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Kevin Walby
Carleton University, Canada
Nicolas Carrier
Carleton University, Canada
Abstract
Revisiting the contributions of numerous foundational biocriminological works, this article uses
the concept ‘bodily economies’ to analyze the emergence and solidification of criminological
pathologizations of the bios dependent on the capture and analysis of human corporeal matter.
The scholars we discuss (Lombroso, Ellis, Goring, Hooton, and the Gluecks) each causally equate
some part of the body with inbuilt criminality. Through an exegesis of their work, we illustrate
how the boundaries of the social body are constituted in and through corporeal capturings
and classifications of ‘criminal man’. Our analysis investigates the biocriminological method of
locating sources of criminality inside the body, which still permeates the new ‘science of criminals’
used as a tool to define and protect the social body. We conclude by discussing the renewed
biocriminological interest in preventing criminality through forecasting it in various scientific
constructs and visualizations of the inner body.
Keywords
biocriminology, eugenics, human body, pathologization, social body
Introduction
Historical accounts of the development of a particular field of scientific inquiry focusing
on crime and criminals have proposed different, sometimes conflicting, analyses of how
criminology came to be defined as a relatively autonomous set of discourses and practices.
In the 1880s, oppositions to the label ‘criminal anthropology’, particularly by French
scholars and lawyers, led to various proposals, including criminalogie, science criminelle
Corresponding author:
Kevin Walby, Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, 14 Queen’s Park Cres. W.,
Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3K9 Canada
email: kwalby@connect.carleton.ca
and sociologie criminelle (see Beirne, 1993: 233–7; Renneville, 1994: 199–202). Debates
concerning the correct denomination were fueled by deep discomforts with the growing
diffusion of work by representatives of La Scuola Positiva, and more particularly with
Lombroso’s ‘internationally acclaimed’ (d’Agostino, 2002: 320) conception of criminal
anthropology as well as its associated fundamental ‘discovery’: the ‘born criminal’.1
Criminology was ultimately accepted as the name for a blossoming yet heterogeneous
field, and the paternity of this denomination is now usually attributed to Garofalo, who
was the first to coin the term in his 1885 Criminologica.2 It is possible to see in those
debates about denomination that ‘criminology’ was, from the outset, a term used to signal
that the bodies of criminals3 could never be presented as the one and only legitimate site
of truth excavation. Nevertheless, the fundamentally zoological approach advocated by
criminal anthropology continued to play a central role in early criminological discourses
and practices, as we soon shall document. Preoccupations with the body have indeed been
integral to the consolidation of criminology, and an important branch of criminology, now
usually termed biocriminology, continued, at least up to the Gluecks, to indulge in an
obsession with the criminal physique.
Advances from Lombroso’s crude sizing up of jug ears to the techno-scientific mea-
surements of contemporary neuroscience have called for different biocriminological
concepts as well as an expansion of corporeal capturings that criminologists are inter-
ested in collecting to explain, measure, predict, and act on criminal propensities. From
Della Porta’s (1586) De Humana Physiognomonia and Lavater’s (1775) Physiognomische
Fragmente (see Labadie, 1995/2008: 320–3) to contemporary research on ‘new’ biologi-
cal determinants of crime,4 such as the causal role of a specific genotype in becoming a
‘gang member’ (Beaver et al., 2010), proto-criminological and criminological pathologi-
zations of the bios5 always ‘find’ the ultimate locus of criminal (or anti-social) behavior
in particular configurations of the body. This is so even when the bios–behavior relation-
ship is supposedly broken by the introduction of the social (e.g. in ‘interactionist’ or
‘holistic’ biological models, presented as avoiding crude determinism), since ‘the envi-
ronment’ is used solely as a (probabilistic) behavioral ‘trigger’ (see Spallone, 1998).
Throughout its whole history, biocriminology has relied on a fixed notion of the body
that Schilling (2003) refers to as the ‘naturalistic body’, where the biological body, how-
ever dynamic and potentially influenced by external ‘triggers’, is thought to determine
individual behavior patterns. A sociology of biocriminology requires a different notion
of the body. Our approach treats the bodily economies of ‘criminal man’ as cultural arti-
facts visualized, captured, constructed, and analyzed by criminologists. The concept
‘bodily economies’ refers to a non-essentialized notion of the body, one that is always in
flux. Here, it is mobilized to focus on the ways in which criminologists have isolated and
visualized particular parts, layers and sections of the body, and granted these elements of
human bodily economies causal powers in claims about past, actual and future behavior
of ‘criminal man’.
Discourses about the criminal body are not devoid of cultural, juridical and socio-
political implications and impacts (see d’Agostino, 2002; Rafter, 2008; Pavlich, 2009).
Truth productions about the criminal body also – sometimes implicitly, sometimes
explicitly – actively partake in defining the social body, and imagining defensive and
offensive strategies to cope with the threats posed by ‘criminal man’. Understandings of
the criminal formed through a pathologizing gaze focused on bodily economies insert
themselves in various claims about protecting and improving the social body, and thus
about transforming, managing or eradicating criminal bodies. Different ways of invoking
the body (criminal body, punishable body, social body) and various segregated elements
of bodily economies (e.g. skulls, ears, hormones, genes) become tropes for establishing
such claims.
This article contributes to contemporary analyses of the solidification and dispersion,
within criminology, of the positivists’ causal relationship posited between bodily econo-
mies and criminality. We investigate how a prominent method of correlating criminality
with certain bodies – where parts of the human body are isolated and then picked at us
evidence – emerged and has been replicated in criminology up to the 1960s. We focus on
what we shall term, alternatively, criminological pathologizations of the bios or crimino-
logical biopathologizations. But we limit ourselves to criminological discourses and
practices, sometimes labeled as criminal anthropology, which are antecedents to post-
phenomenal criminological biopathologizations, that is, antecedents to the biocrimino-
logical revolution sparked by Eysenck’s (1964) Crime and Personality (see Rafter,
2006), in which the autonomic nervous system becomes the ultimate etiological locus of
crime. Ours is a history of the criminological habit to ‘discover’ on the ‘outer body’
(Featherstone, 1991) the symptoms of pathological dispositions. We leave aside the later
shift from medicalization to biomedicalization (see Clarke et al., 2003).
Rock (2007) has suggested that the Lombrosian moment essentially ended with
Goring’s (1913/1919) The English Convict.6 While we agree that Lombroso did not
enjoy a wide sweeping popularity in Britain, we suggest that his concern for measuring
criminal bodies and for excluding them from the social body has not only survived the
acclaimed English Convict, but that a typically Lombrosian logic operated within it.
Moreover, bodily economies of ‘criminal man’ are still intricately tied up with contem-
porary efforts to know and police ‘criminal man’.
The first section of this article more carefully locates biocriminological discourses
and practices within the field of criminology. This notably enables us to spotlight the
continuities, not just the ruptures or radical oppositions, between biological, psychologi-
cal and (some) sociological criminological theories. The second section discusses con-
cepts concerning the body as it regards the way biocriminologists attempt to capture and
measure elements of corporeality. Then we offer an exegesis of some classical texts from
the criminological canon, dissecting how ‘criminal man’ is constructed through overlap-
ping medical and folk perspectives regarding bodies. We demonstrate the discursive
regularities that unite biocriminological endeavors.
the most common type of criminological discourse and practice, which rests ultimately
on a process through which crime and criminals are produced as symptomatic. Thus, the
differentiation of ‘discursive formations’ within criminology – formations that can be
individualized not from their elements’ homogeneity but from the practices’ regularity
making such elements possible (Foucault, 1969: 95) – is not disciplinarily structured.
Instead, the differentiation rests on the different axiomatic principles organizing crimino-
logical discursive ‘practices that form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault, 1969:
66, our translation).
Pathologization is the most common axiomatic principle structuring criminological
discourses and practices, irrespective of disciplinary affiliations. Typically, this is
restricted to various research linking crime to pathological bodily economies (bio-
pathologization) or pathological psychological structures (psychopathologization),
although it is sometimes extended (e.g. Mills, 1943/1963) to early sociological theories,
such as the social disorganization thesis. Yet, even contemporary self-labeled construc-
tivist sociologists are habitually engaged in the exact same process of symptomatologi-
zation (Carrier, 2008b). From Bonger’s (1916) Criminality and Economic Conditions, to
The New Criminology (Taylor et al., 1973) and in our time the thesis of ‘governing
through crime’ (Simon, 2007), a massive set of sociological theories are enabled by
observing crime (i.e. criminalization) through a pathologizing gaze.7 Sharing the same
practice of symptomatologization facilitates the observation of multiple pathological
sites. Even sociological precursors such as Adolphe Quetelet (1871) and Émile Durkheim
(1893/2007) – known for clearly non-biological explanations of crime – saw no contra-
dictions in themselves biopathologizing (at least some) criminals (see Nye, 1982; Beirne,
1993: 88–92, 147–55).
In this article, we limit ourselves to the solidification and dispersion of early crimino-
logical pathologizations of the bios. We leave aside the other discursive formations
within criminology, those shaped by processes through which crime is understood either
as the result of a choice, or constituted by social practices (see Carrier, 2006b). Finally,
although we are drawing on some Foucauldian archeological concepts, we do not pre-
tend to provide the reader with a full-fledged archeology of early criminological bio-
pathologizations. This would imply, following Foucault, comprehensively analyzing
‘the function that the studied discourse has to exert in a field of non discursive practice’
(Foucault, 1969: 90, our translation; see also Frauley, 2007).
social community through a topological practice: boundaries are established to assert that
they need to be protected from various threats and strengthened to guarantee group integ-
rity. The idea of a social body enforces a sense of collective belonging and, by extension,
defines who is to be defended against. Whereas ‘body politic’ is invoked when the alleged
order of a political regime is threatened, the idea of social body is invoked using references
to sickness when society’s ‘health’ appears endangered (see Foucault, 1980; Scheper-
Hughes and Lock, 1987; Csordas, 1994). Social body is a metaphor used to connote anxiet-
ies about, and dangers of, potential penetration, exposure to infection, and threats of
degeneration in ways the more static and non-metaphorical term ‘society’ does not. As
Douglas (1991: 115) puts it, ‘the body is a model which can stand for any bounded system.
Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious.’
Social body boundaries have been imagined – charted, surveyed, visualized – by
social scientists through the rise of ‘the statistical movement’ (Beirne, 1993) accompany-
ing western states’ consolidation of the monopolization not only of force, but also of
taxation (Elias, 1939/1994). From the 19th century onwards, proto-criminologists and
criminologists have partaken in producing social body boundaries by applying natural
and social scientific instruments and procedures8 to two general sets of threats: one the
one hand, crime as a ‘natural’ yet malleable phenomenon, produced by sociological
forces that could be identified and visualized through a physique sociale (social physics;
Quetelet, 1835) or statistique morale (moral statistics; Guerry, 1833); on the other hand,
crime as an abnormal phenomenon, produced by biological forces that could be identi-
fied and visualized in the bodily economies of public enemy number one: ‘criminal
man’. Our interest here is limited to the latter.
Criminological pathologizations of the bios are achieved through the capturing of
isolated or aggregated bodily economies of criminals. What this concept of bodily econ-
omies points to is an awareness of how the body is differently constituted by social and
natural scientists over time. The body is a fluid object. How we conceive of the human
body always changes. This concept of bodily economies refers not only to the discursive
constitution of human bodies by criminological knowledge, but also how the materiality
of criminal bodies is measured, pinched, cut into. As such, the ‘capture’ of bodily econo-
mies by biocriminologists always involves the scientific shaping of such objects. This
process of shaping is something which, of course, the positivistic naive realism of bioc-
riminology cannot recognize, since it would imply that there can be no such thing as a
(pathological) ‘body outside of cultural configurations’ (Shildrick, 1996: 7; also see Fox,
1997; Burkitt, 1999). Moreover, criminological biopathologizations do not operate on
the basis of scientific representations of the entire body. Biocriminologists investigate
parts, layers and sections of the body: the concept of bodily economies points to how the
criminal body is literally pulled apart as a means of producing an inventory of it, inquir-
ing into and mobilizing against it. Through capturing and examining bodily economies
of criminals, what is being presented as objective measurement, classification, analysis
of surfaces, structures and shapes of criminal bodies has a secondary effect: re-imagining
the contours of the social body.
Drawing from Gall’s and Spurzheim’s phrenological assumptions, inspired by ‘the
Darwinian imagination’ (Morrison, 2006: 109–31), and stimulated by Galton’s work on
composite photography (see Pavlich, 2009) as well as Quetelet’s work on anthropometry
(see Beirne, 1993), the Italian school of criminal anthropology develops the technical
skills of preserving and analyzing body-based evidence – ‘criminalistics’ in criminal
justice lingo today. Contemporary biocriminology cannot be reduced to a single and
simple progression of criminal anthropology forward; too many interrelations between
bio-, psycho-, and sociopathologizations are at work. Yet, as we demonstrate below,
there is, from Lombroso to the Gluecks, a definite regularity in early biocriminological
discourses and practices not only around the capturing of bodily economies of criminals,
but also grounded in the fact that these bodily incursions are performed not to assess the
criminal’s virility per se, but to erect and maintain boundaries that define and secure the
social body. The boundaries of the social body are constituted in and through corporeal
capturings and classification of so-called ‘criminal man’.9
We are focused on the claims made about and the metaphors used to discuss criminal
bodies, since ‘body metaphors illustrate the fact that we use the body as a convenient
way for talking or thinking about the moral and political problems of the day’ (Turner,
2003: 1). The contribution we make, beyond those of others (Beirne, 1993; Labadie,
1995/2008; Rafter, 1997; Horn, 2003) who have already mined the work of these bioc-
riminologists, is to trace the specific regularity in the claims Lombroso, Ellis, Goring,
Hooton, and the Gluecks make about criminal bodily economies, and to show how those
claims are always already about defining and defending the social body.10
the idea of suppressing not the microbes of anarchy but the sick, or even worse, the physicians
of the disease, is one that cannot take shelter except among a people unworthy to live and enjoy
the light of modern civilization. (Lombroso, 1876/2006: 242)
A society which palliates and cherishes criminals, which fosters the insane and turns them loose
to breed, bids fair to evolve into a pandemonium of morons, imbeciles, and idiots, ruled by the
insane and by criminals. If these be the offspring of democracy, the end of human liberty is
imminent. I think that such a vile parturition is likely to produce those microcephalous Siamese
twins, the Isms – Fasc and Commun. (1939b: 289)18
Hooton argues the ‘Negro’ commits murder, as well as burglary and larceny, at a
much higher rate than ‘Old Americans’, native ‘whites’ with foreign parentage or foreign
born ‘whites’. ‘There can be no doubt,’ writes Hooton (1939b: 342), ‘that the marked
physical differences between the Negro and “white” divisions of mankind are accompa-
nied by physiological and probably psychological and temperamental divergences.’ And
what marks the ‘criminal Negro’ from the ‘white’ criminal? Hooton thinks it is the ‘sheer
ignorance and primitiveness’ (1939b: 356) ‘more commonly encountered in savages’
(1939b: 362). This is how Hooton takes ‘strong stands against racial and ethnic prejudice
while at the same time maintaining the old-fashioned distinction between degenerates
and nondegenerates’ (Rafter, 2004a: 758), to speak out against the Nazis and remain an
American Eugenics Society member.
While Hooton (1939b) purports to offer superior statistical methods to Goring, his
typology of criminals and their associated bodily economies are sometimes as folksy as
Lombroso’s. For Hooton, the sex offender is ‘full-bodied’, the thief is a ‘sneaky little con-
stitutional inferior’, robbers are ‘wiry’ or ‘hard-bitten tough’, and violent criminals are
‘large and brutish’ (1939b: 374). The difference between the ‘Negro’ and the ‘white’
American is that with ‘whites’ ‘the scum floats’ and ‘the heavy sediment has settled’,
whereas ‘the Negro population is a pool in which there has been a continual stirring and
churning’ such that the ‘better’ and the ‘worse’ biological parts ‘have not separated’ (1939b:
384). Hooton (1939c: 296, 300) uses the term ‘biological sin’ to refer to reproduction that
deliberately or ignorantly ‘accentuates original hereditary weakness’ since it leads to the
‘breakdown of social organization’ and threatens the ‘biological future’ of humans.
Hooton has ideas about what to do with criminal bodies as it regards punishment. The
first is to, on an island, ‘establish a reservation for permanent occupation by paroled
delinquents’ (Hooton, 1939b: 391). For those criminals who are ‘hopeless constitutional
inferiors’, Hooton recommended ‘permanent incarceration’. ‘Let us cease trying to make
the world safe for morons, and endeavor rather to save it from them’, advocates Hooton
(1940: 230). ‘The evil human being is the inferior biological organism’, writes Hooton
(1940: 226–8), and the purpose of biocriminology is to be able to ‘control and limit the
production of inferior and useless organisms and to improve the individual and save
society by bettering inheritance’. Hooton finishes Crime and the Man by stating ‘it
behooves us to learn our human parasitology and human entomology, to practice an arti-
ficial and scientific selection with intelligence, if we wish to save our skins’ (1939b: 398,
emphasis added), summing up the biocriminological theme of defending the social body
from ‘criminal man’.
factors loom as more significant than the environmental’. Again: ‘bodily constitution …
is probably determined genetically’ (Glueck and Glueck, 1968: 18). With the Gluecks,
talk of the ‘gene’ becomes prominent and announces the biomedical turn, which leads
biocriminologists to reorient their focus on non-phenomenal bodily economies, pro-
duced through increasingly complex techno-scientific mediations. Theirs are indeed the
last colossal inquiries into the link between observable bodily economies and crime.
According to the Gluecks (1968: 19), mesomorphs have a special delinquency poten-
tial because of their sturdy, masculine bodies. Endomorphs, in contrast to mesomorphs,
would be dominated by digestive viscera, and are characterized by lesser energy, greater
inhibition and submissiveness to authority, which gives them a lower delinquency poten-
tial. Endomorphs – with bodily economies being characterized as fat, soft, and slow –
under-react to sociocultural influences (1968: 232). The relation of traits and physical
resources in endomorphs are ‘not conducive to a career of criminalistic aggression’ (1968:
234). Because the ectomorph lacks energy and has higher degrees of emotional instabil-
ity, fantasy and feelings of inadequacy, the ectomorph has low delinquency potential.
For the Gluecks, boys of different body types have varying pathways to delinquency,
thus it is important that parents and teachers deal with their behavior differently. Because
of the sensitivity of ectomorphs, for instance, ‘teachers and counselors might unwittingly
cause particular damage to them unless alerted to the special needs of children of this
physique and temperament’ (Glueck and Glueck, 1956: 255). Treatment and/or preven-
tion of delinquency should accord with bodily economies’ putative differential needs –
interventions’ ‘specific targets’ (Glueck and Glueck, 1950: 4) should be determined by
rigorous scientific inquiry into the causes of delinquency. As such, the Gluecks were
actively involved in strengthening criminological professional ideology (see Cullen and
Gendreau, 2001), where criminologists are presented as defenders of the social body
even before the threats manifest themselves, thus partaking in the colonization of the
family by a growing array of experts of the norm (see Rose, 1999).
Indeed, the ultimate purpose of criminology, for Eleanor Glueck (1958), is to develop
screening devices to identify delinquents before they start criminal careers, or ‘control’
them once delinquency has manifested. Echoing Lombroso’s comments regarding
scientific policing, the Gluecks (1966b: 101–2) write that criminal justice should use
‘scientific fitting’ of treatment to the biological delinquency potentialities, especially
during young ‘dangerous ages’ when criminogenic biological potentialities are actual-
ized. Delinquents come from ‘biologically unwholesome’ homes, and the task of dealing
with delinquency and crime requires, according to Sheldon Glueck (1952: 199–209),
‘continuous attack on all fronts of biologic and social pathology’. This includes volun-
tary sterilization laws and ‘a wide program of physical and mental hygiene … today
deemed indispensable to a civilized state’.
Our focus on biocriminological pathologizations in the Gluecks’ work is not meant to
suggest that they discounted the psyche and the social as other potentially pathological
sites that could be revealed through studying delinquents (see Debuyst et al., 2008:
89–126). In Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency, they pointed to the ‘dynamic interplay’
between ‘numerous factors and forces’ to explain delinquency, or at least ‘persistent
delinquency’ (Glueck and Glueck, 1950: 286). In contradistinction with Eysenck (1964),
for example, their interest in personality and its link to delinquency cannot be reduced to
a crude biological determinism. But what the Gluecks announce, and that Eysenck’s
work more forcefully launches, is openness to non-biological factors, which are consid-
ered only to the extent that they are possibly affecting the new bodily economies of the
criminals of which the biomedical revolution will enable the ‘discovery’ (e.g. genes). As
such, in the Anglophone realm, the Gluecks signal the end of a biocriminology based on
capturing observable bodily economies.
Terms change to make the biocriminological discourse palatable for certain audiences
or to keep up with trends in knowledge about the body and ways to dissect or penalize
it. Lombroso’s criminals are ‘atavistic’ and ‘asymmetrical’. Goring’s convicts display
‘marked differentiation’ and ‘unusual selection’, while Hooton discusses ‘unfit’ crimi-
nals and their ‘excesses’. The Gluecks’ delinquents are ‘irregular’ and exhibit ‘internal
disharmony’. For biocriminologists, these body markers make criminality legible on the
outer body of those under scrutiny. Biocriminologists claim to have mastered the ulti-
mate problem of control necessary for efficient social defense: time (see notably Bogard,
1996; Lafontaine, 2004). Indeed, by knowing how to scientifically identify symptoms of
criminal propensities on the outer body, detection, normalization, and eradication no
longer need to be ex post facto. This is the common utopia of all past and current bioc-
riminologies, which was particularly explicit in the Gluecks’ fixation with precocious
detection, and which is nowadays pushing back the frontier of science-fiction: to know
bodily economies in such a way that pathological ones never reach their full potential, so
that social defense is made a thing of the past. Even if present in biocriminology before,
the Gluecks mark a tipping point after which prevention becomes, in the terms of Beck
(1986/2001: 145), a ‘legitimate totalitarianism’.
Although his ‘taxonomies’ might now appear as mere ‘historical curiosity’ (Warwick,
2006: 562), looking at criminological biopathologizations from Lombroso onwards
reveals the tremendous uniformity of biocriminology’s ‘solutions’ as to what regards the
criminal cum punishable body. Lombroso says ‘conciliate’ or ‘exterminate’. Goring
pleads for ‘modification’ and ‘segregation’. Hooton wants ‘selective reproduction’ and
‘permanent incarceration’. When it comes to claims about physique and how to deal with
the delinquent body, even the Gluecks are parallel to rather than divergent from
Lombroso; they advocate ‘control’, ‘attack’ and sterilization. Negative eugenic claims
tied to biocriminology’s trajectory have persisted into the late-20th century (Rafter,
1997, 2008), and contemporary pathologizations of bodily economies led some to talk of
a ‘new eugenics’ geared toward crime, homosexuality, and other (usual) ‘deviances’ (e.g.
Duster, 1990; Fernbach, 1998).
One typical sociological critique of biocriminological pathologizations attends to the
theme of medicalization, problematizing the ‘activist reason’ of (past and present) bioc-
riminologies. The critique of the ‘medicalization of deviance’ (e.g. Conrad and Schneider,
1980; Zola, 1990) presents itself in two ways (see Carrier and Quirion, 2003). On the one
hand, it corresponds to the extension of the objects that are signified and acted upon
through a medical, and now biomedical, gaze – here, one may point to the (bio)medical
colonization of everything from con(tra)ception to death. On the other hand, the critique
suggests that (bio)medicalized objects should instead be understood as social objects –
here, one may argue that early and contemporary biocriminologies are guilty of reduc-
tionism, and that the ‘true’ causes of crime lie in social inequality. Psychopathologists,
sociopathologists, and biopathologists are united in a will to intervene on the pathologies
that they ‘discover’. Yet, those discovered pathological sites are the product of an analo-
gous symptomatologizing gaze (see Carrier, 2006b).
The activist reason of biocriminologists, which constantly devises ‘solutions’ to man-
age, transform, or eradicate individuals because of their putative symptomatic bodily
way, is broad enough to be an analytical tool for assessing the different knowledges – be
it folklore, comparative anatomy, or geneticism – biocriminologists have used to depict
the human body without itself importing essentialism regarding how the human body
should be thought of. ‘Because bodies are part of the production of knowledge and
distribution of social power,’ writes Rafter (1997: 238), ‘ultimately born criminals must
be understood as epistemological phenomenon, as metaphors.’ The biocriminological
method of capturing parts of the corporeal then problematizing ‘criminal man’ on the
basis of that knowledge has continuously been linked to a need for defense of the social
body. Pathologization of the bios is a first step in attempting regulatory interventions.
The normative coordinates of this trajectory in biocriminology, perpetuated in different
contemporary guises, tends toward law and order and its affiliated measures, or worse,
segregation, evisceration, and extermination.
Notes
Thanks to Chris Hurl as well as the Criminology & Criminal Justice reviewers for their helpful
comments.
1. Although Lombroso’s work has had a tremendous influence, the idea of a ‘born criminal’ was
received differently in various national contexts and scientific circles. It is rapidly refused
in France by Lacassagne, only to assume a relatively similar focus on observable physical
symptoms of criminality (Renneville, 1994; Kaluszynski, 2002). La Scuola Positiva was one
central root of the birth of criminology in the Netherlands (van Swaaningen, 2006), while
Lombroso’s work strongly shaped the direction of criminological work in pre- and Fascist
Germany (Rafter, 2008). In sum, the international acclamation of Lombroso’s work should
not be equated with the adoption of the notion of the born criminal in ‘normal science’, but
with the scientific legitimization of the biocriminological project.
2. Rock (2007: 120) notes that ‘the first recorded English use of the term’ criminology is in a
1890 article published in The Antheneum. Beirne (1993: 236) notes that the term ‘criminolo-
gist’ was used in an 1857 article published in The Saturday Review, that is, before ‘criminol-
ogy’ was coined.
3. We will refrain from placing ‘criminal’ in scare quotes throughout this article, but the reader
should note that the criminal is taken here as law’s and criminology’s product.
4. For instance, see Mednick and Christiansen (1977), Jeffery (1979), Wilson and Herrnstein
(1985), Booth and Osgood (1993), Bock and Goode (1996).
5. As Hannah Arendt (1958), and more recently Giorgio Agamben (1995: 1), have reminded
us, the Greeks distinguished between two terms to grasp what we nowadays refer to as ‘life’:
‘zoē, which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living (animals, men, or gods),
and bios, which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group’. The
rise of scientific knowledge regarding bios, concerning its pathologies, and, more generally,
concerning Man is, according to Foucault (1966: 398), not only the result of the fairly recent
‘invention’ of the concept of Man, but needs to be appreciated with the parallel development
of capitalist societies; as such, the bios is a ‘biopolitical reality’ (Foucault, 1977: 210).
6. Debuyst (1998b/2008: 502) makes the same claim, arguing that Goring provided ‘the first
scientific refutation of the born criminal theory’, and that the theory could not ‘survive’ this
refutation.
cautions about the solidity and universality of their ‘findings’ (cautions generally downplayed
by the ill-informed social critique efficiently evoking Auschwitz or Huxley’s (1932) dysto-
pian Brave New World), we can observe, from Lombroso to contemporary biocriminology,
the recurrent presence of a worrying specter: that ‘criminals’ are devoid of free will, thus
potentially threatening some vital juridical assumptions about human behavior (see Rose’s
2000, 2007 confident remarks on the ability of the juridical system to immunize itself against
such criminological truths). For example, in a special issue of a popular science magazine
regarding the biology of the‘criminal mind’, Strueber et al. (2006: 27, emphasis in the origi-
nal) ask: ‘does it really make sense to assume that a criminal can consciously choose to not
act violently?’
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Biographies
Kevin Walby is a SSHRC postdoctoral fellow at the Centre of Criminology, University of
Toronto, and Prisoners’ Struggles Editor for the Journal of Prisoners on Prisons. He has
published in journals such as the British Journal of Criminology (2010, with J. Piché) and
Social & Legal Studies (2007). Areas of interest include surveillance, policing and law.