8 Santos v.
Secretary of Labor resp's counsel filed a motion praying that the 36
Facts: Segundo Santos was employed as Labor
Conciliator I (Regional Office No. 4) of the Department
of Labor. His salary is 259 per month or 3108 per
annum. On Aug. 24, 1960, he was promoted and
appointed as Labor Conciliator II (Regional Office No.3,
Manila) with 3493 salary per year. The appointment
effective Sept. 1, 1960, was approved by th
Commissioner of Civil Service on May 14, 1962 and
release to the dept. Of labor on May 25, 1962.
Resp. Sec. Of Labor appointed Ricardo Tiongco to the
same position in June of 1962. Santos' demand
revocation of tiongco's appointment and payment to
him salary differentials but was rejected by the Sec. Of
labor. Santos then filed mandamus on aug. 20, 1962 (3
days before he is actually retired)
Resp's challenge the legallity of santos' appointment
claiming that based on circular of CSC stating that
"employees should not be assigned or promoted to
positions the initial rate of the salary allocation of which
exceed the maximum allowable for their eligibility."
Santos' appointment is within the prohibition (pero di
to totoo kasi 2nd grade eligible si santos kaya sakto lang
yung pagtaas ng salary sa position nya)
Issue: whether or not petitioner's claim is correct
Ruling: Yes. Santos' petition is meritorious. The record
clearly discloses that the original appointment of
petitiona as Labor Conciliator II was not taken out of the
CSC; it was approved by the Commissioner of CS on
May 14,1962 and released to the Sec of Labor on May
25, 1962. CIVIL SERVICE APPROVAL COMPLETED
PETITIONER'S APPOINTMENT.
Kung sakaling itanong ni sir, yung award ng pera
P761.68- estate ng deceased. Kasi namatay si santos,
tapos pinayagan ng court yung heirs na ituloy to.
9. Abeja v. Tañada GR No. 112283 Aug 30, 1992
Facts: Petitioner Evelyn Abeja and private respondent
Rosauro Radovan (deceased) were contenders for the
office of municipal mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, in the
May 11, 1992, national elections. The private
respondent won. After the proclamation Abeja filed an
election protest covering 22 precincts. Priv resp. Filed
an answer with a counter-protest of the results in 36
precincts. The revision of the ballots covering 22
protested precincts was completed in sept 1992. priv.
counter-protested precincts be revised only if it is
shown after completion of the revision of the 22
protested precincts that petitioner leads by a margin of
at least one (1) vote. Petitioner sought that the said
counterprotest be declared withdrawn upon the
inaction of priv resp. June 13, 1993 priv. Radovan died
and was substituted by vice mayor de ram and his
spouse, ediltrudes radovan. Eto in case magbusisi si sir
Judge Lopez ( reassigned to RTC Kalookan) ruling did not
contain summation of the exact number nor the
declaration of the winner. Judge Tanada, who
succeeded Judge Lopez denied motion to determine
votes, to proclaim winner and allow assumption of
office." Filed by petitioner.
Issues: 1 WON the priv resp should be allowed to
revision of the 36 precincts
2 WON the substitution is validly done
Ruling: 1. No. The applicable comelec rules provide that
the submission of evidence must be within reasonable
time. Sc ruled that radova is guilty of laches. Pleadings
and procedure; the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are
controlling in election protests heard by a RTC
2. The SC found it as erroneous the substitution of the
deceased Rosauro Radovan's widow, Ediltrudes
Radovan, on the ground that private respondent had a
counter-claim for damages. "Public office is personal to
the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his
heirs" (Santos vs. Secretary of Labor, 22 SCRA 848
[1968]; De la Victoria vs. Comelec, 199 SCRA 561
[1991]). The heirs may no longer prosecute the
deceased protestee's counter-claim for damages
against the protestant for that was extinguished when
death terminated his right to occupy the contested
office (Dela Victoria, supra)
10 G.R. No. 23226 March 4, 1925 VICENTE SEGOVIA vs.
PEDRO NOEL PUBLIC OFFICERS; RETIREMENT OF
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; Though there is no vested right
to an office, which may not be disturbed by legislation,
yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If
that right is to be taken away by statute, the terms
should OFFICE AS PROPERTY OR CONTRACT.—A public
office cannot be regarded as the property of the
incumbent. A public office is not a contract..
FACTS: In 1907, Vicente Segovia was appointed as
judge in Dumanjug, Cebu. In 1923, Act 3107 was
enacted. Said law made it mandatory for judges to
retire upon reaching the age of 65. In 1924, Judge
Segovia reached the age of 65. The Secretary of Justice
the ordered Segovia to retire from his post and since
then, Judge Pedro Noel acted as the judge in Dumanjug.
Thereafter, Segovia filed a petition for quo warranto
where he assailed the constitutionality of Act 3107 as it
“impairs the contractual right” of Segovia to his office;
that no age limit has been prescribed when he was
appointed as judge hence Act 3107 should not be
applied retroactively.
ISSUE: Whether or not Segovia should be reinstated to
his office.
HELD: Yes. But only because the law should not be
applied retroactively; Act 3107 is therefore
constitutional. Though Segovia abandoned his theory
on the unconstitutionality of Act 3107, the Supreme
Court emphasized that public office cannot be regarded
as the property of whoever is incumbent. A public office
is not a contract contrary to how Segovia viewed it in
his abandoned theory. But though there is no vested
right in an office, which may not be disturbed by
legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to
his office. If that right is to be taken away by statute,
the terms should be clear in which the purpose is
stated. In the case at bar, Act 3107 did not provide for
retroactive application. Hence, it can only be applied
prospectively. As such, the old law is still applicable in
the case of Segovia hence, pursuant to the old law, he
can remain in his post as a judge so long as he maintains
good behavior
RULING: No. The Court do not believe the contention of
the plaintiff nor can it be sustained. The Supreme Court
of the United States has that the Philippine Legislature
has the same powers in the Philippine Islands, within
the sphere in which it may operate, as Congress itself
(Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U. S., 549); and it has strongly
intimated that when an Act of the Philippine Legislature
is reported to Congress and has not been annulled by
that body it is a lawful and valid Act. By this it is not
meant to say, as we understand it, that the Philippine
Legislature can pass a valid law which is in violation of
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any other Act
of Congress; or that it can legislate in a field which
Congress has already occupied by appropriate
legislation (U. S. vs. Bull, 15 Phil. Rep., 7). In the Bull
case we held that an Act of the legislative authority of
the Philippine Government which has not been
expressly disapproved by Congress is valid, unless its
subject-matter has been covered by congressional
legislation or its enactment forbidden by some
provision of the Organic Law; and that the reservation
by Congress (Act of July 1, 1902) of the power to
suspect valid Acts of the Philippine Commission and
Legislature does not operate to suspend such Acts until
approved by Congress, or when approved, make them
laws of Congress. They are valid Acts of the
Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled.

11 CHANCO VS IMPERIAL

FACTS: Chanco alleges that on or about the 1st day of

July 1914, he was duly named and appointed as Judge
of the CFI of Bataan and Zambales, by the Governor
General with the advice and consent of the Philippine
Commission; that he duly qualified and entered upon
the discharge of duties thereof on said date in
conformity with Act no 2347. That the defendant,
Imperial has usurped and intruded into and taken
possession of the said office and is now exercising the
functions o said office without Chanco's resignation or
removal from the position. Imperial now alleges that
Chanco on or before the 9th of October 1915 has
completed his 65th year and that, by reason of sec 7 of
Act no 2347 which provides that no person holding
office of Judge of CFI after he has completed his sixty-
fifth year and that said plaintiff has ipso facto ceased to
be Judge and the office is thereupon became vacant.
The plaintiff no alleges that sec 7 of Act 2347 is
incompatible with and contrary to the Act of Congress
of July 1,1902 and Act no 136 of the Philippine
Commission and is therefore null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7 of 2347 is in violation

of or contrary to the Act of Congress of July 1,1902