GODOFREDO BUCCAT, applicant-appellant,

v.
LU GO MANGONON DE BUCCAT, defendant-appealed.

On March 20, 1939, the plaintiff initiated the present case As a result, since the plaintiff was allowed to present
his evidence, the lower court ruled in favor of the defendant. Hence this appeal.

The applicant seeks the annulment of his marriage to the defendant Luida Mangonon de Buccat on November
26, 1938, in the City of Baguio, on the grounds that, by consenting to that marriage, he did so because the
defendant had assured her that she was Virgin.

The complainant met the defendant in March 1938. After several interviews, both were committed on
September 19 of the same year

Desoues to live together for a period of eighty-nine days, the defendant gave birth to a ninemonth-
old boy, on February 23, 1939. As a result of this event, the plaintiff abandoned the defendant and did not
return to marital life with she

We see no reason to revoke the judgment appealed. In fact, the plaintiff's and appellant's allegation that the
defendant and appellant had not even suspected the defendant's pregnant condition was improbable, which is,
as has been proved, in very advanced pregnancy. So there is no place to estimate the fraud of which the
appellant speaks. The allegation that it is not uncommon to find people with a developed abdomen seems
childish to deserve our consideration, especially since the plaintiff was a first-year student of law.

FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
CO NCHITA DELIZO, respondent.

The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud, it being
alleged, among other things, that defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to
plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact that she
was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after their marriage, gave
birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between
her and the plaintiff.

Only the plaintiff however, testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract
between the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made by
her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date

On June 16, 1956, the trial court — noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was
born
within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged
by
the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud sa would annul a marriage — dismissed the complaint.

plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery

of the child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents, according to him, he had failed to
secure
earlier and produce before the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was denied.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability
to
present the proof of the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred in
denying
the motion for reception of additional evidence.
theory, however, that it was not impossible for plaintiff and
defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child could be their own, and
finding
unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he
married
her, the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration
be
denied, that the case be remanded to the lower court for new trial.

1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brother-in-law and plaintiff's brother, with whom defendant
was living at the time plaintiff met, courted and married her, and with whom defendant has begotten two more
children, aside from her first born, in common-law relationship) admitting that he is the father of defendant's
first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and that he and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at the time of
plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B") admitting her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her brotherin-
law and plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her marriage to plaintiff and her having hidden this fact from
plaintiff before and up to the time of their marriage;
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3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew Cesar Aquino and defendant lived together as
husband and wife before December 27, 1954, the date of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing her date of birth to be April 26,
1955;
5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of defendant with Cesar Aquino, her
brother-in-law;

As both the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an

answer, and stating that it "does not believe the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes", the
Court of
Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion. From that order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru
the
present petition for certiorari.

After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained.

Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by
a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.

That pronouncement, however,

cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months
pregnant at
the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily
apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical
authorities,
even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that
is to
say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if
noticed, be
attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that
the
enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the
abdomen
more general and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is
"naturally
plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time
of
their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Even physicians
and
surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can
only
claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six months.

the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with what has already
been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals
should, therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her
answer thereto

AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FE RNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.

plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were

married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7
January
1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation, which action was docketed in
the
Court of First Instance of Manila as Civil Case No. 21589; that judgment was rendered therein on 23
September
1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's
counterclaim;

while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the
judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital
relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital
secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even
before it
had hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from
going
thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within the
contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code

Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in paragraph IV of the complaint and denied having
had
pre-marital relationship with a close relative; he averred that under no circumstance would he live with Aurora,
as he
had escaped from her and from her relatives the day following their marriage on 4 December 1953; that he
denied
having committed any fraud against her

Defendant Fernando did not

pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages."

Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she alleged:
(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and pretended to shower her
with love and affection not because he really felt so but because she merely happened to be the first
girl available to marry so he could evade marrying the close relative of his whose immediate members
of her family were threatening him to force him to marry her (the close relative);
(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and not because he loved
her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform the marital duties and obligations
appurtenant thereto, and furthermore, he covertly made up his mind not to live with her;
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(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely concretized for him,
when in order to placate and appease the immediate members of the family of the first girl (referent
being the close relative) and to convince them of his intention not to live with plaintiff, carried on a
courtship with a third girl with whom, after gaining the latter's love cohabited and had several children
during the whole range of nine years that Civil Case No. 21589, had been litigated between them

the court realized that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was

legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage

The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

We must agree with the lower court that it is not.

ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife,
as the case may be;
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud
enumerated in Article 86, as follows:
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant
by a man other than her husband.

Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated
circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of
the
article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to
annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been
thereby
cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her
consent
was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is
interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees
with
the rule or not.

But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-divulgement" (the word chosen by
her)
of the pre-marital relationship of her husband with another woman as her cause of action, but that she has,
likewise,
alleged in her reply that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying with his
marital
duties and obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the
lower
court erred in ignoring these allegations in her reply.

This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and absence of intention to
perform
duties of consortium) is an entirely new and additional "cause of action."
Said allegations were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a partyplaintiff
is not permitted to amend or change the cause of action as set forth in his complaint (Calo vs. Roldan, 76
Phil. 445), there is more reason not to allow such party to allege a new and additional cause of action in the
reply.
Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties could become interminable.

On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on the husband's
part
not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her
action
for annulment based on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since
appellant's
wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared
already barred

JOSE RUIZ, plaintiff and appellant, vs. PELAGIA ATIENZA, defendant and
appellee.

Previous to February, 1938, Jose Ruiz and Pelagia Atienza, both single, were sweethearts.
Loving perhaps too well, she allowed him, in a moment of weakness, to have his way, with the
result that
nine months later she became an unmarried mother

Pelagia's father Jose Atienza, Atty. Villavicencio (her cousin-in-law), and three other persons
visited Jose
Ruiz at the boarding house where he lived, in Oregon street,.JVIanila. They requested, and after
some
discussion convince, him to marry Pelagia

With his cousin Alfredo Asuncion, he went with Jose Atienza

and companions to Tanduay street, where Pelagia was living; from there the party, joined by
Pelagia and
others, went to the Aglipayan church at Maria Clara street, Manila, then proceeded to secure a
marriage
license, and later returned to the same Aglipayan church where the marriage was celebrated in
the
evening. Four days later, alleging that he had been forced into wedlock, Jose Ruiz brought this
suit to
secure its avoidance.

His counsel has 'dramatized the visit of Jose Atienza and companions, and the "plans" drawn to
force
Jose Ruiz into the marriage

As to the first, it appears that in the course of the conversation during the visit, Ruiz made the
statement
that he could not marry Pelagia because he was already a married man. This so aroused Jose
Atienza
that he grabbed Ruiz' necktie, exclaiming: "So you mean to fool my daughter!” Those present
intervened
quickly, and the dispute stopped. The flare of anger is easily understandable. But it is not
sufficiently
established that Jose Atienza displayed any "balisong", or made any threat against the life of
Ruiz. In
fact, only a one-and-a-half-inch knife was found in his possession by the policeman whom the
companions of Ruiz called upon seeing what they believed to be the beginning of trouble: As to
the
threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar, by filing charges against him for immorality, the
authorities
are unanimous that it is not such a duress as to constitute a reason for annulling the marriage.
* * * and where a man marries under the threat of, or constraint from, a lawful prosecution for
seduction
or bastardy, he cannot avoid the marriage on the ground of duress; * * *. (38 C. J., sec. 70, p.
1305.)

Now, considering that the law presumes strongly the validity of marriage once the formal
ceremonies
have been completed, we are led to the conclusion that although plaintiff may not have looked
upon the
ceremony as the happy culmination of youthful romance, still the evidence does not warrant
pronouncement that his consent to it was obtained through force or intimidation. Indeed, we
may advert
to the provision of the Marriage Law (sec 30, Act No. 3613) which, referring to "force” or
"violence", does
not seem to include mere intimidation, at least where it does noting legal effect amount to force
or
violence.

At any rate, it is unnecessary to pass on the effect of this legal distinction. For even though
appellant has
presented his case in the best possible light, yet appellee’s attorney has successfully met the
issues,
upholding the judge's conclusion of fact that neither violence nor duress attended the marriage
celebration. Judgment affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered

Felix B. Sarao, plaintiff and appellant, vs. Pilar Guevara, defendant and
appellee.1

Plaintiff and defendant were married in Manila on June 3, 1936. In the afternoon of that same day
plaintiff
tried to have carnal knowledge of defendant, but the latter showed reluctance and begged him to
wait until
evening.

When the night came plaintiff again approached the defendant, but though he found the orifice of her
vagina sufficiently large for his organ, she complained of pains in her private parts and he noticed
oozing
therefrom some purulent matter offensive to the smell. Because of this the coitus was not a success,
and after
that first night every attempt on plaintiff's part to have a carnal act with his wife proved a failure,
because she
complained of pains in her genital organs and he did not want to make her suffer.