IE hymenal tear, recent 6, 9 dont bleed on manipulation, but complained of tenderness upon insertion of 1
finger, copious vaginal discharge.[3]
[G.R. No. 137664. May 9, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE a.k.a.
ROBERTO SAN MIGUEL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Roberto Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, Michael San Antonio, Jocel Ibaneta and Abelardo
Triumpante were charged with rape in an amended information which reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of January, 1995, in Salvacion, Buhi, Camarines Sur, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping each other and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) Rowena Contridas against her will, to her
damage and prejudice in the amount that may be proven in court.
Acts contrary to law.[1]
All the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
It appears that at 3:00 in the morning of January 3, 1995, appellant Roberto Padrigone and the other
accused broke into the house of Rowena Contridas, then 16 years old, situated in San Benito, Salvacion,
Buhi, Camarines Sur. Appellant Roberto Padrigone and accused Jocel Ibaneta poked a knife at Rowena
and her fourteen year-old sister, Nimfa,[2] and threatened to kill them if they reported the incident to
others. They gagged Rowena with a handkerchief and Nimfa with a handtowel. Then, appellant undressed
Rowena, forced her to lie down and sexually violated her while his co-accused watched with
glee. Accused Jocel Ibanita tried to rape Nimfa but failed because she was able to elude him.
After appellant satisfied his lust on Rowena, the other accused took their turns. Every one of the
accused raped Rowena. Before they left, they warned the sisters not to report the incident or else they will
kill them.
Despite the threats, Rowena and Nimfa reported the incident to the police and identified appellant
and his co-accused as the perpetrators. However, based on the police blotter, Rowena stated that it was
only appellant who raped her.
Dr. Damiana Claveria, Municipal Health Officer, conducted a medical examination on Rowena and
found the following:
patient very talkative, incoherent as to questions asked.
PE no signs of external injury
According to Dr. Claveria, there is a possibility that the fluids found inside Rowenas vagina may be
semen. She added that it was possible for Rowena to have only two hymenal tears even if four men had
sexual intercourse with her.
Dr. Chona C. Belmonte, a psychiatrist of Cadlan Mental Hospital in Pili, Camarines Sur, testified
that while she interviewed Rowena, the latter was crying, incoherent and had shouting episodes. She was
confined at the Cadlan Mental Hospital for further treatment. Upon further medical consultation, Dr.
Belmonte observed thus:
Rowena was in a depressed mood and at the same time overactive. She was combative, violent, and was
experiencing auditory hallucination, meaning, she heard things that only she could hear. She was also
grandiously deluded, falsely believing that she could do things others could not do. By that time,
according to Dr. Belmonte, Rowena had already lost touch with reality. [4]
Dr. Belmonte diagnosed her illness as Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition.[5] She found that her
mental disorder was not hereditary because before the incident took place, she did not exhibit any unusual
behavior. She concluded that her mental illness was strongly related to a traumatic experience. She noted
that at one point in the treatment, Rowena confided to her that she was raped. [6]
All the accused, including appellant Roberto Padrigone, interposed the defense of denial and
alibi. Appellant claimed that in the evening of January 2, 1995, he and his companions, Jocel Ibanita and
Michael San Antonio, visited Rowena at her house. According to him, Rowena was crying when they
arrived. When appellant asked her what was wrong, she told him that she wanted to elope with him. He
replied that he was not ready as he was still studying. Rowena snapped, its up to him but he might regret
it.[7] While appellant and Rowena were talking, Jocel Ibanita and Michael San Antonio were in the kitchen
cooking noodles. Later, a certain Ismeraldo Quirante, in the presence of several barangay watchmen
patrolling the area, passed by the Contridas house and advised the accused to go home because it was
getting late. They heeded the advice and left the Contridas house at around 11:30 p.m.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution evidence and rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused, ROBERTO
PADRIGONE a.k.a. ROBERTO SAN MIGUEL, GUILTY of the crime of Rape, under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code (as amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659) and hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA, considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. He is likewise directed to indemnify the offended party, Rowena Contridas, the amount of Fifty
thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and to pay the costs of this suit. Accused JOCEL
IBANITA, MICHAEL SAN ANTONIO and ABELARDO TRIUMPANTE are ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence. It being shown that the three accused are presently detained at the Municipal
Jail at PNP, Buhi, Camarines Sur, their immediate release is hereby ordered.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Appellant interposed the instant appeal based on the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE INSPITE OF THE INHERENT WEAKNESSES AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.
 II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECIDING THE INSTANT CASE NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE IN CRIMINAL LAW THAT THE
PROSECUTION MUST RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS EVIDENCE AND NOT ON THE
WEAKNESS OF THAT OF THE DEFENSE.
Appellant contends that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that according to the prosecution witness, Nimfa, he and his co-accused Michael
San Antonio, Abelardo Triumpante and Jocel Ibanita, took turns in raping Rowena while Jocel Ibanita also
attempted to rape her. However, after preliminary investigation, the Municipal Trial Court of Buhi,
Camarines Sur, dismissed Nimfas complaint for attempted rape against Jocel Ibanita because of its
findings that the latter committed only acts of lasciviousness, considering his voluntary and spontaneous
desistance from continuing to perform the acts leading to carnal knowledge. Furthermore, the
investigating Judge entertained doubts about the truth of her story, which was uncorroborated.[9]
We agree with the following observation of the Solicitor General:
[T]he dismissal of the complaint for attempted rape filed by Nimfa against one of the accused, Jocel
Ibanita, during the preliminary investigation stage should not detract from the credibility of her
testimony. Even if the prosecution wanted to, the merits of the dismissal of Nimfas complaint for
attempted rape could not be properly challenged in the criminal proceedings below since the said
proceedings involved only the culpability of the four accused for the crime of rape committed against
Rowena, the sister of Nimfa.[10]
Appellant further claims that Nimfas lack of credibility was underscored when the trial court
acquitted appellants co-accused. Appellants claim is not well taken. Evidence shows that the trial court
acquitted appellants co-accused because of doubt engendered on the extent of their participation in the
sexual assault committed against Rowena in light of Rowenas own statement as recorded in the police
blotter.[11]
Appellant alleges that Nimfas reactions after the rape of her sister are unnatural, unexpected and
mind-boggling,[12] specifically when she resumed her sleep after having been raped and even reported for
work the following day. The contention deserves scant consideration. It is an accepted maxim that
different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling experience. [13]
Further, appellant argues that Nimfa admitted before the police that she did not recognize the
rapists of Rowena. In this connection, we quote with approval the observation of the Solicitor General, to
wit:
Anent the portion of Nimfas testimony wherein she admitted to the defense counsel that she told the Chief
of Police that she was not able to recognize the persons who raped her sister Rowena, the same is capable
of explanation. Accused-appellant Roberto Padrigone was present when Nimfa uttered the
statement. Hence, she was afraid to tell the truth because of the earlier threat to her and sister Rowenas
lives by accused-appellant Padrigone.[14]
We find that Nimfas credibility has not been impaired despite rigorous cross-examination. In fact,
defense counsel was not able to point to any inconsistency in Nimfas testimony. A perusal of the
transcripts of stenographic notes reveals that she was steadfast in narrating the circumstances of the rape
and in pointing to appellant as one of the perpetrators.
Appellant likewise alleges that it was error for the trial court to have dismissed his sweetheart
defense by the mere absence of love notes, mementos or pictures.
In People v. Corea,[15] we held that:
x x x Moreover, even if such averment is true, it does not necessarily follow that no rape can be
committed against ones sweetheart. Such a relationship provides no license to explore and invade that
which every virtuous woman holds so dearly and trample upon her honor and dignity. That relationship is
held sacred by many x x x. A sweetheart cannot be forced to engage in sexual intercourse against her
will. As a matter of fact, proof even of a prior history of a common-law marital relationship will not
prevail over clear and positive evidence of copulation by the use of force or intimidation.
Regardless, the most telling indication that would belie appellants sweetheart theory was the fact
that he had carnal knowledge of Rowena in the presence of Nimfa and his co-accused. It is most unnatural
for lovers to engage in the ultimate expression of their love for each other in the presence of other people.
Appellant assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the trial
court. He claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting Rowena, the victim, when the
latter should have had her sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court deprived appellant of the
opportunity to cross-examine her when she allegedly declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it
was only appellant who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latters conviction.
Appellants contention is misplaced if not misleading. The basis of his conviction was not Rowenas
declaration before the Chief of Police but rather Nimfas testimony before the trial court that it was him
who raped Rowena, among others.[16] In fact, the trial court found, thus:
x x x The evidence adduced by the parties in this case disclosed that accused Roberto Padrigone, a.k.a.
Roberto San Miguel, Jocel Ibanita, Michael San Antonio and Abel Triumpante entered the dwelling of the
Contridas sisters at 3:00 a.m. of January 3, 1995, and at knifepoint successively raped Rowena Contridas,
a 16 year old lass. The victim became insane after the incident and was not able to testify in Court. Nimfa
Contridas, her fourteen year old sister, who was also present that time narrated the incident when her elder
sisters innocence was forcibly violated. Accused interposed the defense of denial and alibi. x x x
The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused Roberto Padrigone ravished
Rowena Contridas against her will and consent, and with the use of a bladed weapon. [17]
Besides, the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as suppression
of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both
parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the
suppression is an exercise of a privilege.[18]
Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the opportunity to
subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to
call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute Psychotic
Depressive Condition and thus cannot stand judicial proceedings yet. [19] The non-presentation, therefore,
of Rowena was not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and
in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister.
Appellant cannot claim that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of Rowenas
statement as recorded in the police blotter. His conviction was based on the trial courts findings of facts
and assessment of the witnesses credibility.Well-settled is the rule that the findings of facts and
assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position
of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand
while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the
furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant
or full realization of an oath, all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness
honesty and sincerity. The trial courts findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of the case.[20]
Besides, in rape cases where the offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages of
twelve to sixteen, we have consistently held that the victims version of what transpired deserves credence,
considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which such a
grueling experience as a court trial, where they are called upon to lay bare what perhaps should be
shrouded in secrecy, exposed them to. This is not to say that an uncritical acceptance should be the rule. It
is only to emphasize that skepticism should be kept under control. [21]
Nonetheless, no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was ravished and her
honor tainted unless the same were true, for it would be instinctive on her part to protect her honor and
obtain justice for the wicked acts committed upon her.[22] Not to be overlooked is the complainants
willingness to face police investigators and to submit to a physical examination which are eloquent and
sufficient affirmations of the truth of her charge.[23]
As regards the matter of damages, the trial court ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the
offended party, Rowena Contridas, the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages.[24] In People v. Belga,[25] it was held that civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the
fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on
different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.Thus, consistently
with present case law which treats the imposition of civil indemnity as mandatory upon a finding of rape,
accused-appellant is ordered to pay the additional amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as civil
indemnity ex delicto.[26]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the assailed Decision, finding accused-appellant Roberto
Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is
ordered to pay Rowena Contridas civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 in addition to moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122899. June 8, 2000]
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
G.T.P. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails (1) the amended decision
of public respondent Court of Appeals [1] dated 03 July 1995 in CA-GR CV No. 33395 affirming the trial
court's judgment ordering herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (hereafter,
METROBANK) to release/cancel the real estate mortgage constituted over the subject property, and (2)
the respondent court's resolution dated 04 December 1995 denying petitioner METROBANK's motion for
reconsideration.
The subject property is a parcel of land in Diliman, Quezon City consisting of six hundred ninety (690)
square meters originally owned by businessman Tomas Chia under Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
16753 (106901) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City. Saddled with debts and business reverses, Mr.
Chia offered the subject property for sale to private respondent G.T.P. Development Corporation
(hereafter, GTP), with assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner METROBANK
secured by the subject property.
Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Bernardo Atienza, acting in behalf of respondent GTP,
went to the METROBANK branch in Quiapo, Manila sometime in the last week of August 1980 to
inquire on Mr. Chia's remaining balance on the real estate mortgage. METROBANK obliged with a
statement of account of Mr. Chia amounting to about P115,000.00 as of August ,1980.
The deed of sale[2] and the memorandum of agreement[3] between Mr. Chia and respondent GTP were
eventually executed and signed on 04 September 1980 in the office of Atty. Atienza. Twelve (12) days
later, or on 16 September 1980, Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and paid one
hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71),[4] for
which METROBANK issued an official receipt acknowledging payment.
This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject
property despite repeated requests from Atty. Atienza, thus prompting respondent GTP to file on October
17, 1980 an action for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia.
In answer to the complaint, Mr. Chia denied having executed any deed of sale in favor of respondent GTP
involving the subject property. Petitioner for its part justified its non-release of the real estate mortgage (1)
upon the advise of Mr. Chia that he never executed any sales agreement with respondent GTP, and (2) by
the fact that there are other loans incurred by Mr. Chia which are also secured by the subject property.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the regional trial court on 11 December 1990 granting the reliefs
prayed for by respondent GTP as plaintiff, viz:
"WHEREFORE, after a careful and thorough study of the record, this Court holds
that in view of the facts contained in the records, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff and against defendants, ordering -
"1.....Defendant Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. to execute the release or
cancellation of the real estate mortgages executed by the deceased defendant Tomas
Chia and his wife, defendant Vicenta Chia, over the property described in TCT No.
106901 of the registry of deeds for Quezon City;
"2.....Defendants to surrender or deliver the owner's duplicate copy of said TCT No.
106901; and,
"3.....Defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P10,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
"The counterclaims set up by both defendants are dismissed.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."[5]
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 24 October 1994 [6] reversing the trial
court's 11 December 1990 judgment, ruling in the main that the one hundred sixteen thousand four
hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71) paid by respondent GTP to petitioner
METROBANK did not extinguish the real estate mortgage inasmuch as there are other unliquidated past
due loans secured by the subject property.
With this unfavorable turn of events, respondent GTP, on 07 November 1994, [7] filed before respondent
Court of Appeals a "motion for reconsideration with alternative prayer to require METROBANK to
furnish appellee (GTP) of the alleged unpaid balance of Mr. Chia." At the re-scheduled date of oral
arguments on 08 March 1995 where METROBANK was supposed to bring before the respondent Court
the current statement of the mortgage debt of Mr. Chia secured by the deeds of mortgage sought to be
released, METROBANK's counsel did not appear; only the lawyers of respondent GTP and Mr. Chia
appeared. Thus, the Court required GTP's counsel to file a memorandum in lieu of oral arguments in
support of its motion for reconsideration.[8] GTP filed its memorandum on March 17, 1995[9] to which a
reply memorandum was filed by METROBANK on April 10, 1995. [10]
On 03 July 1995,[11] the now assailed amended decision was rendered reconsidering the original 24
October 1994 Decision and thus affirming the 11 December 1990 judgment of the regional trial court.
Respondent Court of Appeals took a second hard look at the evidence on hand and seriously considered
METROBANK's refusal to specify any unpaid debt secured by the subject property, in concluding anew
that "the present case for specific performance is well-grounded, absent indubitable showing that the
aforesaid amount of P116,416.71 paid by appellee on September 16, 1980 did not suffice to pay in full the
mortgage debt assumed under the Deed of Absolute Sale, with assumption of mortgage, it inked with the
late Tomas Chia. There is therefore merit in its motion for reconsideration at bench." Petitioner
METROBANK is now before us after its motion for reconsideration of the 03 July 1995 amended
decision was denied by respondent Court of Appeals per Resolution of 04 December 1995. [12]
We find no compelling reasons to disturb the assailed decision.
We quote with favor the following pronouncements of respondent Court of Appeals in the Amended
Decision, thus:
"x x x. In the case under scrutiny, we are convinced that we erred in reversing the
appealed judgment despite the finding that subject property covered by TCT
106901- Quezon City had been sold, in a manner absolute and irrevocable, by the
spouses, Tomas Chia and Vicenta Chan, to plaintiff-appellee, and on September 16,
1980, the latter complied with its contractual obligation thereunder by paying the
total mortgage debt it assumed, amounting according to Metrobank itself,
to P116,416.71, as of September 16, 1980.
"All things studiedly viewed in proper perspective, we are of the opinion, and so
rule, that whatever debts or loans mortgagor Chia contracted with Metrobank after
September 4, 1980, without the conformity of plaintiff-appellee, could not be
adjudged as part of the mortgage debt the latter so assumed. We are persuaded that
the contrary ruling on this point in Our October 24, 1994 decision would be unfair
and unjust to plaintiff-appellee because, before buying subject property and
assuming the mortgage debt thereon, the latter inquired from Metrobank about the
exact amount of the mortgage debt involved.
"The stipulation in subject Deeds of Mortgage that mortgagors' debts subsequently
obtained would be covered by the same security became inapplicable, when
mortgagor sold to appellee the mortgaged property with the knowledge of the
mortgagee bank. Thus, since September 4, 1980, it was obvious that whatever
additional loan mortgagor got from Metrobank, the same was not chargeable to and
collectible from plaintiff-appellee. It is then decisively clear that Metrobank is
without any valid cause or ground not to release the Deeds of Mortgage in question,
despite full payment of the mortgage debt assumed by appellee."[13]
Petitioner METROBANK is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim
that the subject property still secures "other unliquidated past due loans." In Maneclang vs. Baun,[14] this
Court enumerated the requisites for estoppel by conduct to operate, to wit:
"1.....there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts;
"2.....the representation must have been with knowledge of the facts;
"3.....the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the
matter; and
"4.....it must have been with the intention that the other party would act upon it.
Respondent GTP, thru Atty. Atienza, requested from METROBANK that he be furnished a copy of the
full indebtedness secured by the real estate mortgage.[15] In response thereto, petitioner METROBANK
issued a statement of account as of September 15, 1980[16] which amount was immediately settled and paid
the next day amounting to P116, 416.71. Petitioner METROBANK is thus barred from taking a stand
inconsistent with its representation upon which respondent GTP, as an innocent third person to the real
mortgage agreement, placed exclusive reliance. Respondent GTP had the reasonable right to rely upon
such representations as true, considering that it had no participation whatsoever in the mortgage agreement
and the preparation of the statement of account, coupled with the expectation that a reputable banking
institution such as petitioner METROBANK do conduct their business concerns in the highest standards
of efficiency and professionalism. For an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against a person relying thereon. A party may not
go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. In
the law of evidence, whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it.[17]
Just as decisive is petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before respondent Court of Appeals the
current statement evidencing what it claims as "other unliquidated past due loans" at the scheduled hearing
of 8 March 1995. It was a golden opportunity, so to speak, lost for petitioner METROBANK to defend its
non-release of the real estate mortgage. Thus, the following pronouncements of this Court in Manila Bay
Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals et. al,[18] speaking thru Mr. Justice Ricardo Francisco,[19] find
rightful application, viz.-
"It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which
imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which
from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded
on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the
evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his
adversary. x x x"
"No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a
fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be
taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist."
x x x......................x x x......................x x x
"Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to establish the
ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be affected by
the proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may well
be taken as admitted with all the effect of the inferences afforded. x x x"
"The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own control,
and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable
construction upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the
fact to be as claimed by the opposing party."
Verily, petitioner METROBANK's omission to present its evidence only created an adverse inference
against its cause. Therefore, it cannot now be heard to complain since respondent Court extended a
reasonable opportunity to petitioner METROBANK that it did not avail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The amended decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 3
July 1995 as well as its resolution of 4 December 1995 is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013
FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS, JOSEFA A. BACALTOS, NELANIE A. ANTONI, AND
MAUREEN A. BIEN, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY ITS
COMMISSIONERS,Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are
Decision Nos. 2010-0512 and 2011-045,3 dated April 8, 2010 and August 8, 2011, respectively, of
respondent Commission on Audit (CoA) which affirmed Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2008-09-01
(SAT)4 dated September 8, 2008 for the amount of P3,386,697.10 and thereby held petitioners Filomena
G. Delos Santos, Josefa A. Bacaltos, Nelanie A. Antoni, and Maureen A. Bien (petitioners), inter alia,
solidarily liable therefor.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco (Cuenco) of the Second District of
Cebu City entered into a Memorandum of Agreement5 (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical
Center (VSMMC or hospital), represented by Dr. Eusebio M. Alquizalas (Dr. Alquizalas), Medical Center
Chief, appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy
(TNT) Health Program (TNT Program).6 It was agreed, inter alia, that: (a) Cuenco shall identify and
recommend the indigent patients who may avail of the benefits of the TNT Program for an amount not
exceeding P5,000.00 per patient, except those with major illnesses for whom a separate limit may be
specified; (b) an indigent patient who has been a beneficiary will be subsequently disqualified from
seeking further medical assistance; and (c) the hospital shall purchase medicines intended for the indigent
patients from outside sources if the same are not available in its pharmacy, subject to reimbursement when
such expenses are supported by official receipts and other documents. 7 In line with this, Ma. Isabel
Cuenco, Project Director of the TNT Program, wrote8 petitioner Nelanie Antoni (Antoni), Pharmacist V of
VSMMC, requesting the latter to purchase needed medicines not available at the hospital pharmacy from
Sacred Heart Pharmacy or Dell Pharmacy which were supposedly accredited suppliers of the Department
of Health. The said request was approved.9cralaw virtualaw library
The Audit Proceedings
Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions
and referrals for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. On December 14, 2004,
petitioner Filomena G. Delos Santos (Delos Santos), who succeeded10 Dr. Alquizalas, created, through
Hospital Order No. 1112,11 a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter.
Within the same month, Beatriz M. Booc (Booc), State Auditor IV, who was assigned to audit the
hospital, came up with her own review of the account for drugs and medicines charged to the PDAF of
Cuenco. She furnished Delos Santos the results of her review as contained in Audit Observation
Memoranda (AOM) Nos. 2004-21,12 2004-21B,13 and 2004-21C,14 all dated December 29, 2004,
recommending the investigation of the following irregularities:
a. AOM No. 2004-21 x x x involving fictitious patients and falsified prescriptions for anti-rabies
and drugs costing P3,290,083.29;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
b. AOM No. 2004-21B x x x involving issuance of vitamins worth P138,964.80 mostly to the
staff of VSMMC and TNT Office covering the period January to April 2004; and
c. AOM No. 2004-21C x x x covering fictitious patients and falsified prescriptions for other
drugs and medicines worth P552,853.85 and unpaid falsified prescriptions and referral letters
for drugs and medicines costing P602,063.50.15cralaw virtualaw library
Meanwhile, the fact-finding committee created by Delos Santos submitted its Report16 dated January 18,
2005 essentially affirming the “unseen and unnoticeable” irregularities attendant to the availment of the
TNT Program but pointing out, however, that: (a) VSMMC was made an “unwilling tool to perpetuate a
scandal involving government funds”;17 (b) the VSMMC management was completely “blinded” as its
participation involved merely “a routinary ministerial duty” in issuing the checks upon receipt of the
referral slips, prescriptions, and delivery receipts that appeared on their faces to be regular and
complete;18 and (c) the detection of the falsification and forgeries “could not be attained even in the
exercise of the highest degree or form of diligence”19 as the VSMMC personnel were not handwriting
experts.
In the initial investigation conducted by the CoA, the results of which were reflected in AOM No. 2005-
00120 dated October 26, 2005, it was found that: (a) 133 prescriptions for vaccines, drugs and medicines
for anti-rabies allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P3,407,108.40, and already paid by VSMMC
from the PDAF of Cuenco appeared to be falsified;21 (b) 46 prescriptions for other drugs and medicines
allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P705,750.50, and already paid by VSMMC from the PDAF
of Cuenco likewise appeared to be falsified;22 and (c) 25 prescriptions for drugs and medicines allegedly
issued by Dell Pharmacy costing P602,063.50 were also ascertained to be falsified and have not been paid
by VSMMC.23cralaw virtualaw library
In her Comment/Reply24 to the aforementioned AOM No. 2005-001 addressed to Leonor D. Boado
(Boado), Director of the CoA Regional Office VII in Cebu City, Delos Santos explained that during the
initial stage of the implementation of the MOA (i.e., from 2000 to 2002) the hospital screened,
interviewed, and determined the qualifications of the patients-beneficiaries through the hospital’s social
worker.25 However, sometime in 2002, Cuenco put up the TNT Office in VSMMC, which was run by his
own staff who took all pro forma referral slips bearing the names of the social worker and the Medical
Center Chief, as well as the logbook.26 From then on, the hospital had no more participation in the said
program and was relegated to a mere “bag keeper.”27 Since the benefactor of the funds chose Dell
Pharmacy as the sole supplier, anti-rabies medicines were purchased from the said pharmacy and, by
practice, no public bidding was anymore required.28cralaw virtualaw library
Consequently, a special audit team (SAT), led by Team Leader Atty. Federico E. Dinapo, Jr., State
Auditor V, was formed pursuant to Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO) Order Nos. 2005-019-A dated
August 17, 2005 and 2005-019-B dated March 10, 2006 to conduct a special audit investigation with
respect to the findings of Booc and her team.29 Due to time constraints, however, AOM No. 2005-001 was
no longer included in the SAT focus.30 On October 15, 2007, the SAT reported31 the following findings
and observations:
 1. The provision of National Budget Circular No. 476 dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the
guidelines on the release of funds for the PDAF authorized under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8760, as Reenacted (GAA for CY 2001) were not followed; 32cralaw virtualaw library
Rodulfo Cañete
July 24, 2004 01/16/04 01/12/04
2. Existing auditing law, rules and regulations governing procurement of medicines were not
followed in the [program's] implementation;33cralaw virtualaw library

3. The [program's] implementation did not follow the provisions of the MOA by and between
[Congressman Cuenco] and the Hospital;34 and
4. Acts committed in the implementation of the project were as follows:
a. There were [one hundred thirty-three (133)] falsified prescriptions for anti-rabies
vaccines, drugs and medicines [costing] P3,345,515.75 [allegedly] dispensed by
Dell Pharmacy [were] paid by VSMMC from the [PDAF of Congressman
Cuenco];chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
b. [Forty-six (46) falsified prescriptions] for other drugs and medicines costing
P695,410.10 [were likewise reportedly] dispensed by Dell Pharmacy and paid by
VSMMC from the [said PDAF] x x x; and
c. [Twenty-five (25) prescriptions worth] P602,063.50 [were also claimed to have
been] served by Dell Pharmacy but still unpaid x x x.35cralaw virtualaw library
3. Full dosages of anti-rabies vaccines were allegedly given to the patients although it is gross
error to do so for these medicines are highly perishable. These should be refrigerated and
injected immediately and periodically. For instance:
a. Mr. Vicente Perez received the full dosage on November 26, 2003 and again on
November 27, 2003. (Hospital records showed that Mr. Perez was admitted in
March 2003 for surgery.)
b. Mr. Maximo Buaya received the full dosage on January 25 and on February 29,
2004.
c. Mr. Gregorio Rabago received his full dosage on December 6, 2003.
4. The dates of 80 prescriptions for anti-rabies and 45 for other drugs and medicines are earlier
than the dates of the corresponding delivery receipts. The gaps in the dates ranged from 1 to 47
days. On the other hand, 33 prescriptions for anti-rabies had later dates than the dates of the
delivery receipts. The difference in the dates ranged from 1 to 22 days.

5. The Pharmacy Unit still prepared Purchase Request [PR] for the claims Dell [Pharmacy]
Examination by the SAT of the records and interviews with the personnel involved showed that the submitted to that office when the PR is no longer necessary as the medicines have already been
purported patients-beneficiaries of the TNT Program were mostly non-existent and there was no actual taken by the patients.
procedure followed except for the mere preparation of payment documents which were found to be
falsified as evidenced by the following:
6. Of the three South District residents personally interviewed by the Team, two denied having
sought or received help from the [TNT] Program or being hospitalized at VSMMC for dog
1. Thirteen (13) hospital surgeons disowned the signatures on the prescriptions supporting the bite.
claims. Surgeons do not prescribe anti-rabies vaccines; they operate on patients.
7. The hospital social worker, Ms. Mergin Acido, declared that she was bypassed in the
2. Almost all of the patients named in the prescriptions were not treated or admitted at the evaluation of the alleged patients for the TNT Office has clerks who “evaluate” the eligibility
Hospital or in its Out-patient Department. Those whose names appeared on Hospital records of the patients. The prescriptions and referral slips were directly forwarded to the Pharmacy
were treated at different dates than those appearing on the prescriptions: Unit for stamping and submission to the Dell Pharmacy. She had no opportunity then to see the
patients personally.
DATE OF
PATIENT TREATED BILL
PRESCRIPTION 8. Mr. Louies James S. Yrastorza has stated under oath the falsity of the claims for payment. He
stated that he was ordered to submit to the Pharmacy Unit falsified prescriptions accompanied
Leah Clamon by referral slips signed by Mr. James Cuenco for non-existing patients. Subsequently,
Nov. 12, 2003 11/11/03 11/03/03 sometime in September 2007 Mr. Yrastorza “clarified” his statements effectively recanting his
first oath.
Jean Cañacao
9. The Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor certified that out of the 30 names of the
Nov. 30, 2003 11/25/03 11/18/03
patients randomly selected, only 15 were found listed in the registered voters' database.
Felipe Sumalinog
10. Prescriptions were stamped “VSMMC” signed/initialed by the Pharmacist who is off duty as
Dec. 17, 2004 12/10/03 12/08/03 shown by the attendance record, e.g. Mesdames Arly Capuyan, Norma Chiong, Corazon
Quiao, Rowena Rabillas, and Riza Sei[s]mundo.36cralaw virtualaw library
Vicente Perez
Mar. 12, 2004 11/26/03 11/17/03 Subsequently, or on September 8, 2008, the SAT Team Supervisor, Boado, issued ND No. 2008-09-
01,37disallowing the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for anti-rabies with
Vincent Rabaya Sept. 8, 2003 12/12/03 11/28/03 falsified prescription and documents, and holding petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials,
solidarily liable therefor.38 Petitioners’ respective participations were detailed as follows: (a) for Delos
Santos, in her capacity as Medical Center Chief, for signing and approving the disbursement vouchers and
checks; (b) for petitioner Dr. Josefa A. Bacaltos, in her capacity as Chief Administrative Officer, for
certifying in Box A that the expenses were lawful, necessary and incurred in her direct supervision; (c) for
Antoni, in her capacity as Chief of the Pharmacy Unit, for approving the supporting documents when the
imputed delivery of the medicines had already been consummated; (d) for petitioner Maureen A. Bien, in
her capacity as Hospital Accountant, for certifying in Box B of the disbursement voucher that the
supporting documents for the payment to Dell Pharmacy were complete and proper. 39cralaw virtualaw
library
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective appeals40 before the CoA which were denied through Decision
No. 2010-05141 dated April 8, 2010, maintaining their solidary liability, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal[s] of Dr. Filomena [G]. Delos Santos, Dr. Josefa A.
Bacaltos, Ms. Nelanie A. Antoni and Ms. Maureen A. Bien [are] hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
However, the appeal of Ms. Corazon Quiao, Ms. Norma Chiong, Ms. Rowena Rabillas and Ms. Riza
Seismundo is hereby given due course. Likewise, Ms. Arly Capuyan who is similarly situated is excluded
although she did not file her appeal. ND No. 2008-09-01 (SAT) dated September 8, 2008 involving the
amount of P3,386,697.10 is hereby affirmed with the modification by excluding therein the names [of[
Ms. Corazon Quiao, Ms. Norma Chiong, Ms. Rowena Rabillas, Ms. Riza Seismundo, and Ms. Arly
Capuyan as persons liable. The other persons named liable therein, i.e., Ma. Isabel Cuenco and Mr.
James R. Cuenco, TNT Health Program Directors, and Mr. Sisinio Villacin, Jr., proprietor of Dell
Pharmacy, and herein appellants Delos Santos, Bacaltos, Antoni and Bien remain solidarily liable for
the disallowance.42 (Emphasis supplied)
The Motion for Reconsideration43 of the foregoing decision was further denied in Decision No. 2011-
04544dated August 8, 2011. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CoA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
petitioners solidarily liable for the disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent,
and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and
ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional
mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.45cralaw
virtualaw library
Corollary thereto, it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.
Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and
order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is
only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not
based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism.46 In this case, the Court finds no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the CoA in issuing the assailed Decisions as will be discussed below.
The CoA correctly pointed out that VSMMC, through its officials, should have been deeply involved in
the implementation of the TNT Program as the hospital is a party to the MOA and, as such, has acted as
custodian and disbursing agency of Cuenco’s PDAF.47 Further, under the MOA executed between
VSMMC and Cuenco, the hospital represented itself as “willing to cooperate/coordinate and monitor the
implementation of a Medical Indigent Support Program.”48 More importantly, it undertook to ascertain
that “[a]ll payments and releases under [the] program x x x shall be made in accordance with existing
government accounting and auditing rules and regulations.”49 It is a standing rule that public officers who
are custodians of government funds shall be liable for their failure to ensure that such funds are safely
guarded against loss or damage, and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in
accordance with the law and existing regulations, and on the basis of prescribed documents and necessary
records.50 However, as pointed out by the SAT, provisions of the National Budget Circular No. (NBC)
47651 dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for a congressman’s
PDAF authorized under Republic Act No. 876052 were not followed in the implementation of the TNT
Program, as well as other existing auditing laws, rules and regulations governing the procurement of
medicines.
In particular, the TNT Program was not implemented by the appropriate implementing agency, i.e., the
Department of Health, but by the office set up by Cuenco. Further, the medicines purchased from Dell
Pharmacy did not go through the required public bidding in violation of the applicable procurement laws
and rules.53 Similarly, specific provisions of the MOA itself setting standards for the implementation of
the same program were not observed. For instance, only seven of the 133 prescriptions served and paid
were within the maximum limit of P5,000.00 that an indigent patient can avail of from Cuenco’s PDAF.
Also, several indigent patients availed of the benefits more than once, again in violation of the provisions
of the MOA.54 Clearly, by allowing the TNT Office and the staff of Cuenco to take over the entire process
of availing of the benefits of the TNT Program without proper monitoring and observance of internal
control safeguards, the hospital and its accountable officers reneged on their undertaking under the MOA
to “cooperate/coordinate and monitor” the implementation of the said health program. They likewise
violated paragraph 555 of NBC 476 which requires a “regular monitoring activity” of all programs and
projects funded by the PDAF, as well as Sections 123 56 and 12457 of Presidential Decree No.
1445,58otherwise known as the “Government Auditing Code of the Philippines” (Auditing Code), which
mandates the installation, implementation, and monitoring of a “sound system of internal control” to
safeguard assets and check the accuracy and reliability of the accounting data.
By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the
disbursement of funds under the TNT Program and, thus, invoke good faith in the performance of their
respective duties, capitalizing on the failure of the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that their lapses
in the implementation of the TNT Program were attended by malice or bad faith.
The Court is not persuaded.
Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit
rule that was violated.59 For instance, in Reyna v. CoA60 (Reyna), the Court affirmed the liability of the
public officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered claims of good faith, since their actions violated an
explicit rule in the Landbank of the Philippines’ Manual on Lending Operations. 61 In similar regard, the
Court, in Casal v. CoA62 (Casal), sustained the liability of certain officers of the National Museum who
again, notwithstanding their good faith participated in approving and authorizing the incentive award
granted to its officials and employees in violation of Administrative Order Nos. 268 and 29 which prohibit
the grant of productivity incentive benefits or other allowances of similar nature unless authorized by the
Office of the President.63 In Casal, it was held that, even if the grant of the incentive award was not for a
dishonest purpose, the patent disregard of the issuances of the President and the directives of the CoA
amounts to gross negligence, making the [“approving officers”] liable for the refund [of the disallowed
incentive award].64cralaw virtualaw library
Just as the foregoing public officers in Reyna and Casal were not able to dispute their respective violations
of the applicable rules in those cases, the Court finds that the petitioners herein have equally failed to
make a case justifying their non-observance of existing auditing rules and regulations, and of their duties
under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners’ neglect to properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF
facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-
rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne
out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto.65 Had there been an internal control system
installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been exposed, and the hospital would have been
prevented from processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. Verily,
petitioners cannot escape liability for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT Office on
the ground that Cuenco always reminded them that it was his money.66 Neither may deviations, from the
usual procedure at the hospital, such as the admitted bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in the
qualification of the indigent-beneficiaries,67 be justified as “a welcome relief to the already overworked
and undermanned section of the hospital.”68cralaw virtualaw library
In this relation, it bears stating that Delos Santos’ argument that the practices of the TNT Office were
already pre-existing when she assumed her post and that she found no reason to change the same 69remains
highly untenable. Records clearly reveal that she, in fact, admitted that when she was installed as the new
Medical Center Chief of VSMMC sometime “in the late 2003,” Antoni disclosed to her the irregularities
occurring in the hospital specifically on pre-signed and forged prescriptions.70 Hence, having known this
significant information, she and Antoni should have probed into the matter further, and, likewise, have
taken more stringent measures to correct the situation. Instead, Delos Santos contented herself with giving
oral instructions to resident doctors, training officers, and Chiefs of Clinics not to leave pre-signed
prescriptions pads, which Antoni allegedly followed during the orientations for new doctors. 71 But, just
the same, the falsification and forgeries continued, and it was only a year after, or in December 2004, that
Delos Santos ordered a formal investigation of the attendant irregularities. By then, too much damage had
already been done.
All told, petitioners’ acts and/or omissions as detailed in the assailed CoA issuances 72 and as
aforedescribed reasonably figure into the finding that they failed to faithfully discharge their respective
duties and to exercise the required diligence which resulted to the irregular disbursements from Cuenco’s
PDAF. In this light, their liability pursuant to Sections 10473 and 10574 of the Auditing Code, as well as
Section 16 of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts,75 as prescribed in CoA Circular
No. 2009-006, must perforce be upheld. Truly, the degree of their neglect in handling Cuenco’s PDAF and
the resulting detriment to the public cannot pass unsanctioned, else the standard of public accountability
be loosely protected and even rendered illusory.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191263 October 16, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review through this appeal1 is the Decision2 dated 28 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-I I C. No. 03316, which affirmed the conviction of herein accused-appellant Hadji Socor Cadidia
(Cadidia) of violation of Section 53 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
The prosecution presented Marilyn Trayvilla (Trayvilla), a Non-Uniformed Personnel of the Philippine
National Police, who testified that on 31 July 2002 at around 6:30 in the morning, while performing her
duty as a female frisker assigned at the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal I (domestic airport) in Pasay
City, she frisked the accused Cadidia upon her entry at the departure area 4 and she noticed something
unusual and thick in the area of Cadidia’s buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered that it was only her
sanitary napkin which caused the unusual thickness.5Not convinced with Cadidia’s explanation, Trayvilla
and her female co-employee Leilani M. Bagsican (Bagsican) brought the accused to the comfort room
inside the domestic airport to check. When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they
discovered that inside were two sachets of shabu . The two sachets of shabu were turned over to their
supervisor SPO3 Musalli I. Appang (SPO3 Appang).6 Trayvilla recalled that Cadidia denied that the two
sachets of shabu were hers and said that she was only asked by an unidentified person to bring the
same.7 The accused was identified and found to be bound for Butuan City on board Cebu Pacific Airline
as evidenced by her confiscated airline ticket.8 In open court, Trayvilla identified the two sachets
containing shabu previously marked as Exhibits "B-2" and "B-3." She also identified the signature placed
by her co-employee, Bagsican, at the side of the items, as well as the picture of the sanitary napkin used
by the accused to conceal the bags of shabu.9
The second prosecution witness, Bagsican, corroborated the testimony of Trayvilla. She testified that
together with Trayvilla, she was also assigned as a frisker at the departure area of the domestic airport.
While frisking the accused, Trayvilla noticed something bulky in her maong pants.10 As a result, Trayvilla
asked for her help and with the accused, they proceeded to the comfort room inside the domestic airport.
While inside the cubicle of the comfort room, Bagsican asked the accused to open her pants and pull down
her underwear. Inside the accused’s sanitary napkin were two plastic sachets of shabu which they
confiscated. Thereafter, she reported the incident to their supervisor SPO3 Appang, to whom she endorsed
the confiscated items. They then proceeded to their office to report to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group.11 In open court, she identified the accused Cadidia as the one whom they apprehended.
She also identified the two plastic sachets of shabu they confiscated from Cadidia and pointed to her
initials "LMB" she placed on the items for marking as well as the picture of the napkin likewise marked
with her initials.12
Finally, the prosecution presented domestic airport Police Supervisor SPO3 Appang who testified that on
31 July 2002 at around 6:40 in the morning, the accused passed the walk-thru machine manned by two
domestic airport friskers, Trayvilla and Bagsican. When Trayvilla frisked the accused, she called his
attention and informed him that something was kept inside the accused’s private area. Accordingly, he
instructed Trayvilla and Bagsican to proceed to the comfort room to check what the thing was. 13 Trayvilla
and Bagsican recovered two plastic sachets containing shabu from the accused. The plastic sachets
together with the sanitary napkin were turned over to him by the friskers Trayvilla and Bagsican.
Subsequently, he turned over the two plastic sachets and sanitary napkin to the Intelligence and
Investigation Office of the 2 nd Regional Aviation Security Office (RASO), Domestic International
Airport.14 The seized items were then turned over to SPO4 Rudy Villaceran of NAIA-DITG.15 SP03
Appang placed his initials on the confiscated items at the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Office
(PDEA) located at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. 16
The specimens in turn were referred by PO2 Samuel B. Cobilla (PO2 Cobilla) of the NAIA-DITG to
Forensic Chemist Elisa G. Reyes (Forensic Chemist Reyes) of the Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame,
Quezon City for examination.17
Due to the loss of the stenographic notes regarding the latter part of the direct testimony of SPO3 Appang
and of Forensic Chemist Reyes, the prosecution and the accused agreed to dispense with their testimonies
and agreed on the following stipulation of facts:
a. The prosecution will no longer recall SPO3 Appang to the witness stand in view of his
retirement from service;18
b. The parties agreed on Forensic Chemist Reyes’ competence and expertise in her field;19
c. That she was the one who examined the specimen in this case against Hadji Socor Cadidia,
consisting of one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, previously marked as Exhibit "1"
containing 48.48 grams of white crystalline substance of Shabu, and, one (1) knot-tied
transparent plastic bag with marking "Exhibit-2 LMB, RSA containing 98.29 grams white
crystalline substance of Shabu or Methamphetamine Hydrochloride;20
 d. That after conducting laboratory examination on the two (2) specimens, she prepared the
document and reduced her findings into writing which is Chemistry Report No. D-364-02
which is the Initial Laboratory Report marked as Exhibit "C"21; and,
e. That thereafter, Forensic Chemist Reyes likewise prepared the Final Chemistry Report
marked as Exhibit "D."22
The accused, of course, has a different story to tell.
Cadidia testified that on 31 July 2002, at around 8:15 in the morning, she proceeded to the departure area
of the domestic airport at Pasay City to board a Cebu Pacific plane bound for Butuan City. When she
passed-by the x-ray machine, two women, whom she later identified as Trayvilla and Bagsican,
apprehended her.23 Trayvilla and Bagsican held her arms and asked her if she was a Muslim. When she
replied in the affirmative, the two women said that she might be carrying gold or jewelries.24 Despite her
denial, Trayvilla and Bagsican brought her to the comfort room and told her she might be carrying shabu.
She again denied the allegation but the two women told her to undress. 25 When she asked why, they
answered that her back was bulging. In reply, she told them that she was having her menstrual period.
Trayvilla and Bagsican did not believe her and proceeded to ask her to remove her underwear. They later
frisked her body but failed to recover anything.26 Thereafter, the two women asked for money as they
allegedly recovered two plastic sachets containing shabu from her. 27 At this moment, Cadidia became
afraid and called her relatives for money, particularly her female relative Dam Bai. 28 Her relatives arrived
at the airport at around 1 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day but she failed to talk to them because
she has already been brought to Camp Crame for drug examination.29 She called her relatives again to ask
for ₱200,000.00 and to bring the amount at 7 o’clock in the morning of the next day. Her relatives arrived
on the agreed day and time but managed to bring only ₱6,000.00 which the police officers found
unacceptable.30 As a consequence, Cadidia was subjected to inquest proceedings.31 In her re-direct, she
testified that at that time, she was engaged in selling compact discs in Quiapo, Manila. She recalled that
the names of the relatives she called for money were a certain Lani and Andy. 32
The defense presented its next witness Haaji Mohamad Domrang (Domrang) to corroborate the statement
of accused Cadidia that she called up her relatives including him to bring money to the airport and give the
same to the police officers.33 Domrang testified that he knew Cadidia as a jeweller with a place of business
in Greenhills. He recalled at around 9 o’clock in the morning of 31 July 2002, he was with his nephew
when the latter received a call from Cadidia and was told by the accused that she needed money
amounting to ₱200,000.00.34 His nephew told him that he would go to the airport, so he accompanied him.
They arrived there at around one o’clock in the afternoon but failed to see Cadidia. However, they were
able to talk to the police officers at the airport and inquired about the accused. The police officers replied
that she was brought to Camp Crame but will be brought back to the airport at 7:00 o’clock in the
evening.35 The police officers told Domrang and Andy that if they would not be able to raise the
₱200,000.00, they would file a case against Cadidia. Since they were able to raise ₱6,000.00 only, the
police officers rejected the money.36
After the arrest, the following Information was filed in Criminal Case No. 02-1464 for violation of Sec. 5,
Art. II of Republic Act No. 9165:
That on or about the 31st of July 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport 146.77 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a dangerous drug.37
Upon arraignment on 12 August 2002, Cadidia entered a plea of "not guilty."38
On 7 April 2008, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty as charged. The disposition reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 5 of Republic Act [No.] 9165, she is hereby sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and
to pay the fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
The methamphetamine hydrochloride recovered from the accused is considered confiscated in favor of the
government and to be turned to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its disposal. 39
On appeal, the accused-appellant, contended that the trial court gravely erred when it failed to consider the
conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses’ Trayvilla and Bagsican as to who among them
instructed the accused-appellant to bring out the contents of her underwear.40 Another contradiction
pressed on by the defense was the recollection of Bagsican that when she and Trayvilla found the illegal
drugs, Bagsican placed it inside her blazer for safekeeping, in contrast with statement of SPO3 Appang
that when Bagsican and Trayvilla went out of the comfort room, they immediately handed him the shabu
allegedly taken from the accused-appellant.41 Appellant likewise argued against her conviction by the trial
court despite the fact that the identity of the illegal drugs allegedly seized was not proven with moral
certainty due to the broken chain of custody of evidence.42
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the inconsistencies of the
prosecution’s witnesses did not touch on material points. Hence, they can be disregarded for they failed to
affect the credibility of the evidence as a whole. The alleged inconsistencies failed to diminish the fact that
the accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto at the departure area of the domestic airport
transporting shabu. The defenses of frame-up and alibi cannot stand against the positive testimonies of the
witnesses absent any showing that they were impelled with any improper motive to implicate her of the
offense charged.43 Finally, the OSG posited that the integrity of evidence is presumed to be preserved
unless there is any showing of bad faith, and accused-appellant failed to overcome this presumption.44
In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the
alleged contradictory statements of the prosecution’s witnesses did not diminish their credibility as they
pertained only to minor details and did not dwell on the principal elements of the crime. It emphasized that
the more important matter was the positive identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drug.45 Further, it upheld the trial court’s ruling that the
prosecution satisfactorily preserved the chain of custody of evidence over the seized drugs as well as the
integrity of the specimen confiscated from the accused-appellant.46
In this instant appeal, the accused-appellant manifested that she would no longer file her Supplemental
Brief as she had exhaustively discussed her assignment of errors in her Appellant’s Brief. 47
Before this Court for resolution are the two assigned errors raised by the accused-appellant:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF
CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUG.48
We uphold the ruling of both the trial and the appellate courts.
At the outset, We find it unnecessary to discuss the propriety of the charge of violation of Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 against Cadidia for illegal transportation of 146.77 grams of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride by the prosecution. As elucidated by the trial court, "there is no doubt that the accused had
the intention to board the flight bound for Butuan as per her plane ticket and had submitted herself to body
frisking at the final check-in counter at the airport when she was found to be carrying prohibited drugs in
her persons (sic). In like manner, considering the weight of the "shabu" and the intention of the accused to
transport the same to another place or destination, she must be accordingly penalized under Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165, x x x.49"
Now to the issues presented before this Court.
The accused also assails the application of presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of the
witnesses. She claimed that the self-serving testimonies of Trayvilla and Bagsican failed to overcome her
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution.58
Again, we disagree.
In People v. Unisa,59 this Court held that "in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive
on the part of the police officers."

As to the first assignment of error, the accused casts doubt on the set of facts presented by the prosecution
In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the crime
particularly the narration of Trayvilla, Bagsican and SPO3 Appang. She alleges that since the testimonies
against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled the accused
given by the witnesses were conflicting, the same should not be given credit and should result in her
who entered the x-ray machine of the departure area. There was no pre-determined notice to particularly
acquittal. She cited two instances as examples of inconsistencies. First, Trayvilla in her testimony recalled
search the accused especially in her private area. The unusual thickness of the buttocks of the accused
that she was the one who asked the accused to bring out the contents of her underwear. However, in her
upon frisking prompted Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The subsequent
re-direct, she clarified that it was Bagsican who asked the accused. Bagsican, in turn testified that she was
search of the accused would only show that the two female friskers were just doing their usual task when
the one who asked the accused while Trayvilla was beside her. 50 Second, Bagsican in her testimony
they found the illegal drugs inside accused’s underwear. This is bolstered by the fact that the accused on
recalled that after confiscation of the alleged illegal drugs, she placed the items inside her blazer for
the one hand and the two friskers on the other were unfamiliar to each other. Neither could they harbour
safekeeping. However, SPO3 Appang testified that when the two female friskers came out from the
any ill-will against each other. The allegation of frame-up and denial of the accused cannot prevail over
comfort room, they immediately handed to him the seized illegal drugs allegedly taken from Cadidia. 51
the positive testimonies of three prosecution witnesses who corroborated on circumstances surrounding
the apprehension.
In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the
incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have
As final attempt at acquittal, the accused harps on the alleged broken chain of custody of the confiscated
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. 52 Further, the
drugs. She casts doubt on the identity of the drugs allegedly taken from her and the one presented in open
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose
court to prove her guilt.60 She also questions the lack of physical inventory of the confiscated items at the
conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to
crime scene, the absence of photographs taken on the alleged illegal drugs and the failure to mark the
observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. Applying the
seized items upon confiscation.61
foregoing, we affirm the findings of the lower court in the appreciation of facts and credibility of the
witnesses.53
The duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous drugs and substances is discharged when the arresting
law enforcer ensures that the chain of custody is unbroken. Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
Upon review of the records, we find no conflict in the narration of events of the prosecution witnesses. In
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines the chain of custody as:
her direct testimony, Trayvilla testified that both of them asked Cadidia to remove what was inside her
underwear when she and Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room to check what was hidden
inside.54 However, in her re-direct, she clarified that it was really Bagsican who particularly made the b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
request but she was then also inside the cubicle with the accused. 55 This clarification is sufficient for the controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
Court to conclude that the two of them were inside the cubicle when the request to bring out the contents time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
of the underwear was made and the concealed illegal drug was discovered. destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature
of the person who held temporary custody was of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. 62
The other inconsistency alleged by the accused pertains to what happened during the confiscation of the
illegal drug at the cubicle. The accused alleges that Bagsican and SPO3 Appang differed in their
statements. Upon review, We find no such inconsistency. Bagsican testified that after confiscation, she put In Mallillin v. People,63 the requirements to establish chain of custody were laid down by this Court. First,
the two plastic sachets of shabu in her blazer for safekeeping. She further narrated that afterwards, she testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered
turned over the accused and the plastic sachets to SPO3 Appang. 56 SPO3 Appang, in turn, testified that into evidence. Second, witnesses should describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
when the two female friskers went out of the comfort room, they handed to him what was taken from the change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of
accused. The statements can be harmonized as a continuous and unbroken recollection of events. the item.

Even assuming that the said set of facts provided conflicting statements, We have consistently held time
and again that minor inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of the
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As long as the testimonies as a whole presented a coherent and
believable recollection, the credibility would still be upheld. What is essential is that the witnesses’
testimonies corroborate one another on material details surrounding the commission of the crime.57
The prosecution in this case was able to prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses, that the integrity
of the seized item was preserved every step of the process.
As to the first link, Trayvilla and Bagsican testified that upon confiscation of the two plastic sachets of
illegal drug from the accused, the seized items were transferred to SPO3 Appang, who himself confirmed
such transfer. The second link pertains to the point when SPO3 Appang turned over the two plastic sachets
and sanitary napkin to the RASO of the Domestic International Airport. 64 As to the marking, Bagsican
testified that she put her initials and signature on the plastic sachet and the sanitary napkin at the
Investigation Office. Afterwards, the seized items were turned over to SPO4 Rudy Villaceran of the
NAIA-DITG.65 SP03 Appang signed the confiscated items at the PDEA Office which is also located at the
airport.66
As evidenced by the Initial Laboratory Report,67 the specimens were referred by PO2 Cobilla of the
NAIA-DITG to Forensic Chemist Reyes of the Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City for
examination. Finally, based on the Chemistry Report68 of Forensic Chemist Reyes and stipulation69 of
facts agreed upon by both parties, the specimen submitted by PO2 Cobilla tested positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride after qualitative testing. The same specimens contained in the two
plastic sachets previously marked were identified by two female friskers Trayvilla and Bagsican in open
court as the same ones confiscated from the accused.70
As to non-compliance of all the requirements laid down by Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 regarding the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered dangerous
drugs,71 the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 states that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and
custody over said items as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team. What is important is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.72 The successful presentation of the prosecution of every link of chain of
custody as discussed above is sufficient to hold the accused liable for the offense charged.
On a final note, we held that airport frisking is an authorized form of search and seizure.1âwphi1 As held
in similar cases of People v Johnson73 and People v Canton,74 this Court affirmed the conviction or the
accused Leila Reyes Johnson and Susan Canton for violation of drugs law when they were found to be in
hiding in their body illegal drugs upon airport frisking. The Court in both cases explained the rationale for
the validity of airport frisking thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure or their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack or subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation s
airports. Passengers attempting to hoard an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors: their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage arc routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects. physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches arc reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity or the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
Indeed. travellers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that the are subject to search and. if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would he subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. 75
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28
August 2009 in CA-G.R. CR.-H. C. No. 03316 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 119072. April 11, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS EDUALINO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
Accused Jesus Edualino was charged with rape in an information dated 5 July 1994 reading as
follows:
"That on or about the 12th day of May, 1994, at Bgy. xxx, Municipality of xxx, Province of xxx,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one AAA, a pregnant
woman, against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[1]
The case for the prosecution, as told by complainant AAA, is as follows:
On 12 May 1994, the complainant and her mother BBB were in xxx to attend a dance. At about ten
(10) o'clock in the evening of that day AAA saw her cousin CCC at the dance and she asked him to drink
beer with her.
CCC got drunk and fell asleep. It was at this time that accused Jesus Edualino approached her and
offered her a glass of beer. AAA noticed that Edualino was drunk so she accepted the glass. She then felt
dizzy after drinking the beer.
Edualino then dragged her towards a grassy area where no people were present. The accused then
forced himself on top of her and succeeded in raping her while she was in a semi-unconscious state.
AAA further stated that she was continuously resisting the assault upon her but Edualino was
stronger and he even boxed her in the stomach. She stated that she passed out after the rape was
consummated.
Prosecution witness DDD testified that she saw the accused in the act of raping AAA in the grassy
area near the store of a certain Sgt. Edep and the house of a certain Mrs. Adier.
DDD stated that she was looking for her cousin AAA in the early morning of 12 May 1994 at xxx
where a dance was being held. She saw AAA with the accused on top of her in a dark grassy area near the
site of the dance. Both the accused and AAA were naked. She was able to identify the accused by
pointing her flashlight from a distance of less than two (2) meters away.
She then called her aunt EEE, the victim's mother, but when they returned, the accused immediately
left when he noticed their presence.
Dr. xxx, a physician at the xxx District Hospital, testified that on 13 May 1994, he examined AAA
who alleged that she was sexually abused.
The medical certificate issued by Dr. xxx reads as follows:
"Medical Certificate
This is to certify that Mrs. AAA, 22 years old, married, of xxx, with a 2-1/2 yrs old child, was examined
of this date. She alleged to have been sexually forcefully assaulted by a known person, last May 12,
1994. She was accompanied by her mother.
The patient upon admission was found to be combative, with emotional outburst, shouting and
crying. She was then put to sleep.
Findings
 1. General: Fairly developed and nourished, patient was still under sedation during
the exam. Approximately 5'4" in Ht.; wt.: 118 lbs.
2. Head & Face: contusion left temporal area 2 x 2 cm. dia. Multiple superficial
abrasions on the left forehead, right and left side of the face.
3. Abdomen: Linear abrasion, post. lumbar, 3 inches length, longitudinal
4. Breast: slightly globular, dark brown areola and nipple, presence of
multiple contusion just below the areola on both breast.
5. Upper extremities: presence of multiple linear abrasions on both arm and
forearm.
6. External genitalia: numerous pubic hair, labia majora and minora both gaping,
presence of numerous dry leaves (grass) noted on both buttocks.
7. I.E. hymen fimbriated in shape, no laceration noted, easily admits 2 fingers
vaginal wall lax, less prominent rugae, uterus enlarges to 2-3 mos. gestation.
Note: no sperm cell exam. done. no available microscope.
Conclusion: hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers, it can admit an average size penis in erection
without laceration, uterus enlarges to 2-3 months gestation.
(SGD.) R
ogelio C.
xxx,
M.D.
Medical
Officer" [
2]
The defense had a different version of the incident.
Accused Jesus Edualino, while admitting that he was at the dance at xxx on 11 May 1994, denied
that he raped complainant AAA.
Edualino testified that after leaving the dance, he and a certain Calixto Flora went to the store of
Sgt. Edep to drink beer. After he and Flora had finished a big bottle of beer, complainant AAA and a
certain CCC arrived. They noticed that AAA and CCC were already drunk. Accused Edualino testified
that complainant AAA then began teasing him to kiss her. He (Edualino) stood up to get away from her
but the latter followed him. Flora then held on to AAA's arm to prevent the latter from following
him. Edualino testified that he and Flora then went to his house where they stayed until the morning of 12
May 1994.
Edualino also testified that CCC and AAA may have been under the influence of marijuana since
he heard the two (2) talking about having taken drugs.
Calixto Flora corroborated the accused-appellant's version of the incident.
Felix Alberto, a resident of xxx, testified that in the evening of 11 May 1994 while they were
walking towards the place where the dance was being held, he and his sister Rose saw complainant AAA
sitting by the roadside with her hands cupped covering her mouth. Upon seeing them, AAA allegedly
called out "Rose, halika, tikman mo, masarap ito." (Rose, come and try this. It's tasty). When they
approached AAA, Alberto testified that he saw her holding what appeared to be dried marijuana
leaves. Alberto then testified that he even scolded AAA saying, "Why are you doing that? You have
already two children and you know that is bad." Alberto then took his sister and left.
Rodolfo Caabay, then barangay captain of xxx testified that in the early morning of 12 May 1994,
an unusual incident was reported to him. BBB complained that her daughter AAA was found lying on the
ground about eight (8) meters from the store owned by a certain Sgt. Edep. He found AAA was very
hysterical and he observed that she had too much to drink. He turned over AAA to the police. He later
learned that accused-appellant was picked up for questioning regarding his alleged rape of AAA.
Epifania Caabay, Rodolfo's wife, testified that she accompanied AAA and her mother on board the
police vehicle which took them to xxx District Hospital. She stated that AAA was hysterical and kept on
shouting in the vernacular, "I want water! " Epifania further stated that AAA's mother slapped her and hit
her on different parts of the body to quiet her down. Epifania agreed with the other defense witnesses that
AAA was quite drunk at the time.
On 23 December 1994, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and considerations, the Court hereby finds the herein
accused, JESUS EDUALINO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE charged in the above-
entitled case as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to and as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH in the gas chamber or in the electric chair and ordered to indemnify the raped victim, AAA moral
and exemplary damages amounting to P60,000.00, and to pay the costs.
With this conviction and imposition of the death penalty to the accused, he is hereby ordered immediately
shipped to the national penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, under maximum security, to await the
execution of this sentence there and the review of this decision by the Honorable Supreme Court, Manila,
Philippines.
SO ORDERED."[3]
The conviction of accused-appellant is now before this Court on automatic review.
Accused-appellant assigns the following errors to the trial court.
1. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion and demonstrated bias and partiality in
favor of the prosecution during the entire proceedings of the case;
2. The trial court erred in giving credence to the false and incredible testimony of the
complainant and other witnesses for the prosecution and in not giving due credence to
the evidence for the defense;
3. The trial court erred in making findings of facts not supported by the evidence and in
making conclusions based on mere surmises, conjectures and speculation; and
4. The trial court erred in convicting the appellant of the heinous crime of rape instead of
upholding his innocence based on the evidence and the law.[4]
Accused-appellant contends that the trial judge actively and "enthusiastically" assisted the
prosecution, both in the direct and cross-examination of the witnesses. It is argued that "the undue interest
and bias of (the trial judge) is revealed by his active participation in the entire proceeding, consistently
taking the cudgels for the prosecution, instead of conducting the trial with the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge."[5]
A close and careful scrutiny of the transcripts of the proceedings before the trial court shows that
the trial court judge may have exhibited a degree of zeal which could lead to impressions of partiality and
bias. However, this per se does not warrant nullification of the entire proceedings in the case.
In People v. Hatton[6], this Court citing People v. Ibasan[7] held thus:
"x x x. It is not denied that the court had at certain points conducted its own questioning during the
proceedings. The records, however, show that the court's questions did not amount to interference as to
make the case for the prosecution and deprive the accused of their defense. The question of the judge
addressed to the witnesses and the accused were merely to clarify certain points and confirm certain
statements. The number of times that a judge intervenes is not necessarily an indication of bias. It cannot
be taken against a judge if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which
tend to destroy the theory of one party.
'As held in the case of Ventura v. Yatco (105 Phil. 287) 'Judges are not mere referees like those of a
boxing bout, only to watch and decide the results of a game; they should have as much interest as counsel
in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence calling attention of counsel to points at issue that
are overlooked, directing them to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved,
clarifying ambiguous remarks by witnesses, etc.'
A judge may properly intervene in the trial of a case to promote expedition and avoid unnecessary waste
of time or to clear up some obscurity (People v. Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196; Par. 14 Canons of Judicial
Ethics; Administrative Order No. 162 dated August 1, 1946, 42 O.G. 1803). In this respect, the record
shows no irregularity in the conduct of the trial judge."
Moreover, it is of note that counsel for accused-appellant did not object, during the trial, to the
manner of questioning of the trial judge nor was his inhibition sought by the defense for alleged bias and
technicality for the prosecution.
The Court will now proceed to determine if the guilt of accused-appellant has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
The elements of the crime of rape, as allegedly committed by accused-appellant, are:
1. That the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the complainant;
2. That the act was done against the complainant's will;
3. That force and/or intimidation was used in the commission of the act.
In the present case, the prosecution's evidence consists mainly of the testimonies of the complainant
AAA, DDD and Dr. xxx.
On the other hand, accused-appellant relies on alternative defenses of alibi and consent on the part
of complainant. While accused-appellant's defense before the trial court alleges that he had left the scene
of the incident together with defense witness Calixto Flora, he alternatively raises before this Court the
contention that the elements of the crime of rape have not been established.[8]
Accused-appellant posits the following arguments:
1) No carnal knowledge occurred
It is argued that since Dr. xxx did not examine specimens from the complainant's private parts for the
presence of spermatozoa, then complainant's testimony to the effect she, although in a state of semi-
unconsciousness, felt accused-appellant on top of her consummating the sexual act, deserves no credence.
2) No force or intimidation was employed
It is argued that the force allegedly employed to consummate the rape was merely implied by the trial
court from complainant's testimony that she did not enjoy the sexual act. Accused-appellant contends that
even assuming that the sexual act was consummated, the same could only have been successfully done
with the consent of the complainant, "for if she ever attempted to resist or evade the thrust of the penis of
appellant, the latter could not have successfully hit the mark and penetrate the vagina". [9]
Accused-appellant likewise argues that the medical examination conducted on complainant fails to
support the latter's testimony that accused-appellant boxed her in the stomach.
3) The identity of the assailant has not been established
Accused-appellant assails the finding that the complainant and prosecution witness DDD had adequately
established that it was accused-appellant who committed the rape.
It is argued that complainant, who admitted being only semi-conscious, could not have seen who raped her
and DDD who, in a written statement before trial, stated that she only saw accused-appellant in shorts
beside the complainant, at the time and place of the alleged rape, contradicted herself when she testified at
the trial that she saw accused-appellant on top of the complainant in a grassy area behind the store of Sgt.
Edep.
4) The offense of rape has not been established.
Accused-appellant contends that the testimony of the complainant tends to show "that there was foreplay
before the alleged rape whereby the accused allegedly kissed her, caressed her breast and bit her nipple;
that the accused was on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina and did the push and pull
movement; that she cannot remember how long it lasted but she knew [accused] had an orgasm after
which the accused stood up and left, all this bear the earmarks of a voluntary and mutual coition, a
consensual intercourse. There was no rape."[10]
Finally, accused-appellant raises the issue of the character of complainant AAA. It is argued that a
responsible and decent married woman, who was then three (3) months pregnant, would not be out at two
(2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to accompany her to
drink beer. It is contended that complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to save her marriage
since her husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle
of herself when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on 11 May 1994 while she was under the influence
of drugs and alcohol.
At the outset of this discussion, it should be pointed out that the moral character of a rape victim is
immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be
the victims of rape.[11]
In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations that the victim was drunk and under the
influence of drugs and that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and responsible married
woman, were true, said circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped.
Accused-appellant cannot successfully argue that no rape occurred because no medical examination
was conducted to confirm the presence of spermatozoa in her private parts.
The Court has repeatedly held that a medical examination of the victim is not a prerequisite in
prosecutions for rape.[12]
A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided the
testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of
things.[13]
After a careful and thorough study of the records of the case, the Court is convinced that the
constitutional presumption of accused-appellant's innocence has been overcome by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
On accused-appellant's contention that the presence of force and intimidation was not proven, the
Court has consistently ruled that force and intimidation should be viewed in the light of the victim's
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the offense. [14]
Indeed, there can be no hard and fast rule on the matter specially in a situation like the present case
where the victim testified to being in a state of semi-consciousness after drinking a glass of beer given to
her by accused-appellant.
Besides, the testimony of the victim is supported by the findings in the aforequoted medical
certificate which shows that the injuries suffered by the victim are consistent with the charges of rape and
contrary to the theory of the defense that the injuries were inflicted by the victim's mother when she was
trying to quiet her daughter who was hysterical.
 The allegation that accused-appellant's identity has not been established deserves scant
consideration. It is to be noted that accused-appellant was known to the victim and prosecution witness
DDD long before the incident. Both witnesses positively identified the accused as the perpetrator of the
rape. There is nothing to show that these two (2) witnesses would or did falsely implicate accused-
appellant.
On whether the acts of accused-appellant constitute rape, the victim AAA's testimony was
sufficiently clear to show that the carnal knowledge was without her consent and with force and
intimidation. There is no doubt that the crime committed by accused-appellant is rape.
Accused-appellant in a final attempt to absolve himself argues that the charge of rape was
concocted by the victim to save her marriage.
The Court cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an
attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. We fail to understand how
a false rape story can save a marriage under the circumstances averred by accused-appellant.
The other arguments adduced by accused-appellant pertaining to credibility of the two (2)
prosecution witnesses are basically issues that cannot be reviewed by the Court absent attendant
circumstances that do not exist in this case.
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses pertain to minor matters
and are even badges that the witnesses were unrehearsed and honest.
Besides, in reviewing the entire records of this case, we find no reversible error in the judgment of
conviction except as to the penalty of death imposed by the trial court.
The Solicitor General correctly points out that absent the attending circumstances provided for
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 wherein the penalty
for rape is death, the correct penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, R.A. No. 7659:
"x x x.
The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives
within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
disease.
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National
Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation. (As amended by Sec. 11, RA 7659.)"[15]
In the present case, the prosecution has not proved any circumstance which would justify or call for
the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
Finally, with regard to the award of P60,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, it is noted that
there is no basis for said award. Consequently the award of moral and exemplary damages is
deleted. However, the accused-appellant is liable to indemnify the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court finding accused-appellant
Jesus Edualino guilty of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1) Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and
2) He is ordered to indemnify the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
in lieu of the award of moral and exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146697 July 23, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE, accused-appellant.
VITUG, J.:
Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court, Br. VI, of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur,
of raping his own daughter Marilou Fabre, and he was sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
Fabre was indicted in an Information that read:1
"That on or about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 26, 1995 in the house of the accused
located at Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by force, threats and intimidation, with lewd
design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual
intercourse with his own daughter MARILOU FABRE, a girl thirteen (13) years of age, of
good reputation, against her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of the said victim
consisting of moral, actual and compensatory damages."
Accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of
Marilou, that of Adela Fabre, her mother and the wife of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the
doctor who examined Marilou, along with the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn
statement of Adela, and the criminal complaint signed by both Marilou and Adela. The defense, during its
turn in the presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the accused himself. It also called
Adela Fabre back to the witness stand.
The trial court gave credence to the evidence given by the prosecution, particularly to the narration of the
young complainant, expressing a quote from an observation once made by this Tribunal in one of its
decision that "even when consumed with revenge, it (would) take a certain amount of psychological
depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which (could) put her own father for the rest of his
remaining life in jail and drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame."2 Convinced that
the accused committed the crime of rape on his own daughter, the trial judge disposed of the case thusly:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE alias Nardo,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of RAPE as defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 Section 11 thereof
and hereby imposes upon the accused Leonardo Fabre y Vicente alias Nardo the penalty of
 DEATH; to pay the victim Marilou Fabre civil indemnity in the amount of FIFTY daughter's sexual organs. He was finally able to penetrate her. Once inside her, appellant made push and
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS and the costs."3 pull movements until he was through with her. Appellant threatened to kill her if she would tell anybody
about the sexual encounter. The young girl's mother, Adela Fabre, arrived home about five o'clock that
afternoon but, remembering her father's threats, she kept mum about her ordeal.
In this automatic review, the convicted accused assigned the following alleged errors committed by the
court a quo.
The credibility of Marilou would not be all that difficult to discern from her narration that, as so described
by the prosecution, "was full of graphic details which a young provincial girl could not possibly have
"I
concocted and which could only have come from someone who must have personally experienced a brutal
rape assault." She testified:
"THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-
APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND DENIAL.
"PROS. ENRIQUEZ:

"II
"Q Now, Miss Marilou, can you recall where were you on April 26, 1995 at about 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon?
"ASSUMING IN ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH SENTENCE UPON ACCUSED-
"A Yes, sir.
APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE
ACTUAL AGE OF MARILOU FABRE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE
ALLEGED RAPE."4 "Q Where were you that time?

The defense argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength for "A In our house, sir.
the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal evidence.
The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called. 5 The
"Q What were you doing in your house?
purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct
examination.6 The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination
unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on "A I was cleaning our yard, sir.
what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to
give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-
examined by the other party. "Q How far is your yard where you were doing some works from your house?

The alibi of appellant itself would not appear to be deserving of serious consideration. His account that at "A (Witness pointing a distance of around 2 to 3 meters.)
the time of the alleged rape he was working at a coconut plantation, just about one kilometer away from
the place of the crime, hardly would amount to much. Nor would the testimony of Adela Fabre, his wife, "Q Now, while you were doing your work in your yard, can you recall if there was an
merit any better regard. At first, she testified that on the day of the rape incident, she had left their house at incident that occurred?
four o'clock in the afternoon. Later, however, she changed her story by saying that she had left the house
in the morning and returned only at ten o'clock that same morning, staying home the whole day thereafter.
In any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough for an accused to prove that he was "A Yes, sir.
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he would have to demonstrate likewise that he could not
have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its "Q What was that incident that occurred?
commission.7 Clearly, in the instant case, it was not at all impossible nor even improbable for appellant to
have been at the crime scene.
"A While I was gathering a palm oil my father arrived and suddenly dragged me to our
house, sir.
Upon the other hand, the evidently candid and straightforward testimony of Marilou should be more than
enough to rebut the claim of innocence made by appellant.8
"COURT:

On 26 April 1995, around four o'clock in the afternoon, Marilou Fabre was alone in their house in
Barangay Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Adela Fabre, her mother, had gone to Purok 4 to buy fish while "Q Where is your house located?
her siblings were out strolling. After cleaning their yard, Marilou went to the adjacent palm plantation,
about fourteen to fifteen meters away from their house, to gather palm oil. Marilou had been gathering "A At Purok 4, Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, Your Honor.
palm oil for about a minute when her father, appellant Leonardo Fabre, arrived. He suddenly gripped
Marilou's hands and forcibly dragged her towards the house. He closed the door and removed his
daughter's underwear. He took off his pants and asked Marilou to hold his sex organ. In tears, Marilou "PROS. ENRIQUEZ:
obeyed her father. He then began touching the girl's breasts and vagina. He forced her to lie down,
mounted her and sought to insert his penis into her organ. Marilou cried in pain. When after some time he "Q What did you do when your father dragged you to your house?
still could not insert his penis into Marilou's vagina, he applied coconut oil to lubricate his and his
"A Because I was dragged by my father to our house I just went with him, sir. "Q What was that?

"Q While you were in your house after having been dragged by your father, what "A He used coconut oil in his penis and also in my vagina so that his penis can easily
happened if any? insert my vagina, sir.

"A He closed our house and he removed my panty, sir. "Q Now, while his penis was in your vagina, can you tell this Honorable Court if he did
anything also on top of you and while his penis was inside your vagina?
"Q And after removing your panty, what did your father do next?
"A None, sir.
"A He removed his pants and he let me hold his penis, sir.
"Q Did he make any movement?
"Q And what did you do next after holding his penis?
"A Yes, sir.
"A I was crying, sir.
"Q What was that movement?
"Q While you were crying what did your father do?
"A He made a push and pull movement on my body, sir.
"A He was touching my breast and my vagina, sir.
"Q Now, while your father was doing it to you where was your mother that time?
"Q After that what did he do next?
"A She was in Purok 4, Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, sir.
"A He let me lie down, sir.
"Q And did you report this incident to your mother?
"Q And while lying down, what did your father do?
"A Not yet sir because he told me not to tell anybody.
"A He mounted me and he inserted his penis, to my vagina, sir.
"Q So when did you had a chance to tell your mother about this incident?
"Q And what did you feel while your father was inserting his penis to your vagina?
"A On May 1, 1995, sir.
"A Very painful, sir.
"Q And what did your mother do after you reported to her this incident?
"Q And what did you do while your father was inserting his penis to your vagina?
"A She reported [the matter] to the Kagawad, sir."9
"A I was crying, sir.
It has been stressed quite often enough that the testimony of a rape victim, who is young and still
immature, deserves faith and credence10 for it simply would be unnatural for a young and innocent girl to
"Q And while you were crying what did your father do if any?
invent a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter subject herself and
her family to the trauma of a public trial unless she indeed has spoken the truth. 11 Most especially, a
"A He told me not to tell anybody because if I will do it he will kill me, sir. daughter would not accuse her own father of such a serious offense or allow herself to be perverted if she
were not truly motivated by a desire to seek a just retribution for a violation brazenly committed against
her.12
"Q Now, did your father find it easy to insert his penis to your vagina?

Confirming Marilou's story was the medical report and testimony of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the government
"A It [took] a long time, sir. physician stationed at the Bunawan District Hospital in Agusan del Sur, who examined Marilou. Dr.
Jalalon made these findings; viz:
"Q And did he use anything to facilitate the insertion of his penis to your vagina?
"Abrasion at (L) labia minora at 3:00 o'clock position.
"A Yes, sir.
 "Vaginal smear (-) negative for spermatozoa."13
The doctor concluded that it was possible that genital penetration on the victim did occur and that a penis
could have caused the abrasion on the victim's labia minora.
There is merit, however, in the plea of the defense, seconded by the prosecution, that the penalty of death
imposed by the trial court should be reduced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, provides:
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim."
While the father-daughter relationship between appellant and private complainant has been sufficiently
established, the fact of minority of the victim, although specifically averred in the information, has not
been equally shown in evidence. These qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority are twin
requirements that should be both alleged in the information and established beyond reasonable doubt
during trial in order to sustain an imposition of the death penalty.14 Neither an obvious minority of the
victim nor the failure of the defense to contest her real age always excuse the prosecution from the desired
proof required by law.15 Judicial notice of the issue of age without the requisite hearing conducted under
Section 3, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court, would not be considered sufficient compliance with the law.
The birth certificate of the victim or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence, like a baptismal
certificate, school records and documents of similar nature, or credible testimonial evidence, that can help
establish the age of the victim should be presented.16 While the declaration of a victim as to her age, being
an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule on pedigree, the question on
the relative weight that may be accorded to it is a totally different matter.17
In the case at bar, the complainant claimed that she was 13 years old at the time of the incident. 18 Her
mother stated, however, that she was 14.19 The birth certificate of the victim, at least already in her teens,
was not presented to ascertain her true age on the bare allegation that the document was lost when their
house burned down.20 No other document that could somehow help establish the real age of the victim was
submitted.
The Court, in sum, upholds the decision of the trial court convicting Leonardo Fabre of the crime of rape
but must reduce, on account of insufficiency of proof on the qualifying circumstance of minority of the
victim, the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the civil liability, the Court sustains the
award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity but, in keeping with prevailing jurisprudence, must additionally order
the payment of P50,000.00 moral damages21 and P20,000.00 exemplary damages.22
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding LEONARDO FABRE guilty of rape
is AFFIRMED but the sentence of death therein imposed should be, as it is hereby so, reduced
to reclusion perpetua. The award of P50,000.00 civil liability in favor of victim, Marilou Fabre, is
sustained; however, appellant is further ordered to pay to the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 moral
damages and P20,000.00 exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 142556. February 5, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez (appellant for
brevity), guilty of raping Mayia P. Ponseca (Mayia for brevity) and imposing on appellant the death
penalty.
On January 22, 1997, the Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor[2] of Zambales filed an
Information[3] charging appellant with the crime of rape penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1997 at 12:00 noon at Sitio Baco, Brgy. Macarang, in the
Municipality of Palauig, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with lewd design and by means of coercion, inducement and other consideration,
did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Mayia P.
Ponseca, a minor of 6 years old, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter.
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de officio Atty. Genaro N. Montefalcon, pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged.[4] Subsequently, the trial court allowed the withdrawal of Atty.
Montefalcon as counsel for health reasons. The trial court appointed Atty. Roberto Blanco as appellants
counsel de oficio.[5]
At the pre-trial, the prosecution and defense stipulated on the following facts:
1. The identity of the accused;
2. The accused was at the time of the incident in the vicinity thereof;
3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca, was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by her birth
certificate;
4. That after the incident, the child was subjected to a medico-legal examination to which a medico-legal
certificate was issued by Dr. Editha Divino.
The prosecution marked in evidence the birth certificate of the victim Mayia O. Ponseca as Exhibit A, and
the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Editha Divino as Exhibit B.[6]
Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: the victim, Mayia
Ponseca; the victims mother, Hermie Ponseca; the victims father, Osias Ponseca; Virginia Espejo Giron;
and Dr. Editha dela Cruz Divino. On the other hand, the defense presented appellant and his employer,
Bartolome Tolentino.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG for brevity) summarized the prosecutions version of the
incident in the appellees brief, to wit:
On January 17, 1997, about noontime, in Sitio Baco, Barangay Macarang, Palauig, Zambales, six-year old
Mayia Ponseca was walking along Sulok on her way to her house in Sitio Camiling when appellant Jesus
Sebunga Perez approached her (pp. 7-8, TSN, December 15, 1998). Appellant introduced himself as
Johnny and immediately afterwards, strangled her neck and boxed her abdomen (p. 10, TSN, December
15, 1998). Still in shock, Mayia fell down (id.). At that point, a dog arrived and barked at them.
Appellant then proceeded to lower his black denim pants while simultaneously removing Mayias
panty. He then inserted his penis inside Mayias vagina (p. 11, id.). Mayia felt excruciating pain in her
private parts (sic) but was not able to repel her aggressor whose strength and weight totally engulfed
her. Her only recourse was to cry while her young body was being ravished (p. 13, id.).
After satisfying his beastly desires, appellant raised his pants and ran away (p. 14, id.). Notwithstanding
that her vagina was bleeding profusely and her dress now covered with her own blood, Mayia managed to
stand up and seek help. She ran to the house of Virginia Giron, which was only fifty (50) meters away
from the scene of the crime. In fact, Giron was outside when she heard her dog barking (apparently, it was
the same dog barking at appellant while he was consummating his lust on Mayia, pp. 2-3, TSN, January
12, 1999; p. 11, TSN, December 15, 1998). Looking at the direction of the noise, she saw a confused
Mayia approaching her with blood dripping from her private parts and thighs. When Giron asked Mayia
what happened, the latter shouted ni-rape ako, ni-rape ako (p. 4, TSN, January 4, 1999). Giron then
summoned her husband and other companions to look for Mayias attacker but was unable to find
him. Giron then proceeded to Hermie Ponseca and Osias Ponseca, Mayias parents, to inform them of what
happened (p. 5, TSN, January 5, 1999; p. 2, TSN, January 19, 1999).
When her parents asked Mayia if she knew her assailant, the latter answered the name Johnny. (id.) The
couple brought their daughter to the President Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital for medical
examination (p. 2, TSN, February 24, 1999). She was examined by Dra. Editha Dela Cruz Divino, who
issued a medico-legal certificate dated January 23, 1997 stating the following:
a. Bleeding of genitalia coming from median laceration at the vaginal floor around four (4)
centimeters in size. Possible cause, a fall and then hitting a sharp object
and also an alleged sexual assault (p. 4, TSN, February 24, 1999).
b. Genitalia had hymenal lacerations at 3, 6, 9 and 12 oclock positions.
(pp. 4-6 id.)
Because of the extent of the damage on her genitals, Mayia undertook an IV sedation operation to repair
her lacerations (p. 6, id.) During her confinement at the hospital, the Ponseca couple reported the incident
to the Palauig PNP Police Station and recounted their daughters narration including the name of the culprit
as Johnny who, according to their neighbors, was a worker at the fishpond of Bartolome Tolentino (pp.
11-12, TSN, January 5, 1999). Police operatives then proceeded to the said fishpond and arrested
appellant. After her discharge from the hospital, Mayia learned that appellant was already apprehended
(pp. 3-8, TSN, January 5, 1999). In the police station, she was able to positively identify the appellant as
the person who sexually assaulted her (p. 18, TSN, December 15, 1998). [7]
Appellant denied raping Mayia. Appellant testified that on the date of the alleged rape incident, he
was working at a fishpond at Macarang, Zambales. He heard of the rape of a young girl from his manager,
Bartolome Tolentino (Tolentino for brevity).[8] Appellant further testified that on January 25, 1997,
policemen went to the fishpond where he worked. The policemen arrested appellant and brought him to
the police station at Palauig.Later, the policemen took him to the municipal jail of Palauig.
On cross-examination, appellant testified that his nickname is not Johnny but Jessie. [9] He testified
that on January 17, 1997, at around 12 oclock noon, he left the fishpond and walked home to Barangay
Alwa which was about thirty meters from the fishpond.[10]
The defense formally offered the testimony of witness Tolentino to prove that appellant was
employed as caretaker of Tolentinos fishpond for almost two years before the alleged rape
incident. Appellant was purportedly of good moral character while employed as a fishpond caretaker. The
prosecution admitted the offer of testimony. Hence, the trial court dispensed with the testimony of
Tolentino in open court.[11]
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment[12] on October 26, 1999, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, accused Jesus Perez y Sabung (SIC) is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutore Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was only 6 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III, Republic Act 7610, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH. Jesus Perez is directed to pay to the private complainant the amount of
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as and by way of civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) as and by way of moral damages.
Hence, this automatic review.
In his brief, appellant raises the following lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT
HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular. Appellant
points out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt when the
prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant stresses that when Mayia identified him in
open court, she referred to him as a man named Johnny and did not give any description or any identifying
mark. Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in the cell when Mayia identified him after the police
arrested him. Appellant bewails that the identification was not done with the usual police line-up.
Appellants contention is untenable.
As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the
witness is a child of tender years[13] as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting
or suggestion.[14] Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. [15] In the case
at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and
unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain.[16] As explained in People v. Rodito
Dagamos:[17]
The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the questioning
of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which took
effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that
questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) to protect children
from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of
examination of a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of justice.
The Court has repeatedly stated that it is highly inconceivable for a child of tender age,
inexperienced in the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical
examination of her private part, subject herself to public trial, and tarnish her familys honor and
reputation, unless she was motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against
her.[18]
Mayia recounted her harrowing experience, thus:
Q What time was this when Johnny introduced himself to you?
A I do not recall, mam. A Yes, mam.

Q Was it in the morning, noontime or in the afternoon or in the evening? Q What was your clothes at that time?

A Noontime, mam. A A dress, mam.

Q So, when Johnny said, Ako si Johnny, what did you do? Q When his penis entered your vagina Mayia, did he remove your panty?

A None, mam. A Yes, mam.[19]

Q After that when Johnny said, Ako si Johnny, what happened? The identity of appellant as the rapist has been established by the clear, convincing and
straightforward testimony of Mayia. During the trial, she testified as follows:
A He strangled (sinakal) me.
Q Mayia, there is a man sitting wearing orange t-shirt, do you know this man?
Q Were there persons around in the place when Johnny strangled you?
A Yes, mam.
A None, mam.
Q Do you know his name?
Q So, what did he do then after he strangled you?
A Yes, mam.
A He boxed me on my stomach, mam.
Q What is his name?
Q When he boxed you on your stomach, what happened to you?
A Johnny, mam.
A I was shocked, mam.
Q Why do you know him?
Q Did you fall down?
A Because he introduced himself to me.
A Before that, I was already lying down, so when he boxed me, I was shocked.
Q Where did he introduced himself to you?
Q You said that you were already lying down. Who made you lie down?
A At Sulok, mam.
A The person, mam.
Q Sulok is a place?
Q Why were you shocked, Mayia?
A Yes, mam.
A Because he strangled me and boxed me.
Q Do you have any companion when this man introduced himself to you?
Q After he boxed you on your abdomen, what happened? What else did he do to you?
A None, mam.
A There was a dog that arrived in the place and it barked at us. Then Johnny moved in a
hurry by penetrating my private part and after he dressing (SIC) me, he ran away. Q How did he introduce himself to you?

Q You said that Johnny penetrated your private part. With what instrument did he use in A The man introduced himself to me by saying, Kilala mo ba ako? Hindi po. Ako si
penetrating your private part? Johnny.[20]

A His penis, mam. The trial court further asked Mayia:

Q What was he wearing at that time? Q You were talking of a certain Johnny. s this Johnny in court now?

A A black denim, mam. A Yes, sir.

Q When he used his penis in entering your private part, did he remove his pants? Q Can you point to him?

A No, mam. A Yes, sir.

Q What did he do with his pants? Q Point to him.

A He brought out his penis, mam. A (Witness pointing to the person sitting at the accused bench and when asked of his name
answered Jesus Perez)
Q You mean to say Mayia, he lowered his pants?
Q Is this Johnny whom you point to the person whom you saw in that Sulok?
A Yes, mam.
A Yes, sir. [21]
Q What about you, were you wearing any panty?
 Mayias simple, positive and straightforward recounting on the witness stand of her harrowing
experience lends credence to her accusation. Her tender age belies any allegation that her accusation was a
mere invention impelled by some ill-motive. As the Court has stressed in numerous cases, when a woman
or a child victim says that she has been raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show that rape was
indeed committed.[22]
Mayia had a clear sight of appellants face since the rape occurred at noontime.[23] Her proximity to
appellant during the sexual assault leaves no doubt as to the correctness of her identification for a man and
woman cannot be physically closer to each other than during the sexual act.[24] Thus, even if Mayia did not
give the identifying marks of appellant, her positive identification of appellant sufficed to establish clearly
the identity of her sexual assailant.
Appellants claim that the police improperly suggested to Mayia to identify appellant is without
basis. True, Mayia did not identify appellant in a police line-up when Mayia identified appellant in his
cell. However, appellant, in his testimony admitted that he had two other companions in his
cell.[25] Moreover, the Court has held that there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification. Even without a police line-up, there could still be a proper identification as long as the
police did not suggest such identification to the witnesses.[26] The records are bereft of any indication that
the police suggested to Mayia to identify appellant as the rapist.
Mayias identification in open court of appellant as her rapist dispels any doubt as to the proper
identification of appellant. Mayia positively identified and pointed to appellant as her rapist. We are
satisfied that her testimony, by itself, is sufficient identification of her rapist. As held in People v.
Marquez:[27]
xxx. Indeed, the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit, as the
willingness of complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a
public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint. Stated differently, it is most improbable for
a five-year old girl of tender years, so innocent and so guileless as the herein offended party, to brazenly
impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not true.
In his Reply Brief, appellant contends that even assuming that the guilt of appellant has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty. Appellant maintains
that the death penalty cannot be imposed on him for failure of the prosecution to prove Mayias age by
independent evidence. Appellant points out that while Mayias birth certificate was duly marked during the
pre-trial, it was not presented and identified during the trial. Appellant asserts that Mayias minority must
not only be specifically alleged in the Information but must also be established beyond reasonable doubt
during the trial.
Appellants argument deserves scant consideration.
At the pre-trial, the parties mutually worked out a satisfactory disposition of the criminal
case. Appellant, assisted by counsel, signed a Pre-Trial Agreement[28] which, as incorporated in the Pre-
Trial Order, stated that:
x x x.
3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by her birth
certificate;
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence Mayias birth certificate as Exhibit
A.[29] The prosecution submitted its Offer of Evidence[30] which included Exhibit A, a certified true copy
of Mayias birth certificate. The trial court admitted Exhibit A[31] without any objection from the defense.
The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c)
marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes lawful defenses; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the
case.[32] Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind the parties. Section 4, Rule 118 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[33] provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions
taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court
to prevent manifest injustice. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on December 15,
1998, which was about twenty-three (23) months after the rape incident occurred on January 17, 1997,
Mayia testified on cross-examination that she was 8 years old last May 23.[34] Thus, by deduction, since
Mayia was born on May 23, 1990 as shown in her birth certificate, she was about six (6) years and seven
(7) months old on January 17, 1997, the day the crime took place. We rule that the prosecution has
indisputably proven that Mayia was below seven years old at the time appellant raped her.
Finally, the trial court was correct in imposing the death penalty on appellant. Under Article
335[35] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,[36] the death
penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years
old. Mayia was six (6) years and seven (7) months old when appellant raped her.
If rape is qualified by any of the circumstances[37] warranting the imposition of the death penalty,
the civil indemnity for actual or compensatory damages is mandatory.[38] Following prevailing
jurisprudence, the civil indemnity is fixed at P75,000.00. In addition, moral damages of P50,000.00 should
also be awarded to the rape victim without need for pleading or proving it. [39]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, sentencing him to suffer the death penalty, [40] and ordering
him to pay the victim Mayia P. Ponseca the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages, is AFFIRMED in toto.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of the
Republic Act No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President of the Philippines for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 139412. April 2, 2003]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. alias Talino,
RONALD CASTILLANO alias Nono and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias
Junjun, accused,
RONALD CASTILLANO alias Nono and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun, appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
 This is an appeal from the Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch
31, in Criminal Case No. P-2542, convicting appellants Ronald Castillano alias Nono and Jaime
Castillano, Jr. of murder, meting on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering them to
pay, jointly and severally, damages to the heirs of the victim Diosdado Volante.
The Evidence or the Prosecution
From the police station, SPO4 Javier, SPO3 Bellano and Sgt. Rogelio Palacio boarded their mobile
police car and set out a manhunt for the malefactors. They proceeded towards the boundary in Sto.
Domingo where they put up a checkpoint. The police officers inspected every vehicle that passed by. At
around 12:45 a.m., SPO4 Javier halted a passenger jeepney. On board were Jaime, Sr. and his two sons,
Jaime Jr. and Ronald, each of whom carried a bag containing their clothes. The policemen brought the
Castillanos to the police station.[16] The bags of Jaime, Jr. and Ronald were turned over to the police
investigators. The three were placed under arrest for the killing of Diosdado. The policemen submitted
their investigation report.[17]

In the meantime, at 7:00 a.m., Dr. Evangeline Consolacion, the Municipal Health Officer of Bula,
conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Diosdado. Her autopsy report revealed the following findings:
Diosdado Volante, who eked out a living as a farmer, his wife Luz, [2] and their four children lived
in their farmland located in the outskirt of Sitio Danawan, Barangay Sagrada, Bula, Camarines Sur.
External Findings
About 200 meters away from Diosdados farmland was the farmhouse of Jaime Castillano, Sr. [3] He
tasked his son, Jaime Castillano, Jr., to take care of the farmhouse and allowed him to reside
there.[4] Jaime, Sr., his wife Concepcion, their son Ronald (Nono) Castillano and other children lived at 1. Incise Wound 3 cm Superior pinna R ear
their family residence in Sagrada, Bula, Camarines Sur, approximately three kilometers away from their
farmhouse in Sitio Danawan.[5] 2. Incise woud (sic) 10 cm. from nasal bridge extending to mandible R
[6]
Sometime in the early part of June 1996, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun indiscriminately. Afraid that a
stray bullet might hit any member of his family, Diosdado accosted Jaime, Sr. and asked him to desist 3. Stab wound 2 cm.x 5 cm. Epigastrium R
from firing his gun indiscriminately. Jaime, Sr. resented the intrusion. He remonstrated that neighbors did
not even complain about him firing his gun. A heated altercation ensued. Jaime, Sr. then fired his gun 4. Stab wound 2 cm.x 4 cm. Epigastrium L
towards the house of Diosdado. The incident germinated deep animosity between the two and their
respective families.[7] Jaime, Sr. always carried a bolo whenever he passed by the house of Diosdado.
5. Stab wound 2.5 cm. Middle third Arm R
On July 8, 1996, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., Levy Avila, a teacher, was in his house doing
some repairs. He noticed Jaime, Jr. and Ronald talking by the roadside near the gate of his (Levys) house.
Levy overheard the two planning to go to Diosdados house. Jaime, Jr. and Ronald even told Levy: Ayaw 6. Stab wound 2cm x 5 cm. posterior Back.
namin kasing inaasar. Suspecting that the two were intending to harm Diosdado, Levy urged them to
amicably settle their differences with Diosdado. 7. Amputating middle third finger L
At around 8:00 p.m., Luz and Diosdado were about to retire for the night. Their children were
already fast asleep. Diosdado was tired after a days work of spraying chemicals at the rice field. He 8. Hacked wound posterior ankle L
reclined on a bamboo bench near the main door of their house. A kerosene lamp lighted the house.
Suddenly, Luz heard voices near their house. She saw Jaime, Sr. holding a flashlight and his two sons, 9. Gunshot wound POE 2 x 2cm. with contusion collar medial aspect middle third R thigh
Jaime Jr. and Ronald, on their way to the house. Luz immediately alerted her husband and told him that
the Castillanos were in their yard. However, Diosdado was nonchalant and simply told Luz not to mind
them. All of a sudden, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun at Diosdados house. Terrified, Luz hastily carried her baby No point of exit noted
daughter Mary Jane, sought cover and hid near the rear door. She was about five meters away from her
husband when the Castillanos barged inside their house and ganged up on Diosdado. Jaime, Jr. and
Internal Findings:
Ronald, armed with bladed weapons, took turns in stabbing Diosdado. Ronald stabbed Diosdado on the
right side of his breast, right thigh and on the back. He also struck him with a one-meter long pipe. Not
satisfied, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun hitting the right thigh of Diosdado. Luz was so shocked by the sudden Fracture femur with Foreign body bullet lodge in middle third femur with hematoma about about 100 cc R
turn of events. To silence her one year old baby, she breastfed her. As soon as she could, Luz fled to the thigh
rice paddies where she hid for a time. The Castillanos fled on board a jeep parked in the NIA road about
200 meters from the house of Diosdado. When Luz returned to their house, she saw her husband sprawled
Cause of Death; Hypovolemia secondary to Multiple Stab Wound [18]
on the ground in a pool of his own blood. Diosdado, at the point of death, asked her for help. Not knowing
what to do, Luz lost no time and ran to the house of their neighbor Celedonio Espiritu for help. Celedonio
rushed to the Bula Police Station and reported the incident. The doctor recovered a slug from the right thigh of Diosdado. She later signed the victims post-
mortem certificate of death.[19] Senior Inspector Edgardo B. Sambo, Chief of Police of Bula Police Station,
[8]
A team composed of SPO4 Jaime Javier, SPO3 Jaime Bellano and SPO3 Nilo Fornillos, the duty filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Bula, Camarines Sur, a criminal complaint [20] for murder against
investigator,[9] went to the crime scene[10] to conduct an on-the-spot investigation. Photographs were taken the Castillano brothers.[21] Judge Francisco O. Tolentino conducted the preliminary examination and
of the cadaver.[11] SPO3 Fornillo drew rough sketch[12] of the scene. The policemen saw a bolo at the place thereafter issued an order of arrest against the Castillanos.[22] No bail was recommended for their
where Diosdado was sprawled near the door of their house. A scabbard of a bolo was found a meter away provisional release. On July 9, 1996, Luz gave a sworn statement to the police investigators.[23]
from the house of Diosdado.[13] The policemen also found a bullet hole on the wall of the
house.[14] Thereafter, the cadaver was placed on a hamak [hammock] brought to the police station. The On July 10, 1996, the accused were transferred to the Tinangis Penal Farm. Senior Inspector Sambo
police investigators turned over the scabbard and bolo to the desk officer of the police station. [15] requested the PNP-CLRU5 Provincial Unit to conduct a paraffin test on the Castillanos.[24]
 On July 12, 1997, Major Lorlie Arroyo, the Head Forensic Chemist of PNP-Region 5, conducted
the paraffin test on the Castillanos. Ronald was found positive for gunpowder residue. [25] Jaime, Sr. and
Jaime, Jr. were found negative for gunpowder residue.
The MTC issued a subpoena requiring the accused to submit their counter-affidavits from notice
thereof. However, the accused failed to submit any counter-affidavit.[26]
On August 2, 1996, an Information for murder was filed against Jaime, Sr., Ronald and Jaime Jr.
with the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of July 1996 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening at Barangay Sagrada,
Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another
with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation armed with a handgun, bladed weapon and
piece of wood did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot and stab one
DIOSDADO VOLANTE y LOZANO inflicting upon the latter several mortal wounds on the different
parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Diosdado Volante the amount of which to be proven in Court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[27]
Upon their arraignment[28] on August 29, 1996, accused Jaime Sr., Jaime, Jr and Ronald, duly
assisted by counsel de parte, Atty. Avelino Sales Jr., pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.
Luz testified that when Diosdado was still alive, he had an annual income of over P65,000. She
spent P18,000 for the funeral services,[29] P300 for religious services,[30] P9,111 for food and other
expenses[31] during her husbands wake and funeral. She suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish for
his sudden death.
The Defenses and Evidence of the Accused
Ronald admitted when he testified that he killed Diosdado but insisted that he did so in self-defense
and in defense of his brother Jaime, Jr. He asserted that his father Jaime, Sr. and brother Jaime, Jr. had
nothing to do with Diosdados death. Ronald alleged that on September 8, 1996, at about 7:30 p.m., he was
driving a passenger jeepney on his way to the poblacion of Bula. Jaime, Jr. flagged down the jeepney. He
boarded the jeepney and told Ronald that he was instructed by their mother to go to the house of Jose del
Socorro to ask the latter to accompany them to their farmhouse in order to fetch Gilda Albes. Ronald was
armed with a .38 paltik gun, while Jaime, Jr. was armed with a bolo sheathed in a scabbard. They fetched
Jose and then Ronald parked the jeepney at the NIA road. Jaime, Jr., who was holding a flashlight, walked
along the footpath on top of a pilapil(a narrow earthen barrier between two rice fields). Ronald and Jose
walked behind Jaime, Jr. As they passed by the house of Diosdado, a man suddenly shouted: you shit, I
have await (sic) for you for a while, why just now. Surprised, Jaime, Jr. forthwith focused his flashlight
towards the man who shouted. He was aghast when he saw Diosdado armed with a bolo running towards
them and about to attack them with his bolo. Ronald shoved Jaime, Jr. who fell on the muddy rice paddies
below the pilapil. Ronald forthwith shot Diosdado. Diosdado took a step but fell on a kneeling position.
Diosdado brandished his bolo. Ronald shot Diosdado once more but his gun misfired. To defend himself,
Ronald took Jaime, Jr.s bolo and hacked Diosdado to death.[32] Ronald then fled from the scene and ran to
the jeepney at the NIA road. Jaime, Jr. and Jose boarded the jeep and left the scene. Ronald threw the bolo
along the way. He threw his gun into a rice farm in Danawan.
Jaime, Jr. corroborated the testimony of his brother. He, however, testified that he did not see his
brother hack and kill Diosdado. He claimed that when Ronald got hold of his bolo, he ran away and
proceeded to their jeepney which was then parked at the roadside. Minutes later, Ronald followed. They
then hastily went home to Sagrada and told their father Jaime, Sr. of the incident.[33]
Jose Del Socorro corroborated the testimony of Ronald. He testified that on July 8, 1996, at about
5:00 p.m. he was on his way home when he met Diosdado whom he noticed to be inebriated and unruly
Diosdado was throwing dried mud at the farmhouse of the Castillanos and challenging the occupants of
the farmhouse to a fight. He advised Diosdado to stop what he was doing and warned him that he was only
inviting trouble. Diosdado told him to mind his own business and not to intervene. Jose thereafter left
Diosdado and went, home.[34] When Jose arrived home, Dominador Bria was waiting for him. He and
Dominador talked business for a while and subsequently had dinner. After some time, Jaime, Jr. and
Ronald arrived at Joses house.
Concepcion Castillano testified that on July 8, 1996 at around 5:00 a.m., her son Jaime, Jr. arrived
home and told her that Diosdado threw stones at their farmhouse and challenged everybody to a fight. She
felt nervous and reported the incident to the police and caused the same to be entered in the police
blotter.[35] Thereafter, she went home and told her sons Jaime, Jr. and Ronald to immediately fetch Gilda.
She, likewise, instructed her sons to first drop by the house of Jose so that the latter could accompany
them to the farmhouse.
Jaime, Sr. vehemently denied any participation in the killing of Diosdado. He claimed that at the
time of the alleged incident, he was at their house in Sagrada, bedridden due to his debilitating diabetes.
He narrated to the trial court his medical history and his confinement at the Mandaluyong Medical Center
sometime in 1994.[36] He presented documents and receipts showing that he had been and is still under
medication.[37] He declared that upon learning from his son Ronald that the latter killed Diosdado, he
advised his sons to look for a lawyer for legal representation. He told the trial court that at around 11:30
p.m., he and his two sons had decided to go to Andangnan in order to meet a cousin of his who knew of a
lawyer named Atty. Rotor. As they traversed the road to Andangan, they were stopped by some policemen
at a checkpoint and were invited to the police station where they were investigated and eventually
incarcerated.[38]
Gilda Abes, the last witness for the defense, affirmed that she was the girlfriend of Jaime, Jr. She
told the trial court that on July 8, 1996 she was at the farmhouse of the Castillanos. She corroborated the
testimony of Jose that Diosdado was combative and drunk. According to Gilda, Jaime, Jr. left the
farmhouse before sundown to go to his parents place at Sagrada. Jaime, Jr. never returned to the
farmhouse that night. Gilda learned of the incident the next morning when she went home. [39]
The Verdict of the Trial Court
On December 22, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting Jaime, Jr. and Ronald of
murder qualified by evident premeditation and treachery. The trial court exonerated Jaime, Sr. of the
crime on reasonable doubt. The trial court gave no credence to Ronalds claim that he acted in self-defense.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the two (2) accused
RONALD CASTILLANO and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of MURDER and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties imposed thereby. Further, as civil liability, the said two (2)
accused are hereby ordered to pay the legal heirs of the late Diosdado L. Volante, through his widow Luz
R. Volante, the total sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
TWENTY ONE PESOS (P177,421.00) Philippine Currency as actual and moral damages including death
indemnity, with costs against both accused.
The accused Jaime Castillano, Sr. is hereby acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.[40]
The accused, now appellants, interposed their appeal from the decision of the trial court contending
that it committed reversible errors:
(a) in rejecting appellant Ronalds plea of self-defense; and (b) in not acquitting appellant Jaime, Jr.
of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Anent the first issue, appellant Ronald posits that he adduced proof that he acted in self-defense
when he stabbed the victim.
The Court disagrees with appellant Ronald. The Court has consistently held that like alibi, self-
defense is inherently weak because it is easy to fabricate. [41] In a case where self-defense and defense of
relatives is invoked by the accused, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove with clear and
convincing evidence the essential requisites of self-defense, namely (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. There can be no complete or incomplete self-
defense or defense of relatives unless the accused proves unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim.[42] The accused must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence
of the prosecution for by pleading self-defense, the accused thereby admits having killed the victim and he
can no longer be exonerated of the crime charged if he fails to prove the confluence of the essential
requisites for self-defense and defense of a relative.[43]
Appellant Ronald failed to discharge his burden.
First. After shooting and stabbing Diosdado, appellant Ronald fled from the situs criminis. Flight
from the situs of the crime is a veritable badge of guilt and negates his plea of self-defense.[44]
Second. Appellant Ronald threw away his paltik .38 gun and the bolo he used in hacking Diosdado
as he fled from the scene of the crime instead of surrendering the same to the police authorities. Appellant
Ronald admitted that he had no license for the gun:
Q Where is that gun now that you use?
A I do not know, Your Honor, I think I was able to throw it away.
Q Where?
A At Danawan, Your Honor.
Q Danawan, is that a lake?
A No, Your Honor, it is a ricefarm.
Q What kind of gun is this?
A Paltik .38, Your Honor.[45]
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
q By the way, where is that bolo that you used in hacking and stabbing Diosdado Volante?
a I do not know anymore because I was able to throw it away also when I ran away.
q Where is that place where you throw it?
a It was by the NIA road.
q You mentioned also a while ago that this gun that you said is a paltik and you throw it
away also, is it not?
a Yes, Maam.
q And that gun had been in your possession the whole day that you are driving up to the time
you shot the victim, Diosdado Volante?
a Yes, Maam.
q Do you have license to possess that firearm?
a None, Maam.[46]
The failure of appellant Ronald to surrender the bolo and his gun to the police authorities belies his
claim of self-defense.
Third. Appellant Ronald failed to report the incident to the police authorities even when they
arrested him. Curiously, he failed to inform the police officers who arrested him that he acted in self-
defense when he shot and stabbed the victim The resounding silence of the appellant is another indicium
of the incredibility of his defense.[47] Moreover, the records show that the municipal trial court issued a
subpoena on July 9, 1996 requiring appellant Ronald to submit his counter-affidavit but he refused and/or
failed to submit the same despite service on him of the subpoena. It was only during the trial that appellant
Ronald, for the first time, invoked self-defense and defense of a relative.
Fourth. The cadaver of the victim was found inside his house when the police investigators
arrived.[48] This belies appellant Ronalds claim that he shot the victim in the rice paddies, near his house
and that he (appellant Ronald) took the bolo of appellant Jaime, Jr. and used it to stab the victim.
Appellant Ronald failed to prove his claim that when the police investigators arrived in the victims house,
they carried his (the victims) body from the rice paddies to the house. The only evidence adduced by
appellant Ronald was his testimony which is hearsay, and besides being hearsay, it is speculative and mere
conjecture.
Fifth. Appellant Ronald hacked the victim no less than five times. Two of the stab wounds
sustained by the victim were at his back and posterior portion of his left ankle. The number and nature of
the wounds of the victim negate the appellants claim that he shot the victim in self-defense. On the
contrary, they prove that appellant Ronald was determined to kill the victim.[49]
Appellant Jaime, Jr. avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. He asserts that the testimony of Luz Volante, the widow of Diosdado, was inconsistent
with her testimony during the preliminary examination in the municipal trial court and her sworn
statement before the police investigators as well as the testimonies of SPO1 Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime
Favier, and the physical evidence on record. The appellant catalogued said inconsistencies, thus:
1. He was lying on the bench inside just upon entering. (Tsn p. 9, 2/17/97).
-I was lying down with my husband inside our house but we were still awake (9th Answer,
Prel. Exam. MTC, 7/9/96).
2. JCS fired towards our house hitting the wall (Tsn p. 11, 2/17/96).
JCS fired twice (16th answer, Prel. Exam. MTC, 7/9/96).
JCS kept on firing the gun pointing towards the body of my husband (9th Answer, Sworn
Statement, PNP, 7/9/96).
JCS shot my husband three (3) times (Tsn p. 16, 2/17/97)
3. My husband was shot and hit on the right thigh (Tsn p. 14, 2/17/97). He was hit on the left
lap (23rd Answer, Prel. Exam. MTC, 7/9/96). He was hit on his side (Tsn p. 43,
2/17/97).
4. RC struck my husband with a 1-meter long Pipe (Tsn p. 13, 2/17/97). RC & JCJ smashed
my husband with a hard object (5th Answer, Sworn Statement, 7/9/96).
RC smashed my husband (22nd Answer, Prel. Exam. MTC, 7/9/96).
 5. He was not able to fight back (Tsn p. 43, 2/17/97). He was standing and was trying to
parry the attack of the accused (26th Answer, Prel. Exam. 7/9/96).
6. When I went back to the house, he was still alive (Tsn p. 19, 2/17/97). - LV Yes, the
victim could have died instantly (Tsn p. 35, 2/3/97) With wounds sustained, he could
have died instantly (p. 8, Complainants Memorandum).
7. It was bright inside our house with a kerosene and a bottle lamp (Tsn pp. 33-34,
2/17/97). Only one kerosene lamp - bottle of gin with wick and light (Tsn p. 10, 4/1/97
- SPO1 Pornillos
Surrounding house, dark, total darkness (Tsn pp. 12-13, 4/1/97).
8. Scene Photography by Jaime Jornales (Tsn, p. 21, 2/17/97).
-do- by Mr. Lozano (Tsn., p. 12, 3/7/97).
9. SPO1 Nilo Pornillos learned of the incident at 8:00 oclock of July 8, 1996 (page 5 of
Complainants Memorandum.
SPO4 Jaime Javier received report at 9:00 oclock P.M. of July 8, 1996 of Complainants
Memorandum.
SPO4 Jaime Javier received report at 8:00 P.M. (page 7 of Complainants
Memorandum).[50]
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony of
Luz, the prosecutions principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary
examination before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police investigators
for the reason that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the
appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz with
her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz
was not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies, as mandated by Section 13,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:
How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement. - Before a witness can be impeached by
evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements
must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he
must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in
writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. Before the credibility of a witness and
the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements which
are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for
impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness must be
given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state
the circumstances under which they were made.[51] This Court held in People v. Escosura[52] that the
statements of a witness prior to her present testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching her credibility
unless her attention was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given an opportunity
to explain said inconsistencies. In a case where the cross-examiner tries to impeach the credibility and
truthfulness of a witness via her testimony during a preliminary examination, this Court outlined the
procedure in United States vs. Baluyot,[53] thus:
...For instance, if the attorney for the accused had information that a certain witness, say Pedro Gonzales,
had made and signed a sworn statement before the fiscal materially different from that given in his
testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon the attorney when cross-examining said witness to
direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not make such and such statement before
the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement different from that delivered in court. If the witness
admits the making of such contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of the admission, while the
witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the other hand, if the witness denies
making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove that the witness did make
such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the document, secondary
evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. This process of cross-examining a witness upon the
point of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of the American courts laying a predicate
for the introduction of contradictory statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is
thus laid upon cross-examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to impeach a
witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the discretion of the court.
In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any discrepancies
between her present testimony and her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn
statement. The appellants did not even mark and offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn statement
for the specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her present testimony. Unless so marked and
offered in evidence and accepted by the trial court, said transcript and sworn statement cannot be
considered by the court.[54]
On the purported inconsistencies or discrepancies catalogued by the appellants relating to the
testimony of Luz during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement, the Office of the Solicitor
General posits that:
Sixth, Volante indeed testified that when she returned to their house from the ricefield, after the three
accused had left the premises, her husband was still alive (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 19) as he was still
able to ask for her assistance (Ibid, p. 20). But it is not inconsistent with the expert opinion of Dr.
Consolacion that by the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim, the latter could have died thereof
instantaneously (TSN, February 3, 1997, p. 35). It is clear that the said physician was merely stating a
possibility and not what happened in the instant case because in the first place, she was not present at the
scene right after the incident.
Seventh, Volante was insistent in her testimony that at the time of the commission of the subject crime, it
was bright inside their house because they had a kerosene lamp and a bottle lamp both lighted up, one
placed on the wall and the other on the ceiling (Ibid, pp. 33, 52-53). While it may appear contradictory to
SPO1 Pornillos testimony that there was only a kerosene lamp at the time, he could not have been
expected to notice all the things found inside the house, including the bottle lamp, because he might not
have been familiar with its interiors. Or, he could have focused his attention primarily on the body of the
fallen victim and the objects that may be used later as evidence against the perpetrators of the crime.
Eight, it is admitted that the testimonies of Volante and SPO1 Pornillos as to who took pictures of the
crime scene including the lifeless body of the victim are contradictory. But again, such contradiction,
being only minor and irrelevant, does not affect the credibility of their testimonies.
And ninth, the apparently inconsistent statements of the prosecution witnesses (SPO1 Pornillos and SPO4
Javier) as to the exact time the subject incident was reported to the police authorities are similarly
irrelevant to the matters in issue. Of consequence here is the fact that on the night the crime was
committed, it was reported to the authorities who later effected the arrest of the perpetrators thereof. [55]
The Court fully agrees with the foregoing ruminations of the Office of the Solicitor General. The
inconsistencies adverted to by the appellants pertained only to minor and collateral matters and not to the
elements of the crime charged; hence, they do not dilute the probative weight of the testimony. It bears
stressing that even the most truthful witness can make mistakes but such innocent lapses do not
necessarily affect his credibility. The testimonies of witnesses must be considered and calibrated in their
entirety and not by their truncated portions or isolated passages. [56] And then again, minor contradictions
among several witnesses of a particular incident and aspect thereof which do not relate to the gravamen of
the crime charged are to be expected in view of their differences in impressions, memory, vantage points
and other related factors.[57]
 Contrary to appellant Jaime, Jr.s claim, the prosecution adduced proof that he and appellant Ronald A From where I am sitting up to that window which is about five (5) meters.
conspired to kill and did kill Diosdado by their simultaneous acts of stabbing the victim. As narrated by
Luz: Q Now after the accused strucked (sic) and shot your husband, what else happened if any?

ATTY. BALLEBAR: A Jaime Castillano Jr. stabbed my husband on his breast (Witness is pointing to her breast).

Q Now after Jaime Castillano Sr. fired at your house, what happened next if any? ATTY. BERNALES:

A They entered our house. We will move that the answer be striken off from the records because it is not responsive to
the question. The question is after your husband has been stabbed strucked (sic) and
Q Now, when you say they to whom are you referring to? shot.

A Jaime Castillano Sr., Jaime Castillano, Jr., and Ronald Castillano. COURT:

Q Now, where did they enter? Q Your are being asked what happened after the accused was already stabbed, strucked (sic)
and shot, what happened next?
A In the other door.
WITNESS:
Q Now at the time they entered your house was the door of your house closed or opened?
Q Jaime Castillano Junior still stabbed my husband and try to cut his ankle, Your Honor.
A It was closed.
COURT:
Q Now, after the accused entered your house what happened next, if any?
Strike our (sic) the previous answer of the witness.
A Jaime Castillano Jr. stabbed my husband and also Ronal Castillano stabbed my husband.
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
Q Now, was your husband hit by the stabbing of Ronald Castillano, Jr. (sic)?
Q By the way, will you tell us how many times did Ronald Castillano stab your husband?
A Yes, sir.
A I cannot determine how many times he even stabbed my husband on his left eye.
Q Will you tell us on what part of his body was he hit?
Q How about Jaime Castillano Jr., how many times did he stab your husband?
A My husband was still struck by Ronald Castillano hitting him on his right side of his body
including on his right thigh and also on his back.. A I cannot determine exactly how many times but he repeatedly stabbed my husband. [59]

ATTY. BALLEBAR: The mere denial appellant Jaime, Jr. of the crime charged is but a negative self-serving which
cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward testimony of Luz and the physical evidence on
Q Now, you said Ronald Castillano struck your husband, now with what instrument did he record.[60]
use in strucking (sic) your husband?

ATTY. BERNALES:

We object, misleading, your Honor. The Crime Committed by Appellants

COURT:

Witness may answer. The trial court correctly convicted the appellants of murder, qualified by treachery, under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court, however, does not agree with the trial courts finding that
WITNESS: evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime.

A A pipe. Case law has it that the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt qualifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime. For evident premeditation to qualify a crime, the
ATTY. BALLEBAR: prosecution must prove the confluence of the essential requites thereof: (a) the time when the offender has
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender has clung to his
Q Now, will you tell us more or less how long was that pipe that was used by Ronald determination; (c) an interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime enough to
Castillano? allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. [61] There must be proof beyond cavil when and how
the offender planned to kill the victim and that sufficient time had elapsed between the time he had
A About one (1) meter, Maam.[58]
decided to kill the victim and the actual killing of the victim, and that in the interim, the offender
Luz was merely five meters away from where Diosado was attacked and stabbed by the appellants. performed overt acts positively and conclusively showing his determination to commit the said
Appellant Jaime, Jr. even tried to cut the ankle of the victim: crime.[62] In this case, the only evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove evident premeditation is the
testimony of Levy Avila that between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on July 8, 1996, he heard the appellants
ATTY. BALLEBAR: planning to go to the house of Diosdado and that he heard them say: Ayaw namin kasing inaasar, and that
at 8:00 p.m., the appellants arrived in the house of the victim and stabbed him to death. There is no
Q Now during this incident, how far were you from the accused and your husband?
evidence of any overt acts of the appellants when they decided to kill Diosdado and how they would
consummate the crime. There is no evidence of any overt acts perpetrated by the appellants between 5:00
and 8:00 p.m. that they clung to their determination to kill Diosdado.
There is treachery in the commission of a crime when (a) at the time of attack, the victim was not in
a position to defend himself; (b) the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods and forms of attack employed by him.[63] Even a frontal attack may be treacherous when
unexpected on an unarmed victim who would not be in a position to repel the attack or avoid it.[64] In this
case, the victim was unarmed and was supinely resting before sleeping after a hard days work. Although
Luz warned the victim that the appellants were already approaching their house, however, the victim
remained unperturbed when the appellants barged into the victims house. They stabbed him repeatedly
with diverse deadly weapons. The victim had nary a chance to defend himself and avoid the fatal thrusts
of the appellants.
The crime was committed in the house of the victim. There was no provocation on the part of the
victim. Dwelling thus aggravated the crime. However, dwelling was not alleged in the information, as
mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
The use by appellant Ronald of an unlicensed firearm to shoot Diosdado on the thigh is not an
aggravating circumstance because (1) there is no allegation in the information that said appellant had no
license to possess the firearm. That appellant lacked the license to possess the firearm is an essential
element of the crime and must be alleged in the information.[65] Although the crime was committed before
the new rule took effect on December 1, 2002, the rule should, however, be applied retroactively as it is
favorable to the appellants.[66]
The appellants are not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The evidence
shows that the appellants were arrested when the police officers manning the checkpoint stopped the
passenger jeepney driven by appellant Ronald and arrested the appellants. The fact that the appellants did
not resist but went peacefully with the peace officers does not mean that they surrendered voluntarily.[67]
There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the
appellants should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Civil Liabilities of the Appellants
The trial court awarded the total amount of P177,421 as civil indemnity, actual and moral damages
in favor of the heirs of the victim Diosdado. The Court has to modify the awards.
Appellants Ronald and Jaime, Jr. are obliged to pay jointly and severally the amount of P50,000 as
civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; P25,000 as exemplary damages in view of the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling;[68] and the amount of P18,300 for funeral and religious services. The heirs of the
victim failed to adduce in evidence any receipts or documentary evidence to prove their claim for food and
other expenses during the wake. However, they are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of
P5,000, conformably with the ruling of the Court in People v. dela Tongga.[69] His wife Luzs testimony
that the victim had an annual income of more than P65,000 is not sufficient as basis for an award for
unearned income for being self-serving. There was no proof of the average expense of the victim and his
family and his net income. In People v. Ereo,[70] this Court held that:
It bears stress that compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and as such requires due proof
of the damage suffered; there must be unbiased proof of the deceaseds average income. In the instant case,
the victims mother, Lita Honrubia, gave only a self-serving hence unreliable statement of her deceased
daughters income. Moreover, the award for lost income refers to the net income of the deceased, that is,
her total income less her average expenses. No proof of the victims average expenses was presented.
Hence, there can be no reliable estimate of the deceaseds lost income.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines
Sur, Branch 31 in Criminal Case No. P-2542 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Ronald
Castillano alias Nono and Jaime Castillano, Jr. alias Junjun are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, qualified by treachery, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, the
appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code. They are, likewise, ordered to pay jointly and severally to the heirs of the victim,
Diosdado Volante, the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; P18,300 as
actual damages; P25,000 as exemplary damages; and P5,000 as temperate damages. Costs against the
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 90198 November 7, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADO alias "Tonying," ROBERTO DESCARTIN y
PASICARAN alias"Ruby" and JOELITO (JULITO), DESCARTIN y PASICARAN, accused-
appellants.
VITUG, J.:
Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery with
homicide in an information, dated 20 December 1984, that read:
That on or about the 29th day of November, 1984 at around 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, more or less, in sitio San Juan, Barangay Patao, Municipality of
Bantayan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their
superior number and strength and with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault
and use personal violence upon Herminio Mansueto, thereby inflicting upon him
the following physical injuries:
1. Stab wounds which was approximately two inches in
length, parallel to the ribs and is located 1 1/2 inches below
the right nipple on the right anterior axillary line and on the
fifth intercostal space. On probing the wound was penetrating
immediately up to the left parasternal border approximately
hitting the heart;
 2. Hacking wound 9 inches in length extending from the
coracoid process of the left clavicle passing between the left
anterior and the left mid axillary line up to the left 4th
intercostal space including all muscle underlying the skin
exposing the ribs.
Cause of death: Internal hemorrhage due to stab wound.
after which the body was placed inside a plastic bag and brought to an open sea by
the pump boat owned by Roberto Descartin y Pasicaran and operated by Joelito
Descartin y Pasicaran and dumped to the water by herein accused, and as a result of
which said Herminio Mansueto died, herein accused, in pursuance of their
conspiracy, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to gain, took and
carried away the personal property belonging to Herminio Mansueto, namely: one
(1) Seiko 5 "Stop Watch" valued at P3,000.00; one (1) Bicycle (standard size)
valued at P1,000.00; and cash in the amount of P10,000.00, all in the total amount
of FOUR-TEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the
damage and prejudice of said oner (sic) in the said total sum.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, and the
generic aggravating circumstance of known premeditation.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
When arraigned, all the accused entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge; whereupon, trial commenced.
The prosecution sought to establish, as follows:
At around ten o'clock in the morning of 29 November 1984, Herminio Mansueto, wearing a blue and
white striped t-shirt, maong pants, Seiko 5 stop watch and a pandan hat, left on his bicycle for Barangay
Patao, Bantayan, Cebu. He had with him P10,000.00 cash which he would use to purchase hogs from a
certain "Ruby."
In Patao, Francisca Espina, also known in the locality as Pansing and whose house was just across the
street from the respective residences of the three accused, saw at the roadside Herminio Mansueto and
Roberto Descartin alias "Ruby" engaged in conversation. Pansing approached them and asked Mansueto
if he would be interested in buying two of her pigs for P1,400.00. Mansueto said "yes" and promised that
he would be right back.
Mansueto and Ruby meantime proceeded to the latter's piggery. Joelito Descartin and his brother-in-law
Rene were also seen going to the place. After some time, Pansing noticed Joelito take Mansueto's bicycle.
Believing that Mansueto was already preparing to leave and in her desire to catch up with him, Pansing
promptly walked towards the piggery which was around 100 meters away from her house. She could see
Mansueto leaning on the pigsty with Ruby on his right side and Antonio Plasencia alias "Tonying" on his
left; behind was Joelito.2 Midway, she was halted on her tracks; she suddenly saw Antonio stab Mansueto.
The latter staggered towards Ruby who himself then delivered another stab blow. Mansueto fell on his
back. Joelito started hitting Mansueto on the forehead while Rene held Mansueto's legs. 3 Except for a
coconut tree and some ipil-ipil trees around the area, nothing obstructed Pansing's line of vision. Pansing
rushed back home. The image of Antonio waving the weapon and the thought that she might herself be
killed kept her from revealing to anyone what she saw.4
The following day, in Kodia, Madridejos, Cebu, where Mansueto resided, his daughter Rosalinda reported
to Francisca Tayo, the barangay captain, that her father had not returned home. Tayo proceeded to Putian,
which was in Mansueto's itinerary, and then to Ruby's piggery in Patao, where a youngster, who turned
out to be Ruby's son, innocently informed her that Mansueto's bicycle was taken by Joelito. 5
The day after, Francisca Tayo, accompanied by police officers of Madridejos, Cebu, and some relatives of
Mansueto, went back to Ruby's place. On a railing of the pigpen, she saw blood stains. When she asked
Ruby's father about it, he said that the stains had come from chicken blood. Going around the piggery, she
also saw blood stains on a bamboo pole, which Ruby's father once again so identified as chicken blood. At
the back of the piggery, Francisca noticed a digging which looked like an empty grave. The digging was
measured and photos were taken. The police found a hat at the back of a hut beside the piggery, which
was later recognized to be that which belonged to Mansueto. 6
In the morning of 30 November 1984, Patrolman Elpidio Desquitado of the Bantayan police went back to
the piggery. This time, the police learned from Pansing herself that Joelito took Mansueto's
bicycle.7 Joelito was invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the case. Later, Joelito, waiving his
right to counsel, executed a "confession."8
Joelito narrated that, upon Ruby's instruction, he brought the bicycle to the piggery. Unexpectedly, he
said, Tonying Plasencia stabbed Mansueto. Stunned, Joelito tried to run away but Tonying stopped him.
Tonying then dragged the victim to a nearby house. Threatened by Tonying, Joelito agreed to later return
to where the victim's body was dragged. At around eleven o'clock that evening, tonying and Joelito placed
the body in a sack. Tonying asked Ruby to allow the use of the latter's pumpboat to ferry the body.
Tonying paddled the pumpboat to the island of Po-Po'o where he picked up some pieces of stones. Then,
again paddling the pumpboat farther away from the island, he ordered Joelito to start the engine of the
boat. They headed for the islet of Gilotongin (Hilotongan). On the way, Tonying filled the sack with
stones and, using a rope, tied to it the body of the victim. Tonying then unloaded their cargo into the sea.
Guided by Joelito, members of the Bantayan police force headed for the islet of Hilotongan on two
pumpboats9 in the area pinpointed to be the place where the body was dumped. On the second day of the
search, the group was informed that the body had already surfaced near the vicinity of the search and
delivered to the municipal building. 10
The municipal health officer of Bantayan, Dr. Oscar Quirante, examined the body and concluded that the
victim died of internal hemorrhage due to stab wounds. 11 The bloated body was in a late stage of
decomposition and its skin had sloughed off. 12 He found the victim's face to be "beyond recognition."
There were "some rope signs in the body particularly in the waistline and in the knees." 13
The main defense interposed is one of alibi.
Antonio stated that on the whole day of 29 November 1984, he was out at sea fishing with his son. Joelito,
on his part, asserted that he was in Barrio Baod, about an hour's walk from his residence, at the house of
his fiancee. He returned to his house, he said, only the day after. Roberto ("Ruby"), Joelito's uncle,
testified that on that fateful day, he was in Samoco Purok 2, Iligan City, and then left for Cebu on 06
December 1984 only after receiving a telegraph that Joelito was implicated in the crime.
The Regional Trial Court 14 did not give credence to the defense of alibi. It convicted the three accused of
murder (punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code), instead of robbery with homicide,
explaining that the term "homicide" was used in the information in its generic sense. 15 Finding
conspiracy, the trial court ruled that the killing was qualified by both treachery and abuse of superior
strength with the latter, however, being absorbed by the former. No other aggravating or mitigating
circumstances being attendant in the commission of the crime, the trial court said, the penalty that could
be imposed upon each of the accused was reclusion perpetua with a joint and several civil liability for
indemnification to the heirs of Herminio Mansueto in the amount of P30,000.00.
The instant appeal was interposed by the three convicted appellants.
Appellant Antonio Plasencia attacks the credibility of the prosecution's lone eyewitness, Francisca Espina, A I was the one who wrote this.
alleging that she is a pejured witness who has an axe to grind against him because his dog had once bitten
Francisca's child. 16 He bewails the fact that it has taken Francisca until 29 December 1984 to reveal what
Q Why, what was your purpose of writing that in your palm?
she supposedly has seen to the police authorities. Contending that treachery has not been duly proven as
"no wound was inflicted at the back and as a matter of fact only one wound was fatal," 17 appellant argues
that even if conspiracy were to be considered to have attended the commission of the crime, he could be A I wrote this in my palm because I wanted to be sure of
held liable with the others, if at all, only for homicide. what time the incident happened, was the same as that I
wrote in my palm.
Appellant Roberto Descartin, likewise challenging Francisca Espina's credibility because of her alleged
inconsistencies, faults the trial court for allowing the witness to glance at the notes written on her palm Q And who furnished you the data in which you wrote in the
while testifying. He also argues that his alibi, being corroborated, should have been given weight. palm of your hand?

Appellant Joelito Descartin, in assailing the credibility of Francisca, has noted her "jittery actuation" while A I was the one who made that.
giving her testimony. He also questions the findings of the ponente for not being the presiding judge
during the examination of Francisca on the witness stand.
ATTY. GONZALES:

The focus of this appeal is clearly one of credibility. The initial assessment on the testimony of a witness
is done by the trial court, and its findings still deserve due regard notwithstanding that the presiding judge Q You don't understand my question. You wrote that writing
who pens the decision is not the one who personally may have heard the testimony. 18 The reliance on the but where did you get that data?
transcript of stenographic notes should not, for that reason alone, render the judgment subject to
challenge. 19 The continuity of the court and the efficacy of its decision are not affected by the cessation A. This is just of what I know.
from the service of the judge presiding it 20or by the fact that its writer merely took over from a colleague
who presided at the trial. 21
Q Since you claim to have all this knowledge of your mind,
why did you find it necessary to write that in the palm of
It is asserted that the testimony of Francisca Espina should not be given worth since, while testifying, she your hand and I notice during the trial that you used to look
would at times be seen reading some notes written on her left palm. Thus — in your palm, why, is that necessary in your believe to testify
here to what you knew about the incident.
Q. May I see your left hand, may I see what is written there?
A Because of the fact that I have an headache.
A. Witness showing to the court her left palm and the
following words have been written in her palm in ball pen Q When did this headache occur?
handwritten words and number of the pumpboat No. 56 and
there is another word "petsa" and there are words which
cannot be deciphered and all found in the palm of the left A After I left my house because my sick child.
hand.
Q Now, knowing that you have an headache, did you not
ATTY. MONTECLAR: bring this to the attention of the Fiscal?

That is all. A No, I did not tell the Fiscal.

ATTY. GONZALES: RE-CROSS
Q Mrs. witness, you cannot deny of what these physical
evidences or writings on the palm of your left hand. I want
you to be honest, the law will not allow you to lie, you are
subject to punishment and penalty. My question is, who
wrote this on the palm of your left hand?
A I was the one who wrote this.
Q Do you know of your own that doing this is unfair and is
not allowable while testifying in open court, do you know
that is illegal act?
A No, I did not, know.
Q And you did all of this claiming that you do not know
about the incident for the purpose of giving here testimony
against the accused?

Q Why did you write that down? A Yes, sir. 22

The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule
132, of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to
refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or
under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or
at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same
was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-
examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may
testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the
particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the
transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.
(Emphasis supplied.)
23
Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this
case, the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that
she merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like details.
Appellants see inadvertency on Francisca's appearing to be "jittery" on the witness stand. Nervousness and
anxiety of a witness is a natural reaction particularly in the case of those who are called to testify for the
first time. The real concern, in fact, should be when they show no such emotions.
Francisca did fail in immediately reporting the killing to the police authorities. Delay or vacillation,
however, in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily adulterate the credibility of the
witness. 24 Francisca, in her case, has expressed fears for her life considering that the assailants, being her
neighbors, could easily exact retribution on her. 25 Also, the hesitancy in reporting the occurrence of a
crime in rural areas is not unknown. 26
Francisca's inability to respond to the summons for another appearance in court for further questioning
was satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. Francisca at the time just had a miscarriage and was found
to be too weak to travel. The recall of the witness was, after all, at the sound discretion of the trial court. 27
The claim of appellant Roberto Descartin that Francisca and her husband, a tuba-gatherer, owed him
P300.00, and the assertion made by appellant Antonio Plasencia on the dog-biting story involving
Francisca's son truly were too petty to consider. It would be absurd to think that Francisca, for such trivial
reasons was actually impelled to falsely implicate appellants for so grave an offense as murder.
Like the trial court, we are not persuaded that robbery has been proven to be the principal motive for the
crime that can warrant the conviction of appellants for the complex crime of robbery with
homicide. 36 Appellants could only thus be held responsible for the killing of Mansueto. Conspiracy
among the appellants has been established beyond doubt by the sum of their deeds pointing to a joint
purpose and design. 37
Three aggravating circumstances were alleged in the information, i.e., treachery, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength. The trial court disregarded the circumstance of evident premeditation and
concluded that the attack upon Mansueto was committed with treachery and abuse of superior strength.
On its finding that the assault was unexpectedly perpetrated upon the unarmed victim to ensure its
execution without risk to themselves from the defense that the victim might make, the trial court
appreciated treachery, which it deemed as having so absorbed abuse of superior strength.
The trial court was correct when it concluded that the crime committed was murder, a crime technically
lower than robbery with homicide, 38 not, however, because of the attendance of treachery but of abuse of
superior strength. Treachery, in our view, was not satisfactorily proven by the prosecution. Francisca
Espina simply testified that appellant Plasencia stabbed Mansueto while the latter and the appellants were
in a huddle. There was nothing adduced on whether or not the victim gave provocation, an indispensable
issue in the proper appreciation of treachery. 39 The presence, nonetheless, of the aggravating circumstance
of abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder. 40 The three appellants utilized superiority in
numbers and employed deadly weapons in assaulting the unarmed Mansueto.
There being no other aggravating or mitigating circumstances to consider, the trial court aptly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, the medium period 41 of the penalty of reclusion temporal maximum to
death prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In conformity with prevailing jurisprudential
law, the heirs of the victim should be indemnified in the amount of P50,000.00. 42
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting appellants Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin
and Joelito (Julito) Descartin of the crime of murder and imposing on each of them the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the indemnity to the heirs of the
victim, Herminio Mansueto, is raised to P50,000.00. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 96202. April 13, 1999]

Appellants questioned Francisca's ability to recognize them from a distance. Francisca knew appellants
well; they all were her neighbors while Antonio Plasencia himself was her cousin. 28 The crime occurred
at around three o'clock in the afternoon only about fifty (50) meters away from her. With an unobstructed
view, Francisca's positive identification of the culprits should be a foregone matter. 29 ROSELLA D. CANQUE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
The alleged inconsistencies in Francisca's testimony and in her sworn statement of 18 December 1984,
cover matters of little significance. Minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses do not detract DECISION
from their credibility; 30 on the contrary, they serve to strengthen their credibility and are taken as badges
of truth rather than as indicia of falsehood 31 even as they also erase suspicion of rehearsed testimony.32 MENDOZA, J.:

All considered, the case against the appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt even with the
retracted extra-judicial admission of Joelito Descartin. 33 The testimony of a single witness, if found to be
credible, is adequate for conviction, 34 The defense of alibi hardly can overcome the positive identification
of an unprejudiced eyewitness. 35
This petition for review on certiorari seeks a reversal of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City ordering petitioner -
. . . to pay [private respondent] the principal sum of Two Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand Seven Hundred
Seventeen Pesos and Seventy Five Centavos (P299,717.75) plus interest thereon at 12% per annum from
September 22, 1986, the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid; to pay [private respondent] the
further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for reasonable attorneys fees; to pay the sum of Five
Hundred Fifty Two Pesos and Eighty Six Centavos (P552.86) for filing fees and to pay the costs of
suit. Since [private respondent] withdrew its prayer for an alias writ of preliminary attachment vis-a-vis
the [petitioners] counterbound, the incident on the alias writ of preliminary attachment has become moot
and academic.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and style RDC
Construction. At the time material to this case, she had contracts with the government for (a) the
restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf road; (b) the asphalting of Lutopan access road; and (c) the asphalting
of Babag road in Lapulapu City.[3] In connection with these projects, petitioner entered into two contracts
with private respondent Socor Construction Corporation. The first contract (Exh. A),[4] dated April 26,
1985, provided:
The Sub-Contractor (SOCOR Corporation) and the Contractor (RDC Construction) for the consideration
hereinafter named, hereby agree as follows:
1. SCOPE OF WORK:
a. The Sub-Contractor agrees to perform and execute the Supply, Lay and Compact Item
310 and Item 302;
b. That Contractor shall provide the labor and materials needed to complete the project;
c. That the Contractor agrees to pay the Sub-Contractor the price of One Thousand Pesos
only (P1,000.00) per Metric Ton of Item 310 and Eight Thousand Only (P8,000.00)
per Metric Ton of Item 302.
d. That the Contractor shall pay the Sub-Contractor the volume of the supplied Item
based on the actual weight in Metric Tons delivered, laid and compacted and
accepted by the MPWH;
e. The construction will commence upon the acceptance of the offer.
The second contract (Exh. B),[5] dated July 23, 1985, stated:
The Supplier (SOCOR Construction) and the Contractor (RDC Construction) for the consideration
hereinafter named, hereby agree as follows:
1. SCOPE OF WORK:
a. The Supplier agrees to perform and execute the delivery of Item 310 and Item 302 to the
jobsite for the Asphalting of DAS Access Road and the Front Gate of ACMDC, Toledo
City;
b. That the Contractor should inform or give notice to the Supplier two (2) days before the
delivery of such items;
c. That the Contractor shall pay the Supplier the volume of the supplied items on the actual
weight in metric tons delivered and accepted by the MPWH fifteen (15) days after the
submission of the bill;
d. The delivery will commence upon the acceptance of the offer.
On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a bill (Exh. C), containing a revised
computation,[6] for P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month, representing the balance of
petitioners total account of P2,098,400.25 for materials delivered and services rendered by private
respondent under the two contracts. However, petitioner refused to pay the amount, claiming that private
respondent failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items
delivered and the acceptance thereof by the government. [7]
Hence, on September 22, 1986, private respondent brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
to recover from petitioner the sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month.
In her answer, petitioner admitted the existence of the contracts with private respondent as well as
receipt of the billing (Exh. C), dated May 28, 1986. However, she disputed the correctness of the bill
. . . considering that the deliveries of [private respondent] were not signed and acknowledged by the
checkers of [petitioner], the bituminous tack coat it delivered to [petitioner] consisted of 60% water, and
[petitioner] has already paid [private respondent] about P1,400,000.00 but [private respondent] has not
issued any receipt to [petitioner] for said payments and there is no agreement that [private respondent] will
charge 3% per month interest.[8]
Petitioner subsequently amended her answer denying she had entered into sub-contracts with
private respondent.[9]
During the trial, private respondent, as plaintiff, presented its vice-president, Sofia O. Sanchez, and
Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper.
Petitioners evidence consisted of her lone testimony.[10]
On June 22, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to pay private respondent
the sum of P299,717.75 plus interest at 12% per annum, and costs. It held:
. . . . [B]y analyzing the plaintiffs Book of Collectible Accounts particularly page 17 thereof (Exh. K) this
Court is convinced that the entries (both payments and billings) recorded thereat are credible. Undeniably,
the book contains a detailed account of SOCORs commercial transactions with RDC which were entered
therein in the course of business. We cannot therefore disregard the entries recorded under Exhibit K
because the fact of their having been made in the course of business carries with it some degree of
trustworthiness. Besides, no proof was ever offered to demonstrate the irregularity of the said entries thus,
there is then no cogent reason for us to doubt their authenticity. [11]
The trial court further ruled that in spite of the fact that the contracts did not have any stipulation on
interest, interest may be awarded in the form of damages under Article 2209 of the Civil Code. [12]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It upheld the trial courts reliance on private respondents
Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) on the basis of Rule 130, 37 [13] of the Rules of Court.
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner contends that
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AS ENTRIES
IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS THE ENTRIES IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
BOOK OF COLLECTIBLE ACCOUNTS CONSIDERING THAT THE PERSON
WHO MADE SAID ENTRIES ACTUALLY TESTIFIED IN THIS CASE BUT
UNFORTUNATELY HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF SAID ENTRIES.
II. THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED AS IT
HAS ONLY INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.
First. Petitioner contends that the presentation of the delivery receipts duly accepted by the then
Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) is required under the contracts (Exhs. A and B) and is a
condition precedent for her payment of the amount claimed by private respondent. Petitioner argues that
the entries in private respondents Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) cannot take the place of the
delivery receipts and that such entries are mere hearsay and, thus, inadmissible in evidence.[14]
 We agree with the appellate court that the stipulation in the two contracts requiring the submission
of delivery receipts does not preclude proof of delivery of materials by private respondent in some other
way. The question is whether the entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) constitute
competent evidence to show such delivery. Private respondent cites Rule 130, 37 of the Rules of Court
and argues that the entries in question constitute entries in the course of business sufficient to prove
deliveries made for the government projects. This provision reads:
Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer,
by a person deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the
facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty.[15]
The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following
conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.[16]
As petitioner points out, the business entries in question (Exh. K) do not meet the first and third
requisites. Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented by private respondent to testify on the
account of RDC Construction. It was in the course of her testimony that the entries were presented and
marked in evidence. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the
entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court.
Necessity is given as a ground for admitting entries, in that they are the best available evidence. Said a
learned judge: What a man has actually done and committed to writing when under obligation to do the
act, it being in the course of the business he has undertaken, and he being dead, there seems to be no
danger in submitting to the consideration of the court. The person who may be called to court to testify on
these entries being dead, there arises the necessity of their admission without the one who made them
being called to court be sworn and subjected to cross-examination. And this is permissible in order to
prevent a failure of justice.[17]
Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the
entry. She said she made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of the truth
or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. The deliveries of the materials stated in the bills were supervised
by an engineer for (such) functions.[18] The person, therefore, who has personal knowledge of the facts
stated in the entries, i.e.,that such deliveries were made in the amounts and on the dates stated, was the
companys project engineer. The entries made by Aday show only that the billings had been submitted to
her by the engineer and that she faithfully recorded the amounts stated therein in the books of
account. Whether or not the bills given to Aday correctly reflected the deliveries made in the amounts and
on the dates indicated was a fact that could be established by the project engineer alone who, however,
was not presented during trial. The rule is stated by former Chief Justice Moran, thus:
[W]hen the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him, and the person who gave him
the information is individually known and may testify as to the facts stated in the entry which is not part of
a system of entries where scores of employees have intervened, such entry is not admissible without the
testimony of the informer.[19]
Second. It is nonetheless argued by private respondent that although the entries cannot be
considered an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132, 10 [20] of the Rules of
Court which provides:
SEC. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred,
or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the
same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read
it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the
particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly stated the transaction when made; but such
evidence must be received with caution.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for
which it was offered cannot be admitted for another purpose. She cites the following from Chief Justice
Morans commentaries:
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. Where the offer is general, and the
evidence is admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another, the evidence should be
rejected. Likewise, where the offer is made for two or more purposes and the evidence is incompetent for
one of them, the evidence should be excluded. The reason for the rule is that it is the duty of a party to
select the competent from the incompetent in offering testimony, and he cannot impose this duty upon the
trial court. Where the evidence is inadmissible for the purpose stated in the offer, it must be rejected,
though the same may be admissible for another purpose. The rule is stated thus: If a party x x x opens the
particular view with which he offers any part of his evidence, or states the object to be attained by it, he
precludes himself from insisting on its operation in any other direction, or for any other object; and the
reason is, that the opposite party is prevented from objecting to its competency in any view different from
the one proposed.[21]
It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for another purpose. Private
respondents counsel offered it for the purpose of showing the amount of petitioners indebtedness. He said:
Exhibit K, your Honor - faithful reproduction of page (17) of the book on Collectible Accounts of
the plaintiff, reflecting the principal indebtedness of defendant in the amount of Two
hundred ninety-nine thousand seven hundred seventeen pesos and seventy-five centavos
(P299,717.75) and reflecting as well the accumulated interest of three percent (3%)
monthly compounded such that as of December 11, 1987, the amount collectible from the
defendant by the plaintiff is Six hundred sixteen thousand four hundred thirty-five pesos
and seventy-two centavos (P616,435.72);[22]
This is also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to refresh the memory
of Dolores Aday as a witness. In other words, it is the nature of the evidence that is changed, not the
purpose for which it is offered.
Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence. As
explained in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:[23]
Under the above provision (Rule 132, 10), the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness
does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has
just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has testified
independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute,
such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be
corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because
he supports his open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare
them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid
down. What is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule
itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to
conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain
materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence . . . . [24]
As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge, they could only
corroborate Dolores Adays testimony that she made the entries as she received the bills.
Third. Does this, therefore, mean there is no competent evidence of private respondents claim as
petitioner argues?[25] The answer is in the negative. Aside from Exh. K, private respondent presented the
following documents:
1) Exhibit A - Contract Agreement dated 26 April 1985 which contract covers both the Toledo wharf
project and the Babag Road project in Lapulapu City.
incomplete or irregular performance. In view of these facts, we believe Art. 1235 of the New Civil Code is
applicable.
Art. 1235. When the obligee accepts the performance, knowing its incompleteness and irregularity and
without expressing any protest or objection, the obligation is deemed complied with.
FINALLY, after a conscientious scrutiny of the records, we find Exhibit D-1 (p. 85 record) to be a
material proof of plaintiffs complete fulfillment of its obligation.
There is no question that plaintiff supplied RDC Construction with Item 302 (Bitunimous Prime Coat),
Item 303 (Bituminous Tack Coat) and Item 310 (Bitunimous Concrete Surface Course) in all the three
projects of the latter. The Lutopan Access Road project, the Toledo wharf project and the Babag-Lapulapu
Road project.

2) Exhibit B - Contract Agreement dated 23 July 1985 which covers the DAS Asphalting Project. On the other hand, no proof was ever offered by defendant to show the presence of other contractors in
those projects. We can therefore conclude that it was Socor Construction Corp. ALONE who supplied
RDC with Bituminous Prime Coat, Bituminous Tack Coat and Bituminous Concrete Surface Course for
3) Exhibit C - Revised Computation of Billings submitted on May 28, 1986. all the aforenamed three projects.[26]

4) Exhibit D - an affidavit executed by [petitioner] to the effect that she has no more pending or unsettled
obligations as far as Toledo Wharf Road is concerned.
5) Exhibit D-1 - Statement of Work Accomplished on the Road Restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf project.
Indeed, while petitioner had previously paid private respondent about P1,400,000.00 for deliveries
made in the past, she did not show that she made such payments only after the delivery receipts had been
presented by private respondent. On the other hand, it appears that petitioner was able to collect the full
amount of project costs from the government, so that petitioner would be unjustly enriched at the expense
of private respondent if she is not made to pay what is her just obligation under the contracts.

6) Exhibit E - another affidavit executed by [petitioner] attesting that she has completely paid her laborers WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
at the project located at Babag, Lapulapu City
SO ORDERED.

7) Exhibits F, G, G-1, G-2, G-3 - Premiums paid by [private respondent] together with the receipts for
filing fees.

8) Exhibits H, I, J - certifications issued by OIC, MPWH, Regional Office; Lapulapu City, City Engineer;
Toledo City Treasurers Office respectively, proving that RDC construction has no more collectibles with
all the said government offices in connection with its projects.

10) Exhibit L - Bill No. 057 under the account of RDC Construction in the amount of P153,382.75 dated
August 24, 1985.

11) Exhibit M - Bill No. 069 (RDCs account), in the amount of P1,701,795.00 dated November 20, 1985.

12) Exhibit N - Bill No. 071 (RDCs account) in the amount of P47,250.00 dated November 22, 1985.

13) Exhibit O - Bill No. 079 (RDCs account) in the amount of P7,290.00 dated December 6, 1985.

As the trial court found:

The entries recorded under Exhibit K were supported by Exhibits L, M, N, O which are all Socor Billings
under the account of RDC Construction. These billings were presented and duly received by the
authorized representatives of defendant. The circumstances obtaining in the case at bar clearly show that
for a long period of time after receipt thereof, RDC never manifested its dissatisfaction or objection to the
aforestated billings submitted by plaintiff. Neither did defendant immediately protest to plaintiffs alleged