide all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or
affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural
or non-agricultural. Necessarily, in the exercise of this jurisdiction over
labor-management relations, the med-arbiter has the authority, original and
exclusive, to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between the parties.
Apropos to the present case, once there is a determination as to the
existence of such a relationship, the med-arbiter can then decide the
certification election case. As the authority to determine the employer-
employee relationship is necessary and indispensable in the exercise of
jurisdiction by the med-arbiter, his finding thereon may only be reviewed
and reversed by the Secretary of Labor who exercises appellate jurisdiction
under Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides -
"ART. 259. Appeal from certification election orders. - Any party to an
election may appeal the order or results of the election as determined by the
Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment on the
ground that the rules and regulations or parts thereof established by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment for the conduct of the election have
been violated. Such appeal shall be decided within fifteen (15) calendar
days."10
In this case, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order dated 19 November 2007,
dismissing the certification election case because of lack of employer-
employee relationship between HRC and the members of the respondent
union. The order dismissing the petition was issued after the members of the
respondent union were terminated from their employment in September
2007, which led to the filing of the illegal dismissal case before the NLRC
on 19 September 2007. Considering their termination from work, it would
have been futile for the members of the respondent union to appeal the
Med-Arbiter' s order in the certification election case to the DOLE
Secretary. Instead, they pursued the illegal dismissal case filed before the
NLRC.
The Court is tasked to resolve the issue of whether the Labor Arbiter, in the
illegal dismissal case, is bound by the ruling of the Med-Arbiter regarding
the existence or non-existence of employer-employee relationship between
the parties in the certification election case.
The Court rules in the negative. As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts
in this case are very similar to those in the Sandoval case, which also
involved the issue of whether the ruling in a certification election case on
the existence or non-existence of an employer-employee relationship
operates as res judicata in the illegal dismissal case filed before the NLRC.
In Sandoval, the DOLE Undersecretary reversed the finding of the Med-
Arbiter in a certification election case and ruled that there was no employer-
employee relationship between the members of the petitioner union and Decision and the 13 August 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. (SSI), since the former were employees of the CA-G.R. SP No. 04058-MIN.
subcontractors. Subsequently, several illegal dismissal cases were filed by
some members of the petitioner union against SSI. Both the Labor Arbiter SO ORDERED.
and the NLRC ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship
between the parties, citing the resolution of the DOLE Undersecretary in the
certification election case. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC ruling
and held that the members of the petitioner union were employees of SSI.
On appeal, this Court affirmed the appellate court's decision and ruled that
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in relying on the pronouncement of
the DOLE Undersecretary that there was no employer-employee
relationship between the parties. The Court cited the ruling in the Manila
Golf11 case that the decision in a certification election case, by the very
nature of that proceeding, does not foreclose all further dispute between the
parties as to the existence or non-existence of an employer-employee
relationship between them.

This case is different from the Chris Garments case cited by the NLRC
where the Court held that the matter of employer-employee relationship has
been resolved with finality by the DOLE Secretary, whose factual findings
were not appealed by the losing party. As mentioned earlier, the Med-
Arbiter's order in this case dismissing the petition for certification
election on the basis of non-existence of employer-employee
relationship was issued after the members of the respondent union were
dismissed from their employment. The purpose of a petition for
certification election is to determine which organization will represent the
employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. 12The
respondent union, without its member-employees, was thus stripped of
its personality to challenge the Med-Arbiter's decision in the
certification election case. Thus, the members of the respondent union
were left with no option but to pursue their illegal dismissal case filed
before the Labor Arbiter. To dismiss the illegal dismissal case filed before
the Labor Arbiter on the basis of the pronouncement of the Med-Arbiter in
the certification election case that there was no employer-employee
relationship between the parties, which the respondent union could not even
appeal to the DOLE Secretary because of the dismissal of its members,
would be tantamount to denying due process to the complainants in the
illegal dismissal case. This, we cannot allow.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 29 August 2012