Social Weather Stations vs.

COMELEC

G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001

Mendoza, J.:

Facts:

The Social Weather Stations is a non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various
fields thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. They questioned the
validity of §5.4 of RA No. 9006 (Fair Election Act) which prohibited the publication of election surveys
within 15 days immediately preceding the day of the election for the national candidates and 7 days for
local candidates. Petitioners argued that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constituted a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger
to justify such restraint. Respondent Commission on Elections justified the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No.
9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous
and erroneous surveys just before the election.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed law is valid

Held:

No. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that "the government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."11 The
inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the expression falls within one of the few unprotected
categories dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, thus:

There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words - those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. [S]uch utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.

Also, although Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the
sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by
punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the
danger of such evils. Pursuant to this power of the COMELEC, it can confiscate bogus survey results
calculated to mislead voters.

To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom
of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
 Disini vs. Secretary of Justice

G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014

Abad, J.:

Facts:

Several petitioners assailed the validity of certain provisions of RA 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention
Act, one of which is the “cyber libel” clause which punishes libel committed using electronic means.
Petitioner argued that the said law violates our international obligations and is violative of the people’s
right to speech and expression.

Issue: Whether the assailed provision is valid?

Held:

Yes. The UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It
simply suggested that defamation laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle freedom of
expression. Indeed, the ICCPR states that although everyone should enjoy freedom of expression, its
exercise carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Free speech is not absolute. It is subject to
certain restictions, as may be necessary and as may be provided by law.

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that
the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is
actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes
it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for
committing libel.

But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the
libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal
code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of
print.
 GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014

Peralta, J.:

FACTS:

The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and
political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120)
minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to
suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect
during the forthcoming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station”
airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for
candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates freedom
of expression, of speech and of the press.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable
and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach
out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based”
airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would
justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate
their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence
of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on
broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There
are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a
national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be
necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the
people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects
would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his
political speech.