En Banc: CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.]
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym

OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD
OMAR FAJARDO , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO!
PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS
MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE;
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS &
HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG
OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO;
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN
NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-
LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY
HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 , respondents.
[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.]
BAYAN MUNA , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;

NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO
(PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG
AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE
PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION ,
respondents.
Neri Javier Colmenares for Bayan Muna.

Chan Robles & Associates for Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc.
Cruz Cruz & Navarro for Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga.
Brillantes Navarro Jumamil Arcilla Escolin & Martinez Law O ces for The True
Marcos Loyalist Association of the Philippines.
Francis A. Ver for Phil. Local Autonomy Movement.
Yap Crisanto Salvador & Calderon and Fonacier & Fonacier Law O ce for Chamber
of Real Estate Builders Asso.
Mcaskell Equila & Associates for Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW).
Juan Carlos T. Cuna for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.
Buñag Kapunan Migallos & Perez for Aksyon Democratiko.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
Tonisito M.C. Umali for Liberal Party.
Antonio Dollete & Associates for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.
Yulo and Bello Law Offices for LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP.
Ceferino Padua Law O ce, Gerardo A. Del Mundo Law O ce and Antonio R.
Bautista & Partners for Bagong Bayani Org.
The Solicitor General for Commission on Elections.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna led the present
petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 37851
issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disquali cation of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to bene t the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-
marginalized or overrepresented.
The Supreme Court found the petition partly meritorious. The Court remanded the
case to the Comelec and directed the Commission to conduct summary evidentiary
hearings on the quali cations of the party-list participants. The Court rejected the
submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is,
without any quali cation, open to all. According to the Court, such position does not only
weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices
them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it
would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them
and aggravate their marginalization. The Court stressed that the very reason for the
establishment of the party-list system is the fundamental social justice principle that those
who have less in life should have more in law. It was for them that the party-list system
was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the
opportunity to be elected and to represent the speci c concerns of their constituencies;
and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State.
The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this
social justice vehicle. The Court also laid down some guidelines to assist the Comelec in
its work of conducting summary evidentiary hearings on the quali cations of the party-list
participants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; VALIDITY OF COMELEC

OMNIBUS RESOLUTION 3785 IN CASE AT BAR MAY BE BROUGHT BEFORE THIS COURT
IN A VERIFIED PETITION THEREFOR UNDER RULE 65 OF RULES OF COURT. — Petitioners
attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list
elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules of Court, such
challenge may be brought before this Court in a veri ed petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE. — These cases present an exception to the rule
that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other
remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and
in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and
with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the
House of Representatives.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS MAY BE GLOSSED OVER TO
PREVENT A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. — Procedural requirements "may be glossed over
to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice . .
. when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available."
4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE; MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION PROHIBITED UNDER SECTION 1(D), RULE 13 THEREOF. — The
assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc;
hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under
Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DUTY; TO FORMULATE GUIDING AND
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, PRECEPTS, DOCTRINES OR RULES. —
These cases raise transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this
Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." acCTIS
6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; POLITICAL PARTIES; MAY PARTICIPATE IN PARTY-

LIST ELECTIONS AND MAY BE REGISTERED UNDER PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. — Under the
Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disquali ed from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution,
political parties may be registered under the party-list system. Furthermore, Section 11 of
RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system.
We quote the pertinent provision below: . . . Indubitably, therefore, political parties — even
the major ones — may participate in the party-list elections.
7. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-
list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that
consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in
Congress. He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections,
we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth
place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they
would have ve or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party-list system."
8. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL PARTY; DEFINED. — For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also
provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either
a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law
de nes "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the
most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."
9. ID.; ID.; RA 7941; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, CONSTRUED. —
"Proportional representation" in Sec. 2 of RA 7941 does not refer to the number of people
in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it
allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exempli ed by the
enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941; namely, "labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF WELL-DEFINED CONSTITUENCY, EXPLAINED. — "Lack of
well-de ned constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally identi able electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identi ed with the "marginalized or
underrepresented."
11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES; WHERE
LANGUAGE OF LAW IS CLEAR, IT MUST BE APPLIED ACCORDING TO ITS EXPRESS
TERMS. — The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not
only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, . . ., to become
members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must
be applied according to its express terms.
12. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF A TERM IN A STATUTE MAY BE LIMITED, QUALIFIED OR
SPECIALIZED BY THOSE IN IMMEDIATE ASSOCIATION. — While the enumeration of
marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear
intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a
fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words
and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a
statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
13. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; PRIMARY SOURCE FROM WHICH TO
ASCERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT OR PURPOSE IS LANGUAGE OF PROVISION
ITSELF. — The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the
primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of
the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other words, verba
legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal
should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and
ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.
14. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION; WHEN A LOWER COURT OR A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY VIOLATES OR
IGNORES THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAW, ITS ACTION CAN BE STRUCK DOWN BY THIS
COURT ON THE GROUND THEREOF. — When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like
the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can
be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the
function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they nd it,
not to reinvent or second-guess it.
15. ID.; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION; SUPREME COURT NOT A TRIER OF
FACTS. — Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan
Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources and
privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. It is not equipped to receive evidence
and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
16. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); POLITICAL
PARTY, SECTOR, ORGANIZATION OR COALITION MUST REPRESENT MARGINALIZED AND
UNDERREPRESENTED GROUPS IDENTIFIED IN SECTION 5 THEREOF. — First, the political
party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identi ed in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show
— through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of
government and track record — that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests,
it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES MUST SHOW THAT THEY REPRESENT
INTERESTS OF THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED. — Second, while even
major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of
enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to
be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disquali ed
merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they
represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. DAHaTc
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS SECTOR MAY NOT BE REPRESENTED IN PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM. — In view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system.
19. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS AND SECTS
SHALL NOT BE REGISTERED AS POLITICAL PARTIES. — Furthermore, the Constitution
provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered." The prohibition
was explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T]he
prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any
prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the
registration of a religious sect as a political party."
20. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); A PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST
NOT BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER SECTION 6 THEREOF. — Fourth, a party or an organization
must not be disquali ed under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disquali cation as follows: "(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means
to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any
foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its o cers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist
for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections
or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system
in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE AN ADJUNCT OF, OR A
PROJECT ORGANIZED OR AN ENTITY FUNDED OR ASSISTED BY THE GOVERNMENT. —
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
funded or assisted by the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party
or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens.
It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its
o cials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties,
but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House
of Representatives.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEES MUST REPRESENT MARGINALIZED AND
UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS. — Not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To
repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the
interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the
urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the
State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEE MUST BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO FORMULATION AND
ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION THAT WILL BENEFIT THE NATION AS A
WHOLE. — As previously discussed, while lacking a well-de ned political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained
during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or
regional, is not going to represent a particular district . . . ."
VITUG, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM;
SYSTEMS OF REPRESENTATION; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND SECTORAL
REPRESENTATION, EXPLAINED. — Perhaps the present controversy stems from a
confusion of the actual character of the party-list system. At rst glance, it gives the
impression of being a combination of proportional representation for non-traditional
parties and sectoral representation. The rst, proportional representation, on one end, is
intended for no other reason than to open up the electoral process for broader
participation and representation. Sectoral representation on the other, presupposes that
every underrepresented sector be represented in Congress. This impression of sectoral-
based representation stems from the provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specific sectors to be represented.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOUR GROUPS BELONGING THERETO, NAMELY: 1) POLITICAL
PARTIES, 2) SECTORAL PARTIES, 3) SECTORAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND 4) COALITIONS,
CONSTRUED. — The party-list system is limited to four groups — 1) political parties, 2)
sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party is an
organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominate and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office. A sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to
identi able sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987
Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities and women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the sherfolk, elderly,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a
group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,
sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE. — A party-list nominee is
subject to basically the same quali cations applicable to legislative districts candidates,
with the exception of the additional requirement that he be nominated in one list only, and
provided, further, that he is not a candidate for any elective o ce or has lost his bid for an
elective o ce in the immediately preceding election. A nominee must actually belong to
the sector which they purport to represent, otherwise, there can be no true representation.
A nominee of the youth sector is further required to be at least 25 but not more than 30
years of age on the day of the election. Should he, however, attain the age of 30 during his
term, he is allowed to continue until the expiration thereof. Once elected, party-list
representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and privileges as do district
representatives, except that they are not entitled to the Country-wide Development Fund
(CDF).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FEATURE THEREOF IS THAT POLITICAL PARTIES, SECTORAL GROUPS
AND ORGANIZATIONS, COALITIONS AND AGGRUPATION ACQUIRE STATUS OF
"CANDIDATES" AND THEIR NOMINEES RELEGATED TO MERE AGENTS. — A feature of the
party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and organizations, coalitions and
aggrupation acquire the status of "candidates" and their nominees relegated to mere
agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies, becomes physically incapacitated, removed
from o ce by the party or the organization he represents, resigns, or is disquali ed during
his term, his party can send another person to take his place for the remaining period,
provided the replacement is next in succession in the list of nominees submitted to the
COMELEC upon registration. Furthermore, a party-list representative who switches party
a liations during his term forfeits his seat. So, also, if a person changes his sectoral
a liation within 6 months before the election, he will not be eligible for nomination in
party-list representative under his new party or organization.EcTDCI
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; EFFECT

MUST BE GIVEN TO INTENT OF FRAMERS OF ORGANIC LAW AND OF PEOPLE ADOPTING
IT. — The polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains — "effect must be
given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it." The law,
in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-room for construction. Courts
are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional
provisions according to their plain terms and import have been considered in advance and
accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by countervailing
advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may unwittingly, be crossing the limits
of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of judicial legislation, and more
importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the lament of herein petitioners is
understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the people themselves
through an amendment of their work as and when better counsel prevails.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting opinion:
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; MOST
IMPORTANT SINGLE FACTOR IN DETERMINING INTENTION OF PEOPLE FROM WHOM
CONSTITUTION EMANATED IS LANGUAGE IN WHICH IT IS EXPRESSED. — "The most
important single factor in determining the intention of the people from whom the
Constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed." The text of Art. VI, §5(1)
(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of "registered, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations," not for sectoral representation. Only for three consecutive terms
following the rati cation of the Constitution and only with respect to one-half of the seats
allotted to party-list representatives does it allow sectoral representation. Textually, Art. VI,
§5(1)(2) provides no basis for petitioners' contention that whether it is sectoral
representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide exclusive representation for
"marginalized sectors," by which term petitioners mean the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
2. ID.; ID.; RESORT TO DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION MAY BE HAD ONLY WHEN OTHER GUIDES FAIL AS SAID PROCEEDINGS
ARE POWERLESS TO VARY TERMS OF CONSTITUTION WHEN MEANING IS CLEAR. — The
polestar of constitutional interpretation has been stated by this Court in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary , as follows: While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to
consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at
the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when
other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution
when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes,
but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of
the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; SYSTEMS OF
REPRESENTATION; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM AND WINNER-TAKE-ALL SINGLE-SEAT DISTRICT
SYSTEM, DISTINGUISHED. — The two systems of representation are not identical. Party-
list representation is a type of proportional representation designed to give those who
otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of Representatives in district elections a chance
to win if they have su cient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups
are considered "marginalized and underrepresented.") Under the party-list system,
representatives are elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes
received in contrast to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate
garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat. Thus, under the party-list system, a party or
candidate need not come in rst in order to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand,
in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted
as only those who vote for the winner are represented. To the extent then that it assures
parties or candidates a percentage of seats in the legislature that re ects their public
support, the party-list system enables marginalized and underrepresented sectors (such
as, but not limited to, the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, and youth sectors) to obtain seats in the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the
party-list system does not guarantee to these sectors seats in the legislature.
4. ID.; ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; A TYPE OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
INTENDED TO GIVE VOICE TO THOSE WHO MAY NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY NUMBER
TO WIN A SEAT IN A DISTRICT BUT ARE SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS TO GIVE THEM A
SEAT NATIONWIDE. — The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the
party-list system is not limited to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors
referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a type of proportional representation
intended to give voice to those who may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a
district but are su ciently numerous to give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore,
misreads the debates on Art. VI, §5(1)(2) to say that "Although Commissioners Villacorta
and Monsod differed in their proposals as to the details of the party-list system, both
proponents worked within the framework that the party-list system is for the 'marginalized'
as termed by Comm. Villacorta and the 'underrepresented' as termed by Comm. Monsod,
which he defined as those which are 'always third or fourth place in each of the districts.'"
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT CANNOT HOLD THAT PARTY-LIST SYSTEM IS
RESERVED EXCLUSIVELY FOR LABOR, PEASANTS, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL
COMMUNITIES, WOMEN AND YOUTH. — A problem was placed before the Constitutional
Commission that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves
blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of under representation two solutions
were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional
representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system. This Court
cannot hold that the party-list system is reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth as petitioners contend without
changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the
opposite of the reserved seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that "A free and
open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people,
subject to the provisions of this Article."
6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (R.A. NO. 7941); SECTION 2 THEREOF,
CONSTRUED. — What Section 2 of RA No. 7941 simply states is that the purpose of the
party-list system is to promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives and, that to achieve this end, "a full, free
and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives" shall be guaranteed. Contrary
to what the majority claims, §2 does not say that the party-list system is intended "to
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations, and parties, and who lack well-de ned political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats
in the House of Representatives. What it says is that the policy of the law is "to promote
proportional representation through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and
parties, and who lack well-de ned political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House. For while
the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of
the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional
representation is to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a
chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in
§5, i.e., labor, peasants, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly,
the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These
groups can possibly include other sectors. DHITcS

DECISION
PANGANIBAN , J : p
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to
the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to bene t them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active
participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals
and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same
opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and
mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on
March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek
the disquali cation of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to bene t the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration led by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the
Comelec, "[v]eri cations were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and
organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard.
With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural
requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in
order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate
Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous
petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early
release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10
February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations
led their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were
denied also led Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent
to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties led their
Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of
154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26,
2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this
system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic]
and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to
directly participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as de ned, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of
proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must
recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties,
organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those
who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the
su ciency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for
Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party led before the Comelec a Petition
praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certi ed List
of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List
System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certi ed list be accordingly
amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not
be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11,
2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also led a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disquali cation
cases to le Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on
April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing, however,
Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatis ed with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as
G.R. No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated
April 17, 2001, 1 0 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-
extendible period of five days from notice. 1 1
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also led before this Court a Petition, 1 2
docketed as G.R. No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In
its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 1 3 the Court ordered the consolidation of the two
Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to le their
respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral
Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and
canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any
winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 1 4 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on
May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open
court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously
within a non-extendible period of five days. 1 5
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the
following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises.
More speci cally, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list

elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and

underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 1 6
The Court's Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the
Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision. ASCTac
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is
improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary
course of law. 1 7 The O ce of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have
led before the Comelec a petition either for disquali cation or for cancellation of
registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 1 8
dated November 9, 2000. 1 9
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus
Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it
allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both
t he Constitution 2 0 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this
Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 2 1
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had led before the Comelec a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 2 2 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there
was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency
of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition
before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the O ce
of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, thesse cases present an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie
only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 2 3 It has been held
that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the
issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency."
2 4 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme
urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list
system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 2 5
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of
justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice . . . when the decision sought
to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is
the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 2 6
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of
political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the
questioned Resolution." 2 7 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation
of "major political parties." 2 8 On the other hand, the O ce of the Solicitor General, like the
impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political
parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in
fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." 2 9
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disquali ed from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are
political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the
House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political
parties may be registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party , organization, or coalition
shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided
in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the
party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law."
30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.

Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party,
a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 3 1 Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 3 2
This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas
Ople: 3 3
"MR. TADEO.
Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-

Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE.
Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."

Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision
was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place
third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 3 4 He
explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out
that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have
about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of
the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have ve or
six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative
districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list
system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ." Section 3
expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties." More to the point, the law de nes "political party" as "an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct
of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of
political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"xxx xxx xxx
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the rst ve (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the
start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in
the party-list system.
"xxx xxx xxx"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties — even the major ones — may participate in
the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party — or any organization or group for that matter — may do
so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the
purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fty members, unless otherwise xed by law , who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the rati cation of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be lled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant , urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector." (Italics supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of

the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to
give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed,
he exultantly announced: "On this rst day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a
new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the
legislature." 3 5
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it
was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence,
RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy . — The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-de ned political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation
as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented

to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the
election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a
particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude
to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exempli ed by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign.
The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 3 6 Concurrently, the persons
nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-de ned constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally
identi able electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identi ed with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list
system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only
by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing
law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, . . . , to become members of the
House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied
according to its express terms. 3 7
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-
list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a
party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by ling with
the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition veri ed
by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system
as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such
parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of o cers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include
labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not
exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their
meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are
associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, quali ed or
specialized by those in immediate association. 3 8
The Party-List System Desecrated
by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the O ce of the Solicitor
General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system
to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 3 9 In fact, it contends that
any party or group that is not disquali ed under Section 6 4 0 of RA 7941 may participate in
the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization
representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the
party-list elections. 4 1
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the O ce of the
Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain
Filipino citizens — speci cally those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties — to be elected to the House of Representatives. The
assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich
and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of
these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them
similarly de es reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty.
Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 4 2 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers,
industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of
their respective sectors. 4 3
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny
minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that
their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical
limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of
one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount
of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are
the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and in rmity. It was for them that the party-
list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give
them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the speci c concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs
of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and
ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and
underrepresented in the past — the farm hands, the sher folk, the urban poor, even those
in the underground movement — to come out and participate, as indeed many of them
came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and
frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested
groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the
party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of
the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20
percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system,
44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain
representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. 4 5
Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold
within it — those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the
"simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system
to those who have long been within it — those privileged sectors that have long dominated
the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when
compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to
enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the bene t of outsiders only, not the
dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In
the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected
through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented
who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining
seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the
marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The
party-list system is a tool for the bene t of the underprivileged; the law could not have
given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries. HDAaIc
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted
by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that icker of
hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and
Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the
Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary
source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the
provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 4 6 In other words, verba legis still
prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort
be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the
true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 4 7
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 4 8 that "the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose
of the resulting Constitution . . . only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes
at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched
in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto,
Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation,
we should therefore look at the law rst. Only when we nd its provisions ambiguous
should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain
words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t the
nation as a whole . . ." The criteria for participation is well de ned. Thus, there is no need
for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In
any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at
best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA
7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied
plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems
to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel
admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented,
could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections,
violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 4 9 Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-
judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they nd it, not to reinvent or second-guess
it. 5 0
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disquali cation of the major political parties — Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP
and PMP — on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been
accredited as the ve (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001
elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting o cial
Comelec Election Returns, Certi cates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers . . . ." We note,
however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to
the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would
be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual
determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously
approved groups, have the necessary quali cations to participate in the party-list
elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw
sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources and
privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 5 1 It is not equipped to receive
evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should rst be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision,
before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-
list system.
Guidelines for Screening
Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the
latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court nds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its
work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identi ed in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other
words, it must show — through its constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws, history,
platform of government and track record — that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other
words, while they are not disquali ed merely on the ground that they are political parties,
they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated
political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote
shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must
claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN:
Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes." 5 2
Third, in view of the objections 5 3 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following
discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. . . .
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international
networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this
prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those
parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and
philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall
within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD.
If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then
certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction." 5 4
The following discussion is also pertinent:

"MR. VILLACORTA.
When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of
course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say,
the indigenous community sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS.
Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the
Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera." 5 5
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall
not be registered." 5 6 The prohibition was explained by a member 5 7 of the Constitutional
Commission in this wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a
political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate.
That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party." 5 8
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disquali ed under Section 6 of RA
7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized
for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its o cers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to

elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered." 5 9
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disquali es a party or group for

violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include
Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties . . . to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an
organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or
an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system,
the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated
by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the
government or its o cials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal 6 0 and
unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected
to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees
must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Quali cations of Party-List Nominees . — No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and
write, a bona de member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty- ve

(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any
youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized
and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of
RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth
cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working
class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-de ned political constituency,
the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained
during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or
regional, is not going to represent a particular district . . ." 6 1
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-de ned political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that
those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool
intended to bene t those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people
genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and
even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to
come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.

Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the
other respondents that the party-list system is, without any quali cation, open to all. Such
position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list
system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the
marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the
Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of
noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this
could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA
7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to
immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the quali cations of the party-list
participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the
extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is
directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have
garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The
Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days
from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain
from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until
after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing
disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt
thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr.,C.J ., concurs in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente
M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is abroad on official business.
Separate Opinions
VITUG , J., dissenting :
The 1987 Constitution, crafted at a time when the euphoria of the 1986 People
Power had barely subsided, recognized the vigor infused by civilian society in a cleansing
political reform and focused itself on institutionalizing civilian participation in daily
governance. A cause for concern was the not-too-unlikely perpetuation of a single party in
power — a convenient contrivance for authoritarian rule. Article VI, Section 5, subsection 2,
of the 1987 Charter —
THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER
CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE
UNDER THE PARTY LIST FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. AFTER THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED
TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY
SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR,
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER
SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. —
was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.

Immediately, after the resumption of the next Congress, then president Corazon C.
Aquino, exercising her transitory appointing powers, assigned to the reserved seats in the
Lower House, representatives of the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women and youth sector. The assignment was made from a selected list of
names submitted by the sectors themselves. The sectors would continue to enjoy these
reserved seats for the next three terms; thenceforth, they would have to participate in an
electoral contest to secure their representation in Congress.
Article 6, Section 5(2), however, not being self-executing, would wait for the
legislature to ordain the enabling law. Congress was to be circumscribed by the terms
expressed in Article 6, Section 5(2). — First, the system should only apply to the election of
20% of the total composition of the House of Representatives, second, it would prescribe
a mandatory proportional representation scheme, and, third, it would allow participating
parties and organizations to be represented in voter's registration boards, board of
election inspectors, parties and organizations or similar entities.
On 03 March 1995, Republic Act 7941, also known as "An Act Providing for the
Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System, and Appropriating
Funds Therefor," was enacted. The enabling law laid the basis for COMELEC Resolution No.
2847, issued on July 1996, prescribing the "Rules and Regulations Governing the Elections
of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System." In the May 1998 rst
party-list elections, the sectors were required, to test, for the rst time, their political
mettle in an open electoral contest with other parties, groups and organizations under a
party-list system. While the elections had a low-voter turnout, seen largely as a result of
public unawareness of an electoral innovation, the recent 2001 multi-party list elections,
however, were different. This time, a huge number of parties, groups and coalitions applied
for registration with, and subsequently obtained accreditation from, the COMELEC. Six of
these groups were established political parties, namely PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO,
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL PARTY, NACIONALISTA PARTY and PDP-
LABAN.
The instant petition prays for the exclusion of these major parties on the ground that
their participation does not level the playing eld for less known and less organized
sectoral groups still in dire need of election logistics and machinery. Arguing that the
system is open to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, as well as other parties
but only on the condition that the latter eld sectoral candidates themselves, herein
petitioner sought the disquali cation of the large major political parties and groups which
do not represent any "genuine" sectoral interest.
A perusal of the novel electoral engineering, introduced by the Constitution into the
electoral system, would show the pertinent provisions to be stoically quiet on the
quali cations of a party, group or coalition to participate under the party-list system.
Instead, it has opted to rely on a subsequent statutory enactment to provide for the
system's focal particulars, which now lead us to the enabling law itself. Section 2 of R.A.
7941 reads —
"The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable the Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lacked well-de ned
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives, by enhancing their chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of
the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions — the rst headed by
Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 percentum of the total seats in
Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to
appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was
opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the di culty in delimiting the
sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-
pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral
interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that
pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be
like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established
political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it
banned the rst ve major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the rst party-list
elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The
advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a
compromise — that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and
marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of
the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would garner
the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for
permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the
sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to
muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive
terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected
to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral
contest with the more veteran political groups.
The system, designed to accommodate as many groups as possible, abhors the
monopoly of representation in the Lower House. This intent is evident in the statutory
imposition of the three-seat cap, which prescribes the limit to the number of seats that
may be gained by a party or organization. 1 Votes garnered in excess of 6% of the total
votes cast do not entitle the party to more than three seats.
There is no express provision of the Constitution or in the enabling law that
disallows major political parties from participating in the party-list system and, at the
same time, from fielding candidates for legislative district representatives.
Perhaps the present controversy stems from a confusion of the actual character of
the party-list system. At rst glance, it gives the impression of being a combination of
proportional representation for non-traditional parties and sectoral representation. The
rst, proportional representation, on one end, is intended for no other reason than to open
up the electoral process for broader participation and representation. Sectoral
representation on the other, presupposes that every underrepresented sector be
represented in Congress. This impression of sectoral-based representation stems from
the provisions of Article 6, Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in
enumerating speci c sectors to be represented. In holding that the party list system is
open only to the underrepresented and marginalized sectors, the ponencia places much
reliance on Section 5 of R.A. 7941:
"SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a
parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall
include labor peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.
"The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
"The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition
within fteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case
not later than sixty (60) days before election." EcTIDA
It would seem to me that, construed along with Section 3(d) of the statute, de ning
a "sectoral party," the enumeration was intended to qualify only "sectoral parties" and not
the other eligible groups (e.g ., political parties, sectoral organizations and coalitions).
Neither Article 6, Section 5(2), nor R.A. 7941 intended to guarantee representation to all
sectors of society and, let alone, hand it over only to underrepresented and marginalized
sectors. The real aim, if the will of the majority of the Commissioners were to be
respected, was to introduce the concept of party-list representation.
The party-list system is limited to four groups — 1) political parties, 2) sectoral
parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party is an organized group
of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office. A sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to
identi able sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987
Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities and women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the sherfolk, elderly,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a
group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,
sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.
A party or organization desiring to join the party-list system is required to register
with the COMELEC, together with a list of its ve nominees for party-list representatives,
arranged according to the group's order of preference. In every election for the House of
Representatives, each voter casts two votes — one for the district representative of his
choice and another for the party or organization of his choice. The votes cast for the
parties and organizations are totaled nationwide. In contrast to the election of all other
o cials where the rule of plurality ( i.e., the candidate with the highest number of votes
wins) is adopted, the number of seats under the party-list system depends on the number
of votes received in proportion to the total number of votes cast nationwide. On the basis
of the number of registered voters in the recent elections, a group under the party-list
system, should get approximately half a million votes to be entitled to one seat.
At the center stage of this controversy are the political parties themselves.
Undeniably, political parties are an important feature in both democratic and authoritarian
regimes. By legitimizing the individuals and institutions that control political power, parties
add an important element of stability to a political system and also help organize the
government and electorate by recruiting candidates, conducting campaigns, encouraging
partisan attachments and generally educating the public, stimulating voter participation
and providing varying degrees of policy direction to government. The idea could also be
seen as a good training and recruiting ground for potential leaders. Advocates commend
the multi-party as allowing the expression and the compromise of the many interests of a
complex society, including a range of ideological differences, con icting political values
and philosophies. Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution is explicit — "A free and open party
system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people." 2 The multi-
party system of proportional representation broadens the composition of the House of
Representatives to accommodate sectors and organizations that do not have well-de ned
political constituencies and to facilitate access to minority or small parties.
A party-list nominee is subject to basically the same quali cations applicable to
legislative districts candidates, 3 with the exception of the additional requirement that he
be nominated in one list only, and provided, further, that he is not a candidate for any
elective o ce or has lost his bid for an elective o ce in the immediately preceding
election. 4 A nominee must actually belong to the sector which they purport to represent,
otherwise, there can be no true representation. 5 A nominee of the youth sector is further
required to be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election. 6
Should he, however, attain the age of 30 during his term, he is allowed to continue until the
expiration thereof. 7 Once elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the same term,
rights and privileges as do district representatives, except that they are not entitled to the
Country-wide Development Fund (CDF). 8
A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups and
organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of "candidates" and their
nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies, becomes
physically incapacitated, removed from o ce by the party or the organization he
represents, resigns, or is disquali ed during his term, his party can send another person to
take his place for the remaining period, provided the replacement is next in succession in
the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon registration. Furthermore, a party-list
representative who switches party a liations during his term forfeits his seat. 9 So, also, if
a person changes his sectoral a liation within 6 months before the election, he will not be
eligible for nomination in party-list representative under his new party or organization. 1 0
The argument raised by petitioners could not be said to have been overlooked as
they precisely were the same points subjected to intense and prolonged deliberations by
the members of the Constitutional Commission.
And, the polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains — "effect
must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it."
1 1 The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-room for
construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the
application of constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import have
been considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as
compensated by countervailing advantages. 1 2 The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may
unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of
judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the lament
of herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the
people themselves through an amendment of their work as and when better counsel
prevails. aASEcH
WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my colleagues in their judgment. I

am thus constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petitions.
MENDOZA , J., dissenting :
I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases. I will presently explain my vote, but
before I do so it seems to me necessary to state briefly the facts and the issues.
THE FACTS
Petitioner Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party (OFW for short) is the political
agency of the Overseas Filipino Workers Movement, a non-stock and non-pro t
organization. On the other hand, petitioner Bayan Muna is a political party representing
peasants, workers, women, the youth, and other marginalized sectors. Both were
accredited by the Commission on Elections in connection with the election for party-list
representatives on May 14, 2001.
Petitioners brought these suits — in G.R. No. 147589, for certiorari and, in G.R. No.
147613, for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus — for the purpose of seeking the
annulment of the registration of the following parties classi ed as "political parties" and
"organizations/coalitions" by the Commission on Elections:
Political Parties:
Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP),
Lakas NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP),

Nationalist Peoples' Coalition (NPC),
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP),
Aksyon Demokratiko (AKSYON),
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN),

Liberal Party (LP),
Nacionalista Party (NP),
Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong
Organizations/Coalitions:
Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc. (DRUG WATCH),
Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),

Go! Go! Philippines Movement (GO, GO PHILIPPINES),
The True Marcos Loyalist (MARCOS LOYALIST),
Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Inc. (PLAM),

Citizens Movement for Justice, Economy Environment and Peace (JEEP),
Chamber of Real Estate Builders Association (CREBA),
Sports and Health Advancement Foundation, Inc. (SHAF),
Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW),

Bagong Bayani Organization (BAGONG BAYANI),
National Federation of Sugar Planters (NFSP)
R.A. No. 7941, §5 provides that any party, organization, or coalition desiring to
participate in the party-list system must apply to the COMELEC for registration not later
than 90 days before the election. On the other hand, §4 of the same law requires that any
party, organization, or coalition which is already registered with the COMELEC should
declare its intention to participate in the party-list system 90 days before the election.
In its Resolution No. 3785, dated March 26, 2001, the COMELEC passed upon the
applications for registration or manifestations of intention of several parties,
organizations, and coalitions. On March 28, 2001, it issued a certi ed list of parties,
organizations, or coalitions entitled to participate in the May 14, 2001 elections. All in all,
148 parties, organizations, and coalitions were accredited, including private respondents
herein.
Petitioners OFW and Bayan Muna contend that the party-list system is exclusively
for the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors of the Philippine society and that
there is no way by which other sectors not so identi ed, much less the major political
parties, can participate in the party-list elections. Petitioner Bayan Muna in particular calls
attention to the fact that seven of the respondent political parties (PMP, Lakas NUCD-
UMDP, NPC, LDP, AKSYON, PDP-LABAN, and LP) are actually the major political parties in
the country today as determined by the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 4073, dated May 3,
2001, and charges that the rest of private respondents are "pseudo party-list
organizations" which are actually satellites of the major political parties and of big
businesses.
Bayan Muna argues that the party-list system is intended to address the problem
of ineffective representation of underprivileged sectors of society and enhance direct
people's action and participation in the decision-making process to counter-balance
the territorial representation of 80% of the House of Representatives, and that to allow
participation in the party-list system of respondent political parties and
parties/coalitions would be to defeat this purpose because these parties do not
represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. 1 For this reason, Bayan Muna
prays that R.A. No. 7941, §11, par. 2 be declared unconstitutional on the ground that, by
banning the ve major political parties from participating in the party-list system only in
the May 1998 elections, it leaves them free to participate in subsequent elections.
On the other hand, the COMELEC argues:
[B]oth the Constitution and the Party-List System Act clearly allow, and
they do not prohibit, the participation of "registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations" to participate in the party-list system, whether or not said
parties or organizations represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
of society. 2
It cites the provisoof Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that

For three consecutive terms after the rati cation of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be lled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector,
as proof that "marginalized" sectors are not entitled to permanent seats in the House of
Representatives. In any event, it is contended that petitioners' recourse is not to this
Court but to the COMELEC because whether a party, organization, or coalition
represents "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a question of fact, and this
Court is not a trier of facts. The COMELEC states that, as a matter of fact, petitioner
Bayan Muna has pending petitions to disqualify, based on this ground, respondents
NPC, LDP, PMP, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, LP, MAD, CREBA, NFSP, JEEP, and BAGONG
BAYANI.
THE ISSUES
The issues in these cases actually come down to the following:
(1) Whether the petitions led in these cases should be dismissed for failure of
petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies in the COMELEC; and
(2) Whether the party-list system is exclusively for "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors of society.
We shall deal with these issues in the order they are stated.
DISCUSSION
I.
While it is true that petitioner Bayan Muna has led petitions for the disquali cation
of respondents, the fact is that when the petitions in these cases were led on April 16 and
17, 2001, the elections were just a month away, and there was doubt whether a resolution
of the petitions for disquali cations was forthcoming. In fact, up to the time of the
elections on May 14, 2001, the cases were still unresolved. Petitioners, therefore, had no
other "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" within the
meaning of Rule 65, §§1-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and were justi ed in resorting to
the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
From another point of view, there is no need for petitioners to await formal
resolution of their petitions as the COMELEC had already indicated in press statements its
stand that parties, organizations, or coalitions, whether or not representing "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors, could participate in the election for the party-list system —
a fact con rmed by it in its comment and memorandum in these cases. There is thus no
basis for insisting that petitioners should have exhausted administrative remedies before
coming to this Court.
Nor are the issues raised in these cases factual as the statement of the second
issue above plainly shows. It is only if the question whether the party-list system is limited
to "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is answered in the a rmative will it be
necessary to determine the status of respondents.
II.
At the core of the controversy in these cases is the following provision of the
Constitution:
Art. VI, §5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred fty members, unless otherwise xed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the rati cation of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be lled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law
except the religious sector.
To carry out this provision of the Constitution, Congress enacted the Party-List
System Act (R.A. No. 7941), the pertinent provisions of which read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party . — The State shall promote proportional
possible.
SEC. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of
the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the rst ve (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the
start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in
the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat
each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes:
Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.
"The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from
whom the Constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed." 3 The text of
Art. VI, §5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of "registered, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations," not for sectoral representation. Only for three
consecutive terms following the rati cation of the Constitution and only with respect to
one-half of the seats allotted to party-list representatives does it allow sectoral
representation. Textually, Art. VI, §5(1)(2) provides no basis for petitioners' contention that
whether it is sectoral representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide
exclusive representation for "marginalized sectors," by which term petitioners mean the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party-list representation
is a type of proportional representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win
a seat in the House of Representatives in district elections a chance to win if they have
su cient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered
"marginalized and underrepresented.") Under the party-list system, representatives are
elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast
to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9% of
the votes, he gets no seat.
Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in rst in order
to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district,
the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are
represented. To the extent then that it assures parties or candidates a percentage of seats
in the legislature that re ects their public support, the party-list system enables
marginalized and underrepresented sectors (such as, but not limited to, the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors) to obtain seats in
the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list system does not guarantee to
these sectors seats in the legislature.
This is the method of representation adopted in the Constitution as answer to the
problem of underrepresentation.
In arguing that the party-list system is exclusively for the "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors," petitioner Bayan Muna argues that the constitutional intent in
adopting the party-list system must be searched for in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.

The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been stated by this Court in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 4 as follows:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention
"are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating
the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose
votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof.
It is worth recalling the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr. on the role of
history in constitutional exegesis:
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could discover what it
was, when it is not adequately expressed in the Constitution, that is to say, what they meant
when they did not say it, surely that has no binding force upon us. If we look behind or beyond
what they set down in the document, prying into what else they wrote and what they said,
anything we may nd is only advisory. They may sit in at our councils. There is no reason why
we should eavesdrop on theirs. 5
Be that as it may, the Record of the Constitutional Commission speaks clearly

against petitioners' reading of Art. VI, §5(1)(2). It shows clearly that the Constitutional
Commission rejected sectoral representation in preference to proportional representation.
As originally written, §5 of the Draft Article on the Legislative Department read:
SEC. 5. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fty members who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected from the sectors and party
list. The sectoral or party list representatives shall in no case exceed twenty
percent of the entire membership of the House of Representatives.
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory, provided, however, that each city with a
population of more than two hundred thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided
in this section. 6
As petitioner Bayan Muna states, two proposals for additional representation in the
House of Representatives were submitted by the Committee on Legislative Department:
one for sectoral representation, advocated by Commissioner Villacorta, and another one
for party-list system, advocated by Commissioner Monsod. The two are not the same. As
Commissioner Monsod said in explaining his proposal:
MR. MONSOD. . . .
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for
the party list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation.
Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors
and who constitute the members of the sectors . . . . In effect, a sectoral
representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have
reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those
reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will
notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, shermen,
workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other
similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identi ed here as "sectoral
representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in
trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at
these nine sectors or include other sectors. . . . Second, we had the problem of
who comprise the farmers. . . . A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a
farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he
would be included in that sector.
. . . Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. . . .
This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka
or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants
the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any
party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had
been garnered by each party or each organization — one does not have to be a
political party and register in order to participate as a party — and count the votes
and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a
party, organization or coalition.
xxx xxx xxx
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral

representation while at the same time making sure that those who really have a
national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in
the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the
constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to
win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide
basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found
out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third
place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have ve or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system. 7
Commissioner Monsod, therefore, proposed to amend the phrase "shall be elected

from the sectors and party list" in §5 by replacing it with the following
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR
SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS. 8
Attention should be paid to this proposal because with slight modi cation it later
became the basis of the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2).
The following exchange took place on the Monsod amendment:
MR. DAVIDE:
Madam President, before accepting the proposed amendment, the Committee
would like to get some clarifications.
When the proponent speaks of "OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS," is
he referring to any sector which the law may subsequently define?
MR. MONSOD:
. . . . The party list system that is being advocated by this amendment is a

system that opens up the list to any regional, national or sectoral party . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO.
The Committee would like to be clarified on this.

Do we understand the proponent correctly that this party list system is not
necessarily synonymous to sectoral representation?
MR. MONSOD:
No, it is not necessarily synonymous, but it does include the right of sectoral
parties or organizations to register, but it is not exclusive to sectoral parties
or organizations.
MS. AQUINO.
And that it does not likewise reserve any institutional seat for any sector? In other
words, it only enables it to be a part of the party list if it has the capacity to
do so, but it does not reserve any seat for the sectors.
MR. MONSOD.
Yes, Madam President, this is not a reserve seat system. 9
The proposed amendment was opposed by a group headed by Commissioner

Villacorta, which included Commissioners Tadeo, Lerum, and Bernas. Lerum said:
MR. LERUM.
Madam President, in view of the explanation, I am objecting to this amendment

because it is possible that the labor sector will not be represented
considering that those who will vote are all the voters of the Philippines. In
other words, the representative of labor will be chosen by all the electors of
the Philippines, and that is not correct. My contention is that the sectoral
representative must be selected by his own constituents, and for that
reason, I am objecting to this amendment. 1 0
On the other hand, Tadeo objected on the ground that if allowed to participate in
the party-list system, the major political parties could gobble up the sectoral parties. He
said:
MR. TADEO
. . . Kapag inilagay natin ang party list, papasukin ng political parties.
Mangigibabaw at kakainin din niyan hanggang mawala ang sektor. 1 1
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party,
it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din iyong sector.
Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko
lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties. 1 2
Villacorta said he was objecting to the party-list system because it would not solve
the problem of ineffective representation of the underprivileged sectors. He said:
For too long since our people attained a semblance of self-government at
the start of this century, our legislators were elected based on their promise that
they would represent the little people of our land. With the exception of a few
patriotic legislators, some of whom are in our Commission today, members of the
National Assemblies, the Congresses, and the Batasans of the past did not devote
themselves enough to the alleviation of the dismal condition of our country's poor
and lower classes.
xxx xxx xxx

These realities convince us that there are no spokesmen and legislators
who can best represent the poor, the underprivileged, the marginalized than those
coming from within their ranks. 1 3
To Commissioner Villacorta, only reserved seats for the sectors would give them
effective representation:
MR. MONSOD.
My amendment merely says that it is THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF
REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR SECTORAL PARTIES OR
ORGANIZATIONS.
My question is: Does the Honorable Commissioner object to this amendment?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, because it does not guarantee that the seats reserved for the party list
representatives will be reserved for the sectors. 1 4
Because of the impasse, the discussion on Friday, July 25, 1986, on §5 was
suspended to allow the commissioners to come to an agreement. After one week, a
compromise formula was reached by the two groups and presented to the plenary session
of the Commission on August 1, 1986. In lieu of the phrase "shall be elected from the
sectors and the party list," it was proposed that the following be inserted in §5 of the Draft
Article:
THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND
SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS AS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE PARTY
LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PROVIDED THAT FOR
THE FIRST TWO TERMS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION
TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES
SHALL BE FILLED BY SELECTION OR ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW FROM
THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR AND YOUTH SECTORS.
However, although an agreement had apparently been reached, the advocates of
sectoral representation were not satis ed that it would be allowed only for two terms and
only with respect to one-half of the seats allocated for party-list representatives.
Commissioner Aquino proposed instead the following amendment of §5:
ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL,
REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AS PROVIDED BY
LAW. THE PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
TWENTY-FIVE OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES
SHALL BE FILLED BY ELECTION, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, FROM THE LABOR,
PEASANT, URBAN POOR, WOMEN AND YOUTH SECTORS.
When put to vote, however, Aquino's proposal was defeated with nineteen (19)
voting in favor, and twenty-two (22) voting against. 1 5
The Commission then voted on the proposed amendment of Commissioner
Monsod. With only a few minor changes, it was approved by a vote of thirty-two (32)
commissioners against none. 1 6 As finally worded, the amendment reads:
SHALL BE FILLED AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION, FROM
THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES,
WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW,
EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.
Thus, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list
system is not limited to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors referred to by
petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
the youth, but that it is a type of proportional representation intended to give voice to
those who may not have the necessary number to win a seat in a district but are
su ciently numerous to give them a seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates
on Art. VI, §5(1)(2) to say that "Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed in
their proposals as to the details of the party-list system, both proponents worked within
the framework that the party-list system is for the 'marginalized' as termed by Comm.
Villacorta and the 'underrepresented' as termed by Comm. Monsod, which he de ned as
those which are 'always third or fourth place in each of the districts.'" 1 7
Indeed, the two proposals put forth by them are basically different, and they do not
have the same basis. What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was
permanent reserved seats for "marginalized sectors" by which they mean the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. Under
Art. VI, §5(2), these sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the House of
Representatives and only for three terms. On the other hand, the "third or fourth place(rs)"
in district elections, for whom the party-list system was intended, refer to those who may
not win seats in the districts but nationwide may be su ciently strong to enable them to
be represented in the House. They may include Villacorta's "marginalized" or
"underprivileged" sectors, but they are not limited to them. There would have been no need
to give the "marginalized sectors" one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three
terms if the two systems are identical.
The objections raised against the accreditation of private respondents are the same
ones raised by Commissioners Villacorta, Tadeo, and Lerum, among others, to the Monsod
proposal which became the present Art. VI, §5(1)(2), namely, that certain sectors, like
labor, may not win seats in the House under the party-list system; that the big parties
might gobble up the sectoral parties; that the party-list system will not solve the problem
of ineffective representation of the "underprivileged sectors." These objections, however,
did not carry the day, as the members of the Constitutional Commission voted 32-0 in
favor of the Monsod proposal. It is noteworthy that even those who spoke against the
Monsod proposal did not vote against it. To uphold these objections now would be to
overrule the Constitutional Commission and in effect amend the Constitution.
In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the
existing "winner-take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters
underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions were proposed:
sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional representation. The
Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system. This Court cannot hold that the
party-list system is reserved for the labor, peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth as petitioners contend without changing entirely the
meaning of the Constitution which in fact mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved
seats system when it provides in Art. IX, C, §6 that "A free and open party system shall be
allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of
this Article."
Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the
party-list system is designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, and youth sectors. As Commissioner Ople said in supporting the
Monsod proposal:
In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and
mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-
Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make
common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these
parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And
if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the
Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will
be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we
belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with
their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed
because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass
organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system
is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the
parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass
organizations a liated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent
system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for
example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a
transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties. 1 8
With respect to the cancellation of any party registered under the party-list system,
§6 of the Party-List System Act provides:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC
may, motu proprio or upon veri ed complaint of any interested party, refuse or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its o cers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system
in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Petitioners' allegations that certain parties or organizations, such as private

respondents MAD and Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, are disquali ed under this
provision are for the COMELEC to determine after due notice and hearing. They are un t
for resolution in these proceedings.
III.
On the other hand, the majority states:
The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other words, verba
legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and
interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of
the provision being construed.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is

couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941 . . . . Section 2 thereof unequivocally
states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was
designed to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
as a whole . . ."
With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the meaning of §2 of R.A. No.
7941. The provision reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Party . — The State shall promote proportional
possible.
What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the party-list system is to
promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives and, that to achieve this end, "a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives" shall be guaranteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, §2
does not say that the party-list system is intended "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-
de ned political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House of Representatives. What it
says is that the policy of the law is "to promote proportional representation through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-de ned political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation" to win seats in the House. For while the representation of "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As
already explained, the aim of proportional representation is to enable those who cannot
win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of winning. These groups are not
necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in §5, i.e., labor, peasants, sherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly include other
sectors.
Indeed, how can there be a "full, free and open party system" if the election for the
party list system is to be limited to the sectors which are enumerated in §5 of the law, i.e.,
labor, peasants, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly,
handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals? After all,
what is provided for is "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations" each of which is separately defined in §3 of the law.
That the party-list system is not limited to these groups is also clear from §5 of the
law:
SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a
parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall
include labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.
There would be no need to provide speci cally for the sectors if the party-list system is
reserved for them.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petitions in these cases should be dismissed.
Footnotes
1. Signed by Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco,
Ru no S. B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra and
Florentino A. Tuason Jr.
2. Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, p. 13; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 40.
3. Ibid., pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 48-49.

4. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 272-273.
5. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250-263.
6. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283.

7. See rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 223.
8. TSN (GR Nos. 147589 and 147613), May 17, 2001, p. 49.
9. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73.

10. Rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 74.
11. Comments were led by MAD, Bagong Bayani, The True Marcos Loyalists, the Comelec,
Partido ng Masang Pilipino, the Liberal Party, the O ce of the Solicitor General, CREBA,
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Aksyon Demokratiko,
Citizens' Drug Watch Foundation, Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, Ang Lakas ng OCW,
and Sports and Health Foundation.
12. Rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 3-45.
13. Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46.

14. These were led by the O ce of the Solicitor General, the Comelec, the Bagong Bayani
Organization, Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, and the Philippine Local Autonomy
Movement.
15. Memoranda were led by Petitioners Bayan Muna and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party; and Respondents Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga, CREBA, the Bagong Bayani
Organization, the O ce of the Solicitor General, and Aksyon Demokratiko.
Manifestations instead of memoranda were filed by Lakas-NUCD and OCW.
16. See the May 17, 2001 Resolution, p. 2; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 88.
17. See, e.g., the Bagong Bayani Organization's Memorandum, pp. 3-4; Aksyon Demokratiko's
Memorandum, pp. 2-3; and MAD's Memorandum, pp. 3-6.
18. Rules and regulations governing the ling of a petition for registration, a manifestation to
participate, and the names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in
connection with the May 14, 2001 national and local elections.
19. OSG's Memorandum, pp. 6-14; rollo (GR No. 147613), pp. 151-159.
20. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides: "Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government."
21. "SECTION 1. What pleadings are not allowed. The following pleadings are not allowed:
xxx xxx xxx
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in

election offense cases;
xxx xxx xxx"
22. Docketed as SPA 01-113. As earlier noted, Akbayan also led before the Comelec a similar
Petition, docketed as SPA-01-109. See Annexes 1 and 2, Comment of the O ce of the
Solicitor General; rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 250 et seq. and 266 et seq.
23. Section 1, Rule 65. See Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan , 263 SCRA 222, October 16, 1996; BF
Corporation v. CA , 288 SCRA 267, March 27, 1998; GSIS v. Olisa , 304 SCRA 421, March
10, 1999; National Steel Corporation v. CA , GR No. 134437, January 31, 2000; Sahali v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 134169, February 2, 2000.
24. Republic v. Sandiganbayan , 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997, per Panganiban, J. See also
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission on Elections , GR No. 133486,
January 28, 2000; Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307, April 11, 1972.
25. Salonga v. Cruz Paño , 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985, per Gutierrez, Jr., J. See also
Tañada v. Angara , 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Guingona v. Gonzales , 219 SCRA 326,
March 1, 1993.
26. ABS-CBN v. Comelec, GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000, per Panganiban, J.
27. Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 15; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 18.
28. Petition of Bayan Muna, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 20.
29. OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
30. Italics supplied. See also §§17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
31. It may be noted that when the Constitution was being drafted in the early days of the post-
Marcos era, UNIDO was the dominant political party.
32. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.


36. Infra.
37. Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan , 268 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997; Ramirez v. CA , 248 SCRA
590, September 28, 1995.
38. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 331.
39. OSG Comment, p. 18; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 244.
40. Infra.
41. TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 147-148.
42. Counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko.
43. TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-180.

44. Supra. See also §6, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which reads: "A free and open party
system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to
the provisions of this Article."
45. Section 2 of RA 7941 states in part as follows: ". . . Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
46. JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, February 18, 1970; cited
in Ruben C. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 311. See also Gold Creek Mining
Corp. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259, 264 (1938).
47. See Agpalo, ibid., p. 313.
48. 194 SCRA 317, February 22, 1991, per Fernan, CJ; quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph , 111 Pa
365, 3 Atl 220.
49. Tañada v. Angara , 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997. See also Santiago v. Guingona , 298 SCRA
756, November 18, 1998; Miranda v. Aguirre , 314 SCRA 603, September 16, 1999; Garcia
v. HRET, 312 SCRA 353, August 12, 1999.
50. Veterans Federation Party et al. v. Comelec et al., GR No. 136781, October 6, 2000.
51. See Valmonte v. Court of Appeals , 303 SCRA 278, February 18, 1999; Inciong Jr. v. CA , 257
SCRA 578, June 26, 1996; Palomado v. NLRC, 257 SCRA 680, June 28, 1996; Heirs of the
Late Teodoro Guaring Jr. v. CA, 269 SCRA 283, March 7, 1997; Sesbreño v. Central Board
of Assessment Appeals, 270 SCRA 360, March 24, 1997; PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr ., 302
SCRA 217, January 27, 1999.
52. TSN, May 17, 2001, p. 180.
53. Petition of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, p. 16; rollo (GR No. 147589), p. 19.
54. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 636.
56. §2 (5), Article IX (C).

57. Christian S. Monsod.
58. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 634
59. See also §11, Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A.
60. See §2 (4), Article IX (B) of the Constitution. See also Article 261 (o), BP 881.
61. The bicameral conference committee on the disagreeing provision of Senate Bill No. 1913
and House Bill No. 3040, January 31, 1994, p. 4.

VITUG, J., dissenting:
1. Section 11(b), R.A. 7941.
2. Bernas, pp. 355-358.
3. The Constitutional quali cations for legislative districts representatives apply to party-list
nominees —
Section 6, Article 6, 1987 Constitution. No person shall be a member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of
the election, at least twenty- ve years of age, able to read and write, and except the
party-list representative, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
a resident thereof for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the elections.
4. Section 8, R.A. 7941.
5. Supangan, Jr. vs. Santos, 189 SCRA 56.
6. Section 9, R.A. 7941.

7. Ibid.
8. See the plenary deliberations (2nd reading) of House Bill No. 3043.
9. Section 15, R.A. 7941.
10. Ibid.
11. Whitman vs. Oxford National Bank 176 US 559, 44 L Ed 587, 20 Sct. 477.
12. People ex rel. Snowball vs. Pendegast, 96 Cal 289 St 126, 110 NE 485.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
1. Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna 17-18.
2. Memorandum for the COMELEC 23-24.
3. Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration Commission , 102
Phil. 596, 627 (1957).
4. 194 SCRA 317, 337-338 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph , 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220
(1886).
5. LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2 (1947) (emphasis in the original).
6. Committee on Legislative Power, Committee Report No. 22 (italics added).
7. 2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86, session of Tuesday, July 22,

1986 (italics added).
8. Id. at 252-253, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.
9. Id. at 253 (italics added).
10. Id. at 254, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.

11. Id. at 254.
12. Id. at 257.
13. Id. at 255.
14. Id. at 258.
15. Id. at 584, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.

16. Id. at 589.
17. Memorandum for Petitioner Bayan Muna 13.
18. II RECORD 568, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.]

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym

[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.]

BAYAN MUNA , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;

Neri Javier Colmenares for Bayan Muna.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; VALIDITY OF COMELEC

6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; POLITICAL PARTIES; MAY PARTICIPATE IN PARTY-

5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; EFFECT

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"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list

"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and

The Court's Ruling

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.

Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-

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"xxx xxx xxx"

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of

The Marginalized and Underrepresented

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

The following discussion is also pertinent:

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disquali es a party or group for

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty- ve

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was the result of long-drawn deliberations and compromises.

WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my colleagues in their judgment. I

MENDOZA , J., dissenting :

Lakas NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP),

Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN),

Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),

Philippine Local Autonomy Movement, Inc. (PLAM),

Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW),

It cites the provisoof Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that

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Be that as it may, the Record of the Constitutional Commission speaks clearly

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral

Commissioner Monsod, therefore, proposed to amend the phrase "shall be elected

. . . . The party list system that is being advocated by this amendment is a

The Committee would like to be clarified on this.

The proposed amendment was opposed by a group headed by Commissioner

Madam President, in view of the explanation, I am objecting to this amendment

xxx xxx xxx

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

Petitioners' allegations that certain parties or organizations, such as private

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is

3. Ibid., pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 48-49.

6. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 282-283.

9. Rollo (GR No. 147589), pp. 4-73.

13. Rollo (GR No. 147613), p. 46.

d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in

32. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.

34. Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 86.

43. TSN, May 17, 2001, pp. 178-180.

56. §2 (5), Article IX (C).

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6. Section 9, R.A. 7941.

7. 2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 85-86, session of Tuesday, July 22,

10. Id. at 254, session of Friday, July 25, 1986.

15. Id. at 584, session of Friday, Aug. 1, 1986.