Republic of the Philippines CONTRARY TO LAW.

1
SUPREME COURT
Manila defendant-appellant Patrick de Luna, assisted by Counsel-de Oficio Atty.
David Ompoc, when arraigned on December 23, 1986, entered a PLEA OF
FIRST DIVISION GUILTY with the qualification that "hindi ko sinasadya." 2

G.R. No. L-77969 June 22, 1989 The five-page transcript of stenographic notes taken on the day of the
arraignment reveals the following:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. INTERPRETER: (TO ACCUSED)
PATRICK DE LUNA, defendant-appellant.
(After reading the Information)
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Q: Do you understand the charge which I have just read to
David G. Ompoc for defendant-appellant. you?

ACCUSED DE LUNA:

GANCAYCO, J.: A: Yes, I understand but I have no motive to kill her. I was
drunk at that time.
Two main issues are raised by defendant-appellant in his appeal from the
decision of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City: (1) Whether INTERPRETER: (TO ACCUSED)
or not the defendant-appellant entered a valid plea of guilty to the offense as
charged in the information; and (2) Assuming that there was a valid plea of Q: What do you say to this charge, are you guilty or not?
guilty, whether the accused may waive the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution.
ACCUSED DE LUNA:

Charged with Murder before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
A: I am guilty but" hindi ko sinasadya ang nangyari." I was so
City, under the following information, drunk.

That on or about the 17th day of December 1986, at about

COURT:
7:00 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with
deliberate intent, with intent to kill and with treachery and Companero, did the accused understand that this is a capital
evident premeditation, did then and there attack, assault and offense?
use personal violence upon one Tricia by punching and
kicking her on the different parts of her body thereby inflicting ATTY. OMPOC: (Explaining to the accused)
upon her the following physical injuries:
Do you understand that this is a capital offense?
CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST, SECONDARY TO
SEVERE MULTIPLE INJURIES, TRAUMATIC. ACCUSED DE LUNA:

and as a consequence of said injuries Tricia died in the next A: Yes, but' hindi ko sinasadya ang nangyari.
day.
 xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Under the law, the Rules of Court, the prosecution will have
to present evidence in order to determine the culpability of
the accused in this heinous charge of Murder.
(TO ACCUSED):
What does the accused say, do we have to present evidence
for the prosecution?
ACCUSED DE LUNA:
A: No more evidence. No more presentation of evidence. I
accept my fault but I want the court to know that I have no
motive to kill her.
ATTY. OMPOC:
The accused your honor categorically stated that he does
not want evidence to be presented but he accepts his fault,
but according to him, he did not intend to commit the
crime, "hindi sinasadya."
COURT: (TO ACCUSED)
So you admit the charge against you? You understood the
charge of Murder filed against you and you admit you are
guilty?
ACCUSED DE LUNA:
Yes, I am guilty but I have no intention to kill the child.
Thereupon, the court a quo rendered a decision dated December 23, 1986
convicting defendant-appellant of the crime of Murder. The decision reads,
thus:
When this case was called for arraignment, Atty. David G.
Ompoc, appointed Counsel-de-Oficio for the accused Patrick
de Luna lengthily conferred with the accused and after such
lengthy conference with the accused, accused Patrick de
Luna, upon arraignment registered his plea of Guilty to the
charge of Murder with the qualification that 'hindi niya
sinasadya.
Being informed of the charge and having understood the
said accusation, the accused waived his right that the
prosecution present its evidence in order to determine for
this court the degree of culpability of the accused under the
present charge.
Aside from the plea of Guilty, the records is [sic] replete with
evidence strongly and indubitably showing that on the 17th
day of December, 1986 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening,
the accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
attack, assault and use personal violence upon one little,
small [sic] girl named Tricia by punching and kicking her on
the different parts of her body thereby inflicting upon her the
following physical injuries:
Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Secondary to Severe Multiple
Injuries, Traumatic' and as a consequence of said injuries,
Tricia died the next day.
WHEREFORE, finding accused Patrick de Luna Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the came of Murder and
appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of plea
of guilty plus his manifestation to this court that he did not
intentionally want it to happen that way, the court hereby
sentences accused Patrick de Luna to Reclusion Perpetua
(life imprisonment) and to indemnify the heirs of Tricia the
sum of P 30,000.00.
Costs de oficio.
3
SO ORDERED. 4
Not satisfied therewith, the defendant-appellant interposed this appeal
alleging that the trial court committed the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED FOR
MURDER WHICH WAS NOT PLEADED OR ADMITTED BY THE
ACCUSED, BECAUSE OF HIS QUALIFICATION TO HIS PLEA, THAT HE
DID NOT COMMIT THE CRIME INTENTIONALLY.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE PROSECUTION
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE PROPER
PENALTY FOR THE CRIME INVOLVED.
In his first assigned error, it is the contention of appellant that the trial court
misappreciated the plea of guilty made by him. Appellant contends that what
he admitted was the commission of the crime of Homicide and not Murder
because of the repeated qualification to his plea that he did not commit the
crime intentionally. He denied the allegations of treachery and evident
premeditation in the information which are necessary to sustain a charge and
subsequent conviction for Murder. He questions the appreciation by the trial
court that what was proved by the qualification 'hindi ko sinasadya' was only
the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave a wrong"
recited in paragraph 3, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, and claims that
in truth and in fact his plea was that of guilt of the lesser offense of Homicide,
not Murder.
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt, freely,
voluntarily, and with a full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of
his act and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime
charged in the complaint or information. 5
While it is true that a plea of guilty admits all the allegations in the information
including the aggravating and qualifying circumstances, 6 the repeated and
emphatic qualification stated by the defendant- appellant as regards his plea
of guilty should have drawn the attention of the trial court that the plea was
made without a full knowledge of its consequences. Apparently, counsel
failed to advise him as to the meaning and effect of the technical language
used in the information qualifying the acts constituting the offense.
In order to be valid, the plea must be an unconditional admission of guilt. It
must be of such nature as to foreclose the defendant's right to defend himself
from said charge, thus leaving the court no alternative but to impose the
penalty fixed by law. 7
Under the circumstances of this case, the appellant's qualified plea of guilty
is not a valid plea of guilty.
Thus, this Court has ruled that:
An accused may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in the
sense that he admits his guilt, provided that a certain penalty
be imposed upon him. In such cases, the information should
first be amended or modified with the consent of the fiscal if
the facts so warrant, or the accused must be considered as
having entered a plea of not guilty. 8
While this Court has had the occasion to rule that it is permissible for an
accused to enter a plea of guilty to the crime charged with the reservation to
prove mitigating circumstances, 9 considering, however, the gravity of the
offense charged in the case at bar, the more prudent course for the trial court
to follow is to reject the plea made by the appellant and direct the parties to
submit their respective evidence.
Even assuming that the plea was in fact to the lesser offense of Homicide
and not Murder, as stated by appellant in his appeal, 10 this Court cannot
sustain appellant's earnest request for an immediate reduction of the penalty
imposed by the trial court. This procedure would run contrary to the explicit
provisions of Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, which states:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.-The accused, with
the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the
crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser
jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (Emphasis supplied.)
The consent of the fiscal and the offended party is necessary. If the plea of
guilty to a lesser offense is made without the consent of the fiscal and the
offended party, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another
prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in
the former information. 11
On the second assigned error, it is the contention of appellant that the trial
court, after a plea of guilty to a capital offense (Murder), should have required
the prosecution to present its evidence to determine the proper penalty to be
imposed.
The Court sustains the appellant on this score.
This Court has had the opportunity to formulate this proceedings as early as
People vs. Apduhan, Jr." and a long line of cases thereafter. 13
In People vs. Camay, 14 this Court has ruled that:
The procedure to be followed in a situation like this where
the accused, with assistance of counsel, voluntarily pleads
guilty to a capital offense is explicitly laid down in Sec. 3,
Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated by
the Court, and which went into effect on January 1, 1985.
This new rule states:
When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may also present
evidence in his behalf.
The amended rule is a capsulization of the provisions of the
old rule and pertinent jurisprudence. We had several
occasions to issue the caveat that even if the trial court is
satisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with full
knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the court must
still require the introduction of evidence for the purpose of
establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the
defendant.
xxxxxxxxx
Under the new formulation, three (3) things are enjoined of
the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital offense has
been entered by the accused:
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability; and
3 The court must ask the accused if he desires to present
evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
This rule is, therefore, mandatory.
After a plea of guilty in capital offenses, it is imperative that the trial court
requires the presentation of evidence for the prosecution to enable itself to
determine the precise participation and the degree of culpability of the
accused in the perpetration of the capital offense charged.
In his Manifestation, in lieu of Appellee's Brief, the Solicitor General, in fact,
made the following observation:
Herein trial court's recognition and admission of appellant's
purported waiver of his right that the prosecution present
further evidence ... is rather odd. For it is the duty of the trial
court to take evidence in capital cases where accused enters
a plea of guilty ... 15
Thus, notwithstanding the waiver made by the appellant as to the
presentation of evidence by the prosecution, the presentation of evidence
should be required in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the
mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility
that there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the
accused as to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to
ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which
justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the
imposition of the prescribed penalties. 16
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated December 23, 1986 is
hereby SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to said court for a new
arraignment and further proceeding. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53586 January 30, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PONCIANO LUMAGUE, JR., MARIO LUMAGUE, ROLANDO LUMAGUE
and JUANITO LUMAGUE, accused whose death sentences are under
review.
PER CURIAM:
This is a murder case. Early in the morning of July 25, 1977, Antonio A.
Regalado, 39, a credit investigator of the Social Security System, was
maliciously killed in the Marikit Sub. division, Marikina, Rizal.
The postmortem examination revealed that he had fourteen incised wounds,
two lacerated wounds, ten punctured wounds and ten stab wounds, or thirty-
six wounds in all, eight of which were fatal because they affected his vital
organs like his lungs, liver, heart and intestines (Exh. A). The wounds were
located in different parts of his body: front and back, head, arms, legs,
abdomen, knees, chest and shoulders (Exh. B). Obviously, he had been
assaulted by more than one person.
The incised and stab wounds were caused by a bladed weapon such as a
kitchen knife. The lacerated wounds were caused by a blunt instrument such
as a piece of wood or iron bar. The punctured wounds were caused by a
pointed instrument such as an icepick.
Elma Icater Regalado, a thirty-nine year-old businesswoman, the victim's
widow, testified that she spent P 25,000 for the funeral of her husband and
for miscellaneous obligations (Exh. J to J-8). Aside from his widow, the
deceased was survived by his two children, Ian, 4 and Shiela, 6. In her letter
to General Romeo C. Espino, she said (Exh. K):
In our own little world, my husband and I planned the future
of our children.
Ma. Shiela was to be a nurse while L. Ian, ... was to be a
doctor according to his wish. We planned and rejoiced in our
little hopes even when life was difficult, until last July 25,
1977 at about 0030 Hrs. when a gang of hoodlums pounced
upon my husband and his companions while they were on
their way home and robbed him and brutally and mercilessly
murdered him, and with him, the beautiful dreams we had for
our children.
Even a mad dog or an abominable criminal did not deserve
his manner of death! He, who never harmed anybody nor
spanked his children out of love, lay there in a muddy street
of the Marikit Subdivision, gasping for breath and calling our
... son even as his assailants took turns in stabbing him and
pummeling him with a garden hoe that broke at the handle
as it hit my helpless husband as he lay on the ground.
Our house that was once a happy home when he was
around is no longer the same since he has gone. Our little
girl, Ma. Shiela, eats her breakfast silently with tears
streaming down her face; our son L. Ian keeps asking me
when his father will wake up, and I, will never get used to the
emptiness and the void that he has left behind.
The Marikina police could not solve the crime. At the request of Mrs.
Regalado, General Espino referred the case to the Constabulary criminal
investigation service (CIS) at Camp Crame.
As a result of the investigation, the four Lumague brothers, Ponciano, Jr., 27,
Rolando, 25, Mario, 23, and Juanito 21, and their brother-in-law, Rodolfo de
la Cruz, were charged with murder for the killing of Regalado. Ponciano,
Rolando and Mario were arrest on August 20, 1977. Juanito was arrested on
October 10, 1977 when the prosecution had already finished the presentation
of its evidence against his three brothers. De la Cruz is at large.
The Lumague brothers came from a family of five boys and five girls. They
grew up in the slum area of Tondo, Manila. Their parents were natives of La
Union. The father, a convict, was killed by a member of the Oxo gang (p.
138, Record).
Even before the Lumague brothers were implicated in the killing of Regalado,
Rolando had been charged in the municipal court of San Fernando, La Union
with frustrated murder and slight physical injuries (Exh. L and M). In the
same court, Ponciano was charged with frustrated homicide (Exh. P). He
was also charged in the provincial fiscal's office of La Union with direct
assault of an agent of a person in authority and robbery (Exh. R and S).
Ponciano is married with four children. He used to be a shoe repairman. He
finished grade four. Rolando is married with three children. He finished grave
five. He used to be a tricycle driver. Mario is married with three children. He
finished grade three. He was jobless.
The probation officers found the Lumague brothers to have marked criminal
tendencies and to have a propensity for anti-social behavior (p. 139, Record).
Trial of Ponciano, Rolando and Mario Lumague.— These three brothers
were tried first because the other two accused, Juanito Lumague and
Rodolfo de la Cruz, were at large. According to the prosecution, in July,
1977, the Lumague brothers, with their mother, Morales, and their sister and
brother-in-law, Rodolfo de la Cruz, were renting from Walter Romero
Gutierrez a shack or "barong-barong" in the Marikit Subdivision in Marikina
near the residence of Virgilio Pacunayen.
At about eleven o'clock in the evening of July 24, 1977, Regalado, with his
friends, Roberto Asuncion, Gerardo A. Ducha, Lorenzo Gravador and
Rogelio Bautista, had a drinking spree at the Havana Pub and Beerhouse
located at Barrio Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila. Each of the five drank
three bottles of beer. They watched the floor show.
Shortly after midnight, the group left that place and, as it was curfew time,
they decided to walk to Bautista's house in the subdivision about a kilometer
away and sleep there. (Regalado was a resident of 5-C Annapolis Street,
Cubao, Quezon City, a neighbor of Asuncion who resided at 5-D Annapolis
Street.)
What happened while the group was walking was testified to by two
eyewitnesses, Asuncion, 30, and Pacunayen, 21, a high school graduate,
who, as noted above, was residing at a house near the shack where the
Lumague family was staying and who claimed to have been a victim of an
assault perpetrated by the members of the Lumague family in June, 1977.
Asuncion testified that he and Regalado were walking together. Gravador
was ahead of them. Bautista and Ducha followed Regalado and Asuncion.
While walking on the street in front of the shack occupied by the Lumague
family and Pacunayen's house, Asuncion heard Ducha shouting that Bautista
had been stabbed. When Asuncion looked behind, he noticed that Ducha
and Bautista were running because they were being pursued by two persons.
Asuncion's impulse was to follow Bautista and Ducha but after taking a few
steps, he turned around and looked at the place where he had left Regalado.
He saw Mario Lumague beating Regalado on the back with a hoe (Exh. D).
Asuncion was about two fathoms away. Regalado fell on the ground face
down. Asuncion got a stone and threw it at Mario.
Mario pulled Regalado to a dark grassy place near the lighted street. Four
persons approached Regalado. Asuncion Identified three of them as the
brothers Ponciano, Mario and Rolando Lumague. Ponciano hit Regalado
many times with his fist and struck him on the back with an adobe stone.
Rolando also threw an adobe stone at the head of Regalado and boxed him
many times. Juanito repeatedly stabbed Regalado. Rodolfo de la Cruz
clobbered Regalado with a club ("pamalo") about two feet long.
Then, Mario who was armed with a hoe turned his attention to Asuncion,
Ducha and Bautista who fled upon his approach. Mario pursued them. He did
not overtake them. Shortly thereafter, the five assailants left the place where
they had assaulted Regalado.
Asuncion approached Regalado who was bloodied all over but was still
breathing. Asuncion directed Bautista to fetch a vehicle. Ducha went to the
police station. "Then a taxicab passed by, Asuncion hailed it and placed
Regalado inside the taxicab. He was brought to the E, Rodriguez Hospital
but was already dead on arrival thereat.
Asuncion's testimony is a confirmation of his sworn statements dated August
8 and 22, 1977 before the Constabulary investigator of the CIS police
intelligence section at Camp Crame (Exh. C and C-2).
Pacunayen, the other prosecution witness, a neighbor of the Lumague
family, who was acquainted with the members thereof, testified that at past
midnight on July 25, 1977 he was in the balcony of his house overlooking the
lighted street.
He witnessed the assault on Regalado which was perpetrated by the four
Lumague brothers and their brother-in-law Rodolfo de la Cruz. Pacunayen,
who was at a distance of fifteen meters from the scene of the assault,
corroborated the particulars thereof as narrated by Asuncion. Pacunayen's
testimony is a confirmation of his sworn statement dated August 9, 1977
before the Constabulary investigator of the CIS police intelligence section at
Camp Crame (Exh. G).
Ducha, who, like Gravador and Bautista, did not testify, executed sworn
statements dated August 1 1 and 22, 197 7 before the Constabulary CIS
investigator (Exh. E and F). Ducha, 25, a high school graduate, narrated how
he and Bautista encountered a person who tried to stab Bautista. Then,
Ducha saw another person beating Regalado with a hoe. At a confrontation,
Ducha Identified Mario as the wielder of the hoe Ponciano as the one who
assaulted Regalado with an adobe stone and Rolando as the one who boxed
Regalado (pp. 79-83, Record).
Another documentary evidence of the prosecution is the hardly legible sworn
statement of Mario Lumague taken by the same Constabulary investigator
(Exh. H, pp. 87-90, Record).
The investigator, before interrogating Mario, warned him that anything that he
would say regarding the death of Regalado would be used against him in
court and that he (Mario) had the rights (1) to remain silent and not to answer
any question that would be prejudicial to him, (2) to have counsel, (3) to be
investigated in the presence of his lawyer and (4) to have counsel de oficio if
he could not afford to hire his own lawyer.
Then, the investigator asked Mario whether after being apprised of his
constitutional rights he was willing to give a voluntary statement and to sign
an acknowledgment that he understood his constitutional rights. Mario
answered in the affirmative. He then signed the following certification,
amounting to a waiver of his constitutional rights, which formed part of his
statement:
Ito ay nagpapatunay na nauunawaan kong lahat ang aking
mga karapatan na napaliwanag sa akin ng inbestigador gaya
ng pagbibigay ng salaysay na kusang loob, at hindi na rin
kukuha ng abogado dahil katotohanan lamang ang aking
sasabihin. (Exh. H-1 p. 87, Record.)
Mario's version in his statement is that he and Juanita were in the Havana
Pub and Beer Garden from seven to ten o'clock in the evening of July 25
(should be 24), 1977. At around eleven o'clock, when Mario was already in
his residence at the Marikit Subdivision (where he lived with his brothers,
mother and brother-in-law) he heard a shout coming from the street in front
of the house and the sound of an object hitting the roof ("kalabog") and he
saw Juanito going out of the house.
Then, later, Beth, the sister of his brother-in-law, informed Mario that some
persons had ganged up against Juanita. Mario came out of the house and
allegedly saw Juanita prostrate on the street in front of their house. Mario
reentered the house, got a hoe and helped Juanita in resisting his four
assailants who were holding stones and assaulting Juanita. Mario clubbed on
the head the person holding Juanita. Juanito got a kitchen knife from the
house and repeatedly stabbed the person whom Mario had clubbed on the
head and who was sitting on the ground. The assaulted person fell on the
ground. Mario and Juanito ran away.
Mario in his statement disclosed that the persons staying in the house at the
Marikit Subdivision were Rodolfo de la Cruz and his wife Hermenegilda
(Mario's sister), Ildefonsa or Perlita Lumague, Reynaldo Lumague, Beth de la
Cruz, Lita Lumague (Mario's wife) and Juanito (No. 32, Exh. H).
Mario said that only he himself and Juanita assaulted
Regalado but he (Mario) was not sure whether he was the
only one who killed Regalado (No. 40, Exh. H).
The version of the defense is that Juanita Lumague was the sole assaulted
of Regalado. Ponciano, Rolando and Mario presented as witnesses their
mother Emerenciana Morales and Angelita Ramos, Eleno Gomez and
Winnie Camacho to prove their defense of alibi.
Emerenciana, a sixty-nine year-old widow, testified that in July, 1977 she
resided with the spouses Hermenegilda Lumague and Rodolfo de la Cruz in
the house which they had been renting for three months in the Marikit
Subdivision. In the evening of July 24, 1977 she went to bed at eleven o'
clock. She was awakened because of the noise caused by some persons
who were passing near the house and who were challenging the Ilocanos to
a fight. She came out of the house and saw five men who were very noisy.
She advised them to go home because it was already very late. They
allegedly answered that they did not observe the curfew and they cursed the
President for enforcing it. Emerenciana said that the five men pushed her
towards the door of her house and she fell on the ground. She was allegedly
stoned by the five noisy individuals. She was hit in the cheek, chest, left foot
and front part of her body. A woman named Marilou (Angelita) was also
stoned and her foot was injured ("nipilay") (412).
Emerenciana admitted that when the incident happened she, her children
and son-in-law were staying in the house but when asked to clarify her
answer she said that her daughter Hermenegilda, son-in-law Rodolfo de la
Cruz and her grandchildren were staying in the house (398). She declared
that she did not know who killed Regalado and that when Regalado was
killed her four sons "were not there" (399), meaning that Rolando, Ponciano
and Juanito were in the province, Mario was in Tondo and Rodolfo was in the
house (400-3). When pressed by counsel de oficio to clarify the whereabouts
of Juanito, Emerenciana answered that Juanita arrived in the house when
Emerenciana was pushed by the five persons (4069).
Emerenciana categorically declared that Ponciano never resided with her in
Marikina (410-11). She testified that when Juanita was boxed by the men, a
fight ensued between them and Juanita. She admitted that Juanita had
previously been confined in the Madrigal Rehabilitation Center for having
been involved in a homicide case with his brother-in-law, Maximino Dacanay.
Angelita Ramos, 20, a helper of Emerenciana, testified that Pacunayen used
to go to Emerenciana's house. In the afternoon of July 24, 1977, Ponciano
was not in the house in Marikina but was in Bauang, La Union, Mario was in
Tondo and Rolando was in Barrio Ambangonan, Pugo, La Union, but Juanita
was in Emerenciana's house in the Marikit Subdivision, Marikina.
Angelita corroborated Emerenciana's, testimony that at about midnight on
July 24 five persons passed by Emerenciana's house and challenged the
Ilocanos to step out. Emerenciana came out of the house and told the five
persons to go home. She was pushed by the five persons and she fell on the
ground.
At that juncture, Juanita and Pacunayen arrived. Regalado allegedly boxed
Juanita. The five persons threw stones and the witness, Angelita, was hit in
the ankle. Pacunayen assaulted Regalado with a hoe Regalado fell on the
ground face down. Pacunayen repeatedly stabbed Regalado (461).
Because Angelita was not available for cross-examination, her testimony on
direct examination was stricken out of the record (506).
Eleno Gomez, 50, a farmer, a resident of Barrio Quinavite, Bauang, La
Union, and a first cousin of Julian Camacho, who in turn is a first cousin of
the Lumague brothers, testified that in the evening of July 24, 1977 he acted
as guard at a dance held on the occasion of a wedding in Barrio Quinavite
and that Ponciano, Rolando and Mario were present at that dance (475).
Juanita and De la Cruz were not present at that dance. A few moments later,
Gomez testified that Rolando and Mario were not present at the wedding
party (489).
Winnie Camacho, a twenty-three year-old housewife, whose husband is a
first cousin of Rolando, testified that on July 24 and 25,1977 Rolando was at
her house in Barrio Ambangonan, Pugo. He planted rice on July 24. The next
day he went fishing in the river.
Decision in the case of Ponciano, Rolando and Mario Lumague.—At the
conclusion of Winnie's testimony on January 31, 1978, defense counsel
Galvan announced that he would present the accused as witnesses at the
next hearing scheduled on February 24. That hearing was not held. The case
was reset for March 14. No hearing was held on that date for reasons not
shown in the record.
On that date, the trial court issued an order requiring the prosecution to
present its memorandum within ten days and giving defense counsel Galvan
five days within which to file a reply memorandum. It scheduled on April 18
the promulgation of its sentence.
The prosecution in a motion dated March 20, 1978 offered its Exhibits L to S
which were marked during the cross-examination of the defense witnesses.
Galvan objectived to Exhibits L, M and N. He did not make not attached to
the motion.
The prosecution filed its memorandum on April 5. Galvan was furnished with
a copy thereof. He did not submit his reply memorandum. As scheduled, the
death sentence against Pnciano, Rolando and Mario was "dictated and
promulgated in open court" on April 18, 1978.
The trial court convicted Ponciano, Rolando and Mario Lumague of murder,
sentenced each of them to death and ordered them to pay solidarily to the
heirs of Regalado an indemnity of thirty-two thousand pesos. Treachery and
abuse of superiority were considered qualiffying circumstances. Cruelty was
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstances. Cruelty was
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstances. The trial court did not
give credence to the alibis of the accused.
The trial court in its decision explained that the defense waived its right to
present further evidence after it failed to present such evidence in spite of
numerious postponements and when defense counsel failed to appear in
court despite due notice (p. 286, Record).
Galvan filed on April 24 a motion for reconsideration. He complained that the
accused were denied due process of law because they were not given a
chance to testify in their behalf. The motion was denied. The trial court in its
order of April 28, 1978 directed the clerk of court to forward the record of the
case to this Court.
Separate trial and decision in Juanito Lumague's case. — As priorly noted,
Juanito was arrested in Barrio ambangonan, on October 10, 1977 when the
prosecution had finished the presentation of its evidence against his brothers
Ponciano, Roland and Mario. When arraigned on October 19, Juanito
pleaded not guilty. He was given a separate trial.
At the hearing on June 28, 1978, when the medico-legol officer was testify for
the second time in the separate trial for Juanito, Benjamin Santos, Juanito's
counsel, interrupted the testimony of the medico-legal and manifested that
Juanito was withdrawing his plea of not guilty and changing it to a plea of
guilty. The doctor's testimony was suspended. Juanita was placed on the
witness stand. He took his oath and was interrogated as follows:
Court to Juanito Lumague: Do you confirm
and affirm that you are changing your plea
of not guilty to that plea of guilty? — A. Yes,
sir. I was not able to talk.
Q. by Court: You were not able to talk
because you were arrested. ...—A. No, your
Honor. The reason at that time I was asking
but I was not able to reason out that I was
the one who committed the crime.
Court: Why did you not tell the lawyer of
your brother that you (are) the only one to
be presented by the defense lawyer? — A. I
stated so, your Honor.
Court: Did anybody intimidate, coerce you or
promise you of (any) leniency for changing
that plea of not guilty to that plea of guilty?-
A.No. your Honor. (550-552)
The trial court then ordered the resumption of the presentation of evidence
against Juanita. The medico-legal officer was cross-examined by Juanito's
counsel Asuncion and Elma 1. Regalado testified again. The prosecution
formally offered in evidence against Juanita the same Exhibits A to K which it
had already presented during the trial of Ponciano, Rolando and Mario
Lumague.
Juanito's counsel did not present any evidence. On July 5, 1978, the trial
court rendered in Juanito's case a decision similar to its previous decision. It
convicted him of murder, sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay the
same indemnity (p. 281, Record).
Ruling.—In this automatic review of the fear death sentences, counsel de
oficio contends that the trial court erred in not giving the four accused a
chance to present other witnesses and to testify in their behalf, in admitting
the extrajudicial confession of Mario Lumague, in giving credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in convicting the accused of
murder.
With respect to Juanita Lumague, who withdrew his plea of not guilty, who
was tried separately and whose guilt was also established by means of the
evidence presented against him, we find that the counsel's contentions are
devoid of merit. Juanito's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. His
plea of guilty and the evidence introduced by the prosecution destroyed the
presumption of innocence in his favor.
There is conclusive evidence that he was the one who stabbed Regalado. In
doing so, he conspired with the other assailants of the victim particularly with
the assailant who treacherously struck Regalado on the back with a hoe
Even Juanito's mother admitted that he took part in the assault (408-9, 413-
4). And, of course, the fact that Juanita was a fugitive from justice for several
months is an indication of his guilt.
The trial court correctly held that the killing was murder qualified by treachery
and abuse of superiority and aggravated by cruelty. Hence, death is the
proper penalty. Juanito's plea of guilty is not mitigating because it was made
after the prosecution had commenced the presentation of its evidence.
With respect to the other three accused, Ponciano, Mario and Rolando
Lumague, who pleaded not guilty and who were tried ahead of Juanito, there
is merit in their contention that they were denied due process of law because
they were not given a chance to testify in their behalf and to present
additional evidence.
An accused has the constitutional right "to be heard by himself and counsel"
and the right "to testify as a witness in his own behalf ". The denial of such
rights is a denial of due process, as held in People vs. Santiago, 46 Phil. 734.
See People vs. Abuda, L-30009, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 789.
Due process of law in a criminal prosecution consists of a
law creating or defining the offense, an impartial tribunal of
competent jurisdiction. accusation in due form. notice and
opportunity to defend, trial according to established
procedure, and discharge unless found guilty (16A C.J.S.
617).
The constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate.
"No court of justice under our system of government has the power to
deprive him of that right." (Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525, 534).
Fundamental fairness, which is the essence of due process, requires that the
three accused should be allowed to testify on their defenses and to present
additional evidence to prove their innocence.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the trial court's separate decision dated July 5,
1978, sentencing Juanito Lumague to death.

Its prior decision of April 18, 1978, sentencing to death Ponciano, Mario and
Rolando, all surnamed Lumague, is set aside. It is directed to receive the
additional evidence of the said accused, subject to the right of the
prosecution to present rebuttal evidence and the right of the accused to
present surrebuttal evidence. The evidence already presented subsists and
should be taken into account in the rendition of another decision. Costs de
oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,Fernandez,

Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Fernando, CJ., took no part

De Castro, J., I concur with justice Ericta's observation.


DIVISION
[ GR No. 176033, Mar 11, 2015 ]
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO v. REYNALDO P. VENTUS +
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision [1]dated August 11,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its December 4, 2006 Resolution[2] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 92094. The CA dismissed for lack of merit the Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioners Felilibeth Aguinaldo and
Benjamin Perez, praying for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the
public respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia from implementing the Orders
dated May 16, 2005 and August 23, 2005; (2) the issuance of a Writ
of Certiorari to annul the said Orders, and (3) the dismissal of the estafa case
against them for having been prematurely filed and for lack of cause of
action.
The procedural antecedents are as follows:
On December 2, 2002, private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B.
Joson filed a Complaint-Affidavit[3] for estafa against petitioners Aguinaldo
and Perez before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila. Claiming
to be business partners in financing casino players, private respondents
alleged that sometime in March and April 2002, petitioners connived in
convincing them to part with their Two Hundred Sixty Thousand
(P260,000.00) Pesos in consideration of a pledge of two motor vehicles
which the latter had misrepresented to be owned by Aguinaldo, but turned
out to be owned by one Levita De Castro, manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-
Car.
On January 15, 2003, Perez filed his Counter-Affidavit,[4] denying the
accusation against him, and claiming that his only participation in the
transaction between private respondents and Aguinaldo was limited to
having initially introduced them to each other.
On January 22, 2003, private respondents filed their Reply-
Affidavit,[5] asserting that Perez was the one who showed them photocopies of
the registration paper of the motor vehicles in the name of Aguinaldo, as well
as the one who personally took them out from the rent-a-car company.
On January 29, 2003, Perez filed his Rejoinder-Affidavit,[6] stating that
neither original nor photocopies of the registration was required by private
respondents to be submitted to them because from the very start, they were
informed by Aguinaldo that she merely leased the vehicles from LEDC Rent-
a-Car.
On February 25, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Renato F. Gonzaga
issued a Resolution[7] recommending both petitioners to be indicted in court
for estafa under Article 315, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
He also noted that Aguinaldo failed to appear and to submit any
controverting evidence despite the subpoena.
On July 16, 2003, an Information[8] (I.S. No. 02L-51569) charging petitioners
with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC was
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Case No.
03-216182, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and
Benjamin Perez," the case was raffled to the public respondent.
On July 31, 2003, Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for
Reduction of Bail to be Posted in Cash, which the public respondent granted
in an Order of even date.[9]
On the same day, petitioners filed through counsel a Very Urgent Motion to
Recall or Quash Warrants of Arrest,[10] alleging that the Resolution dated
February 25, 2003 has not yet attained finality, and that they intended to file
a motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 2003, petitioners jointly filed with the OCP of Manila their
"Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the
Information Prematurely Filed With the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City
of Manila."[11] Citing the Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez,
Aguinaldo asserted, among others, that no deceit or false pretenses was
committed because private respondents were fully aware that she does not
own the pledged motor vehicles.
On August 6, 2003, the public respondent issued an Order[12] granting the
motion for withdrawal of information, and directing the recall of the arrest
warrant only insofar as Aguinaldo was concerned, pending resolution of her
motion for reconsideration with the OCP.
On August 9, 2003, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of
Arraignment, pending resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed
with the OCP of Manila. Upon the prosecution's motion,[13] the public
respondent ordered the proceedings to be deferred until the resolution of
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.[14]
On December 23, 2003, the public respondent ordered the case archived
pending resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration with the OCP of
Manila.[15]
On January 16, 2004, the OCP of Manila, through ACP Antonio M. Israel,
filed a Motion to Set Case for Trial,[16] considering that petitioners' motions
for reconsideration and for withdrawal of the information have already been
denied for lack of merit.
On February 27, 2004, petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ)
a petition for review[17] in I.S. No. 02L-51569 for estafa, entitled "Benjamin
Perez and Felilibeth Aguinaldo v. Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson."
Acting on the prosecution's recommendation for the denial of petitioners'
motions for reconsideration and withdrawal of the information, and its
motion to set the case for trial, the public respondent issued an
Order[18] dated March 15, 2004 directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against Aguinaldo and the setting of the case for arraignment.
On March 26, 2004, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel
Arraignment and Suspend Further Proceedings,[19] until their petition for
review before the DOJ is resolved with finality. Petitioners reiterated the
same prayer in their Urgent Motion for Reconsideration[20]of the Order dated
March 15, 2004.
On April 16, 2004, the public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion
to cancel arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion for
reconsideration.[21]
On June 23, 2004, Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapeña and
Associates, filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of
Arrest.[22] De Castro alleged that she was the private complainant in the
estafa case that had been ordered archived. Petitioners filed an Opposition
with Motion to Expunge,[23] alleging that De Castro is not a party to the said
case, which is in active file, awaiting the resolution of their petition for review
before the DOJ.
On October 15, 2004, De Castro filed a Manifestation[24] informing the public
respondent that the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution dated
September 6, 2004 denying petitioners' petition for review in I.S. No. 02G-
29349 & 02G-28820 for estafa, entitled "Levita De Castro v. Felilibeth
Aguinaldo."[25]
On May 16, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion
to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, thus:
Pending with this Court are (1) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue
Warrant of Arrest against accused Aguinaldo filed by private prosecutor with
conformity of the public prosecutor. x x x
It appears from the records that:
(1) the warrant of arrest issued against accused Aguinaldo was recalled
pending resolution of the Petition for Review filed with the DOJ; x x x
(2) the Petition for Review was subsequently dismissed x x x
(3) accused Aguinaldo has not yet posted bail bond.
In view of the foregoing, (the) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant
of Arrest is GRANTED. Let this case be REINSTATED and let warrant of
arrest be issued against accused Aguinaldo.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[26]
On May 30, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to Quash Warrant of Arrest.[27]
On August 23, 2005, the public respondent issued an Order denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash Warrant of
Arrest, and setting petitioners' arraignment, as the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure (or Rules of Court) allows only a 60-day period of suspension of
arraignment. Citing Crespo v. Mogul,[28] he also ruled that the issuance of the
warrant of arrest is best left to the discretion of the trial court. He also noted
that records do not show that the DOJ has resolved the petition for review,
although photocopies were presented by De Castro.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent in issuing
the Orders dated May 16, 2005 and August 23, 2005. On August 11, 2006, the
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution[29] dated December 4,
2006. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT
THE MOTION TO REINSTATE THE CASE AND ISSUE A WARRANT OF
ARREST WAS FILED BY ONE LEVITA DE CASTRO WHO IS NOT A PARTY
TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. 03-21[6]182.
 II.
A PROCEDURAL TECHINICALITY THAT THE SUSPENSION ALLOWED
FOR ARRAIGNMENT IS ALREADY BEYOND THE 60-DAY PERIOD MAY
BE RELAXED IN THE INTEREST OF AN ORDERLY AND SPEEDY
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
III.
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE I.S. NO. 02L-51569
(CRIMINAL CASE NO. 03-21[6]182) BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF MANILA HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED.[30]
On the first issue, petitioners argue that the public respondent erred in
issuing the Order dated May 16, 2005 reinstating the case and issuing an
arrest warrant against Aguinaldo. They point out that the Motion to Reinstate
the Case and to Issue a Warrant of Arrest against Aguinaldo was filed by De
Castro who is not a party in Criminal Case No. 03-216182, entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez," instead of
private complainants Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson. They also assert
that said motion was erroneously granted based on the purported denial of
their petition for review by the DOJ, despite a Certification showing that their
actual petition in I.S. Number 02L-51569, entitled "Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v.
Felilibeth Aguinaldo," has not yet been resolved and is still pending with the
DOJ.
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the provision of Section 11, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only sixty
(60) days is merely directory; thus, it cannot deprive petitioners of their
procedural right to due process, as their petition for review has not yet been
resolved by the DOJ.
On the third issue, petitioners take exception that even before they could
receive a copy of the DOJ resolution denying their petition for review, and
thus move for its reconsideration, the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-
216182 had already been filed with the RTC on July 16, 2003. They contend
that such precipitate filing of the Information and issuance of a warrant of
arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the preliminary
investigation having been completed because they were not afforded their
right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. In support of
their contention, they raise the following arguments: that the right to
preliminary investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural right; that
an Information filed without affording the respondent his right to file a
motion for reconsideration of an adverse resolution, is fatally premature;
and, that a denial of a complete preliminary investigation deprives the
accused of the full measure of his right to due process and infringes on his
constitutional right to liberty.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
On the first issue, petitioners are correct in pointing out that the Motion to
Reinstate the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest[31] was filed by one Levita
De Castro who is not a party to Criminal Case No. 03-216182. Records show
that De Castro is not even a private complainant, but a mere witness for being
the owner of the vehicles allegedly used by petitioners in defrauding and
convincing private respondents to part with their P260,000.00. Thus, the
public respondent should have granted petitioners' motion to expunge, and
treated De Castro's motion as a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect, as it
was filed by one who is not a party to that case.
Petitioners are also correct in noting that De Castro's motion was granted
based on the purported dismissal of their petition for review with the DOJ. In
reinstating the case and issuing the arrest warrant against Aguinaldo, the
public respondent erroneously relied on the DOJ Resolution dated
September 6, 2004 dismissing the petition for review in a different
case, i.e., I.S. No. 02G-29349 & 02G-28820, entitled "Levita De Castro v.
Felilibeth Aguinaldo, for two (2) counts of estafa." As correctly noted by
petitioners, however, their petition for review with the DOJ is still pending
resolution. In particular, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Miguel F. Guido,
Jr. certified that based on available records of the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor, their petition for review filed in I.S. Number 02L-51569, entitled
"Reynaldo Ventus, et al. v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo" for estafa, is still pending
resolution as of May 27, 2005.[32] It bears stressing that their petition
stemmed from Criminal Case No. 03-216812, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez" wherein the public
respondent issued the interlocutory orders assailed before the CA, and now
before the Court.
On the second issue, the Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that the
provision of Section 11 (c),[33] Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the
suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus,
the estafa case against them cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their
petition for review with finality.
In Samson v. Judge Daway,[34] the Court explained that while the pendency
of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60
days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.[35]
In Diño v. Olivarez,[36] the Court held that it did not sanction an indefinite
suspension of the proceedings in the trial court. Its reliance on the reviewing
authority, the Justice Secretary, to decide the appeal at the soonest possible
time was anchored on the rule provided under Department Memorandum
Order No. 12, dated 3 July 2000, which mandates that the period for the
disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall be seventy- five (75)
days.[37]
In Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals,[38] the Court ruled that in a long line
of decisions, it has repeatedly held that while rules of procedure are liberally
construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are
necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. After all,
rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the litigants, and they
are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience of
invoking "substantial justice." Relaxation or suspension of procedural rules,
or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by
compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it.[39]
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, and there being no such reasons
shown to warrant relaxation of procedural rules in this case, the CA correctly
ruled, thus:
In the case at bar, the petitioners' petition for review was filed with the
Secretary of Justice on February 27, 2004. As early as April 16, 2004, upon
the petitioners' motion, the arraignment of the petitioners herein was
ordered deferred by the public respondent. We believe that the period of one
year and one month from April 16, 2004 to May 16, 2005 when the public
respondent ordered the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of petitioner
Aguinaldo, was more than ample time to give the petitioners the opportunity
to obtain a resolution of their petition for review from the DOJ. The
petitioners though submitted a Certification from the DOJ dated May 30,
2005 stating that their petition for review is pending resolution by the
Department as of May 27, 2005. However, such delay in the resolution does
not extend the period of 60 days prescribed under the afore-quoted Section
11(c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Besides, the
petitioners may be faulted for the delay in the resolution of their petition.
According to their counsel, she received the letter dated April 15, 2004 from
the DOJ requiring her to submit the pertinent pleadings relative to
petitioners' petition for review; admittedly, however, the same was complied
with only on October 15, 2004. We therefore find that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders.[40]
On the third issue, the Court is likewise unconvinced by petitioners'
argument that the precipitate filing of the Information and the issuance of a
warrant of arrest put petitioners at the risk of incarceration without the
preliminary investigation having been completed because they were not
afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation is
a substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in arguing
that the Information filed, without affording the respondent his right to file a
motion for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally
premature. In support of their argument, petitioners cite Sales v.
Sandiganbayan[41] wherein it was held that since filing of a motion for
reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper, an
Information filed without first affording the accused his right to a motion for
reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary
investigation.
The Court finds petitioners' reliance on Sales[42] as misplaced. A closer look
into said case would reveal that the accused therein was denied his right to
move for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a
preliminary investigation under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman
before the filing of an Information. In contrast, petitioners in this case were
afforded their right to move for reconsideration of the adverse resolution in a
preliminary investigation when they filed their "Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion for the Withdrawal of Information Prematurely Filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, City of Manila,"[43] pursuant to Section 3 of
the 2000 National Prosecution Service (NPS Rule on Appeal)[44] and Section
56 of the Manual for Prosecutors[45].
With the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed on July
16, 2003, the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the August 23, 2005 Order denying their motion to
quash warrant of arrest, and setting their arraignment, pending the final
resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ. The Court believes that the
period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from the time petitioners
filed their petition for review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004 to
September 14, 2005[46] when the trial court finally set their arraignment, was
more than ample time to give petitioners the opportunity to obtain a
resolution of their petition. In fact, the public respondent had been very
liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court which limits the suspension of arraignment to a 60-day period from
the filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than eleven (11) years having
elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners have yet to
be arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the
merits in the criminal case below, as the 60-day period counted from the
filing of the petition for review with the DOJ had long lapsed.
On whether petitioners were accorded their right to a complete preliminary
investigation as part of their right to due process, the Court rules in the
affirmative. Having submitted his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit
to the OCP of Manila before the filing of Information for estafa, Perez cannot
be heard to decry that his right to preliminary investigation was not
completed. For her part, while Aguinaldo was not personally informed of any
notice of preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the Information, she
was nonetheless given opportunity to be heard during such investigation. In
petitioners' motion for reconsideration[47] of the February 25, 2003
Resolution of ACP Gonzaga, Aguinaldo relied mostly on the Counter-Affidavit
and Rejoinder-Affidavit of Perez to assail the recommendation of the
prosecutor to indict her for estafa. Since the filing of such motion for
reconsideration was held to be consistent with the principle of due process
and allowed under Section 56 of the Manual for Prosecutors,[48] she cannot
complain denial of her right to preliminary investigation.
Both petitioners cannot, therefore, claim denial of their right to a complete
preliminary investigation as part of their right to due process. After all, "[d]ue
process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied
when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their respective sides of the controversy. Where an opportunity to be heard
either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process."[49]
In fine, the Court holds that public respondent erred in issuing the May 16,
2005 Order granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of
Arrest, as it was filed by one who is not a party to the case, and it was based
on the DOJ's dismissal of a petition for review in a different case.
Nevertheless, the Court upholds the CA ruling that the public respondent
committed no grave abuse of discretion when he issued the August 23, 2005
Order denying petitioners' motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting
their arraignment, despite the pendency of their petition for review with the
DOJ. For one, the public respondent had been very liberal in applying Section
11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which allows suspension of arraignment
for a period of 60 days only. For another, records show that petitioners were
given opportunity to be heard during the preliminary investigation of their
estafa case.
Considering that this case had been held in abeyance long enough without
petitioners having been arraigned, the Court directs the remand of this case
to the trial court for trial on the merits with strict observance of Circular No.
38-98 dated August 11, 1998, or the "Implementing the Provisions of
Republic Act No. 8493, entitled 'An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of All
Criminal Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and
for Other Purposes.'" In this regard, suffice it to state that petitioners cannot
invoke violation of their right to speedy trial because Section 9 (3) of Circular
No. 38-98 excludes in computing the time within which trial must commence
the delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders,
such as their petitions before the CA and the Court.
Finally, in order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that
the pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or
petition for review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest
previously issued because the quashal of a warrant of arrest may only take
place upon the finding that no probable cause exists. Moreover, judges
should take note of the following:
1. If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for
reinvestigation of the resolution of the public prosecutor, the court
may suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However,
the court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the
public prosecutor to submit the resolution disposing of the motion on
or before the period fixed by the court, which in no instance could be
more than the period fixed by the court counted from the granting of
the motion to suspend arraignment, otherwise the court will proceed
with the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
2. If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court
may suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However,
the court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the
DOJ to submit the resolution disposing of the petition on or before
the period fixed by the Rules which, in no instance, could be more
than sixty (60) days from the filing of the Petition for Review before
the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with the arraignment as
scheduled and without further delay.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated August 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution
dated December 4, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92094, are AFFIRMED.
Considering that the proceedings in this criminal case had been held in
abeyance long enough, let the records of this case be remanded to the trial
court which is hereby directed to try the case on the merits with dispatch in
accordance with the Court's Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ.,
concur.