G.R. No.

L-31703 February 13, 1930
CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria
Alcantara, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of
First Instance of Manila,defendants-appellants.
L. D. Lockwood and Jose M. Casal for appellants.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Leoncio B. Monzon for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the
association known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated
credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against
Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, the defendant
Mariano Garchitorena.
And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against
Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the
sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an
attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana.
The question here raised is confined to the scope and meaning of the institution
of heirs made in the will of the late Ana Maria Alcantara already admitted to
probate, and whose legal force and effect is not in dispute.
The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between the parties are
the ninth, tenth, and eleventh, quoted below:
Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my gratitude to
my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age, married to my nephew,
Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and living in this same house with me, I
institute her as my sole and universal heiress to the remainder of my
estate after the payment of my debts and legacies, so that upon my
death and after probate of this will, and after the report of the committee
on claims and appraisal has been rendered and approved, she will
receive from my executrix and properties composing my hereditary
estate, that she may enjoy them with God's blessing and my own.
Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that my
whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving children; and should
any of these die, his share shall serve to increase the portions of his
surviving brothers (and sisters) by accretion, in such wise that my estate
shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far
as it is legally possible.

Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena, die after

The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of
the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction restraining
the execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The defendants contend
that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution
of the injunction.
The court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's
children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final
writ of injunction.
The defendants insist in their contentions, and, in their appeal from the decision
of the trial court, assign the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in holding that a trust was created by the will of
Doña Ana Maria Alcantara.
2. The lower court erred in concluding and declaring that the amount of
P21,428.58 deposited with La Urbana is the property of the children of
the plaintiff as "herederos fidei-comisarios."
3. The lower court erred in making the injunction permanent and
condemning defendant to pay the costs.
me while her children are still in their minority, I order that my estate be
administered by my executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default,
by Attorney Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son Ramon
Salinas; but the direction herein given must not be considered as an
indication of lack of confidence in my nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara,
whom I relieve from the duties of administering my estate, because I
recognize that his character is not adapted to management and
administration.
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a simple
substitution, while the appellee contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution.
This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases that
might give rise to a simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code), only the death of
the instituted heiress before the testatrix would in the instant case give place to
such substitution, inasmuch as nothing is said of the waiver of inheritance, or
incapacity to accept it. As a matter of fact, however, clause XI provides for the
administration of the estate in case the heiress instituted should die after the
testatrix and while the substitute heirs are still under age. And it is evident that,
considering the nature of simple substitution by the heir's death before the
testator, and the fact that by clause XI in connection with clause X, the
substitution is ordered where the heiress instituted dies after the testatrix, this
cannot be a case of simple substitution.
The existence of a substitution in the will is not and cannot be denied, and since
it cannot be a simple substitution in the light of the considerations above stated,
let us now see whether the instants case is a fideicommissary substitution.
In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and universal
heiress, and provides that upon her death (the testatrix's) and after probate of
the will and approval of the report of the committee on claims and appraisal, said
heiress shall receive and enjoy the whole hereditary estate. Although this clause
provides nothing explicit about substitution, it does not contain anything in
conflict with the idea of fideicommissary substitution. The fact that the plaintiff
was instituted the sole and universal heiress does not prevent her children from
receiving, upon her death and in conformity with the express desire of the
testatrix, the latter's hereditary estate, as provided in the following (above
quoted) clauses which cannot be disregarded if we are to give a correct
interpretation of the will. The word sole does not necessarily exclude the idea
of substitute heirs; and taking these three clauses together, such word means
that the plaintiff is the sole heiress instituted in the first instance.
The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress shall receive and enjoy
the estate, is not incompatible with a fideicommissary substitution (it certainly is
incompatible with the idea of simple substitution, where the heiress instituted
does not receive the inheritance). In fact the enjoyment of the inheritance is in
conformity with the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the
heir instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at the same time
he preserves it in order to pass it on the second heir. On this point the illustrious
Manresa, in his Civil Code (Vol. 6, pp. 142 and 143, 5th ed.), says:
Or, what amounts to the same thing, the fideicommissary substitution,
as held in the Resolution of June 25, 1895, February 10, 1899, and July
19, 1909, requires three things:
1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a
third person the whole or a part of the estate.
3. A second heir.
To these requisites, the decision of November 18, 1918 adds another,
namely that the fideicommissarius be entitled to the estate from the time
the testator dies, since he is to inherit from the latter and not from the
fiduciary. (Emphasis ours.)
It appears from this quotation that the heir instituted or the fiduciary, as referred
to in articles 783 of the Civil Code, is entitled to enjoy the inheritance. And it
might here be observed, as a timely remark, that the fideicommissum arising
from a fideicommissary substitution, which is of Roman origin, is not exactly
equivalent to, nor may it be confused with, the English "trust."
It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to
enjoy but not the right to dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but
does not say she may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct inherent
in fideicommissary substitution.
Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does not say
whether the death of the heiress herein referred to is before or after that of the
testatrix; but from the whole context it appears that in making the provisions
contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a fideicommissary
substitution, since she limits the transmission of her estate to the children of the
heiress by this provision, "in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the
hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible." Here it
clearly appears that the testatrix tried to avoid the possibility that the substitution
might later be legally declared null for transcending the limits fixed by article 781
of the Civil Code which prescribed that fideicommissary substitutions shall be
valid "provided they do not go beyond the second degree."
Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in
clause X is the provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the
heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole
estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the
fideicommissary heirs. This provision complies with another of the requisites of
fideicommissary substitution according to our quotation from Manresa inserted
above.
Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution,
when a provision is therein made in the event the heiress should die after the
testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case where the instituted heiress
should die after the testatrix and after receiving and enjoying the inheritance.
The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the requisites of a
fideicommissary substitution, according to the quotation from Manresa above
inserted, are present in the case of substitution now under consideration, to wit:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case
the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the
estate, according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit
to a third person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is
imposed in clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass
unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving
the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law
to take its course in case she dies intestate, said clause not only
 disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides
for the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.

3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are
referred to as such second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.

Finally, the requisite added by the decision of November 18, 1918, to wit, that
the fideicommissarius or second heir should be entitled to the estate from the
time of the testator's death, which in the instant case, is, rather than a requisite,
a necessary consequence derived from the nature of the fideicommissary
substitution, in which the second heir does not inherit from the heir first
instituted, but from the testator.

By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the
heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her
children, from the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.

Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning,

which is on deposit with the association known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's
name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it be subject to the execution of
the judgment against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary
heirs.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant,
Mariano Garchitorena. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA
PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and
ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of
Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in
Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover,
the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964,
with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa
Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted
an inventory of the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un terreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones,
situadoen la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos parcelas de terreno situadas en
Antipolo, Rizal......................................................................................... 658.34
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones de la 'Central Azucarera de la
Carlota a P17.00 por accion ....................................................................8,347.00
Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.',
disuelta y en liquidacion a P0.15 por accion.............................................1,620.90
Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust Co...........................................2,350.73
TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97
MENOS:
Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-tizada con prenda de las acciones
de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00
VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
A.—En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores
de edad, residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de
su sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus
respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con sustitucion vulgar
reciprocal entre ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la
finca Santa Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios
nombrados, en atencion a que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido
padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos continuadores del apellido Ramirez,
B.—Y en usufructo a saber: —
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da.
Marcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General Gallieni No.
33, Seine Francia, con sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da.
Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma de Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los
Reyes 13,
b.—Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada
Da. Wanda de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:—
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan
Pablo Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad
restante, a favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building,
Florida St. Ermita, Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas,
las usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios,
podran en cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado,
sin intervencion alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows:
the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to
the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or
"free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad."
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's
usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to
the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V.
Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs
Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for
fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not
related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in
Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in
the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5,
Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the
testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow
Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this
property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in
its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have
appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the
estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his
widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is
the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary
estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-
half of his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance,
condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question
and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor
of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-
third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half
of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what
she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the
estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's
intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and
tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another
heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of
substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and
fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the
Code enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal classes of
substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely
variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to
substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs
should die before him, or should not wish, or should be
incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which
it refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the
fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to
preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first
heir and the second heir are living at time of the death of the
testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of
the legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion
vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con
substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The
appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda
de Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to
the widow Marcelle However, this question has become moot because as We
have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in
connection with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda
survived the testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the
testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution
for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in
Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are
correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not
related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code
validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as
follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as
designation, substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court
of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction. From this
point of view, there can be only one tranmission or substitution,
and the substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa,
Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word
"degree" as generation, and the present Code has obviously
followed this interpretation. by providing that the substitution
shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally
instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir
must be related to and be one generation from the first heir.
succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any
alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a
Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because
a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary
and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby
ordered distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in
naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple
substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.

From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special
a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives
pronouncement as to costs.
who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit.,
pp. 193-194.)
SO ORDERED
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the
appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a
fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked
owners." (Brief, p. 26.)

3. The usufruct of Wanda.

The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor
of Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the
acquisition of lands by aliens.

The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private

agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)

The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground
that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also
testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision
which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary
G.R. No. 45425 March 27, 1992
CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and
REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE GUINTO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO
LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the Estate of the late EUSTAQUIA
LIZARES, respondents.
G.R. No. 45965 March 27, 1992
ROLDOFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of
the ESTATE OF EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO, CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO,
ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS VDA. DE
GUINTO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
1 sufragio de mi alma, y misas ordinarias en sufragio de las
These consolidated cases seek to annul the orders dated September 20, 1976,
January 7, 1977 and January 31, 1977 of the then Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, Branch, IV respectively, cancelling the notice of lis
pendens filed by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. with the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental, denying the motion for reconsideration of the order dated
September 20, 1976 filed by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., and holding in
abeyance the resolution of defendants' motion to dismiss.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On November 20, 1962, the late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a
2
"Testamento" which contains among its provisions, the following:
DECIMA — Asimismo, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion
consistente en una tercera parte (1/3) de una catorce (1/14)
avas partes proindivisas de la Hda. Minuluan, que he adquirido
mediante permuta de mi hermano Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, se
adjudique, como por el presente se adjudica, a mi sobrina
Eustaquia Lizares; ENTENDIENDOSE, sin embargo, que en el
caso de que mi citada sobrina Eustaquia Lizares muera soltera
o sin descendientes legitimos, mi referida participacion en la
Hda. Minuluan se adjudicara a mi hermano Antonio A. Lizares
que me sobrevivan.
UNDECIMA — Tambien ordeno y dispongo que el resto de
todas mis propiendades, incluyendo mis participaciones,
derechos e intereses (no dispuestos mas arriba) an las
Haciendas "Minuluan" (Lotes Nos. 439, 403, 1273, 1274, 1278,
1279 y 1280 del Catastro de Talisay, Negros Occidental), y
"Matab-ang" (Lotes Nos. 514, 550, 552, 553 y 1287-C del
Catastrado de Talisay, Negros Occidental), situadas en el
Municipio de Talisay, Provincia de Negros Occidental, I.F., el
resto de mis acciones en la Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,
Inc. (unas 2,860 acciones) y de la Financing Corporation of the
Philippines (unas 53,636 acciones), registradas a mi nombre y
no heredadas de mi difunta madre Dña. Enrica A. Vda. de
Lizares, mis acciones en la Central Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
Inc., Negros Navigation Co. y otras Compañas Mineras, y todos
los demas bienes no mencionados en este testamento y que
me pertenezcan en la fecha de mi muerte, se adjudiquen, como
por el presente adjudico, a mi sobrina Srta. Eusaquia Lizares,
hija de mi difunto hermano Don Simplicio Lizares cuidados que
mi citada sobrina me ha prestado y signe prestandome hasta
ahora. Ordeno, sin embargo, a mi referida sobrina, Srta.
Eustaquia Lizares, que ella se haga cargo de pagar todas las
obligaciones que tengo y que gravan sobre las propriedades
adjudicadas a la misma. Asimismo ordeno a mi citada sobrina
que ella mande celebrar una Misa Gregoriana cada año en
almas de mi difunto Padre y de mi difunta Madre, el 6 de Marzo
y 17 de Deciembre de cada año, respectivamente, y mande
celebrar todos los años la fiesta de San Jose en Talisay como
lo hago hasta ahora. En el caso de que mi citada sobrina, Srta.
Eustaquia Lizares, falleciere sin dejar descendientes legitimos,
ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion consistente en una
sexta parte (1/6) de la Hda. Matab-ang, con su correspondiente
cuota de azucar y otros mejoras, se adjudique a mis hermanas
y hermano antes mencionados y que me sobrevivan (Emphasis
supplied)
On January 28, 1968, Maria Lizares y Alunan died without any issue leaving
said "testamento" in the possession and custody of her niece, Eustquia
3
Lizares. On February 6, 1968, Eustaquia filed a petition for the settlement of the
testate estate of Maria Lizares y Alunan, before the Court of First Instance of
4
Negros Occidental, Branch IV, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 8452.
The required publication of the notice of hearing of the petition having been
made, in due course, the probate court issued an order declaring the will
probated and appointing Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria
5
Lizares.
 6
On July 10, 1968, Eustaquia filed a project of partition which was granted by
the probate court in an order dated January 8, 1971. Simultaneously, said court
declared the heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in the
project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries of the
estate; adjudicated to them the properties repectively assigned to each and
every one of them, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and
Bacolod City to effect the corresponding transfer of the real properties to said
heirs as well as the transfer of shares, stocks, and dividends in different
corporations, companies and partnerships in the name of Maria Lizares to the
heirs and legatees, and the closure of the testate proceedings of Maria
7
Lizares.
Thereafter, Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings
in order that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been omitted in the
partition be adjudicated to her. 8 The Court granted the motion and
correspondingly reopened the testate proceedings. It adjudicated to Eustaquia
certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation credits and sugar
quota allocations, and real or personal properties of Maria Lizares which were
9 14
not given by her to any other person in her last will and testament.
On November 28, 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares, namely: Encarnacion L. Vda.
de Panlilio, Remedios L. Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario
Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an agreement of partition
and subdivision, thereby terminating their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514,
553, 1287-C of plan SWO-7446, and 552, all of the Cadastral Survey of Talisay
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005; T-65006, T-
10
65007, and T-65008.
A year later or on November 23, 1973, Eustquia Lizares died single without any
11
descendant. In due time, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares were appointed
joint administrators of Eustquia's intestate estate.
On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10 and
11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a simple
substitution, Celsa Vda. de Kilayko, Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, and
Remedios Vda. de Guinto (hereinafter collectively referred to as Celsa L. Vda.
de Kilayko, et al.) filed a motion in Special Proceedings No. 8452 to reopen once
again the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed among
others that a substitute administrator be appointed; that the order dated January
8, 1971 be reconsidered and amended by declaring them as heirs to 1/3 of 1/14
of Hda. Minuluan and to 1/6 of Hda. Matab-ang, both of which form an
aggregate area of 33 hectares; that the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental,
after such amendment, be ordered to register at the back of their respective
certificates of title, the order of probate and a "declaration" that movants are the
heirs of said properties, and correspondingly issue new certificates of title in
12
their names.
Two (2) sets of intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia Lizares namely:
Socorro L. Vda. de Escario, Rodolfo Lizares, Mario Lizares, Lucrecia Gustilo,
and Aurora Lizares Wagner opposed the aforesaid motion. They alleged that the
court had no more jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria
Lizares as the order of closure had long become final and that the testamentary
13
provisions sought to be enforced are null and void.
On April 6, 1974, the Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen the
testate proceedings and holding that inasmuch as the settlement of an estate is
a proceeding in rem, the judgment therein is binding against the whole world. It
observed that inspite of the fact that the movants knew that the court had
jurisdiction over them, they did not take part in the proceedings nor did they
appeal the order of January 8, 1971. Thus, the court concluded, even if the said
order was erroneous, and since the error was not jurisdictional, the same could
have been corrected only by a regular appeal. The period for filing a motion for
reconsideration having expired, the court opined that the movants could have
sought relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, but
unfortunately for the movants, the period for filing such remedy had also
elapsed.
Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. then filed a motion for reconsideration of said
15
order. It was denied on June 17, 1974. Hence, on October 14, 1974, the said
movants filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real
property against the joining administrators of the estate of Eustaquia Lizares,
Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 11639 with the
16
then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV. On the same
date, they availed of their rights under Rule 14, Section 24 of Rules of Court
by filing a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds of Negros
17
Occidental.
As duly appointed judicial joint administrators of the estate of the late Eustaquia
Lizares, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares (the joint administrators for brevity),
filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the case; the cause of action was barred by prior
18
judgment, and the complaint stated no cause of action. This motion was
opposed by the plaintiffs.
On January 23, 1975, the joint administrators filed a motion for the cancellation
of the notice of lis pendens on the contentions that there existed exceptional
circumstances which justified the cancellation of the notice of lis pendensand
19
that no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiffs. The latter opposed said
motion. The defendants having filed a reply thereto, the plaintiffs filed a rejoinder
reiterating their arguments in their opposition to the motion for cancellation of
20
notice of lis pendens.
On September 20, 1976, respondent judge issued an order granting the motion
21
for cancellation of notice of lis pendens. The court simultaneously held in
abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss the complaint.
The joint administrators filed the answer to the complaint in Civil Case No.
22
11639. Thereafter, they filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative
23 24
defenses. Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. vigorously opposed said motion.
On November 3, 1976, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion praying for
25
the reconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976. The joint
26
administrators having filed an opposition thereto, on January 7, 1977 the
27
lower court denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration. It held that while
a notice of lis pendens would serve as notice to strangers that a particular
property was under litigation, its annotation upon the certificates of title to the
properties involved was not necessary because such properties, being
in custodia legis, could not just be alienated without the approval of the court.
Moreover, the court added, a notice of lis pendens would prejudice any effort of
the estate to secure crop loans which were necessary for the viable cultivation
and production of sugar to which the properties were planted.
Upon receipt of a copy of said order, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed in this
Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari.
Docketed as G.R No. L-45425, the petition contends that the grounds of lis
pendens, namely, that the properties are in custodia legis and the lending
institutions would not grant crop loans to the estate, are not the legal
grounds provided for under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court for the
cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.
Meanwhile, on January 31, 1977, the lower court issued an order stating that
since on September 21, 1976 it had held in abeyance the resolution of the
motion to dismiss, it was also proper to suspend the resolution of the affirmative
defenses interposed by the defendants until after trial on the merits of the case.
28
Accordingly, the court set the date of pre-trial for March 24, 1977.
On April 13, 1977, the joint administrators filed before this Court a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It was docketed as G.R. No. L-45965. Petitioners contend that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 11639 as it involves the
interpretation of the will of Maria Lizares, its implementation and/or the
adjudication of her properties. They assert that the matter had been settled in
Special Proceedings No. become final and unappealable long before the
complaint in Civil Case No. 8452 which had become final and unappealable long
before the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639 was filed, and therefore, the cause
of action in the latter case was barred by the principle of res judicata. They aver
that the claim of Celsa, Encarnacion and Remedios, sisters of Maria Lizares,
over the properties left by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had
inherited by will from Maria Lizares, was groundless because paragraphs 10 and
11 of Maria's will on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. base their claim,
conceived of a fideicommissary substitution of heirs. Petitioners contend that
said provisions of the will are not valid because under Article 863 of the Civil
code, they constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs.
On April 26, 1977, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
29
lower court from further proceeding with the trial of Civil Case No. 11639. After
both G.R. Nos. L-45425 and L-45965 had been given due course and submitted
for decision, on January 20, 1986, the two cases were consolidated.
The petition in G.R. No. L-45965 is impressed with merit.
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after
30
the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public
requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
31
rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than
such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
32
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.
Pertinent to the issue interposed by the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45965 is
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When
the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable
to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court,
on application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall
assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the
same, naming them and the proportions or parts, to which each
is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any
other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
Applying this rule, in the cases of De Jesus v. Daza,
33
and Torres v.
34
Encarnacion, the Court said:
. . . (T)he probate court, having the custody and control of the
entire estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this
provision, within the estate proceeding, said proceeding being
the most convenient one in which this power and function of the
 court can be exercised and performed without the necessity of
requiring the parties to undergo the incovenience and litigate an
entirely different action.
Some decisions of the Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court has the
jurisdiction to settle the claims of an heir and the consequent adjudication of the
properties, are worth mentioning. In the cases of Arroyo v.
35 36
Gerona, and Benedicto v. Javellana, this Court said:
. . . any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the
authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any
heir, legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate
succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within
the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the
same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate
shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when
the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and
adjudication of the property to the interested parties. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has
the power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributee is
37
entitled . . .. A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the
heredity estate which the court may accept or reject. It is the court that makes
38
that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto.
In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate
estate of Maria Lizares, the executrix, Eustaquia Lizares submitted on January
8, 1971, a project of partition in which the parcels of land, subject matters of the
complaint for reconveyance, were included as property of the estate and
assigned exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares. In accordance
with said project of partition which was approved by the probate court,
Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios Lizares Vda. de Guinto,
Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares
executed an Agreement of Partition and Subdivision on November 28, 1972,
whereby they agreed to terminate their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514,
553, 1287-C of SWO-7446 and 552 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-65004, T-65005, T-65006, T-65007 and T-65008. These facts taken
altogether show that the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition
sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof.
Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any
part of it in the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and
in good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or
39
judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. Thus, where a piece of land
has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that the inclusion was
affected through improper means or without petitioner's knowledge, the partition
barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under
the control and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition according to the
40
tenor of the partition. The question of private respondents title over the lots in
question has been concluded by the partition and became a closed matter.
The admission made by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. in their complaint, Civil
Case No. 11639, that Eustaquia had been in possession of the questioned lots
since March 2, 1971 up to the time of her death indicates that the distribution
pursuant to the decree of partition has already been carried out. Moreover, it
cannot be denied that when Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. moved for the
reopening of the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares, the judicial decree
of partition and order of closure of such proceedings was already final and
executory, then reglementary period of thirty (30) days having elapsed from the
time of its issuance, with no timely appeal having been filed by them. Therefore,
they cannot now be permitted to question the adjudication of the properties left
by will of Maria Lizares, by filing an independent action for the reconveyance of
the very same properties subject of such partition.
A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to
the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be
corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like
any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or
fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same
has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes
41
irrelevant.
It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a principle of
public policy, that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final at some definite time fixed by law, interest rei publicae ut finis sit
litum. "The very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to
42
controversies." The only instance where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason
of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is the
opening of the same by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of
an independent action, the effect of which if successful, would be for another
court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and
43
reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that
parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that,
when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
44
upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
All the requisites for the existence of res judicata are present. Thus, the order
approving the distribution of the estate of Maria Lizares to the heirs instituted in
said will has become final and unappealable; the probate court that rendered
judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; the Vda. de Kilayko, et al. More so in this case where it turned out that their claim to
judgment or orders had been rendered on the merits; the special proceedings the properties left by Eustaquia is without any legal basis.
for the settlement of the estate of Maria Lizares was a proceeding in rem that
was directed against the whole world including Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in L-45425 is hereby DENIED
so that it can be said that there is a similarity of parties in Special Proceedings but the petition for certiorari and prohibition and/or mandamus in L-45965 is
No. 8452 and Civil Case No. 11639, the judicial administrators of Eustaquia GRANTED. The temporary restraining order of April 26, 1977 which was issued
being privy to Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.; there is identity of subject matter by the Court in L-45965 is made PERMANENT. Costs against the petitioners in
involved in both actions, namely, the properties left by Maria Lizares; there is L-45425.
identity of causes of action because in the first action there was a declaration of
the probate court in its order dated April 6, 1974 that although the testatrix
SO ORDERED.
intended a fideicommissary substitution in paragraphs 10 and 11 of her will, the
substitution can have no effect because the requisites for it to be valid, had not
45
been satisfied.

Granting that res judicata has not barred the institution of Civil Case No. 11639,
the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. that they are conditional
46
substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria Lizares is not
meritorious. While the allegation of the joint administrators that paragraphs 10
and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament conceives of a fideicommissary
substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is also baseless as said
paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the
estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may said paragraphs
be considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.

It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and

provides that if such heir should die a second heir also designated shall
succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should then
be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil Code
47
but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator. In this
case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence,
there can be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares' death, the
properties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under the
circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of
Eustaquia by operation of the law of intestacy.

With respect to the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the properties
involved, there is no merit in the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.,
that the lower court acted contrary to law and/or gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling the notice of lis pendens. The cancellation of such a precautionary
notice, being a mere incident in an action, may be ordered by the court having
48
jurisdiction over it at any given time. Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled "after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
49
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded." In
this case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of said notice on the principal
reason that the administrators of the properties involved are subject to the
supervision of the court and the said properties are under custodia
legis. Therefore, such notice was not necessary to protect the rights of Celsa L.
G.R. No. L-13386 October 27, 1920
SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellants.
Felipe Agoncillo for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Tayabas, absolving the defendants from all liability under the plaintiff's
complaint, without any finding as to costs.
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva,
married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.
Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo
Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land described in
Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon
the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco
Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married
the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose
Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son,
the defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under
the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had
inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged
natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the
purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question,
particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the
provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was
an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the
property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no
right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is
an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears
from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the
plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as
her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that
the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein;
that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until the latter was married to
Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her
publicly, as a legitimate daughter. (See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6;
Prudencio de la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten.
notes.)
The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in
the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision of this
court in that case we are of the opinion and so decide, without rediscussing here
the law and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See also In re estate of
Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)
The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or
not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva
troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired
by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother
or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which such property came.
The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco
Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the
same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the
same line from which the property in question came. Was Francisco Deocampo
obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an
illegitimate relative within the third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then,
upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo, was
entitled to the said property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must
fail.1awph!l.net
There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil
Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in question if she were
a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in
said article 811 the legislator uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant,"
and "relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate.
Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives?
Counsel for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to
maintain the affirmative.
This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by
any court or tribunal. However, eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil
Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and solution of the intricate and
difficult problems that may arise under the provisions of that Code, have dealt
with the very question now before us, and are unanimous in the opinion that the
provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relative. One of
such commentators, undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We
believe we can do no better than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in
deciding the question before us. In determining the persons who are obliged to
reserve under article 811, he says:
Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve?
Should the natural father or grandfather reserve the properties
proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article 811
does not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the
qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that
exists for applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying it
to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the
ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the
obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.
Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code
recognizes or does not recognize the existence of the natural family, or
whether it admits only the bond established by acknowledgement
between the father or mother who acknowledges and the acknowledged
children. However it may be, it may be stated as an indisputable truth,
that in said Code, the legitimate relationship forms the general rule and
the natural relationship the exception; which is the reason why, as may
be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks only of children or
parents, of ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is of
course made of those who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a
provision applicable only to natural relationship, it does not say father or
mother, but natural father or natural mother; it does not say child, but
natural child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or parents in the
abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural parents.
(See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to 938, 944
and 945 and 946 to 955.)
Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in
any way be maintained that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural
ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate
ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And
article 811, — and as we will see also article 812, — continues to treat
of this same legitime. The right of the natural parents and children in the
testamentary succession in wholly included in the eighth section and is
limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class being excluded in
articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811
occupies in the Code of proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants.
And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of
article 938, which states that the provisions of article 811 applies to
intestate succession, which is just established in favor of the legitimate
direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of
intestate succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to
847, treating of their testamentary succession, which do not allude
directly or indirectly to that provision.
Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811
creates in the right to succeed neither admits of any other interpretation.
Whether the provision is due to the desire that the properties should not
pass, by reason of new marriage, out of the family to which they
belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva
troncal," and whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights
(troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is intended to be
preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants
and descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they
do from the danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate
parents do the special laws of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Cataluña
concede the right to succeed with respect to lineal properties (bienes
troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the
duty to reserve.
The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and
ascendants may be raised just as the question whether it would be
preferable to suppress it altogether may be raised; but in the realm of
the statute law there is no remedy but to admit that article 811, the
interpretation of which should on the other hand be strict was drafted by
the legislator with respect only to legitimate ascendants. (Manresa,
Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is
established, says:
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. — This is one of
the most delicate points in the interpretation of article 811. According to
this article, the reservation is established in favor of the parents who are
within the third degree and belong to the line from which the properties
came.
It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on
succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise,
because relationship by affinity is established between each spouse and
the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor
the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of
the other, which is just what this article intends to prevent.
 It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a
legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which
proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can
be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed
must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the
reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the object
is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the
precedents of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943
denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child and
viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither
have the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article
cited established a barrier between the two families; properties of the
legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural
family. (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)

Scævola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives

at the same conclusion as Manresa. "La reserva del articulo 811 es
privilegio de la familia legitima. (The reservation in article 811 is a
privilege of the legitimate family.)" (See Scævola, Codigo Civil, Vol. 14,
pp. 211-224, 3401-305.)

Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:

A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the

legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has
acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the
natural or legitimated child.

To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother,
Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express
provision of the foregoing article (943).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby
affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.

Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Malcolm, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and
JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO
CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code
on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the
parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and
the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco,
are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and
granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-
Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had
a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great
grandfather of defendant. The family relationship of the parties is as
shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made an integral
part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously
donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate
sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this
stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino
Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-
Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as
the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by
his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs)
and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the
partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l',
were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she
had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of
land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and
without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven
(7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his
sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva
troncal which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates
of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and
her rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were
inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband,
defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate,
survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now
owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned
as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal
advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon
the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession;
but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because
they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said
parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from
Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue
of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this
case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho
is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or
whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are
reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso
share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son
Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-
indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land,
and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be
collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the tenants of
said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes
corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
 12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have
acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order
to restore and preserve harmony in their family relations, they hereby
waive all their claims against each other for damages (other than legal
interest on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this Honorable Court may
deem proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which
shall be borne by the respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-
Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in
dispute, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the
court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas
Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso
shares or three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land involved in
this action. Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights
(3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant
Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land,
minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs'
share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly
waived all their claims against each other for damages including
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than the legal interests
on plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court renders judgment adjudging
the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land
described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-
64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The
defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an
accounting of all rents received by her on the properties involved in this
action for the purpose of determining the legal interests which should be
paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in the rentals of the property in
question.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled
by the lower Court, all relatives of thepraepositus within the third degree in the
appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the
death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property came.
(811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are
subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
3
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, where
the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of
the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood,
and the claim was also made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary
property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews
and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that of each of
the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil
Code. Said the Court:
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case
of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving
the reservista, and belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the
descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and
the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved
properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews
of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of
the half blood?
xxx xxx xxx
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have
concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva
troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line
from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated
into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property
has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this
time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations
between one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no
call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of
each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary
rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court
and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all
the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to the
descendant (prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote
degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894;
Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third
degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs.
Florentino, supra).
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when
there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of
the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the
reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him,
excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation
cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the
right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree
personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are
within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property
came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can
never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize
them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on
the part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the
third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation
on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned
by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom
the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs.
Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of
ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers
and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and
nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios
inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews
are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of
the whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of
relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned;
but within that group, the individual right to the property should be
decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since
Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by
the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its
application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the
purpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol.
6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe
ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto,
manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese
realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales
y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos
extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la
propia esfera de accion de la reserva que se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new
Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as
exemplified by the suppression of the reserva viudal and the reversion
legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate
succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto
because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus),
they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant,
although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. To this
4
effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the
Civil Code were cited and applied:
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of
intestacy nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other
collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.
This is readily apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews
and nieces who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters
of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per
stirpes.
 Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews
and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals
(uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and
more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that
immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus,
Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces,
children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving
spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces inheritedab intestato ahead of the surviving
spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or
widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the
spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters
of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter
vis a vis the other collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a
decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed. ...
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that
as to the reservable property, thereservatarios do not inherit from the reservista,
but from the descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of
the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as
long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58
Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from
the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez
Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol.
6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
5
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands , where it was ruled that
intestacy proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are not necessary
where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of
the reservista over property subject to reserva troncal Identifies
the reservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's rights as such:
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon
the assumption that thereservatario win succeed in, or inherit, the
reservable property from the reservista. This is not true.
The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the
reservable property part of thereservista's estate;
the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of
origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there
being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter must be
deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable
property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of
the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in
this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of
the reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the
estate of the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the
latter. ... .
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no
doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-
appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a
different result should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property
6
was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" i.e., the property took a
"detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its
transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the
defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the
reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set
aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991
MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT
COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO,
DONATO, LUIS, ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and DOLORES, all surnamed
BALANTAKBO, respondents.
Ceriaco A. Sumaya for petitioners.
Tomas P. Añonuevo for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in C.A. G.R. No. CV-01292-93, which
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
1
Laguna in the consolidated cases in Civil Case No. SC-956 and Civil Case No.
2
SC-957.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is
summarized as follows:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of
properties subject of this case: 1) A one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a
parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna and described in paragraph 7
of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-956 from his father Jose, Sr., who died on
January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10)
parcels of registered lands described in paragraph 6 of the complaint in Civil
Case No. SC-957 from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on
November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving
only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving
heir to the real properties above-mentioned.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described
properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul
Balantakbo" which provided, among others:
I. Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose
Balantakbo, he tenido varios hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo, llamado
Raul Balantakbo.
II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio de
1952, en la Ciudad de Pasay, durante su minolia de edad sin dejar
testamento alguno.
III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente
alguno.
IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo Raul
Balantakbo y por lo tanto su unica heredera formosa, legitima y
universal.
V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.
VI. Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes
inmuebles situados en la Provincia de Laguna.
VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado
Raul Balantakbo per herencia de su difunto padre, Jose Balantakbo, y
de su tia abuela Luisa Bautista.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, p. 29)
On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the property
described in Civil Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The sale was
evidenced by a deed attached as Annex "C" to the complaint. The same
property was subsequently sold by Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio
Development Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963. On January 23, 1967,
Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and assigned its rights over
the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The
documents evidencing these transfers were registered in the Registry of Deeds
of Laguna and the corresponding certificates of titles were issued. The
properties are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative,
Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining 1/3 share is in the name of Sancho
Balantakbo.
Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the
properties described in the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 to Villa Honorio
Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its
rights to the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative,
Inc. which properties are presently in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described
properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.
On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed
Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and
Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose
Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed the above
mentioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the respective
complaints which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.
The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the identity of the
subject matter of res involved, the transferees, the dates of the conveyances but
involve the same legal question of reserva troncal. Hence, the consolidation of
the two (2) cases.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants,
as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative,
Inc. to convey to the plaintiffs —
a) In Civil Case No. SC-956 — the one-third (1/3) interest and
ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the parcel of land described
in paragraph three (3) sub-paragraph 1, of pages one (1) and
two (2) of this decision;
b) In Civil Case No. SC-957 — the one-seventh (1/7) interest
and ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the ten (10) parcels of
land described in paragraph three (3), sub-paragraph 2, of
pages two (2) and three (3) of this decision;
c) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties herein
ordered to be conveyed to them by the defendants with plaintiffs
Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, receiving
one-third (1/3) of the one share pertaining to the other plaintiffs
who are their uncles:
2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to
account for and pay to the plaintiffs the value of the produce from the
properties herein ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs, said accounting
and payment of income being for the period from January 3, 1968 until
date of reconveyance of the properties herein ordered:
3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are to
pay plaintiffs —
a. One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses.
b. Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.
4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956
and 957.
xxx xxx xxx
(p. 46, Rollo)
This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of
the court a quo in toto. The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 65, Rollo)
by the appellate court which found no cogent reason to reverse the decision.
This petition before Us was filed on November 12, 1984 with the petitioners
assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent
purchaser for value and in good faith of the properties covered by
certificates of title subject of litigation.
II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the
reservable interest of the reservee in the properties covered by
certificates of title subject of litigation.
III. The trial court erred in finding that the cause of action of the plaintiffs
(private respondents) has not yet prescribed.
IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in favor
of the plaintiffs by virtue of the institution of Civil Cases Nos. 956 and
957.
Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo,
which the appellate court affirmed, that they were not innocent purchasers for
value. According to petitioners, before they agreed to buy the properties from
the reservor (also called reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo, they
first sought the legal advice of their family consultant who found that there was
no encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate of title coveting the
properties.
The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul
Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration
of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly
stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., as
regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and from his maternal
grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No.
SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that said affidavit was, in its form,
declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of the
reservable character of the properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit clearly
stated that the affiant, Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant and heir to Raul
Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving properties previously inherited from other
ascendants and which properties were inventoried in the said affidavit.
It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question
show that they were free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the
sale. The fact remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed
by Consuelo stating the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable
nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is
sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property
Registration Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496) which provides:
Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION. — Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or
entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all
persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.
Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706,
712-713, cited in People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989, 175
SCRA 597; Garcia v. CA and PNB v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and L-
40911, both dated January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380 and Legarda and Prieto v.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600, We held:
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is
constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein . . .
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined
every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is
irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record
and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record
would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof
of innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of
the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption
cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record
contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was
ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take
notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The
rule must be absolute, any variation would lead to endless confusion
and useless litigation. . . .
In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was laid down that
the mere entry of a document in the day book without noting it on the certificate
of title is not sufficient registration. However, that ruling was superseded by the
holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420. As explained
in Garcia v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 20, 1980, 95
SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction.
That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin
v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420, where a distinction was made between voluntary
and involuntary registration, such as the registration of an attachment,
levy upon execution, notice of lis pendens, and the like. In cases of
involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient
notice to all persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not
presented to the register of deeds.
On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in case
of voluntary registration of documents an innocent purchaser for value
of registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in contemplation
of law the holder of a certificate of title, the moment he presents and
files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in
the day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the
owner's duplicate certificate of title covering the land sold and pays the
registration fees, because what remains to be done lies not within his
power to perform. The register of deeds is duty bound to perform it.
(See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196).
In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de
Balantakbo which contained a statement that the property was inherited from a
descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter from another
ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property. The failure of the
Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property in the
certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.
Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of
the reservable character of the properties before they bought the same from
Consuelo. This matter appeared in the deed of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by
Consuelo in favor of Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of the property litigated
in Civil Case No. SC-956, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the
one-third (1/3) portion of the above described parcel of land by virtue of
the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition executed by the Heirs of the
deceased Jose Balantakbo dated December 10, 1945 and said portion
in accordance with the partition above-mentioned was adjudicated to
Raul Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I inherited after his death and
 this property is entirely free from any encumbrance of any nature or kind
whatsoever, . . . (p. 42, Rollo)
It was admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in Civil Case SC-
957, no such admission was made by Consuelo to put Villa Honorio
Development on notice of the reservable character of the properties. The
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo and registered with the
Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.
Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents
were long time acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio Development Corporation
and its successors, the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are
family corporations of the Sumayas and that the petitioners knew all along that
the properties litigated in this case were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his
father and from his maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. de
Balantakbo inherited these properties from his son Raul.
The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo. Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva troncal provides:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as
he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which
said property came. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that there
is no need to register the reservable character of the property, if only for the
protection of the reservees, against innocent third persons. This was suggested
as early as the case of Director of Lands v. Aguas, G.R. No. 42737, August 11,
1936, 63 Phil. 279. The main issue submitted for resolution therein was whether
the reservation established by Article 811 (now Art. 891 of the New Civil Code)
of the Civil Code, for the benefit of the relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line of the descendant from whom the ascendant reservor received the
property, should be understood as made in favor of all the relatives within said
degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned, without distinction legitimate,
natural and illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children.
However, in an obiter dictum this Court stated therein:
The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of
the ascendant reservor's right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled,
that is, if upon the ascendant reservor's death there are relatives having
the status provided in Article 811 (Art. 891, New Civil Code), the
property passes, in accordance with this special order of succession, to
said relatives, or to the nearest of kin among them, which question not
being pertinent to this case, need not now be determined. But if this
condition is not fulfilled, the property is released and will be adjudicated
in accordance with the regular order of succession. The fulfillment or
non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition, the efficacy or cessation of the
reservation, the acquisition of rights or loss of the vested ones, are
phenomena which have nothing to do with whether the reservation has
been noted or not in the certificate of title to the property. The purpose
of the notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons entitled to
the reservation, if any,
due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it
ineffective . . . (p. 292, Ibid)
Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14, 1926, 48
Phil. 601, 603, this Court ruled that the reservable character of a property may
be lost to innocent purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that
the obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable
character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal.
(See also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913, 25 Phil. 295).
Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third
persons, Vicente Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now
register nor record in the Registry of Deeds their reservable character;
neither can he effect the fee simple, which does not belong to him, to
the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the said
land in good faith, free of all incumbrances. An attempt was made to
prove that when Juan Medina was advised not to buy the land he
remarked, "Why did he (Vicente Galang) not inherit it from his son?"
Aside from the fact that it is not clear whether this conservation took
place in 1913 or 1914, that is, before or after the sale, it does not arise
that he had any knowledge of the reservation. This did not arise from
the fact alone that Vicente Galang had inherited the land from his son,
but also from the fact that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it
from his mother Rufina Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the record
shows, Juan Medina had not been aware of. We do not decide,
however, whether or not Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado are obliged
to acknowledge the reservation and to note the same in their deeds, for
the reason that there was no prayer to this effect in the complaint and
no question raised in regard thereto.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve
(the widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property
the reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the
ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited
from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to
annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the
right reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied
to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil
Code. This rule is consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of
Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of registration shall be
the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied)

The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and
unless the registration of the limitation is effected (either actual or constructive),
no third persons shall be prejudiced thereby.

The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of
the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the
reservees did not commence upon the death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo
on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de
Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the
right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the
reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the reservor
should die before the reservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus
creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession
of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree
(See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89).
The reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then becomes
a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a
reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the time
for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of Civil
Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28, 1966, 18
SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The
actions for recovery of the reserved property was brought by herein private
respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of the
reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet.

Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for actual litigation
expenses and two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for attorney's fees is proper
under Article 2208(2) of the New Civil Code. Private respondents were
compelled to go to court to recover what rightfully belongs to them.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the

Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the
necessity to annotate the reversable character of a property subject of reserva
troncal.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000
1 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
2 said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
3
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the
defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and
interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S.
Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel
of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil,
which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before
the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following
provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my name
according to the records of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned
property and the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be
inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge
Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and
Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No.
4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the
year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of
Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of
the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002
(10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the
Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the
month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that
the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease,
mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the
obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY
FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until
Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this
lot, not have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir
and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the
latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of
sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition
(Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and
follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate
4
with others than my near descendants and my sister."
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his
name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and
children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional
Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged
that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
 1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the
Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction
to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the
testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one
hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs
domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from
sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by
the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil
which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the
property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the
obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private
respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the
surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on
March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant
Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan
Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and
acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement
and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT
No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to
wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our
names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each
sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of
the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the
annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will
be complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and
which is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of
sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash
installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year,
to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00)
Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00)
Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00)
Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00)
5
Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of
Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to
sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing
the complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the
action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as
yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the
command as mandated exaction from them simply because they are the
children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not
warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall.
Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that
plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of
Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim
under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."
6
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right
to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392;
defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the
modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-
appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation
since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the
Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja
Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the
reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to
the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate
proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an
administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order
to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100
piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered
ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title
over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja
Belleza.
7
SO ORDERED."
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
found his way to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of
Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix
Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the
testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the
purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in
accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in
deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the
cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as
there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple
substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by
the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to
herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died
single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such
testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the
reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are
merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference
8 Again, the contention is without merit.
as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843 and
9
845 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the
Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the
propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause
of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the
private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition
made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent
had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil;
on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
10
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs
are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower,
11
are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter
by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional
rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property,
rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably,
whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily,
the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to
the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and
they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot
involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir
reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the
fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through
the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of
action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint
below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal
institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a
substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near
descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the
piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the
place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the
testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the
property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce
12
the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2)
leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary
13
substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the
14
first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case
under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is
that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in
the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner
is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to
15
preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In
the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the
Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near
descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the
first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir.
"Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will,
16
there is no fideicommissary substitution." Also, the near descendants' right to
inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of
the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing
here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the
fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not
17
related by first degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near
descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article
882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883
of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the
property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be
considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that
the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the
testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its
fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the
preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it
shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his
wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known
in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a
modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the
purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge
18
imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon
the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the
19
succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the
condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to
succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the
20
mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a
21
resolutory condition.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly
that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on
the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred
piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that
should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to
the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge
upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such
institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an
obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it
clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In
case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not
22
conditional.
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private
respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property
itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to
violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will,
as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
23
circumstances under which it was made. Such construction as will sustain and
24
uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.

Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One
Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such
obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and
their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise
negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event
that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza
Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the
sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near
descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not
only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction
imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should
equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable

settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the
lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the
lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive
compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement between the
lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with
the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the
obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
25
which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. Since
the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be
disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus,
a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby
defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-11386 March 31, 1917
EMILIO NATIVIDAD, administrator of the estate of the deceased Tiburcio
Salvador y Reyes, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BASILIA GABINO, respondent-appellee.
Herrero and Marasigan and I. Santiago for appellant.
Perfecto Gabriel for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal, filed by the administrator of the estate of the decedent
Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, from the order of August 21, 1915, by which the
judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, interpreting the true wishes of the
testator, expressed the opinion that the ownership and dominion of the property
mentioned in clause 6 of the will should be awarded to Basilia Gabino, subject to
the reservation made in behalf of Lorenzo Salvador and Emilio Natividad.
Therefore the trial court ordered an amendment made to the fourth basis for the
proposed partition of the decedent's estate, presented by the testamentary
executor, and, as soon as such be made, a day set for the hearing and approval
of the proposed amended partition.
The testator Salvador y Reyes contracted a valid and legal marriage with
Anselma Nicasio, who died in 1868, leaving a daughter named Higinia who
married Clemente Natividad. Higinia Salvador died in 1913, survived by two
children Emilio and Purificacion, both surnamed Natividad y Salvador. Tiburcio
Salvador disposed of all his property in the manner recorded in the will executed
in legal form on November 9, 1914, instituting as sole heirs his grandchildren
Emilio and Purificacion, both surnamed Natividad y Salvador. In the sixth clause
of this will the testator left to Basilia Gabino the legacy mentioned therein.
Literally, this clause is as follows:
I bequeath to Doña Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of the
urban property, consisting of a house and lot situated on Calle
Lavezares of the said district of San Nicolas and designated by No. 520,
and in addition eleven meters by two meters of the lot designated by No.
419, situated on Calle Madrid. This portion shall be taken from that part
of the lot which is adjacent to the rear of said property No. 520. If the
said legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver this
house, together with the lot on which it stands, to my grandson Emilio
Natividad, upon payment by the latter to the former of the sum of four
thousand pesos (P4,000), Philippine currency.
The executor of the estate of the decedent is the decedent's own heir, Emilio
Natividad, who in due season and by counsel presented to the court for its
approval a proposed partition of the property pertaining to the estate, setting
forth in the fourth basis the following relative to the legacy made to Basilia
Gabino:
Summarizing the statements made in respect to this matter, we are of
the opinion that the sixth clause expresses in itself a right of usufruct, in
favor of Doña Basilia Gabino, of the house at No. 520 Calle Lavezares,
and a general legacy in favor of Lorenzo Salvador of the sum of P4,000
whenever Basilia should die; but that the ownership of the property upon
which this right and legacy are established belongs to the heir Emilio
Natividad who, by the express will of the testator, had been made liable
for these encumbrances.
By a writing of August 5, 1915, counsel for the legatee Basilia Gabino opposed
the approval of the proposed partition with regard to the adjudication to the
legatee of the usufruct only of the property at No. 520 Calle Lavezares, claiming
that said legatee ought to be recognized as entitled to the dominion and
ownership of the same. For this and the other reasons set forth, her counsel
requested that the testamentary executor be ordered to amend the fourth basis
of the proposed partition in order that ownership and dominion, instead of
usufruct only, of said property be adjudicated to the objector-legatee, Basilia
Gabino.
After proper legal steps had been taken and the written briefs of the parties and
the schedule of the proposed partition filed by the testamentary executor had
been examined, the trial judge issued the order aforementioned. Appeal was
taken by counsel for the executor to this court, and a transcript of the record of
the proceedings below was forwarded to the clerk of this court.
The only question raised by this appeal and submitted to us for decision is: What
construction must be given to the above-quoted sixth clause of the will executed
by Tiburcio Salvador?
A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please
him, provided the testamentary provisions conform to law and meet its
requirements. He may impose conditions, either with respect to the institution of
heirs or to the designation of legatees, and, when the conditions imposed upon
the former or the latter do not fall within the provisions of those articles of the
Civil Code touching heirs and legatees, they shall be governed by the rules
therein prescribed for conditional obligations, (Civ. Code, arts. 790 and 791.)
In the sixth clause of the will executed by the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y
Reyes, he bequeathed to Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of the
property therein specified as to its location and other circumstances, on
condition that if the legatee should die Lorenzo Salvador would be obliged, upon
the payment of P4,000 by the testator's grandson and heir Emilio Natividad, to
hand over this property to the latter.
The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy mentioned depends obliged to make a monetary compensation to Lorenzo Salvador who appears to
upon the happening of the event constituting the condition, to wit, the death of be the successor of the legatee Gabino.
the legatee Basilia Gabino, a perfectly legal condition according to article 1114
of the Civil code, as it is not impossible of performance and is not contrary to law For the foregoing reasons, considering that the order appealed from is in
or public morals, as provided in article 1116 of said code. accordance with law and that the several features of the sole assignment of
error made thereto are without merit, the said order of August 21, 1915, must be
The moment the legatee Gabino dies the other legatee, Lorenzo Salvador, is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
obliged to deliver the property to the heir Emilio Natividad who, in his turn and in
exchange, must pay the legatee Salvador the sum of P4,000, thereby fulfilling
the double legacy contained in the said sixth clause of the will, the first of these
legacies being the voluntary reservation to Basilia Gabino of the ownership of
the said house, and the second, the conditional legacy of P4,000 to Lorenzo
Salvador.

Making use of his right, the testator provided in his will that the dominion, that is,
the ownership and possession of his house situated on Calle Lavezares, No.
520 together with a part of the lot at No. 419, should be delivered as a legacy,
provided that if the legatee should die, this property instead of passing to the
successor, would revert to the testator's grandson and heir, provided that he in
turn would pay to Lorenzo Salvador the sum of P4,000. It cannot be understood
that the legacy conveyed only the usufruct of the property because the plain and
literal meaning of the words employed by the testator in the said clause sixth
clearly shows beyond all doubt the express wished of the testator who,
establishing a voluntary reservation of the ulterior and final disposition of the
bequeathed property, ordered that the legatee's right of dominion should end at
her death, and that on this occurrence his wish was that the ownership of the
property should pass to Emilio Natividad, provided the latter in turn delivered
said P4,000 to Lorenzo Salvador who appears to be the son of the legatee
Gabino.

If the provisions of article 675 of the Civil Code are to be complied with, it cannot
be understood that the testator meant to bequeath to Basilia Gabino the mere
usufruct of the property, inasmuch as, by unmistakable language employed in
the said sixth clause, he bequeathed her the ownership or dominion of the said
property — language which expresses without the slightest doubt his wishes
which should be complied with literally, because it is constant rule or
jurisprudence that in matters of last wills and testaments the testator's will is the
law.

It is true that the legatee could not make any disposal of the bequeathed real
property to be effective after her death, nor could the property be acquired from
her by her heir through testate or intestate succession; but if we take into
account that the institution of donations and legacies depends on the full free will
of the testator, and that if the testator intended no more than that Basilia Gabino
should enjoy the ownership of the property during her lifetime, this testamentary
provisions is not contrary to law or to public morals, inasmuch as the testator
thereby intended that the property should revert to its lawful heir, the latter being
G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907
ELENA MORENTE, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, respondent-appellee.
Agoncillo and Ilustre, for appellant.
Agustin Alvares, for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:lawphil.net
1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass
to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa.
2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death,
and that he shall not marry anyone; should my said husband have
children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left
by me, except the one-third part thereof and the two remaining thirds
shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he
have any.
3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which
the bakery is located, which is one of the properties belonging to me.
Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the
death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in
the proceeding relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending in
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas in which she alleged the
second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him
above-mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the
husband to the procedure followed by the petitioner. The court below, however,
held that the proceeding was proper and from that holding the husband did not
appeal. From the judgment of the court below, the petitioner, Elena Morente,
appealed.
In its judgment the court denied the petition. It was said, however, in the
decision, as we understand it, that the husband having married, he had the right
to the use of all the property during his life and that at his death two-thirds
thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother of the testatrix, and one-third thereof
could be disposed of by the husband. The construction given to the will by the
court below is not accepted by the appellant. She claims that by the mere act of
marriage the husband at once lost all rights acquired by the will. It is neither
alleged nor proven that any children have been born to the husband since the
death of the testatrix. lawphil.net
Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made
conditional and article 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage
may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower. But the
question in this case is, Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the
absolute gift which is contained in the first clauses of the will? It is to be
observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave
her sisters. It is provided in the third clause that he must continue to live in a
certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again.
To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with
them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is
nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's sisters, or does not
continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the property
given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he marries
again he shall incur such a loss. But it is expressly provided that if one event
does happen the disposition of the property contained in the first clause of the
will shall be changed. It is said that if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of
that property shall pass to Vicente, the brother of the testatrix.
We are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained
therein, and with reference to such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in
the case, and after such consideration we can not say that it was the intention of
the testatrix that if her husband married again he should forfeit the legacy above
mentioned. In other words, there being no express condition attached to that
legacy in reference to the second marriage, we can not say that any condition
can be implied from the context of the will. In the case of Chiong Joc-Soy vs.
Jaime Vano (8 Phil. Rep., 119), we held that the legacy contained in the will
therein mentioned was not conditional. It is true that case arose under article
797 of the Civil Code, which perhaps is not strictly applicable to this case, but
we think that it may be argued from what is said in article 797 that, in order to
make a testamentary provision conditional, such condition must fairly appear
from the language used in the will.
Whether the children mentioned in the second clause of the will are natural
children or legitimate children we do not decide, for no such question is before
us, the contingency mentioned in that part of the clause not having arisen, and
we limit ourselves to saying merely that by the subsequent marriage of the
husband he did not forfeit the legacy given to him by the first part of the will.
That was the only question before the court below. the judgment of that court,
denying the petition, is accordingly affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-17742 December 17, 1966
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON VICENTE NOBLE. JUAN
NOBLE, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARIA S. NOBLE, oppositor-appellant.
Jesus N. Maravilla and Nicolas Belmonte, for petitioner-appellee.
Farrera, Belmi and Associates for oppositor-appellant.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal by Maria S. Noble from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Batangas (in Sp. Proc. No. 343), dismissing her opposition to the probate of
the purported last will of the late Don Vicente Noble, who died on April 25, 1959.
The proceedings for the probate of the last will of the deceased was instituted by
Juan Noble who was named executor therein and who had expressed
willingness to assume the trust. This was opposed by Maria S. Noble, who
claimed to be an illegitimate (spurious) child of the deceased, born on July 22,
1923 out of an illicit relation between the latter and Lucia Sinag. It was alleged
that the will sought to be probated, dated August 25, 1957, was not the last will
and testament of the late Don Vicente Noble; that from all indications as shown
by a perusal of the alleged last will of the deceased, the same was not executed
in accordance with the law, and that the said will was executed through undue
influence, mistake and improper pressure on the part of one or some of the
beneficiaries, and that petitioner Juan Noble, as then incumbent Assistant
General Manager of the NAMARCO, a government corporation could not
properly execute the trust of his office in the estate of the deceased, which
consists of real and personal properties located in several provinces.
Furthermore, oppositor contended that petitioner has an adverse interest against
those immediately interested in the estate, like her. Thus, she prayed that the
purported last Will and Testament presented to the court be disallowed; that she
be declared the only surviving illegitimate daughter of the deceased; and in case
the will sought to be probated be allowed, the institution of heirs made therein be
declared null and void; the devises and legacies be declared ineffective for
being inofficious; and oppositor be declared entitled to one-half of the entire
hereditary estate of the deceased; that instead of petitioner, letters of
administration be issued in favor of Mrs. Corazon Apacible de Cañiza of Taal,
Batangas. Simultaneously, she filed a motion asking for permission to present
evidence of her alleged filiation with the deceased. This motion was opposed by
petitioner Juan Noble, on the ground that the claim was in effect an action for
compulsory recognition, and since it was brought after the death of the putative
father and when claimant was already of majority age, the right to bring the
same has already prescribed pursuant to Article 285 of the new Civil
1
Code. This motion was not immediately resolved. Instead, the court proceeded
with the reception of the evidence for the petitioner, during which proceeding,
the oppositor was allowed to cross-examine the petitioner's witnesses.
Finding, on the basis of the evidence presented by the petitioner, that the
document, Exhibit "D", and its copies, Exhibits "D-1" to "D-12", constitute the last
will and testament of the deceased Vicente Noble, and it was executed with all
the formal requirements of the law, the aforesaid will was admitted to probate,
and Juan Noble was appointed administrator of the estate upon a bond of
P30,000.00. It was also ruled that the petition of Maria S. Noble to present proof
for the purpose of establishing her filiation, filed after the death of the presumed
father, had been barred by prescription. Consequently, the motion to dismiss the
petition of Maria S. Noble was granted. Oppositor appealed.
The main issue presented in this case requiring resolution by this Court is: what
is necessary to be established by an illegitimate not natural child in order that he
may be entitled to successional rights under Article 887 of the new Civil Code,
the fact of his bare filiation, or a filiation acknowledged by the putative parent?
While the Civil Code merely provides that "in all cases of illegitimate children,
their filiation must be duly proved" (Art. 887), there are cogent reasons, both
legal and moral, which require that such filiation must be acknowledged by the
presumed parent. For, if the mere fact of the paternity of the supposed father is
all that need be proved, that construction of the law would pave the way to
unscrupulous individuals taking advantage of the death of the presumed parent
who would no longer be in a position to deny the allegations, to present even
fictitious claims and expose the life of the deceased to inquiries affecting his
character.
But more important than this, the law could not have demanded anything less
than proof of an acknowledged filiation. Precisely, under Article 289 of the new
Civil Code, the investigation of the paternity or maternity of children mentioned
in the two preceding articles (referring to illegitimate not natural children) is
specifically permitted only in the circumstances enumerated in Articles 283 and
284 of the same code. It must be noted that these two articles refer to
compulsory recognition or acknowledgment. Hence, since the proof of filiation
required in Article 887, necessarily involves the investigation mentioned in
Article 289, and this investigation in turn refers to recognition by the putative
parent, it follows that the filiation to be proven must be one that is recognized.
In the present case, what is intended to be proved by appellant is simply the
supposed naked paternity of the deceased. This is evident from the pertinent
allegations of her opposition to the probate of the will, which state:
2. That the oppositor is in continuous possession of status of a child of
the late Don Vicente Noble by the direct acts of the latter and/or his
family; and, that the oppositor has in her favor evidence and/or proof
that the late Don Vicente Noble is her father.
It may be pointed out that the first sentence does not state that the supposed
father had recognized or acknowledged the oppositor as his child. It is merely
claimed that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child, an
allegation which is a ground for compelling recognition under Article 283 of the
new Civil Code and, therefore, presupposes no previous recognition. The last
sentence alleges that oppositor has in her favor evidence and/or proof that the
late Don Vicente Noble is her father. Again, there is no assertion that she has
evidence that the deceased had recognized or acknowledged her as such a
child.

In a unanimous decision, in the case of Paulino v. Paulino (G.R. No. L-15091,

Dec. 28, 1961), this Court held:

It is true that by their motion to dismiss the appellees are deemed to

have admitted that the appellant is the illegitimate spurious, not natural,
child of the deceased Marcos Paulino. Such an admission, however,
does not entitle her to inherit from her alleged putative father. It is
necessary to allege that her putative father had acknowledged and
recognized her as such. Such acknowledgment is essential and is the
basis of her right to inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment the action becomes one to compel recognition which
can not be brought after the death of the putative father. (Emphasis
supplied.)

This is authority to the declaration that acknowledgment is the basis of the right
of a spurious child to enjoy the successional rights mentioned in Articles 287
and 887 of the new Civil Code. There being no allegation of her recognition or
acknowledgment by the alleged father in the petition to establish her filiation, the
same, therefore, states no cause of action and the dismissal thereof by the
lower court was proper.

Incidentally, the last sentence of the above-quoted portion of the decision in

the Paulino case constitutes a reversal of the ruling contained in the majority
opinion in the case of Zuzuarregui v. Zuzuarregui (G.R. No. L-10010, Oct. 31,
1957) relied upon by the appellant.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 118449 February 11, 1998
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan
City, and RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two
children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five
siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other
children of Rafael and Salud
are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon,
and RicardoNicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is
now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area
of 10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property)
covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand
Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a "Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na
1 12
Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT No. T-36734". In view thereof, TCT No. V-554
2
covering the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita. On March 30, 1990,
Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad
Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred
3
Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00). In June of the same year, Estrellita bought from
Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St.,
BF Homes, Parañaque (hereafter Parañaque property) using a portion of the
proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela property. The remaining amount of the
proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner's life occurred. Estrellita
and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an
incident popularly known as the "Vizconde Massacre". The findings of the
investigation conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her
4
daughters. Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded
Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner
was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into
an "Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-
5
Vizconde With Waiver of Shares", with Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's parents.
The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of
Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and
Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car and the Parañaque property.
The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other related expenses
in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three Million Pesos
6
(P3,000,000.00). The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of
the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except Savings
Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token
amount. The other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Parañaque
property and the car and were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud
7
waiving all their "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs" in the
said properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael's estate, Teresita
8
instituted an intestate estate proceeding docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679,
with Branch 120 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as
heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo, and the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio.
Teresita prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate.
Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of Salud, now
senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother Herein private respondent Ramon
9
filed an opposition dated March 24, 1993, praying to be appointed instead as
Salud and Ricardo's guardian. Barely three weeks passed, Ramon filed another
10
opposition alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela
property by Rafael which she sold for not less than Six Million Pesos
(P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded for the court's
intervention "to determine the legality and validity of the intervivos distribution
11
made by deceased Rafael to his children," Estrellita included. On May 12,
1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled
"In The Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G.
Nicolas" and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the
properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon
stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafael's children "by right of representation
13
as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita."
In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon
as the guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as
the Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. The court's Order did not include
14
petitioner in the slate of Rafael's heirs. Neither was the Parañaque property
15
listed in its list of properties to be included in the estate. Subsequently, the
RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed Ramon as Salud and
Ricardo's guardian for Selling his ward's property without the court's knowledge
16
and permission.
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner
"ten (10) days . . . within which to file any appropriate petition or motion related
to the pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file any
opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by both the counsels for
Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de Leon." In response, petitioner filed a
Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing that he was neither a
compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to
participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said Manifestation in its Order
17
dated February 2, 1994. Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion
dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate
proceeding and asked that the Parañaque property, as well as the car and the
balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be
18
collated. Acting on Ramon's motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994 granted
the same in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate
proceedings in instant case and considering the comment on
19
his Manifestation, the same is hereby granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which
20
Ramon opposed. On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. It provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The centerpoint of oppositor-applicant's argument is that
spouses Vizconde were then financially incapable of having
purchased or acquired for a valuable consideration the property
at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly,
the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased
Rafael Nicolas in the latter's ancestral home. In fact, as the
argument further goes, said spouses were dependent for
support on the deceased Rafael Nicolas. And, Lauro Vizconde
left for the United States in, de-facto separation, from the family
for sometime and returned to the Philippines only after the
occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were
financially incapable to buy the property from the late Rafael
Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been engaged in
business venture such as taxi business, canteen concessions
and garment manufacturing.However, no competent evidence
has been submitted to indubitably support the business
undertakings adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the
acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a
valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor
of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the subject
property in Parañaque which was purchased out of the
proceeds of the said transfer of the property by the deceased
Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
21
DENIED. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent
Court of Appeals. In its decision of December 14, 1994, respondent
22
Court of Appeals denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly
adjudicated the question on the title of the Valenzuela property as "the
jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
settlement of the estate of the deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised
23
Rules of Court)." Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari. Finding prima faciemerit, the Court on December 4,
1995, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.
The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate court's Order, which
respondent Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela
property from Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Parañaque property as
subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.
Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of
the Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or
any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of
the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who
intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the
common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division
24
may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only
required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and
involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the
25
lifetime of the decedent. The purpose is to attain equality among the
compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it is presumed that the intention of the
testator or predecessor in interest making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a
forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in the
estate, and that the predecessor's will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the
26
absence of any expression to the contrary. Collation does not impose any lien
on the property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought
to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such
27
property at the time it was donated, the rationale being that the donation is a
real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any
increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir
28
or donee.
The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find that the
probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible
errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the
intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of
Rafael's compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one
another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the
extent established by this Code.
With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even
shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a
29
stranger. As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate
estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene
30
as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding, which
31
petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or
ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate
32
proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to
33
final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In the case at bench,
however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction
when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela
property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject
property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the
deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or
absence of consideration, are matters outside the probate court's jurisdiction.
These issues should be ventilated in an appropriate action. We reiterate:
. . . we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes
cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included
therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the
deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate
in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the interested
parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the
34
ownership or existence of the right or credit.
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Parañaque property to
collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is
still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of
any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. We thus advert to
our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:
We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In
35
accordance with the provisions of article 1035 of the Civil
Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to allege and prove that
the donations received by the defendants were inofficious in
whole or in part and prejudiced the legitime or hereditary portion
to which they are entitled. In the absence of evidence to that
effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack of ground or
basis therefor.
Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the
probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the
Parañaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of
deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Parañaque property which
Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property
does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the
36
Parañaque property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court
presupposes that the Parañaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael
to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Parañaque property was
37
conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00, by Premier Homes, Inc., to
Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who
inherited and is now the present owner of the Parañaque property is not one of
Rafael's heirs. Thus, the probate court's order of collation against petitioner is
unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and
not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate. As it
stands, collation of the Parañaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation
covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to
his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the
Parañaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and
38
willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir" in the
Parañaque property.

Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the
Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed,
died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an
39
amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. Hence, even
assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be
allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the
estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the
matter serves no valid and binding purpose.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010 The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate.
Thus it disposed:
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians,
AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner, WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
vs. that:
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.
1. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of
DECISION Makati as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;

CARPIO MORALES, J.: 2. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to collation;

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his 3. 1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her and the 3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City form part of the
1
daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents estate of Angel N. Pascual;
2
Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.
4. The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual:
In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters
of Administration," docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034, filed by a. 1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal
respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Village Makati TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental
respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) income thereon;
located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred
by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square
assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner.
meters located at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT No.
119063;
Respondent’s nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as
3
Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC. c. Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at
Puerta Galera Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati,
d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the
which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it "may be
following Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144, A082906,
considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner, the trial court, acting as A006087, A065796, A11979, A049521, C86950, C63096,
probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the
C55316, C54824, C120328, A011026, C12865, A10439,
donation.
A021401, A007218, A0371, S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309;

Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated e. Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the
property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the following Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308,
4
decedent’s estate, the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of
S69309, A006708, 07680, A020786, S18539, S14649;
the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it
5
is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads:
f. ¼ share in Eduardo Pascual’s shares in Baguio Gold Mining
Co.;
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in
other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the the name of Nona Arellano;
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
i. Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered
by TCT No. 181889, Register of Deeds of Makati City;
 j. Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by
Branch 64 of the Court on November 17, 1995.
5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:
a. To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT No.
181889;
b. To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the real
properties covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of the
Register of Deeds of Makati City and the property covered by
OCT No. 2159, to be divided equally between them up to the
extent that each of their share have been equalized with the
actual value of the property in 5(a) at the time of donation, the
value of which shall be determined by an independent appraiser
to be designated by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel N. Pascual and
Francisco N. Pascual. If the real properties are not sufficient to
equalize the shares, then Francisco’s and Miguel’s shares may
be satisfied from either in cash property or shares of stocks, at
the rate of quotation. The remaining properties shall be divided
equally among Francisco, Miguel and Amelia. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that
I WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL
ARELLANO IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.
II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF
DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY
HEIRS ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
xxxx
and
V
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL
6
JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS. (underscoring
supplied)
7
By Decision of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioner’s appeal
"partly meritorious." It sustained the probate court’s ruling that the property
donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality
of division, We hold that the property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of
Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the
decedent and we believe that under the circumstances, the value of such
immovable though not strictly in the concept of advance legitime, should be
deducted from her share in the net hereditary estate. The trial court therefore
committed no reversible error when it included the said property as forming part
8
of the estate of Angel N. Pascual. (citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)1avvph!1
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate
court, herein petitioner "was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of
stocks owned by the [decedent] which have not been included in the inventory
submitted by the administrator."
Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of
properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as the partition
and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in
9
accordance with the disquisitions herein. (underscoring supplied)
10
Petitioner’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the
11
appellate court by Resolution of October 7, 2009, the present petition for
review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court its ruling
I
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO
PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT
THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR
DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO
LEGITIMES.
IV
are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory
heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring
17
compulsory heirs.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime,
he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his
siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it
18
was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the
19
free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the
donated property is not subject to collation.

. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL, On the second issue:

JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL
12
OR INTESTATE HEIRS. (underscoring supplied) The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his
heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to
the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner is
subject to collation; and whether the property of the estate should have been
ordered equally distributed among the parties. Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. (underscoring supplied)
On the first issue:

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood,
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the
value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary
estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
13 ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to
lifetime.
the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in
so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of
14 the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further proceedings
so that inofficious donations may be reduced.
in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate,
and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties.
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes
being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory
15 SO ORDERED.
heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his
collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime – that part of
the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved
16
it for compulsory heirs.

The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3)
concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over
and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are
primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who
succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and
ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs
G.R. No. 7890 September 29, 1914
FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of
Florencio Pecson, et al., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO, defendant-appellee.
S. E. Imperial for appellants.
Tomas Lorayes for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that some time prior to the 17th day of September,
1910, the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes,
an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on the ground that it had
not been authorized nor signed by the deceased, in accordance with the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. After hearing the respective parties,
the Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge, found that the will had been signed and
executed in accordance with the provisions of law, and denied the opposition on
the 17th day of September, 1910.
On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing
Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion in the words
following:
1. That Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate
child of the deceased Teresa Pecson, who also was a daughter of the
testator, Florencio Pecson, and therefore the first mentioned is and the
second was a grandchild of the latter.
2. That the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was
disinherited by her grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according
to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to show him due respect and
on a certain occasion raised her hand against him.
3. That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps
she did, it was due to the derangement of her mental faculties which
occurred a long time ago and from which she now suffers in periodical
attacks.
By reason of all the foregoing and because the disinheriting clause 3 of
the will is unfounded, the undersigned prays the court to annul the said
clause and to make the testator's died without succession, but is
represented now by his father, Basiliso Mediavillo), participants in the
estate left by their grandfather; and, finally, that the court grant such
other relief as it may deem just and equitable.
After a consideration of the question presented by said motion, the lower court,
on the 22d day of September, 1911, rendered the following decision:
This case has come up to-day for a hearing on the declaration of heirs
of the decease Florencio Pecson, who died in Daraga, about the year
1910.
From the evidence it appears that the deceased had eight children by
his wife Nicolasa Manjares, likewise deceased, which children are those
named Emerenciano, Teresa, Filomena, Asunsion, Rufino, Zoila,
Emiliano, and Perfecto, all surnamed Pecson. It also appears that
Rufino Pecson absented himself from these Islands twenty-five years
ago, going to Australia, and that nothing has been heard of him for the
past twenty years. The said Rufino Pecson left no children in the
Philippines and was unmarried when he emigrated. As nothing has
been heard of him for twenty years, it is presumed that he died and it is
held that the part of this estate to which he was entitled must be divided
among the other heirs.
It also appears from the evidence that Teresa Pecson married Basiliso
Mediavillo, by whom she had two children, Joaquin and Rosario
Mediavillo. Teresa also died, leaving these two children and her
husband, Basiliso Mediavillo. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and
childless, before the death of the testator, Florencio Pecson. Rosario is
the only living daughter of Teresa and the latter's husband, Basiliso
Mediavillo, is also living. The evidence shows that this girl Rosario
became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva Caceres to study in
college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she
disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him, and, as the
testator states in the third paragraph of his will, he disinherited her. This
court understands that this Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and
who shortly afterwards became insane, was not responsible for her acts
and should not have been disinherited by her grandfather.
The court therefore decrees that this part of the will is contrary to law
and sets it aside as being of no force or value whatever. The court
further holds that Rosario Mediavillo, the daughter of Teresa Pecson, is
the heiress of the one-half of the share of this estate pertaining to the
said Teresa, and that her father, as the heir of his son Joaquin, also
Teresa's son, is the heris of the other one-half of the said share
pertaining to Teresa — that is, of the one-seventh of this estate that
pertains to the latter. Moreover, the court decrees that, besides the two
heirs just above mentioned, Emerciano, Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila,
Emiliano, and Perfecto, surnamed Pecson, and the children of Teresa,
are also heirs of the estate of Florencio Pecson.
From the decision the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following
assignments of error:
 FIRST ERROR
The lower court erred in finding that the part of the will which disinherits
Rosario Mediavillo is contrary to law, and in setting it aside as being of
no force or value whatever.
SECOND ERROR
The lower court erred by decreeing that Basaliso Mediavillo, the father
of Joaquin Mediavillo, is the heir by representation of the one-half of the
one seventh of this estate pertaining to Joaquin Mediavillo.
With reference to the first assignment of error it may be said that from the record
it appears that during the lifetime of Florencio Pecson he had been married to
Nicolasa Manjares, with whom he had eight children, named Filomena,
Asuncion, Zoila, Emerenciano, Emiliano, Perfecto, Rufino and Teresa Pecson;
that before the death of Florencio Pecson he executed and delivered the will in
question. The will made no provision for the said Rufino Pecson, neither was
there any provision in the will for the said Teresa. All of the other children were
named as heirs in said will. It appears that Teresa had been married with one
Basiliso Mediavillo, and that some time before the making of the will in question
she died, leaving her husband and two children, Joaquin Mediavillo and Rosario
Mediavillo, as her heirs. It also appears from the record that Joaquin Mediavillo
died without heirs, leaving as the only heirs of the said Teresa Pecson, her
husband, Basilio Mediavillo and the said Rosario Mediavillo. The said Joaquin
Mediavillo died before his grandfather, Florencio Pecson, and probably before
the will in question was made.
Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo in the following language:
I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a
legitimate daughter named Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I
disinherit my granddaughter, the said Rosario Mediavillo, because she
was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it
was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is
my will that the said Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my
property.
The defendant, Rosario Mediavillo, in the motion which she presented and
which is copied above, alleges that she was disinherited without case. Upon a
consideration of that question, the lower court found that she had been
disinherited without cause and annulled said paragraph 3 of the will. That order
of the lower court constitutes the error complained of by the appellant in her first
assignment of error.
By reference to said paragraph 3 above quoted, it will be seen that Florencio
Pecson disinherited the said Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly
disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not
remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is my will that she, the
said Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property."
The lower court admitted proof the question of the responsibility of the said
Rosario Mediavillo at the time she offered the offense to her grandfather,
Florencio Pecson. After hearing the proof, the lower court reached the following
conclusion:
The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when
she went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved
that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and
raised her hand against him, and, as the testator states in the third
paragraph of his will, he disinherited her. This court understands that
this Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and who shortly afterwards
became insane, was not responsible for her acts and should not have
been disinherited by her grandfather.
The first assignment of error presents the question whether or not the courts,
when a parent disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of the
disinheritance and decide that there was or was not ground for such
disinheritance. The Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance
shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. In accordance
with the provisions of that article (848) we find that articles 756 and 853 provide
the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other words, the cases or causes in
which the ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs. Article 849 of the Civil
Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in
which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. If
it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and for causes mentioned in
the Civil Code, it would seen to follow that the courts might properly inquire
whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes provided
for by law. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there
was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by
express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof of the
truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of
the testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would appear then that if
the person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the cause of
disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his allegation by proof. The right
of the court to inquire whether or not the disinheritance was made for just cause
is also sustained by the provisions of article 851, which in part provides that:
Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the
truth of which, if contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the
designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited.
It seems clear from the above-quoted provisions, that the courts may inquire into
the justice of a disinheritance such as was attempted in the present case, and if
they find that the disinheritance was without cause, that part of the testament or
will may be pronounced null and void. It remains, however, to be seen whether
the evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause was sufficient to
show that the disinheritance made in paragraph 3 of the will was made for just
cause. It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14
years of age, she had received some attentions from a young man — that she
had received a letter from him — and that her grandfather, Florencio Pecson,
took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the said young
man; that it was upon that occasion when, it is alleged, the disobedience and
disrespect were shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her
disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that very soon after said
event she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never regained
them, except for very brief periods, up to the present time. The lower court,
taking into consideration her tender years, and the fact that she very soon
thereafter lost the use of her mental faculties, reached the conclusion that she
was probably not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her
grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.
After a careful consideration of the record, we are inclined to believe that the
same supports the conclusions of the lower court and that the same supports
the conclusions of the lower court that he did not commit the error complained of
in the first assignment of error.
With reference to the second assignment of error, it will be remembered that
Teresa Pecson, the mother of Rosario Mediavillo, at the time of her death left
two children, Rosario and Joaquin, and her husband Basiliso Mediavillo, and
that said Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs. The lower court gave one-half of
the inheritance of the said Teresa Pecson to Rosario Mediavillo and the share
that would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, and the share that would have gone
to Joaquin Mediavillo, to his father Basiliso Mediavillo. In that conclusion of the
lower court we think error was committed. The appellant relies upon the
provisions of article 925 of the Civil Code, in his contention that the lower court
committed an error. Article 925 provides that:
The right of representation shall always take place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending. In collateral lines, it shall
take place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether
they be of the whole or half blood.
The appellee, in support of the conclusions of the lower court, cites articles 935
and 936 of the Civil Code. Article 935 provides that:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased,
his ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
Article 936 provides that:
The father and mother, if living shall inherits share and share alike. If
one of them only survive, he or she shall succeed to the son's entire
estate.
It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with reference
to the first assignment of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited
and the court evidently believed that there were no "legitimate children,
descendants of the deceased, surviving," and that therefore the father or mother
of said legitimate children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch, however, as
there was a descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could not
ascend, and for the reason the lower court committed an error in declaring that
Basiliso Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of the estate that would have
belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living. Therefore, and for all the
foregoing, that part of the judgment of the lower court nullifying and setting aside
paragraph 3 of the will is hereby affirmed, and that art of said judgment which
decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of Florencio Pecson,
belonging to Teresa Pecson and which would have been given to Joaquin
Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is hereby revoked. And without any findings
as to costs, it is hereby ordered that the cause be remanded to the lower court,
with direction that judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and that such
further proceedings be had as the interested parties may deem necessary, for
the purpose of disposing of that part of the inheritance of Teresa Pecson would
have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving.
Torres, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARELLANO, C.J., concurring:
I agree with the second part of the decision reversing the judgment appealed
from.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting:
I do not agree with the part of the decision which affirms the judgment appealed
from.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D.
SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D.
SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR
D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY
D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
1
This is a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification
of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate
on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the
Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio,
Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of
the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–
90870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa
D. Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner
Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the
petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full
command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power
of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise
control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the
most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of
Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a
holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private
respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic
will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will,
the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by
the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99–93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC.
They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence
over SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 because testate proceedings take precedence
2
and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is quoted,
as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St.,
Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay
tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong
anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan
beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia
Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako
nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa
ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para
makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa
China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng
babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at
stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga
custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak
ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at
hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo
Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa
3
harap ng tatlong saksi.
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 and SP.
4
Proc. No. 99–93396 were consolidated.
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
5
proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the
Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act
of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else;
that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or
legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being
the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is
called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from
delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the
petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1)
generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of
the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and
not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of
the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because
Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of
6
one or more compulsory heirs.
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition
for probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng
Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs
mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted,
Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow
Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a
compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would
amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v.
Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position
clear: "for … respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed
the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void …
would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate
outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved(underscoring
supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby
DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
7
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated
October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS
3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER
PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE
TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR’S WILL
IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION,
WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE
COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE
TESTATOR’S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH
THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF
THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE
TESTATOR’S WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS
BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A
SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE
OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place
for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance
thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks
successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general
circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and
devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but
rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply
contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in
the decedent’s will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private
respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None
of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the
holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it
is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to
proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work
injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners
was dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the
ground of preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the
authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed
Segundo’s intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate
for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by
Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the
same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by
Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a
whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son,
Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of
a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of
children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt
against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for
which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or
concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or
undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one
already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or
ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or
8
descendant;
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil
interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by
Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need
not be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the
the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of
the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the No costs.
10
absence of Alfredo.
SO ORDERED.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be
recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are
designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot
11
be given effect.

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in
the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally
than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances
12
surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In
this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of
13
a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be
14
given effect.

15
With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory
heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s
opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory
heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an
16
heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the
name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to
institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to
the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1âwphi1

Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and

that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be
dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to
17
dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate
18
proceedings for the same purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial

Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are
set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-
93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The
G.R. No. L-21993 June 21, 1966
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.
Lorenzo Somulong for petitioners.
Torres and Torres for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition
this Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding
No. 1331, which said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of without
jurisdiction.
The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent
court, dated June 13, 1963 (Petition, Annex 0), in this wise:
It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo
and Antonio Rodriguez, through counsel, that this Court "has no
jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in view of the pendency of
another action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr.
Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp.
Proceedings No. 3907 entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of
the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the
instant case".
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12,
1963 in the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan
and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a
purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8,
1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a
petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will; that
on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same
was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of
the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that
Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died without
leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special
Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia
Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the
probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was
stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque,
Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy,
Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he
was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal,
Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while
the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof
the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No.
7792, July 27, 1955.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the
stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction
over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on
March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence
over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss on
the ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to
preference over the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were aware of the
existence of the purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of
Bulacan, since they filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants
clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to
prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings". Reconsideration having been denied, movants, now petitioners,
came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of
Court, and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De Borja, L-7792, July
27, 1955.
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the
late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was
filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu
proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and
issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section
3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be
published. — When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance
of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a
time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to
contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and
place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time
appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for
probate has been filed by the testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition
for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon
the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its
allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit
of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was
delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to
the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the
precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is
incontestable.1äwphï1.ñët
But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will
being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the
Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal
province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish
priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that
he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in
Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked
jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents'
estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of
the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw
Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil.
676). Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left
personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June
11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case before
us.
In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that:
"... If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be
that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different
incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the
same case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the
same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the
prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf.
Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31,
1942). Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, providing that the
estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he
had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter, because such
legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is
one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney
General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of
jurisdiction — Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of
First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the
1
place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many
Courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act
No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case
shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. And
it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where
the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called
"venue" (Rule 75, section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is denied.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First
Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express
provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins
that:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
(Sec. 1)
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper
venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first
invoked, without taking venue into account.
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One
is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the
delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently
done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the
Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not
designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between
applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only
subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the
absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:

ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:

(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity;

(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the
property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall
take place only with respect to the property in which the testator has not
disposed;

(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not
happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or
repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of
accretion takes place;

(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases

provided in this Code.

Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final
decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be
instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy
proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported
will of Father Rodriguez is pending.

We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the
settlement of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate.
proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the
proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.

Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners
Rodriguez.
G.R. No. L-29192 February 22, 1971
GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Benjamin Pineda for plaintiff-appellee.
Ceasar R. Monteclaros for defendant-appellant.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Direct appeal to this Court on questions of law from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, in its Civil Case No. Q-8792.
From the record of this case, we cull the following salient facts: On May 21,
1965, Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against
Maximo de la Cruz, alleging, among others, that on August 24, 1963, she and
several co-heirs, including the defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition
agreement (a copy of which was attached to the complaint) over a certain
portion of land with an area of around 20,000 sq. m.; that the parties thereto had
agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to the defendant, in addition to his
corresponding share, on condition that the latter would undertake the
development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter of the
agreement, all expenses in connection therewith to be defrayed from the
proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned three (3) lots; that in spite of
demands by the plaintiff, by the co-heirs, and by the residents of the subdivision,
the defendant refused to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had
already sold the aforesaid lots. The plaintiff prayed the court to order the
defendant to comply with his obligation under the extrajudicial partition
agreement and to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicial
partition agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no
cause of action against him because the said agreement was void with respect
to her, for the reason that the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz,
deceased owner of the property, and was included in the extrajudicial partition
agreement by mistake; and that although he had disposed of the three lots
adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to
develop and improve properly the subdivided estate. The answer contained a
counterclaim wherein the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had likewise sold
her share in the estate for P10,000.00, and that the extrajudicial partition
agreement being void insofar as the latter was concerned, he was entitled to
one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds as his share by way of reversion. The defendant
prayed that the complaint be dismissed; that the extrajudicial partition
agreement be declared void with respect to the plaintiff; and, on his
counterclaim, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay him the sum of P2,500.00.
On motion of the defendant, the court below entered an order on July 19, 1965,
declaring the plaintiff in default for not having answered the counterclaim.
On July 6, 1966, the case was submitted for decision on the following stipulation
of facts:
1. That the parties admit the existence and execution of the
"Extra-Judicial Partition Agreement" dated August 24, 1963,
which was marked as Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff, and Exhibit "I"
for the defendant, which partition agreement was marked as
Annex "A" in the complaint;
2. That the parties agree that the original purpose of the above-
mentioned Extra-Judicial Partition Agreement was for the
distribution of the in question for the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz;
however the parties further agree that several lots in the said
land have been sold by some of the co-heirs, and there are
houses several houses constructed therein and residents
therein;
3. That the parties agree that the defendant is the appointed
Administrator and In-charge of the development and subdivision
of the land in question, as provided for in the aforementioned
extrajudicial partition agreement;
4. That parties agree that Lots 1, 2 and 3 as described on page
3, 3rd paragraph to the last of said partition agreement have
been sold by the defendant herein; and parties further agree
that there are no properly constructed roads, nor proper light
and water facilities;
5. That the parties agree that the defendant is the nephew of
the deceased Pelagia de la Cruz aforementioned, who was the
owner and predecessor in interest of the land which was the
subject matter of the extra-judicial partition agreement;
6. That the parties agree that the plaintiff is the grandniece of
the said Pelagia de la Cruz;
7. That Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue on
October 16, 1962, as evidenced by a death certificate, which is
marked as Exhibit "2" for tap defendant; and
 8. That Marciana de la Cruz is the mother of the plaintiff and the
niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz, and that the said Marciana
de la Cruz died on September 22, 1935, as evidenced by
Exhibit "3" for the defendant.
In its decision dated November 3, 1966, the court a quo held that the defendant,
being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising
in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz;
hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement. The court ordered the
defendant "to perform his obligations to develop Lots 1, 2 and 3 of (LRC) Psd-
29561 as described on page 2 of the Extrajudicial Partition Agreement"
(meaning, apparently, that the defendant should develop the subdivision
because said Lots 1, 2 and 3 were intended to be sold for this purpose), and to
pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages, the sum of P500.00
as attorney's fees, and the costs. No disposition was made of defendant's
counterclaim. The defendant filed a "Motion for New Trial" but the same was
denied. Hence, this appeal.
The seven (7) errors assigned by defendant-appellant in his brief boil down to
the following:
1. The court a quo erred in not holding that the extrajudicial
partition agreement is null and void with respect to plaintiff-
appellee, and, consequently, that plaintiff-appellee has no
cause of action against defendant-appellant.
2. The court a quo erred in holding that defendant-appellant is
estopped from questioning plaintiff-appellee's right to have the
agreement enforced.
3. The court a quo erred in ordering defendant-appellant to pay
actual damages to plaintiff-appellee, and, on the other hand, in
not granting the relief prayed for by defendant-appellant in his
counterclaim.
We shall discuss seriatim these errors as thus condensed.
1. In the stipulation of facts submitted to the court below, the parties admit that
the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement,
was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate on October 16, 1962; that defendant-
appellant is a nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee is a
grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a
niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz; that plaintiff-appellee's mother died on
September 22, 1935, thus predeceasing Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the
purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute the
estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
The pivotal question is whether, in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is a heir of the
decedent. We are convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere
grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by right of
representation.
ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.
Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of
representation when it properly takes place. ... .
Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court, in Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte y
Iturralde, 5 Phil., 176 (1905), said,
... [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased
and not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the
latter being a nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is
excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does
not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and
sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the
father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.
In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are
her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily,
plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.
But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation in the
extrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action is
concerned? They did not confer upon her the right to institute this action. The
express purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement, as admitted by the
parties in the stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz. Indeed, the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-
appellee was participating therein in representation of her deceased mother.
The pertinent portion of the agreement is herein quoted, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, we ... and Diego de los Santos, married to
Anastasia de la Cruz; Mariano delos Santos married to Andrea
Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos, married to Pascual Acuna;
Alejo delos Santos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera delos
Santos, married to Narciso Ramota; all in representation of our
mother, MARCIANA DELA CRUZ, ..., do hereby by these
 presents, mutually, voluntarily and amicably agree among
ourselves to equitably divide the property left by the deceased
PELAGIA DELA CRUZ, and adjudicate unto ourselves definite
and independent portions of the estate in the following manner
... .
It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties thereto
were laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was one of the
legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such a heir, the
partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be a
heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such
person.
Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the
deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when
he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir
designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void (De Torres vs. De
Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49). A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from
the agreement the right to have its terms enforced.
2. The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to
plaintiff-appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppel against defendant-
appellant. Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void contract (17 Am. Jur. 605),
or on acts which are prohibited by law or are against public policy (Baltazar vs.
Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., et al., G.R. Nos. 16236-38, June 30, 1965 [14
SCRA 5221). In Ramiro vs. Graño, et al., 54 Phil., 744 (1930), this Court held:
No estoppel arises where the representation or conduct the
party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon a
mistake. And which there is authority to the contrary, the weight
of authority is that the acts and declarations of a party based
upon an innocent mistake as to his legal rights will not estop
him to assert the same, especially where every fact known to
the party sought to be estopped is equally well known to the
party setting up the estoppel. (21 C.J., 1125, 1126.)
And in Capili, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-18148, February 28,
1963 (7 SCRA 367), this Court said:
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped
to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved
because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not
object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the
assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-
judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very
authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute
estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be
apprised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting
estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no
estoppel. ... .
3. The award of actual damages in favor of plaintiff-appellee cannot be
sustained in view of the conclusion we have arrived at above. Furthermore,
actual or compensatory damages must be duly proved (Article 2199, Civil
Code). Here, no proof of such damages was presented inasmuch as the case
was decided on a stipulation of facts and no evidence was adduced before the
trial court.
We now come to defendant-appellant's counterclaim, in which he alleged that
plaintiff-appelee sold her share to a certain person for the price of P10,000.00,
and claims that he is entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds by right of
reversion. It will be noted that plaintiff-appellee had been declared in default on
defendant-appellant's counterclaim; but the latter did not present any evidence
to prove the material allegation therein — more specifically, the alleged sale of
the former's share for the sum of P10,000.00. That no such evidence had been
adduced is understandable, for the parties expressly submitted the case for the
resolution of the court upon their stipulation of facts which, unfortunately, did not
make any mention of the alleged sale; and neither had defendant made any
offer or move to introduce the necessary evidence to that effect for the
consideration and evaluation by the trial court.
Defendant-appellant contends, however, that in view of plaintiff-appellee's
having been declared in default, the latter must be deemed to have admitted all
the allegations in his counterclaim, so that the court a quo should have granted
the relief prayed for by him. We find no merit in this contention.
Section 1, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
SECTION 1. Judgment by default.—if the defendant fails to
answer within the time specified in these rules, the court shall,
upon motion of the plaintiff and proof of such failure, declare the
defendant in default. Thereupon the court shall proceed to
receive the plaintiff's evidence and render judgment granting
him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may
warrant. This provision applies where no answer is made to a
counterclaim, crossclaim or third-party complaint within the
period provided in this rule.
The abovequoted rule was taken from Sections 128 and 129 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. In Macondray & Co. vs. Eustaquio, 64 Phil., 446 (1937), this Court
said:
 Under section 128 of our Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar Castro, Fernando,
by default against a defendant who has neither appeared nor Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar,
filed his answer does not imply a waiver of rights except that of
being heard and of presenting evidence in his favor. It does not
imply admission by the defendant of the facts and causes of
action of the plaintiff, because the codal section requires the
latter to adduce his evidence in support of his allegations as an
indispensable condition before final judgment could be given in
his favor. Nor could it be interpreted as an admission by the
defendant that the plaintiff's causes of action find support in the
law or that the latter is entitled to the relief prayed for. ... .

Nevertheless, the basic fact appears in the stipulation submitted by the parties
that said plaintiff-appellee admitted having received a portion of the estate by
virtue of the extrajudicial partition agreement dated August 24, 1963, to wit:

(9). Lot 9, (LRC) Psd-29561, containing an area of 1,691 sq. m.

as described in the Technical Description to be adjudicated to
Diego delos Santos, married to Anastacia dela Cruz; Mariano
delos Santos, married to Regina Baluyot; Hilario delos Santos,
married to Andrea Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos, married to
Pascual Acuna; Alejo delos Santos, married to Leonila David;
and Sotera delos Santos, married to Narciso Ramota, in co-
ownership, share and share alike.

Such being the case, defendant-appellant is apparently correct in his contention

that the lower court erred in not passing on his counterclaim and, consequently,
in not sentencing appellee to turn over to him his corresponding share of said
portion received by appellee under the void partition. Remote relatives or
unrelated person who unduly received and took possession of the property of a
deceased person without any right, by virtue of a null and void partition, must
restore it to the legitimate successor in the inheritance (De Torres vs. De Torres,
et al., supra). Of course, if such share has already been disposed of by appellee
to a bona fide purchaser, as seems to be indicated in the unproven allegations
of the counterclaim, We cannot render judgment awarding any specific amount
to defendant-appellant as his proportionate share of the proceeds of such sale
for the reason that, as already stated above, this aspect of the counterclaim has
not been touched upon in the stipulation of facts nor has it been supported by
evidence which appellant should have presented in the lower court but did not.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed

from is hereby reversed and set aside; the defendant-appellant is absolved from
any ability to and in favor of plaintiff-appellee; and, on appellant's counterclaim,
appellee is hereby sentenced to restore or reconvey to him his corresponding
share of the property she has received under the extrajudicial partition
hereinbefore mentioned if the same has not already been disposed of as
alleged. Costs in both instance against plaintiff-appellee.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-
LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her
husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL
SAYSON, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to
inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them
that right, asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and
Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on
March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all
surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with
Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting
of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil
Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action
was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional
rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this
time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela
Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil
Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The
complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit,
that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit
Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis
of practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,
1
1986, that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9,
2
1967. Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth
3
certificate dated February 27, 1967. Consequently, the three children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.
4
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed
Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of
Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded
the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were
5
consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989, the respondent
court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541),
the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No.
1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED
in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from
inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and
Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal
of the respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence
of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it
declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally
adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when
the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel
disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of
the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by
legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita
Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her
6
natural mother.
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek
to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and
Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to
demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to
challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That
7
was way back in 1967. Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties, what
they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing
to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia
and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before
the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he
had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN
(10) days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the
petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of
DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps
petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or
rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not
one of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission of
an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the
adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is
valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not
having been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the
trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the
finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the
validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for
partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional
facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in
a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases
where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the
necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on
Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American
Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the
necessary facts and the burden of proof is on
the party attacking it; it cannot be considered
void merely because the fact needed to show
statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial
determination of some particular fact, such as
the abandonment of his next of kin to the
adoption, may be essential to the exercise of
jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this
does not make it essential to the jurisdictional
validity of the decree that the fact be
determined upon proper evidence, or
necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere
error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the
determination must stand until reversed on
appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally
attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of
adopted children would always be uncertain,
since the evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded with
different effect by different tribunals, and the
adoption might be held by one court to have
been valid, while another court would hold it to
have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial
courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth
certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of
recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family
Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers
9
only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila
was understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The
10
affidavit of Abila denying her earlier statement in the petition for the
guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never
offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth
11
certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where we
ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the
absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the
present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned
in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed
by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not
have this purely evidential character. It serves a more
fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child
born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in
 a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties,
and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
12
purpose. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as
their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the
parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or
age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting
parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.
Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would
have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her
13
grandparents' other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to
whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted
child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the
latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship
created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted
14
child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted
children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel
Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the
estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct,
however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the
inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents
being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his
of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter
spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a
token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after
he is gone from this earth.

Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by

virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the

law and not by the person represented. The representative does
not succeed the person represented but the one who the person
represented would have succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of

other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in
their own right, and the latter by right of representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her
deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.
G.R. No. 106401 September 29, 2000
SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-
ZARAGOZA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA
MORGAN, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks (1) the
1
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 27, 1992
2 WHEREFORE, in view of the above findings, judgment is hereby rendered,
in CA - G.R. CV No. 12587, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. 14178, except the dismissal of private respondent's
claim over lot 943; (2) the dismissal of the complaint filed by private respondent
in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo; and (3) the declaration of the deed of sale
executed by Flavio Zaragoza covering Lot 943 as valid.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals and on record are as
follows:
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land
situated at the Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara,
Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta,
all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a will and was
survived by his four children.
On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Spouses Florentino
and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of
Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She claims that she is a natural
born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She further alleged
that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his
four children. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in
advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share,
which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of
sale then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became an American
citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by
hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was
executed in her favor covering these lots during her father's lifetime.
Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private respondent and
the allegations on the properties of their father. They, however, denied
knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by their
father. They said that lot 871 is still registered in their father's name, while lot
943 was sold by him to them for a valuable consideration. They denied
knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to convey the cited lots to
Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure to do so because she became an
American citizen. They denied that there was partitioning of the estate of their
father during his lifetime.
On November 23, 1983, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that
the complaint did not state a cause of action and it failed to implead
indispensable parties. The resolution of said Motion was deferred by the lower
court until the case was tried on the merits.
On October 7, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo promulgated its decision,
the decretal portion of which reads:
adjudicating Lot 871 in the name of Flavio Zaragoza Cano to plaintiff Alberta
Zaragoza-Morgan as appertaining her share in his estate and ordering
defendants to vacate its premises and deliver immediately the portion occupied
by them to herein plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim against defendants over Lot 943 is
3
dismissed as well as claims for damages interposed against each other.
In the above decision, the RTC found that Flavio partitioned his properties
during his lifetime among his three children by deeds of sales; that the
conveyance of Lot 943 to petitioners was part of his plan to distribute his
properties among his children during his lifetime; and that he intended Lot 871 to
4
be the share of private respondent.
Not satisfied with the above decision, both parties interposed an appeal in the
Court of Appeals docketed as CA -GR CV No. 12587.
On March 27, 1992, respondent court rendered the assailed decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, WE reverse the decision appealed from, insofar as defendant-
appellants, spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda E. Zaragoza, were
adjudged owner of Lot 943. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is
5
hereby AFFIRMED.
The appellate court gave weight to the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by private respondent to support its finding that Lots 871 and 943
were inheritance share of private respondent. Specifically, it noted the admission
by petitioner in his letter in 1981 to private respondent's counsel, that their father
6
had given them their inheritance. Further, public respondent found that the
alleged sale of lot 943 in favor of petitioner Florentino was fictitious and void.
The signature of Don Flavio in the said document was markedly different from
his other signatures appearing in other documents he signed from January to
 7
February 1957. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied
8
Resolution dated June 26, 1992.
9
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, with a supplemental petition, raising
the following assigned errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOTS 871 AND 943
ARE THE INHERITANCE SHARE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE DECEDENT FLAVIO ZARAGOZA
HAS NOT EXECUTED ANY WILL NOR ANY DOCUMENT GIVING THESE
TWO PROPERTIES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING WEIGHT
TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S WITNESSES TO THE
EFFECT THAT LOTS 871 AND 943 ARE THE INHERITANCE SHARE OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS TOLD TO THEM BY FLAVIO ZARAGOZA
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THESE TESTIMONIES ARE HEARSAY;
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEED OF
SALE EXECUTED BY FLAVIO ZARAGOZA IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER OVER
LOT 943 IS A FORGERY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
1. THE THEORY THAT THE AFORESAID DEED OF SALE WAS A
FORGERY WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE COMPLAINT NOR
ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE.
2. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS IN A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT.
3. NO WITNESSES WAS EVER PRESENTED TO ASSAIL THE
GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF FLAVIO ZARAGOZA.
4. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS EVEN WITNESSED BY HIS
OTHER DAUGHTER GLORIA ZARAGOZA NUÑEZ AND NOTARIZED
BY NOTARY PUBLIC ATTY. EDURESE.
D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WITH RESPECT TO LOT 943 WHEN
THE LATTER SUSTAINED THE GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF
PETITIONER'S FATHER FOUND IN EXH. I.
E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF
ESTOPPEL, IGNORING THE FACT THAT IT IS THE LAW ON INTESTATE
SUCCESSION, AND THE CORRESPONDING RULES OF COURT ON THE
10
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE THAT IS APPLICABLE ON THIS CASE.
In their Supplemental Petition for Review dated October 29, 1992, petitioners
additionally raised:
in a I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION,
II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT LOTS TRANSFERRED INTER VIVOS TO THE OTHER HEIRS
SHOULD HAVE BEEN COLLATED TO THE MASS OF THE ESTATE
OF THE DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
AS LAWFUL AND VALID ALL THE DISPOSITIONS MADE BY THE
DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO EXCEPT LOT # 943
DESPITE UTTER LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS FINDING
THAT THE SIGNATURE OF THE LATE FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO
IN EXH. "M-11-A" APPEARING IN THE DEED OF SALE DATED
FEBRUARY 5, 1957 (EXH. "1", FLORENTINO) WAS A FORGERY.
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-35946 (EXHIBIT 2) COVERING LOT
943 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER CONCLUSIVELY EVIDENCES
11
THE LATTER'S OWNERSHIP THEREOF.
Essentially, we are asked to resolve two issues: (1) whether the partition inter
vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his properties, which include Lots 871 and
943, is valid; and (2) whether the validity of the Deed of Sale and consequently,
the Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot 943 registered in the name of the
petitioners, can be a valid subject matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery
of inheritance share.
On the first issue. It is the main contention of the petitioner that the adjudication
of Lots 943 and 871 in favor of private respondent, as her inheritance share, has
no legal basis since there is no will nor any document that will support the
transfer.
Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the lifetime of
Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties among his three
children, excepting private respondent, through deeds of sale. A deed of sale
was not executed in favor of private respondent because she had become an
American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioner
admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private respondent.
These are factual determinations of the Court of Appeals, based on
documentary and testimonial evidence. As a rule, we are bound by findings of
12
facts of the Court of Appeals. Was the partition done during the lifetime of
Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid? We think so. It is basic in the law of succession
that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not
13
prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime of
compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any
other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original petition
for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory
heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the
institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present
for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were
prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition
for review. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 27, 1992 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 12587, entitled Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan vs. Spouses Florentino
Zaragoza and Erlinda Enriquez-Zaragoza is VACATED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint for delivery of inheritance share in the Regional Trial Court, for failure
to implead indispensable parties, is also DISMISSEDwithout prejudice to the
institution of the proper proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

We now come to the second issue. Private respondent, in submitting her petition
for the delivery of inheritance share, was in effect questioning the validity of the
deed of sale covering Lot 943 in favor of petitioner and consequently, the
Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the latter's name. Although the trial court,
as an obiter, made a finding of validity of the conveyance of Lot 943 in favor of
petitioners, since according to it, private respondent did not question the
genuineness of the signature of the deceased, nevertheless, when the case was
elevated to the Court of Appeals, the latter declared the sale to be fictitious
because of finding of marked differences in the signature of Flavio in the Deed
of Sale vis-à-vis signatures found in earlier documents. Could this be done? The
petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by Sec. 48 of the Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which
provides:

Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack. It can not be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

We have reiterated this rule in the case of Halili vs. Court of Industrial
14 15
Relations, citing the earlier cases of Constantino vs. Espiritu and Co vs. Court
16
of Appeals. In Halili, we held that a certificate of title accumulates in one
document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by
its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and
shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very
few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.
Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. In Constantino, the
Court decided that the certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title
and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with
very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by
law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. And in Co, we stated
that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of
title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose.
G.R. No. 118680 March 5, 2001
MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON,
all surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI,
MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA,
JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT CHIU YULO,
PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION
COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1994
which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozamiz
City in Civil Case No. OZ-1397.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez
initiated proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of
herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI
granted the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel
and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina
entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between
themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the
adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein
respondent Rosalina as defendants docketed as OZ 349.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the
adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision to the
Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered
into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the
estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the
representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his
brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of
land covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. These properties were
divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel,
represented solely by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were given 226 square
meters of parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters and 24,457 square meters of
1
parcels 7 and 9, respectively. The total land area allocated to the heirs of
Miguel was 34,250 square meters.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents
Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and
2
were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein.
Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504,
3
were transferred to respondents Chuan Lung Fai, but not included in the Deed
of Settlement and Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc.
and are now registered under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was
subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and Mercedes and was designated as
Lots 560-A, 560-B, 560-C, 560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square
4
meters was transferred to respondent Victorino Detall and was subsequently
transferred to Jerome Deiparine who registered it under his name under TCT
No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500 square meters was transferred to respondent
5
Petronilo Detalla and was later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo who
registered it under his name under TCT No. T-11305. Lot 560-C was transferred
and registered under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-
10206. Lot 560-D was sold to and subsequently registered in the name of
Lorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The remaining portion, Lot 560-E
consisting of 43,608 square meters was bought by respondent Immaculate
Concepcion College and was registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208.
6
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption
of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of
petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of
the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena
and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint
was filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25,
1987 to include the allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise were
7
made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed."
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the
8
decision of the trial court. Its ruling was premised on the following grounds:
1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from
questioning the validity of the partition, and since she is already
 estopped, it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-in-interest,
is likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;
2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null
and void is weakened by her inconsistent claim that the partition would
have been alright had she been given a more equitable share;
3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed
late considering that it was filed beyond the 4 year period provided for in
9 11
Article 1100 of the Civil Code;
4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of
10
Appeals in a Resolution dated December 20, 1994.
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the following errors were
allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals in -
I. ……FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION
ENTERED INTO BY DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAID
TRANSACTION
II. ……CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE
ALREADY PRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION
III. ...…CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS
BARRED OR ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEW OF THE
DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY
HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THEN PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS IN AC [C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208
IV. ……SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES' CLAIM THAT AS THEY
HAVE NOT AS YET RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN
ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY
FOR THEM TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS "S" AND "I"
V. ……CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT
CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER
OF THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT
OF REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS
VI. ……FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND 560 SOLD TO
THE OTHER DEFENDANTS–APPELLEES WERE CLEAN AND FREE FROM
ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID
VII. ……FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFF–APPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN
COURT TO TESTIFY OR REBUT THE ASSERTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS–
APPELLANTS THAT THERE WAS A VALID PARTITION
VIII. ……AWARDING PLAINTIFF–APPELLANT DAMAGES FOR THE INCOME
OF HER SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION
In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1) whether or not the
complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition"
had already prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed is valid; and (3) whether or
not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been
transferred to the respondent buyers.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition
has not yet prescribed since the prescriptive period which should be applied is
four years following the case of Beltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962). She also
avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a two-year prescriptive period
needs two requirements. One, the party assailing the partition must have been
given notice, and two, the party assailing the partition must have participated
12
therein. Petitioner insists these requirements are not present in her case, since
she did not participate in the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition."
She cites Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we held that a deed
of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had
no knowledge and consent to the same, is fraudulent. She asserts that she is an
adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel.
13
Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith
since they failed to exercise the necessary due diligence required before
14
purchasing the lots in question. In the alternative, petitioner wants to redeem
the said lots as a co-owner of respondent Rodriguezes under the provisions of
Article 1620 of the New Civil Code.
15
Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would be
allowed. She asks for the rescission of the said partitioning under Articles 165-
175 of the Civil Code.
16
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already
prescribed. In addition, they argue that petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalina
already have their shares in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the
compromise agreement they entered into with the respondent Rodriguezes in
AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria
Elena in the extrajudicial partition was understandable since her status as an
adopted child was then under litigation. In any case, they assert that the shares
17
of Miguel's heirs were adequately protected in the said partition.
18
Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons
who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition,
19
and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been
strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have
taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or
20
through guardians.
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition.
Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona
vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the
ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the
fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said
instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of
21
title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987,
or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement
dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the
respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of
extrajudicial settlement. It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided
in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
22
notice thereof.
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the
proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The
rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of
Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested
parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition,
not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. Following
Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate
in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of
extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of
extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
23
knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena
is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone
descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from
participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil
24
Code. The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not
aware of Maria Elena's adoption since they even filed an action to annul the
decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the
adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the
deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only
twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed
response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The
decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent
that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to
defraud Maria Elena.
In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:
This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a
person who has been deprived of his lawful participation in the estate of
the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within
two years after the extrajudicial or summary settlement of such estate
under Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he
will be precluded from doing so as the right will have prescribed.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in
question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.
The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case
was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled
to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total
nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial
court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed
25
after two years from its execution in 1941.
To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is
imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time
Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of
Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically
vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes'
interests did not include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the
circumstances in this case, we are constrained to hold that this is not the proper
forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the
petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is
the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of
26
the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.

Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts, agreements or any other
documentary evidence was presented to justify such claim for damages. Actual
damages, to be recoverable, must be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
27
determining the fact and amount of damages. The same is true for moral
28
damages. These cannot be awarded in the absence of any factual basis. The
unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is hearsay and has no
probative value. It is settled in jurisprudence that damages may not be awarded
29
on the basis of hearsay evidence. Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to
substantiate her claims for damages does not mean that she will be totally
deprived of any damages. Under the law, nominal damages are awarded, so
that a plaintiff's right, which has been invaded or violated by defendants may be
30
vindicated and recognized.

Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which,

unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, (2) petitioner was
unlawfully deprived of her legal participation in the partition of the estate of
Miguel, her adoptive father, (3) respondents had transferred portions of the
properties involved to third parties, and (4) this case has dragged on for more
than a decade, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioner's favor nominal
31
damages in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. The amount to be
awarded as such damages should at least commensurate to the injury sustained
32
by the petitioner considering the concept and purpose of said damages. Such
award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special
33
reasons extant in this case. Thus, the grant of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages is proper in view of the
technical injury she has suffered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is
declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby awarded to petitioner as
damages to be paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the
costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors,
represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON,
CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON
and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT
CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION &
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The petitioner involves the case of the illegitimate children who, having been
born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in
order to enforce their respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules of
succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August
1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie
A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the
latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by
Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992,
leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition
with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan
G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder,
sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the
status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina
de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit,
the motion to dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration on,
respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed
the denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and
ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It
ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be threshed out at the
trial considering that the birth certificates presented by respondents appeared to
have effectively contradicted petitioners' allegation of illegitimacy.1âwphi1.nêt
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and
several other motions, respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in
fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate
children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an
ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able the establish their status as
such heirs. It was contended, in fine that an action for partition was not an
appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an
issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately,
dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being
1
improper. It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a
special proceeding in asmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a
status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for
review on certiorari. Basically, petitioners maintain that their recognition as being
illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself
sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action
for judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs.
2
Bellosillo.
In the comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by
petitioners is inapplicable to the case because there has been no attempt to
impugn legitimate filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of
dismissal of the complaint, respondents count on the case of Sayson vs. Court
3
of Appeals, which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in
a complaint for partition and accounting but must be seasonably brought up in
direct action frontally addressing the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it
is time that this matter draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1)
the record of birth appearing the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be
proved by (1) the open and continuos possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
4
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court or record, or in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further
5
court action is required. In fact, any writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself voluntary recognition that does not require a
 6
separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G.
is predicted on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot
outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record or be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether
an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statue of petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent,
7
limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgement. cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to
impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
15
marriage of their parents. The certificates of live would also identify Danilo de paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one
Jesus as being their father. that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for
16
that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded 17
have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
8
children born in wedlock are legitimate. this presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is
of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which DENIED. No costs.
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of
the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband SO ORDERED.
and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not
possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
9
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in
10 11
Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took
effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would
no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption
12
becomes fixed and unassailable,

Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G.

Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being
children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be
aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the
13 14
father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only
when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.

Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor

in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had
claimed to be an acknowledgement spurious child by virtue of a private
document. Signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It
was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be somebody else's
illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it was not for them,
given the attendant circumstances particularly, to declare that they could not
have been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their
respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.
G.R. No. 161916 January 20, 2006
ARNELITO ADLAWAN, Petitioner,
vs.
EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and NARCISA M. ADLAWAN, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
1
Assailed in this petition for review is the September 23, 2003 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which set aside the September 13,
2
2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil
3
Case No. CEB-27806, and reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392,
dismissing petitioner Arnelito Adlawan’s unlawful detainer suit against
respondents Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan. Likewise questioned is the January
4
8, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals which denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties’ dispute over Lot 7226 and
the house built thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
5
8842, registered in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan and located at
Barrio Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu. In his complaint, petitioner
6
claimed that he is an acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who died on
May 28, 1987 without any other issue. Claiming to be the sole heir of
Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the
7 plaintiff’s cause of action, the above-entitled case is hereby Ordered
house built thereon. Out of respect and generosity to respondents who are the
siblings of his father, he granted their plea to occupy the subject property
provided they would vacate the same should his need for the property arise.
Sometime in January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to vacate the
house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of
8
title with the RTC. Finally, upon respondents’ refusal to heed the last demand
letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed the instant case on August
9
9, 2000.
On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age,
10
respectively, denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the
questioned property and stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and
the house standing thereon since birth. They alleged that Lot 7226 was originally
11
registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon Adlawan and the
ancestral house standing thereon was owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia
12
Mañacap Adlawan. The spouses had nine children including the late
Dominador and herein surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa. During the
lifetime of their parents and deceased siblings, all of them lived on the said
property. Dominador and his wife, Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died without
13
issue, also occupied the same. Petitioner, on the other hand, is a stranger who
never had possession of Lot 7226.
Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the
renovation of their house. Since they were not qualified to obtain a loan, they
transferred ownership of Lot 7226 in the name of their son Dominador who was
the only one in the family who had a college education. By virtue of a January
14
31, 1962 simulated deed of sale, a title was issued to Dominador which
enabled him to secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral. Notwithstanding the
execution of the simulated deed, Dominador, then single, never disputed his
parents’ ownership of the lot. He and his wife, Graciana, did not disturb
respondents’ possession of the property until they died on May 28, 1987 and
May 6, 1997, respectively.
Respondents also contended that Dominador’s signature at the back of
petitioner’s birth certificate was forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of
15
Dominador and has no right to claim ownership of Lot 7226. They argued that
even if petitioner is indeed Dominador’s acknowledged illegitimate son, his right
to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana.
16
On February 12, 2002, the MTC dismissed the complaint holding that the
establishment of petitioner’s filiation and the settlement of the estate of
Dominador are conditions precedent to the accrual of petitioner’s action for
ejectment. It added that since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana,
who died 10 years thereafter, her legal heirs are also entitled to their share in
Lot 7226. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
In View of the foregoing, for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence, the
DISMISSED.
17
SO ORDERED.
On appeal by petitioner, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC holding that
the title of Dominador over Lot 7226 cannot be collaterally attacked. It thus
ordered respondents to turn over possession of the controverted lot to petitioner
and to pay compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. The
decretal portion thereof, provides:
Wherefore, the Judgment, dated February 12, 2002, of the Municipal Trial Court
of Minglanilla, Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, is reversed. Defendants-appellees
are directed to restore to plaintiff-appellant possession of Lot 7226 and the
house thereon, and to pay plaintiff-appellant, beginning in August 2000,
compensation for their use and occupation of the property in the amount of
P500.00 a month.
 18
So ordered.
Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioner’s motion for execution pending
19
appeal which was opposed by the alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana in
20
their motion for leave to intervene and to file an answer in intervention. They
contended that as heirs of Graciana, they have a share in Lot 7226 and that
intervention is necessary to protect their right over the property. In addition, they
declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing respondents to
stay in Lot 7226 until a formal partition of the property is made.
21
The RTC denied the motion for leave to intervene. It, however, recalled the
order granting the execution pending appeal having lost jurisdiction over the
22
case in view of the petition filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the RTC
and reinstated the judgment of the MTC. It ratiocinated that petitioner and the
heirs of Graciana are co-owners of Lot 7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject
respondents from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name
and as the sole owner of the property. Thus –
WHEEFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated September 13,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-
27806 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Judgment dated February 12,
2002 of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No.
392 is REINSTATED. Costs against the respondent.
23
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner can validly
maintain the instant case for ejectment.
Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir
of Dominador. He in fact executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the
controverted property. In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the
questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale validly transferred title to Dominador
and that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited ownership
of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that the RTC lost sight of the
fact that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving
that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was
survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10
24
years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987. By intestate
25
succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226. The
death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of
Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by
consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The
Court of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no authority to institute
the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226.
Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he
can on his own file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code
which provides:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487
includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of
possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
26
reivindicacion). A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to
have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that
where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole
owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should
27
be dismissed.
The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained –
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the
other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for
the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such
that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the
28
action will not prosper. (Emphasis added)
29
In Baloloy v. Hular, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming
exclusive ownership of the property, but the evidence showed that respondent
has co-owners over the property. In dismissing the complaint for want of
respondent’s authority to file the case, the Court held that –
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an
action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-
owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-
owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit
of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others
but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the
unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who
claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will
not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable
parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership
over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner
thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over
the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners
were aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment
declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its
possession, to the prejudice of the latter’s siblings. Patently then, the decision of
the trial court is erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to
implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The
respondent failed to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the
Republic of the Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because
the respondent sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued
based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-
defendant, any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held
that the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the
proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.
The absence of the respondent’s siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings
subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of the court, ineffective
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
30
present.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful
detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of
Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the disputed
property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant
action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily
flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father, Dominador.
In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-
ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. A
favorable decision therein would of course inure to the benefit not only of the
plaintiff but to his co-owners as well. The instant case, however, presents an
entirely different backdrop as petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and sole
ownership of the questioned lot. In his complaint, petitioner made the following
allegations, to wit:
3. The plaintiff was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir of the late
DOMINADOR ADLAWAN who died intestate on 28 May 1987 without any other
descendant nor ascendant x x x.
xxxx
5. Being the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole heir of the deceased
Dominador Adlawan, the plaintiff became the absolute owner, and
automatically took POSSESSION, of the aforementioned house and lot x x x.
37
(Emphasis added)
Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioner’s action
operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in
representation or recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore
proper. As noted by Former Supreme Court Associate Justice Edgrado L. Paras
"[i]t is understood, of course, that the action [under Article 487 of the Civil Code]
is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is
38
bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper."

In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he has the legal Indeed, respondents’ not less than four decade actual physical possession of
personality to file the present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of the questioned ancestral house and lot deserves to be respected especially so
respondents would benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners.
that petitioner failed to show that he has the requisite personality and authority
However, petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession
as co-owner to file the instant case. Justice dictates that respondents who are
of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain
now in the twilight years of their life be granted possession of their ancestral
possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to
property where their parents and siblings lived during their lifetime, and where
the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully they, will probably spend the remaining days of their life.
capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners. Incidentally, it should be
pointed out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled
31
as "fictitious heirs," the State will inherit her share and will thus be petitioner’s WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 23, 2003 Decision of the
co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which reinstated the February 12,
2002 Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu,
dismissing petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 392, and its January 8, 2004
The present controversy should be differentiated from the cases where the Resolution, are AFFIRMED.
Court upheld the right of a co-owner to file a suit pursuant to Article 487 of the
32 33
Civil Code. In Resuena v. Court of Appeals, and Sering v. Plazo, the co-
owners who filed the ejectment case did not represent themselves as the SO ORDERED.
exclusive owner of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa
34
Santiago, the complaint for quieting of title was brought in behalf of the co-
35
owners precisely to recover lots owned in common. Similarly in Vencilao v.
36
Camarenta, the amended complaint specified that the plaintiff is one of the
heirs who co-owns the controverted properties.
G.R. No. 154942 August 16, 2005
ROLANDO SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
CONSTANCIA SANTOS ALANA, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
1 the Deed of Donation inofficious insofar as it impair the legitime of the plaintiff
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision dated March 7, 2002 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
40728.
A brief narration of the factual antecedents follows:
Rolando Santos, petitioner, and Constancia Santos Alana, respondent, are half-
blood siblings both asserting their claim over a 39-square meter lot located at
1339-B Andalucia St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. It was registered in the name of their
father, Gregorio Santos, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14278 of
the Registry of Deeds of Manila. He died intestate on March 10, 1986.
During his lifetime, or on January 16, 1978, Gregorio donated the lot to petitioner
which the latter accepted on June 30, 1981. The deed of donation ("Pagsasalin
ng Karapatan at Pag-aari") was annotated on Gregorio’s title.
On April 8, 1981, Gregorio sold the lot to petitioner as per a Deed of Absolute
Sale.
On June 26, 1981, by virtue of the annotated deed of donation, TCT No. 14278
in Gregorio’s name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 144706 was
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila in petitioner’s name.
On January 11, 1991, respondent Constancia Santos filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, a complaint for partition and reconveyance
against petitioner. She alleged that during his lifetime, her father Gregorio
denied having sold the lot to petitioner; that she learned of the donation in 1978;
and that the donation is inofficious as she was deprived of her legitime.
In his answer, petitioner countered that respondent’s suit is barred by
prescription considering that she is aware that he has been in possession of the
lot as owner for more than ten (10) years; and that the lot was sold to him by his
father, hence, respondent can no longer claim her legitime.
The trial court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was not signed by the
parties nor was it registered in the Registry of Deeds. Thus, it is not a valid
contract. What is valid is the deed of donation as it was duly executed by the
parties and registered.
The trial court then held that since Gregorio did not own any other property, the
donation to petitioner is inofficious because it impaired respondent’s legitime.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
which is ½ the of the subject property.
The Registry of Deeds of Manila is hereby ordered to cancel the entry in TCT
No. 14278 of the Deed of Donation dated January 16, 1978 and to cancel TCT
No. 144706 issued based on said entry.
The parties are enjoined to institute the proper action for the settlement of the
2
Estate of Gregorio Santos and for the eventual partition of the estate."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision, holding that:
"There are in the instant case two documents by which the subject property was
purportedly transferred to the defendant – a deed of donation and a deed of
sale.
xxx
There can, therefore, be no way by which the appellant may successfully
convince us that Gregorio Santos sold the property in dispute to him and
such sale can bind the appellee so as to remove the case from the realm of
the law on donations.
Moreover, as aptly put by the trial court:
‘In general one who has disposed his property would not and could not have
disposed the same again unless the previous act was rendered invalid or
ineffective.
The validity of the Deed of Donation was never assailed by the defendant. In
fact, it was impliedly recognized as valid by defendant by registering the same to
the Registry of Deeds.
It is the honest belief of this Court, given the circumstances, i.e., the existence of
the vendor and the vendee in the Deed of Absolute Sale and the registration of
the Deed of Donation despite the supposed previous execution of (the) Deed of
Absolute Sale, that there was no valid deed of sale executed and that the
true and real agreement between Gregorio Santos and Rolando Santos
was that of a donation.
Furthermore, considering that defendant himself registered the Deed of
Donation, he cannot now close his eyes and deny the existence of the same by
alleging that there had been a deed of sale executed previously." (Appealed
Decision, supra, at pp. 238-239)
xxx
While a person may dispose of his property by donation, there is a limitation to
the same. The law provides that no person may give or receive, by way of
donation, more than he may give or receive by will, and any donation which may
exceed the foregoing is considered inofficious. x x x The donation shall be
inofficious in all that it may exceed this limitation. (Article 752, Civil Code) The
said donation may correspondingly be reduced insofar as it exceeds the portion
that may be freely disposed of by will (ART. 761).
xxx
It has been undisputedly shown that the subject property was the only property
of the deceased Gregorio Santos at the time of his death on March 10, 1986
(Exhibit ‘K’, Original Record, p. 163); and that he made no reservation for the
legitime of the plaintiff-appellee, his daughter (See paragraph 2, Complaint and
paragraph 2, Answer, Ibid., at pp 1 and 12) and compulsory heir. Clearly, the
rule on officiousness applies. x x x
xxx
Defendant-appellant finally argues that since plaintiff-appellee knew of the
donation since 1978, while the donor Gregorio Santos was still alive, her
assailing the said donation only on January 11, 1991 or thirteen years after, has
effectively barred her from instituting the present action. The foregoing is
apparently groundless and without merit.
The inofficiousness of a donation cannot be determined until after the death of
the donor because prior to his death, the value of his estate cannot be
determined or computed. Determination of the value of the deceased’s estate
will require the collation of all properties or rights, donated or conveyed by
gratuitous title to the compulsory heirs in order that they may be included in the
computation for the determination of the legitime of each heir and for the
3 prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations,
account of partition (Art. 1061, Civil Code)."
Hence, the instant petition.
The findings of the courts below that (1) Gregorio donated to petitioner the
subject lot; (2) the Deed of Absolute Sale is void; and (3) Gregorio’s only
property is the said lot – are all
factual in nature which are not within the domain of this Court for it is not a trier
4
of facts. Basic is it that findings of fact by the trial court, especially when
5
affirmed on appeal, as in this case, are conclusive and binding upon this Court.
The issues which involve questions of law are: (1) whether the donation is
inofficious; and (2) whether the respondent’s action has prescribed.
I. Whether the donation is inofficious.
It bears reiterating that under Article 752 of the Civil Code, the donation is
inofficoius if it exceeds this limitation – no person may give or receive, by way
of donation, more than he may give or receive by will. In Imperial vs. Court
6
of Appeals, we held that inofficiousness may arise only upon the death of the
donor as the value of donation may then be contrasted with the net value of the
estate of the donor deceased.
At this point, we emphasize that as found by the trial court, Gregorio did not sell
the lot to petitioner. He donated it. The trial court also found that the donation is
inofficious as it impairs
respondent’s legitime; that at the time of Gregorio’s death, he left no property
other than the lot now in controversy he donated to petitioner; and that the
deceased made no reservation for the legitime of respondent, his daughter and
compulsory heir. These findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Pursuant to Article 752 earlier cited, Gregorio could not donate more than he
may give by will. Clearly, by donating the entire lot to petitioner, we agree with
both lower courts that Gregorio’s donation is inofficious as it deprives
respondent of her legitime, which, under Article 888 of the Civil Code, consists
of one-half (1/2) of the hereditary estate of the father and the mother. Since the
parents of both parties are already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each
being entitled to one-half (1/2) thereof.
II. Whether respondent’s suit is barred by prescription.
7
In Imperial vs. Court of Appeals, we held that "donations, the reduction of which
hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime (as in this case), are not
controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason, we must resort to
the ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions
upon an obligation created by law must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year
8
required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the
legitime of compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? In Mateo vs.
9
Lagua, involving the reduction, for inofficiousness, of a donation propter
nuptias, we held that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the
death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate
may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.

Here, Gregorio died in 1986. Consequently, respondent had until 1996 within
which to file the action. Records show that she filed her suit in 1992, well within
the prescriptive period.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision and Resolution

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40728 are hereby AFFIRMED, with
modification in the sense that the subject deed of donation being inofficious, one
half (1/2) of the lot covered by TCT No. 14278 of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila is awarded to Constancia Santos Alana, respondent, the same being her
legitime. The remaining one-half (1/2) shall be retained by petitioner, Rolando
Santos, as his legitime and by virtue of the donation.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149751. March 11, 2005 Plaintiff further prays for other relief as may be deemed just and proper in the
4
premises.
PURIFICACION BALILO-MONTERO and JOVENCIO* BALILO, Petitioners,
vs. Jovencio amended the complaint and impleaded Placido Robles as party-
EUGENIA SEPTIMO, CONSUELO ROBLES and PLACIDO defendant, on his claim that the latter purchased a five-hectare portion of the
ROBLES, Respondents. property before the complaint was filed. On November 8, 1966, the CFI
rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. The CFI ruled that Jovencio had
DECISION no right to repurchase the property, the five-year period under Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 having long expired. Jovencio failed to appeal the
5
CALLEJO, SR., J.: decision.

Jose Balilo was the owner of a parcel of land, with an area of 7.7837 hectares, On March 3, 1987, Purificacion Balilo-Montero filed a complaint with the
located in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, covered by Homestead Patent No. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, against
the respondents, Eugenia Septimo, the surviving spouse of Jose Septimo, and
46784 issued on February 21, 1938. Based on the said patent, Original
the spouses Placido Robles and Consuelo Robles, for recovery of possession of
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3014 was issued to and under his name by the
1 the said property. However, despite the allegation in his complaint in Civil Case
Register of Deeds.
No. R-159 that he was the only legitimate child of Jose Balilo, she impleaded
2 Jovencio Balilo as party-plaintiff.
On August 12, 1943, Jose Balilo died intestate. Sometime in 1948, Niniana
Balilo, the sister of Jose Balilo, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance (CFI)
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the parties were the children and only legal
of Pampanga, for the guardianship of the property and the person of Jovencio
heirs of the late Jose Balilo who, before his death, was the owner of Lot No.
Balilo whom she alleged to be the son of her brother, Jose Balilo; hence, her
1649 covered by OCT No. 3014 located in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; only a
nephew. The case was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 262. Niniana filed a
motion in the said case, for authority to execute, for and in behalf of her ward, a year before the complaint was filed, Purificacion learned that she was one of the
deed of absolute sale over the property covered by OCT No. 3014 in favor of co-owners of the property; that the respondents claimed ownership over the
property and installed tenants thereon; and despite their demands, the
Jose Septimo for ₱750.00. The CFI granted the motion. Niniana executed the
respondents and their tenants refused to do so.
deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of Jose Septimo who, thereafter,
declared the property in his name for taxation purposes and paid the realty taxes
thereon. Jovencio and Purificacion prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be
rendered in their favor:
However, Jose Septimo failed to register the deed in the Office of the Register of
Deeds and, consequently, to secure a torrens title over the property in his name. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be
The guardianship case was terminated on September 24, 1951 per the Order of rendered for the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
3
the CFI of even date.
1. Restoring possession of the landholdings in question unto the plaintiffs;
Thereafter, on October 12, 1963, Jovencio Balilo filed a complaint against Jose
Septimo in the CFI of Occidental Mindoro, to compel the latter to resell the 2. Ordering defendants to reimburse plaintiffs the rentals on the landholdings to
property to him. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-159. Jovencio be determined by this Honorable Court;
alleged therein that he was the only legitimate child of the spouses Jose Balilo
and Juana Villarama, and that the latter died on August 30, 1946. He prayed 3. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of ₱20,000.00 as
that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor, thus: attorney’s fees and litigation expenses;

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that an order be issued requiring 4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit; and
the Defendant to resell the said Lot No. 1649, Pls-33, situated in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, to the herein Plaintiff upon tender to the herein Defendant
5. Extending unto the plaintiffs such other reliefs to which they may be entitled in
the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY (₱750.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, 6
law and equity.
or any such sum as this Honorable Court finds just and fair, and requiring said
Defendant to deliver possession of said homestead land to the herein Plaintiff.
The summons and complaint were served on respondents Eugenia Septimo and
Consuelo Robles. As per the return of the sheriff, Placido Robles was already
dead.
In her answer to the complaint, respondent Eugenia Septimo alleged that her
late husband Jose Septimo had purchased the property from Jovencio Balilo,
through his guardian, and that the sale was approved by the CFI of Pampanga
in Special Proceeding No. 262. She specifically denied, for lack of information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof, the allegation of Purificacion
Montero that she was one of Jose Balilo’s children and one of his heirs.
Consuelo Robles was declared in default for her failure to file her answer to the
7 the decision, alleging that, applying the provisions of the Old Civil Code on
complaint.
On October 15, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Jovencio and
Purificacion. The fallo of the decision reads:
Premises thoroughly and fairly considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant Eugenia Septimo as successor-in-interest of decedent
Jose Septimo to recovery (sic) to plaintiff Purificacion Balilo-Montero one-half of
the parcel of agricultural land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3014;
2. Denying claim for damages; and
3. Dismissing counterclaim.
8
SO ORDERED.
Only respondent Eugenia Septimo appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA), where she alleged the following:
I. That the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff Purificacion Balilo-Montero
did not lost (sic) her right to recover the property from the defendants, because
she was not a party to the sale and for not having actual knowledge on the
guardianship proceedings.
II. That the trial court erred in ruling that the sale of the land by the legal
guardian of Jovencio Balilo duly authorized and approved by the Court which
(sic) the guardianship proceedings was being held did not affect the share of
plaintiff Purificacion Balilo-Montero because the sale was not registered.
III. The trial court erred in ordering defendant Eugenia Septimo to reconvey 1/2
of the property in question covered by TCT No. T-3014 to plaintiff Purificacion
9
Balilo-Montero.
In a Decision dated April 11, 2001, the CA affirmed with modification the
decision of the trial court. The CA applied the Old Civil Code on testate
succession, and ruled that the property was registered in the name of Jose
Balilo whose civil status was stated as single. Considering that he was survived
by Purificacion Montero, his wife Juana Villarama and their son Jovencio Balilo
when he died in 1943; and when Juana Villarama died intestate, was, in turn,
survived by her son Jovencio Balilo and Purificacion Montero, Jovencio was
entitled to two-thirds undivided portion of the property, while Purificacion
Montero was entitled to one-third undivided portion of the property. Respondent
Eugenia Septimo did not file any motion for the reconsideration of the decision.
However, Purificacion Montero filed a motion for the partial reconsideration of
intestate succession, she was entitled to an undivided one-half portion of the
property. The CA, however, denied the said motion.
Purificacion Montero, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review,
contending that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED ONLY TO ONE-THIRD (1/3) SHARE OF THE
PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE RECOVERED HEREIN, SAID ADJUDICATION
FINDING NO LEGAL SUPPORT UNDER THE CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN WHICH
10
WAS THE LAW THEN PREVAILING.
The petitioner maintains that the CA should have applied the provisions of the
Old Civil Code on intestate succession because Jose Balilo died intestate in
1943 before the New Civil Code took effect. She posits that she and Jovencio
Balilo were entitled to inherit the property from Jose Balilo in equal shares,
because there is no competent evidence on record to prove that Jose Balilo and
Juana Villarama, the mother of Jovencio, were married.
The petition is granted.
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that there is no evidence on
record that Jose Balilo and Juana Villarama were married, or that they cohabited
with each other as husband and wife. Even Jovencio Balilo opted not to testify.
Neither was Jose Balilo survived by any ascendants. However, we agree with
the ruling of the CA that Jose Balilo and Gertrudes Nicdao were not, likewise,
married.
The contention of the petitioner that the CA erred in applying the law on testate
succession under the Old Civil Code is, likewise, correct. The appellate court
should have applied the provisions of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession
considering that Jose Balilo died intestate in 1943, before the effectivity of the
New Civil Code.
Article 931 of the Old Civil Code provides that when a person dies intestate, his
legitimate children and their descendants succeed him, without distinction of
sex, or age, even though they spring from different marriages. Article 932 of the
same Code provides that the children of the deceased shall always inherit from
him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. Moreover, under
Article 939 of the Old Civil Code, in the absence of legitimate descendants or
ascendants, the natural children legally acknowledged and those legitimated by
royal succession shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

When Jose Balilo died intestate on August 12, 1943, he was survived by his
daughter, the petitioner herein, his son Jovencio Balilo, and Gertrudes Nicdao
and Juana Villarama. Conformably to Article 939 of the Old Civil Code, only the
petitioner and Jovencio Balilo inherited the property in equal shares, to the
exclusion of Juana Villarama and Gertrudes Nicdao. Neither of them was the
lawful wife of Jose Balilo. Besides, under Article 946 of the Old Civil Code, the
surviving spouse shall inherit only in default of the persons enumerated "in the
three sections next preceding."

Consequently, when Jovencio Balilo, through his guardian Niniana Balilo,

executed the deed of absolute sale over the entire property on May 26, 1948 in
favor of Jose Septimo, the latter did not acquire title over the entire property, but
only to an undivided one-half portion thereof which Jovencio Balilo had inherited
from Jose Balilo. Jose Septimo could not have purchased and acquired the
other half of the property from Jovencio Balilo because the latter was not the
owner thereof. Hence, the CA erred in holding that Jovencio Balilo inherited an
undivided two-thirds portion of the property, and that Jose Septimo acquired title
over the said two-thirds undivided portion.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140975, Promulgated December 8, 2000
OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, Petitioner.
vs.
PASTORA PIEDAD, Respondent.
VITUG, J.:
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to
intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter of the
Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement
to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the
finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent
Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural
infirmities, including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of
personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements
of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court
denied the motion, prompting petitioners to raise her case to the Court of
Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the
issues brought up on appeal only involving nothing else but questions of law to
be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.
In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals belabored the distinctions
between questions of law and questions of fact, thus:
"There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. There is
question of fact when the query necessarily invites calibration of
the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other and to the whole
1
and the probabilities of the situation."
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court, ratiocinated that
whether or not the RTC erred in denying the intervention considering (1) that the
intervenor-appellant had a prima facie interest over the case (2) that the
jurisdiction over the person of the proper parties was not acquired in view of the
deficient publication or notice of hearing, and (3) that the proceedings had yet to
be closed and terminated, were issues which did not qualify as "questions of
fact" as to place the appeal within the jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus;
"The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their resolution are
based on facts not in dispute. Admitted are the facts that intervenor-appellant is
a collateral relative within the fifth degree of Augusto H. Piedad; the she is the
daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad; that as such, intervenor-
appellant seek to inherit was published for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation; that there was no order of closure of
proceedings that has been issued by the intestate court; and that the intestate
court has already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estate of
Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee.
"These facts are undisputed.
"In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the truth or
falsehood on alleged facts. The question as to whether intevenor-appellants as
a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate
proceeding which would justify her intervention; the question as to whether the
publication of notice of hearing made in this case is defective which would
amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and the question as
to whether the proceedings has already been terminated when the intestate
court issued the order of transfer of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to
petitioner-appellee, in spite the absence of an order of closure of the intestate
court, all call for the application and interpretation of the proper law is applicable
on a certain undisputed state of facts.
"The resolution of the issues raised does not require the review of the evidence,
nor the credibility of witnesses presented, nor the existence and relevance of
specific surrounding circumstances. Resolution on the issues may be had even
2
without going to examination of facts on record."
Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the
instant petition for review on certiorari.
The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate court. But let us
set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude and take on the basic substantive
issue. Specifically, can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree,
inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree?
Elsewise stated does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find
application among collateral relatives?
Augusto H. Piedad without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent
is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent,
while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree
relative of the decedent.
The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost
complete set of law to govern, either by will or by operation of law, the
transmission of property, rights and obligations of a person upon his death. Each
article is construed in congruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system set
out by the Code.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to
the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent
that the right of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code
provides:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the
more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes
place.
"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the
provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and
of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and
maternal lines."
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by
operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of
a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps
into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but
from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded.
"ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which
the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which latter would have if he were living or
if he could have inherited."
"ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by
the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded."
"ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which
the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which latter would have if he were living or
if he could have inherited."
"ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by
the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded."
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never
in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only
take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when
such children survive with their uncles or aunts.
"ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line,
but never in the ascending.
"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.
"ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the
estate shall be made per stripes, in such manner that the representative or
representatives shall not inherit more than what the person they represent would
inherit, if he were living or could inherit."
"ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with
their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions."
The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives within
the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong)
who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children
and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the
illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly,
the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth decedent. Among collateral
relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article
962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of
relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil
Code gives direction.
"Article 966. xxx
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent
is made ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the
computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his
brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first
cousin and so forth."
Accordingly----
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H.
Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an
intestato to the estate of the decedent.
The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code
"Article 1009, Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of relationship by the whole blood."
"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth
degree of relationship in the collateral line." Invoked by petitioner do not at all
support her cause. The law means only that among the other collateral relatives
(the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be
observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt
can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood but an uncle or an aunt,
being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the
fourth degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession
to a fifth-degree relative.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143256 August 28, 2001
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO FERNANDEZ,
HUSBAND and WIFE, EDDIE C. FERNANDEZ and LUZ FERNANDEZ,
SPOUSES, petitioners,
vs.
ROMEO FERNANDEZ, POTENCIANO FERNANDEZ, FRANCISCO
FERNANDEZ, JULITA FERNANDEZ, WILLIAM FERNANDEZ, MARY
FERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO FERNANDEZ, GERARDO FERNANDEZ,
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and GREGORIO FERNANDEZ, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
1
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated December 22, 1999 affirming the
2
decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 40, Dagupan City in an action for
nullity of contracts, partition, recovery of possession and damages in favor of
plaintiffs-appellees, herein respondents.
3 To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez
The facts as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia
were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City
covered by TCT No. T-9267 (525) consisting of 194 sq. meters, and the
two-storey building constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration 22-
592-1. It is undisputed that Generosa gave birth to a baby boy named
Rogelio who died when he was only twelve (12) years old as paralytic.
In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez (TSN, Aug. 31, 1994, pp. 9-14) it
was revealed that the late Spouses being childless by the death of their
son, purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month baby
boy. The boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo
Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken care of by the
couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician. He lived
with the couple until they became old and disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife
Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez and an estate
consisting of the following:
(a) "A parcel of land (Lot 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the
Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O.
Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio of Pantal, City
of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 447; on the SE. by
Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano Street; and on the
NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred
Ninety Four (194) square meters, more or less. Covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan
Registry of Deeds."
(b) "A two (2) storey residential building made of concrete and
wood, G. I. roofing with a floor area of 154 square meters and
126 square meters of the first and second floor, respectively.
Declared under Tax Decl. No. 22- 592-1 and assessed therein
at P26,000.00."
On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez
(a) 119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of the land;
(b) Whole residential house above-mentioned;
74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern portion of the land.
On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez, appellant's son over the following:
"A portion of One Hundred Nineteen and One-Half (119.5)
Square meters including the building and/or all existing thereon
to be taken from the southwestern portion of the parcel of land
described as follows, to wit:
'A parcel of land (Lot No. 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the
Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O.
Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio of Pantal, City
of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 447; on the SE by
Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano Street; and on the
NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred and
Ninety-Four (194), Square Meters, more or less, covered by
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 525 (T-9267) —
Pangasinan Registry of Deeds" (Exh. "8", Exhibits for the
Defendants)
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita,
William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed
Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K.
Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on
September 21, 1994, an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of
 Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio (docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
00016-D).
The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants), motivated by
unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of depriving the plaintiff
and other heirs (herein appellees) of the deceased spouses, without
basis of heirship or any iota of rights to succession or inheritance, taking
advantage of the total physical and mental incapacity of the deceased
Generosa de Venecia aggravated by unlawful scheme confederated,
colluded and conspired with each other in causing the fake, simulated
grossly inauthentic contracts purporting to be executed on August 31,
1989 and jointly on the same date, caused the execution of the deed of
absolute sale purportedly signed by Generosa de Venecia covering the
same property described in the deed of extra-judicial partition and by
virtue of the said acts, appellants were able to secure new land titles in
their favor (Records, pp. 3-4, Complaint). Appellees thus prayed that the
Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 54641 be declared void from the beginning.
Significantly, in their answer, defendants alleged:
"16. That the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa
were husband and wife blessed with one child the herein
defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez whom they acknowledged
during their lifetime. (italics supplied)
18. That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the late Generosa de Venecia and
defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez which are now in question
were all made with the full knowledge, consent and approval of
the parties thereto and for value." (Records, pp. 20-21,
Answer)."
On May 10, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the
4
plaintiffs, the dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
against the defendants;
1. Declaring the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989
(Exh. "3 ), the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. 8"),
the TCT No. 54641, and the TCT No. 54693 null and void;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey to, and to peacefully surrender
to the plaintiffs the possession of the house and lot in question;
3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay to plaintiffs the
following:
(a) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(d) P2,000.00 as litigation costs.
SO ORDERED."
In so ruling, the trial court found that defendant Rodolfo Fernandez was not a
legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the
spouses. Rodolfo's claim as a son of the deceased spouses Fernandez was
negated by the fact that (1) he only reached high school and was told to stop
studying so that he could help in the clinic of Dr. Fernandez, (2) he failed to
present any birth certificate, (3) the book entitled Fercolla clan which was
compiled and edited by respected people such as Ambassador Armando
Fernandez, Justice Jorge Coquia and Teresita Coquia-Sison, showed the
geneology of the family of Dr. Jose and Generosa Fernandez without a child; a
pedigree may be admitted in evidence to prove the facts of genealogy and that
entries in a family bible or other family books or charts, engravings or rings,
5
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree, (4) the
certification issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that there
was no available information about the birth of petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses
Fernandez, (5) the application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay certificate
naming petitioner Rodolfo as his son was doubtful considering that there were
blemishes or alteration in the original copy; (6) that Rodolfo's baptismal
certificate was spurious and falsified since there were no available records of
baptism with the parish from June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936, while Rodolfo's
baptismal certificate which was issued in 1989 showed that he was baptized on
November 24, 1934. The court found that the extra-judicial partition and the
deed of absolute sale were prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual
and irregular circumstances which rendered the documents null and void.
Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et. al appealed to the respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the trial court's judgment in its assailed decision dated
December 22, 1999.
In resolving the appeal, the respondent court delved into the legitimacy of
defendant-appellant Rodolfo Fernandez' filiation with the deceased spouses. It
found that appellants' evidence which consisted of a certificate of baptism
stating that he was a child of the spouses Fernandez and the application for
recognition of rights to back pay under RA 897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez,
wherein the latter referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not acquire evidentiary '8'), TCT NO. 54641, AND TCT NO. 54693 NULL AND VOID FOR THE
weight to prove his filiation. The appellate court concluded that while baptismal FOLLOWING REASONS:
certificates may be considered public documents, they were evidence only to
prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but (a) IT HAS NO FACTUAL BASIS DULY ESTABLISHED BY
not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND
his kinsfolk; that while the application for back pay was a public document, it
was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V.
(b) RESPONDENTS, NOT BEING PARTIES TO THE
Fernandez, the herein appellant; that the public document contemplated in QUESTIONED DEEDS, HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO
Article 172 of the Family Code referred to the written admission of filiation CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF SAID DOCUMENTS.
embodied in a public document purposely executed as an admission of filiation
and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public document was executed as
an application for the recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No. III
897.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed their motion for reconsideration which COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ
was denied in a resolution dated May 17, 2000.
6 WAS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND
GENEROSA DE VENECIA BECAUSE
Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed the instant petition for review with the following
issues: (a) THE FILIATION OF PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ
COULD NOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED IN AN ACTION
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF DOCUMENTS,
I
PARTITION, RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND DAMAGES,
AND;
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE DEFENDANTS,
(b) THE DECISION AS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF
PETITIONERS HEREIN, TO RECONVEY TO, AND PEACEFULLY
APPEALS DID NOT DECLARE IN THE DISPOSITIVE
SURRENDER TO THE PLAINTIFFS, RESPONDENTS HEREIN, THE
PORTION THEREOF THAT PETITIONER RODOLFO
POSSESSION OF THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION BECAUSE
FERNANDEZ IS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE
THE SAID ORDER IS PALPABLY CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA FERNANDEZ.
FACTS THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:
IV
(a) THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION ARE ADMITTED BY
THE PARTIES TO BE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF THE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF
SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA DE DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE RESPONDENTS,
VENECIA, AND THERE BEING NO FACTUAL BASIS IN THE AFFIRMED DECISION
TO JUSTIFY SUCH AWARD.
(b) RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO
GENEROSA DE VENECIA BY CONSANGUINITY, ARE NOT The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights of the parties to
HER INTESTATE HEIRS AND CANNOT SUCCEED AB the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Fernandez.
INTESTATO TO HER INTESTATE ESTATE.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the extra-judicial partition
II executed by petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa Fernandez, widow of
Dr. Jose Fernandez, null and void because the former allegedly failed to prove
legitimate filiation to his putative father, the late Dr. Jose Fernandez. Petitioners,
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT
contend, however, that the burden of proof lies with the respondents because
OF THE TRIAL COURT DECLARING (1) THE DEED OF EXTRA-
they were the ones contesting the filiation of Rodolfo Fernandez. They insist that
JUDICIAL PARTITION DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. '3'), THE
both lower courts had no power to pass upon the matter of filiation because it
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE ALSO DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH.
could not be collaterally attacked in the present action but in a separate and
independent action directly impugning such filiation.
We are not persuaded.
It must be noted that the respondents' principal action was for the declaration of
absolute nullity of two documents, namely: deed of extra-judicial partition and
deed of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn one's legitimacy. The
respondent court ruled on the filiation of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez in order to
determine Rodolfo's right to the deed of extra-judicial partition as the alleged
legitimate heir of the spouses Fernandez. While we are aware that one's
legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, this doctrine has no application in the instant case considering that
respondents' claim was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased
spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez; we do not have a situation wherein
they (respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a child of their uncle's wife. The case
7
of Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals, which has a similar factual backdrop is
instructive:
8 on the parties and not reviewable by this Court and they carry even more
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged
not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs)
denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the
husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it
was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of
children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170
and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate
court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at
bench. For the case at bench is not where the heirs of the late Vicente
are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their
clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA
451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners' recourse to Art. 263 of the New Civil Code (now
Art. 170 of the Family Code) is not well taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their
childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but
that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by
legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of
the deceased.""
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner Rodolfo
Fernandez to the deceased spouses Fernandez for the purpose of determining
what legal right Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extra-judicial partition.
In fact, the issue of whether or not Rodolfo Fernandez was the son of the
deceased spouses Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was squarely
9
raised by petitioners in their pre-trial brief filed before the trial court, hence they
are now estopped from assailing the trial court's ruling on Rodolfo's status.
We agree with the respondent court when it found that petitioner Rodolfo failed
to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez. Such is a factual
issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court
and the appellate court. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive
10
weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial
11
court. We accordingly find no cogent reason to disagree with the respondent
12
court's evaluation of the evidence presented, thus:
"The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of any records
of the birth of appellant Rodolfo Fernandez. On October 11, 1995, it
issued a certification worded as follows:
"This is to certify that the Register of Births for the Municipality
of Dagupan, Pangasinan in the year 1984 is not on file with the
National Archives, hence, there is no available information
about the birth of Rodolfo V. Fernandez alleged to have been
born on November 24, 1934 to the spouses Jose K. Fernandez
and Generosa de Venecia in Dagupan, Pangasinan" (Records,
p. 146)
Appellant nonetheless, contends that the Application for Recognition of
Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public document and a
conclusive proof of the legitimate filiation between him and the
deceased spouses (Rollo, p. 41, Appellants' Brief). We do not agree.
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay
Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public document nevertheless, it was not
executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V.
Fernandez, the herein appellant. The public document contemplated in
Article 172 of the Family Code refer to the written admission of filiation
embodied in a public document purposely executed as an admission of
filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public document
was executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay
under Republic Act No. 897. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence provides:
"SECTION 32. Public documents as evidence — Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter."
The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents of a public
document are conclusive evidence against the contracting parties as to
the truthfulness of the statements made therein. They constitute only
prima facie evidence of the facts which give rise to their execution and
of the date of the latter. Thus, a baptismal certificate issued by a
Spanish priest under the Spanish regime constitutes prima facie
evidence of the facts certified to by the parish priest from his own
knowledge such as the administration of the sacrament on the day and
in the place and manner set forth in the certificate; but it does not
constitute proof of the statements made therein concerning the
parentage of the person baptized (Francisco, Evidence, 1994 ed., p.
516, citing Garcia vs. Gajul, 53 Phil. 642; Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil.
350; Buan vs. Arquiza, 5 Phil. 193; Siguion vs. Siguion, 8 Phil. 7). Public
documents are perfect evidence of the fact which give rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter if the act which the officer
witnessed and certified to or the date written by him are not shown to be
false; but they are not conclusive evidence with respect to the
truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties
(Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines with Note and Comments, vol.
4, p. 577).
Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act
No. 897 is only a proof that Jose K. Fernandez filed said application on
June 5, 1954 in Dagupan City but it does not prove the veracity of the
declaration and statement contained in the said application that concern
the relationship of the applicant with herein appellant. In like manner, it
is not a conclusive proof of the filiation of appellant with his alleged
father, Jose K. Fernandez the contents being, only prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein.
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status
of being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and continuously until
they died (Rollo, p. 42; Appellants' Brief). Open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by
the child of the position and privileges usually attached to the status of a
legitimate child such as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the
parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the
child's support and education, and giving the child the reputation of
being a child of his parents (Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the
Philippines, pp. 245-246). However, it must be noted that, as was held
in Quismundo vs. WCC, 132 SCRA 590, possession of status of a child
does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a
child to compel recognition by his assumed parent.
Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child appellant
presented a baptismal certificate issued by Fr. Rene Mendoza of the St.
John Metropolitan Cathedral of Dagupan City on August 10, 1989
stating therein that appellant is a child of the late spouses having been
born on November 15, 1934 and baptized on November 24, 1934 (Exh.
"1" Exhibits for the Defendants). As stated, while baptismal certificates
may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove
the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but
not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with
respect to his kinsfolk (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439). It
may be argued that a baptismal certificate is one of the other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of proving filiation but in
this case, the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtful when
Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the Evangelist Parish of
Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certification on October 16,
1995 attesting that the records of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8,
1936 were all damaged (Records, p. 148, Exh. "G"). Neither the family
portrait offered in evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation
Pictures do not constitute proof of filiation (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals)
(supra). In fine, the evidence presented by appellant did not acquire
evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. Consequently the Extra-Judicial
Partition dated August 31, 1989 executed by appellant Rodolfo
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia is null and void."
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of
the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez, thus the
subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez
between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as
13
Rodolfo is concerned pursuant to Art. 1105 of the New Civil Code which states:
"A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is
not, shall be void only with respect to such person."
Petitioners next contend that respondents admitted that the property in question
was the conjugal property of the late spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia, thus when Dr. Jose Fernandez died intestate in 1982, his
estate consisted solely of ½ pro indiviso of the conjugal property and the other
half belonged to his wife Generosa de Venecia; that granting Dr. Jose
Fernandez was only survived by his wife, the respondents nephews and nieces
of Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the ½ share of the decedent's estate while the
¾ share of the conjugal property will still belong to Generosa as the widow of Dr.
Jose Fernandez, hence the trial court's order reconveying the possession of the
subject lot and building to respondents was contrary to the admitted facts and
law since respondents are not related by consanguinity to Generosa vda de
Fernandez.
We agree.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides:
"Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half."
Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as provided in the above-
quoted Article 1001, she is entitled to the ½ of the inheritance and the
respondents to the other ½. In effect, ¾ pro indiviso is the share of Generosa as
the surviving spouse, i.e., ½ as her share of the conjugal property estate and ½
of the remaining ½ as share as heir from her husband's estate. Thus, we find
well taken the petitioners' assertion that the annulment of the extra-judicial
partition between Generosa and petitioner Rodolfo does not necessarily result in
respondents' having exclusive right to the conjugal property, as erroneously
found by the respondent court. Generosa, during her lifetime, had the right to
enjoy and dispose of her property without other limitations than those
14
established by law, which right she exercised by executing a deed of sale in
favor of petitioner Eddie Fernandez.
Petitioners assails respondents' right, not being heirs of Generosa, to question
the validity of the deed of sale since the action for the annulment of contracts
15
may only be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily.
We disagree.
As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party obliged
principally or subsidiarily under a contract. However, when a contract prejudices
the rights of a third person, he may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if
he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and
can show detriment which would positively result to him from the contract in
16
which he had no intervention. As we have discussed above, respondents are
entitled to the ¼ of the entire conjugal property, i.e., lot and building; however
considering that widow Generosa, during her lifetime, sold the entire building to
petitioner Eddie Fernandez, respondents had been deprived of their ¼ share
therein, thus the deed of sale was prejudicial to the interest of respondents as
regards their ¼ share in the building. Respondents therefore, have a cause of
action to seek the annulment of said deed of sale.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court erred in declaring null and
void the deed of sale executed between Generosa and petitioner Eddie
Fernandez concluding that the same was simulated or false and in affirming the
trial court's findings that the deed was prepared and executed under abnormal,
unusual and irregular circumstances without however, particularly stating the
circumstances.
We agree.
Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and simulated because
there was no consideration for the sale. However, this assertion was
controverted by vendee petitioner Eddie Fernandez' declaration, that the money
he paid for the sale came from his savings as overseas contract worker in Saudi
Arabia from 1982-1989 which respondents failed to controvert by presenting
evidence to the contrary. The presumption that a contract has sufficient
consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no
17
consideration. Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed
unless the contrary is proven.
Respondents also claim that the signature appearing in the deed of sale was not
that of Generosa because she was already bedridden with both legs amputated
before she died. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear,
18
positive and convincing evidence and whoever alleges it has the burden of
19
proving the same; a burden respondents failed to discharge. The respondents
had not presented any convincing proof to override the evidentiary value of the
duly notarized deed of sale. A notarial document is evidence of the facts in the
clear unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption
of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear,
20
convincing and more than merely preponderant.
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building to petitioner
Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did not only sell her ¾ undivided share in the building
but also the ¼ share of the respondents. We rule, that such a sale of the entire
building without the consent of the respondents is not null and void as only the
rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer, petitioner
Eddie, a co-owner of the ¾ share of the building together with the respondents
who owned the ¼ share therein.
21
Finally, anent the issue of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees
awarded by the trial court, we find them to be bereft of factual basis. A party is
entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered
22
by him as he has duly proven. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not
only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree
23
of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork
24
in determining the fact and amount of damages. The testimony of respondent
Romeo Fernandez that he suffered around P100,000 actual damages was not
supported by any documentary or other admissible evidence. We also agree
with the petitioners that the respondent court should not have awarded moral
damages in the amount of P100,000 since they also failed to show proof of
moral suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and social humiliation. Attorney's fees should likewise be
deleted for lack of factual basis and legal justification. Both the lower courts did
not cite specific factual basis to justify the award of attorney's fees, which is in
violation of the proscription against the imposition of a penalty on the right to
25
litigate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is hereby Affirmed

with Modification, as follows:

1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to the ¼

share of the conjugal lot and building of the deceased spouses Jose and
Generosa Fernandez who died childless and intestate;

2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of petitioner

Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is concerned and the title issued pursuant thereto in
the name of Rodolfo Fernandez;

3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the ¾ share of Generosa
sold to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is cancelled and a new title
should be issued in the names of petitioner Eddie Fernandez and respondents
as co-owners of the ¾ and ¼ shares respectively in the conjugal building.

4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees are deleted.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE
VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
Mateo C. Bacalso and C. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant.
Gaudioso Sosmeña and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a pauper's appeal, directly brought to this Court on points of law, from a
resolution, dated September 20, 1961, excluding petitioner-appellant herein,
Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the summary settlement of the estate
of Melodia Ferraris, Special Proceeding No. 2177-R of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, as well as from the order, dated October 16,
1961, denying a motion to reconsider said resolution.
The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties.
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until
1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the
summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her
whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since
the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead
for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her
heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share
in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and
which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant,
or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto
Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed
Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only
brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent).
These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to
participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of the
contending parties to said Melodia Ferraris:
Note: Picture
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the intestate
estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral
relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or
her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother
in the inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter?
The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only
predeceased brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of
the same decedent reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two
degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right of
representation, while petitioner-appellant is three degrees distant from the
decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters
or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with article 1009
of the New Civil Code.
Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal
that she is of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors
appellees, three degrees removed from the decedent; and that under article 975
of the New Civil Code no right of representation could take place when the
nieces and nephew of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt, as in
the case at bar, but rather the former succeed in their own right.
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant
as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to
which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to
the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966).
Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do
not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with
brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975:
ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if
they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they
shall inherit in equal portions.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy,
nephews and nieces of the de cujusexclude all other collaterals (aunts and
uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from
articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that
provided as follows:
 ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.
ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews
and nieces, who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters
of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per
stripes.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins,
etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case
under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code
now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889
prescribed as follows:
ART. 952. In the absence of brother, or sisters and of nephews or
nieces, children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the
surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while
other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil
Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews
and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the
preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.
Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the
present Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of
preference. Which is true as to "other collaterals," since preference among them
is according to their proximity to the decedent, as established by Article 962,
paragraph 1.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes
the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it
properly takes place.
But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other
collaterals of equal degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of his
commentaries to Article 1009 (Vol II, p. 439) (which counsel for appellants had
unethically omitted to quote), Tolentino expressly states:
Other collaterals. — The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed
in intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters
or children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives
within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly
any affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law,
therefore, relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as
relatives, for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this
article should be understood in connection with the general rule that the
nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree
inherit in equal parts, there being no right of representation. They
succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them on
account of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis supplied)
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's
uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces
of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby
affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-26170 January 27, 1969
THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, plaintiff,
vs. SUSANA, ROMUALDO, JULIAN, MACARIO A., MOISES, MACARIO, C.,
ADRIANO, CELESTINA and LUISA, all surnamed CUSTODIO, defendants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Originally elevated to the Court of Appeals, this case was certified to this
Supreme Court as one involving only questions of law.
Proceedings were initiated on 10 June 1958, in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, by the Government Service Insurance System (a non-stock corporation
created by Commonwealth Act 186) by a complaint in interpleader (docketed as
Civil Case No. 5037) for the determination of who, among the several
defendants, is entitled to the retirement benefits, in the amount of P8,339.36, that
fell due to a deceased member of the System, one Simeon Custodio. Defendant-
cross-claimant-appellee Susana Custodio, a surviving sister of the decedent and
the aunt of the other defendants, claims to be the sole beneficiary thereof; but her
nephews and nieces contest her recognition as such and claim to be entitled to
share in the proceeds by right of representation of their deceased fathers, who
are three (3) brothers of the late Simeon. These nephews and nieces
(defendants-cross-claimants-appellees in this case) are the following: Macario,
C., Macario A., Luisa, David, Romualdo, Julian, Moises, Adriano and Celestina,
all surnamed "Custodio".
After responsive pleadings were filed, and the issues joined, a pre-trial was held
but the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. They, however,
submitted a stipulation of facts, as follows:
1. That the late SIMEON CUSTODIO, who during his lifetime was a member of
the Retirement Insurance Fund administered by plaintiff GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, died intestate at Tanay, Rizal, on
February 16, 1957;
2. That said SIMEON CUSTODIO was survived by his only sister, SUSANA
CUSTODIO and his nephews and nieces, namely ROMUALDO, JULIAN,
MACARIO A., MOISES, MACARIO, C., ADRIANO, CELESTINA, LUISA and
DAVID, all surnamed CUSTODIO;
3. That shortly after the death of SIMEON CUSTODIO, there was found among
his personal belongings an undated and unsigned application form for
Retirement accomplished by said SIMEON CUSTODIO wherein his sister,
SUSANA CUSTODIO was named the beneficiary, although said application
form was never submitted to the Government Service Insurance System.
Photostat copy of said application for retirement is hereto attached as Annex
"A" and made an integral part of this Stipulation of Facts;1awphil.ñêt
4. That on July 7, 1957, at the residence of Leon K. Tongohan, son-in-law of
Susana Custodio at Tanay, Rizal, SUSANA, ROMUALDO, JULIAN,
MACARIO A., MOISES, ADRIANO, and CELESTINA, all surnamed
CUSTODIO, and JULIA TONGOHAN executed a document entitled "Extra
Judicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs' which provides, among other
things that "(c) For any amount due the decedent SIMEON CUSTODIO,
holder of GSIS policy No. 73557, our Aunt Susana Custodio as the
decedent's only living sister, is hereby recognized by the aforementioned
heirs as the sole and only beneficiary of the decedent SIMEON CUSTODIO,
and giving unto our Aunt Susana Custodio the right to file, sign and receive
whatever retirement pay under Republic Act 660, as amended by Rep. Acts
Nos. 728 and 1123, and other amendments thereto". Copy of said Extra
Judicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs, which consist of four (4) pages,
without, page 5, is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made an integral part of
this Stipulation of Facts;
5. That on July 8, 1957 ROMUALDO, JULIAN, MOISES, MACARIO A.,
ADRIANO, CELESTINA, LUISA and MACARIO, C. all surnamed
CUSTODIO, wrote a letter to the Manager of the Government Service
Insurance System stating, among other things that they "inadvertently signed
on July 7, 1957, without properly having understood, a document whereby it
was made to appear therein that the aforementioned persons are waiving
their claim on the benefits legally accruing to the aforementioned deceased".
A duplicate copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made an
integral part of this Stipulation."
It will thus be noted from the stipulation of facts and its annexes that the
deceased retiree, Simeon Custodio had one (1) sister, appellee Susana Custodio
and three (3) brothers, namely, Vicente, Crispin and Jacinto, who had
predeceased him; that the appellants are the children of these brothers; that two
(2) among these children are both named "Macario" (Macario A. and Macario C.;
that the children, Macario C., Luisa, and David Custodio did not sign the deed of
extrajudicial settlement; and that Macario C. is the only child of Crispin, while
Luisa and David are two (2) of the six (6) children of Jacinto.
From her opposition to the motion for reconsideration dated 20 April 1960,
appellee Susana Custodio made clear her non-opposition to the division of the
estate where Macario C. Luisa and David would share per stirpes (Record on
Appeal, pages 55-56).
In submitting their Stipulation of Facts for approval, the parties prayed the trial
court "to resolve the questions of law raised in said stipulation of facts".
On 2 January 1960, the trial court approved the Stipulation of Facts and required
the interpleading defendants to submit their memoranda "within fifteen (15) days
on a question of law", with the understanding that the case shall be considered
submitted for decision on said issue after the filing of the memoranda or upon
expiration of the period herein required".
Without submitting other evidence, the defendants-claimants filed their
respective memoranda, and, on 10 March 1960, the trial court rendered its
decision in favor of appellee Susana Custodio, holding that her designation as
beneficiary in the unsigned application form for retirement benefits, which was not
filed with the Government Service Insurance System prior to the death of the
employee, as required by regulations, was invalid; but that, nonetheless, she is
entitled to the retirement benefit to the exclusion of the appellants nephews and
nieces because the latter had recognized her as sole beneficiary in the deed of
extrajudicial settlement executed on 7 July 1957, which is to be presumed regular
in the absence of evidence of fraud or mistake attending its execution.
Appellants nephews and nieces moved to reconsider, and on denial, they
appealed to the Court of Appeals. Finding no question of fact involved in the
case, but only questions of law, said appellate court certified the appeal to the
Supreme Court.
Appellants' first assignment of error is well-taken; that the intestate heirs,
Macario C., Luisa and David Custodio who did not sign the deed of extrajudicial
settlement, not be considered as having recognized Susana Custodio, as the
only beneficiary of Simeon's retirement money. There is no evidence the case
having been submitted for decision below solely on a stipulation of facts, that
these non-signatory heirs had agreed, or accepted other benefits under the deed
of partition, as appellee now claims. Susana Custodio did not oppose their
separate motion for reconsideration and, actually, even prayed that said motion
be granted (Record on Appeal, page 56), although the court denied it just the
same. These three (3) heirs should inherit per stirpes, in accordance with Article
1005 of the Civil Code. As Macario C. Custodio (as distinguished from Macario
A., who signed the agreement) is the only child of Crispin, said Macario C.
inherits by representation the one-fourth (¼) share pertaining to his father, while
Luisa and David Custodio being two (2) of six (6) children of Jacinto, are each
entitled to a sixth of one-fourth (1/6 x 1/4) equivalent to 1/24 of the hereditary
mass.
The other assigned errors are:
II. The trial court erred in not taking into consideration the circumstances
surrounding the preparation and signing of the "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
Among Heirs', Annex "B" of the Stipulation of Facts, as circumstantial evidence of
the fraud by means of which the signatures of appellants Romualdo, Julian,
Macario A., Moises, Adriano and Celestina, all surnamed Custodio were secured,
and in not holding that, consequently, said Annex "B" is null and void.
III. The trial court erred in not holding that the appellants Romualdo, Julian,
Macario A., Moises, Adriano and Celestina, all surnamed Custodio are also
entitled to share as intestate heirs in the proceeds due Simeon Custodio from the
Government Service Insurance System.
Under these alleged errors, appellants contend that fraud or mistake rendered
null and void the deed of extrajudicial settlement, such vice of consent being
shown by the pretended badges of fraud, as follows: the fact that David Custodio
was not made a party to the extrajudicial settlement nor mentioned in its recitals;
the failure to secure the signatures not only of David but also of Luisa and
Macario C. Custodio; the repudiation by the appellants of the extrajudicial
settlement that they had signed just one day after its execution; the fact that Leon
Tongohan, the son-in-law of Susana Custodia apparently had some intervention
in the execution of the deed; and the adjudication in favor of Susana Custodio of
an alleged unconscionable bulk of the estate.
The Court of Appeals, in its resolution certifying the case to this Court, did not
consider these assigned errors as ones properly of fact within its appellate
jurisdiction on the following grounds: the covenanting parties, in asking for the
approval of the trial court of their stipulation of facts, had prayed that the
questions of law arising from the facts stipulated be resolved by the court; the
parties did not submit any evidence; and fraud was not specifically alleged in the
pleadings.
We affirm the action taken by the Court of Appeals in certifying the appeal to us.
Even if the five (5) circumstances stated by the appellant be held to be indicative
of fraud or mistake, and infirming the deed of extrajudicial settlement, the stark
fact is that the existence of fraud or mistake was not stipulated (Miranda vs.
Tiangco, et al., 96 Phil. 526). Appellants' raising the issue of fraud or mistake
without having specifically stipulated or pleaded the same, constitutes and unfair
surprise upon their adversary, besides being in violation of the rule that fraud be
specifically pleaded (Rule 9, Section 9, Rules of Court). Therefore, this plea of
fraud or error is not allowable, being deemed waived by the lack of proper
averment.
At any rate, the circumstances now stressed by the heirs who have actually
signed the deed of partition, and who have been allocated properties therein, fall
short of evidencing fraud or mistake. The failure to secure the signatures of
Luisa, David, and Macario Custodio could not have escaped their co-heirs, now
appellants, and it is unfair to lay blame therefor on Susana Custodio. The
intervention of Leon Tongohan, her son-in-law, is without particular significance,
since none of the signers was illiterate, nor was the deed notarized by him. As to
the appellants' having repudiated their signatures, the same was a self-serving
act, more indicative of a belated intention to squirm out of a disadvantageous
transaction, after they entered it with open eyes, which is no ground for setting
the same aside (Noble vs. City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1). Certainly, it should take
much weightier proof to invalidate a written instrument (cf. Mendezona vs. Phil.
Sugar Estates, 41 Phil. 493; Bank of the Phil. Is. vs. Fidelity Surety Co., 51 Phil.
57).
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed,
with the modification that Macario C. Custodio is declared entitled to a share of
one-fourth (1/4), and Luisa Custodio and David Custodio to a share of one-
twenty-fourth (1/24) each, of the retirement benefits. No costs.
G.R. No. 150175 February 5, 2007
ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES, namely:
ESTELA, ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA,
ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES, ERNESTO MENDOZA, RIZALINA SANTOS,
ADOLFO MENDOZA and PACITA MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, namely: SILVERIO S. BRIONES, PETRA
BRIONES, BONIFACIO CABAHUG, JR., ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA
FORTUNA, CRESENCIA BRIONES, FUGURACION MEDALLE and
MERCEDES LAGBAS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1
On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its Decision in the above-entitled
2
case, ruling in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR CV No. 55194, dated 31 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the
Cebu City RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, dated 28 September 1986, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the Complaint for partition,
annulment, and recovery of possession filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil
Case No. CEB-5794 is hereby DISMISSED.
3 covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21545, and 58684, based on two Deeds of
On 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision was
filed by Atty. Celso C. Reales of the Reales Law Office on behalf of the
respondents, heirs of Maximino R. Briones. On 19 May 2006, petitioners Erlinda
Pilapil and the other co-heirs of Donata Ortiz Vda. de Briones, through counsel,
4 intestate proceedings of the estate of Donata; and as far as this Petition is
filed an Opposition to Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration, to which the
5 concerned, all the heirs of Donata, including Erlinda, appear to be on the same
respondents filed a Rejoinder on 23 May 2006. Thereafter, Atty. Amador F.
Brioso, Jr. of the Canto Brioso Arnedo Law Office entered his appearance as
6
collaborating counsel for the respondents. Atty. Brioso then filed on 11 June
7 8
2006 and 16 June 2006, respectively, a Reply and Supplemental Reply to the
petitioners’ Opposition to respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration. Finally,
9
petitioners filed a Rejoinder to the respondents’ Reply and Supplemental Reply
on 5 July 2006.
10
The facts of the case, as recounted in the Decision, are as follows –
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata), consisting of
her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalina’s daughter, Erlinda
Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other nephews and nieces of Donata, in representation
of her two other sisters who had also passed away. Respondents, on the other
hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones (Maximino), composed of his
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of
the deceased siblings of Maximino.
xxxx
Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children.
When Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to
settle her husband’s estate with the Cebu City Court of First Instance (CFI), 14th
Judicial District, designated as Special Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 July 1952,
the CFI issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix
of Maximino’s estate. She submitted an Inventory of Maximino’s properties,
which included, among other things, the following parcels of land x x x.
xxxx
The CFI would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2 October 1952, awarding
ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata. On 27 June 1960,
Donata had the said CFI Order recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the
Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof, received new TCTs, covering the said
properties, now in her name.
Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces, instituted
with the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata.
Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as
administrators of Donata’s intestate estate. Controversy arose among Donata’s
heirs when Erlinda claimed exclusive ownership of three parcels of land,
Donation, both dated 15 September 1977, allegedly executed in her favor by her
aunt Donata. The other heirs of Donata opposed Erlinda’s claim. This Court,
however, was no longer informed of the subsequent development in the
side.
On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino, filed a
Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of
Maximino, which was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an
Order, dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio to collect rentals from
Maximino’s properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set
Aside the Order, dated 5 December 1985, claiming that the said properties were
already under his and his wife’s administration as part of the intestate estate of
Donata. Silverio’s Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino
was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against
the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of
real property, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-5794. They later filed an
Amended Complaint, on 11 December 1992. They alleged that Donata, as
administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in
breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in
registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of
Maximino.
xxxx
After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in
favor of the heirs of Maximino x x x.
xxxx
x x x[T]he RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to ½ of the real
properties covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21543, 21544, 21545, 21546, and
58684. It also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs of Maximino the said
properties and to render an accounting of the fruits thereof.
The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986, to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, promulgated on 31
August 2001, affirmed the RTC Decision, x x x.
xxxx
Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs of
Donata filed the present Petition, x x x.
In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court found the Petition meritorious
and, reversing the Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), dismissed the Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession of real property filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-
11
5794. This Court summed up its findings, thus –
In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties,
belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In the
absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata and the
heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to
register the real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but
pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly
issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino;
hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino,
including the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of
her deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of
Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been dismissed.
Respondents move for the reconsideration of the Decision of this Court raising
still the arguments that Donata committed fraud in securing the Court of First
Instance Order, dated 2 October 1952, which declared her as the sole heir of
her deceased husband Maximino and authorized her to have Maximino’s
properties registered exclusively in her name; that respondents’ right to
succession to the disputed properties was transmitted or vested from the
moment of Maximino’s death and which they could no longer be deprived of;
that Donata merely possessed and held the properties in trust for her co-
12
heirs/owners; and that, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Quion v. Claridad and
13
Sevilla, et al. v. De Los Angeles, respondents’ action to recover title to and
possession of their shares in Maximino’s estate, held in trust for their benefit by
Donata, and eventually, by petitioners as the latter’s successors-in-interest, is
imprescriptible. Respondents also advance a fresh contention that the CFI
Order, dated 2 October 1952, being based on the fraudulent misrepresentation
of Donata that she was Maximino’s sole heir, was a void order, which produced
no legal effect. Lastly, respondents asseverate that, by relying on certain
procedural presumptions in its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court has
sacrificed their substantive right to succession, thus, making justice "subservient
14
to the dictates of mere procedural fiats."
While this Court is persuaded to reexamine and clarify some points in its
previous Decision in this case, it does not find any new evidence or argument
that would adequately justify a change in its previous position.
On the finding of fraud
As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any trust relations
between petitioners and respondents shall be examined in the light of Article
1456 of the New Civil Code, which provides that, "[i]f property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes." Hence, the foremost question to be answered is still whether an implied
trust under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code had been sufficiently established
in the present case.
In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since there was insufficient
evidence to establish that Donata committed fraud. It should be remembered
that Donata was able to secure certificates of title to the disputed properties by
virtue of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (the proceedings she
instituted to settle Maximino’s intestate estate), which declared her as
Maximino’s sole heir. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the Court accorded
to Special Proceedings No. 928-R the presumptions of regularity and validity.
15
Reproduced below are the relevant portions of the Decision –
At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able to secure the TCTs
covering the real properties belonging to the estate of Maximino by virtue of a
CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952. It is undisputed that the said CFI Order was
issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, instituted by Donata
herself, to settle the intestate estate of Maximino. The petitioners, heirs of
Donata, were unable to present a copy of the CFI Order, but this is not
surprising considering that it was issued 35 years prior to the filing by the heirs
of Maximino of their Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 on 3 March 1987.
The existence of such CFI Order, nonetheless, cannot be denied. It was
recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds on 27 June 1960,
at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No. 1714. It was annotated on the TCTs covering the real
properties as having declared Donata the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of
Maximino. The non-presentation of the actual CFI Order was not fatal to the
cause of the heirs of Donata considering that its authenticity and contents were
never questioned. The allegation of fraud by the heirs of Maximino did not
pertain to the CFI Order, but to the manner or procedure by which it was issued
in favor of Donata. Moreover, the non-presentation of the CFI Order, contrary to
the declaration by the RTC, does not amount to a willful suppression of evidence
that would give rise to the presumption that it would be adverse to the heirs of
Donata if produced. x x x.
xxxx
The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings No. 928-
R, effectively settled the intestate estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the
sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of her deceased husband. The issuance by
the CFI of the said Order, as well as its conduct of the entire Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy the presumption of validity pursuant to the
Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, reproduced
below –
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory
if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must presume, in the absence
of any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, that the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties,
and to have rendered a judgment valid in every respect; and it could not give
credence to the following statements made by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision.
xxxx
There was totally no evidentiary basis for the foregoing pronouncements. First of
all, the Petition filed by Donata for Letters of Administration in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R before the CFI was not even referred to nor presented
during the course of the trial of Civil Case No. CEB-5794 before the RTC. How
then could the Court of Appeals make a finding that Donata willfully excluded
from the said Petition the names, ages, and residences of the other heirs of
Maximino? Second, there was also no evidence showing that the CFI actually
failed to send notices of Special Proceedings No. 928-R to the heirs of Maximino
or that it did not require presentation of proof of service of such notices. It should
be remembered that there stands a presumption that the CFI Judge had
regularly performed his duties in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, which included
sending out of notices and requiring the presentation of proof of service of such
notices; and, the heirs of Maximino did not propound sufficient evidence to
debunk such presumption. They only made a general denial of knowledge of
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least until 1985. There was no testimony or
document presented in which the heirs of Maximino categorically denied receipt
of notice from the CFI of the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The
only evidence on record in reference to the absence of notice of such
proceedings was the testimony of Aurelia Briones (Aurelia), one of the heirs of
Maximino, x x x.
xxxx
Aurelia’s testimony deserves scant credit considering that she was not testifying
on matters within her personal knowledge. The phrase "I don’t think" is a clear
indication that she is merely voicing out her opinion on how she believed her
uncles and aunts would have acted had they received notice of Special
Proceedings No. 928-R.
It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, the Court was proceeding
from an evaluation of the evidence on record, which did not include an actual
copy of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. Respondents only
submitted a certified true copy thereof on 15 June 2006, annexed to their
Supplemental Reply to petitioners’ opposition to their motion for reconsideration
of this Court’s Decision. Respondents did not offer any explanation as to why
they belatedly produced a copy of the said Order, but merely claimed to have
been "fortunate enough to obtain a copy" thereof from the Register of Deeds of
16
Cebu.
Respondents should be taken to task for springing new evidence so late into the
proceedings of this case. Parties should present all their available evidence at
the courts below so as to give the opposing party the opportunity to scrutinize
and challenge such evidence during the course of the trial. However, given that
the existence of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R was never in
issue and was, in fact, admitted by the petitioners; that the copy submitted is a
certified true copy of the said Order; and that the said Order may provide new
information vital to a just resolution of the present case, this Court is compelled
to consider the same as part of the evidence on record.
 17
The CFI Order in question reads in full as –
ORDER
This is with reference to the Motion of the Administratrix, dated January 5, 1960,
that she be declared the sole heir of her deceased husband, Maximino Suico
Briones, the latter having died without any legitimate ascendant nor descendant,
nor any legitimate brother or sister, nephews or nieces.
At the hearing of this incident today, nobody appeared to resist the motion, and
based on the uncontradicted testimony of Donata G. Ortiz that she was the
nearest surviving relative of the deceased Maximino Suico Briones at the time of
the latter’s death, and pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code
of the Philippines, the Court hereby declares the aforesaid Donata G. Ortiz the
sole, absolute and exclusive heir of the estate of the deceased Maximino Suico
Briones, and she is hereby entitled to inherit all the residue of this estate after
paying all the obligations thereof, which properties are those contained in the
Inventory, dated October 2, 1952.1awphi1.net
Cebu City, January 15, 1960.
From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this Court is able to deduce that
the CFI Order was in fact issued on 15 January 1960 and not 2 October 1952,
as earlier stated in the Decision. It was the inventory of properties, submitted by
Donata as administratrix of Maximino’s intestate estate, which was dated 2
18
October 1952. Other than such observation, this Court finds nothing in the CFI
Order which could change its original position in the Decision under
consideration.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had
surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be
given personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind
that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in
19
rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application
and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law,
is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the
hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The publication
requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing
all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the
settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or
creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or
involuntarily made.
This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the
intestate proceedings instituted by Donata before the trial court. As this Court
pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which the CFI judge conducted
the proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity, and encompassed in such
presumption is the order of publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings.
A review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete proof that the
CFI also failed to order the publication in newspapers of the notice of the
intestate proceedings and to require proof from Donata of compliance therewith.
Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as to why Maximino’s
siblings could have missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of
their brother.
In relying on the presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and
lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order,
dated 15 January 1960, this Court is not, as counsel for respondents allege,
sacrificing the substantive right of respondents to their share in the inheritance in
favor of mere procedural fiats. There is a rationale for the establishment of rules
of procedure, as amply explained by this Court in De Dios v. Court of
20
Appeals –
Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and expeditious
administration of justice by providing for a practical system by which the parties
to a litigation may be accorded a full and fair opportunity to present their
respective positions and refute each other's submissions under the prescribed
requirements, conditions and limitations. Adjective law is not the counterfoil of
substantive law. In fact, there is a symbiotic relationship between them. By
complying faithfully with the Rules of Court, the bench and the bar are better
able to discuss, analyze and understand substantive rights and duties and
consequently to more effectively protect and enforce them. The other alternative
is judicial anarchy.
Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general rule, and
abandonment thereof should only be done in the most exceptional
circumstances. The presumptions relied upon by this Court in the instant case
are disputable presumptions, which are satisfactory, unless contradicted or
overcome by evidence. This Court finds that the evidence presented by
respondents failed to overcome the given presumptions.
Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI that she was her husband’s
sole heir, it was not established that she did so knowingly, maliciously and in
bad faith, so as for this Court to conclude that she indeed committed fraud. This
Court again brings to the fore the delay by which respondents filed the present
case, when the principal actors involved, particularly, Donata and Maximino’s
siblings, have already passed away and their lips forever sealed as to what truly
transpired between them. On the other hand, Special Proceedings No. 928-R
took place when all these principal actors were still alive and each would have
been capable to act to protect his or her own right to Maximino’s estate. Letters
of Administration of Maximino’s estate were issued in favor of Donata as early
as 8 July 1952, and the CFI Order in question was issued only on 15 January
1960. The intestate proceedings for the settlement of Maximino’s estate were
thus pending for almost eight years, and it is the burden of the respondents to
establish that their parents or grandparents, Maximino’s surviving siblings, had
absolutely no knowledge of the said proceedings all these years. As established
21
in Ramos v. Ramos, the degree of proof to establish fraud in a case where the
principal actors to the transaction have already passed away is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, to wit –
"x x x But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and as
it thus removes from the parties all the immediate means to verify the
nature of the original transactions, it operates by way of presumption, in
favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It would be
unreasonable, after a great length of time, to require exact proof of all the minute
circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a satisfactory explanation of
every difficulty, real or apparent, with which it may be encumbered. The most
that can fairly be expected, in such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty
of memory, and human infirmity, is, that the material facts can be given with
certainty to a common intent; and, if the parties are dead, and the cases rest in
confidence, and in parol agreements, the most that we can hope is to arrive at
probable conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact
knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the
living; for, the legal presumption is the other way; as to the dead, who are
not here to answer for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and
cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless
the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable doubt (Prevost vs.
Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498).
Moreover, even if Donata’s allegation that she was Maximino’s sole heir does
constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order, dated
22
15 January 1960, considering the nature of intestate proceedings as being in
rem and the disputable presumptions of the regular performance of official duty
and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order,
dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
On prescription of the right to recover based on implied trust
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donata’s misrepresentation constitutes
fraud that would impose upon her the implied trust provided in Article 1456 of
the Civil Code, this Court still cannot sustain respondents’ contention that their
right to recover their shares in Maximino’s estate is imprescriptible. It is already
settled in jurisprudence that an implied trust, as opposed to an express trust, is
subject to prescription and laches.
23
The case of Ramos v. Ramos already provides an elucidating discourse on the
matter, to wit –
"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention
of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of
law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any
interest therein may be proven by oral evidence. An implied trust may be proven
by oral evidence" (Ibid; Arts. 1443 and 1457).
"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid; Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs.
Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA
543, 546). "Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive
acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly
or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J. S. 122).
"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the
nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the
transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the
particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided
into resulting and constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).
"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the
act or construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by
implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the
parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction,
but not expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725).
Examples of resulting trusts are found in Article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code.
See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168,
179).
On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of law,
or arising by operation of law." In a more restricted sense and as
contradistinguished from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not
created by any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to
create a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of
justice. It does not arise by agreement or intention but by operation of law." (89
C.J.S. 726-727). "If a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or
concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive
trust in favor of the defrauded party." A constructive trust is not a trust in the
technical sense (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See Art.
1456, Civil Code).
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership of
property entrusted to him (Palma vs. Cristobal, 77 Phil. 712), or that an action to
compel a trustee to convey property registered in his name in trust for the
benefit of the cestui qui trust does not prescribe (Manalang vs. Canlas, 94 Phil.
776; Cristobal vs. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810), or that the defense of prescription
cannot be set up in an action to recover property held by a person in trust for the
benefit of another (Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or that property held
in trust can be recovered by the beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time
(Marabilles vs. Quito, 100 Phil. 64; Bancairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. 122, 126;
Juan vs. Zuñiga, 62 O.G. 1351; 4 SCRA 1221; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957,
May 31, 1962. See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147 Phil. 31, 37).
That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the
possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire
by prescription the property held in trust. Thus, Section 38 of Act 190 provides
that the law of prescription does not apply "in the case of a continuing and
subsisting trust" (Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266; Laguna vs.
Levantino, 71 Phil. 566; Sumira vs. Vistan, 74 Phil. 138; Golfeo vs. Court of
Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12 SCRA 199; Caladiao vs. Santos, 63 O.G. 1956, 10
SCRA 691).
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust may
possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not repudiated the
trust (Heirs of Candelaria vs. Romero, 109 Phil. 500, 502-3; Martinez vs. Graño,
42 Phil. 35; Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O. G. 11033, 16 SCRA 849).
The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to constructive trusts (Geronimo
and Isidoro vs. Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153. Compare with Cuison vs.
Fernandez and Bengzon, 105 Phil. 135, 139; De Pasion vs. De Pasion, 112 Phil.
403, 407).
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee
in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the
trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of
the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known
to the cestui qui trust and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive
(Laguna vs. Levantino, supra; Salinas vs. Tuason, 55 Phil. 729. Compare with
the rule regarding co-owners found in the last paragraph of Article 494, Civil
Code; Casañas vs. Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona vs. De Guzman, L-19060, May
29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153, 157).
With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is different. The prescriptibility of an
action for reconveyance based on constructive trust is now settled (Alzona vs.
Capunitan, L-10228, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450; Gerona vs. De Guzman,
supra; Claridad vs. Henares, 97 Phil. 973; Gonzales vs. Jimenez, L-19073,
January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80; Boñaga vs. Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason
& Co., vs. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 84). Prescription
may supervene in an implied trust (Bueno vs. Reyes, L-22587, April 28, 1969,
27 SCRA 1179; Fabian vs. Fabian, L-20449, January 29, 1968; Jacinto vs.
Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 371).
And whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be barred
by laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54 Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz vs. Gorricho and
Aguado, supra; Compare with Mejia vs. Gampona, 100 Phil. 277). [Emphases
supplied.]
24 25
A present reading of the Quion and Sevilla cases, invoked by respondents,
must be made in conjunction with and guided accordingly by the principles
established in the afore-quoted case. Thus, while respondents’ right to
inheritance was transferred or vested upon them at the time of Maximino’s
death, their enforcement of said right by appropriate legal action may be barred
by the prescription of the action.
Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the disputed properties based on
implied trust is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, which reads –
ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law (specifically, in this case,
by Article 1456 of the New Civil Code), then respondents had 10 years within
which to bring an action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximino’s
properties. The next question now is when should the ten-year prescriptive
period be reckoned from. The general rule is that an action for reconveyance of
real property based on implied trust prescribes ten years from registration and/or
26
issuance of the title to the property, not only because registration under the
27
Torrens system is a constructive notice of title, but also because by registering
the disputed properties exclusively in her name, Donata had already
unequivocally repudiated any other claim to the same.
By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No.
928-R, Donata was able to register and secure certificates of title over the
disputed properties in her name on 27 June 1960. The respondents filed with
the RTC their Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of
the disputed real properties, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-5794, only on 3
March 1987, almost 27 years after the registration of the said properties in the
name of Donata. Therefore, respondents’ action for recovery of possession of
the disputed properties had clearly prescribed.
Moreover, even though respondents’ Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case
No. CEB-5794 also prays for partition of the disputed properties, it does not
make their action to enforce their right to the said properties imprescriptible.
While as a general rule, the action for partition among co-owners does not
prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized, as
provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears to emphasize that
Donata had never recognized respondents as co-owners or co-heirs, either
28
expressly or impliedly. Her assertion before the CFI in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R that she was Maximino’s sole heir necessarily excludes recognition of
some other co-owner or co-heir to the inherited properties; Consequently, the
rule on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common
does not apply to the case at bar.
On laches as bar to recovery
Other than prescription of action, respondents’ right to recover possession of the
disputed properties, based on implied trust, is also barred by laches. The
defense of laches, which is a question of inequity in permitting a claim to be
enforced, applies independently of prescription, which is a question of time.
29
Prescription is statutory; laches is equitable.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is
based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale
30
claims for the peace of society.
This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its Decision the basis for barring
respondents’ action for recovery of the disputed properties because of laches.
31
This Court pointed out therein that –
In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs of Maximino
even emphasized that Donata lived along the same street as some of the
siblings of Maximino and, yet, she failed to inform them of the CFI Order, dated
[15 January 1960], in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and the issuance in her
name of new TCTs covering the real properties which belonged to the estate of
Maximino. This Court, however, appreciates such information differently. It
actually works against the heirs of Maximino. Since they only lived nearby,
Maximino’s siblings had ample opportunity to inquire or discuss with Donata the
status of the estate of their deceased brother. Some of the real properties, which
belonged to the estate of Maximino, were also located within the same area as
their residences in Cebu City, and Maximino’s siblings could have regularly
observed the actions and behavior of Donata with regard to the said real
properties. It is uncontested that from the time of Maximino’s death on 1 May
1952, Donata had possession of the real properties. She managed the real
properties and even collected rental fees on some of them until her own death
on 1 November 1977. After Donata’s death, Erlinda took possession of the real
properties, and continued to manage the same and collect the rental fees
thereon. Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights
of ownership over the real properties, in exclusion of all others, which must have
already put the heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still
had rights thereto.
The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his
wake. They did not offer any explanation as to why they had waited 33 years
from Maximino’s death before one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino on 21 January 1985. After
learning that the intestate estate of Maximino was already settled in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited another two years, before instituting, on 3
March 1987, Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the Complaint for partition, annulment
and recovery of the real property belonging to the estate of Maximino. x x x
Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as
respondents’ conduct before this Court, particularly the belated submission of
evidence and argument of new issues, respondents are consistently displaying a
penchant for delayed action, without any proffered reason or justification for
such delay.
It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and
not those who sleep when the law requires them to act. The law does not
encourage laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a
party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he must show that he is not
32
guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.
On void judgment or order
Respondents presented only in their Reply and Supplemental Reply to the
petitioners’ Opposition to their Motion for Reconsideration the argument that the
CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R is void
and, thus, it cannot have any legal effect. Consequently, the registration of the
disputed properties in the name of Donata pursuant to such Order was likewise
void.
This Court is unconvinced.
33
In the jurisprudence referred to by the respondents, an order or judgment is
considered void when rendered by the court without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or in violation of a mandatory duty, circumstances which are not
present in the case at bar.
Distinction must be made between a void judgment and a voidable one, thus –
"* * * A voidable judgment is one which, though not a mere nullity, is liable to be
made void when a person who has a right to proceed in the matter takes the
proper steps to have its invalidity declared. It always contains some defect which
may become fatal. It carries within it the means of its own overthrow. But unless
and until it is duly annulled, it is attended with all the ordinary consequences of a
legal judgment. The party against whom it is given may escape its effect as a
bar or an obligation, but only by a proper application to have it vacated or
reversed. Until that is done, it will be efficacious as a claim, an estoppel, or a
source of title. If no proceedings are ever taken against it, it will continue
throughout its life to all intents a valid sentence. If emanating from a court of
general jurisdiction, it will be sustained by the ordinary presumptions of
regularity, and it is not open to impeachment in any collateral action. * * *"
But it is otherwise when the judgment is void. "A void judgment is in legal effect
no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained.
Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless.
It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible SO ORDERED.
as trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself
without title and without redress." (Freeman on Judgments, sec. 117, citing
Campbell vs. McCahan, 41 Ill., 45; Roberts vs. Stowers, 7 Bush, 295, Huls vs.
Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell vs. Goodrum, 3 Humph., 418; Andrews vs. State, 2
Sneed, 549; Hollingsworth vs. Bagley, 35 Tex., 345; Morton vs. Root, 2 Dill.,
312; Commercial Bank of Manchester vs. Martin, 9 Smedes & M., 613; Hargis
vs. Morse, 7 Kan., 259. See also Cornell vs. Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dawson and
Another vs. Wells, 3 Ind., 399; Meyer vs. Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414; Olson vs.
Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391; White vs. Foote L. & M. Co., 29 W. Va., 385.)

It is not always easy to draw the line of demarcation between a void judgment
and a voidable one, but all authorities agree that jurisdiction over the subject-
matter is essential to the validity of a judgment and that want of such jurisdiction
renders it void and a mere nullity. In the eye of the law it is non-existent. (Fisher
vs. Harnden, 1 Paine, 55; Towns vs. Springer, 9 Ga., 130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9
Ga., 247; Beverly and McBride vs. Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central Bank of Georgia
vs. Gibson, 11 Ga., 453; Johnson vs. Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis and
Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. vs. Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111 Ill., 32;
Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 Scam., 364; Miller vs. Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3
34
Greene [Iowa], 374.)

The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by Donata on the CFI in Special

Proceedings No. 928-R did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the case, namely, the intestate estate of Maximino. Donata’s
fraud and misrepresentation may have rendered the CFI Order, dated 15
January 1960, voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the said Order, which
already became final and executory, can only be set aside by direct action to
annul and enjoin its enforcement.35 It cannot be the subject of a collateral attack
as is being done in this case. Note that respondents’ Complaint before the RTC
in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 was one for partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession of the disputed properties. The annulment sought in the Complaint
was not that of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, but of the certificates of
title over the properties issued in Donata’s name. So until and unless
respondents bring a direct action to nullify the CFI Order, dated 15 January
1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and attain a favorable judgment
therein, the assailed Order remains valid and binding.

Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an action to annul an order or
judgment based on fraud must be brought within four years from the discovery
of the fraud.36 If it is conceded that the respondents came to know of Donata’s
fraudulent acts only in 1985, during the course of the RTC proceedings which
they instituted for the settlement of Maximino’s estate, then their right to file an
action to annul the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R (earlier instituted by Donata for the settlement of Maximino’s estate),
has likewise prescribed by present time.

In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

G.R. No. L-66574
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA
guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI
JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.
PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First
Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate
Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things,
that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that
she be appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate
children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana
married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and
another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is
the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo
Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in
1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his
death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural
children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children
with Felixberta Pacursa.
1
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 and December 9,
2
1976 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of
the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of
the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the
properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate
Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5,
was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual
Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition
and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further
taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero
and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her
Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude
Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa
Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of
Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the
3
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order
dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate
4
Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision was rendered by the
Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision of
the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads —
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the
facts and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one
entered sustaining the Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the
petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and
ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the
declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein)
was denied by the same respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984
hence, the present petition for Review with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
 I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of
petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978)
and/or natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece,
who is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);
II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the
natural grandchildren Santero to represent their father Pablo Santero in
the succession to the intestate estate of their
grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda.de Santero (Art. 982);
III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the
grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of
"legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of the
petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin
who is a niece and therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who
are her direct descendants and/or grand children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990
are the applicable provisions of law on intestate succession; and
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and
December 9, 1976 which are provisional and interlocutory as final and
executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows — who are the legal
heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or
her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein)
as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a
legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their
pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case.
They contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule in
Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970)
to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil
Code denied illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased parents
and inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that Rule was expressly
changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants
the illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased father (Pablo
5 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him
Santero) in the estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti)."
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely
to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate
mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the
Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other
hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for
the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family;
the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product
of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
6
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the
succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of
the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the
Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are
reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L.
Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was
admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of
that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can riot inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The
Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it
reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with
fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code
allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992
in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an
 illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and
unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to
make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all
cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be
suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995
and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened
attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of
Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the
7
person spoken of. The record shows that from the commencement of this case
the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the
provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not
commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to
the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred
in ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and
December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention is without merit. The
Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held that the
oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and hence not
allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subsequently, Judge Jose
Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-
Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were
never made the subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected
appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final and executory are already
removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The
only power retained by the lower court, after a judgment has become final and
executory is to order its execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore in
ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa
Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
"is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and executory,
hence null and void. "

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is

hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19996 April 30, 1965
WENCESLA CACHO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
JOHN G. UDAN, and RUSTICO G. UDAN, oppositors-appellants.
Gregorio Dolojan for petitioner-appellee.
Benjamin A. G. Vega and Abad Santos and Pablo for oppositors-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on questions of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales (Hon. Lucas Lacson presiding), issued on 20 February 1962, in its
Special Proceeding No. 2230, wherein the court disallowed the opposition of
John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan to the probate of the alleged will of their
sister Silvina Udan.
From the records it can be gleaned that on 13 December 1959 one Silvina G.
Udan, single, and a resident of San Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving a
purported will naming her son, Francisco G. Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as
her sole heirs, share and share alike. Wencesla Cacho, filed a petition to
probate said Will in the Court of First Instance of Zambales on 14 January 1960
(RA. pp. 1-16). On 15 February 1960 Rustico G. Udan, legitimate brother of the
testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate (RA. pp. 16-18). On 16 February
1960 Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., filed his Appearance and Urgent Motion for
Postponement for and in behalf of his client Francisco G. Udan, the appointed
heir in the Will (RA. pp. 18-22). On 9 June 1960 Francisco G. Udan, through
counsel, filed his opposition to the probate of this will (RA. pp. 33-35). On 15
September 1960 oppositor Rustico G. Udan, through counsel, verbally moved to
withdraw his opposition, dated 13 February 1960, due to the appearance of
Francisco G. Udan, the named heir in the will and said opposition was ordered
withdrawn (RA. pp. 55-56). After one witness, the Notary Public who made and
notarize the will, had testified in court, oppositor Francisco G. Udan died on
June 1961 in San Marcelino, Zambales, Philippines (RA. pp. 63-66).
After the death of Francisco G. Udan, John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, both
legitimate brothers of the testatrix Silvina G. Udan, filed their respective
oppositions on the ground that the will was not attested and executed as
required by law, that the testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and that it was
procured by fraud or undue influence (RA. pp. 63-66; 67-71). On 20 January
1962 proponent-appellee, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss
Oppositions filed by the Oppositors (RA. pp. 73-80), and on 20 February 1962
the Honorable Court of First Instance of Zambales issued an Order disallowing
these two oppositions for lack of interest in the estate and directing the Fiscal to
study the advisability of filing escheat proceedings (RA. pp. 97-99). On 26 and
30 March 1962 both oppositors filed their Motions for Reconsideration, through
their respective counsels, and these motions were both denied by the lower
court on 25 April 1962 (RA. pp. 99-122; pp. 131-132). On 7 May 1962 oppositors
filed their joint Notice of Appeal (RA. pp. 132-135).
The first issue tendered by appellants is whether the oppositor brothers, John
and Rustico Udan, may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, the
late Silvina Udan. We find that the court below correctly held that they were not,
for at the time of her death Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her
heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. This is clear from Articles 988 and
1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines, in force at the time of the
death of the testatrix:
ART. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the
illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate
inherit only in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children.
Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or widower under
Article 1101, they do, not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children,
legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003).
That Francisco Udan was the illegitimate son of the late Silvina is not denied by
the oppositor; and he is so acknowledged to be in the testament, where said
Francisco is termed "son" by the testatrix. As the latter was admittedly single,
the son must be necessarily illegitimate (presumptively natural under Article
277).
The trial court, therefore, committed no error in holding that John and Rustico
Udan had no standing to oppose the probate of the will. For if the will is
ultimately probated John and Rustico are excluded by its terms from
participation in the estate; and if probate be denied, both oppositors-appellants
will be excluded by the illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, as sole intestate heir,
by operation of law.
The death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not improve
the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only
transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who are
legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, as correctly decided by the
court below, the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her
illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code.
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
 such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.

For the oppositors-appellants it is argued that while Francisco Udan did survive
his mother, and acquired the rights to the succession from the moment of her
death (Art. 777, Civ. Code), still he did not acquire the inheritance until he
accepted it. This argument fails to take into account that the Code presumes
acceptance of an inheritance if the latter is not repudiated in due time (Civ.
Code, Art. 1057, par. 2), and that repudiation, to be valid, must appear in a
public or authentic instrument, or petition to the court. There is no document or
pleading in the records showing repudiation of the inheritance by Francisco
Udan. The latter's own opposition (RA. p. 61) to the probate of the alleged will is
perfectly compatible with the intention to exclude the proponent Cacho as
testamentary coheir, and to claim the entire inheritance as heir ab intestato.

Finally, it is urged that as probate is only concerned with the due execution of a
testament, any ruling on the successional rights of oppositors-appellants is at
present premature. Inquiry into the hereditary rights of the appellants is not
premature, if the purpose is to determine whether their opposition should be
excluded in order to simplify and accelerate the proceedings. If, as already
shown, appellants cannot gain any hereditary interest in the estate whether the
will is probated or not, their intervention would merely result in unnecessary
complication.

It may not be amiss to note, however, that the hearing on the probate must still
proceed to ascertain the rights of the proponent Cacho as testamentary heir.

It is urged for the applicant that no opposition has been registered against his
petition on the issues above-discussed. Absence of opposition, however, does
not preclude the scanning of the whole record by the appellate court, with a view
to preventing the conferment of citizenship to persons not fully qualified therefor
(Lee Ng Len vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20151, March 31, 1965). The applicant's
complaint of unfairness could have some weight if the objections on appeal had
been on points not previously passed upon. But the deficiencies here in question
are not new but well-known, having been ruled upon repeatedly by this Court,
and we see no excuse for failing to take them into account.1äwphï1.ñët

WHEREFORE, the order under appeal is affirmed, without prejudice to further

proceedings in the case, conformably to this opinion. Costs against appellants
John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan.
G.R. No. 126707 February 25, 1999
BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA MERCED, BLANQUTIA
M. MACATANGAY, MA. OLIVIA M. PAREDES, TERESITA P. RUPISAN,
RUBEN M. ADRIANO, HERMINIO M. ADRIANO, JOSELITO M. ADRIANO,
ROGELIO M. ADRIANO, WILFREDO M. ADRIANO, VICTOR M. ADRIANO,
CORAZON A. ONGOCO, JASMIN A. MENDOZA and CONSTANTINO M.
ADRIANO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSELITO P. DELA MERCED, respondent.
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated October 17, 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41283, which reversed the
decision, dated June 10, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Pasig
City, in Civil Case No. 59705.
The facts of the case are, as follows:
On March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue. She
left five (5) parcels of land situated in Orambo, Pasig City.
At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs, viz: (1)
Francisco M. dela Merced, her legitimate brother; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan, her
niece who is the only daughter of Rosa dela Merced-Platon (a sister who died in
1943); and (3) the legitimate children of Eugenia dela Merced-Adriano (another
sister of Evarista who died in 1965), namely: Herminio, Ruben, Joselito, Rogelio,
Wilfredo, Victor and Constantino, all surnamed Adriano, Corazon Adriano-
Ongoco and Jasmin Adriano-Mendoza.
Almost a year later or on March 19, 1988, to be precise, Francisco (Evarista's
brother) died. He was survived by his wife Blanquita Errea dela Merced and their
three legitimate children, namely, Luisito E. dela Merced, Blanquita M.
Macatangay and Ma. Olivia M. Paredes.
On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent, Evarista M. dela
Merced, referring to (1) the abovenamed heirs of Francisco; (2) Teresita P.
Rupisan and (3) the nine [9] legitimate children of Eugenia, executed an
extrajudicial settlement, entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Evarista M. dela Merced" adjudicating the properties of Evarista to
them, each set with a share of one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso.
On July 26, 1990, private respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced, illegitimate son of
the late Francisco de la Merced, filed a "Petition for Annulment of the
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Evarista M. Dela Merced
with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order", alleging that he was
fraudulently omitted from the said settlement made by petitioners, who were fully
aware of his relation to the late Francisco. Claiming successional rights, private
respondent Joselito prayed that he be included as one of the beneficiaries, to
share in the one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of the deceased
Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.
On August 3, 1990, the trial court issued the temporary restraining order prayed
for by private respondent Joselito, enjoining the sale of any of the real properties
of the deceased Evarista.
After trial, however, or on June 10, 1992, to be definite, the trial court dismissed
the petition, lifted the temporary restraining order earlier issued, and cancelled
the notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the real properties of
the deceased Evarista.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court stated:
The factual setting of the instant motion after considering the circumstances of
the entire case and the other evidentiary facts and documents presented by the
herein parties points only to one issue which goes into the very skeleton of the
controversy, to wit: "Whether or not the plaintiff may participate in the intestate
estate of the late Evarista M. Dela Merced in his capacity as representative of
his alleged father, Francisdo Dela Merced, brother of the deceased, whose
succession is under consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
It is to be noted that Francisco Dela Merced, alleged father of the herein plaintiff,
is a legitimate child, not an illegitimate. Plaintiff, on the other hand, is admittedly
an illegitimate child of the late Francisco Dela Merced. Hence, as such, he
cannot represent his alleged father in the succession of the latter in the intestate
estate of the late Evarista Dela Merced, because of the barrier in Art. 992 of the
New Civil Code which states that:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother, nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The application of Art. 992 cannot be ignored in the instant case, it is clearly
worded in such a way that there can be no room for any doubts and ambiguities.
This provision of the law imposes a barrier between the illegitimate and the
legitimate family. . . . (Rollo, p. 87-88)
Not satisfied with the dismissal of his petition, the private respondent appealed
to the Court of Appeals.
In its Decision of October 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the trial court of origin and ordered the petitioners to execute an amendatory
agreement which shall form part of the original settlement, so as to include
private respondent Joselito as a co-heir to the estate of Francisco, which estate
includes one-third (1/3) pro indiviso of the latter's inheritance from the deceased
Evarista.
The relevant and dispositive part of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, reads:
xxx xxx xxx
It is a basic principle embodied in Article 777, New Civil Code that the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent, so that Francisco dela Merced inherited 1/3 of his sister's
estate at the moment of the latter's death. Said 1/3 of Evarista's estate
formed part of Francisco's estate which was subsequently transmitted
upon his death on March 23, 1987 to his legal heirs, among whom is
appellant as his illegitimate child. Appellant became entitled to his share
in Francisco's estate from the time of the latter's death in 1987. The
extrajudicial settlement therefore is void insofar as it deprives plaintiff-
appellant of his share in the estate of Francisco M. dela Merced. As a
consequence, the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens is not in order
because the property is directly affected. Appellant has the right to
demand a partition of his father's estate which includes 1/3 of the
property inherited from Evarista dela Merced.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants-appellees are hereby ordered
to execute an amendatory agreement/settlement to include herein
plaintiff-appellant Joselito dela Merced as co-heir to the estate of
Francisco dela Merced which includes 1/3 of the estate subject of the
questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Evarista M.
dela Merced dated April 20, 1989. The amendatory
agreement/settlement shall form part of the original Extrajudicial
Settlement. With costs against defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 41)
In the Petition under consideration, petitioners insist that being an illegitimate
child, private respondent Joselito is barred from inheriting from Evarista because
of the provision of Article 992 of the New Civil Code, which lays down an
impassable barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families.
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable because involved here is not
a situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate
sister of his father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather,
it is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latter's
share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister,
Evarista.
As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is Article
777 of the New Civil Code which provides that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion
of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco
died, his heirs, namely: his spouse, legitimate children, and the private
respondent, Joselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his (Francisco's) share in the
estate of Evarista. It bears stressing that Joselito does not claim to be an heir of
Evarista by right of representation but participates in his own right, as an heir of
the late Francisco, in the latter's share (or portion thereof) in the estate of
Evarista.
Petitioners argue that if Joselito desires to assert successional rights to the
intestate estate of his father, the proper forum should be in the settlement of his
own father's intestate estate, as this Court held in the case of Gutierrez vs.
Macandog (150 SCRA 422 [1987])
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Gutierrez vs. Macandog (supra) is
misplaced. The said case involved a claim for support filed by one Elpedia
Gutierrez against the estate of the decedent, Agustin Gutierrez, Sr., when she
was not even an heir to the estate in question, at the time, and the decedent had
no obligation whatsoever to give her support. Thus, this Court ruled that Elpedia
should have asked for support pendente lite before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court in which court her husband (one of the legal heirs of the
decedent) had instituted a case for legal separation against her on the ground of
an attempt against his life. When Mauricio (her husband) died, she should have
commenced an action for the settlement of the estate of her husband, in which
case she could receive whatever allowance the intestate court would grant her.
The present case, however, relates to the rightful and undisputed right of an heir
to the share of his late father in the estate of the decedent Evarista, ownership
of which had been transmitted to his father upon the death of Evarista. There is
no legal obstacle for private respondent Joselito, admittedly the son of the late
Francisco, to inherit in his own right as an heir to his father's estate, which
estate includes a one-third (1/3) undivided share in the estate of Evarista.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
Appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129163 April 22, 2003
VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO, LUCENA ARBOLARIO TA-ALA, FE ARBOLARIO,
EXALTACION ARBOLARIO, CARLOS ARBOLARIO, and Spouses
ROSALITA RODRIGUEZ and CARLITO SALHAY, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, IRENE COLINCO, RUTH COLINCO, ORPHA
COLINCO and GOLDELINA COLINCO,respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Once a valid marriage is established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it
has been legally ended is presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the
husband with another woman will not give rise to a presumption of legitimacy in
favor of the children born of the second union, until and unless there be
convincing proof that the first marriage had been lawfully terminated; and the
second, lawfully entered into.
The Case
1
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
2
challenging the February 28, 1995 Decision and the March 5, 1997
3 "In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was executed by and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR No. 38583. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and a new one is accordingly entered –
"(a) in Civil Case No. 385, DISMISSING the complaint and [counter-
claim];
"(b) in Civil Case No. 367, ORDERING the defendant spouses to vacate
the premises occupied within Lot 323, Ilog Cadastre, registered under
T.C.T. No. 140081 in favor of Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha
4
Colinco and Goldelina Colinco."
5
On the other hand, the assailed Resolution denied reconsideration:
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA as follows:
"The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo
and Macaria Lirazan had five (5) children, namely: (1) Agueda Colinco,
(2) Catalina Baloyo, (3) Eduardo Baloyo, Gaudencia Baloyo, and (5)
Julian Baloyo. All of the above-named persons are now dead.
"The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by her two children,
namely, Antonio Colinco and [respondent] Irene Colinco. Antonio
Colinco predeceased his three daughters, herein [respondents], Ruth,
Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco.
"The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario.
Their union was blessed with the birth of only one child, Purificacion
Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a spinster and without issue.
"Records disclose moreover that decedent Purificacion’s father, Juan
Arbolario, consorted with another woman by the name of Francisca
Malvas. From this cohabitation was born the [petitioners], viz, Voltaire
Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario,
and Carlos Arbolario (refered to hereinafter as ‘Arbolarios’). It is
significant to note, at this juncture, that all the foregoing [petitioners]
were born well before the year 1951.
"In 1946, it appears that the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire
interest in Lot 323 to his sister, Agueda Baloyo Colinco, by virtue of a
notarized document acknowledged before Notary Public Deogracias
Riego.
between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and
Julian, who extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs of
the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. The fourth child,
Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her
two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to
the other half.
"And as far as Julian Baloyo -- the fifth and last child --was concerned,
records could only show that he was married to a certain Margarita
Palma; and that he died, presumably after 1951 without any issue.
"Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to take possession of a portion
of the disputed parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985.
"It was under the foregoing set of facts that [respondents] Irene Colinco,
Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing
themselves to be the only surviving heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and
Macaria Lirazan, executed a ‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement’, dated May 8, 1987 where they adjudicated upon
themselves their proportionate or ideal shares in O.C.T. No. 16361, viz:
Irene Colinco, to one-half (1/2); while the surviving daughters of her
(Irene’s) late brother Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina
Colinco, to share in equal, ideal proportions to the remaining half (1/2).
This forthwith brought about the cancellation of O.C.T. No. 16361, and
 the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-140018 in their names and conformably
with the aforesaid distribution.
"On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed Civil Case No. 367 against
Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito Salhay, seeking to
recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by
[respondent] spouses (‘Salhays’ hereinafter) since 1970.
"The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful
lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and
that said spouses allegedly purchased the disputed portion of Lot No.
323 from the deceased lessor sometime in [September] 1978.
"Meanwhile, or on May 9, 1988 -- before Civil Case No. 367 was heard
and tried on the merits -- Voltaire M. Arbolario, Fe Arbolario, Lucena
Arbolario Ta-ala, Exaltacion Arbolario, Carlos Arbolario (‘Arbolarios’,
collectively) and spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay
(the same defendants in Civil Case No. 367), filed Civil Case No. 385
‘[f]or Cancellation of Title with Damages’, against the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 367. The Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend that the
‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement’ executed by he
Colincos was defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were
excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to
the inheritance of their alleged half-sister, Purificacion Arbolario; and, as
forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the aforesaid
lot."
6 deceased Purificacion Arbolario, while the Colincos were her cousins and
Ruling of the Trial Court
After a full-blown trial on the consolidated cases, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
7
of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental (Branch 61) rendered its judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the [Arbolarios] and against the [Colincos] in Civil Case No. 385
--
1) Declaring that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement, dated May 8, 1987, executed by Irene, Ruth, Orpha
and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco, as null and void and of no
effect insofar as the share of Purificacion Arbolario in Lot No.
323 is concerned[;]
2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to
cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-140018 and issue a
new one in the names of Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario
Ta-ala, Carlos Arbolario, Fe Arbolario and Exaltacion Arbolario,
3/8 share or One thousand Six Hundred Forty Three Point Five
(643.5) square meters, and the remaining 5/8 share or One
Thousand Seventy Two Point Five (1,072.5) square meters in
the names of Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco and
Goldelina Corlingco or other heirs, if any[;]
3) Ordering the [Respondents] Irene, Ruth, Orpha and
Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco, to pay jointly and severally to
[Petitioners] Voltaire M. Arbolario, et al., the sum of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages, Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney’s fees and the x x x
sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,500.00) as appearance fees;
and
in Civil Case No. 367 --
1) Ordering the dismissal of [respondents’] complaint and the
[petitioners’] counter-claim for lack of legal basis.
In both cases --
8
1) Ordering the Colincos to pay costs."
The trial court held that the Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the
nieces. Pursuant to Article 1009 of the Civil Code, the Colincos could not inherit
from her, because she had half-brothers and half-sisters. Their 1987 Declaration
of Heirship and Partition Agreement was made in bad faith, because they knew
all along the existence of, and their relationship with, the Arbolarios. The
Salhays, on the other hand, had no document to prove their acquisition and
possession of a portion of the disputed lot.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA rejected the contention of petitioners that "the cohabitation of
their father with their natural mother, Francisca Malvas, was by virtue of a valid
marriage." The appellate court observed that the Arbolarios had all been born
before the death of Catalina Baloyo, as shown by the Deed of Declaration of
Heirship, which she had executed in 1951. No evidence was ever presented
showing that her conjugal union with Juan Arbolario had been judicially annulled
or lawfully ended before that year. Because it was also in 1951 when Juan
Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, their union was presumably
extramarital. Consequently, their children are illegitimate half-brothers and half-
sisters of Purificacion, the daughter of Juan and Catalina.
Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting
intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or mother. As
the illegitimate siblings of the late Purificacion Arbolario, petitioners cannot
conveniently undermine the legal limitations by insisting that they were treated
as half-brothers and half-sisters by the deceased.
On the other hand, there is no impediment for respondents to declare
themselves as the sole and forced heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria
Lirazan. Moreover, there is no clear and reliable evidence to support the
allegation of the Salhays that they purchased from the decedent, Purificacion
Arbolario, the lot that they have been occupying since 1970.
9
Hence, this Petition.
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our
consideration:
I trier of facts. However, where the trial court and the CA arrived at different
"The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in
considering the Arbolarios illegitimate children and not entitled to inherit
from their half-sister Purificacion Arbolario.
II
"The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in
considering the purchase of the property by Rosela Rodriguez and
subsequent acquisition by Petitioners Rosalita Rodriguez and Carlito
Salhay improper.
III
"The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in
deciding that the court a quo had no right to distribute the said
10
property."
In other words, petitioners are questioning the CA pronouncements on (1) the
illegitimacy of their relationship with Purificacion; (2) the validity of the Salhays’
purchase of a portion of the disputed lot; and (3) the impropriety of the RTC
Order partitioning that lot.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Illegitimacy of Petitioners
Petitioners contend that their illegitimacy is a "far-fetched and scurrilous claim"
that is not supported by the evidence on record. They maintain that the CA
declared them illegitimate on the unproven allegation that Catalina Baloyo had
signed the Declaration of Heirship in 1951. They aver that this 1951 Declaration
does not contain her signature, and that she died in 1903:
"Que Agueda Baloyo, Catalina Baloyo y Eduardo Baloyo murieron ab
intestate en Ilog, Negros Occ.; la primera fallecio en 11 de Noviembre
de 1940, la segunda murio el ano 1903 y el ultimo en 28 de Marzo de
11
1947 x x x."
We are not persuaded.
We begin our ruling with the general principle that the Supreme Court is not a
12
13
factual findings, a review of the evidence on record may become necessary.
Petitioners, in effect, are asking us to evaluate the 1951 Declaration of Heirship,
deduce that Catalina Baloyo had long been dead before it was ever executed,
and conclude that the Arbolarios are legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of
Juan and Catalina’s only daughter, Purificacion. What we see, on the other
hand, is a series of non sequiturs.
First, a review of the 1951 Declaration reveals that the year of Catalina’s death
was intercalated. The first two numbers (1 and 9) and the last digit (3) are
legible; but the third digit has been written over to make it look like a "0." Further,
the paragraph quoted by petitioners should show a chronological progression in
the heirs’ years of death: Agueda died in 1940 and Eduardo in 1947. Hence, if
Catalina had indeed died in 1903, why then was her name written after
Agueda’s and not before it? Moreover, the document, being in Spanish, requires
an official translation. We cannot readily accept the English translation proffered
by petitioners, since respondents did not agree to its correctness. Besides, it
consisted of only a paragraph of the whole document.
Second, there is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan
Arbolario’s marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid, supposedly because
Catalina Baloyo was already dead when they were born. It does not follow that
just because his first wife has died, a man is already conclusively married to the
woman who bore his children. A marriage certificate or other generally accepted
proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact.
Third, clear and substantial evidence is required to support the claim of
petitioners that they were preterited from the 1951 Declaration of Heirship. The
RTC Decision merely declared that they were half-brothers and half-sisters of
Purificacion, while respondents were her cousins and nieces (collateral
relatives). It made no pronouncement as to whether they were her legitimate or
illegitimate siblings. We quote the appellate court:
"x x x. Therefore, in the absence of any fact that would show that
conjugal union of Juan Arbolario and Catalina Baloyo had been judicially
annulled before 1951, or before Juan Arbolario cohabited with Francisca
Malvas, it would only be reasonable to conclude that the foregoing union
which resulted in the birth of the [Arbolarios] was extra-marital. And
consequently, x x x Voltaire Arbolario, et al., are illegitimate children of
Juan Albolario.
"There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy in this jurisdiction
(Article 261, New Civil Code); and whoever alleges the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child born after the dissolution of a prior marriage or the
separation of the spouses must introduce such evidence to prove his or
her allegation (Ibid.; Sec. 4, Rule 131, New Rules on Evidence). It is the
x x x Arbolarios, claiming to be born under a validly contracted
subsequent marriage, who must show proof of their legitimacy. But this,
14
they have miserably failed to do."
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially
15
established. It stands to reason that children born within wedlock are
16
legitimate. Petitioners, however, failed to prove the fact (or even the
presumption) of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca
Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor.
As it is, we have to follow the settled rule that the CA’s factual findings cannot be
17
set aside, because they are supported by the evidence on record. As held by
the appellate court, without proof that Catalina died in 1903, her marriage to
Juan is presumed to have continued. Even where there is actual severance of
the filial companionship between spouses, their marriage subsists, and either
spouse’s cohabitation with any third party cannot be presumed to be between
18
"husband and wife."
Second Issue:
Evidence of Purchase
Petitioners contend that the CA committed a serious error when it disregarded
the testimony that the Salhays had purchased the portion of the lot they had
been occupying since 1970. This issue, according to them, was not even raised
by respondents in the latter’s appeal to the CA.
We disagree. Although the sale was not expressly assigned as an error in their
Brief, respondents (as petitioners in the CA) still assailed the existence of the
sale when they argued thus:
"As to the spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita R. Salhay, they could not
present any written contract to support their claim to having purchased a
portion of Lot 323 where their house stands. Rosalita R. Salhay on the
witness stand testified under oath that she has no contract of sale in her
favor because it was her mother, Rosela Rodriguez who had purchased
the land, but she was not able to produce any evidence of such sale in
favor of her mother. She declared that she has never paid land taxes for
19
the land."
Hence, they prayed for the reversal of the appealed RTC Decision in toto. The
CA, on the other hand, categorically ruled that "no clear and reliable evidence
had been introduced to prove such bare [allegation]" that a portion of the
disputed lot had ever been purchased by the Salhays. Besides, no favorable
supporting evidence was cited by petitioners in their Memorandum. Thus, we
find no reason to overturn the CA’s factual finding on this point.
Third Issue:
Partition
Petitioners also contend that the Court of Appeals overstepped its bounds when
it ruled that since respondents did not raise the issue of partition on appeal, the
RTC had no jurisdiction to divide the disputed lot. The CA held, however, that
the partition of the property had not been contemplated by the parties, because
respondents merely sought recovery of possession of the parcel held by the
Salhays, while petitioners sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition
respondents had entered into.
We agree with the appellate court. The purpose of partition is to put an end to
co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of co-owners,
vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and a right to enjoy
20
the allotted estate without supervision or interference.
Petitioners in this case were unable to establish any right to partition, because
they had failed to establish that they were legitimate half-brothers and half-
sisters of the deceased Purificacion. Questions as to the determination of the
heirs of a decedent, the proof of filiation, and the determination of the estate of a
decedent and claims thereto should be brought up before the proper probate
court or in special proceedings instituted for the purpose. Such issues cannot be
adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of ownership and
21
possession.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED
JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA.
DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF
CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE
DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO
PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO
DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS
DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON
DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO
CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO
CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-
MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R.
DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ,
namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-
RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF
ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA
RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO
RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as
1 2 3
Oppositors; and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11,
1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, in SP
4 What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did
Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in
5
its decision dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia
6
and Josefa Delgado. The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who,
between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents.
However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be
divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of
her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and
grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his
7 8 9
sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de
10
facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
11
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one
Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple,
namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado.
Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-
blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life.
12
Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.
But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without
the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s
union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is
crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their
successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate
13
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. If Ramon Osorio and
Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was
a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from
the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely,
if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be within the
illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In
support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it,
not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage.
Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida
14
de Casamiento stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural
15
child of Felisa Delgado), significantly omitting any mention of the name and
16
other circumstances of his father. Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents)
insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily
mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by
Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several
months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
17
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but
whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the
two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To
prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested
marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming
Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or
unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of
a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired.
They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June
3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of
Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a
century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been
married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces
of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to
Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident
Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25,
1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability
Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the
United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the
Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr.
Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to
18
his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that
he was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children
of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia
and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were
what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an
19
illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo
Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his
daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous
possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. In fact,
Josefa Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the
intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the
20
University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no
interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory
acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot
claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not
21
the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado,
22
Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption of their ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal
23
fiction." The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by
his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by
the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina
Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia,
24
Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado,
filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of
the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila,
25
Branch 55. This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of
Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
26
Rustia-Cruz; (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia,
Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was
grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other
claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-
blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the
proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of
Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein),
the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended
to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had
merely lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss
the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned.
The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and
the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon
submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her
sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as
27
administratrix of both estates. The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the
estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated
elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the
said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8,
1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with
the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and
only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the
entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the
other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by
the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and
declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their
settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with
law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the
petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the
appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her
as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to
the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of
the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease
and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise
ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the
rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner
and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA,
immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby
required to render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
28
SO ORDERED.
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground
29
that the record on appeal was not filed on time. They then filed a petition for
30
certiorari and mandamus which was dismissed by the Court of
31
Appeals. However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties’
oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to
32
oppositors’ appeal in the interest of substantial justice.
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the
Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors’ failure to file the record on
appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified
the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the
33
appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However,
under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be
excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court’s pronouncements as to
certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the
decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were
to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record
on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise valid issues in the appeal
is apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or
prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private
respondents’ Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the
Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court’s May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
 34
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals partially set aside the trial court’s
35
decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals amended its
36
earlier decision. The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial
court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo
Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo)
entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in
accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-
appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled
to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and
4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the
late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his
estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in
relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of
the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite
bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and
desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to
the appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on
the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records
and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately
upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render
an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the
estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the
administrator’s qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr.
Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas
and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which
courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are
classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of
37
law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory
if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their
cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends
knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such
that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply
lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make
much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a
38
witness attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which
39
referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of
marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took
40
place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be
presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly
establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the
presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa
41
Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D.
42
Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was
43
married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of
"Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima
 44
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was
presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they
primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia
had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had
"lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the
presumption of marriage.
45
Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity
46
of the declarations and statements contained therein, such as the alleged
single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand
in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward
legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if
the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in
constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper
47
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status
of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first
be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory
48
that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. On the other
hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage,
can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and
Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the
disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing
evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon
Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad
49
Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa
50
Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the
rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were
never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations
with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all
51 52
surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then
X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship.
Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and
legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie
of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab
intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from
that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a
legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters
are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal
successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the
case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in
category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such
difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even
if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the
law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that
the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be
applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive
double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the
53
full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-
blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all
illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews,
nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of
the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place
only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
54
grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are
entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their
children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They
55
have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being
clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the
surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of
56
her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from
57
Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could
not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to
the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in
the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to
himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register
of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
58
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of
Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon
59
proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She, however, claimed the
status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the
death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new
Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate
children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however,
later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to
illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.
60
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. Recognition
is compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the
offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the
61
alleged father (or mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his
family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
62
defendant is his father.
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a
63
will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory
recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate
child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia.
However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which
64
she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore,
any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the
65
lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of
66
either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. In this
case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment
prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise
fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as
a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia).
This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be
67
his. Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and
Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic
writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of
intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that
his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since
he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that
it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa
Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that
published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What
could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of
the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not
the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed
manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia,
who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her
adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was
dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and
therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this
jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To
establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out,
otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never
presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
68
existence.
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo
Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under
Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia
69 70
are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews.
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate
estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an
order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest
71
in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule
out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in
72
the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of
Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces
of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision
of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24,
2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is
hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to
(a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b)
the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who may
have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa
Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her
estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine
the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share
in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa
Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian
and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall
be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who
survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per
stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall
pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of
Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and
filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the
trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON,
CLARO SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO
CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
Clodualdo P. Surio and Claro Santillon (in his own behalf) for petitioner-
appellant.
Patricio M. Patajo for oppositors-appellees.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
specifying the respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate
estate of Pedro Santillon.
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan,
his residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his
marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province.
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of
administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta
Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the
following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all
conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her
exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had
conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the
petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate
was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if
administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the
petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently,
oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate.
On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty
days, a project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased
Pedro Santillon.
On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to
resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights
in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after
deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the
remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor
Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was
entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining
half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta
claimed 1/2.
After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled
and ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro
Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-
HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only
son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow
as co-owner of the conjugal properties. ... .
From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two
questions of law are involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to Dismiss
Appeal, is whether the order of the lower court is appealable. And the second,
raised in appellant's lone assignment of error, is: How shall the estate of a
person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are the spouse
and one legitimate child?
The First Issue: — It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and,
therefore, appealable to this Court.
Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an
order of the Court of First Instance where such order "determines ... the
distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled."
The Second Issue: — Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code which provides that:
If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the
widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate.
... .
As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other
hand, cites Art. 996 which provides:
If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left,
the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of
each of the children.
Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to
the extent that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children in
intestate succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.
Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should
control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate
succession involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in ART. 887. — The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children
statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes the singular "child." and descendants ... .

Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary ART. 888. — The legitime of legitimate children and descendants
Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate consists of one-half of the hereditary estate ... .
Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892
to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892 merely ART. 896. — Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to
fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of one-fourth of the hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901).
children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with
respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they
In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be
concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and
inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the
spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the
only legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency
pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996. is clear, because the only legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888, which
speaks of "children," not "child." So if "children" in Art. 888 includes "child," the
Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; same meaning should be given to Art. 996.
at least, his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm the half and half
idea of the Pangasinan court. B. Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate
succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-
This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied
legal or intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or
colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having inequitable, they insist.
expressed the opinion that under this article, when the widow survives with only
1
one legitimate child, they share the estate in equal parts. Senator Tolentino in On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or
his commentaries writes as follows: widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half — if the testator so
wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by
One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child surviving with testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor).
the spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the
child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance
refers to "children or descendants," the rule in statutory construction that
that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was
the plural can be understood to include the singular is applicable in this taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where
case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)
the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the
second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception),
The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the
propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when legislator's desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both
there is only one "child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, situations.
thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair
because, whereas in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only
The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain — and this we are
(Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate.
not called upon to discuss — but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we
are bound to enforce.
A. Children. — It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include
2
the singular. So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the
The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the
same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this
case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children," the consequences
would be tremendous, because "children" will not include "child" in the following
articles:
G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996
ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA
ROSALES, NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA
ROSALES, ELENA ROSALES AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:p
The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248-square meter residential
lot (identified to be Lot No. 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, located along
Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan City). Private respondent,
Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a right of legal redemption
over the subject property and traces her title to the late Macaria Atega, her
mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel
Burdeos and the second, following the latter's death, with Canuto Rosales. At the
time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and
her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first
marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo
Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time after
Macaria's death, died intestate without an issue.
In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely, his
widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold to
petitioner Zosima Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for the
price of P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of sale, dated 14 November 1982, it
would appear, however, that the lot was sold for only P23,000.00. Petitioner
explained that the second deed was intended merely to save on the tax on capital
gains.
Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she was at the City
Treasurer's Office. On 31 March 1987, she sought the intervention of the Lupong
Tagapayapa of Barangay 9, Princess Urduja, for the redemption of the property.
She tendered the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused to accept the
amount for being much less than the lot's current value of P80,000.00. No
settlement having been reached before the Lupong Tagapayapa, private
respondents, on 16 October 1987, initiated against petitioner an action for "Legal
Redemption with Preliminary Injunction" before the Regional Trial Court of
Butuan City.
On 29 June 1990, following the reception of evidence, the trial court handed
down its decision holding, in fine, that private respondents' right to redeem the
property had already lapsed.
An appeal to the Court of Appeals was interposed by private respondents. The
appellate court, in its decision of 22 April 1993, reversed the court a quo; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby
REVERSED, and a new one is accordingly entered declaring plaintiff-
appellant, Socorro C. Rosales, entitled to redeem the inheritance rights (Art.
1088, NCC) or pro indiviso share (Art. 1620, NCC) of the Heirs of Ramon
Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, within the remaining
ELEVEN (11) DAYS from finality hereon, unless written notice of the sale and
its terms are received in the interim, under the same terms and conditions
appearing under Exhibit "J" and after returning the purchase price of
1
P23,000.00 within the foregoing period. No cost.
In her recourse to this Court, petitioner assigned the following "errors:" That —
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring Socorro C. Rosales is entitled
to redeem the inheritance rights (Article 1088, NCC) or pro-indiviso share (Article
1620, NCC) of the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan
Cadastre, for being contrary to law and evidence.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the peculiar circumstance, in
that, the respondents' actual knowledge, as a factor in the delay constitutes
laches.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Socorro C. Rosales, in
effect, timely exercised the right of legal redemption when referral to Barangay by
respondent signifies bona fide intention to redeem and; that, redemption is
properly made even if there is no offer of redemption in legal tender.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the running of the statutory
2
redemption period is stayed upon commencement of Barangay proceedings.
Still, the thrust of the petition before us is the alleged incapacity of private
respondent Socorro C. Rosales to redeem the property, she being merely the
spouse of David Rosales, a son of Macaria, and not being a co-heir herself in the
intestate estate of Macaria.
We rule that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that
matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-
3
law; however, Socorro's right to the property is not because she rightfully can
claim heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband,
David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother's inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died
on 08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them
David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David
Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest
over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and
her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and
illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces,
should there be any, under article 1001.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
4
half.
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David
Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally descended
from Macaria.
When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a
right of redemption arose in favor of private respondents; thus:
Art. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same
terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who
acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other
transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title.
Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in
case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a
third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private respondents.
Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs
5 payment thereof, but rather that it was
(vendors) to the co-owners required under Article 1623 of the Civil
Code —
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or
by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of safe shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he
has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private
respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March
1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of
Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the trial
court.
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule
that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a
written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about
6
the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
7
Even in Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, relied upon by petitioner in
contending that actual knowledge should be an equivalent to a written notice of
sale, the Court made it clear that it was not reversing the prevailing
jurisprudence; said the Court:
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from
the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably
applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly
as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court
in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we
ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines.
What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in
8
view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.
In Alonzo, the right of legal redemption was invoked several years, not just days
or months, after the consummation of the contracts of sale. The complaint for
legal redemption itself was there filed more than thirteen years after the sales
were concluded.
Relative to the question posed by petitioner on private respondents' tender of
payment, it is enough that we quote, with approval, the appellate court; viz.:
In contrast, records dearly show that an amount was offered, as required
in Sempio vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 1 and Daza vs. Tomacruz, 58 Phil.
414, by the redemptioner-appellant during the barangay conciliation
proceedings (Answer, par. 8) but was flatly rejected by the appellee, not
on the ground that it was not the purchase price (though it appeared on
the face of the deed of sale, Exh. "J-1"), nor that it was offered as partial
All given, we find no error in the appellate court's finding that private respondents
are entitled to the redemption of the subject property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,
vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of
land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife,
herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married
to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds
disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were
married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly
secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving
sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City,
Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased
Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter
alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the
latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and
thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be
appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the
inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have
been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage
with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his
whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted
her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of
Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent.
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano
C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix,
respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of
petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitioner and
against the oppositor whereby herein petitioner, Antonia Armas y
Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico
1 Petitioner asseverates:
Calisterio y Cacabelos.
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, formulating that —
1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code in
the instant case despite the fact that the controversy arose when the
New Civil Code was the law in force.
2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-
appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for
failure of the former to secure a decree of the presumptive death of
her first spouse.
3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at No. 32
Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is the
conjugal property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased
Teodorico Calisterio.
4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a legal
heir of deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration
2
should be granted solely in favor of oppositor-appellant.
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring as
follows:
(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugal
partnership property with the concomitant obligation of the
partnership to pay the value of the land to Teodorico's estate
as of the time of the taking;
(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is
entitled to one half of her husband's estate, and Teodorico's
sister, herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to
the other half;
(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of
Marietta E. Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodorico's
estate, and if so found competent and willing, that she be
appointed as such; otherwise, to determine who among the
deceased's next of kin is competent and willing to become
3
the administrator of the estate.
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present appeal.
 It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court is not in accord
4
with the law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between
the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be
determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was
solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not
the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the
5 of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can
Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it
thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of
the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news
of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been
absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
and void by a competent court.
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is
first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the
above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional
cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee
6
spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. Bad
faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong — it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through
7
some motive of interest or ill will. The Court does not find these circumstances
to be here extant.
8 dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise entitled,
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as
long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the
marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to
be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows
that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the
second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent
for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of
disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last
condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial
9
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41 , in relation to
10
Article 40, of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first
husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more
than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the
deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted
during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding
the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been
adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to
them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property
should rightly be divided in two equal portions — one portion going to the
surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The
11
successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of the
deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces
(the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers
and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and
nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation in the presence of
uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed
in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and
nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predecease
or are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in
paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to
petitioner's children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking
successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the
along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby
DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to
petitioner to the exclusion of her own children. No costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-10033 August 30, 1917
THE CITY OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA and THE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF MARIA CONCEPCION
SARMIENTO, interveners-appellees.
City Attorney Escaler for appellant.
William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for the appellee Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila.
No appearance for the other appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
on the 15th day of February, 1913. Its purpose was to have declared escheated
to the city of Manila certain property situated in and around said city; that said
property consists of five parcels of land located ion the districts of Malate and
Paco of the city of Manila, as shown in a plan, in the office of the Department of
Engineering and Public Works of said city of Manila, No. B-10-27. The theory of
the plaintiff is that one Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said property and died
in the year 1668 without leaving "her or person entitled to the same."
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, in a carefully
prepared opinion, reached the conclusion that the prayer of the plaintiff should
be denied without any finding as to costs. From that conclusion the plaintiff
appealed to this court and made a number of assignments of error.
Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated.
It provides, "when a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property . .
. leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same," that then and in that
case such property under the procedure provided for by sections 751 and 752,
may de declared escheated.
The proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. She left a will. The will
provides for the administration of said property by her nephew as well as for the
subsequent administration of the same. She did not die without an heir nor
without persons entitled to administer her estate. It further shows that she did
not die without leaving a person by law entitled to inherit her property. In view of
the facts, therefore, the property in question cannot be declared escheated as of
the property of Ana Sarmiento. If by any chance the property may be declared
escheated, it must be based upon the fact that persons subsequent to Ana
Sarmiento died intestate without leaving heir or person by law entitled to the
same.
The will clearly, definitely and unequivocally defines and designates what
disposition shall be made of the property in question. The heir mentioned in said
will evidently accepted its terms and permitted the property to be administered in
accordance therewith. And, so far as the record shows, it is still being
administered in accordance with the terms of said will for the benefit of the real
beneficiary as was intended by the original owner.
The record fully and completely shows that the theory of the plaintiff is without
foundation either in fact or in law.
The judgment of the lower court is, therefore, hereby affirmed, with costs in this
instance. So ordered.

After an examination of the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, we
find that the following facts were proved by a large preponderance of the
evidence: That Ana Sarmiento resided, with her husband, in the city of Manila
sometime prior to the 17th day of November, 1668; that on said date she made
a will; that on the 23d day of November, 1668, she added a codicil to said will,
that on the 19th day of May, 1669, she made another will making a part thereof
the said codicil of November 23d, 1668; that said will contained provisions for
the establishment of a "Capellania de Misas;" that the first chaplain of
said capellania should be her nephew Pedro del Castillo; that said will contained
a provision for the administration of said property in relation with the said
"Capellania de Misas" succeeding administration should continue perpetually;
that said Ana Sarmiento died about the year 1672; that for more than two
hundred years the intervener, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,
through his various agencies, has administered said property; that the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila has rightfully and legally succeeded in
accordance with the terms and provisions of the will of Ana Sarmiento.
G.R. No. 132964 February 18, 2000
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G.
ABELA, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN
BRANCH, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES seeks the nullification of the 5 March
1
1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal by the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 77, Malolos, Bulacan, of the petition for escheat filed by
2
the Government.
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses
3 Petitioner anchors its argument on Art. XII of the Constitution which provides —
Simeon Guzman, a naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman,
an American citizen. In 1968 Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs Helen and
David an estate consisting of several parcels of land located in Bagbaguin, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-146837 (M), T-146839 (M), T-146840
(M), T-146841 (M), T-146842 (M), T-120254 (M) and T-120257 (M).
On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to
themselves all the property belonging to the estate of Simeon. The document of
extrajudicial settlement was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds on
8 December 1971. The taxes due thereon were paid through their attorneys-in-
fact, Attys. Juan L. Austria and Lolita G. Abela, and the parcels of land were
accordingly registered in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman and David Rey
Guzman in undivided equal shares.
On 10 December 1981 Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring
and conveying to her son David her undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the
parcels of land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Simeon Guzman. Since the document appeared not to have been
registered, upon advice of Atty. Lolita G. Abela, Helen executed another
document, a Deed of Quitclaim, on 9 August 1989 confirming the earlier deed of
quitclaim as well as modifying the document to encompass all her other property
in the Philippines.
4 David manifested his acceptance of the donation in the Special Power of
On 18 October 1989 David executed a Special Power of Attorney where he
acknowledged that he became the owner of the parcels of land subject of the
Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen on 9 August 1989 and empowering Atty.
Lolita G. Abela to sell or otherwise dispose of the lots. On 1 February 1990 Atty.
Lolita G. Abela, upon instruction of Helen, paid donor's taxes to facilitate the
registry of the parcels of land in the name of David.
On 16 March 1994 a certain Atty. Mario A. Batongbacal wrote the Office of the
Solicitor General and furnished it with documents showing that David's
ownership of the one-half (1/2) of the estate of Simeon Guzman was defective.
On the basis thereof, the Government filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos Bulacan a Petition for Escheat praying that one-half (1/2) of David's
interest in each of the subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor. On 9
August 1994 David Rey Guzman responded with a prayer that the petition be
dismissed.
On 11 July 1995 the trial court dismissed the petition holding that the two (2)
deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen Meyers Guzman had no legal force and
5
effect so that the ownership of the property subject thereof remained with her.
6
The Government appealed the dismissal of the petition but the appellate court
affirmed the court a quo.
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations
provided by law.
Thus as a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands in the Philippines.
The only instances when a foreigner can acquire private lands in the Philippines
are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born Filipino
citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner therefore contends that the
acquisition of the parcels of land by David does not fall under any of these
exceptions. It asserts that David being an American citizen could not validly
acquire one-half (1/2) interest in each of the subject parcels of land by way of
the two (2) deeds of quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter vivos. It also
reasons out that the elements of donation are present in the conveyance made
by Helen in favor of David: first, Helen consented to the execution of the
documents; second, the dispositions were made in public documents; third,
Attorney he executed in favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela; fourth, the deeds were
executed with the intention of benefiting David; and lastly, there was a resultant
decrease in the assets or patrimony of Helen, being the donor. Petitioner further
argues that the payment of donor's taxes on the property proved that Helen
intended the transfer to be a gift or donation inter vivos.
David maintains, on the other hand, that he acquired the property by right of
accretion and not by way of donation, with the deeds of quitclaim merely
declaring Helen's intention to renounce her share in the property and not an
intention to donate. He further argues that, assuming there was indeed a
donation, it never took effect since the Special Power of Attorney he executed
does not indicate acceptance of the alleged donation.
There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the
patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c)
the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a
donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the donation be
made in a public document and that there should be an acceptance thereof
7
made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document. In cases
where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the
donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both
8
instruments.
Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are present in the
instant case. The transfer of the property by virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim
executed by Helen resulted in the reduction of her patrimony as donor and the
consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen's
intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently
established. A perusal of the two (2) deeds of quitclaim reveals that Helen
intended to convey to her son David certain parcels of land located in the
Philippines, and to re-affirm the quitclaim she executed in 1981 which likewise
declared a waiver and renunciation of her rights over the parcels of land. The
language of the deed of quitclaim is clear that Helen merely contemplated a
waiver of her rights, title and interest over the lands in favor of David, and not a
donation. That a donation was far from Helen's mind is further supported by her
deposition which indicated that she was aware that a donation of the parcels of
land was not possible since Philippine law does not allow such an
9
arrangement. She reasoned that if she really intended to donate something to
David it would have been more convenient if she sold the property and gave him
10
the proceeds therefrom. It appears that foremost in Helen's mind was the
preservation of the Bulacan realty within the bloodline of Simeon from where
they originated, over and above the benefit that would accrue to David by
11
reason of her renunciation. The element of animus donandi therefore was
missing.
Likewise, the two (2) deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen may have been in
the nature of a public document but they lack the essential element of
acceptance in the proper form required by law to make the donation valid. We
find no merit in petitioner's argument that the Special Power of Attorney
executed by David in favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela manifests his implied
acceptance of his mother's alleged donation as a scrutiny of the document
clearly evinces the absence thereof. The Special Power of Attorney merely
acknowledges that David owns the property referred to and that he authorizes
Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. There is no intimation, expressly or
impliedly, that David's acquisition of the parcels of land is by virtue of Helen's
possible donation to him and we cannot look beyond the language of the
document to make a contrary construction as this would be inconsistent with the
12
parol evidence rule.
Moreover, it is mandated that if an acceptance is made in a separate public
writing the notice of the acceptance must be noted not only in the document
containing the acceptance but also in the deed of donation. Commenting on Art.
13
633 of the Civil Code from whence Art. 749 came Manresa said: "If the
acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another.
Solemn words are not necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept
. . . . it is necessary that formal notice thereof be given to the donor, and the fact
that due notice has been given must be noted in both instruments. Then and
14
only then is the donation perfected.
Thus, in Santos v. Robledo we emphasized that when the deed of donation is
recorded in the registry of property the document that evidences the acceptance
— if this has not been made in the deed of gift — should also be recorded. And
in one or both documents, as the case may be, the notification of the
acceptance as formally made to the donor or donors should be duly set
15
forth. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the
formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate instrument is either not
given to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in the separate
16
acceptance, the donation is null and void.
These requisites, definitely prescribed by law, have not been complied with, and
no proof of compliance appears in the record. The two (2) quitclaim deeds set
out the conveyance of the parcels of land by Helen in favor of David but its
acceptance by David does not appear in the deeds, nor in the Special Power of
Attorney. Further, the records reveal no other instrument that evidences such
acceptance and notice thereof to the donor in an authentic manner. It is well-
settled that if the notification and notation are not complied with, the donation is
void. Therefore, the provisions of the law not having been complied with, there
was no effective conveyance of the parcels of land by way of donation inter
17
vivos.
However, the inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation made by
Helen in favor of David valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as
Helen had already accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together
with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon
Guzman on 29 December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two (2) of
them all the property in Simeon's estate. By virtue of such extrajudicial
settlement the parcels of land were registered in her and her son's name in
undivided equal share and for eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in the
concept of owner. Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides —
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made is
irrevocable and cannot be impugned, except when it was made through
any of the causes that vitiate consent or when an unknown will appears.
Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her inheritance from
Simeon was made through any of the causes which vitiated her consent nor is
there any proof of the existence of an unknown will executed by Simeon. Thus,
pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an instrument which has
the effect of revoking or impugning her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2)
share of the subject property from Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim
deeds which she executed eleven (11) years after she had accepted the
inheritance have no legal force and effect.

Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convert
18
the parcels of land into res nullius to be escheated in favor of the Government.
The repudiation being of no effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert
to their private owner, Helen, who, although being an American citizen, is
qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the
litigation.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained

the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, dismissing the
petition for escheat is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979 (2.a) Que el legatario pariente mio mas cercano tendra derecho de empezar a
gozar y administrar de este legado al principiar a curzar la Sagrada Teologio, y
ordenado de Sacerdote, hasta su muerte; pero que pierde el legatario este
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR.
derecho de administrar y gozar de este legado al dejar de continuar sus
THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA,
estudios para ordenarse de Presbiterado (Sacerdote).
TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya estara obligado a celebrar cada año
JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, respondents-appellees. VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas en sufragio de mi alma y de mis padres difuntos, y
si el actual legatario, quedase excomulgado, IPSO FACTO se le despoja este
legado, y la administracion de esto pasara a cargo del actual Parroco y sus
AQUINO, J.:
sucesores de la Iglecia Catolica de Victoria, Tarlac.

This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands

located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares
That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of
Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the
priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands,
appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor
vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No.
24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan,
died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was
probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5,
1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives,
namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and
Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato
Gamalinda.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest (paragraphing
supplied to facilitate comprehension of the testamentary provisions):
Y en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado segun lo arriba
queda expresado, pasara la administracion de este legado a cargo del actual
Parroco Catolico y sus sucesores, de Victoria, Tarlac.
El Parroco administrador de estate legado, acumulara, anualmente todos los
productos que puede tener estate legado, ganando o sacando de los productos
anuales el CINCO (5) por ciento para su administracion, y los derechos
correspondientes de las VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas que debiera el Parroco
celebrar cada año, depositando todo lo restante de los productos de estate
legado, en un banco, a nombre de estate legado.
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted a
project containing the following item:
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the
nearest male relative who shall take the priesthood, and in the interim to
be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic
Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors, the real
properties hereinbelow indicated, to wit:

Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de terreno palayeros

situados en el municipiooo de Guimba de la provinciaaa de NUEVA ECIJA,
cuyo num. de CERTIFICADO DE TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO SON; —
Titulo Num. 6530, mide 16,249 m. cuadrados de superficie Titulo Num. 6548,
mide 242,998 m. cuadrados de superficie y annual 6525, mide 62,665 m.
cuadrados de superficie; y Titulo Num. 6521, mide 119,251 m. cuadrados de
superficie; a cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la carrera
eclesiatica hasta ordenarse de Presbiterado o sea Sacerdote; las condiciones
de estate legado son;

(1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la venta de estos terrenos arriba situados objectos de

este legado;
 Total amount and value — 44.1163 P13,090.00
Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the project of
partition, directed that after payment of the obligations of the estate (including
the sum of P3,132.26 due to the church of the Victoria parish) the administratrix
should deliver to the devisees their respective shares.
It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze
the meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his nearest male
relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the
testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed
that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the
same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained
pending.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February
19, 1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a
petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the
deceased administration Florencia Rigor), who should deliver to the church the
said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to
render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A new
administrator was appointed. On January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another
petition for the delivery of the ricelands to the church as trustee.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25,
1957 praying that the bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as the
persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of
Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever studied for the
priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was opposed by
the parish priest of Victoria.
Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge Bernabe
de Aquino, declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the
testator's legal heirs in his order of June 28, 1957. The parish priest filed two
motions for reconsideration.
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order of
December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew named
Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in
the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator
was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held
that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative
who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty
years because to enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule against
perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty
years after the testator's death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing
articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil
Code.
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that the testator created a public charitable trust and in not liberally
construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the trust operative and to
prevent intestacy.
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest
inoperative because no one among the testator's nearest male relatives had
studied for the priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable
trust. According to the legal heirs, that factual finding is binding on this Court.
They point out that appellant priest's change of theory cannot be countenanced
in this appeal .
In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory
construction, where the intention of the contracting parties or of the lawmaking
body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the determination of the testator's
intention which is the law of the case (dicat testor et erit lex. Santos vs.
Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March
28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546).
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments.
When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be
in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may
certainly appear that his intention was different from that literally expressed (In
re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333).
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the
life and soul of a will It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the
polestar, in giving effect to a will". (See Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos
vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 223, 237-8.)
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the wilt taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made", but excluding the
testator's oral declarations as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following re-
statement of the provisions of his will.
1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who
would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest.
2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy
and administer the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could continue
enjoying and administering the same up to the time of his death but the devisee
would cease to enjoy and administer the ricelands if he discontinued his studies
for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate every
year twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father Rigor and
his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy
and the administration of the riceland would pass to the incumbent parish priest
of Victoria and his successors.
6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as
contemplated above, the administration of the ricelands would be under the
responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors, and
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate
annually the products thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce five
percent thereof for his administration and the fees corresponding to the twenty
masses with prayers that the parish priest would celebrate for each year,
depositing the balance of the income of the devise in the bank in the name of his
bequest.
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator
intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become
a priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he
discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he
was excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say annually twenty
masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer
the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no
nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in
case the testator's nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado", or how long after the testator's death would it be determined
that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that
patent ambiguity that has brought about the controversy between the parish
priest of Victoria and the testator's legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male
relative who would study for the priesthood should be determined. Did the
testator contemplate only his nearest male relative at the time of his death? Or
did he have in mind any of his nearest male relatives at anytime after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living
at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be
capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment
the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art.
1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed.
To construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime
after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create
uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his
intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three sisters or
second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao.
Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have
had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his third-degree
relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticate the
exact date of his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male
relative would be living at the time of his death, he could not specify that his
nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the son of his
nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for
Ramon Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son of his
sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in the
lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of
Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own son,
Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was studying for
the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that
Father Rigor had intended that devise for his nearest male relative beloning to
the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan,
was not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father
told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest of Victoria before the
latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which was based on the ground
that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the
San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a
seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of
Appeals that the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish
priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to
evidence aliunde as to the testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no
probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the testator's
nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his succession was
opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a
judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano
que estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his
nearest male relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his will
He must have known that such a broad provision would suspend for an
unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation
whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a
priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary.
In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before
the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew
entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the
ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be
terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time
Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood
or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query
is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of
February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that
"not male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the
priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of
the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any
reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases
of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado ... por
qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la herencia, fuera
de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960
(2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not
dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor
accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the
testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as
to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly
intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the
indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy
does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property
recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).
We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest,
the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or
inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of
Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.

The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the
testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That
contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the
disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a
trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by
a nephew who became a priest.

It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee
only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to
become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a
priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and
could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested
any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.
G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA
VENTURA, executrix- appellant, MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA
CARDONA, heirs-appellants,
vs.
GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO,
MERCEDES VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, PEDRO D.
CORPUZ, oppositors-appellees.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Guimba, Branch V in Special Proceedings No. 812, Testate of the late Gregorio
Venture, dated October 5, 1965, removing the appellant Maria Ventura as
executrix and administratrix of the estate of the late Gregorio Ventura, and in her
place appointing the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura as joint
administratrices of the estate. (Record on Appeal, pp. 120-131.)
Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio
Ventura while Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona are his son and saving
spouse who are also the brother and mother of Maria Ventura. On the other
hand, appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate
children with his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano (Record on Appeal, p.
122) but the paternity of appellees was denied by the deceased in his will
(Record on Appeal, p. 4).
On December 14,1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his
will which did not include the appellees and the petition was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 812 (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-3). In the said will, the appellant
Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the
testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate (Record
on Appeal, p. 7).
In due course, said will was admitted to probate on January 14,1954 (Record on
Appeal, pp. 8-10). Gregorio Ventura died on September 26,1955. On October
10, 1955, the appellant Maria Ventura filed a motion for her appointment as
executrix and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor (Record on
Appeal, pp. 10-11). On October 17, 1955, Maria Ventura was appointed
executrix and the corresponding letters testamentary was issued in her favor
(Record on Appeal, pp. 11-12).
On or about July 26, 1956, Maria Ventura submitted an inventory of the estate of
Gregorio Ventura (Record on Appeal, pp. 12-20).
On June 17,1960, she filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to
1960, inclusive. (Record on Appeal, pp. 20-27). Said account of administration
was opposed by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz on July 25,
1960 (Record on Appeal, pp. 27-33) and by Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria
Ventura on August 5,1963 (Record on Appeal, pp. 46-50). Both oppositions
assailed the veracity of the report as not reflecting the true income of the estate
and the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses. But on
January 25, 1961, Maria Ventura filed a motion to hold in abeyance the approval
of the accounts of administration or to have their approval without the opposition
of the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz and Gregoria Ventura and
Exequiel Victorio on the ground that the question of the paternity of Mercedes
Ventura and Gregoria Ventura is still pending final determination before the
Supreme Court and that should they be adjudged the adulterous children of
testator, as claimed, they are not entitled to inherit nor to oppose the approval of
the counts of administration (Record on Appeals, pp. 33-36). Spouses Mercedes
Ventura and Pedro Corpuz filed on February 2, 1961 their opposition to the
motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration on the
ground that Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura had already been declared by the
Court of First Instance in Civil Cases No. 1064 and 1476, which cases are
supposed to be pending before the Supreme Court, as the legitimate children of
Gregorio Ventura, hence, they have reason to protect their interest (Record on
Appeal, pp. 36-39). On February 9,1961, the motion to hold in abeyance the
approval of the accounts was denied (Record on Appeal, pp. 39-40).
It appears that on July 12, 1963, the Court set the case for pre-trial on August 7,
1963 in connection with the accounts of the executrix Maria Ventura dated June
17, 1960 and the Motion to Annul Provision of Will dated July 14,1962 of
Mercedes Ventura (Record on Appeal, p. 45).
On October 22, 1963, four motions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and
Gregoria Ventura, namely: (1) motion to remove the executrix Maria Ventura
which was supplemented on April 27, 1965; (2) motion to require her to deposit
the harvest of palay of the property under administration in a bonded
warehouse; (3) motion to render an accounting of the proceeds and expenses of
Administration; and (4) motion to require her to include in the inventory of the
estate certain excluded properties (Record on Appeal, pp. 50-53; 71). An
opposition to said motions was filed by the heirs Juana Cardona and Miguel
Ventura and by the executrix Maria Ventura herself (Record on Appeal, pp. 56-
61; 61-70 and 71).
On motion of counsel for Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura the joint
motions to require an Up-to-date Accounting and to Require Executrix Ventura
to Include Excluded Properties in Her Inventory were ordered withdrawn (Order
dated February 2, 1965, Record on Appeal, p. 73). The other two motions were
however set for hearing.
The grounds of aforesaid joint motions to remove the executrix Maria Ventura
are: (1) that she is grossly incompetent; (2) that she has maliciously and
purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the inventory; (3) that she IT IS SO ORDERED.
is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious relations with
the appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and (Record on Appeal pp. 120-131).
failed to comply with the Order of the Court of December 12, 1963, requiring her
to file her accounts of administration for the years 1961 to 1963 (Record on
Hence, this appeal.
Appeal, pp. 70 and 75-76) and the Order of June 11, 1964, reiterating aforesaid
Order of December 12, 1963 (Record on Appeal, p. 76); and (5) that she is with
permanent physical defect hindering her from efficiently performing her duties as In their brief, appellants Maria Ventura and spouses Juana Cardona and Miguel
an executrix (Record on Appeal, pp. 50-53 and 74-79). Ventura assign the following errors allegedly committed by the probate court:

On May 17, 1965, the executrix Maria Ventura finally submitted her accounts of ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
administration covering the period 1961 to 1965 (Record on Appeal, pp. 79-84)
which were again opposed by the spouses Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria I
Ventura on September 21, 1965 and by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and
Pedro Corpuz on September 29, 1965 (Record on Appeal, pp. 106-120). On The lower court erred in ordering the removal of Maria Ventura
June 2, 1965, the executrix filed her supplemental opposition to the aforesaid as executrix and administratrix of the will and estate of the
four motions, and prayed that the joint supplemental motion to remove the deceased Gregorio Ventura without giving her full opportunity to
executrix be denied or held in abeyance until after the status of Mercedes and be heard and to present all her evidence.
Gregoria Ventura as heirs of the testator is finally decided (Record on Appeal,
pp. 85-1 01). On June 3, 1965, the Court, finding that the estate taxes have not II
been paid, ordered the administratrix to pay the same within thirty (30) days. On
September 13, 1965, the lower court denied the suspension of the proceedings
The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria Ventura
and deferred the resolution of the joint motion to remove executrix Maria
had squandered and dissipated the funds of the estate under
Ventura until after the examination of the physical fitness of said executrix to
her administration.
undertake her duties as such. Also, it ordered the deposit of all palay to be
harvested in the next agricultural year and subsequent years to be deposited in
a bonded warehouse to be selected by the Court and the palay so deposited III
shall not be withdrawn without the express permission of the Court (Record on
Appeal, pp. 103-105). On September 21, 1965, spouses Exequiel Victorio and The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria Ventura
Gregoria Ventura filed their opposition to the accounts of administration of Maria was inefficient and incompetent.
Ventura dated May 17, 1965, while that of spouses Mercedes Ventura and
Pedro Corpuz was filed on September 29, 1965, both oppositions alleging IV
among others that said accounts do not reflect the true and actual income of the
estate and that the expenses reported thereunder are fake, exhorbitant and That, considering the circumtances surrounding the case, the
speculative (Record on Appeal, pp. 106-120). lower court erred in finding that the failure of Maria Ventura to
submit her periodical account had justified her removal as
On October 5, 1965, the court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura executrix.
has squandered the funds of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has
failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the matter of presenting up-to- V
date statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the
estate, rendered the questioned decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
The lower court erred in considering as an established fact that
the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura are the
WHEREFORE, Maria Ventura is hereby removed as executrix legitimate daughters of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.
and administratrix of the estate and in her place Mercedes
Ventura and Gregoria Ventura are hereby appointed joint a
tratrices of the estate upon filing by each of them of a bond of P VI
7,000.00. Let letters of administration be issued to Mercedes
Ventura and Gregoria Ventura upon their qualification.
 The lower court erred in finding that the devises and bequests in
favor of Maria Ventura and Miguel Ventura as specified in
paragraph 8 of the last Will and Testament of the late Gregorio
Ventura have ipso facto been annulled.
VII
The lower court erred in allowing the appellees Mercedes
Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to intervene in the hearing of the
accounts of administration submitted by the executrix Maria
Ventura and/or in not suspending the hearing of the said
accounts until the said appellees have finally established their
status as legitimate children of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.
VIII
The lower court erred in appointing (even without a proper
petition for appointment and much less a hearing on the
appointment of) the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria
Ventura who have an adverse interest as joint administratrices
of the estate of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.
IX
The lower court erred in not appointing the surviving widow,
Juana Cardona, or Miguel Ventura, as administratrix of the
estate of Gregorio Ventura in case the removal of Maria Ventura
as executrix and administratrix thereof is legally justified.
X daughters of Paulina Simpliciano they are entitled to 1/2 of the
Considering that there are in fact two (2) factions representing
opposite interests in the estate, the lower court erred in not
appointing Juana Cardona, or Miguel Ventura, as one of the two
(2) administratrices.' (Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 1-4)
On July 19,1967, Atty. Arturo Tolentino (representing appellees Mercedes
Ventura and Pedro Corpuz) and Atty. Jose J. Francisco (representing Gregoria
and Exequiel Victoria), having failed to submit their respective briefs within the
period for the purpose, which expired on July 2 and May 29,1967, respectively,
the Supreme Court Resolved to consider this case submitted for decision
WITHOUT SAID APPELLEES' BRIEF (Rollo, p. 152).
The crucial issue in this case is whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as
executrix is legally justified. This issue has, however, become moot and
academic in view of the decision of this Court in related cases.
At the outset, it is worthy to note that aside from the instant special proceedings,
there are two other civil cases involving the estate of the deceased Gregoria
Ventura, namely, Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476. Civil Case No. 1064 was
filed on December 2, 1952 by herein appellee Gregoria Ventura in the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch I, against the other appellees herein
Mercedes Ventura and their father, Gregorio Ventura. Later Mercedes Ventura
joined cause with Gregoria Ventura. (Record on Appeal, p. 95). Gregoria and
Mercedes Ventura claimed that they are the legitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura and his wife Paulina Simpliciano, who died in 1943, and asked that one-
half of the properties described in the complaint be declared as the share of their
mother in the conjugal partnership, with them as the only forced heirs of their
mother Paulina (Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 53-68).
Subsequently, Civil Case No. 1476 was filed by Alipio, Eufracia and Juliana, all
surnamed Simpliciano, against Gregorio Ventura and the two sisters, Mercedes
and Gregoria Ventura, before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch
I. They alleged that as the only children of Modesto Simpliciano, sole brother of
Paulina Simpliciano, they, instead of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura, whom
they claimed are adulterous children of Paulina with another man, Teodoro
Ventura and as such are not entitled to inherit from her, are the ones who should
inherit the share of Paulina Simpliciano in the conjugal Partnership with Gregorio
Ventura (Joint Brief For The Appealant,pp.69-79)
It appears that on November 4, 1959, after a joint hearing of Civil Cases Nos.
1064 and 1476, the lower court rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Mercedes
Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to be the ligitimate daughters of Paulina
Simpliciano and Gregorio Ventura; declaring that as such ligitimate
properties described in paragraph six of the complaint; ordering the
defendant Maria Ventura, as administratrix of the estate of Gregorio
Ventura to pay to Mercedes Ventura and Gregorio Ventura the amount
of P 19,074.09 which shall be divided equally between Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura declaring Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz are
the exclusive owners of the property describe in the certificate of Title
Nos. T-1102, 212, T-1213, T-1214, Exhibits 32, 33, 34 and 35,
respectively; ordering Mercedes Ventura and Pedro D. Corpuz to pay to
the conjugal partnership of Gregorio Ventura and Paulina Simpliciano
the sum of P100,000.00, one-half of which shall pertain to the estate of
Gregorio Ventura and the other half to the estate of Paulina Simpliciano
to whom Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura have succeeded, to be
divided between Mercedes and Gregoria in equal parts; and dismissing
Civil Case No. 1476. The parties are urged to arrive at an amicable
partition of the properties herein adjudicated within twenty days from
receipt of this decision. Upon their failure to do so, the Court shall
appoint commissioners to divide the properties in accordance with the
 terms of the decision. Without pronouncements as to costs. (Emphasis
supplied). (Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 3738.)
Thereafter, on July 14, 1962, Mercedes Ventura filed a motion to annul the
provisions of the will of the deceased Gregorio Ventura in Special Proceedings
No. 812, which motion was opposed by Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona and
later by Maria Ventura. They claimed that the decision dated November 4,1959
in Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476 was not yet final.
On February 26,1964, the court annulled the institution of the heirs in the
probated will of Gregorio Ventura. The motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order filed by executrix Maria Ventura was denied on June 11, 1964.
Accordingly, Maria Ventura appealed the February 26, 1964 and June 11, 1964
orders of the probate court in Special Proceedings No. 812 before the Supreme
Court and was docketed as G.R. No. L-23878. On May 27,1977, this Court,
through then Associate Justice Antonio P. Barredo, ruled, as follows:
And so, acting on appellees' motion to dismiss appeal, it is Our
considered opinion that the decision in Civil Cases Nos.1064 and 1476
declaring that appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the
ligimate children of the deceased Gregorio Ventura and his wife, Paulina
Simpliciano, and as such are entitled to the annulment of the institution
of heirs made in the probated will of said deceased became final and
executory upon the finality of the order, approving ther partition directed
in the decision in question. We need not indulge in any discussion as to
whether or not, as of the time the orders here in question were issued
by the trial court said decision had the nature of an interlocutory order
only. To be sure, in the case of Miranda, aforementioned, the opinion of
the majority of the Court may well be invoked against appellant's pose.
In any event, even if the Court were minded to modify again Miranda
and go back to Fuentebella and Zaldariaga — and it is not, as of now —
there can be no question that the approval by the trial court in Civil
Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476 of the partition report of the commissioners
appointed for the purpose, one of whom, Emmanuel Mariano, is the
husband of appellant, put a definite end to those cases, leaving nothing
else to be done in the trial court. That order of approval is an appealable
one, and inasmuch as no appeal has been taken from the same, it is
beyond dispute that the decision in controversy has already become
final and executory in all respects. Hence, the case at bar has become
moot and academic. (Ventura vs. Ventura, 77 SCRA 159, May 27,1977)
Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the pretention or omission of one, some, or
all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious," and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous
appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and academic. This would now
necessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the following
provision:
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse
the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall
be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests
to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is
Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and
Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons
who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property
(Cooper vs. Cooper, 43 Ind. A. 620, 88 NE 341). It is generally said that "the
nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in
the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the strongest ground for
preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin,
the nearest of kin is to be preferred." (Cabanas, et al. vs. Enage et al., 40 Off.
Gaz. 12 Suppl. 227; citing 12 Am. Jur. Sec. 77, p. 416, cited in Francisco
Vicente J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. V-B 1970 Ed., p.
23).
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes
and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his
wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio
Ventura they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated
preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be
appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to
represent both interests.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal interposed by appellants Maria Ventura,
Juana Cardona and Miguel Ventura is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27421 September 12, 1986
ANITA MANG-OY, assisted by her husband, William Mang-oy; LEONORA
MIGUEL, assisted by her husband, Miguel Olila; HELENA TAYNAN, and
JOSE TUMPAO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA TUMPAO, married
to Salming Pirazo, and ABITO TUMPAO, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
We are back to the early 1900's in the cool regions of the Mountain Province,
setting of many legends of adventure and romance among the highlanders of
the North. Our story is not as fanciful, involving as it does not a rivalry for the
hand of a beautiful Igorot maiden but a prosaic dispute over a piece of land.
Even so, as in those tales of old, the issue shall be decided in favor of the just
and deserving albeit according to the dictates not of the heart but of the law.
The hero of this story we shall call Old Man Tumpao although at the time it all
began he was still a young and vigorous man. He had a first wife by whom he
1 surveyed so the share of each will be segregated so also with the
begot three children, who are the private respondents in this case. Upon her
death, he took to himself a second wife, by whom he had no issue but who had
2 we do not dispute the land which we are actually working shall pertain to
two children she had "adopted" according to the practice of the Igorots then. It
is their children who, with some others, are the petitioners in this case.
The facts are as simple as the ancient hills.
On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a "last will
and testament" the dispositive portion of which declared:
Lastly, I appoint my son BANDO TUMPAO, whom I named, that after
departing from this life, he shall be the one to carry or fulfill my
Testament, and that he shall have the power to see and dispose all
what I have stated, he shall not change what I have already stated in my
Testament so that there is truth in my will. I will affix my right thumbmark
at the end of my written name because I do not know how to read and
write, after it has been read to me and affirm all what is my Win this 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon this 4th day of September 1937, before those
who are present and have heard what I have stated, Pico La Trinidad,
Benguet, 4th September, 1937. 3
The contents of this document were read to the beneficiaries named therein who
at the time were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. In
implementation of this document, they then, on September 7, 1937, executed an
agreement providing as follows:
We who are named children and who will inherit from our father
TUMPAO: BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA ABITO, JOSE and LABET, and
we also whose lands are included, SUCDAD BUTIOG, TULINGAN PUL-
OT and ANTHONY MENECIO all of legal age and residing in the town
of La Trinidad, Sub-Province of Benguet we say in truth after swearing
under oath in accordance to law that the testament of our father
TUMPAO who is presently ill by virtue of our right to inherit and also
acknowledge or recognize the lands as included in the area of said land
as appearing in Title No. 416 in the name of our father TUMPAO here in
La Trinidad, Barrio Pico, have heard and understood the Will as told by
him concerning our right to the land which we will inherit and also to
those whose lands which were included in the said Title No. 416
because we were all called be present and hear his wilt We heard and
agreed to his will as appearing in his testament regarding the land which
we will inherit. We also recognized and agree to the appointment of our
brother BANDO to whom the parcels of land is to be delivered and he
will also be the one, to deliver to us our shares as soon as we will
demand the partition in accordance with the will of our father TUMPAO
as soon in the Testament which we saw and have heard by all.
It is also agreed upon among us in this confirmation that when our
brother BANDO who is appointed to distribute to us our shares we affirm
in this instrument that will answer for all the expenses when it shag be
approval of the title, which shall appear the name of each of us and that
us as embodied in the said win of our father TUMPAO.
We execute this deed of confirmation in the presence of the Notary
Public here in Baguio so that this Will, be used as our agreement so
also with the wig of our father so that they be one to be followed as
regard upon by all and we affix our right thumbmark at the end of our
written name because we do not know how to read and write this 7th
day of September, 1937 in the City of Baguio. 4
Two days later, Old Man Tumpao died.
The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them, apparently in
obedience to the wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last "will" and
affirmed by the other abovequoted instrument. But things changed unexpectedly
in 1960, twenty three years later, that brought this matter to the courts.
On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in
which they divided the property of Old Man Tumpao among the three of them
only, to the exclusion of the other persons mentioned in the above-quoted
5
documents. By virtue of this partition, Old Man Tumpao's title was cancelled
6
and another one was issued in favor of the three respondents.
It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who are suing for
7
reconveyance. They had been sustained by the trial court, which, however,
was reversed by the Court of Appeals. They are before this Court to challenge
that reversal.
In deciding against them, the Court of Appeals held that the "will" executed by
Old Man Tumpao was null and void because it had not been probated The
agreement of partition among the supposed beneficiaries of the will was nullified
because it was a partition inter vivos and had not been approved by the Director
of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. It was likewise held that the land in
dispute was acquired during Old Man Tumpao's first marriage although it was
registered during his second marriage and so the petitioners were liable in
8
rentals for the lots occupied by them, as well as attorney's fees.
After examining the musty records, we sustain the ruling-made both by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals-that the will, not having been probated as
required by law, was inoperative as such. The settled principle, as announced in
a long line of decisions in accordance with the Rules of Court, is that no will shall
9 property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime
pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court.
We find, however, that the document may be sustained on the basis of Article
1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time the said document
was executed by Old Man Tumpao in 1937. The said article reads as follows:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an
act inter vivos, or by win, such partition shall stand in so far as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
On this score, we agree with the trial court. The applicable decision is Albela vs.
10
Albela, also decided by the Court of Appeals, with Justice J.B.L. Reyes as
the ponente.
In this case, Agustin Albela executed on January 19, 1935, a deed of partition
dividing two parcels of land between hisdaughters, Eduarda and Restituta, who
indicated their conformity by signing the instrument. The took possession of their
respective shares upon his death, but fourteen years later, Restituta ejected
Eduarda from her lot, alleging title by purchase from a third party and denying
the existence of the partition. Eduarda sued for recovery and was upheld by the
trial court on the basis of the deed of partition.
Let Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who later became a distinguished member of this
Court, take over at this point:
In their argument, appellants do not question the authenticity of the
above document, but argue against its validity, on the grounds
summarized in their brief (p. 7), as follows:
Therefore the allegations of the plaintiff-appellee, Eduarda Albela, rest
on a document which defies classification. If it is a deed of partition, it is
null and void because it is not embodied in a public document; if it is a
simple donation of realty, it is also null and void, because it is not in a
public document and there is no acceptance; if it is a donation Mortis
Causa, certainly it is null and void because it does not follow the rules
governing testamentary succession; and if ever it is to be classified as a
will, more so, it is still null and void because it does not conform to the
requirements of Section 618, Act 190 as amended by Act 2645.
None of these objections is valid in law. The appellants evidently fail to
realize that Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a testator
to partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs,
and that this partition is not necessarily either a donation nor a
testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which is
revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not
operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding
force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the
of the forced heirs. 'El testador es libre y sus herederos han de pasar
por lo que haga en cuanto no perjudique la legitime de los forsozos.
Inutil es sonar en otras limitaciones que no existen.' (7 Manresa
Commentaries, 6th Ed., p. 639.
That such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or
donations inter vivos is a consequence of its special nature. Says the
learned Manresa on this point:
Con estas palabras (en acto entre vivos) la ley en el Articulo 1056,
como en el 1057, que despues examinaremos, alude a las formalidades
con que puede practicarse la particion, no a los efectos de esta,
significando que para ella no es preciso que intervengan las formas
solemnes que todo testamento o acto de ultima voluntad en general
requiere. Ni aun sera preciso guardar las formalidades especiales de
las donaciones, porque no se trata de disponer a titulo gratuito, sino de
divider aquellos bienes de que ya anteriormente sedispuso en forma
legal (Emphasis supplied. Op. Cit., p. 635)
It was sufficient, therefore, that the partition Exhibit A, should be in
writing. It does not have to be in a public document except to affect third
persons (Art. 1280), being valid between the parties who signed it in its
present form.
If any invalidity could be alleged against the partition, it would lie in the
absence of a previous testament preceding it (Legasto v. Verzosa, 54
Phil. 766). And even this may not be indispensable in the present case,
for the testator's partition did not depart from the shares allotted to his
heirs by the law of intestacy. Nor is a prior win necessary under Article
 1080 of the new Civil Code, which replaced the word 'testator' in Article
1056 of the Code of 1889 with the broader term 'person.'
Be that as it may, the nullity of the partition Exhibit A would not alter the
result. There being only two daughters surviving the deceased Agustin,
each one of them would necessarily be entitled to one-half of each of
the two parcels he owned at his death, and Agustin's former ownership
is no longer disputed by the appellants in this instance. In addition, since
both daughters signed the partition Exhibit A, its terms would bind both,
and estop them from asserting a different interest. Appellants' act; in
appropriating the whole inheritance and its fruits can find no support in
law or justice.
There is no difference in legal effect between Agustin Albela's deed of partition
and Old Man Tumpao's "last will and testament." Both are sustainable under
Article 1056 of the Civil Code, which was in force at the time they were executed
Even as Agustin Albela's partition was signed by the two daughters themselves,
so was Old Man Tumpao's "will" affirmed by the beneficiaries in their agreement
of September 7, 1937, which reiterated and recognized the terms of such "will."
While not valid as a partition inter vivos under Articles 816 and 1271 of the old
Civil Code, it was nevertheless binding on the parties as proof of their conformity
to the dispositions made by Old Man Tumpao in his "last will and testament."
As the trial court put it:
The will alone, 'Exh. B', would be inoperative for the simple reason that
it was not probated, However, when the persons who were named
therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to abide
by its terms probably to save the expenses of probate. and furthermore,
carried out its terms after the death of the testator until now, then it must
be held to be binding between them.
Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir
before the death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It
was not contested by the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years
their right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil
Code.
Art. 1144-The following actions must be brought ten years from the time
the right of action accrues:
1) upon a written contract;
2) Upon an obligation created by law;
3) Upon a judgment.
Any formal defect of the deed, 'Exh. 'C', was cured by the lapse of time.
What the plaintiffs received had an aggregate area of less than 1/3 of
the land of Old Tumpao. It covers about 11,000 square meters while the
total area was more than 35,000 square meters, Under the old Civil
Code, it was within the free disposable portion of ones' estate despite
the existence of any forced heirs. (See old Civil Code, Art. 808)
In view of the foregoing considerations, the defendants are ordered to
execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs of the areas
respectively owned and occupied by them and to pay the costs.
Sucdad Butiog is ordered to pay the defendants P160.00 more as a
reasonable amount of his additional share in the expenses of
segregating his lot but the (defendants) are ordered to execute a deed
of conveyance in his favor of the said lot owned by him.
The expenses of Survey and segregation must be borne by the
plaintiffs.
We may add that the agreement entered into by the parties in implementation of
Old Man Tumpao's "will" did not have to be approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao
11
and Sulu was not extended to the Mountain Province. Moreover, the
12
document was not a conveyance of properties or property right.
It remains to state that the property in dispute having been registered in 1917,
the presumption is that it was acquired during the second marriage and so
cannot be claimed by the respondents as the conjugal property of their mother
and Old Man Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as
their exclusive inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the
petitioners.
The trial judge, the Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, was correct in ordering the
reconveyance to the petitioners of their respective shares. We affirm his
decision in toto.
How much simpler was life among the natives in the North during the early days,
when right and wrong were weighed according to the primal code of the ancient
hills. Even so, though that past is gone forever, justice now, as it was then, is
still for the deserving.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that of
the trial court reinstated, with costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141882 March 11, 2005
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L.
TEVES, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Once again, the Court is faced with the perennial conflict of property claims
between two sets of heirs, a conflict ironically made grievous by the fact that the
decedent in this case had resorted to great lengths to allocate which properties
should go to which set of heirs.
1
This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the Decision dated 30 September 1999 of
2
the Court of Appeals which reversed the Decision dated 7 May 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, of Bais City, Negros Oriental.
The factual antecedents follow.
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia
Baena (Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros
Donio). Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa Teves Escaño
(Josefa) and Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros
Donio, namely: Maria Evelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio
Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (Milagros Reyes) and Pedro
3 instrument which constitutes a supplement to the earlier deed of assignment
Reyes Teves (Pedro).
The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred and
fifty-four (954) square meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which
was originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian
and Antonia under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of
Deeds of Bais City. When Antonia died, the land was among the properties
involved in an action for partition and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443
4 12
entitled "Josefa Teves Escaño v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al." Milagros
Donio, the second wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter,
5
the parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied
the partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
On the basis of the compromise agreement and approving the same, the Court
th
of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental, 12 Judicial District, rendered
6 established their home and constructed a lumber yard. Subsequently, Milagros
a Decision dated 31 January 1964. The CFI decision declared a tract of land
known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don
Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage. The property was to remain
7 Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino.
undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio likewise were
given other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the "movie property,"
the commercial areas, and the house where Don Julian was living. The
remainder of the properties was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the present
dispute, lays down the effect of the eventual death of Don Julian vis-à-vis his
heirs:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties
hereinafter adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaňo and Emilio B. Teves,
(excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa
together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be understood as
including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their
mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would
correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.
Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated
to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second
marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely,
Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros
Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children
Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis
supplied)
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of
8
Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
(petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed
an instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with
9
the Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental Deed) dated 31 July 1973. This
transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of
10
petitioner. On 14 April 1974, Don Julian died intestate.
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner sought the
registration of the subject lot in its name. A court, so it appeared, issued an
11
order cancelling OCT No. 5203 in the name of spouses Don Julian and
Antonia on 12 November 1979, and on the same date TCT No. T-375 was
issued in the name of petitioner. Since then, petitioner has been paying taxes
13
assessed on the subject lot.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession
over the subject lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974,
they entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and
14
Hilaria Cadayday, respondents herein. On Lot No. 63, respondents temporarily
Donio and her children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real
15
Estate dated 18 March 1980. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to
Unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the name of petitioner in
1979, respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio as evidenced by
16
the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate dated 9 November 1983.
At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale,
respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner.
17
Thus, they failed to register the deed.
Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a complaint before the RTC
Branch 45 of Bais City, seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of TCT
No. T-375 in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in
18
their names, plus damages.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by respondents. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence,
this Court finds judgment in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiff, and thus hereby orders:
(1) That complaint be dismissed;
(2) That plaintiffs vacate the subject land, particularly identified
as Lot No. 63 registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-375;
(3) That plaintiffs pay costs.
Finding no basis on the counterclaim by defendant, the same is hereby
19
ordered dismissed.
The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on the
20
interpretation of paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement. It added that the
direct adjudication of the properties listed in the Compromise Agreement was
only in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage, Josefa and
21
Emilio. Paragraph 13 served only as an amplification of the terms of the
adjudication in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage.
According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor of Josefa and
Emilio comprised their shares in the estate of their deceased mother Antonia, as
well as their potential share in the estate of Don Julian upon the latter’s death.
Thus, upon Don Julian’s death, Josefa and Emilio could not claim any share in
his estate, except their proper share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa which
was adjudicated in favor of Don Julian in the Compromise Agreement. As such,
the properties adjudicated in favor of Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa, were free from the forced legitimary rights of Josefa and Emilio, and
Don Julian was under no impediment to allocate the subject lot, among his other
22
properties, to Milagros Donio and her four (4) children.
The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words "shall be," the
adjudication in favor of Milagros Donio and her four (4) children was not final
and operative, as the lot was still subject to future disposition by Don Julian
23 24
during his lifetime. It cited paragraph 14 of the Compromise Agreement in
25
support of his conclusion. With Lot No. 63 being the conjugal property of Don
Julian and Antonia, the trial court also declared that Milagros Donio and her
children had no hereditary rights thereto except as to the conjugal share of Don
26
Julian, which they could claim only upon the death of the latter.
The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julian’s death on 14 April 1974, Lot
No. 63 was no longer a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to
petitioner on 31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a proper subject
of extrajudicial partition by Milagros Donio and her children, and not being the
owners they could not have sold it. Had respondents exercised prudence before
buying the subject lot by investigating the registration of the same with the
Registry of Deeds, they would have discovered that five (5) years earlier, OCT
No. 5203 had already been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-375 in the
27
name of petitioner, the trial court added.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court’s decision. The decretal
part of the appellate decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered
declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375 registered in the
name of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. as null and void.
With costs against defendant J.L.T. Agro, Inc. represented by its
Manager, Julian L. Teves.
SO ORDERED.
28
Per the appellate court, the Compromise Agreement incorporated in CFI
decision dated 31 January 1964, particularly paragraph 13 thereof, determined,
adjudicated and reserved to Don Julian’s two sets of heirs their future legitimes
in his estate except as regards his (Don Julian’s) share in Hacienda Medalla
29
Milagrosa. The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and possession of the
properties respectively adjudicated to them in the CFI decision and Don Julian
himself could no longer dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63. The
30
disposition in the CFI decision constitutes res judicata. Don Julian could have
disposed of only his conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.
31
The appellate court likewise emphasized that nobody in his right judgment would
preterit his legal heirs by simply executing a document like the Supplemental
Deed which practically covers all properties which Don Julian had reserved in
favor of his heirs from the second marriage. It also found out that the blanks
reserved for the Book No. and Page No. at the upper right corner of TCT No. T-
375, "to identify the exact location where the said title was registered or
transferred," were not filled up, thereby indicating that the TCT is "spurious and
32
of dubious origin."
Aggrieved by the appellate court’s decision, petitioner elevated it to this Court
via a petition for review on certiorari, raising pure questions of law.
Before this Court, petitioner assigns as errors the following rulings of the
appellate court, to wit: (a) that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated
and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian; (b) that Don Julian had no right to
dispose of or assign Lot No. 63 to petitioner because he reserved the same for
his heirs from the second marriage pursuant to the Compromise Agreement; (c)
that the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the
second marriage; and (d) that TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner is
33
spurious for not containing entries on the Book No. and Page No.
While most of petitioner’s legal arguments have merit, the application of the
appropriate provisions of law to the facts borne out by the evidence on record
nonetheless warrants the affirmance of the result reached by the Court of
Appeals in favor of respondents.
Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of the Compromise
Agreement has to be quoted again:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein
adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaño and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the
properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all
its accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not
only their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also
the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to
them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.Teves. In other
words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L.
Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second
marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely,
Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children
Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two
legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino
Donio Teves." (Emphasis supplied)
With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage
became automatically operative upon the approval of the Compromise
Agreement, thereby vesting on them the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in
favor of respondents.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can
be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. The
34
Court agrees. Our declaration in Blas v. Santos is relevant, where we defined
future inheritance as any property or right not in existence or capable of
determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future
acquire by succession. Article 1347 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides:
ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men,
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which
are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not
outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is
that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the
35
exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
For the inheritance to be considered "future," the succession must not have
36
been opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a
contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of
Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of
37
a right which is purely hereditary in nature.
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the
exception and therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
....
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if
the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the
38
Article. The partition will of course be effective only after death. It does not
necessarily require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is
the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the formalities of a donation be
required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here
after death; since no will has been made it follows that the mode will be
succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is merely the
39
physical determination of the part to be given to each heir.
The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article
40
1056 of the old Civil Code. The only change in the provision is that Article 1080
now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his
estate by act inter vivos. This was intended to abrogate the then prevailing
doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must
41
first make a will with all the formalities provided by law.
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to
partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this
partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special
character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by
the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of
title until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect
due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his creditors and the
intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs.
42
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid
pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally
operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the
second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise
agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the
property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by
its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which
43
it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist.
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot
No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property
since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the
second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot,
Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right
cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it
had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.
Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had validly
transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The lower court ruled
that he had done so through the Supplemental Deed. The appellate court
disagreed, holding that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, containing as it does
a prohibited preterition of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage.
Petitioner contends that the ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The
contention is well-founded.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of
the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;
but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not
naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting
him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part
44
of the properties. It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line
45
from inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a
compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at
all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly
46
disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. But there
is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the
47
legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir.
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to
was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court
approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to
speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will
depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which
the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death.
A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don
48
Julian’s desire along this line. Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don
Julian’s heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is
hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
Despite the debunking of respondents’ argument on preterition, still the petition
would ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer effected by
Don Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was also the president and director
of petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer
thereof. There is of course no legal prohibition against such a transfer to a family
corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such
transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her
children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title which
necessarily must have emanated from it have to be subjected to incisive and
detailed examination.
Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves as evidence of
an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
49
therein. A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and
correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate,
in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real
50
interest of its owner.
To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title establishes, a
sufficient and convincing quantum of evidence on the defect of the title must be
adduced to overcome the predisposition in law in favor of a holder of a Torrens
title. Thus, contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, the appearance of a mere
thumbmark of Don Julian instead of his signature in the Supplemental
Deed would not affect the validity of petitioner’s title for this Court has ruled that
51
a thumbmark is a recognized mode of signature.
The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in the name of
Julian by T.C.T. No. T-375 is marred by a grave irregularity which is also an
illegality, as it contravenes the orthodox, conventional and normal process
established by law. And, worse still, the illegality is reflected on the face of both
titles. Where, as in this case, the transferee relies on a voluntary instrument to
secure the issuance of a new title in his name such instrument has to be
presented to the Registry of Deeds. This is evident from Sections 53 and 57 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The
sections read, thus:
SEC. 53. Presentation of owner’s duplicate upon entry of new
certificate. – No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the
Register of Deeds unless the owner’s duplicate certificate is presented
with such instrument, except in cases expressly provided for in this
Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown. (Emphasis
supplied)
....
SEC. 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances. – An owner desiring
to convey his registered land in fee simple shall execute and register
a deed of conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The Register of
Deeds shall thereafter make out in the registration book a new
certificate of title to the grantee and shall prepare and deliver to him an
owner’s duplicate certificate. The Register of Deeds shall note upon the
original and duplicate certificate the date of transfer, the volume and
page of the registration book in which the new certificate is registered
and a reference by number to the last preceding certificate. The original
and the owner’s duplicate of the grantor’s certificate shall be stamped
"cancelled." The deed of conveyance shall be filed and endorsed
with the number and the place of registration of the certificate of
title of the land conveyed. (Emphasis supplied)
As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental Deed, it
should have presented it to the Register of Deeds to secure the transfer of the
title in its name. Apparently, it had not done so. There is nothing on OCT No.
5203 or on the succeeding TCT No. T-375 either which shows that it had
presented the Supplemental Deed. In fact, there is absolutely no mention of a
reference to said document in the original and transfer certificates of title. It is in
this regard that the finding of the Court of Appeals concerning the absence of
entries on the blanks intended for the Book No. and Page No. gains significant
relevance. Indeed, this aspect fortifies the conclusion that the cancellation of
OCT No. 5203 and the consequent issuance of TCT No. T-375 in its place are
not predicated on a valid transaction.
What appears instead on OCT No. 5203 is the following pertinent entry:
Entry No. 1374: Kind: Order: Executed in favor of J.L.T. AGRO, INC.
CONDITIONS: Lost owner’s duplicate is hereby cancelled, and
null and void and a new Certificate of Title No. 375 is issued per
Order of the Court of First Instance on file in this office.
Date of Instrument: November 12, 1979
Date of Inscription: Nov. 12, 1979 4:00 P.M.
(SGD) MANUEL C. MONTESA
Acting Deputy Register of Deeds II
(Emphasis supplied)
52
What the entry indicates is that the owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 5203 was lost,
a petition for the reconstitution of the said owner’s duplicate was filed in court,
and the court issued an order for the reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate and
its replacement with a new one. But if the entry is to be believed, the court
concerned (CFI, according to the entry) issued an order for the issuance of a
new title which is TCT No. T-375 although the original of OCT No. 5203 on file
with the Registry of Deeds had not been lost.
Going by the legal, accepted and normal process, the reconstitution court may
order the reconstitution and replacement of the lost title only, nothing else. Since
what was lost is the owner’s copy of OCT No. 5203, only that owner’s copy
could be ordered replaced. Thus, the Register of Deeds exceeded his authority
in issuing not just a reconstituted owner’s copy of the original certificate of title
but a new transfer certificate of title in place of the original certificate of title. But
if the court order, as the entry intimates, directed the issuance of a new transfer
certificate of title—even designating the very number of the new transfer
certificate of title itself—the order would be patently unlawful. A court cannot
legally order the cancellation and replacement of the original of the O.C.T. which
53
has not been lost, as the petition for reconstitution is premised on the loss
merely of the owner’s duplicate of the OCT
Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order as a convenient
contrivance to effect the transfer of title to the subject lot in its name, instead of
the Supplemental Deed which should be its proper course of action. It was so
constrained to do because the Supplemental Deed does not constitute a deed of
conveyance of the "registered land in fee simple" "in a form sufficient in law," as
required by Section 57 of P.D. No. 1529.
A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the Supplemental Deed discloses
that the assignment is not supported by any consideration. The provision reads:
 ....
WHEREAS, in the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption
of Liabilities executed by Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T.
th
Escaño at Dumaguete City on 16 day of November 1972 and ratified in
the City of Dumaguete before Notary Public Lenin Victoriano, and
entered in the latter’s notarial register as Doc. No. 367; Page No. 17;
Book No. V; series of 1972, Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa
T. Escaño, transferred, conveyed and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC.,
all its assets and liabilities as reflected in the Balance Sheet of the
former as of December 31, 1971.
WHEREAS, on the compromise agreement, as mentioned in the
Decision made in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental,
th
12 Judicial District Branch II, on Dec. 31, 1964 pertaining to Civil Case
No. 3443 the following properties were adjudicated to Don Julian L.
Teves. We quote.
From the properties at Bais
Adjudicated to Don Julian L.Teves
....
Lot No. 63, Tax Dec. No. 33, Certificate of Title No. 5203, together with
all improvements. Assessed value - P2,720.00
....
WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is executed by the parties herein
in order to effect the registration of the transfer of the above corporation.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises the
ASSIGNOR hereby transfers, conveys, and assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO,
INC., the above described parcel of land[s] with a fair market value of
EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P84,000.00), Philippine
Currency, and which transfer, conveyance and assignment shall
54
become absolute upon signing. (Emphasis supplied)
The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the dispositive portion of the
instrument does not represent the consideration for the assignment made by
Don Julian. Rather, it is a mere statement of the fair market value of allthe
nineteen (19) properties enumerated in the instrument, of which Lot No. 63 is
just one, that were transferred by Don Julian in favor of petitioner. Consequently,
55
the testimony of petitioner’s accountant that the assignment is supported by
consideration cannot prevail over the clear provision to the contrary in
the Supplemental Deed.
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, apparently considered the 1948
mortgage which is annotated on the back of the TCT No. T-375 as the
56 57
consideration for the assignment. However, the said annotation shows that
the mortgage was actually executed in favor of Rehabilitation Finance
58
Corporation, not of petitioner. Clearly, said mortgage, executed as it was in
favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and there being no showing that
petitioner itself paid off the mortgate obligation, could not have been the
consideration for the assignment to petitioner.
Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid contract,
namely: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the
subject matter of the contract; and (3) Cause of the obligation which is
established.
Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause
produce no effect whatsoever. Those contracts lack an essential element and
they are not only voidable but void or inexistent pursuant to Article 1409,
59
paragraph (2). The absence of the usual recital of consideration in a
transaction which normally should be supported by a consideration such as the
assignment made by Don Julian of all nineteen (19) lots he still had at the time,
coupled with the fact that the assignee is a corporation of which Don Julian
himself was also the President and Director, forecloses the application of the
60
presumption of existence of consideration established by law.
Neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a donation. Article 749
of the New Civil Code is clear on the point, thus:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it
must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done
during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be
notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments.
61
In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al., this Court declared that title to immovable
property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of
donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the
donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same
instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same
document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show
the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a
separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the
deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.

In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public

62
document, the absence of acceptance by the donee in the same deed or even
in a separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement.

One final note. From the substantive and procedural standpoints, the cardinal
objectives to write finis to a protracted litigation and avoid multiplicity of suits are
63
worth pursuing at all times. Thus, this Court has ruled that appellate courts
have ample authority to rule on specific matters not assigned as errors or
otherwise not raised in an appeal, if these are indispensable or necessary to the
64
just resolution of the pleaded issues. Specifically, matters not assigned as
errors on appeal but consideration of which are necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case, or to serve the interest of justice or
65
to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice.

In the instant case, the correct characterization of the Supplemental Deed, i.e.,
whether it is valid or void, is unmistakably determinative of the underlying
controversy. In other words, the issue of validity or nullity of the instrument which
is at the core of the controversy is interwoven with the issues adopted by the
66
parties and the rulings of the trial court and the appellate court. Thus, this
Court is also resolute in striking down the alleged deed in this case, especially
as it appears on its face to be a blatant nullity.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30

September 1999 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.

SO ORDERED.