ARTICLE X.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

P3.3 Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, GR No. 79956, January 26, 1990

FACTS: E.O. 220 was signed into law by President Aquino creating the Cordillera Administrative Region
[CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao, Mountain Province and the
City of Baguio. Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial
and political subdivision.

ISSUE: W/N E.O. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision

HELD: No. It did not create a new territorial and political subdivision. It is not a public corporation or a
territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities
and municipalities. x x x The control and supervision by the President over the CAR and the offices created
under E.O. No. 220, and the participation of the departments of the National Government, the CAR may be
considered similar to the regional development councils which the President may create under the Constitution
[Art. X, sec. 14].

P3.3 Limbona v. Conte Mangelin, et al, GR No. 80391, February 28, 1989

Facts: Petitioner, as Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly of Region 12 was invited in a consultation
with local government officials. He accepted but reminded that there shall be no session in November as he
was to attend hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, the Assembly held a session and he was unseated
from his position. Petitioner prays that the session be declared null and void. Pending proceedings of the case,
the SC received a resolution from Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership. Respondents argue
that petitioner the pending case filed by him had become "moot and academic" because of resolution submitted
to SC.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What
is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments
"more responsive and accountable" which relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs to focus on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to
"ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that
he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power involves an abdication of political
power to the LGUs declared to be autonomous. It is then free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities.

If the Assembly then is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are beyond the domain of the Court in the same
way that the internal acts of the Congress are beyond the court’s jurisdiction.
But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes under the court’s jurisdiction. An examination
of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they
were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618,
mandates that the President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

P3.3 San Juan v. CSC, 196 SCRA 69 (1991)

FACTS: Because of vacancy, petitioner requested Director of DBM to endorse appointment of Ms. Santos to
the position of PBO. DBM Director found Cecilia Almajose, among the nominees of the petitioner to be the
most qualified as PBO of Rizal, which the DBM Sec signed the appointment papers of Almajose as PBO.
Upon learning petitioner wrote DBM Sec protesting that the DBM sec is not legally authorized to appoint the
PBO as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31, and that under EO No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor,
not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of
PBO.

HELD: When the CSC interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory,
it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. The right given by Local
Budget Circular No. 31 which states: “SEC. 6.0—The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy
where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.” is ultra vires and
is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by
the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one
meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and
qualifications.

P4.3 Drilon v. Lim – 235 SCRA 135 [1994]

FACTS:
1. The Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies, declared Ordinance No. 7794
(Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the tax ordinances –
that is to conduct public hearings – and for containing provisions contrary to law and public policy.
2. The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the LGC because it vests on
the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated
in the Constitution.
3. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the LGC had indeed not been
observed.

ISSUE: Whether Section 187 of the LGC vest the Secretary of Justice the power of control over LGUs which
is contrary to the policy of local autonomy

RULING: No. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality
of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance,
he is not permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the
measure.

Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of
what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its
annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal.
All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant
of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of
control but of mere supervision.

P4.3 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, GR No. 111097, July 20, 1994

FACTS:
1. PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to CDO for its casino there during the Christmas season.
Civic organizations and religious groups denounced the project for being violative of the Ordinance
No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos.
2. The respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games
of chance, including casinos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinace No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlunsod of Cagayan de Oro City are valid.
RULING: No. Local governments have certain powers which may not be curtailed by the national
government, but may not pass ordinances contrary to statute. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established
following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.

P4.3 Judge Leynes v. COA, GR No. 143596, Dec. 11, 2003

Facts:
1. Petitioner is the presiding judge of the RTC of Calapan City, aside from salary and RATA drawn from
budget of SC, also received a monthly allowance of P944 from the local funds of the Municipality of
Naujan 1984. They even approved an increase to his monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600
2. Provincial Auditor directed the Mayor and Municipality of Naujan to stop and make refunds of what
was paid as it could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in addition to the RATA from the SC based
on Section 36, RA No. 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993, stating that: “No one shall be
allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.” Petitioner judge appealed the matter to COA
Regional Director who, however, upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor.

RULING: The Court ruled in favor of petitioner judge. To rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances
to judges as what respondent COA would like the Court to do will subvert the principle of local autonomy
zealously guaranteed by the Constitution. The LGC of 1991 was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure
the autonomy of local governments as mandated by the Constitution.

P5.3 Batangas CATV v. CA and Batangas City, GR No. 138810, September 29, 2004

FACTS: Assailing the constitutionality of Resolution No. 210 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Batangas City which gave petitioner permit to conduct and operate a CATV, provided that, in accordance with
Section 8 of the said Resolution, increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sanggunian. Petitioner
later increased its rates without seeking approval; hence, respondent threatened to possible revocation.

ISSUE: Whether local government has the power to grant franchise to operate CATV system and the authority
to regulate CATV subscriber rates

RULING: No, LGUs does not have the power to grant franchise and the authority to regulate CATV rates.
The NTC has the regulatory power over technical matters of CATV, including “fair” subscriber rates.
Although the LGU can regulate CATVs under the general welfare clause, this local autonomy has limits.
These limits were crossed by Resolution No. 210 which violated the mandate of existing laws and the State’s
deregulation policy over the CATV industry.

P5.3 CREBA v. Secretary of DAR, GR 183409, June 18, 2010

FACTS: DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion which covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.

Petitioner argues that Section 2.19, Article I of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, making reclassification of
agricultural lands subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion, violates Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 7160 or the LGC which provides for the reclassification of lands, because it was not
provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or
that the DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification. The said Section 2.19 of DAR
AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the constitutional mandate on local autonomy.

ISSUE: Whether the assailed resolution violates the local autonomy of local government units
RULING: No. DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the reclassification of agricultural lands by
LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land use conversion procedure or that DAR’s approval or
clearance must be secured to effect reclassification, did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs.

Sec. 20 of RA 7160 shows that the power of the LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute. The
authority of the DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP)
to non-agricultural uses has been validly recognized by said provision by explicitly providing therein that,
nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of CARP.

P5.3 Garcia v. COMELEC, 227 SCRA 100 (1993)

FACTS: Section 70 of the 1991 LGC authorizes provinces, cities, legislative districts and municipalities to
have a “preparatory recall assembly” authorized to initiate the recall of an elective official. The contention of
Governor Garcia was that “the right to recall does not extend merely to the prerogative of the electorate to
reconfirm or withdraw their confidence on the official sought to be recalled at a special election. Such
prerogative necessarily includes the sole and exclusive right decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding
or not.”

ISSUE: Whether the preparatory recall assembly does not extend on the power of the electorate to recall an
elective official.

RULING: No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole
and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for
any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple
modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for
Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective
mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The power given was to select which among the means and
methods of initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate.

P6.3 Malonzo v. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 380 (1997)

FACTS:
1. COMELEC issued Resolution 96-026 calling for an Election for the Recall of the petitioner who is the
incumbent Mayor of Caloocan City.

2. The petitioner attacks the COMELEC's ruling on the validity of the proceedings held by the
Preparatory Recall Assembly, in that it allegedly ruled that the LIGA ng mga Barangay is not
authorized to initiate the recall and convene the Preparatory Recall Assembly.

RULING: No. Members of liga and PRA are the same who voted for the resolution. Petitioner’s
insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the Liga ng mga
Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner observes that “respondent Liga is an organization of all barangays. It is
not an organization of barangay captains and kagawads. The barangays are represented in the Liga by the
barangay captains as provided under Section 492 of the Local Government Code. It also provides that the
Kagawad may represent the barangay in the absence of the barangay chairman.” The Liga ng mga Barangay
is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that the personalities
representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority
of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo,
after deliberation reported in the record, in accor- dance with the existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays
and Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of
the City of Caloocan, and not as members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall proceedings, therefore,
cannot be denied merit on this ground.

P6.3 Malonzo v. Zamora – 323 SCRA 875

FACTS:
1. Caloocan City passed an ordinance appropriating a supplemental budget and reversion of
appropriation-expropriation of properties. The validity of the ordinance was attacked for violating
Sections 50 and 52 of the Code requiring the Sangguniang Panlungsod to adopt or update its existing
rules of procedure within the first 90 days following the election of its members. (no rules of
procedure)

2. The Sanggunian allegedly conducted three readings of Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998 in one day and
on the first day of its session (July 2, 1998) without the Sanggunian having first organized itself and
adopted its rules of procedure. It was only on July 23, 1998 that the Sanggunian adopted its internal
rules of procedure.

ISSUE: Whether the said ordinance was valid considering that prior to its passage there was as yet no formal
adoption of rules of procedure by the Caloocan City Sangguniang Panlungsod.

RULING: Yes. The law simply requires that the matter of adopting or updating the internal rules of procedure
be taken up during the first day of session. Also, there is nothing in the law which prohibits that the three
readings of a proposed ordinance be held in just one session day.

P6.3 Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271

FACTS:
1. 10 complaints filed against Ganzon for misconduct and misfeasance of office against mayor of Iloilo
City Ganzon. The Secretary of Local Government issued suspension orders about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his
alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; that 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and
strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or
remove local officials.

RULING: Yes. They can suspend but only up to 60 days suspension, otherwise, oppressive. “supervision” is
not incompatible with disciplinary authority. Power of Control is to alter, modify, nullify or set aside
subordinate’s act. Supervision is to see to it they perform duties in accordance with the law.

P7.3 Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279

FACTS: Private respondents filed a letter-complaint to the Office of the President charging Joson with grave
misconduct and abuse of authority because in one of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) meeting, Joson
barged into the hall in order to harass them into approving the loan of 150 million pesos from the PNB. Joson
failed to explain when summoned by the Secretary of Interior and Local Government Barbers and kept on
asking for an extension to file his answer but still failed to do so. Thus, Undersecretary Sanchez directed
private respondents to present their evidence ex-parte. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the
DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him to answer the complaint. He contends
that it is the Office of the President that has jurisdiction over the letter- complaint and that the Court of Appeals
erred in applying the alter- ego principle because the power to discipline elective local officials lies with the
President, not with the DILG Secretary. Executive Secretary Torres, by authority of the President, placed
petitioner under preventive suspension for 60 days pending investigation of the charges against him.

ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to discipline local elective officials

RULING: YES. The power to discipline is not incompatible with supervision. Administrative disciplinary
proceedings against elective local officials are governed by the LGC of 1991, and Administrative Order No.
23. A complaint against an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the Office of the President.
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities:
the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. Pursuant to AO 23, the Disciplining Authority is
the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary
of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority.
In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplinary Authority may designate a Special Investigating Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived
from his power of general supervision over local governments.

P7.3 Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994)

FACTS: The Secretary of Justice declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code,
null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances. In a
petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the RTC of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and
sustained the ordinance, ruling that the procedural requirements had been observed. Judge Palattao declared
Section 187 of the LGC unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax
ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the
Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of
the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether Secretary Drilon exercised power of supervision in this case

RULING: YES. Court held that it was an act not of control but of mere supervision. In reviewing tax
ordinances, the Department of Justice can only declare a tax measure unconstitutional and illegal. The
Secretary cannot amend, modify or repeal the tax measure or declare it excessive, confiscatory or contrary to
public welfare. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his
own version of what the Code should be. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing
the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that
is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code.

P7.3 Bito-onon v. Fernandez – 350 SCRA 732

FACTS: Both petitioner Bito-Onon and respondent Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive
Vice- President in the 1997 election for the Liga ng Brgy Provincial Chapter in the province of Palawan. Bito-
Onon was the proclaimed winner prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of
Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him. Not satisfied with the decision of BES, Quejano
filed a petition for review of the decision of BES. Onon filed a petition to dismiss the review raising the issue
of jurisdiction claiming that RTC has no jurisdiction to review the BES’ decision. Bito-Onon claimed that the
Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 guidelines for the Liga ng Brgy Election issued by the DILG in its
Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular
courts of law is an Ultra Vires act and is void for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its
issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Liga’s Internal Org.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s supervision extend to the Liga ng Baragay which is not an LGU.

RULING: Yes, DOJ ruled that the Liga ng Brgy is a government organization, being an
association federation/league/union by law or authority of law whose members are either
appointed or elected government officials. The ligas are primarily governed by LGC. However, their
respective constitution and by-laws shall govern all matters affecting the internal org of the liga not otherwise
provided for in the LGC, provided that such constitution and by laws shall be supplementary to Book II Title
VI of the Local Government Code and shall conform to Constitution and existing laws.

P8.3 National Liga v. Paredes – 439 130 [2004]

FACTS: DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the Liga ng mga
Barangay in giving remedy to alleged violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga in the conduct of
their elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars which alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga.
Petitioner contends that DILG’s appointment constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga,
since the latter is not subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent Judge contends that DILG exercises
general supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs including the different leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order
No. 267 providing for a broad premise of the supervisory power of the DILG.

ISSUE: Whether or not DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has power of control over the Liga ng
mga Barangay

RULING: No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local government, which exclude the power of control. As the entity
exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILG’s authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed,
but it cannot lay down such rules itself nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace the same.

P8.3 SJS v. Atienza – 545 SCRA 92 [2009]

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 that reclassified the area
described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the
date of effectivity of the ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex. But the city of
Manila and the Department of Energy entered into an MOU which only scaled down the property covered by
the depots and did not stop their operations.

Petitioners then filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. Oil companies, as
well as DOE sought to intervene and asked for the nullification of said ordinance. The DOE alleged that
Ordinance No. 8027 encroaches upon its exclusive and national authority over matters affecting the oil
industry.

ISSUE: Whether the DOE’s request for nullification of the ordinance should be granted

RULING: No. The DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs. Section 4 of Article X of the
Constitution confines the President’s power over LGUs to one of general supervision. Supervisory power,
when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over such body. It does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate.
Here, what the DOE seeks to do is to set aside an ordinance enacted by local officials, a power that not even
its principal, the President, has.

P8.3 Province of Negros v. COA, GR No. 182574, September 28, 2010

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed Resolution No. 720-A4 allocating
P4,000,000 of its retained earnings for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials
and employees of the province. However, after a post-audit investigation, the Provincial Auditor suspended
the premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the President as provided under
Administrative Order No. 1036 (AO 103).

ISSUE: Whether the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance for the premium
paid in the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by the Province od Negros Occidental to
its officials and employees due to lack of the President’s approval

RULING: Yes. Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the
President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed. The
President may only point out that rules have not been followed but the President cannot lay down the rules,
neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation
like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the present case does not need the approval of the
President to be valid.
P9.3 LTO v. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805

FACTS: Respondent city of Butuan asserts that one of the salient provisions introduced by the local
government code is in the area of local taxation which allows LGUs to collect registration fees or charges
along with, its view, the corresponding issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving of tricycles.
Relying on the provisions of the local government code, the sangguniang panlungsod of Butuan passed SP
Ordinance no. 916-42 entitled “An Ordinance Regulating The Operation Of Tricycles-For-Hire, Providing
Mechanism For The Issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit and Imposing Penalties For Violations
Thereof and for Other Purposes.” The ordinance provided for among other things, the payment of franchise
fees for the grant of the franchise of tricyles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the
issuance of a permit for the driving thereof. Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national
government that, indeed, has been transferred to local government units is the franchising authority over
tricycles-for-hire of the land transportation franchising and regulatory board but not, it asseverates, the
authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent city of Butuan may issue license and permit and collect fees for the
operation of tricycle.

RULING: No. The reliance made by the respondents on the broad taxing power of local government units,
specifically under section 133 of the local government code, is tangential. Police power and taxation, along
with eminent domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty which the state might share with local government
units by delegation or given under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All these inherent powers are for a public
purpose and legislative in nature but the similarities just about end there. The basic aim of police power is
public good and welfare. Taxation, in its case, focuses on the power of government to raise revenue in order
to support its existence and carry out its legitimate objectives. Although correlative to each other in many
respects, the grant of one does not necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The two powers are by
tradition and jurisprudence separate and distinct powers, varying in their respecting concepts, character,
scopes, and limitations. To construe the tax provisions of section 133 (1) indistinctively would result in the
repeal to that extent of LTOs regulatory power which evidently has not been intended. If it were otherwise,
the law could have just said so in section 447 and 458 of Book III of the local government code in the same
manner that the specific devolution of LTFRBs power on franchising of tricycles has been provided. Repeal
by implication is not favored. The power over tricycles granted under section 458 (8) (3) (VI) of the local
government code to LGUs is the power to regulate their operation and to grant franchises for the operation
thereof. The government’s exclusionary clause contained in the tax provisions of section 133 (1) of the local
government code must be held to have had the effect of withdrawing the express powers of LTO to cause the
registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance of license for the driving thereof. These functions of the
LTO are essentially regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the police power of the state, whose basic
objectives are to achieve road safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the
competence of drivers prescribed by RA 4136. Not insignificant is the rule that a statute must not be construed
in isolation but must be taken in harmony with the extent body of laws.

P9.3 Lina v. Pano, 364 SCRA 76 (2001)

FACTS: Tony Calvento, an agent of PCSO, asked Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open
the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor on the ground that there is an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. As a result of this resolution of denial,
respondent Calvento filed a complaint asking the RTC of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following
reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or TRO, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a
business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. The respondent judge Paño promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners
from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
ISSUE: Whether the assailed resolution is a valid exercise of the provincial government's police power under
the General Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

RULING: NO. The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through
an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a
franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries.

This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it
wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot
issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national
legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or
resolution.

The basic relationship between the national legislature and the LGUs has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from
that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in
significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the
power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain
notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power
to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution), which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large,
however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will
or modify or violate it.

P9.3 Petron v. Mayor, GR No. 158881, April 16, 2008

FACTS: Petron maintains a depot or bulk plant at the Navotas Fishport Complex, and through that depot, it
has engaged in the selling of diesel fuels to vessels used in commercial fishing in and around Manila Bay.

Petron received a letter from the office of Navotas Mayor wherein the corporation was assessed taxes relative
to the figures covering sale of diesel from 1997 to 2001 with reference to Ordinance 92-03, or the New Navotas
Revenue Code.

Petron filed with the Malabon RTC a Complaint for Cancellation of Assessment for Deficiency Taxes with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction. The RTC
rendered its Decision dismissing Petron’s complaint and ordering the payment of the assessed amount.

Petron has opted to assail the RTC Decision directly before this Court since the matter at hand involves pure
questions of law. Particularly, the controversy hinges on the correct interpretation of Section 133(h) of the
LGC, and the applicability of Article 232 (h) of the IRR.

Section 133(h) of the LGC reads as follows:

Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and Barangays
shall not extend to the levy of the following:

xxx

(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and
taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products;

ISSUE: Whether a local government unit is empowered under the Local Government Code to impose business
taxes on persons or entities engaged in the sale of petroleum products.
RULING: NO. Evidently, Section 133 prescribes the limitations on the capacity of local government units to
exercise their taxing powers otherwise granted to them under the LGC. Apparently, paragraph (h) of the
Section mentions two kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by local government units, namely: excise taxes
on articles enumerated under the NIRC; and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products.

Congress has the constitutional authority to impose limitations on the power to tax of local government units
and Section 133 of the Local Government Code (LGC) is one such limitation.

While Section 133(h) does not generally bar the imposition of business taxes on articles burdened by excise
taxes under the NIRC, it specifically prohibits local government units from extending the levy of any kind of
taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products. Accordingly, the subject tax assessment is ultra vires and void.

P10.3 Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium

Facts: Respondent BA Lepanto is owner of BA-Lepanto Condominium, and is authorized by its by-laws to
collect regular assessments from its members for operating expenses, capital expenditures on common areas,
and other special assessments. It received a tax assessment in the from petitioner Luz Yamane, the City
Treasurer of Makati. The notice of assessment was silent as to the statutory basis of the business taxes
assessed.

Lepanto protested the assessment arguing that the Makati Revenue Code imposes business tax on owners or
operators of any business not specified in the said code. It submits that this is not applicable to the Corporation
as it is not an owner or operator of any business in the contemplation of the Makati [Revenue] Code and even
the LGC considering that as a condominium corporation, was organized not for profit, but to hold title over
the common areas of the Condominium, to manage the Condominium for the unit owners, and to hold title to
the parcels of land on which the Condominium was located.

Yamane denied the protest, insisting that the assessments were made in view of profit-making, as the
assessments which were collected improved the value of the condominiums, which in turn would increase the
chances of getting higher prices.

Issue: Whether the City Treasurer may levy tax on respondent

Ruling: No. The power of local government units to impose taxes within its territorial jurisdiction derives
from the Constitution itself, which recognizes the power of these units to create its own sources of revenue
and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. These guidelines and limitations as provided by Congress
are in main contained in the LGC, which provides for comprehensive instances when and how local
government units may impose taxes. The significant limitations are enumerated primarily in Section 133 of
the Code, which include among others, a prohibition on the imposition of income taxes except when levied
on banks and other financial institutions. None of the other general limitations under Section 133 find
application to the case at bar.

P10.3 Philippine Petroleum v. Municipality of Pililia

Facts: PPC owns and maintains an oil refinery including 49 storage tanks for its petroleum products in Malaya,
Pililla, Rizal. Under section 142 of NIRC of 1939, manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific
tax. Respondent municipality of Pilillia through municipal council resolution no. 25-s-1974 enacted municipal
tax ordinance no. 1-s-1974 otherwise known as “The Pililla Tax Code Of 1974” on June 14, 1974 which took
effect on July 1, 1974. Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance imposed a tax on business, except for those
which fixed taxes are provided in the local tax code on manufacturers, importers, or producers of any article
of commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distiller, rectifiers, repackers and compounders
of liquors distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule found in the local tax code, as well as
mayor’s permit sanitary inspection fee and storage permit fee for flammable, combustible or explosive
substances, while section 139 of the disputed ordinance imposed surcharges and interests on unpaid taxes,
fees or charges. Enforcing the provisions of the above mentioned ordinance, the respondent filed a complaint
on April 4, 1986 docketed as civil case no. 057-T against PPC for the collection of the business tax from 1979
to 1986; storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986; mayor’s permit fee and sanitary permit inspection fees from
1975 to 1984. PPC, however, have already paid the last named fees starting 1985.

Issue: Whether or not the Municipality may validly impose taxes on petitioner’s business.

Held: No. While section 2 of PD 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products, said decree
did not amend sections 19 and 19 (a) of PD 231 as amended by PD 426, wherein the municipality is granted
the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturers, importers, producers of any article of commerce of
whatever kind or nature. A tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. Thus, if the imposition
of tax on business of manufacturers, etc. in petroleum products contravenes a declared national policy, it
should have been expressly stated in PD No. 436.

The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present constitution. To allow the
continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC no. 26-73 would be tantamount to restricting their
power to tax by mere administrative issuances. Under section 5, article X of the 1987 constitution, only
guidelines and limitations that may be established by congress can define and limit such power of local
governments.

P10.3 Acebedo v. Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner Acebedo applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City which was granted by City
Mayor Cabili. However, it came with various special conditions such as that Acebedo be prohibited to practice
optometry within the city, which was agreed upon by both parties. Eventually, Samahan ng Optometrist Sa
Pilipinas (SOPI), Iligan Chapter lodged a complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the City Mayor,
alleging that Acebedo had violated conditions set forth in its business permit and requested the cancellation
and/or revocation of such permit. Mayor Cabili revoked Acebedo’s business permit for violating the said
conditions and Acebedo was subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan.

Issue: Whether the Mayor may issue business permit subject to the condition of limiting practice of profession
such as optometry

Ruling: No. The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local government
units, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business
permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.

The power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel
the same. And the power to revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power to restrict through the imposition
of certain conditions.

However, the Court held that a business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the
City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like that of
optometry. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically
empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the
Board of Examiners in Optometry.

P11.3 PLDT v. City of Davao, GR 143867, March 25, 2003

SUMMARY: PLDT was granted by Department of finance through its bureau of Local Government Finance
exemption from local franchise tax. Invoking such ruling they stopped payment from the Local Government
of Davao City.
FACTS: PLDT is a holder of a legislative franchise under Act No. 3436 to render local and international
telecommunications services. On 24 August 1991, the terms and conditions of its franchise were consolidated
under Republic Act No. 7082 (Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines), Section 12 of
which embodies the so-called “in-lieu-of-all-taxes” clause, whereunder PLDT shall pay a franchise tax
equivalent to three percent (3%) of all its gross receipts, which franchise tax shall be “in lieu of all taxes”.

In August 1995, the City of Bacolod, invoking its authority under Section 137, in relation to Section 151 and
Section 193 of the Local Government Code, made an assessment on PLDT for the payment of franchise tax
due the City. Complying therewith, PLDT began paying the City franchise tax from the year 1994 until the
third quarter of 1998, at which time.

On 2 June 1998, the Department of Finance through its Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF), issued
a ruling to the effect that as of 16 March 1995, the effectivity date of the R.A. No. 7925, PLDT, among other
telecommunication companies, became exempt from local franchise tax. Invoking the BLGF’s ruling, PLDT
then stopped paying local franchise and business taxes to Bacolod City starting the fourth quarter of 1998.

Sometime in 1999, PLDT applied for the issuance of a Mayor’s Permit but the City of Bacolod withheld
issuance thereof pending PLDT’s payment of its franchise tax liability for the fourth quarter of 1998 and for
the year 1999, in the aggregate amount of PhP1,782,836.40, excluding surcharges and interest.

ISSUE: : W/N there is a violation of the constitutional rule on uniformity of taxation.

RULING: YES. A tax exemption granted to one or more, but not to all, telecommunications companies
similarly situated will violate the constitutional rule on uniformity of taxation. It will deny equal protection of
the law to those similarly situated but to whom the tax exemption is denied. A tax exemption granted to one
or some telecommunications companies, but not to all, can only be constitutionally justified if there is a
reasonable basis for classifying some companies exempt and others not exempt. RA No. 7925, which
prescribes the state policy on public telecommunications, does not allow any classification or discrimination
in the grant of any “advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity.”

P11.3 John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim, GR No. 119775, October 24, 2003

Summary: Respondent Lim, filed a petition annulling Proclamation No 420 which grants tax and financial
incentives to Camp John Hay , as a special economic zone.

FACTS: Petitioners filed their Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief assailing
(1) the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420 and
(2) the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement previously entered into
between public respondent BCDA and private respondents.

Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly declared of no legal
force and effect.

Intervener Camp John Hay Development Corp. (CJHDC) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene alleging that
it, together with its consortium partners, entered into a Lease Agreement with respondent BCDA for the
development of the John Hay SEZ; and that it “stands to be most affected” by this Court’s Decision
“invalidating the grant of tax exemption and other financial incentives” in the John Hay Special Economic
Zone (SEZ) since “[i]ts financial obligations and development and investment commitments under the Lease
Agreement were entered into upon the premise that these incentives are valid and subsisting.”

CJHDC, proffering grounds parallel to those of public respondents, prays that: (1) it be granted leave to
intervene in this case; (2) its attached Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention be admitted; and (3) this
Court’s Decision of October 24, 2003 be reconsidered and petitioners’ petition dismissed.
CJHDC’s Motion for leave to Intervene was granted and noted its Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention.

ISSUE: Whether the tax exemptions and other financial incentives granted to the Subic SEZ under Section
12 of R.A. No. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), are applicable to the John Hay SEZ.

RULING: NO. CJHDC’s argument that the President’s “power to create Special Economic Zones carries
with it the power to provide for tax and financial incentives,” does not lie. It is the legislative branch which
has the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions.

Paragraph 4, Section 28 of Article VI of the Constitution is crystal clear: “[n]o law granting any tax exemption
shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.”

Hence, it is only the legislature, as limited by the provisions of the Constitution, which has full power to
exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation. The Constitution itself may provide for
specific tax exemptions or local governments may pass ordinances providing for exemption from local taxes,
but, otherwise, it is only the legislative branch which has the power to grant tax exemptions, its power to
exempt being as broad as its power to tax.

There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7227 which can be considered a grant of tax exemption in favor of
public respondent BCDA. Rather, the beneficiaries of the tax exemptions and other incentives in Section 12
(the only provision in R.A. No. 7227 which expressly grants tax exemptions) are clearly the business
enterprises located within the Subic SEZ.

Contrary to public respondents’ interpretation, the Decision of October 24, 2003 does not “tie the hands” of
executive or administrative agencies from implementing any present or future legislation which affords tax or
other financial incentives to qualified persons doing business in the John Hay SEZ or elsewhere. The second
sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was declared null and void only insofar as it purported to grant
tax exemptions and other financial incentives to business enterprises located in John Hay SEZ. However,
where there is statutory basis for exemptions or incentives, there is nothing to prevent qualified persons from
applying for and availing thereof.

P11.3 Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna, GR No. 131359, May 5, 1999

Summary: Certain municipalities of the Province of Laguna, by virtue of existing laws then in effect, issued
resolutions through their respective municipal councils granting franchise in favor of Manila Electric
Company ("MERALCO") for the supply of electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code, the Province enacted Laguna Provincial Ordinance
imposing Franchise Tax. MERALCO, contended that the imposition of a franchise tax of Laguna Provincial
Ordinance, insofar as it concerned MERALCO, contravened the provisions of P.D. 551 which also impose
franchise tax.

Facts: Certain municipalities of the Province of Laguna,by virtue of existing laws then in effect, issued
resolutions through their respective municipal councils granting franchise in favor of Manila Electric
Company ("MERALCO") for the supply of electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas.
MERALCO was likewise granted a franchise by the National Electrification Administration to operate an
electric light and power service in the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna. On 12 September 1991, Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991," was enacted to take effect on 01
January 1992 enjoining local government units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees
and charges, subject to the limitations expressed therein, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Code, the Province enacted Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, effective
01 January 1993, providing, in part, as follows: “Sec. 2.09. Franchise Tax. — There is hereby imposed a tax
on businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual
receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on account realized during the preceding calendar year
within this province, including the territorial limits on any city located in the province.” On the basis of the
ordinance, the Provincial Treasurer sent a demand letter to MERALCO for the corresponding tax
payment. MERALCO, contended that the imposition of a franchise tax under Section 2.09 of Laguna
Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, insofar as it concerned MERALCO, contravened the provisions of Section
1 of P.D. 551 which read: “Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the
franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat
and power shall be two per cent (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from
transactions incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current. Such franchise tax shall be
payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative on or before the
twentieth day of the month following the end of each calendar quarter or month, as may be provided in the
respective franchise or pertinent municipal regulation and shall, any provision of the Local Tax Code or any
other law to the contrary notwithstanding, be in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed
by any national or local authority on earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and
sale of electric current.”

Issue: Whether the Local Government Code of 1991, has repealed, amended or modified Presidential Decree
No. 551.

Ruling: Local governments do not have the inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might
be delegated to them either by the basic law or by statute. Presently, under Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
a general delegation of that power has been given in favor of local government units. Under the now prevailing
Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist
although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current rule is
to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and
broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and
unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are
being strengthened and made more autonomous, 6 the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will
not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit
will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be unduly
disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just. The Local Government Code of 1991 has
incorporated and adopted, by and large, the provisions of the now repealed Local Tax Code, which had been
in effect since 01 July 1973, promulgated into law by Presidential Decree
7
No. 231 pursuant to the then provisions of Section 2, Article XI, of the 1973 Constitution. The 1991 Code
explicitly authorizes provincial governments, notwithstanding "any exemption granted by any law or other
special law, . . . (to) impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise." Section 137 thereof provides: “Sec.
137. Franchise Tax — Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, the province
may impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one percent
(1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the incoming receipt, or realized,
within its territorial jurisdiction. In the case of a newly started business, the tax shall not exceed one-twentieth
(1/20) of one percent (1%) of the capital investment. In the succeeding calendar year, regardless of when the
business started to operate, the tax shall be based on the gross receipts for the preceding calendar year, or any
fraction thereof, as provided herein. “ Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out the Constitutional
mandate of vesting broad tax powers to local government units, the Local Government Code has effectively
withdrawn under Section 193 thereof, tax exemptions or incentives theretofore enjoyed by certain entities.
This law states: “Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges — Unless otherwise provided in this
Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives
duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are
hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. “ The Code, in addition, contains a general repealing
clause in its Section 534; thus: “Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — . . .(f) All general and special laws, acts, city
charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.”

P12.3 Batangas Power Corp. v. Batangas City, NPC GR No. 152675, April 28, 2004

FACTS: BPC filed a petition for declaratory relief against BC and NPC. That it was not bound to pay the
business taxes imposed on it because under the Build Operate and Transfer Agreement between NPC and
Enron Power Dev’t Corp, Section 11.02 of the BOT Agreement provided that NPC shall pay all taxes that
may be imposed on the power station, except income taxes and permit. When Enron assigned its obligation
under the BOT Agreement to petitioner BPC. NPC refused to assume and pay BPCs business tax later on as
it allegedly constituted an indirect tax on NPC which is a tax-exempt corporation under its Charter.

RULING: The removal of the blanket exclusion of government instrumentalities from local taxation as one
of the most significant provisions of the 1991 LGC. Section 193 of the LGC, an express and general repeal of
all statutes granting exemptions from local taxes, withdrew the sweeping tax privileges previously enjoyed by
the NPC under its Charter.

Pursuant to Article X, section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 5. Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue, to
levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the Local Governments.

When NPC assumed the tax liabilities of the BPC under the BOT Agreement, the LGC which removed NPCs
tax exemption privileges had already been in effect for six (6) months. Thus, while BPC remains to be the
entity doing business in said city, it is the NPC that is ultimately liable to pay said taxes under the provisions
of both the BOT Agreement and the 1991 LGC.

P12.3 Smart Communications v. City of Davao, GR No. 155491, September 16, 2008

FACTS: Smart filed contended that its Tel-center in Davao is exempt from franchise tax because the power
of the City of Davao to impose a franchise tax is subject to statutory limitations such as the “in lieu of all
taxes” clause found in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7294 (Smart’s franchise). Respondents invoked the power
granted by the Constitution to LGUs to create their own sources of revenue. RTC denied petition and noted
that the ambiguity of the in “lieu of all taxes” provision in R.A. No. 7294, on whether it covers both national
and local taxes, must be resolved against the taxpayer.

RULING: Tax exemptions are never presumed and are strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority. They can only be given force when the grant is clear and categorical. Smart has
the burden of providing that, aside from the imposed 3% franchise tax, the Congress intended it to be exempt
from all kinds of franchise taxes whether local or national.

P12.3 Pimentel v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201 (2000)

FACTS: Certiorari and prohibition to annul Section 1 Admin. Order 372 issued by President it requires local
government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-
personal services. And Section 4 withholds portion of their internal revenue allotments.

RULING: Section 1 AO 372 does not violate Local Fiscal Autonomy. This order is to ensure that local
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. It is merely directory and has been issued
by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. Such only contains advise
for reduction measures in all agencies. Section 4 of AO No. 372 orders the withholding of 10% LGU IRA,
although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback. Any retention is prohibited. This effectively encroaches on
the fiscal autonomy of local governments.

P13.3 Province of Batangas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 152774, May 27, 2004

FACTS: The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as unconstitutional and void the provisos in the
GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, relating to the LGSEF (Local Government Service Equalization Fund).

Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it mandates that the just share of the LGUs shall be
automatically released to them. Sections 18 and 286 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which enjoin
that the just share of the LGUs shall be automatically and directly released to them without need of further
action are, likewise, cited.

The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release of the five-billion-peso portion of the IRA,
classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the implementing rules and regulations, including
the mechanisms and guidelines prescribed by the Oversight Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of
the Constitution that the LGUs share in the national taxes shall be automatically released to them.

RULING/MAINPOINT: Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads: Sec. 6. Local government units shall
have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share”
in the national taxes; (2) the “just share” shall be determined by law; and (3) the “just share” shall be
automatically released to the LGUs.

The LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the “just share” accruing to them from the national
coffers—the “just share” of the LGUs shall be released to them “without need of further action”

“Automatic” means “involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely
negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automation.”

The entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible—to
subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the
guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, makes the
release not automatic.

P13.3 Alternative Center v. Zamora, GR No. 144256, June 8, 2005

FACTS: A part of the approved GAA provides that P10 Billion, apart from the stated budget, shall be used
to fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the
President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees
which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on
Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

RULING/MAINPOINT: As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the
just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might
prevent the executive from performing its duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional
provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution
amendable by statute—a proposition which is patently absurd.

P13.3 League of Cities v. COMELEC August 24, 2010

FACTS: The issue voiced by the intervening movant-petitioners was about the eventual reduction of their
IRA share resulting from the creation of the 16 respondent cities.

RULING/MAINPOINT: Said issue must be looked into, not by the court, by the congress.

The prevailing law as to the allocation/budget is as follows:

Section 285 of the 1991 LGC provides:

Allocation to Local Government Units.—The share of [LGUs] in the [IRA] shall be allocated in the following
manner:

(a) Provinces—Twenty-three percent (23%);

(b) Cities—Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities—Thirty-four percent (34%); and
 (d) Barangays—Twenty percent (20%)
Provided, however, that the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on the basis of
the following formula:
(a) Population—Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area—Twenty-five percent (25%); and
(c) Equal sharing—Twenty-five percent (25%)

P1.4 Borja v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157

SUMMARY: The 3-term limit on a local official is to be understood to refer to terms for which the official
concerned was elected. Thus, a person who was elected Vice Mayor in 1988 and who, because of the death of
the Mayor, became Mayor in 1989, may still be eligible to run for the position of Mayor in 1998, even if
elected as such in 1992 and 1995

Facts: Jose T. Capco, Jr. Vice-Mayor of Pateros in 1988 for a term ending in 1992. In 1989, he became Mayor,
by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served
as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. In 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor
of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for
mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor
for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The
Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision
and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the
remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

RULING: No. For the three-term limit rule for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions
or requisites must concur, to wit: 1) been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

P1.4 Lonzanida v. COMELEC, GR No. 135150, July 28, 1999

SUMMARY: For the three-term limit rule for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions
or requisites must concur, to wit: 1) been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Facts: Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in
terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation in 1995 election was declared
by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of elections.

Issue: WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998
may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local
government officials.

Ruling: NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that
he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be
considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.

P1.4 Adormeo v. COMELEC, GR No. 147927, February 4, 2002

Facts: Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During
the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term
ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term
of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground
that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the three term-limit
rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration
which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.

Issue: Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two full terms and
he won in the 2000 recall elections.

Ruling: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disruptedby his defeat
in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term and the recall election is sufficient interruption.
Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.

P2.4 Socrates v. COMELEC, incumvent mayor even after 3 terms can still run in the recall election.

FACTS: Barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa assembled themselves into a PRA to initiate the recall of
Socrates as mayor for loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the
COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.

Thereafter, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition to nullify and deny due course to the Recall
Resolution. The COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates petition.
The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7,
2002.

ISSUE: Whether or not a person who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive terms is still qualified to
run in the recall election.

RULING: Yes. Even elected for 3 consecutive terms such recall election constituted interruption to the 3-
term rule.

P2.4 Latasa v. COMELEC, DIGOS CONVERTED TO CITY: petitioner cannot conclude that he’ll be
running for the first time

FACTS: Petitioner elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995,
and 1998. During petitioners third term, the Municipality of Digos was converted to a city. This event
also marked the end of petitioner’s tenure as mayor. Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor
for the May 14, 2001 elections.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner be allowed to run as the mayor of the City of Digos.

RULING: No. The three-term limit in pursuant to Section 8 of Article 10 applies. Knowing that the
municipality was just converted into a city, the petitioner cannot conclude that he’ll be running for the
first time for the position of city mayor of the City of Digos. There has been no change in territory nor
in constituency.

P2.4 David v. COMELEC: Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term: they
can enact law.

FACTS: Petition for judicial review to declare as unconstitutional certain laws including Sec 43 of the
LGC which essentially limited the term of barangay officials to three (3) years.
RULING: The court held that, “Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from
fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term to the
lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers’ full
discretion to fix such term in accordance with exigencies (demands) of public service.” “The term then for
barangay officials may be determined by law’; more precisely, as provided for in the Local Autonomy Code.
And the Local Autonomy Code in its Sec 43-c, limits their term to three years.”

P3.4 Rivera v. COMELEC: 2nd term was a de facto officer since the Mayor was declared null and void.
NO. IT IS COUNTED.

FACTS: In the May 2004 elections, Morales ran for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-
2007. He admitted that he was elected for the term 1995-1998 (first term) and 2001-2004 (third term), but he
served the second term from 1998-2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer"
since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by (RTC).

ISSUE: Whether or not Morales violated the three-term limit rule when he ran for re-‐election as mayor in the
2004 elections.

HELD: Yes. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

His assumption of office for the second term constituted “service for the full term” and should be
counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and
statutory provisions barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than
three consecutive terms for the same position.

P3.4 Montebon v. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50

FACTS: Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu.
However, during his second term, he assumed the position of vice-mayor when the incumbent vice-mayor
retired. When he filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor for 2007 elections, a petition
for disqualification was filed based on the three-term limit rule.

Held: Yes. Such succession is by operation of law. The legal successor is not given any option under the
law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. It involves the performance of a public duty by a
government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and
criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more
compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.

P3.4 Ong v. Alegre, Ong 1998 assumption fully served.

FACTS: On the 2004 election, respondent Alegre, contender of Ong, filed with the COMELEC a Petition to
Disqualify Francis Ong under the three-consecutive term rule, Ong ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and
May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three
(3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.

Alegre filed an election protest for Ong’s 1998 proclamation but the decision came out only on July 4,
2001. his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions from start to finish of the
term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.

P4.4 Laceda v. Lumena – GR 182867, November 25, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner filed MR, that the COMELEC committed GAD in disqualifying and cancelling his COC
for Punong Barangay, on the ground of three consecutive terms.
RULING: NO. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164 disqualifies officials from running for the same office after a
term of nine years. The purpose is to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run
for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena. This Court has held that for the prohibition to
apply, two requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms
in the same local government post and (2) that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms.

P4.4 Dizon v. COMELEC, GR No. 182088, January 30, 2009

FACTS: Dizon, argues that Morales as the Mayor of Pampanga is no longer qualified to run for the same
position. Because, he had serve for more than 3 consecutive terms.
RULING: Yes, because Morales had been in position for more than 3 consecutive terms during 1998, 2001,
and 2004. 2 requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms
in the same local government post and (2) that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms.

P4.4 Alboin v. COMELEC, If there was preventive suspension for 90 days, is this an interruption? No.

FACTS: Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for 3-consecutive terms however; the sandiganbayan
preventively suspended him for 90 days. During the 2007 election, Asilo filed COC for the same position.
But, Danilo sought to deny his candidacy. Is Asilo qualified to run due to such a preventive suspension.

RULING: No, he is not qualified to run. The court ruled that preventive suspension should not be considered
an interruption that allows an elective official to stay beyond 3-terms.

P5.4 Bolos v. COMELEC During 3rd term as PB, he ran for councilor and then later ran again for
barangay. It is a voluntary renunciation.

FACTS: Nicasio Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for 3
consecutive terms (1994,1997, 2002). In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for Municipal Councilor
and won. He assumed office on July 1, 2004 leaving his post as Punong Barangay. After serving his term as
a councilor he filed his candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay in the October 29, 2007

ISSUE: Whether there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay by Bolos Jr. when he
assumed the post of Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have served for three consecutive terms

P5.4 Aldovino v. COMELEC: Preventive suspension for 90 days was issued during his 3rd term. Later
ran again for 2007. The PS does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule
under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160). 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-
2007.

P5.4 Datu Michel Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR 196271, February 2012 (reconsideration;
holdover provision in RA 9054 Unconstitutional as Congress in passing RA 10153 has made clear)

FACTS: Congress enacted ARMM. The petitioners maintains the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article
VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to remain in a holdover capacity until the May 2013
elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials
from performing their duties in a holdover capacity.

Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides:

Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. – (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of
the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a
period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next following the day
of the election and shall end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective
 officials of the autonomous region shall continue in effect until their successors are elected and
qualified.

RULING: Section 8, Article X expresses a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials
can occupy their offices. Elective ARMM officials are local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-
year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does
not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution,
Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No.
9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution,
and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

Even assuming that a holdover is permissible, the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where
no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is
evident. Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 has made it clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule
expressed in RA No. 9054. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill
the vacancies in the ARMM regional government, which arise from the legislature complying with the
constitutional mandate of synchronization.

P6.4 Supangan Jr. v. Santos, GR No. 84663, August 24, 1990

FACTS:
1. Petitioner was appointed by President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
province of Pangasinan representing the youth sector. However, at the Sanggunian, respondent
Marissa Domantay presented a letter written by Local Government Secretary Santos advising the
sanggunian that she has been named as member to replace petitioner.

2. Petitioner then contended that Sec. Santos has no legal authority to designate private respondent as she
has never been elected as KB Provincial Federation President, a qualification for appointment as
member representing the youth sector.

ISSUE: Whether the President’s power to appoint can be delegated to the Secretary of the Department of
Local Government. Whether the designations/appointments made by the Secretary are unlawful and
unconstitutional in the light of Article X, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, since there is as yet no enabling
law to implement the constitutional provision.

RULING: Yes. Pursuant to Section 9 Article X the LGC (BP 337), gives the power to appoint sectoral
representatives to the President. But the Secretary of Local Government may, by authority of the President,
inform the sectoral representatives of their appointments. Otherwise stated, it is actually the President who
has made the appointments, and the Secretary of Local Government is only the transmitter or communicator
of said appointments.

P6.4 Tan v. COMELEC: Plebiscite: Should include mother province and new province.
FACTS:
1. BP Blg 885 was enacted, creating the new province in the island of Negros. Petitioner filed to stop
respondents from conducting the plebiscite because it was confined only to the inhabitants of Negros
Del Norte, and some voters were excluded from the province of Negros Occidental, argued that the
cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental not included in the new province of
Negros Del Norte.

RULING: Yes. The plebiscite should be “in the unit or units affected. Where a portion of a province was
being lopped off to form a new province, both the mother province and the proposed new province should
participate and not just the proposed new province. Certainly, the mother province is affected because its
boundary is substantially altered.

P6.4 Tobias v. Abalos – 239 SCRA 106 [1994] (metes and bounds)
FACTS: Mandaluyong and San Juan was one legislative district until the passage of RA7675 converting the
municipality of Mandaluyong into a HUC. In a plebiscite, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the conversion
and making it in effect. Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate
in the plebiscite as the same involved a change in their legislative district.

RULING: No. The principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong. The
inhabitants of San Juan are excluded as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.

P7.4 Municipality of Jimenez v. Judge Baz – 265 SCRA 182 [1996]

FACTS: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO No. 258 of then President Elpidio Quirino. By
virtue of such, the territory of the municipality of Jimenez was reduced. Sinacaban laid claim to a portion
of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto, based on the technical
description in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental
against the Municipality of Jimenez. The municipality of Jimenez nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the
basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban which was accordingly approved by the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77 which stated that the Provincial Board
declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement
between the municipalities was void because the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as
such power was vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1983.

ISSUE: Whether Sinacaban has legal existence in such a way that it has a legal standing in Court and Whether
Sinacaban has legal basis for such territorial claim

RULING: Yes. Although the creation of municipal corporations is legislative in nature, where a municipality
created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its
creation can no longer be questioned. LGC of 1991 provides that “municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”
Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years with the EO being questioned.

NOTE: In San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, the Court considered the following factors as having validated the
creation of a municipal corporation through EO: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation
of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo
warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the
fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal
circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House
of Representatives.

P7.4 Cawaling v. COMELEC – GR146319, October 26, 2001

FACTS: Fromer President Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By
Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds
Therefor. COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the
matter for ratification and proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved
by the majority of the votes. Petitioner as resident filed the petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the
plebiscite on the ground that the plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the
approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54. Petitioner also instituted a petition declaring R.A. 8806
unconstitutional contending that the creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section
450(a) of the LGC which requires that only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city. Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created
only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what
R.A. No. 8806 has done.

ISSUE: Whether a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.

RULING: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply
one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger
of local government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria
established by the Code. the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger
of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division
shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

P7.4 League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, GR 176951, Nov. 29, 2008

FACTS: During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on
June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity
of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought
to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills
were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving
Joint Resolution No. 29. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional
for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and contended that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because
more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the
Local Government Code.

ISSUE: Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus
unconstitutional

RULING: YES. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills
became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the
criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violates such because they prevent a fair and just distribution of
the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Lastly, even if the exemption in the Cityhood
Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

P8.4 Sema v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700

FACTS: RA 9054 was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces,
municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff
Kabunsuan which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of
Cotabato City. However, for purposes of the 2007 elections, the 1st district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City.

Respondent Dilangalen contended that the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays contravenes Section
10, Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly can create local government units particularly the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan
RULING: No. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. There is no
provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to
create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. Thus, the
creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with
three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third,
there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

However, Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides that each province shall have at least one
representative in the House of Representatives. Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative
district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to
create a legislative district.

For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the
same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of
Representatives? The answer is in the negative.

P8.4 Camid v. Office of the President, GR No. 161414, January 17, 2005

FACTS: This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of the municipality of Andong in Lanao Del
Sur. This decision have noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive orders of Former President
Macapagal creating 33 municipalities of Lanao del Sur was considered null and void due to undue delegation
of legislative powers. Among the annulled executive orders is EO107 creating Andong.

Petitioner Sultan Camid, representing himself as resident of Andong and suing as a private citizen and taxpayer
argued that the Municipality of Andong never ceased to exercise corporate since it had evolved into a full-
blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tasks and services. It
therefore claims to be a de facto corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Andong can be recognized as a de facto municipal corporation

RULING: No. Most prominent is the fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled
by order of the Court in 1965. To uphold the claim would mean upholding defiance of the decision which
nullified its existence as a municipality.

Moreover, it bears noting that based on Camid’s own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set
forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the
municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must have their respective set of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code.
Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all. This incapacity ties in with the fact
that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. The national government ceased to recognize the existence of
Andong. The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the
last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town.

P8.4 Navarro v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 180050, February 10, 2010

FACTS: The NSO certified that Dinagat Islands’ population is 106,951. This was increased to 371,576 when
a special census of population was conducted. Its land area is 802.12 square kilometers and its average annual
income is P82,696,433.23. The President approved into law R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands and thereafter a mandatory plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.
Petitioners filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 9355 for failure to comply with the requirement on population and land area. Moreover, it questioned the
constitutionality of Section 2 Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC stating that the
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9355 and the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid

RULING:

February 10, 2010 Ruling

No. R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of
eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km. R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed
to comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.

The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of not less than 250,000
inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the NSO, the
population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951. Although the Provincial
Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which
yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the NSO as required by the Local
Government Code.

Furthermore, the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. The
Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption from such
criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. The IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by
Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized portion “The land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.” The extraneous
provision cannot be considered as germane to the purpose of the law as it already conflicts with the criteria
prescribed by the law in creating a territorial subdivision. Thus, there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy
between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails.

April 12, 2011 Ruling

RA 9355 and its IRR were both declared valid.

According to the SC, “with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three
(3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area,
are provided for.”

“But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more
islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of
the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This
exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section
461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.”

There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not
to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater
likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than
in most cities or municipalities. Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-
IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight and to reflect the true legislative intent.
It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income
of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation which is four times more than the minimum requirement of
P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven
possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as
mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they
must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.

P9.4 MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association Assoc., GR No. 135962, March 27, 2000

FACTS: In 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road,
Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised
that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter
wall. The trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the
MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its perimeter
walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

MMDA said it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the Government endowed with
police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the premise of police powers, it follow
then that it need not for an ordinance to be enacted first.

ISSUE: Does MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and
police powers.

RULING: NO. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President and administrative boards, LGU or other
lawmaking bodies.

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are administrative in
nature.The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation,implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system
and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting
through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening
of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

P9.4 MMDA v. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005

FACTS: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued
a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along
Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman
Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be
filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction,
contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924
grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified — and
therefore unlimited — fines and other penalties on erring motorists.

ISSUE: Whether the MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police power.

RULING: NO. Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With
the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under
"a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its
functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself.

P9.4 Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, 658 SCRA 853

FACTS: The Quezon City Council also issued Ordinance No. 2904, which orders the construction of Arcades
for Commercial Buildings. The ordinance was amended to not require the properties located at the Quezon
City - San Juan boundary, and commercial buildings from Balete - Seattle Street to construct the arcades,
moreover, Gancayco had been successful in his petition to have his property, already covered by the amended
ordinance, exempted from the ordinance. MMDA on April 28, 2003, sent a notice to Gancayco, under
Ordinance no. 2904, part of his property had to be demolished, if he did not clear that part within 15 days,
which Gancayco did not comply with, and so the MMDA had to demolish the party wall, or “wing walls.”
Gancayco then filed a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of
Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the demolition of his property, without due process and just compensation,
claiming that Ordinance no. 2904 was discriminatory and selective. He sought the declaration of nullity of the
ordinance and payment for damages. MMDA contended that Gancayco cannot seek nullification of an
ordinance that he already violated, and that the ordinance had the presumption of constitutionality, and it was
approved by the Quezon City Council, taking to note that the Mayor signed the ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA was in their authority to demolish Gancayco’s property.

RULING: NO. The MMDA was only to enforce Authoritative power on development of Metro Manila, and
was not supposed to act with Police Power as they were not given the authority to do such by the constitution,
nor was it expressed by the DPWH when the ordinance was enacted. Therefore, MMDA acted on its own
when it illegally demolished Gancayco’s property, and was solely liable for the damage.

P11.4 Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 196271, October 18, 2011

FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the
first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset
the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No.
9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the
ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUE: Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?

RULING: YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections. While the Constitution
does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards
this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show
the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges,
read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May
1992 and for all the following elections. In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional”
elections, should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution
mandates the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.

P11.4 Ampatuan v. Hon Ronaldo Puno, GR 190259. 17 June 2011 (Proclamation 1946 and AOs and 273
–A do not violate the principle of local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and
Section 1 Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act)

FACTS: On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato
under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be
allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named
places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of
the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term
“transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the
DILG).

Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy
Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for
prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the President’s proclamation and orders encroached on the
ARMM’s autonomy as these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and
to seize the regional government’s powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual basis for
declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where
no critical violent incidents occurred and that the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM
constitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946
as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under
the Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act?

RULING: The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over control of the
powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of ARMM into custody
for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed
the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In
turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali‐
Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not take over the administration
or the operations of the ARMM. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

P11.4 Kulayan v. Tan – 675 SCRA 482 [2012]

FACTS: Three members from the ICRC were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul,
Sulu. Governor Sakur Tan issued Proc. No.1 Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of
Sulu. Invoking Sec . 465 of LGC bestowing Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures
during a man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. Petitioner contends that such power is only vested to the
president and not to a governor.

ISSUE:W/N the Governor can exercise calling out power?

RULING: NO, Only the president is vested with calling out powers as the commander-in chief of the republic
as provided uner Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 7 of Article 7.

Section 17. Powers Not Vested to the ARMM

P12.4 Datu Michel Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR 196271, 18 October 2011.
FACTS: Enacted RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the ARMM which were scheduled to be
held on the second Monday of August 2011 to the second Monday of May 2013. In this case, one particular
argument is that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the national and local elections in
order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough and
tumble of nationwide and local elections.

RULING: while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never
equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the
larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the national government, save
only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination.

(The framers decided to reinstate the provision in order to make it clear, once and for all, that these are the
limits of the powers to the autonomous government; those not enumerated are actually to be exercised by the
national government; the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and
concerns Since the synchronization of elections not just a regional concerns but a national one, the ARMM is
subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having
act in accordance with national policy mandated by no less than the Constitution)

Sections 18 and 19. Organic Act for Autonomous Regions

P12.4 Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287 (1989)
FACTS: In relation to Section 18 Article 10. Article 2 Section 1 mandates the creation of ARMM in
accordance with Section 18 Article X which requires that it is made effective upon the approval by majority
of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. Does MAJORITY refer to a
majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the
constituent units, or both?

RULING: The Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite
they would have so indicated. ARMM creation is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the
plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for
if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they
could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution.

P12.4 Ordillos v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1990)

FACTS: A plebiscite as held pursuant the creation of Cordillera Autonomous Region for provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, and the city of Baguio. The province of
Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region
can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
HELD: The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. Ifugao cannot validly
constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region as explicitly provided under Article X, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution that:
There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.

P13.4 Badua v. CBA, 194 SCRA 101 (1991)

FACTS: Whether a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid and executory
decision in a land dispute is the legal issue presented by this petition.

The petitioners, spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua, allegedly own a farm land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa,
Abra. They were forcibly ejected from the land by virtue of a “decision” of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration (Maeng Tribal Court) in a case entitled “David Quema vs. Leonor Badua.”

RULING/MAINPOINT: Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the
Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the
Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous
cultural community. Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the
Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
They do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the
barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring together the parties
to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise.

The decision rendered by the Maeng Tribal Court is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

P13.4 Atitiw v. Zamora, 471 SCRA 329

FACTS: Petitioners sought among others, the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the Special Provisions
of Republic Act No. 8760, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2000, directing that
the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay the separation and retirement
benefits of all affected officials and employees. The 2000 GAA appropriated a total of P18,379,000.00 for the
CAR's general administration and support services for that year, in contrast to the annual appropriation of
P36,000,000.00 in the previous years.

Petitioners posit that the questioned paragraph in the 2000 GAA had the effect of abolishing the CAR, more
so that the appropriation therein was ordained to be used for the winding up of the affairs of the CAR. Since
a special law created the CAR, petitioners argue that the 2000 GAA is “not the place for amending or repealing
a standing law.”

RULING/MAINPOINT: The CAR was not abolished, as concluded by petitioners, with the reduction of its
budgetary allocation; what took place was only a discontinuance of its programs and activities. In fact, E.O.
No. 328, the implementing rule of the questioned Special Provisions, provides only for the deactivation of the
CAR bodies upon the lapse of its operational period as provided in the E.O.

There is a distinction between the words “deactivate” and “abolish.” To “deactivate” means to render inactive
or ineffective or to break up by discharging or reassigning personnel, while to “abolish” means to do away
with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely. XXX in deactivation the office continues to exist XXX.

P13.4 Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, GR No. 82217, Jan. 29, 1990
FACTS: Assailing the constitutionality of EO 220 for creating Autonomous Region. A reading of E.O.
No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery
of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the
administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras.

RULING/MAINPOINT: E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region, it merely provides for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region; Thus,
E.O. 220, not unconstitutional.

P1.5 Pandi v. CA, GR No. 116850, April 11, 2002

(as of E.O. 133- VESTED THE ARMM REGIONAL SECRETARY OF HEALTH THE POWER OF
SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER ALL FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE REGIONAL
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; SUPERVISION AND CONTROL INCLUDES THE POWER TO DETAIL
A PROVINCIAL HEALTH OFFICER TO ANY REGIONAL HEALTH OFFICE WITHIN THE REGION.)

SUMMARY OF THE CASE: Regional Director and Regional Secretary of Health designated Dr. Pandi as
OIC of IPHO-APGH in August 9, 1993. In September 15, 1993, designated Dr. Saber as the OIC of the IPHO-
APGH. And in November 6, 1993 President Ramos issued E.O. 133 transferring the powers & functions of
the DOH in the region to the Regional Government of ARMM. Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993, the
official vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all provincial health offices in the ARMM. He
then designated Pandi on November 6, 1993. The designation dated August 9, 1993 is void since the Regional
Secretary at that time did not yet exercise supervision and control over the provincial health offices of the
ARMM. The designation of Pandi in August 9, 1993, while valid is only temporary in nature, good until a
new designation or a permanent appointment is made.

P1.5 Sema v. COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16, 2008

Doctrine: Sec. 19, Art. VI of Republic Act 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Regional legislative bodies may be delegated the power to
create municipalities and barangays provided in Sec. 10, Art, X of the Constitution but only Congress may
create provinces and cities.

FACTS: Congress enacted Republic Act 9054 by virtue of which Congress delegated to ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM.

ISSUE: May Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,
cities, and municipalities within the ARMM pursuant to Congress’s plenary legislative powers?

RULING: IT DEPENDS. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to
regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays. However, the creation
of provinces and cities is another matter. Only Congress can create provinces and cities, because the
creation of the same necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can
exercise under Sec. 5 Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to it.

P1.5 Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Panel

FACTS: FACTS: The PH and the MILF were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain. This gives a system of government having the power to enter into treaties of amity
and commerce with foreign nations. The respondents contend that the legislative powers vested to the BJE
in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, Art. 10 of the Constitution and that a mere passage
of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers included in the agreement.
RULING: The Constitution is clear that only the President is the sole organ and authority in external relations
and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. Even if the BJE be granted with the authority to
negotiate with other states, the former provision must be amended consequently.

P2.5 Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, February 2012 (means that only amendments
to, or revisions of, the organic Act Constitutionally-essential to creation of autonomous regions – i.e. , those
aspects specially mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for the Organic Act – require
ratification through a plebiscite)

FACTS: Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional
elections in the ARMM (which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the
second Monday of May 2013. Whether RA No. 10153 has to comply with the supermajority vote and
plebiscite requirements?

RULING: NO. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only
the first ARMM elections; it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In
providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 but
merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054. Only amendments to, or revisions of, the organic Act
Constitutionally-essential to creation of autonomous regions require ratification through a plebiscite.

P2.5 Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Philippines Peace Panel, 568 SCRA 492

FACTS: The PH and the MILF were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain. This gives a system of government having the power to enter into treaties of amity and
commerce with foreign nations. The respondents contend that the legislative powers vested to the BJE in
the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, Art. 10 of the Constitution and that a mere passage
of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers included in the agreement.

RULING: The Constitution is clear that only the President is the sole organ and authority in external relations
and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. Even if the BJE be granted with the authority to
negotiate with other states, the former provision must be amended consequently.