MIDTERM

LECTURE NOTES ON
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
By: Prof. Ildefonso G. Mariquit

LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Public Office—the right, authority and duty created and conferred by law, by which for
a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some sovereign functions of government to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public. (Fernandez vs. Sto. Tomas, 234 SCRA 546)

Public office is a public trust—this requires that all government officials and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Public trust—implies a fiduciary relationship between a public officer, who is a trustee,

and the people, who are the beneficiaries, of a public office. Said relationship makes the
public officer the servant of the people, requires of him:
a. Utmost responsibility;
b. Integrity;
c. Loyalty;
d. Efficiency;
e. Fidelity;
f. Good faith; and
g. Accountability in the discharge of his duties and demands that he takes no
advantage of his position for his personal benefit or to the prejudice of the public.

Createdby:
1. The Constitution—e.g. Office of the President;
2. Valid statutory amendments;
3. By authority of law.

ElementsofPublicOffice:
1. Created by law or ordinance authorized by law;
2. Possesses sovereign functions of the government;
3. Functions defined expressly or impliedly by law;
4. Functions exercised by an officer directly under the control of law, not under a
superior officer unless they be those of an inferior or subordinate office created
or authorized by the legislature, and by it placed under the general control of a
superior office or body; and
 5. Must have permanency or continuity.

Characteristics:
1. Public office is a public trust;
2. Public office is not a property and is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
subject of a contract.

PUBLIC OFFICERS—individuals vested with public office.

Under RPC, Art. 203—any person who, by direct provision of law, popular
election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of
public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a public officer.

Under Sec. 2, RA 3019—the term includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified, unclassified or exempt
service, receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government.

Khan, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006, in the case
of officers/employees in GOCCs, they are deemed “public officers” if their corporations
are tasked to carry out governmental functions.

“classified, unclassified or exempt service”—Career and Non-Career service under

PD 807

Sec.2(14),Administrative Code—“officer” refers to a person whose duties not being a

clerical or manual nature, involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the
functions of government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a
particular act or perform a particular function in the exercise of governmental power,
“officer” includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the
act or exercise that function.

ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATION

(Legislative in nature—belongs to Congress)

Two(2)Senses:

1. Endowments, qualities or attributes which make an individual eligible for public

office—the individual must possess the qualifications at the time of appointment
or election and continuously for as long as the official relationship continues;

a. Citizenship—public office is reserved only to citizens of the Philippines

 b. Residence—elective office or position; in Civil Law, residence and domicile
are different. One can have 1 domicile but several residences. In Political
Law, they are the same. ANIMUS REVERTENDI—the intent to return

3 kinds of domicile in Political Law:

i. Domicile of birth (original)
ii. Domicile of choice—the person left the original domicile without
Animus Revertendi and established a new domicile
iii. Domicile by operation of law—
Marcos vs. COMELEC—former First Lady Imelda Marcos
originally domiciled in Leyte. She married FM (from Ilocos). Under
the Civil Code, it is the duty of the wife to live with her husband.
She acquired the domicile of her husband, Ilocos Norte, by
operation of law.
But when her husband died, the wife has no more duty to
live with her husband. She automatically reverts back to her original
domicile, Leyte. Animus Revertendi is applied.

Caasi vs. COMELEC—residence in a foreign country

c. Age
d. Political Affiliation—as a rule, it is not a qualification.
Exceptions: in Party-List, Membership in the Electoral Tribunal, Commission
on appointment

2. Act of entering into the performance of functions of public office—failure of an

officer to perform an act required by law could affect the officer’s title to the given
office. (example: taking the oath of office)

Authority to Prescribe Qualification:

1. Constitution—ordinarily, EXCLUSIVE. The legislature may not increase or
decrease qualifications except when the Constitution itself provides otherwise as
when only minimum or no qualifications are prescribed.

Examples: Sec. 17 (2) Art. XIII (Human Rights)— The Commission shall be
composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office
and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be
provided by law.

Section 7 (2), Article VIII— The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications
of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he
is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.

2. Statute—Congress has the plenary power to prescribe the qualification but such
must be:
a. Germane to the purpose of the office;
b. Not too specific so as to refer to only one individual.
 In Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999, an oath of
office is a qualifying requirement for public office. Only when the public officer has satisfied
this prerequisite can his right to enter into the position be considered plenary and
complete. Until then, he has none at all, and for as long as he has not qualified, the
holdover officer is the rightful occupant. An oath of office taken before one who has no
authority to administer is no oath at all.

However, in Mendoza vs. Laxina, G. R. No. 146875, July 14, 2003, once
proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to
exercise the functions thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient
basis to enjoin him from assuming office or from discharging his functions.

Sec. 5 (1), Art. XVI—All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or
affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.

Q: A was elected/appointed to public office. He assumed office without taking the oath
of office as prescribed by the Constitution and relevant CSC rules and regulations. Are
his acts valid?

A: Yes, A’s acts are considered valid, insofar as third parties and the general public are
concerned/rely on his acts—acts of a De Facto officer.
(See the case of Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007)

DISQUALIFICATIONS
The legislature has the right to prescribe disqualifications in the same manner
that it can prescribe qualifications, provided that the prescribed disqualifications do not
violate the Constitution.

General Disqualifications under the Constitution

1. Sec. 6, Art. IX-B— No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year
after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any GOCCs
or in any of its subsidiaries.

2. Sec. 7 (1), Art. IX-B—refers to elective officials—“No elective official shall be

eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.”
In the case of Flores vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993, RA
7227—creating the SBMA, one provision states that Mayor Dick Gordon shall be
appointed as Chairman and Chief Executive of the SBMA. The SC ruled for the
constitutionality of his appointment as the first Administrator of the SBMA. He
was allowed to act as Chairman in an ex-officio capacity. Section 7(1) of Article
IX-B of the Constitution refers to elective officials. The second paragraph, refers
to appointive officials, made two exceptions:
a. Unless otherwise allowed by law; or
b. Unless otherwise allowed by the primary function of his position.

Hence, Mayor Gordon’s appointment is valid.

3. Sec. 7 (2), Art. IX-B—Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary

functions of his position, no appointive officials shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.
National Amnesty Commission vs. COA, G.R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004,
when another office is held by a public officer in an ex-officio capacity, as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of his office, there is no violation, because
such other office does not comprise “any other position”. The ex-officio position is actually
and, in legal contemplation, part of the principal office. But the official concerned
is not entitled to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position
because his services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to
his principal office.

Specific Disqualifications under the Constitution

1. Sec. 13, Art. VII—The President, VP, Member of the Cabinet, and their deputies
or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure.

2. Sec. 13, Art. VI— No Senator or Member of the HOR may hold any other office
or employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat. Neither, shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or
the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

Incompatible Office Forbidden Office

- No Senator or Member of the HOR - Neither, shall he be appointed to any office that has
been created or the emoluments thereof have been
may hold any other office or increased during the term for which he was elected.
employment in the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including GOCCs or their subsidiaries, during his
term without forfeiting his seat.
-the purpose is to prevent trafficking in public office.
- The purpose is to prevent him from owing
loyalty to another branch of the government, to
the detriment of the independence of the
legislature and the doctrine of separation of
powers. -what is prohibited is the appointment to the office
during the term for which
-what is prohibited is the simultaneous holding of
that office and the seat in
 3. Sec. 12, Art. VIII—The Members of the SC and of other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
4. Sec. 2, Art. IX-A—No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his
tenure, hold any other office or employment. The same disqualification applies to
the Ombudsman and his Deputies—Sec. 8, Art. XI.

5. Sec. 11, Art. XI—The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall not be qualified to run
for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.

6. Sec. 1, Art. IX-B; Art. IX-C; Sec. 1, Art. IX-D; Sec. 8, art. XI—Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their
appointment.

7. Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-B; Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-C; Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-D; Sec. 11, Art.
XI-- Members of the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his
Deputies are appointed to a term of seven (7) years without reappointment.

8. Sec. 13, Art. VII—the spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or
as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
GOCCs.

Public Interest Center, Inc. vs. Magdangal Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007, the
concurrent appointments of respondent as PCGG Chairman and Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel (CPLC) are unconstitutional. The concurrent appointment to these offices is
in violation of Section 7 (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution, since these are incompatible
offices. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on
the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and reviewing
investigations involving heads of executive departments. Since the actions of the
PCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are subject to the review of the
CPLC, such appointments would be incompatible.

Disqualifications under the Local Government Code: (Section 40, LGC)

The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

1. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
2. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
3. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
4. Those with dual citizenship;
5. Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
6. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code;
7. The insane or feeble-minded.

Caasi vs. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 229, to be qualified to run for elective office, the law
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. The waiver should be manifested by
some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his certificate of candidacy for
elective office. The reason is that residence in the municipality where he intends to run for
elective office which is at least one (1) year at the time of the filing of his certificate
of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate must possess. The mere filing of
his COC for elective office in the country is not sufficient. The election of a candidate who
is a green card holder or who has not validly waived his status as a green card holder
is null and void.

Rodriguez vs. COMELEC, 259 SCRA 296, the term “fugitive from justice” includes not
only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged in the Philippines or abroad, flee to avoid prosecution. Intent to evade on the part
of a candidate must be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at
least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. He is not a fugitive from justice
when, at the time of departure from abroad to the Philippines, there is yet no complaint
filed against him abroad. In this case, it was established that the case was filed against
Rodriguez five (5) months after he had returned to the Philippines. What is controlling
is the intent to evade the California court.

DE FACTO OFFICERS—

One who has reputation of being an officer that he assumes to be, and yet is not
an officer in point of law.

Requisites:

1. A valid existing office;

2. Actual physical possession of said office;

3. Color of title to the office, either by:

a. Reputation or acquiescence;

b. Known or valid appointment or election but officer failed to conform with

legal requirements;
 c. Known appointment or election but void because of ineligibility of officer or
want of authority of appointing or electing authority or irregularity in
appointment or election not known to the public; and

d. Known appointment of election pursuant to unconstitutional law before

declaration of unconstitutionality.

De Facto Officer De Jure Officer Usurper/Intruder

the person is in actual he has lawful title to hold he is in actual possession of
possession of office but he office although he may be the office without title or
merely has a color of title unlawfully deprived of his colorable title
office

acts are valid insofar as 3rd his acts are valid his acts are entirely void
parties and the general
public is concern but he is
not suppose to benefit from
his acts—against public
policy.
Q: Is a de-facto officer lawfully entitled to the salary of the office he is occupying?
A: No, he is not supposed to benefit from his acts. It is against public policy. Otherwise,
it will encourage other people to be a de facto officer that will result to chaos.
Exceptions:
c. If there is no de-jure officer claiming for the same salary;
d. If the assumption/act was done in good faith.

LegalEffectsofActs: Valid, binding and with full legal effect insofar as they affect the
public. It is intended for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in
the official acts of persons discharging the duties of a public office. (Monroy vs. CA, 20
SCRA 620)

General Manager, PPA vs. Monsarate, G.R. No. 129616, April 17, 2002, a rightful
incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the
latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he (the de facto officer) occupied
the office in good faith and under color of title.

Dutiesofapublicofficer:
A. Constitutional Duties
a. To be accountable to the people; to serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency; to act with patriotism and justice; and to lead
modest lives (Section 1, Article XI).
b. To submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth
upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law
(Section 17, Article XI).
c. To owe the State and the Constitution allegiance at all times (Section 18,
Article XI).
B. Specific Cases:
a. The Solicitor General’s duty to represent the government, its offices and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents—except in criminal cases or
civil cases for damages arising from felony—is mandatory. Although he
has discretion in choosing whether or not to prosecute a case or even
withdraw therefrom, such discretion must be exercised within the
parameters set by law and with the best interest of the State as the
ultimate goal. (Gonzales vs. Chavez, 205 SCRA 817)
b. The government is not stopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more
so if they are erroneous or irregular (Sharp Int’l Mktg. vs. CA, 154
SCRA 88).
Prohibitions:
1. Engaging in partisan political party except to vote
2. Additional or double compensation
3. Prohibition against loans
4. Laborers—shall not be assigned to perform clerical duties
5. Detail or reassignment
6. Nepotism

Rightsofpublicofficers:
1. Right to office
2. Right to salary
3. Right to preference in promotion
4. Right to vacation and sick leave
5. Right to maternity leave
6. Right to retirement pay
7. Others—right to reimbursement for expenses incurred in the due performance of
his duty; right to be indemnified; right to longevity pay.

COMMENCEMENTOFOFFICIALRELATIONS
A. By Appointment
B. By Election

APPOINTMENT—
The selection, by authority vested with power, of individual who is to perform
functions of a given office. (Binamira vs. Garrucho, G.R. No. July 30, 1990)

It is an unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority

therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or
trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing
authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in
order to render it effective. Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion
on the part of the appointing authority.

Bermudez vs. Torres, 311 SCRA 733, the right of choice is the heart of the power
to appoint. In the exercise of power to appoint, discretion is an integral thereof.

Commission—is the written evidence of appointment.

Designation—is the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, on a person

already in public office.
It presupposes that the person has already been appointed and merely given
additional function/tasks.
 A mere designation does not confer security of tenure, as the person
designated occupies the position only in an acting capacity. (Sevilla vs. CA, 209 SCRA
637)

Classificationofappointments:
2. Permanent—extended to a person possessing the requisite qualification for the
position and thus enjoys security of tenure.
3. Temporary—acting appointment given to a non-civil service eligible; is without a
definite tenure and is dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power;
4. Provisional—one which may be issued upon:
a. Prior authorization of the Commissioner of the Civil Service
b. To a person who has not qualified in an appropriate examination
c. But who otherwise meets the requirements for appointment to a regular position
in the competitive service
d. Whenever a vacancy occurs
e. The filing thereof is necessary in the interest of the service and
f. There is no appropriate register of those who are eligible at the time of
appointment.
5. Regular—one made by the President while Congress is in session and becomes
effective after the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointment and
continues until the end of the term.
6. Ad-interim—
a. Recess—one made while the Congress is not in session, before confirmation
by the Commission on Appointment; immediately effective; and ceases to
be valid if disapproved or bypassed by CA upon the next adjournment of
Congress;
b. Midnight—made by the President before his term expires, whether or not
it is confirmed by the CA

Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002—(See discussion under Article VII)

General Manager, PPA vs. Monsarate, G.R. No. 129616, April 17, 2002, once an
appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil
service under a complete appointment, he acquires legal, not merely equitable, right to
the position which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot
be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except
for cause, and with previous notice and hearing.

Acceptance by appointee—pending such acceptance, which is optional to the

appointee, the appointment may still be validly withdrawn. Appointment to a public office
cannot be forced upon citizen except for purposes of defense of the State under Section
4, Article II of the Constitution, as an exception to the rule against involuntary servitude.
Discretion of appointing authority—appointment is essentially discretionary power
and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights,
the only condition being that the appointee, id issued a permanent appointment, should
possess the minimum qualification requirements, including Civil Service eligibility
prescribed by law for the position. This discretion also includes the determination of the
nature or character of the appointment, i.e., whether the appointment is temporary or
permanent. (Luego vs. CSC, 143 SCRA 327)

Acting appointment—a temporary appointment and revocable in character.

Double Appointment—not prohibited as long as the positions involved are not

incompatible, except that the officer or employee appointed cannot receive additional or
double compensation unless specifically authorized by law.

Primarily confidential Positions—denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the

appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom
of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal
trust and confidential matters of state. It is the fact of loss of confidence, not the reason
for it that is important and controlling. (Santos vs. Macaraig, 208 SCRA 74)

Next-in-Rank Rule—refers to a position which, by reason of the hierarchical arrangement

of positions in the department or agency or in government, is determined to be the
nearest degree of relationship to a higher position taking into account the following:
1. Organization structure is reflected in the approved organizational chart;
2. Classification and/or functional relationships;
3. Salary and/or range allocation;
4. Geographical location.

A qualified next-in-rank is an employee appointed on a permanent basis to a

position previously determined to be next-in-rank to the vacancy proposed to be filled and
who meets the requisites for appointment thereto as previously determined by the
appointing authority and approved by the Civil Service Commission.

The next-in-rank rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial
duty on the appointing authority.
The next-in-rank rule applies only if the vacancy is filled by promotion

Transfer—a lateral movement in the same position

Promotion—is a vertical movement of position

LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE—
Two(2)Policies:
1. To prevent establishment of political dynasty
2. Enhancing the freedom of choice of the people
Two(2)conditionsthatmustconcurtoapplyDisqualification:
1. The local official was elected for three (3) consecutive times, for the same
position;
2. He had fully served the three (3) consecutive terms.

Elective local official—3 years and may serve only for 3 consecutive terms

----------------------
1988—Capco was a Vice-Mayor
1989—the Mayor (Borja, Sr.) died, Capco succeeded as Mayor
1992—Capco ran for Mayor and won
1995—he ran for re-election and won again
1998—Is he still qualified to run?

The SC held that Mayor Capco is still qualified in 1998 local election. The right to
be elected for 3 consecutive times for the same position was not present in this case.
Mayor Capco did not fully serve his term in 1989. He became a mayor thru succession
and not election. (Borja, jr. vs. COMELEC & Mayor Capco of Pateros)

-----------------------
1992
1995 X was elected Mayor
1998

However, in December 1, 2000, before his 3 rd term ends, he resigned. Is he still

qualified to run as mayor for the next election?
No, he is no longer allowed to run. Resignation is not considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service of office for which he was elected.

----------------------

1992
1995 X was elected as Mayor
1998
On December 1, 2000, before his 3rd term ends, he was removed for misconduct.
He did not appeal the case. The administrative case attained finality. Is he qualified to run
again for mayor in the 2001 election?
 No. he has been elected for 3 consecutive times for the same position. Section
40 (b) of the LGC provides for his disqualification—removed as a result of administrative
case. However, if he appealed, he is still qualified because there is no finality of
judgment yet.
----------------------
1992
1995 X was elected as Mayor
1998

On December 1, 2000, he was removed for grave misconduct. He was able to

appeal seasonably. In May 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor. His
opponent filed a disqualification case. The COMELEC did not act immediately on the
DQ case. He won as mayor.
Held:
1. The DQ filed in COMELEC should be dismissed as there was no finality yet of
the administrative case.
2. The administrative case should also be dismissed. His re-election should be
considered as a condonation by the people of whatever administrative case filed
against him.

Doctrine of Forgiveness or Condonation—when the people have elected a man to

office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character,
and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will
of the people.

Aguinaldo vs. Santos, 212 SCRA 768, a public official cannot be removed for
administrative conduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous conduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to
criminal cases pending against petitioner.

Mayor Alvin Garcia vs. Hon. Mojica, et al., G.R. No. 139043, September 10, 1999, a
re-elected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct
committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the
electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his
life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still
reelects him, such re-election is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
1992
1995 Hagedorn was elected as Mayor
1998

In 2001, Hagedorn ran for governor but lost. Socrates was elected as mayor.
June 30, 2001—end of Hagedorn’s term for mayor

July 2, 2002—resolution calling for recall of Mayor Socrates

September 2002—COMELEC set special election for Puerto Princesa City; Hagedorn
filed his
COC for mayor. Was he qualified?

Held: the three (3)-term limit rule found in Sec. 43-b, LGC has two (2) parts:
1. Three (3) consecutive terms
2. Any length of time will interrupt

The provision speaks of a regular election and not a special one. In this case, recall is
a special election. It is not considered as immediate election. The immediate election
that prohibits Hagedorn from running for mayor is the next regular election after his 3
consecutive terms has ended, the 2001 election.

“any subsequent election”—is not covered by the prohibition.

He won in the September 2002 recall election. He will continue the term of Socrates.
His term will end on June 30, 2004—a term which is less than 3 years.

What if in:
2004
2007 he was elected as Mayor
May he run again in 2010?
No more. Recall election term is considered as one full term for purposes
of applying the disqualification. Otherwise, Hagedorn will be allowed to serve for
more than nine (9) years.

The above hypothetical problem was only an obiter dictum in the case of Socrates vs.
COMELEC.

The rule is, service of the recall term will not interrupt the 3-consecutive term rule. In the
case of Mendoza vs. COMELEC, the SC did not abandon the ruling in Socrates
because it was merely an obiter dictum.

---------------------------
1995—Francis Ong ran for mayor, he won
1998—He ran and won again. Alegre filed a protest.
2001—Ong ran and won again. The protest in 1998 was decided by the RTC on July 4,
2001 that it was Alegre who won in 1998 election.
2004—Ong ran again. Alegre questioned. Ong alleged that his proclamation as mayor-
elect in the May 1998 election was contested and eventually nullified by the RTC of
Daet.
Issue: Whether or not Ong’s assumption of office as Mayor from July 1, 1998 to June
30, 2001 may be considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive 3-
term limit rule?

Held: The assumption of office from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 constitutes “service
for the full term” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the 3-
term limit prescribed by the Constitution and LGC, barring local elective officials from
being elected and serving more than 3-consecutive term for the same position. x x x His
proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected
mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the 3-term rule.

There was no interruption or break in the continuity of Ong’s service respecting the
1998-2001 term. Ong was never unseated during the term in question; he never ceased
discharging his duties and responsibilities as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for
the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.

In the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999), Lonzanida was
elected and served for 2 consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to
the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995
elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor. However, an election protest was filed
before RTC of Zambales. In a decision dated July 9, 1997, it was held that there was a
failure of elections and the position for mayor as vacant. Lonzanida assumed the office
and performed his duties up to March 1998 only. During the 1998 elections, Lonzanida
ran again for mayor. A petition to disqualify under the three-term limit rule was filed
and was eventually granted. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. He
cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered
to vacate (and in fact vacated) his post before the expiration of the term. There was an
involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, therewasan
effectiveinterruptionofthecontinuityofservice.

VACANCIES AND SUCCESSION

Concept of Vacancy:
Two(2)Principlestoconsider:
 1. One who illegally terminated, by legal fiction, is deemed not to have vacated his
position
2. One, no matter how qualified, may not filled a position which is not vacant
RuleonAutomaticSuccession (Section 44, LGC)
A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official:
1. Fills a higher vacant office;
2. Refuses to assume office;
3. Fails to qualify;
4. Dies;
5. Is removed from office;
6. Voluntarily resigns;
7. Or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

Ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district
in the immediately preceding local election.

Governor Mayor Punong Barangay

Vice Governor Vice Mayor

Highest ranking sanggunian member/2nd highest ranking sanggunian member

(in case of permanent inability of the highest ranking member)

In Case of tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members—it shall
be resolved by the drawing of lots.

The successors shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.

Section 44, LGC—Filling the vacancy

Last-in-rank—the one who will replace him must come from the same political party of
the one who caused the vacancy, upon nomination of the party.

Who shall appoint?

1. President—through the Executive Secretary—in case of permanent vacancies in
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of HUCand
independentcomponentcities;
2. Governor—in case of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of componentcities and
the Sangguniang Bayan;
3. City or municipal mayor—in case of Sanggguniang Barangay—upon
recommendation of the Sangguniang Barangay concerned.
 A nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of
the political party concerned are conditions sine qua non. Any appointment without such
nomination and certification shall be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for
administrative action against the official responsible therefor.

No political party, how shall the vacancy be filled? (Section 45-c, LGC)
The local chief executive shall appoint, upon recommendation of the sanggunian
concern, a qualified person to fill the vacancy.

Fariñas vs. Barba, the last-in-rank sangguniang bayan member resigned. Mayor
Barba, upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Bayan, appointed somebody.
However, Gov. Fariñas also appointed somebody, upon recommendation of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The SC held that neither is entitled to occupy the vacancy.
It should have been Gov. Fariñas who should appoint but the sanggunian who
recommended should be the Sangguniang Bayan where the vacancy took place.

Navarro vs. CA, March 2001

Mayor— Lakas-NUCD
V-Mayor— Lakas-NUCD

1. SB Member
2. SB Member
3. SB Member came from Reforma Party
4. SB Member
5. SB Member
6. SB Member—Lakas NUCD
7. SB Member—Reforma Party
8. SB Member—Lakas NUCD

The Mayor died. Vice Mayor succeeded. The #1 SB Member became the Vice Mayor.
The #8 slot became vacant. The Governor appointed somebody from Reforma Party. The
SC held that the appointment made by the governor is valid. The last ranking shall be
filled by Reforma Party to maintain party representation in the Sanggunian as willed by
the electorate.
Gamboa, Jr. vs. Aguirre, July 1999

The Vice-Governor acted as Governor. Can he (V-Governor) preside over the sessions
of Sangguniang Panlalawigan?
No. The creation of temporary vacancy in the office of the governor creates a
corresponding vacancy in the office of the vice-governor. Section 49-d, LGC, the
members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a
temporary presiding officer.
The rule on permanent vacancy should not be applied to temporary vacancy.

Who appoints the Barangay Secretary or Treasurer?

In the case of Alquisola, Sr. vs. Gallardo Ocol, August 1999, the SC held that
the Barangay secretary or treasurer shall be appointed conjointly by the Punong
Barangay and the Sanggguniang Barangay.

SituationscoveredbytheLawonNepotism:
One is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a. Appointing authority;
b. Recommending authority;
c. Chief of the bureau of office; and
d. Person exercising immediate supervision.

In the last situations (c and d), it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending
authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is
extended or issued in favor of a relative within the 3rd civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision
over the appointee. (CSC vs. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999)

Exemptions:
1. Persons employed in confidential capacity;
2. Teachers;
3. Physicians;
4. Members of the AFP;
5. Member of any family who, after his appointment to any position in an office or
bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which
event the employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may be
allowed.

In Section 79 of the Local Government Code, the prohibition is up to the 4th civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity.
 Laurel V vs. CSC, Governor Laurel appointed his brother as Civilian Security Officer,
hence it is exempted, no violation as it is primarily confidential in character. However, the
governor subsequently designated the same brother as Acting Provincial Administrator.
The SC ruled that appointment and designation are two different matters. But for
purposes of the law on nepotism, the two are now the same. Hence, there is now a
violation of the law on nepotism.

Debulgado vs. CSC, it was alleged that the law applies only to original appointment
and not to promotional appointment. The SC did not agree. The law applies to all kinds
of appointment. The law does not distinguish.

TERMINATIONOFOFFICIALRELATIONSHIP:
1. Expiration of term or tenure
2. Reaching the age limit—compulsory retirement age: 70 years of age for members of the
Judiciary; 65 for other government officers and employees
3. Resignation
4. Recall
5. Removal
6. Abandonment
7. Acceptance of an incompatible office
8. Abolition of office
9. Prescription of the right to office
10. Impeachment
11. Death
12. Failure to assume elective office within 6 months from proclamation
13. Conviction of a crime
14. Filing a certificate of candidacy

Term—the period of time during which a public officer has the right to hold the public
office

Tenure—the period of time during which the public officer actually held office

Hold-over principle—[See the case of Lecaroz vs. SB (1999)]—in the absence of any
express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the public officer
is entitled to hold his office until his successor shall have been duly chosen and shall have
qualified. The purpose is to prevent a hiatus in public office.

It implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the
succeeding term. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant
upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume
it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified,
even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
 Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts generally indulge in
the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition
which may result in an executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time,
wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is
founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is
specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering of a vacancy and to
avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions. (Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 397, March 25, 1999)

RECALL—the termination of official relationship of an elective official for loss of

confidence prior to expiration of his term through the will of the electorate.

It is exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local
elective official subject to such recall belongs (Section 69, LGC)
Prohibitionfromresignation:
The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the
recall process is in progress.

LimitationsonRecall (Section 74, LGC)

1. Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during
his term of office for loss of confidence.
2. No recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s
assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

Paras vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996, it was held that the
SK Election is not a regular election within the contemplation of the LGC as
would bar the holding of a recall election. Neither will the recall election of the
Mayor be barred by the Barangay Election.

Angobung vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 126571, March 5, 1997, the “regular local
election” referred to in Section 74, LGC, means that the approaching local
election must be one where the position of the official to be recalled is actually
contested and to be filled by the electorate.

RESIGNATION— is the act of giving up or the act of a public officer by which he

declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the
incumbent in some form, expressed or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce,
and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority.
To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must
be:
1. An intention to relinquish a part of the term;
2. An act of relinquishment;
 3. Acceptance by the proper authority.

The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the revised Penal Code.
(Sanggguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes vs. CA, 284 SCRA 276)

Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, resignation is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: theremustbeanintenttoresignandthe intent
mustbecoupledbyactsofrelinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by
any formal requirement as to for. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can
be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

ABANDONMENT OF OFFICE—it is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the

holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. Indeed, it is
a specie of resignation; while resignation in general is a formal relinquishment,
abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser.
It springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. The
concomitant effect is that the former holder of an office, can no longer legally repossess
it even by forcible re-occupancy.

ABOLITION OF OFFICE—it connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and
permanently, as the word “abolished” denotes. Where one office is abolished and
replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.

In the case of UP Board of Regents vs. Rasul, the renaming and restructuring
of the PGH and its component units cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of
the position of PGH Director. This is because where the abolished office and the offices
created in its place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good faith. The abolition
which merely changes the nomenclature of positions is invalid and does not result in the
removal of the incumbent.
The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the abolition of the position of the
PGH Director and the creation of the UP-PGH Medical center Director are valid, the
removal of the incumbent is still not justified for the reason that the duties and functions
of the two positions are basically the same.

Canonizado vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, January 25, 2000, the substantial identity
in the functions between the two offices was indicia of bad faith in the removal of petitioner
pursuant to a re-organization.
REORGANIZATION—takes place when there is alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Naturally,
it may result in the loss of one’s position through removal or abolition of an office.
 To be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith.

Circumstances evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees as a result of

reorganization and which may give rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment:

1. Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new

staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
2. Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions is created;
3. Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit;
4. Where there is a reclassification offices perform substantially the same functions
as the original offices; and
5. Where the removal violates the order of separation provided for by Section 2 and
of RA 6656.

GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL AND SUSPENSION—(Section 23, Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of 1987 Administrative Code)
1. Grave Offenses
2. Less Grave offenses
3. Light Offenses

Preventive Suspension—
It is not a penalty itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee
who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged
misfeasance while the same is being investigated. It is not an action by itself but merely
an incident in an action.

It is different from administrative penalty of suspension from office. The latter is

the penalty which may only be meted upon the respondent at the termination of the
investigation or the final disposition of the case. Preventive suspension is imposed on
the respondent during the investigation of charges against him.

Governing Laws:
1. Preventive Suspension in Administrative Cases

a. Civil Service Law—

Maximum duration: 90 days

After 90 days: automatic reinstatement

 Certiorari: period will not be included in the 90-day period computation

Gloria vs. CA (199), there are two (2) kinds of preventive suspension under
CSC:
i. Pending investigation
ii. Pending appeal & the respondent is exonerated on appeal

“payment of back salaries”

Pending investigation Pending Appeal

(Respondent is not entitled (Reinstatement with full payment
to back wages) payment of back salaries)

Gov. Plaza vs. CA, G.R. No. 138464, January 18, 2008, the law provides for
preventive suspension of appointive local official and employees pending investigation
of the charges against them. The suspension given to private respondents, cannot,
therefore, be considered unjustified for it is one of those sacrifices which holding a
public office requires for the public good. To be entitled to back salaries, private
respondents must not only be found innocent of the charges, but their suspension must
likewise be unjustified.

b. Local Government Code—

i. Sec. 63—those holding local elective office
PreventiveSuspensionplacedby:
1. Mayor—concerning the elective barangay officials

2. Governor municipal elective officials

Component city elective official

3. President highly urbanized/independent component city officials

Provincial officials

Everyadministrativecharge: maximum: 60 days

Several administrative cases: maximum: 90 days w/in a single
year

90 days before the next local election—PS shall be lifted

automatically

ii. Sec. 85—those appointed officials

 Duration: maximum of 60 days

c. Ombudsman Act—RA 6770

Duration: Maximum of 6 months

2. Preventive suspension in Criminal Cases

a. Section 13, RA 3019—Suspension and loss of benefits

Authoritytoimpose:

i. Court where the information was filed

Luciano vs. Provincial Governor, since the law is silent, the court where the
information was filed shall impose the preventive suspension

ii. Salary Grade 27 or over—Sandiganbayan

iii. Below Salary Grade 27—RTC

It is mandatory for the court to impose the preventive suspension. However, it is

not automatic. In the case of Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan, it was held that the
court must conduct first a pre-suspension hearing to determine the validity of
criminal information filed against the public officer

Duration: the law is silent

In the case of Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, since the law is silent, apply
by analogy the Civil Service Law, the maximum duration would be 90 days.

Deloso vs. SB Section 13, RA 3019 does not state that the public
officer may be suspended in the office where he
committed
Bayot vs. SB the crime.
Segovia vs. SB The term “office” indicates that it applies to “any other
Santiago vs. SB office”.

Paredes vs. SB the suspension imposed is merely preventive. There

Santiago vs. SB is no encroachment.
 Article XI ACCOUNTABILITY
OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Sectio
n 1,
Article
XI
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.

Public office is a public trust, and as such, the same is governed by

law, and cannot be made the subject of personal promises or negotiations
by private persons. Security of tenure of employees in the career executive
service (except first and second level employees in the civil service),
pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the position to which they
may be appointed. (Collantes vs. CA, G.R. No. 169604, March
6, 2007)

Who are impeachable officers?

(The list is exclusive)
1. President
2. Vice-President
3. Members of the Constitutional Commission
4. Justices of the Supreme Court
5. Ombudsman
Justices of the Sandiganbayan cannot be removed by impeachment.

Impeachment of President—the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court will preside; the
Senate/HOR will prosecute

Groundsforimpeachment:
1. Culpable violation of the constitution
2. Treason
3. Bribery
4. Betrayal of public trust
5. Graft and corruption
6. Other high crimes
Procedure in
Impeachment—
Initiation:
The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.

Process:
1. Verified complaint filed by any member of the House or
any citizen upon resolution of endorsement by any member
thereof;
2. Included in the order of business within ten (10) session days;
3. Referred to the proper committee within three (3) session days of its inclusion.
If the verified complaint is filed by at least 1/3 of all its members, the same
shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
.
4. The Committee, after hearing, and by majority vote of all its
members, shall submit its report to the House together with the
corresponding resolution;
5. Placing on calendar the Committee resolution within ten (10)
days from submission;
6. Discussion on the floor of the report;
7. A vote of at least 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles
of Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary
resolution.

Trial
and
Decisi
on—
1. The Senators take an oath or affirmation;
2. When the president is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside but shall not vote;
3. A decision of conviction must be concurred in by at least 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate.
Effect of
Convicti
on—
1. Removal from office;
2. Disqualification to hold any other office under the Republic of the Philippines;
3. Party convicted shall be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law.

Limitation:
1. Not more than one impeachment case shall be initiated against the
same official within a period of one (1) year.
2. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142476, March 20, 2001, the
Republic of the Philippines cannot be held liable under an “Agreement”
entered into by the PCGG with another party where the republic did not
authorize the PCGG to enter into such contract. Where the sale of an
aircraft to a third party by the PCGG is void, it follows that the “Agreement”
between the PCGG and the third party is likewise a nullity, and there can
be no cause of action against the Republic.

Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs.

Desierto, et al. G.R. No. 130140, October 25, 1999, Article XI, Section 15
of the Constitution provides that the “right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their
nominees as transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or
estoppel. This provision does not seem to indicate that what is
imprescriptible is the correspondingcivil action torecover“ill-gottenwealth”
but not the criminal action that may relate thereto. The criminal action, i.e.,
violation of Section 3(c) and (g), RA 3019, can prescribe conformably with
the pertinent statute applicable which,

in this instance, BP 195, providing for a 15-year prescriptive period and

thereby modifying to the above extent the 10-year prescriptive period under
RA 3019.