A.

SUFFRAGE

Lacson v. Posadas (July 30, 1976)

FACTS: Judge Posadas was charged with with (a) ignorance of the law, (b) partiality, and (c)
violation of the Election Code of 1971 because disregarded this provision of law:

Section 136 of the Election Code of 1971, which provides:

Any person who has been refused registration or whose name has been stricken out
from the permanent list of voters may … apply to the proper court for an order
directing the election registration board or the board of inspectors as the case may be,
to include or reinstate his name in the permanent list of voters, attaching to his
application for inclusion the certificate of the Electron registration board or the board
of inspectors regarding his case and proof of service of a copy of his application and of
the notice of hearing thereof upon a member of the said board

And none of the said petitions contains the attached certificate requirement., and he admitted that
as long as the petitioners were present when he called the inclusion cases for hearing and the
respondent Election Registration Board or the members of the Board of Inspectors of the precincts
concerned were not present he considered the latter in default and summarily granted the
petition.

HELD: Jusge was admonished that he should exercise greater care in the observance of the
provisions of existing laws in the discharge of his judicial duty, and warned that any subsequent
misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

The inclusion in or exclusion from the permanent electoral list of any voter concerns not only the
latter in his individual capacity but the public in general. The seriousness of respondent's failure
to comply with the requirements of Section 136 of the electoral law becomes evident. His good
faith or lack of malice is of no avail, considering that in crimes which are mala prohibita the act
alone irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense

Pangutan v. Abubakar

FACTS: A petition was filed by respondent Abubakar and the other candidates, alleging that in the
towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, no elections were in effect held in view of massive violence,
terrorism and fraud. The Commission decided that no elections were held in said municipalities
as the voting was done by persons other than the registered voters while armed men went from
precinct to precinct, prepared the ballots and dictated how the election returns were to be
prepared and ordered the exclusion of certain returns.

ISSUE: WON COMELEC had the power to exclude such returns? – YES. Affirmed.

RATIO: The right to vote has reference to a constitutional guarantee of the utmost significance. It
is a right without which the principle of sovereignty residing in the people becomes nugatory. In
the traditional terminology, it is a political right enabling every citizen to participate in the process
of government to assure that it derives its power from the consent of the governed

While the question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters is properly judicial, As to
whether or not an election has been held is a question of a different type. It is properly within the
administrative jurisdiction of respondent Commission. If, as is our decision, no such voting did
take place, considering the massive irregularities that attended it in the four towns,
The circumstances definitely point, not merely to a few isolated instances of irregularities
affecting the integrity and authenticity of the election returns, but to an organized, well-directed
large-scale operation to make a mockery of the elections in Karomatan.

Taule v. Santos (August 12, 1991)

FACTS: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed of

eleven (11) membersconvened in Virac, Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the
purpose of holding the election of its officers. The group decided to hold the election despite the
absence of five (5) of its members.

Respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary
of Local Government, protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification
in view of several flagrant irregularities

Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held
on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction? – NO, but neither does COMELEC
have jurisdiction.

RATIO: RE COMELEC: The court did not agree that it is the Commission on Elections which has
jurisdiction. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is
over popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the
electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign
power of the people.

"Election contests" would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title or
claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner,

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the
katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by
law whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The COMELEC exercises only
appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective barangay officials decided by the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of
the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election
of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted
by their own respective organization.

RE: SECRETARY - There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by
necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume
jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. To deny
the Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of the elections of officers
of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local
governments.

The respondent Secretary not having the jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving officers
of the FABC, the recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts have
the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest.
Romualdez v. RTC (Sept. 14, 1993)

Facts: Petitioner Romualdez is a ntural-born citizen; the son of Kokoy Romualdez and a niece of
Imelda Marcos. In 1980, he established his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. However, in 1986,
during the days of People Power, relatives of Marcos, fearing for their personal safety, fled the
country, including the Romualdezs.

Romuladez went back to the Philippines in 1991 and returned to his residence in Leyte and
immediately registered himself as a voter.

In 1992, herein private respondent Advincula filed a petition to exclude petitioner from the list of
the voters alleging that the latter is a U.S. resident, and residency is a qualification for a registered
voter. However, the MTC denied the petition but when the respondent elevated the petition to the
RTC, the appellate court reversed MTC’s ruling and disqualified Romuldez as a registered voter.
Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is qualified to be a registered voter in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte despite his
sudden departure to the U.S? - YES

RATIO: The residence of petitioner, was established during the early 1980's to be at Barangay
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice
of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence
or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile.

Stating that, the political situation brought about by people’s Power Revolution must have caused
great fear to the Romualdezes, and as having concern over the safety of their families, their self-
exile is understandable. Hence, their sudden departure cannot be described as ‘voluntary’ or
‘abandonment of residence’.

It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right; a bounden duty of
every citizen enabling them to participate in the government process to ensure the will of the
people.

Badelles v. Cabili (February 27, 1969)

FACTS: This case is a consolidation of 2 election protests against the duly proclaimed Mayor and
Councilors of Iligan City, in the 1967 elections, based on the allegations of flagrant violations of
certain mandatory provisions of the Election Code.

These protest were dismissed for lack of cause of action by the RTC. In such order of dismissal, it
was admitted that while irregularities as well as misconduct on the part of election officers were
alleged in the election protests filed, there was however an absence of an allegation that they
would change the result of the election in favor of the protestants and against the protestees, that
such irregularities would destroy the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast, or that the
protestees knew of or participated in the commission thereof.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal was proper? No.

RATIO: The proper remedy is the protest availed of here if the grievance relied upon is the
widespread irregularities and the flagrant violations of the election law.
The dismissal would amount to judicial abnegation of a sworn duty to inquire into and pass upon
in an appropriate proceeding allegations of misconduct and misdeeds of such character. Time and
time again, we have stressed the importance of preserving inviolate the right of suffrage. If that
right be disregarded or frittered away, then popular sovereignty becomes a myth. The election
law has no justification except as a means for assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of
their views. It is of the essence that corruption and irregularities should not be permitted to taint
the electoral process.

B. POWERS OF COMELEC

Gallardo v. Tabamo (January 29, 1993)

FACTS: In this petition Cong. Romualdo sought to prohibit and restrain the respondents from
undertaking and/or pursuing certain public works projects and from disbursing, releasing, and/or
spending public funds for said projects, allegedly because, among other reasons, said projects
were undertaken in violation of the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881); and that the illegal prosecution of the said public works projects requiring
massive outlay or public funds during the election period was done maliciously and intentionally
to corrupt voters and induce them to support the candidacy of Gov. Gallardo and his ticket in the
May 11, 1992 elections.

In the afternoon of the same day that the petition was filed, Judge Tabamo issued a temporary
restraining order as prayed for.

ISSUE: whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the enforcement of laws involving the
conduct of elections? - NO

RATIO: The act of the judge is invalid. This Court explicitly ruled that considering that the
COMELEC is vested by the Constitution with exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by the
trial court over a case involving the enforcement of the Election Code "is at war with the plain
constitutional command, the implementing statutory provisions, and the hospitable scope
afforded such grant of authority so clear and unmistakable in recent decisions."… “It is easy to
realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were
to arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission
on Elections; that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence.

Tan v. COMELEC (October 4, 1994)

FACTS: On 10 May 1992, petitioner, COMELEC as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers
of Davao City for the 11th May 1992 elections. Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning
candidate for a congressional seat to represent the Second District of Davao City.

Private respondent Alterado, himself a candidate for the position, filed a number of cases
questioning the validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia. This case was, instituted in the
COMELEC against the City Board of Canvassers, including herein petitioner, for "Misconduct,
Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service."

Petitioner moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him for alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, he being under the Executive Department of the government. The
COMELEC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC has jurisdiction – YES

RATIO: The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate
supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any
national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law
to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly
deputized officials and employees of government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the
law has also provided than upon the COMELEC's recommendation, either to suspend or remove
from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of
election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decision or rulings of the COMELEC.

To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses
committed by officials and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC
would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and,
perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of due process to the official or employee
concerned.

Montejo v. COMELEC (March 16, 1995)

Facts: The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislative districts. Biliran, located in the third
district of Leyte, was made its sub-province by virtue of RA 2141. When Biliran was converted
into a regular province, 8 municipalities of the third district composed the new province. As a
consequence, the composition of the third district was reduced to 5 municipalities. To remedy
the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan
of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district
of Leyte.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislative
district to another legislative district - NO

Held: The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of
its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But
based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major
power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance
only empowered the COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made.
Consistent with the limit of its power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not
also give the COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to
another district.

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought
about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of
Leyte. But the issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner’s
remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress
the power to reapportion. The Court held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolution transferring the municipality
of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the
third district of Leyte.
Herrera v. COMELEC (October 4, 1994)

FACTS: In view of the addition of the two (2) new municipalities, San Lorenzo and Sibunag, to the
Province of Guimaras, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras decided to have the province
subdivided into two provincial districts. Conformably, on March 25, 1996, it passed Resolution
No. 68 requesting the Commission on Elections to bring about the desired division.

Acting upon the request, the Provincial Election Supervisor conducted two consultative meetings
with the provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads,
representatives of all political parties, and other interested parties. A consensus was reached in
favor of the division. The PES then issued a memo recommending the division of the province.

Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province under the Memo Circular No.
97-1 issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to
Guimaras. The petitioners questioned Resolution No. 2950.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution
No. 2950? NO.

RATIO: The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and adjacent.
Contiguous and adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected,
and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable distances. On its face, the map of
Guimaras shows that the municipalities grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.

Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members.
Also, under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative district shall be divided into 2 districts
for purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of
Guimaras, being a 4th class province and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8
Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2 districts.

Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division shall be the
number of inhabitants of the province concerned not the number of listed or registered voters.
The districting of the Province of Guimaras was based on the official 1995 Census of Population
as certified by the National Statistics Office.

Matsura v. COMELEC (January 29, 1998)

FACTS: Petitioner Michael Matsura and private respondent Didagen Dilanggalen were
congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao. Dilanggalen objected to the
inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the same
was allegedly tampered. During the examination of the Matnog canvasses, four (4) ballot boxes
were produced and opened. The COMELEC found that indeed the Certificate had been tampered.
Meanwhile, the Municipal Board of Canvassers convenes and re canvassed the votes.

Matsura objected to the inclusion of fifty(50) out of fifty seven(57) election returns on the ground
that the COMELEC copy of the election returns was not reflective of the true results unless
compared with the copy of the original of Municipal Board of Canvassers. Matsura thereafter
walked out while the new Municipal Board of Canvassers continued with the canvassing. After
the proceedings, private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected member and Maguindao.
Matsura filed a petition for Certiorari; prohibition and Mandamus praying the annulment of said
decision due to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC exercise a grave abuse of discretion by not including the seven (7)
remaining election returns for the re canvassing of votes. – NO

HELD: It is settled jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its
inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from
the disputed voting centers. Corollarily, once the election returns were found to be falsified or
tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to
reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns or, if it should refuse,
replace the members of the board or proclaim the winners itself.

Pertinent rulings of this Court have since defined Comelec's powers in pursuance of its
supervisory or administrative authority over officials charged with specific duties under the
election code. It is within the legitimate concerns of Comelec to annul a canvass or proclamation
based on incomplete returns, or on incorrect or tampered returns; annul a canvass or
proclamation made in an unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers either because it
lacked a quorum or because the board did not meet at all. Neither Constitution nor statute has
granted Comelec or board of canvassers the power, in the canvass of election returns, to look
beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity.

BANAGA, JR. vs. COMELEC (July 31, 2000)

Facts: Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for vice-mayor of
the City of Parañaque in the May 1998 election. In said election, the city board of canvassers
proclaimed respondent Bernabe, Jr., as the winner.

Petitioner filed with the COMELEC ], a Petition to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For
Annulment of Elections, alleging that said election was replete with election offenses, such as vote
buying and flying voters, and election Returns appear to be altered, falsified or fabricated.

Respondent COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s suit and held that the election offenses relied upon
by petitioner do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion for dismissing his petition motu propio without any basis whatsoever
and without giving him the benefit of a hearing.

Issue: WON respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners
petition, in the light of petitioners foregoing contentions.- NO.

Ratio: The petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul election results must show on
its face that the conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect are present. Respondent
COMELEC only based its decision on the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code with regard to
declaring a failure of election. There are three instances where a failure of election may be
declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law
for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes; or
 (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect
on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.

The instances being not present in the petition of Mr. Banaga, Jr. The respondent COMELEC have
no other recourse but to dismiss the petition.

Aggabao v. COMELEC (January 26, 2005)

FACTS: Petitioner Georgidi B. Aggabao and private respondent Anthony Miranda were rival
congressional candidates for the 4th District of Isabela during the May 10, 2004 elections. During
the canvassing Miranda moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on grounds that it
was tampered. Aggabao objected arguing that the grounds raised by Miranda are proper only for
a pre-proclamation controversy which is not allowed in elections for Members of the House of
Representatives. Miranda garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Congressman.

The COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 7233 directing the proclamation of the remaining
winning candidates in Isabela. Miranda was proclaimed as the duly elected Congressman for the
4th District of Isabela. Two days after the proclamation, Aggabao filed this petition assailing
Resolution No. 7233. He claimed that the COMELEC En Banc acted without jurisdiction when it
ordered Mirandas proclamation considering that the Second Division has not yet resolved the
appeal.

Miranda moved for the dismissal of the petition considering that the issue raised by Aggabao is
best addressed to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

ISSUE: WON SC can take cognizance of this petition? – NO

RATIO: The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.

It is undisputed that Miranda has already been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office on
June 14, 2004. As such, petitioners recourse would have been to file an electoral protest before
the HRET. His remedy is not this petition for certiorari.

In this case, certiorari will not lie considering that there is an available and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceedings before the
COMELEC. After the proclamation, petitioners remedy was an electoral protest before the HRET.

POE v. Macapagal-Arroyo (March 29, 2005)

FACTS: Former President GMA was proclaimed by the congress as duly elected President
Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, FPJ, filed an election protest before
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. However, the protestant died. Now, the widow of FPJ, Mrs.
Jesusa Sonora Poe submitted a manifestation with urgent petition/motion to intervene as a
substitute for deceased protestant FPJ.
Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not
only of her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino
people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the
election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the
2004 elections. In support of her assertion, she cites De Castro v. Commission on Elections, and
Lomugdang v. Javier to the effect that the death of the protestant does not constitute a ground for
the dismissal of the contest nor oust the trial court of the jurisdiction to decide the election
contest.

ISSUE: WON the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latter’s protest case. – No

RATIO: Only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election.

Rule 14. Election Protest. Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of
the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest
concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner
had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd
highest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.

This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending action. We have held
that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election
protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the
death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence,
we have allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest.

In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the
matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain
or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly
benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get
the highest number of votes.

Legarda v. De Castro (March 31, 2005)

FACTS: Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest against Noli L. de Castro before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET).

De Castro filed a motion for its outright dismissal. He argues that where the correctness of the
number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the ballots; that the process of correcting the
manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns is a function of the canvassing
bodies; that once the canvassing bodies had done their functions, no alteration or correction of
manifest errors can be made; that since the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of
judicial power to determine the facts based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based
on the established facts, it cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing election returns;

ISSUE: WON the PET can correct the manifest errors in the SOV and COC? YES

RATIO: The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is
expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the
duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.

The protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the opportunity
to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to
revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the correction
of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution.

Sarmiento v. COMELEC (August 6, 1992)

FACTS: This is a joint resolution on several special civil actions for certiorari filed under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, seek to set aside the Resolutions of respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Petitioners impugn the challenged resolutions above specified as having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance
of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of its Divisions.

Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

HELD: It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that election cases
include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a
Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear
and decide the same at the first instance. In the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-
proclamation cases are classified as Special Cases 1 and, in compliance with the above provision
of the Constitution, the two (2) Divisions of the Commission are vested with the authority to hear
and decide these Special Cases.

Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases
without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void
and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for
proper referral to a Division.

Zarate v COMELEC (November 19, 1999)

FACTS: During the 1996 SK elections, respondent Julian Lallave, Jr. won over the petitioner,
Marivic Zarate, by a single vote. The former garnered a total of forty-six (46) votes. Accordingly,
the Barangay Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Lallave, Jr. the duly elected SK
Chairman.
Zarate filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that three or more votes
that read “JL” should not have been credited in favor of Lallave. Zarate further stated that the
votes bearing “JL” were stray votes and that there was no candidate with the name or nickname
of “JL”.

MTC decided in favor of Zarate invalidating 8 of the 46 votes. Llave appealed. The appeal by
Lallave was not referred to a division of the Commission but was, instead, submitted to the
Commission en banc.The COMELEC en banc annulled the decision of the Municipal Trial Court
and declared Lallave as the elected SK chairman.

ISSUE: WON COMELEC had jurisdiction? – NO.

RATIO: As can be gleaned unerringly from the antecedent facts and proceedings aforestated, the
appeal interposed by the private respondent to the Commission on Elections from the decision of
the Trial Court of origin in subject election case, was not referred to a division of the Commission
but was, instead, submitted to the Commission En Banc, which decided against the petitioner in
the Resolution of April 24, 1997. Such recourse by the private respondent transgressed Section
3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the Constitution.

Municipal Board of Canvassers v. COMELEC (October 23, 2003)

FACTS: This is a rule 65 certiorari, petition from SPC No. 01-032, a pre-proclamation controversy
instituted by respondent Flora L. Benzonan with the (COMELEC) en banc. Benzonan, who was a
mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Glan, Sarangani seeking to declare null and void the
canvass conducted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Glan, Sarangani because of
irregularities in the canvassing.

The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution finding that, based on the evidence presented, the
canvass of votes had been conducted in a place other than the previous venue, the proclamations
of the winning candidates were declared null and void and a re-canvass of the election returns
was ordered. To reverse the COMELEC en bancs resolution, petitioners filed the present petition

ISSUE: WON COMELEC have jurisdiction? – NO

RATIO: Beginning with Sarmiento v. COMELEC the Court has upheld this constitutional mandate
and consistently ruled that the COMELEC sitting en banc does not have the requisite authority to
hear and decide election cases in the first instance.

It is important to clarify, however, that not all cases relating to election laws filed before the
COMELEC are required to be first heard by a division. The COMELEC en banc can act directly on
matters falling within its administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of quasi-judicial
powers are involved that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then,
upon motion for reconsideration, en banc.

It is clear that SPC No. 01-032 is one that involves a pre-proclamation controversy that requires
the exercise of the COMELECs quasi-judicial powers, as the illegality of the composition and
proceedings of the MBC, including the falsification of election returns and certificate of canvass,
were alleged to be in issue.

Alvarez v. COMELEC (March 1, 2001)

FACTS: Petitioner Alvarez was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Doa Aurora, Quezon
City. He received 590 votes while his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained
585 votes. Private respondent filed an election protest claiming irregularities, i.e. misreading and
misappreciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors. The Metropolitan Trial Court
ordered the reopening and recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts. It subsequently
rendered its decision that private respondent won the election.
On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that private respondent won over
petitioner. Private respondent, meanwhile, filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which
petitioner opposed. The COMELEC granted this motion.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal of
private respondents on April 2, 2000 when the appeal was no longer pending. He claims that the
motion had become obsolete and unenforceable and the appeal should have been allowed to take
its normal course of finality and execution after the 30-day period.

ISSUE: WON COMELEC have jurisdiction? – YES

RATIO: When the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner had a motion for
reconsideration before the Second Division. This pending motion for reconsideration suspended
the execution of the resolution of the Second Division. Appropriately then, the division must act
on the motion for reconsideration. Thus, when the Second Division resolved both petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration and private respondent’s motion for execution pending appeal, it did
so in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Correspondingly, we do not find that the
COMELEC abused its discretion when it allowed the execution pending appeal.

C. POLITICAL PARTIES

Veterans Fed Party v. COMELEC (October 6, 2000)

FACTS: This case is involves three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari under Rule 65 that
assailed COMELEC Resolution which ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional
party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of
Representatives

Under the 1987 Constitution, a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the
party-list method of representation was introduced. Under this system, any national, regional or
sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in
the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in
the House of Representatives as regular members.

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and
coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-
list representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two
percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system.

COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2%

of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of
Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed
38 additional party-list representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total number
of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory
that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from the party-list
representatives.

ISSUE 1: WON the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all
the time? Is it mandatory or a ceiling? IT IS NOT MANDATORY.

RATIO: The pertinent provision of the Constitution on the composition of the House of
Representatives reads as follows:
 Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-
list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally
simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only
the percentage of the total membership in the House reserved for party-list representatives.

In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the
system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

ISSUE 2: WON the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section
11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? – YES

RATIO: In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. To have meaningful representation, the
elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups
which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to
the stability of Congress.

How then, should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Step One. The initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each
received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total
votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two
percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest
number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled
to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is
based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other
parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its
obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.
Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC (June 26, 2001)

FACTS: Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001
party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly
that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not
the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the
pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections. They may,

RATIO: Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

In Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under
the party-list system.

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except
for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall
not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations. – NO, not exclusive.

RATIO: That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however,
that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system

The key words in this policy are proportional representation, marginalized and
underrepresented, and lack [of] well-defined constituencies.

Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,
because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in
a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list
organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies mentioned in Section 5.

Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional
district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of
the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that
even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate
in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the
fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.

Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants.

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show --
through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and
track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Second, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they
must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.
3rd, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be
represented in the party-list system.
4th a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered
5th:The party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded
or assisted by, the government.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so.

Banat v. COMELEC (April 21, 2009)

FACTS: In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made
a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
BANAT, a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. In
proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following
rules:
1. 80-20
2. 2%= 1 seat
3. 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans
4. 3 seat cap rule, ibid

ON WHICH FORMULA TO USE:

HELD: Because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term
proportional representation, this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of
additional seats to party-list organizations.
A. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50.
B. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
• The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
• The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
• Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
• Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections- No by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

BUT, read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state
that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example,
the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas
(KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing.

ISSUE 3: Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid. – YES. The three-seat cap,
as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains
a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.

D. REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC (March 26, 2001)

FACTS: petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new
voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or
before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No.
8189

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 denying the request to conduct a two-day additional
registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001.Petitioners filed for certiorari and
mandamus before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary
writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters? –NO

RATIO: To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all
absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other
rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our
Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law.
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration.
Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the
minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present,
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act
of 1996. Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of
suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in
the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners argument, registration cannot and should not
be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement.

While it may be true that respondent COMELEC set the registration deadline on December 27,
2000, this Court is of the Firm view that petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to
avail of the continuing registration under R.A. 8189. Stated in a different manner, the petitioners
in the instant case are not without fault or blame. They admit in their petition that they failed to
register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration and came to this Court and
invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus
nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean hands.

Siawan v. Inopiquez (May 21, 2001)

FACTS: This is a complaint filed by Datu Inocencio Siawan against Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr.
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kananga-Matag-ob, Leyte, for gross ignorance of the law,
gross abuse of power, and misconduct in connection with the latters handling of a criminal case
and two election cases for inclusion of voters.

Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kananga-Matag-ob,
Leyte. He has had relatives who ran for public office while he assumed as such presiding judge. In
all these elections, the respondent never inhibited [himself] from hearing inclusion and exclusion
cases except for once.

HELD: Under RoC and the Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent judge was disqualified from
hearing the petition of his uncle and it was immaterial that the petition was meritorious. The
purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of
impropriety on the part of a judge. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned and he should administer justice impartially and
without delay. The failure of respondent judge to inhibit himself constitutes an abuse of his
authority and undermines public confidence in the impartiality of judges.

Under the law, a petition for inclusion may be filed only by a person (a) whose application for
registration has been disapproved by the board of election inspectors or (b) whose name has
been stricken out from the list of voters. No exception is provided by the law. The petition of
former Judge Ponciano C. Inopiquez does not fall within the coverage of the law, since he was
neither refused registration by the board nor his name ordered stricken from the list of voters of
Barangay Talisay, Matag-ob, Leyte.

The records show that neither of the petition in Election Case No. 333 and Election Case No. 292
named the board of election inspectors a party to the proceedings. Nor is there any showing that
the board of election inspectors was ever notified of hearings.

The failure of respondent to observe the requirements of the Election Code is inexcusable. As a
judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court vested with the jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions
for inclusion or exclusion of voters, he is expected to be familiar with these requirements because
it can be assumed that these election cases were not the first cases he has decided.
Romualdez v. RTC (Sept. 14, 1993)

Facts: Petitioner Romualdez is a ntural-born citizen; the son of Kokoy Romualdez and a niece of
Imelda Marcos. In 1980, he established his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. However, in 1986,
during the days of People Power, relatives of Marcos, fearing for their personal safety, fled the
country, including the Romualdezs.

Romuladez went back to the Philippines in 1991 and returned to his residence in Leyte and
immediately registered himself as a voter.

In 1992, herein private respondent Advincula filed a petition to exclude petitioner from the list
of the voters alleging that the latter is a U.S. resident, and residency is a qualification for a
registered voter. However, the MTC denied the petition but when the respondent elevated the
petition to the RTC, the appellate court reversed MTC’s ruling and disqualified Romuldez as a
registered voter. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is qualified to be a registered voter in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte despite
his sudden departure to the U.S? - YES

RATIO: The residence of petitioner, was established during the early 1980's to be at Barangay
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice
of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence
or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile.

Stating that, the political situation brought about by people’s Power Revolution must have caused
great fear to the Romualdezes, and as having concern over the safety of their families, their self-
exile is understandable. Hence, their sudden departure cannot be described as ‘voluntary’ or
‘abandonment of residence’.

Mercado v. Dysangco (July 30, 2002)

FACTS: A sworn complaint for grave misconduct was filed against Judge Dysangco. The
complainants alleged that prior to the Barangay Elections of May 12, 1997, forty-eight (48)
persons filed with the said court separate petitions for inclusion in the voters list.

Complainants averred that the issuance of the Order by respondent judge was highly anomalous,
illegal, and patently of dubious origin because not one of the thirty-nine (39) petitioners
presented evidence or appeared in the scheduled hearings.

Respondent judge explained that his Order was based on his interviews with those petitioners.
he Court Administrator found that respondent judge, in issuing the questioned Order, committed
a lapse and recommended that he be fined in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

COURT: He did not decide the petition on the basis of petitioners evidence. He could not have
done so. Extant in the record is the fact that the thirty-nine (39) petitioners failed to attend any
of the scheduled hearings. How then could they present evidence?

Respondent judge claimed that he personally interviewed the thirty-four (34) petitioners. We are
hard put to treat such personal interview as corresponding to the hearing required by law. The
minutes of the interview merely show that it is a superficial and mechanical inquiry on each
petitioners age, citizenship, residence and years of residence in Barangay Kabulihan.
E. CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY

Gador v. COMELEC (January 22, 1980)

Petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming
January 30, 1980 local election; that he filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election
Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980 but the original deadline was on Jan. 4.
in view of the President's announcement that the resolution of the respondent, Commission on
Elections, for the extension of time for filing certificates of candidacy from January 4 to January
10 had been denied.
This petition for mandamus commanding the respondent, Commission on Elections, to
immediately include the petitioner in the list of candidates for Mayor.

Issue is whether or not the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January
7, 1980 is valid. - NO

HELD: Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of candidacy
shag be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner
that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.
This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond
January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.

Coquilla v. COMELEC (July 31, 2002)

FACTS: Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern
Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the
Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S.
Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.

On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, he
continued making several trips to the United States. Subsequently, petitioner applied for
repatriation under R.A. No. 8171. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern
Samar. His application was approved by the Election Registration Board. On February 27, 2001,
he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar for two (2) years.

On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who
was running for reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the
ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for
only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before
the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy? – NO

RATIO: The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found
at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after
enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he
reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him.

This Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a greencard, which entitles
one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

When petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan
visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have
waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171.

Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar
in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because 117 of the Omnibus Election
Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray, however, registration as a voter does not bar the filing of
a subsequent case questioning a candidate’s lack of residency.

We hold that petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of
candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation

Go v. COMELEC (May 10, 2001)

FACTS: On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the
municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.

On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of
Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province
of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor
an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte.
However, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal
and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal
election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.

At that late hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of
candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay
was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax to her father at
Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the same to the office of the lection officer of Baybay, Leyte
at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001. On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay, Leyte,
received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal.

On 05 March 2001, respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, at
Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of
petitioner.] The petitions were based on the ground that petitioner filed certificates of candidacy
for two positions, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus,
making her ineligible for both.

ISSUE: Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte
because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions? NO.

HELD: SHE is QUALIFIED to run as governor and that withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy
for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate
of candidacy for governor.
RATIO: Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code,
provides that:

"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy.- No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the
same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.

"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and
if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for
any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare
under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of
candidacy for the other office or offices."

There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed
with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Section 12 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal
be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such
requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or
jurisdictional.

Villarosa v. COMELEC (November 29, 1999)

FACTS: Petitioner was a candidate for Representative of the lone district of Occidental Mindoro
in the May 11, 1998 elections and was proclaimed duly elected thereto.

On March 27, 1998, she filed her certificate of candidacy in which she stated, among others, that
her nickname is JTV. On April 20, 1998, private respondent Restor filed a letter-petition
addressed to COMELEC Chairman asking for the invalidation or cancellation of JTV as the official
nickname of petitioner as declared in her certificate of candidacy, and the nullification of all votes
cast in the said nickname, on the ground that petitioner is not publicly known by that name. The
letter-petition further averred that petitioner is publicly known in Occidental Mindoro as Girlie
and that the appellation JTV actually pertains to the initials of her husband and former
Congressman of Occidental Mindoro, Jose Tapales Villarosa.

On election day, May 11, 1998, the Commission, sitting en banc, issued a Resolution granting
private respondent Restors letter-petition on the ground that the nickname JTV is not one by
which petitioner is popularly known. Petitioner received a fax copy of this Resolution at 5:32 in
the afternoon of May 11, 1998, at which time voting has ceased and canvassing of votes in some
precincts has already gone underway.
ISSUE: petitioners use of the nickname JTV and the validity of votes cast in the name JTV.

HELD: In view of the fact that the election protest of private respondent Quintos is presently
pending in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, we resolve to leave this matter to the
resolution of the said body as the sole judge of all contests respecting the election, returns and
qualifications of its members.

Sanciangco v. Rono (July 19, 1985)

FACTS: Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain. Later, he was elected President of the
Association of Barangay Councils (ABC). As the President of the Association, petitioner was
appointed by the President of the Philippines as a member of the City's Sangguniang Panlungsod.

On March 27, 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan
Pambansa elections. He was not successful in the said election.

Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 petitioner informed respondent
Vice-Mayor, that he was resuming his duties as member of that body. Jose A. Rono who ruled that
since petitioner is an appointive official, he is deemed to have resigned from his appointive
position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.

Petitioner impugns said ruling on the ground that since Section 13(2) of Batasan Pambansa Blg.
697 makes no distinction between elective and appointive officials, the legislative intent is clear
that even appointive Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision.

ISSUE: WON an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, who ran for the position of
Mambabatas Pambansa should be considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon the
filing of his Certificate of Candidacy. - RESIGNED

RATIO: Sec. 13. Effects of filing of certificate of candidacy.

(1) Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active officers
and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Integrated National Police,
as well as officials and employees of government-owned and government-controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, shall ipso facto cease in office or position as of the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy: ...

(2) Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials

shall, upon filing certificate of candidacy be considered on forced leave of absence from
office.

Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Ozamiz City, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections.

It goes without saying that petitioner remains an elective Barangay Captain from which position
he may be considered as having been on "forced leave of absence."
PNOC-EDC v. NLRC (May 31, 1993)

FACTS: Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the Philippine National Oil Co.-Energy Development
Corp. (PNOC-EDC). While holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary,
Engineering and Construction Department,, Pineda decided to run for councilor of the
Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in the local elections scheduled in January, 1988, and filed the
corresponding certificate of candidacy for the position

Objection to Pineda's being a candidate while retaining his job in the PNOC-EDC was shortly
thereafter registered. Argument was that Pineda could not actively participate in politics unless
he officially resigned from PNOC-EDC.

Pineda was among the official candidates voted for, and eventually proclaimed elected to, the
office of councilor. Despite so qualifying as councilor, and assuming his duties as such, he
continued working for PNOC-EDC

The Legal Department rendered an opinion to the effect that Manuel S. Pineda should be
considered ipso facto resigned upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy in November, 1987,
in accordance with Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Pineda lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal in the Regional Arbitration Branch, and the NLRC
decided in his favor.

ISSUE: Whether an employee in a government-owned or controlled corporations without an

original charter shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy. – YES

RATIO: Congress made no effort to distinguish between these two classes of government-owned
or controlled corporations or their employees in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent
related statutes.

What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the
general laws on incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and
even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words,
Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in
the Labor Code, as amended.

Quinto v. COMELEC (2009 and 2010)

FACTS: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a

public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
 b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elective office or position.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their
CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in
the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for
prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution
No. 8678 as null and void.

ISSUE: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause?

Held: Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class..

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to
the purposes of the law.

Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the
law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the
Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same
time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to
take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and
foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification
to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections.

ON MR (2010)

Held: No

In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the
operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign
power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular
vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it
may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions
in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is
accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term
for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials
are concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the
purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and
discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest
of deferring to the sovereign will.
F. DISQUALIFICATION

MARQUEZ v. COMELEC (April 18, 1995)

FACTS: Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective
position in the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari
praying for the reversal of the resolution "COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo
warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being
allegedly a fugitive from justice.

It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal
charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was
still pending before the Municipal Court of Los A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is
claimed, has yet to be served.

The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the conflicting claims of the
parties on the meaning of the term "fugitive from justice as that phrase is so used under the
provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160). That law
states:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from

running for any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or
abroad(.)

ISSUE: Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy
(and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant
for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice". – YES

RATIO: fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution.

Caasi v. CA (November 8, 1990)

FACTS: At issue is the disqualification of private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of
municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January
18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United
States of America, not of Bolinao

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he
denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card
for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical
examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987
for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.

ISSUE: WON by fiiling a COC, a green card holder has waived his PR status and is therefore
qualified? - NO
HELD: The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which
provides:

“Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country

shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws.'

To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should
be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for
elective office in this country.

In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of
excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess
dual loyalties and allegiance.

Pamil v. Teleron (November 20, 1978)

FACTS: Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the
position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. A suit for quo warranto was then filed
by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this
Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a
municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the
municipality."

The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge sustained the right of Father Gonzaga to the
office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed
by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the disqualification of the respondent based on Administrative Code provision
Constitutional

HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935 Constitution, “No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” If the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy is to be maintained, then Section 2175 shall not prevail, thus, an
ecclesiastic may run for elective office. However, this issue proved to have divided the
Supreme Court because it failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in
order to declare Section 2175 of the RAC to be unconstitutional. For this, the petition filed
by Pamil must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set aside. Fr.
Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.

It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how can one who swore to serve
the Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may
conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the church and state. The
Revised Administrative Code still stands because there is no implied repeal.
Fermin v. COMELEC (December 18, 2008)

FACTS: the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
passed Autonomy Act No. 205 creating the Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan in Shariff
Kabunsuan

Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner, was a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan. On
December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year
and 6 months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his registration
record to the said barangay. In the meantime, the creation of North Kabuntalan was ratified
in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006, formally making Barangay Indatuan a component of
Northern Kabuntalan.

COMELEC approved petitioner's application for the transfer of his voting record and
registration. Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Northern
Kabuntalan in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections.

On April 20, 2007, private respondent Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen, another mayoralty
candidate, filed a Petition for Disqualification against Fermin.

The petition alleged that the petitioner did not possess the period of residency required for
candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC and in his application for transfer of
voting record. Dilangalen emerged as the victor.

ISSUE 1: WHETHER OR NOT THE ONE (1) YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT IS

APPLICABLE TO CANDIDATES RUNNING FOR NEW MUNICIPALITIES - NO

ISSUE 2: WON petition was files on time ie, WON Sec 68 or sec 78? –On time, sec 78.

To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section
12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation
in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person
who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the
person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated
as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya ] this Court
made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be
substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until
disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under
Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.

The Court finds that the same is in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC.

The petition contains the essential allegations of a Section 78 petition,

namely: (1) the candidate made a representation in his certificate; (2) the
representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the
substantive rights of the candidate (the right to run for the election for which
he filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the false representation
with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public
office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render him ineligible.
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not
based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under
Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that
a Section 78 petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed
after proclamation of the wining candidate.

At this point, we must stress that a Section 78 petition ought not to be interchanged or
confused with a Section 68 petition. They are different remedies, based on different
grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. Private respondents insistence, therefore,
that the petition it filed before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a
disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact captioned a Petition for
Disqualification, does not persuade the Court.

The ground raised in the Dilangalen petition is that Fermin allegedly lacked one of the
qualifications to be elected as mayor of Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., he had not established
residence in the said locality for at least one year immediately preceding the election.
Failure to meet the one-year residency requirement for the public office is not a ground for
the disqualification of a candidate under Section 68.

Diangka v. COMELEC (January 28, 2000)

FACTS: A special action for disqualification was commenced by private respondent Ali M.
Balindong (BALINDONG), a rival mayoralty candidate of DIANGKA, before the COMELEC on
the ground that the latter and her husband, then incumbent mayor of said municipality,
committed acts of terrorism in order to accord DIANGKA an undue advantage at the polls.
Allegation: compelled the Watchers of other candidates through force, threat and
intimidation to leave the ballot box, having swooped down and assaulted the Poblacion of
Ganassi, Lanao del Sur, creating tumultuous commotion or disturbances therein scaring
away and preventing voters

On September 2, 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division issued a Resolution disqualifying

DIANGKA as candidate.

ISSUE: WON SHE COULD BE DISQUALIFIED ON THE BASIS OF THE ALLEGED TERRORISM
SUPPOSEDLY PERPETRATED BY HER HUSBAND - YES

DIANGKA argues that her disqualification was simply based on relationship, she being the
wife of the alleged terrorist; that there is no evidence that she conspired with her husband
in the perpetration of the acts of terrorism; and that there is a violation of the rule that "the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.

SEC. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in

which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of,
or found by the Commission of having … (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy;

HELD: Contrary to DIANGKAS claim, the COMELEC found evidence of her direct
participation in the first act of terrorism.

DIANGKA could not feign ignorance as to what had transpired as the COMELEC had found,
based on her own admission and the testimonies of witnesses, that DIANGKA was a
passenger in the ambulance; that she had control over the driver of the ambulance, who
upon her request, dropped her off at her house; and that the ambulance belongs to the
municipality under the control of her mayor husband. Evidently, the application of the rule
on res inter alios acta is unavailing on account of these circumstances which show her
participation or at the very least her acquiescence to the incident.

JURILLA V. COMELEC (June 2, 1994)

FACTS: On 23 March 1992, respondent Antonio V. Hernandez filed with the Commission on
Elections his certificate of candidacy for one of the contested seats. In Item No. 6 of his
certificate he gave as his address "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City." However, he
did not indicate on the space provided in Item No. 12 therein his Precinct Number and the
particular Barangay where he was a registered

Petitioners herein challenged his qualification before COMELEC explaining however that
since they became aware of the grounds for private respondent’s qualification only after
the elections, they chose to file their petition under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure authorizing the filing of such petition at any day after the last day for filing
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.

On 2 June 1992, COMELEC promulgated its questioned resolution denying the petition for
disqualification for being filed outside the reglementary period under Sec. 5 of RA 6646,
which pertains to nuisance candidates. Hence the instant petition for certiorari imputing
grave abuse of discretion

HELD: It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government
Code of 1991, earlier quoted, that the law does not specifically require that the candidate
must state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number and the Barangay where he
is registered. Apparently, it is enough that he is actually registered as a voter in the precinct
where he intends to vote, which should be within the district where he is running for office.

In the case at bench, his failure to so state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number
is satisfactorily explained by him in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yet
assigned a particular Precinct Number

Certainly, the holding of COMELEC that private respondent Hernandez was a "nuisance
candidate" is erroneous because, tested against the provisions of Sec. 69, there is no way
by which we can categorize him as a "nuisance candidate," hence, the procedure therein
provided could not have been properly invoked by petitioners herein.

DOMINO v. COMELEC (July 19, 1999)

Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative
of the lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in
the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months.

Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of

Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is
not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks
election.

Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as

candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani based on his
own Voter’s Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts.,
Old Balara, Quezon City.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections - NO

HELD: Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that
sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his
certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon
City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned
his residence in Quezon City

A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not
adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s
intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required
to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his
permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not
result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot
in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period
of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his
residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City.
While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of
residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.
 K. FAILURE OF ELECTIONS

Carlos v. Angeles (Nov. 29, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of mayor of the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (later converted into a City) during the May 11, 1998
elections. The Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the mayor. The private respondent
filed an election protest with the RTC. The court came up with revision reports which also showed
that the petitioner got the highest number of votes. Nevertheless, in its decision, the trial court set
aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of "significant badges of fraud," which it
attributed to the present petitioner. The court then declared private respondent as the winner.
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, and also filed a petition to the SC questioning the
decision of the RTC. The private respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the SC.

ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over CPM petitions in election cases?

HELD: Both the SC and COMELEC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (RTCs) in election
cases involving elective municipal officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed with the COMELEC,
the same would not bar the present action as an exception to the rule because under the
circumstances, appeal would not be a speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The power to nullify an election must be exercised with the greatest care with a view not to
disenfranchise the voters, and only under circumstances that clearly call for such drastic remedial
measure. More importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election. It is
the COMELEC en banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure of election.
Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the extent of that
power is limited to the annulment of the election and the calling of special elections. The result is
a failure of election for that particular office. In such case, the court cannot declare a winner.

Batabor v. COMELEC (July 21, 2004)

FACTS: Batabor, petitioner, and Batondiang, private respondent, ran as opposing candidates for
the position of Punong Barangay The result of the election shows that private respondent won as
Punong Barangay, garnering 123 votes, as against petitioners 94 votes. In due time, private
respondent was proclaimed.

Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition to declare a failure of election. He claims that on
election day, after lunch, the Chairwoman of the (BEI) of Precincts 3A, 4A and 5A suddenly tore
all the unused official ballots. Thus, the voting was not continued. The BEI then padlocked the
ballot boxes. At that time, petitioner was not present. COMELEC denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON COMELEC was in GADALEJ in not declaring a FoE? - NO

RATIO: While the alleged 100 votes of petitioners relatives and supporters, if cast during the
election, are sufficient to affect its result, however, he failed to prove that the voting did not take
place in precincts. the Statement of Votes and the Certificate of Canvass of Votes show that out of
the 316 registered voters in the questioned precincts, at least 220 actually voted. This simply
shows that there was no failure of election in the subject precincts. Moreover, petitioners
allegation that the voting was not resumed after lunch break, preventing 100 of his relatives and
followers to vote, is better ventilated in an election contest.
Benito v COMELEC (January 19, 2001)

FACTS: Benito and private respondent Pagayawan were 2 of 8 candidates vying for the position of
municipal mayor in Calanogas, Lanao del Sur during the May 11, 1998 elections. At noon of
election day, 5 precincts clustered in the Sultan Disimban Elementary School were met with
violence when some 30 armed men appeared at the school premises and fired shots into the air.
This sowed panic among the voters and elections officials, causing them to scatter in different
directions.

Petitioner alleged that the voting never resumed even after the lawless elements left. On the other
hand, private respondent alleged that voting resumed when the armed men left around 1 pm in
the afternoon. Considering that private respondent would still lead petitioner by seven (7) votes
even if all forty-one (41) votes from the three (3) excluded precincts were counted in the latters
favor, private respondent was proclaimed mayor.

Petitioner then filed a petition to declare failure of election and to call a special election. COMELEC
however denied the petition and affirmed the proclamation.

ISSUE: WON COMELEC acted in GADALEJ in not calling a special election and not declaring a failure
of election? – NO

RATIO: Two preconditions must exist before a failure of election may be declared: (1) no voting
has been held in any precinct due to force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2) the votes not
cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of such failure may arise
before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.

While petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of votes cast vis-à-vis the
number of registered voters in the subject election precincts, the court said that there can be a
failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be
ascertained. But if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision
in our election laws which requires that a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. All
the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless
of the actual number of ballots cast.

The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost care and only
under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the disregard of the law had
been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to distinguish what votes
are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or that the great
body of voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their
franchise.

Sanchez v. COMELEC (August 12, 1987)

FACTS: Sanchez filed his petition praying that COMELEC, be directed to conduct a recount of the
votes cast in the May 11, 1987 senatorial elections to determine the true number of votes to be
credited to him and prayed further for a restraining order directing the Comelec to withhold the
proclamation of the last four (4) winning candidates on the ground that votes intended for him
were declared as astray votes because of the sameness of his surname with that of disqualified
candidate Gil Sanchez, whose name had not been crossed out from the Comelec election returns
and other election forms.
Enrile alleged that the Comelec exceeded its jurisdiction on the ground that Sanchez' petition for
recount is not a pre-proclamation controversy which involves issues affecting extrinsic validity.

ISSUE: WON this petition may be considered a summary pre-proclamation controversy falling
within the Comelec's exclusive jurisdiction (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code) Not a pre-
proclamation controversy.

RATIO: Sanchez anchors his petition for recount and/or reappreciation on material defects in
canvassed election returns. He contends that the canvassed returns discarding "Sanchez" votes as
stray were "incomplete" and therefore warrant a recount or reappreciation of the ballots under
Section 234. A simple reading of the basic provisions of the cited Section shows readily its
inapplicability. By legal definition and by the very instructions of the Comele, an election return is
incomplete if there is "omission in the election returns of the name of any candidate and/or his
corresponding votes" (Sec. 234) or "in case the number of votes for a candidate has been omitted."
(Sec. 6, Res. No. 1865)

Here, the election returns are complete and indicate the name of Sanchez as well as the total
number of votes that were counted and appreciated as votes in his favor by the boards of
inspectors. The fact that some votes written solely as "Sanchez" were declared stray votes because
of the inspectors' erroneous belief that Gil Sanchez had not been disqualified as a candidate,
involves an erroneous appreciation of the ballots. It is established that errors in the appreciation
of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for recount or
reappreciation of the ballots.

The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under sec. 243 of
the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in pre-
proclamation controversy, is restrictive and exclusive.
 election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234),
 appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235)
 and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of
which affects the result of the election (sec. 236),

Hassan v. COMELEC (November 13, 1996)

FACTS: Petitioner, Hadji Nor Basher L. Hassan, and private respondent, Mangondaya P. Hassan
Buatan were candidates for the Office of the Vice-Mayor. However, due to threats of violence and
terrorism in the area there was failure of elections in six out of twenty-four precincts in Madalum.
The ballot boxes were burned and there were threats by unidentified persons in some precincts.
Elections did not take place because the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) failed
to report to their respective polling places.

COMELEC re-scheduled the elections in these precincts for May 29, 1995 at Liangan. On May 29,
1995, the members of the Board did not again report for duty. Hassan filed a petition with the
COMELEC assailing the validity of the May 29 re-scheduled special elections on the following
grounds: voting forcibly ended because of gunfire exchange, hence voting was moved to another
place 15 km away but only 21% were able to, and the BEI weren’t able to report for duty.

COMELEC denied the petition to declare failure of elections. Thus, petitioner went up to this Court
assailing the aforesaid resolution with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to enjoin
the proclamation of the winning candidates. as no valid grounds since the outcome of the special
elections in the said precincts would nonetheless not change the final results of the elections
ISSUE: WON there was a ground to declare a failure of elections? – YES

RATIO: pre-conditions for declaring a failure of election are:

(1) that no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence or
terrorism, and
(2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections.
The concurrence of these two (2) circumstances are required to justify the calling of a special
election.

Mindful of these two (2) requirements, we rule in favor of the petitioner. While jurisprudence
holds that terrorism may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of elections and to
disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate through the misdeeds of only a relative few.
Otherwise elections will never be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement of the
innocent voters, for the losers will always cry fraud and terrorism, the COMELEC cannot turn a
blind eye to the fact that terrorism was so prevalent in the area, sufficient enough to declare that
no voting actually occurred on May 29

It must be recalled that elections had to be set for the third time because no members of the Board
of Election Inspectors (BEI) reported for duty due to impending threats of violence in the area.
This then prompted COMELEC to deploy military men to act as substitute members just so
elections could be held

It was quite sweeping and illogical for the COMELEC to state that the votes uncast would not have
in any way affected the results of the elections. While the difference between the two candidates
is only 219 out of the votes actually cast, the COMELEC totally ignored the fact that there were
more than a thousand registered voters who failed to vote.

Sardea v. COMELEC (August 17, 1993)

FACTS: At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 13, 1992, while the canvassing of the election
returns was going on, some sympathizers of petitioner Edwin Sardea, a defeated mayoralty
candidate of LAKAS-NUCD, "stormed the municipal building" and "destroyed . . . all election
materials and paraphernalia including, among others, the copies of election returns furnished to
respondent Board . . ."

On May 14, 1992, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers convened and assessed the
extent of the damage wrought by the demonstrators. It discovered that the election returns in the
possession of the MTC Judge of Mauban were intact, so it ordered the retrieval of said election
returns for use in the canvass.

Petitioners filed special action seeking to declare a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon, based
on the grounds that: The attendant facts and circumstance constitute substantial grounds to
declare a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon.Respondent Board gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in canvassing the impugned election returns without
prior authority from the Honorable Commission. COMELEC denied.

ISSUE: WON there was a failure of elections?

RATIO: The destruction and loss of the copies of the election returns intended for the Municipal
Board of Canvassers on account of violence committed on May 13, 1992 is not one of the causes
that would warrant the declaration of a failure of election because voting actually took place as
scheduled on May 11, 1992 and other valid election returns still existed. Moreover, the incident
did not affect the result of the election.
The election is to be set aside when it is impossible from any evidence within reach, to ascertain
the true result - when neither from the returns nor from other proof, nor from all together can the
truth be determined. Since in this case copies of the election returns submitted to the MTC of
Mauban, Quezon were extant, and their authenticity was not questioned, they were properly used
as basis for the canvass.

Mitmug v. COMELEC (February 10, 1994)

FACTS: The turnout of voters during the 11 May 1992 election in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur,
was abnormally low. As a result, several petitions were filed seeking the declaration of failure of
election in precincts where less than 25% of the electorate managed to cast their votes. But a
special election was ordered in precincts where no voting actually took place. Other petitions
seeking the declaration of failure of election in some or all precincts of Lumba-Bayabao were also
filed with COMELEC by other mayoralty candidates, to wit:

ISSUE: whether respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying motu proprio and without due notice and hearing the petitions seeking to
declare a failure of election in some or all of the precincts

RATIO: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that for as long as the precincts functioned
and conducted actual voting during election day, low voter turnout would not justify a declaration
of failure of election. We are now called upon to review this ruling.

Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2)
conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date
fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless results in failure to elect; and,
second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election.

In the case before us, it is indubitable that the votes not cast will definitely affect the outcome of
the election. But, the first requisite is missing, i.e., that no actual voting took place, or even if there
is, the results thereon will be tantamount to a failure to elect.

Considering that there is no concurrence of the two (2) conditions in the petitions seeking to
declare failure of election in forty-three (43) more, precincts, there is no more need to receive
evidence on alleged election irregularities. The question of whether there have been terrorism and
other irregularities is better ventilated in an election contest.

Tan v. COMELEC (November 20, 2006)

FACTS: Petitioners Abdusakur M. Tan and Basaron Burahan were candidates, of Sulu Province in
the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. On May 17, 2004, petitioners, together with other
local candidates for congressman, mayor, and vice-mayor, filed with the COMELEC four (4)
Petitions for Declaration of Failure of Elections in the towns of Maimbung, Luuk, Tongkil, and
Panamao, Petitioners Tan and Burahan alleged systematic fraud, terrorism, illegal schemes, and
machinations allegedly perpetrated by private respondents and their supporters resulting in
massive disenfranchisement of voters.

The COMELEC dismissed and held that none of the grounds relied upon by petitioners fall under
any of the three instances justifying a declaration of failure of election. First, the COMELEC found
that based upon the evidence presented by the parties, a valid election was held as scheduled.
Second, there was no suspension of the election as voting continued normally. Third, private
respondent Loong was elected by a plurality of votes as proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBC).

ISSUE: WON there was failure of elections: NO

RATIO: A scrutiny of the petitions filed before the COMELEC shows that petitioners never alleged
that no voting was held nor was voting suspended in the subject municipalities. Neither did
petitioners allege that no one was elected. Petitioners only allege that there was a sham election
and similar sham canvassing. As noted earlier, to warrant a declaration of failure of election, the
alleged irregularities must be proven to have prevented or suspended the holding of an election,
or marred fatally the preparation and transmission, custody, and canvass of the election returns.
These essential facts should have been clearly alleged by petitioners before the COMELEC en banc,
but they were not. As aptly ruled by respondent COMELEC, petitioners should have filed an
election protest to substantiate their allegations of election anomalies, not a petition to declare a
failure of election.

MUTILAN v. COMELEC (April 2, 2007)

FACTS: Dr. Mahid M. Mutilan (petitioner) and Zaldy Uy Ampatuan (private respondent) were
candidates for Governor in (ARMM). On 11 August 2005, private respondent was proclaimed as
the duly elected

On 19 August 2005, petitioner filed an Electoral Protest and/or Petition to Annul the Elections.
Petitioner contested the results of the elections in Maguindanao, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu on
the ground that no actual election was conducted in the precincts in these four provinces.
Petitioner alleged that the voters did not actually vote and that the ballots were filled up by non-
registered voters in the four provinces. Petitioner also contested the results where massive
substitute voting allegedly took place.

The COMELEC Second Division stated that during the initial hearing of the case, petitioner’s
counsel admitted that the petition was not an election protest but one for annulment of elections.
The COMELEC Second Division ruled that jurisdiction over petitions for annulment of elections is
vested in the COMELEC En Banc. However, the elevation of the case to the COMELEC En Banc is
not sanctioned by the rules or by jurisprudence. Thus, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed
the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

COMELEC En Banc denied the motion for reconsideration for petitioner’s failure to comply with
verification requirements.

ISSUE: WON the Second Division acted in GADALEJ in dismissing the petition to annul elections
and in not elevating the petition to the COMELEC En Banc. - Partly.

RATIO: Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166), jurisdiction over postponements,
failure of elections and special elections vests in the COMELEC En Banc. Under Section 3, Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must
be heard and decided by a division of the COMELEC. Petitioner filed an Electoral Protest and/or
Petition to Annul the Elections. Petitioner cannot put the blame on the docketing clerk because he
clearly tried to avail of two different remedies, each one falling under separate jurisdictions.

But, instead of dismissing, case should have been automatically elevated. While automatic
elevation of a case erroneously filed with the Division to En Banc is not provided in the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, such action is not prohibited.
ISSUE 2: WON there was failure of elections:

RATIO: There are three instances where a failure of elections may be declared, thus:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes

None of the three instances is present in this case. In this case, the elections took place. In fact,
private respondent was proclaimed the winner. Petitioner contests the results of the elections on
the grounds of massive disenfranchisement, substitute voting, and farcical and statistically
improbable results. Petitioner alleges that no actual election was conducted because the voters
did not actually vote and the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters. Again, petitioner
failed to state the particulars of these incidents.

The allegations of massive substitution of voters, multiple voting, and other electoral anomalies
should be resolved in a proper election protest in the absence of any of three instances justifying
a declaration of failure of election. In an election protest, the election is not set aside, and there is
only a revision or recount of the ballots cast to determine the real winner.

The nullification of elections or declaration of failure of elections is an extraordinary remedy. The

party who seeks the nullification of an election has the burden of proving entitlement to this
remedy.

L. SPECIAL ELECTIONS

Tolentino v. COMELEC (January 21, 2004)

FACTS: Following Senator Guingonas confirmation as VP, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed
Resolution No. 84 (Resolution No. 84) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate.

Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator
receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-
year term seat. (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election;
(2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether
they seek election under the special or regular elections, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in
the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular
senatorial elections as purportedly required. Petitioners add that because of these omissions,
COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections
without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but
just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term

Petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished
in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results.

ISSUE: WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645. - NO
RATIO: Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any
vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives in the manner prescribed by law.

Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term,
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing
the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety
(90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election
shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to
the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.

In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate,
the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding
regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from
Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held at any other
time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001.

The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of
the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number
of voters as would change the result of the special election. More than 10 million voters cast their
votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply
cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELECs
omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of
the special election.

Neither is there basis in petitioners claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the
special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document
separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such
requirements exist in our election laws.

M. COUNTING OF VOTES

Loong v. COMELEC (April 14, 1999)

FACTS: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436 on December 22, 1997 prescribing the adoption of an
automated election system. The new system was used in the May 11, 1998 regular elections held
in the ARMM.

On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of
discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the
municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an
erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately
communicated the problem. fter the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was
caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They
found nothing wrong with the automated machines.

Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation,
urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC
issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of
Pata. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty.
Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the
COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual
count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at
the PICC.
ISSUE1: Is there a legal basis for the manual count? Are its factual bases reasonable?

- The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is
well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the
municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated
machines found nothing wrong the automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing
of local ballots by the National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count
would result in a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would
have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate.

ISSUE2: Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC when it
ordered a manual count?

Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino memorandum
clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of the local
ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted written position papers. Their
representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu to
Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from beginning to end.

ISSUE3: Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it is
proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.

-It is not proper. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election.
o hold a special election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate
the right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected
officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties. These
officials were proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual
counting is illegal, their assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent's
election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.

Dojillo v. COMELEC (July 25, 2006)

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were two of three candidates for Punong Barangay in the 15
July 2002 synchronized election. Respondent obtained 374 votes while petitioner received 371
votes. The BET declared respondent as the elected Punong Barangay by a plurality of three votes.

Petitioner filed an election protest before the trial court, petitioner questioned the election results
in some precincts on grounds of misappreciation of ballots and incorrect tallying of votes.
Trial court found that one ballot previously regarded as a stray vote should be counted in favor of
petitioner and that 11 ballots previously counted in favor of respondent should be declared as
marked ballots.

Rules established:
•Unless it should clearly appear that they have been deliberately put by the voter as identification
marks, xxx the use of two or more kinds of writing shall not invalidate the ballot.
•Crosses x x x put on the spaces on which the voter has not voted shall be considered as signs to
indicate his desistance from voting and shall not invalidate the ballot.
•A name or surname incorrectly written which, when read, has a sound similar to the name or
surname of a candidate when correctly written shall be counted in his favor. The idem sonans rule
does not require exactitude nor perfection in the spelling of names. The question whether a name
sounds the same as another is not one of spelling but of pronunciation.
•2 names: [a]ny vote in favor of x x x a candidate for an office for which he did not present himself
shall be considered as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate the whole ballot. Vic Pedeglorio was
not a candidate for Punong Barangay, but for Kagawad.
•Unless it should clearly appear that they have been deliberately put by the voter as identification
marks, x x x the use of two or more kinds of writing shall not invalidate the ballot. which was boldly
written, does not nullify the ballot as marked. The voter merely emphasized his intent to vote for
respondent.
•A ballot should be counted if it is marked afterwards by some person or persons other than the
voter himself. Subsequent changes in the ballot made by a person other than the voter should not
be permitted to affect the result of the election or destroy the will of the voters.
•Any vote x x x which does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it is intended shall be
considered as a stray vote but shall not invalidate the whole ballot