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Descartes and the Primacy of Practice: The Role of the Passions in the Search for Truth

Author(s): Amy M. Schmitter


Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, Vol. 108, No. 1/2, Selected Papers Presented in 2001 at the 75th Annual Meeting of
the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association (Mar., 2002), pp. 99-108
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321238 .
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AMY M. SCHMITTER

DESCARTESAND THE PRIMACYOF PRACTICE:THE ROLE


OF THE PASSIONSIN THE SEARCHFOR TRUTH

ABSTRACT. This paper argues that Descartes conceives of theoreticalreason


in terms derived from practicalreason, particularlyin the role he gives to the
passions. That the passions serve - under "normal"circumstances- to preserve
the union of mind and body is a well-known feature of Descartes's defense of
our nativemake-up.But they are equally importantin our more purelytheoretical
endeavors. Some passions, most notably "wonder,"provide a crucial source of
motivation in the search after truth, and also serve to reinforce memory. Our
cognitive successes and failures can also be trackedby passions and trains of
passions.

Descartes's reputationpaints him as the quintessential armchair


philosopher.But this is unfairon severalcounts.Descarteswas, after
all, a practicingscientist, and he frequentlystressedthe value of his
work for solving practicalproblems.1 And even his most theoretical
works acknowledge our need to make our way aroundthe world. I
want to suggest that the practicalis of primaryimportanceto all of
Descartes's work. In particular,I maintainthat Descartes adopts a
broadstrategyof treatingthe operationsof theoreticalreasonusing
terms and evaluationsmore traditionallyfound in accountsof prac-
tical reason.2Here, I will restrictmy argumentto the role Descartes
gives to the emotionsin the operationsof ourtheoreticalreason,that
is, in the searchaftertruth.
ForDescartesdrawsa close connectionbetween the passions and
practicalreason. The connection is made mainly in two places: the
Sixth Meditationand The Passions of the Soul. Both make a case
for understandingour variousbodily-basedperceptions- passions,
sensations and appetites - in terms of their functionality3under
standardcircumstancesfor preservingthe union of mind and body.
The appetites, such as hunger and thirst, have obvious value for
maintainingmind-bodyunion (even if particularcases of thirstwhen
dropsieddo not). And the passions motivateus to take action when

Li Philosophical Studies 108: 99-108, 2002.


?C)2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
100 AMY M. SCHMITTER

confronted with objects according to "the various ways in which


they may harm or benefit us, or in general have importancefor
us."4Descartes's late work concentratesalmost exclusively on the
passions, for he obviously thinks that their diversityandjudgment-
like characterallow a finer-grainedaccount of motivationthan do
the mere pushes and pulls of appetite. But as the theodicy in the
Meditationsmakes clear, all of these perceptionsbecome explicable
in the context of practicalreasoningby an embodiedagent.
The passions, however, have intellectual counterparts:we can
feel both the passion of joy, which gets its startin a certainbodily
state, and intellectualjoy, which dependson a volition or perception
properto the soul itself. Both count as 'joy,' althoughthey are not
analogous in all respects. Indeed, the classificationDescartes gives
of 'functions' of the soul in Part I of the Passions should count
intellectualjoy and other such "passions"caused by the action of
the soul alone as volitions, and only secondarilyas perceptions.But
treatingthem merely as volitions would miss the affective character
they sharewith bodily passions. And for us embodiedcreatures,the
actions of mind and body are so tightly interwoven in the causal
nexus of their union that we may be hard pressed to trace the
ultimateorigin of the emotion we experience.
Descartes's recognition that there are intellectual "passions,"
which do not require bodily genesis, means that the connection
between passions and practicalreason need not be limitedto agents
seeking to move their bodies throughthe world. Just as there are
goods we pursue that are independentof our embodied states, and
thus practicalreasoningwe engage in independentlyof our statusas
embodiedagents, so too arethereemotions we experienceindepend-
ently of our bodily-based experience. The intellectual "passions"
play the same role there as bodily passions do for embodiedagents.
They are both motivationsin practicalreasoningand consequences
of our actions. And I will suggest that one of the goals we pursue
aidedandabettedby the passionsis successful theoreticalreasoning.
Certainly,the inverse seems true. A true understandingof the
natureof things allows us to correctthe "natural"operationof our
passions, to make them rational,and thus to improve our practical
reasoning.The Passions of the Soul describesa "disciplineof virtue"
thataims at bringingour capacityto experiencethe variouspassions
DESCARTESAND THE PRIMACYOF PRACTICE 101

in line with our consideredjudgmentsaboutgoods and evils, so that


feeling a passion of, e.g., fear constitutesa genuine reason to judge
that something is fearful. But we want to correct our passions not
only because we aim at truth,but because we pursue other goods
as well. The properuse of our reason is a good, but so is a well-
orderedemotional life, so is simple experience of the pleasurable
passions, and so is the health and perfection of our souls. Making
our passions rationalserves many of the pluralityof human goods
Descartesrecognizes.
To understandhow the passions might promote the ends of
theoreticalreason, i.e., good reasoning,and the attainmentof truth
and avoidanceof error,let us startwith "the first of the passions"-
wonder.Wonderhas a special status among the passions: it has no
opposite, and it involves no change in the heartor in the blood. That
is because "its object is not good or evil, but only knowledge of the
thing that we wonder at."5Wonder,however, is useful, as are the
other passions, for they all "strengthenand prolong thoughtsin the
soul which it is good for the soul to preserve and which otherwise
might easily be erased from it."6 But whereas the other passions
make us take note of those objects that appeargood or evil for the
mind-bodyunion, wonder can be directedat things "which merely
appearunusual."Indeed, wonder is useful particularlyinsofar as it
"makesus learn and retainin our memorythings of which we were
previously ignorant."7The function of wonder,then, is to drive us
from ignoranceand towardsthe search for truth.Nor is its motiva-
tional force restrictedto knowledge that has instrumentalvalue for
our preservationas humanbeings.
Of course, wonder, like any other passion, requires regulation
and discipline if it is to be genuinely useful. Descartes often insists
that excessive wonder is as dysfunctionalas an absence of wonder,
especially when it becomes a habit. Then, it no longer motivates
us to seek knowledge, but ratherbecomes "blindcuriosity,"and at
worst, promptsus to "seek out raritiessimply in orderto wonder at
them andnot in orderto know them."8Justas bad, excessive wonder
can become insatiable,preventingus from enjoying the even-keeled
life Descartesvalues. Indeed,whatwe taketo be wonderfulandhow
wonderfulwe take it to be may well requirecorrectionby reasoning
aboutthe worthof the object andits place withinan overalleconomy
102 AMY M. SCHMITTER

of our search for knowledge. But the success of our reasoning, as


well as the success of the search for knowledge to which wonder
can motivateus, may be measuredby our emotionallife as much as
by ourjudgments.
That seems to be the lesson of The Searchfor Truthby Means of
the Natural Light,9a peculiar and oft-ignoredwork that is particu-
larly explicit aboutthe role of wonderandthose passionsthatfollow
in its wake. The workcontraststwo of its threecharacterson just this
basis: Epistemon is plagued by the desire for knowledge and by a
curiositythatonly increaseswith study,so much so thathis passions
are, by his own admission,a disease. Eudoxuscomparesthis disease
to dropsyin the body - one of Descartes'sfavoriteexamplesof how
the mechanical workings of the body, which under normal condi-
tions maintainhealth, can motivateself-destructivebehavior.If the
analogy holds, then the passions from which Epistemonsuffers are
destructiveof the good of the inquiringmind,but properlyregulated
and disciplinedpromotethis good.
In contrastto Epistemon, Eudoxus has a well-orderedmind in
a healthy condition. The value of his knowledge over the bookish
School-learningof Epistemonis supposedto be shown by the satis-
faction of his wonder and the epistemic contentmenthe enjoys.
What Eudoxus particularlyenjoys is a repose that stems from his
no longer having any passion to learn.10Eudoxus is not, of course,
ignorant,nor did he always lack desire to learn. Rather,his current
tranquillityis the result of having satisfieda genuine curiosity with
trueknowledge of the most necessarythings.Thatthe contentof his
knowledge is true and important,however, seems measuredmainly
by the affective state it produces. This may seem to leave us with
a problematiccircularity,until we realize that Descartes holds that
the natureand value of tranquillityand contentmentcan command
much wider recognitionthan does the content of what right reason
tells us: Epistemon - corrupted as his reason may be - has no trouble
recognizingthe characterof Eudoxus'saffective life, and takes it as
evidence of the superiorityof Eudoxus'sknowledgeover his own.1I
Indeed the dialogue suggests that, in some of the most crucial
cases, our affective state in contemplatingsome truthsimply cannot
be distinguishedfrom the reason for accepting it. That, I argue, is
how we can understandthe response given to Epistemon,when he
DESCARTESAND THE PRIMACYOF PRACTICE 103

challenges the right to claim knowledge of my own existence on


the basis of awarenessof my doubting,without first defining each
of these terms.12Eudoxus denies that anyone can be so "stupid"
as to need to be told what these terms mean before drawing the
conclusion. He then proceeds to explain why each of us ought to
be in the position to acquire knowledge of these terms and of the
truthin questionwithoutany additionalhelp - and certainlywithout
torturing our intellects.13 But the real proof for this pudding is
providedby the third character,Polyander,who supportsEudoxus
by specifying why he can indeed know what doubt, existence, etc.,
are, once he attendsto them. This admissionforces even Epistemon
to grant (grudgingly) that Polyander has reason to claim that he
knows all that can be known about these matterssimply because
he is satisfied[contentus] with his insight.14
Descartes does not maintain that mental satisfaction alone is
always a guarantee of genuine knowledge: both Eudoxus and
Polyander offer reasons why in this special case, nobody could
be content with her knowledge on inadequategrounds. Still, the
satisfaction of a well-ordered intellect is here taken as evidence
(defeasible evidence) for believing that all that can be known about
the matter is known, and that our knowledge is both certain and
complete. On the other hand, an intellect that never gained that
sort of satisfaction,remainingovercome with wonderand curiosity,
should count not only as ignorantof truthswithin its grasp, but as
disordered.
Descartes does not present this contentmentas one opposed to
wonderor curiosityor disruptedby theirappearance.Rather,proper
contentmentis the resultof allowingthese passionsto runtheirfunc-
tional, "natural"course. And the corrective for excessive wonder
is not denial of the passion, but knowledge - and that can be, and
usually is, motivated by curiosity.15Indeed, wonder itself can be
sated by indulging in the passion in the right way: thus Eudoxus
says that he will cause the othersto wonder,so that eventuallythey
will have no reason for wonder.16We should rememberalso that
not only can wonder stimulatecuriosity,which can in turnmotivate
the search for truth, but that it serves to fix importantpieces of
knowledge firmly in our memories.Wonderprovides a propadeutic
to our memory,the limits of which had long worriedDescartes. On
104 AMY M. SCHMITTER

the other hand, too much wonder or wonder misdirected at mere


novelties and trivialitiescan overburdenand weaken our memories.
In short, wonder and curiosity can be either functionalor dysfunc-
tional, but the solution to the risk of the latter is the former.For
these passions and their resolution in intellectual satisfactionmay
be our best guide to humanly accessible and genuinely important
knowledge - knowledge availableand efficiently availableto finite,
mortalbeings who must spendthe lion's shareof theirtime in action.
The sort of intellectual satisfaction touted so heavily in The
Search for Truth should not, however, be considered a distinct
passion in its own right. Rather, it marks the easy, tranquil and
uniform succession of our passions, which is the opposite of the
emotional turbulence and regret that Descartes held could result
from false judgment. But a merely formal description of their
progression may not capture what is characteristicof cognitive
success. For there may also be false or unwarrantedintellectual
"tranquillity,"the possibility of resting content with inadequate,
false, or even no knowledge.17 Of course, such risks may be inescap-
able for any criterion;judging or believing that one has met the
criterion is not the same as truly meeting it, even if that criterion
dependson the judgment,belief or otherattitudesof the subject.
But Descartesmay provideanother,more substantivepiece of the
puzzle that will allow us to distinguishbetween unwarrantedsatis-
faction and the genuine article(althoughnot incorrigibly).Whether
from intellectual laziness or deep-seated ignorance, a person may
remain satisfied simply because he fails to realize that he lacks
knowledge, even when that knowledge is easily had. That is the
"contentment,"not of passions run their course, but of the absence
of the relevantpassion from the start.18The key to distinguishing
this sort of false satisfactionfrom real contentmentwill lie in the
presenceof particularpassions.We might, for instance,ask whether
the person in question has ever experienced wonder and curiosity,
or whethershe has experiencedthe sort of despairand unease that
arises from doubtand motivatesus to resolve thatdoubt.
Perhapsmost important,though, is the characterof her current
satisfactionand whetherit includes the sweet passions of love and
joy. Now, if love andjoy are based on truejudgments,then we love
what truly brings (or will bring) us joy, and receivingjoy in return,
DESCARTESAND THE PRIMACYOF PRACTICE 105

love the object more. Thus love is "extremely good because by


joining real goods to us it makes us to thatextent more perfect,"and
joy is a mark of increasing perfection. Since intellectual love and
joy are not subject to any confusion about their causes and effects
(unlike the bodily passions), it seems they will always motivateand
signal the increasing perfection of the thinking soul.19 And since
knowledge, the acquisitionof truth,must count as the primaryend
of the activities properto the thinkingsoul, we thinkersshould love
knowledge. If we pursue knowledge and are (regularly)rewarded
by joy, then we have as good evidence as we could want of our
success at joining ourselves to real knowledge, and thus of our
increasingperfection.So, a constantjoy in the activityof thinkingis
a sign of the truthachieved thereby.Certainly,Descartes suggests
time and again that clear and distinct perceivings bring us joy
in proportionto their clarity and distinctness. The most dramatic
avowalof this connectionappearsin the ThirdMeditation,wherethe
narratordeclares that the contemplationof God and of our depend-
ence on God - a contemplationof the perfection of our soul that
perfects it yet further- constitutes "the greatestjoy of which we
are capable in this life."20By joining ourselves to God in loving,
devoted contemplation,we experience a joy that marksthe truthof
our perceiving.
There may be a lesson here for understandingwhat Descartes
means by clarity and distinctness. At least since Leibniz, these
criteria have been criticized for supposedly making a wildly
implausiblesubstitutionof subjectivecertaintyfor objectivelyavail-
able reasons for belief. But that may be unjust. Surely, if asked
why the locus of points described by Pappus's problem for four
lines can be expressed by an equation with no term higher than
the second degree, Descartes would not cite his feelings, but would
offer the solution given in the Geometry.But if challenged why he
takesthatsolutionto constitutea satisfactoryanswerto the problem,
then (leaving aside second-order issues of proof procedure) he
cannot produceyet anotherdemonstrationon pain of a regress. He
could, perhaps,recommendtaking anotherlook at the solution.But
assuming that the challengerhas indeed paid full attentionand still
wonders why one should count the whole thing as satisfactory(i.e.,
explanatory), the only appeal left may be - not to unanalyzable
106 AMY M. SCHMITTER

feelings of subjectivecertainty- but to somethinglike the complex


workings of wonder,intellectualcontentmentandjoy that Eudoxus
offers to Epistemon.
Like the most garden-varietypracticalreasoning, then, theoret-
ical reasoning is both motivatedand measuredby the train of our
passions. This is not the only way in which Descartes extends
concepts and analyses from practicalreason to theoreticalreason;
examples include his "doxastic voluntarism,"in particular,the
grounding of intellectual error in theoretical weakness of will.22
But why does Descartes treat theoretical reason by analogy with
practical reason? It is not simply because he understandsthat
theoreticalreasoningis itself an activity.Aristotle,too, understands
this: theoreticaland practicalreason are distinguishedboth by their
objects and as different activities that can shape different sorts
of lives. Descartes allows the differences in activities: theoretical
reasoningis not subjectto the same sort of cost-benefitanalyses as
is practicalreasoning,since its goal is truthabouthow things stand,
and we can always suspend judgment in the face of uncertainty,
without the pressureof having to decide what to do. Nonetheless,
Descartes refuses to segregate the activities into differentpsycho-
logical faculties. That refusal may stem from his attentionto the
subjective conditions for our activities. From the point of view of
the subject-agentwho seeks the truth,figuringout how things stand
requiresfiguringout what to do to find out how things stand.23And
deciding how to go about any theoreticalinvestigationrequiresthe
same sort of versatile,particularizedpracticalwisdom as does prac-
tical activity. Descartes also contests the Aristotelianposition that
one can shape a life aroundtheoretical activity; the principles of
metaphysics,for one, need be consideredonly once in a lifetime.24
For althoughtruthis an end in itself, the health and perfection of
our soul seem even more importantto Descartes, and engaging only
in theoreticalspeculationstuntsour othercapacities.In this respect,
Descartes shows some surprisingsimilaritiesto Hume - although
he would probablyrecommendreading Seneca over playing back-
gammon or making light conversationin the salon as a remedy for
intellectualdistress.
DESCARTESAND THE PRIMACYOF PRACTICE 107

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks to Elijah Millgram, Aladdin Yaqufb,Dean Schmitter,


and PatriciaEaston, as well as to audiences at the 2000 Northwest
Philosophy Conference and the 2001 Pacific Division APA. This
paper was writtenduring a sabbaticalleave from the University of
New Mexico, for which I am grateful.

NOTES

See especially AT VI 62, CSM 1 143, and AT IXB 14-15, CSM 1 186. Refer-
ences are to C. Adam and P. Tannery(eds.) (AT), Oeuvresde Descartes (Paris,
France: J. Vrin, 1996); and J. Cottingham,R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch (CSM)
and A. Kenney (CSMK), The Philosophical Writingsof Descartes, Vols. 1-111
(Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1984-1987).
2 This may seem to contrast with, e.g., Bernard Williams's description of
Descartesas engagedin a "projectof pureinquiry"(Descartes: the Projectof Pure
Inquiry,N.Y.: Penguin, 1978, p. 66), in which "no values drawnfrom [practical
matters]affect the enquiry"(p. 47). But the disagreementhere is only skin-deep
(see the last paragraphabove).
3 Although Descartes's story about the origin of the passions is through-and-
throughteleological (God equips our natureso in order that we may manoeuver
our way aboutthe world), I preferto describe the passions as "functional."What
determineswhen and where we will feel any particularpassion is the make-up
of our bodies, and that can be explained only mechanically,a fact which in turn
explains how the passions can be dysfunctionalon some occasions. Descartes's
insistence on accounting for the operation of our passions in terms of their
underlyingmechanismis, I take it, an importantstep towardsthe understanding
of biological functions without naturalteleology. For an interestingdiscussion
(which came to my attention too late to consider here), see Alison Simmons,
'Sensible Ends:LatentTeleology in Descartes' Account of Sensation',Journalof
the Historyof Philosophy 39 (2001), 49-75.
4 AT XI 372, CSM I 349. Sensationstoo alertus to differentpropertiesof things.
5 AT X 381, CSM 1 353.
6 ATX383,CSM1354.
7 ATX384,CSM1354.
8 AT X 386, CSM1356.
9 Discovered posthumously,the piece is of uncertaindate.
10 ATX501,CSM11402.
1 ATX501,CSM11403.
12 Such demands are part of Descartes's long-standingquarrelwith Scholastic
logic.
13 AT X 523, CSM 11 417.
108 AMY M. SCHMITTER

14
ATX525,CSMJI418.
15 See Epistemon'sdescriptionat AT X 504, CSM 11404.
16 AT X 505, CSM II 405.
17 This is a spectreraisedby Eudoxusabouthis own scholastic education,AT X
516, CSM II 411.
18 One might imagine cases where false belief answers genuine curiosity. But
Descartescan admitexceptions to the corrigiblereliabilityof satisfaction.And it
seems unlikely that such satisfactioncould be sustainedover the long haul. The
world has a nasty habit of destabilizingfalse opinions.
19 See AT X 434-5, CSM I 378-379.
20 AT VII 52, CSM II 36.
21 I have not hereextendedthe storytofailures of theoreticalreasoning,although
I think it could be.
22 See Sergio Tenenbaum, 'The Judgmentof a Weak Will', Philosophy and
PhenomenologicalResearch49 (1999), 875-91 1.
23 That is the topic of method.
24 See AT III 695, CSMK 228 and AT V 165, CSMK 346.

Universityof New Mexico


Albuquerque,NM 87131-1151, USA
E-mail: amys@unm.edu

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