Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Pasay City
Professor
Submitted by:
Angelica Castillo
Earl Goico
Filadrian Canlas
Jayson Sari
Victor Cayco
JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FORMS
CRIMINAL CASES
For Violation of BP 22
For Estafa
For Concubinage
Complaint Affidavit
Counter Affidavit
Reply
Rejoinder
Sub-Rejoinder
Resolution
Information
Affidavit of Desistance
Mis-accounting
Mistakes Identity
Misapprehension of Facts
Offer of Evidence
Proffer of Evidence
CIVIL CASES
Complaint
Answer
Reply
TRIAL BRIEF
Position Paper
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdictional Requirements
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
LABOR PROCEEDINGS
1. Complaint
2. Answer
3. Position Paper
4. Reply Position Paper
5. Rejoinder
6. Sur Rejoinder
7. Memorandum for the Complainant
8. Memorandum for the Defendant / Respondent
9. Memorandum of Appeal
10. Motion for Execution with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution
1. Complaint
2. Answer
3. Reply
4. Position Paper
5. Pre Trial Brief
1. Complaint
2. Answer
3. Reply
4. Position Paper
5. Memorandum
6. Notice of Appeal (Office of the President)
7. Appeal Memorandum
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
CITY OF MANILA )S.S.
COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT
I, KRISTEN REYES, of legal age and a resident of 1300-A Batangas St., Brgy. San
Isidro, Makati City under oath declare that:
1. Last June 10, 2009, KAREN CRUZ borrowed Php 500,000.00 from me, obliging
herself to pay that loan by September 30, 2009. A copy of the promissory note which
she made and issued for that loan is hereto attached as Annex “A”.
2. Last September 30, 2009, in the City of Manila, the respondent purportedly in
payment for that loan, drew and issued to me a check drawn on the Banco De Oro,
Taft Avenue, Manila particularly check no. 05100610 dated October 5, 2009. A copy
of that check is hereto attached as Annex “B”.
3. Upon presentment for clearing or collection, that check was dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and Account closed.” The
Bank debit advice to that effect is hereto attached as Annex “C”.
4. Notice of dishonor and demand for payment were made upon the respondent
However, the latter simply ignored them.
5. I am executing this sworn statement for the purpose of charging the respondent with
having violated B.P. No. 22.
KRISTEN REYES
Complainant
Doc. No. 10
Page No. 16
Book No. 10
Series of 2009.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
CITY OF MANILA )S.S.
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
I, KAREN CRUZ, of legal age and a resident of 1300-B Batangas St., Brgy. San
Isidro, Makati City under oath declare that:
3. It is not enough that the issued check was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency
of funds. It must be shown that I knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the
check was issued. Hence, the law provides that the issuer must be notified of the
dishonor;
4. While it is true that I was asked by herein plaintiff to pay the amount I borrowed,
such kind of notice is not the one required by B.P. 22, which must be in writing as
held by the Supreme court in several of its cases;
5. Considering that I did not receive a written notice of dishonor of the checks, clearly,
there is no way of determining when the 5-day period prescribed in Section 2 of B.P.
22 would start and end. Thus, the required knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or
credit at the time I issued the checks did not arise;
KAREN CRUZ
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of October, 2009 at Manila. I
further certify that I have examined the affiant and I am satisfied that he understood and
voluntarily executed the foregoing counter-affidait.
Doc. No. 20
Page No. 25
Book No. 10
Series of 2009.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
CITY OF MANILA )S.S.
REPLY – AFFIDAVIT
I, KRISTEN REYES, of legal age and a resident of 1300-A Batangas St., Brgy. San
Isidro, Makati City under oath declare that:
1. That I am reiterating my allegation in my affidavit that last June 10, 2009, KAREN
CRUZ borrowed Php 500,000.00 from me, obliging herself to pay that loan by
September 30, 2009. A copy of the promissory noted which she made and issued for
that loan is hereto attached as Annex “A”.
2. Last September 30, 2009, in the City of Manila, the respondent purportedly in
payment for that loan, drew and issued to me a check drawn on the Banco De oro,
Taft Avenue, Manila particularly check No. 05100610 dated October 5, 2009. A copy
of that check is hereto attached as annex “B”.
3. Upon presentment for clearing or collection, that check was dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and Account closed.” The
Bank debit advice to that effect is hereto attached as Annex”C”.
4. That contrary to her claim, he was informed by the bank teller of the said bank and
was asked to deposit the amount needed for the clearing of the check. Not only that,
Notice of Dishonor was sent to her.
5. Notice of Dishonor and demand for payment were made upon the respondent.
However, the latter simply ignored them. Moreover, she ignored such verbal and
written notices.
6. That I am willing and ready to present Notice of Dishonor and proof of receipt from
bank records;
7. That is without doubt, the best evidence to prove the veracity of my allegation that the
respondent violated B.P. 22 and that I have no other motives initiating this action but
to make her liable for her action.
KRISTEN REYES
AFFIANT
KRISTEN REYES,
Complainant,
KAREN CRUZ,
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------x
REJOINDER
I, KAREN CRUZ, of legal age and a resident of 1300-B Batangas St., Brgy. San Isidro,
Makati City, after being duly sworn to in accordance with law submit this Rejoinder-Affidavit, as
follows:
1. I respectfully aver that I was not informed or was made aware of the presentment,
much more the dishonor by the bank as alleged in the complaint and Reply of herein
complainant;
2. I vehemently deny the allegation of the Complainant that she sent a written Notice of
Dishonor supporting her claim and the consequent act of ignoring the said notice.
How can someone ignore something she was not made aware of, in the first place.
4. I would like to emphasize that under B.P. 22, the Complainant must prove not only
that the adverse party issued a check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also
establish that he was actually notified that the check was dishonored, and that he or
she failed, within five banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the
check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment. This is in line
with the Philippine Jurisprudence, that while, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does
not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with
Section 3 of the law. i.e., “that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with
such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor
or refusal,” a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient
for conviction under the law. The Court in several of its cases has consistently held
that it is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks law would
require for the act to be punished there under not only that the accused issued a check
that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing
of the fact of dishonor.
5. It is not enough that the issued check was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency
of funds. It must be shown that I knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the
check was issued. Hence, the law provides that the issuer must be notified of the
dishonor;
6. While it is true that I was asked by herein plaintiff to pay the amount I borrowed,
such kind of notice is not the one required by B.P. 2, which must be in writing as held
by the Supreme Court in several of its cases;
7. To reiterate, considering that I did not receive a written notice of dishonor of the
checks, clearly, there is no way of determining when the 5-day period prescribed in
Section 2 of B.P. 22 would start and end. Thus, the required knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds or credit at the time I issued the checks did not arise.
8. Lastly, applying the foregoing arguments, therefore, it cannot be said that I violated
B.P. 22.
KAREN CRUZ
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 20th day of November, 2009 at Manila.
I further certify that I have examined the affiant and I am satisfied that he understood and
voluntarily executed the foregoing counter-affidavit.
KRISTEN REYES
Complainant,
KAREN CRUZ,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SUR-REJOINDER
KRISTEN REYES
Complainant
KAREN CRUZ,
Accused.
x------------------------x
INFORMATION
The undersigned 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor accuses KAREN CRUZ of the crime of
Violation of BP 22, committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of June 2009, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to KRISTEN REYES,
to apply on account or for value the check describe below:
Said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, she did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of said
check upon its presentment, which check, when presented for payment within ninety (90)
days from its date, was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason “Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds and Account closed”, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor,
she failed to pay said payee the face amount thereof or to make arrangement for its full
payment within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Makati City, December 18, 2009
LITO D. MAGTALAS
City Prosecutor
I hereby certify that I have conducted a preliminary investigation on this case; that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against her; that she was
given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence; and, that based on the evidence
presented, there exists a reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 18th day of December 2009 in Makati
City.
Witnesses:
1. KAREN CRUZ – 1300-B Batangas St., Brgy. San Isidro, Makati City
2. The cashier (or his/her duly authorized representative) of Dela Rosa-Salcedo branch,
Legaspi Village, Makati City re: Account Number: 00551-103667-6
3. And others
COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT
I, ALVIN C. ENGUILLO, of legal age, married, Filipino, with residence and postal
address at Brgy. Magsaysay, Lopez, Quezon, subscribing under oath, state that:
1. On September 15, 2009 at Calamba, Laguna, Mr. Jose de Jesus, with residence at
Island Subdivision, Palo Acto, Canlubanmg, Laguna, delivered and endorsed to me a
post-dated check drawn against his account at the Equitable PCI Bank, Waltermart-
Calamba branch, Calamba, Laguna, with Check No. 0000091959, dated September
20, 2009, in the amount of Nine Thousand Pesos (P9,000.00);
2. Mr. de Jesus assured me that the said check will have sufficient fund upon its
presentment on its maturity date, so I gave and delivered to him wood products
valued at P9,000.00 in exchange of said check;
3. On September 20, 2009, I deposited the said check in the Philippine National Bank,
Lopez Branch, Lopez, Quezon, but the same was dishonoured by the bank due to
stopped payment without any valid reasons and due to account insufficient funds
(SPO-DAIF), a machine copy of the said check with the reason of its dishonor is
hereto attached as Annex “A” and made an integral part hereof;
4. I made several demands to Mr. de Jesus to make good his Equitable PCI Check or to
pay the face value thereof, the last of which was on November 4, 2009, a copy of the
notice of dishonor and the demand to pay is hereto attached as Annex “B”, however,
Mr. de Jesus, until to date, failed, refused and continue to fail and refuse to fund the
check or pay the amount of the check to my damage and prejudice in the amount of
P9,000.00;
5. I would have not parted with my wood products in the amount of P9,000.00, if not the
assurance and misrepresentation made to me by Mr. Jose de Jesus, that the said
Equitable PCI Check will be sufficiently funded and honoured by his bank upon its
presentment on its maturity date;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 18 th day of November, 2009
at Lopez, Quezon, Philippines.
ALVIN C. ENGUILLO
Complainant-Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 18th day of November 2009 at the City
of Manila, Philippines.
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
I, JOSE DE JESUS, of legal age, married, Filipino, with residence and postal address at
Island Subdivision, Palo Acto, Canlubang, Laguna, subscribing under oath, state that:
1. That I am the respondent in the complaint for Estafa filed by ALVIN ENGUILLO
before the Municipal Prosecutor of Lopez, Quezon;
2. That I admit that portion of paragraph 1 of the complaint regarding the names,
residences and status of the parties, as well as the fact of having issued the post-dated
check mentioned therein;
3. That I likewise admit the allegation in paragraph 3 as to the assurance I gave the
complainant regarding the sufficiency of the funds represented by the check on the
date stated therein, and for which reason I received from him wood products valued at
P9,000.00;
4. That I deny the rest of the allegations in the complaint, the truth being that a certain
Laurence Aquino promised to deposit the amount of P11,000 to my account on
September 18, 2009 and that the assurance I made to the complainant was based on
such expectancy; that I informed the complainant of such fact, yet he agreed to
proceed with the transaction; that such fact was the reason why we agreed that the
due date be on September 20; that on September 19, I learned that Laurence Aquino
did not make good his promise and on the same day, I asked the complainant not to
deposit the check and I will instead tender payment to him in cash the following day;
that when I personally delivered the cash to his address, it was accepted by ERIN
ENGUILLO, personally known to me to be complainant’s wife;
5. That despite of my advice and payment, complainant still deposited the check, hence
it was dishonoured;
6. That on September 22, 2009, I asked Erin Enguillo if she had given the money to the
complainant, but she told me that she used the money to purchase a television set for
their bedroom, and that she thereafter informed her husband;
7. That despite repeated explanation to the effect that I already paid what was due to his
wife, he still sent me several demand letters which I naturally refused to heed for the
reason already stated in the preceding paragraph;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 18 th day of November, 2009
at Lopez, Quezon, Philippines.
JOSE DE JESUS
Complainant-Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of November 2009 at the City of
Manila, Philippines.
REPLY
I, ALVIN C. ENGUILLO, of legal age, married, Filipino, with residence and postal
address at Brgy. Magsaysay, Lopez, Quezon, subscribing under oath, state that:
2. That contrary to his claim, he never informed me of any such fact as he narrated in
paragraph 4 of his counter-affidavit;
3. That because I did not receive any advice, I deposited the check in good faith and
with full confidence that the same was fully funded.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 18th day of November, 2009
at Lopez, Quezon, Philippines.
ALVIN C. ENGUILLO
Complainant-Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7th day of December 2009 at the City of
Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No._________;
Page No._________;
Book No. ________;
Series of ________;
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL PROSECUTOR
Lopez, Quezon
ALVIN C. ENGUILLO,
Complainant,
REJOINDER
Comes Now, RESPONDENT JOSE DE JESUS, unto this honourable office, respectfully
state that:
2. Respondent reiterates his defense that on the day the sale was consummated, he
informed the complainant that the check had to be post-dated in view of the deposit
which was yet to be made by Laurence Aquino, and that immediately after learning
that no such deposit was made, he advised the complainant not to deposit the check,
and tendered payment in cash to his wife Erin Enguillo, which was accepted and
acknowledged by the latter, the acknowledgement receipt is attached herein and made
an integral part thereof.
3. Erin Enguillo told respondent that she had used the money to buy a television set for
their bedroom, which means that the payment, though not made personally to the
complainant, redounded to his benefit. Though Erin may have failed or purposely
never intended to tell her husband that she had received cash from respondent, it is
unlikely that defendant would not even ask his wife how the latter was able to
purchase a television set. Erin Enguillo is a plain housewife and is not engaged in
any business or gainful employment. Respondent is hereby requesting that Erin
Enguillo be called upon to testify.
4. The efforts made by the respondent and the actual payment of cash to replace the
check clearly show lack of intent to deceive the complainant. The complainant is
stopped from denying receipt of payment because even though the money did not
physically pass through his hands, it nevertheless redounded to his benefit since it
was used to buy an item which is now being used in their household. In the case of
Piraza vs. People (G.R. NO. 154721, March 22, 2007), the elements of estafa under
paragraph 2(D) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are the following(1) Postdating
or issurance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check
was issued;(2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to
the payee. By his acquiescence to his wife’s acts, the complainant is deemed to have
appropriated the money by himself, thus, he could not have suffered damage.
5. The allegations in the complaint are clearly malicious and manifestly intended to
collect a sum of money for a debt which had already been fully settled.
JOSE DE JESUS
Respondent
I hereby certify that I have personally examined the affiant and I am convinced
that he personally and voluntarily verified the foregoing Rejoinder and he understood the
contents thereof.
ALVIN ENGUILLO,
Complainant,
SUR-REJOINDER
2. Complainant denies having been duly informed by the respondent that the availability
of funds for the check would depend upon the collection of money from a third
person. The sale of wood products would not have been consummated had the
complainant known that the sufficiency of funds is conditional. But even assuming
that the sale would have taken place at any rate, it is not true that respondent properly
communicated the eventual non-payment of the said third person. No conversation
had taken place between the date of sale and the date of deposit.
3. Complainant did not receive any payment from respondent, either personally or
through his wife. If any amount was indeed received Erin Enguillo, such did not
redound to the benefit of the complainant because the latter has been separated in bed
and board with his wife since 2006. Defendant was grossly negligent in not taking
steps to determine such fact, which is not very hard to known since it is of public
knowledge.
4. While the defendant refuses to settle his obligation, Erin also insists in not turning
over the money to the complainant, if any has been received by her. It is therefore
clear that complainant did not, in any way, benefit from any payment made by
respondent. Payment, if any, was not made to the proper person. Hence, it does not
result in the settlement of the obligation.
5. The foregoing facts and the affidavits already sworn to by the complainant narrate all
the elements necessary to hold the respondent liable for the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.
ALVIN ENGUILLO
Complainant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22nd day of December, 2009 in Manila.
I hereby certify that I have personally examined the affiant and I am convinced that he
personally and voluntarily verified the foregoing Rejoinder and he understood the contents
thereof.
INFORMATION
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Lopez, Quezon, November 23, 2009.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have conducted a preliminary investigation in this case, that I
have personally examined the complainant and his witness, that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he
was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT
I, LAARNI ESTEBAN, of legal age, married and a resident of No. 14 Quirikada St.,
Alabang, Muntinlupa City after having been sworn to law hereby depose and state:
1. That I am the legal wife of Abner A. Esteban. We were married at St. Anne Church
at Bayanan, Muntinlupa City on July 14, 2004;
2. That we are living as husband and wife at Block 4, Lot 5 Richpoint village, Brgy.
Poblacion, Muntinlupa City;
3. That in or about the month of July 2007 and on dates subsequent thereto, in the City
of Muntinlupa, ABNER ESTEBAN and AILEEN D. CO willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cohabited as husband an wife at No. 123 National Road, Putatan,
Muntinlupa City, AILEEN D. CO has full and actual knowledge of the fact that
ABNER A. ESTEBAN is legally a married man.
4. That as the result of the cohabitation of ABNER A. ESTEBAN and AILEEN D. CO, a
child named PETER JOHN C. ESTEBAN was born on October 9, 2008.
LAARNI L. ESTEBAN
Affiant
COUNTER AFFIDAVIT
I, AILEEN D. CO, of legal age, single and a resident of Block 9, Lot 27, Rodriguez
Village, Barangay Makiling, Muntinlupa City after having been sworn to law hereby depose and
state:
1. That I met ABNER A. ESTEBAN sometime in January, 2007 in Sta. Cruz, Manila
while working as a sales clerk in a department store.
2. That ABNER A. ESTEBAN represented himself as a single and unmarried man.
3. That we fell in love and decided to live as husband and wife at No. 123 National
Road, Putatan, Muntinlupa City.
4. That our son PETER JOHN C. ESTEBAN was born on October 9, 2008.
5. That I have no knowledge that ABNER A. ESTEBAN was lawfully married to a
certain LAARNI L. ESTEBAN.
6. That I gained knowledge of the marriage between ABNER A. ESTEBAN and
LAARNI L. ESTEBAN only upon the confrontation that occurred at No. 123
National Road, Putatan, Muntinlupa City when LAARNI L. ESTEBAN confronted
ABNER A. ESTEBAN.
7. That after the said confrontation I left ABNER A. ESTEBAN and lived with my
parents at Block 9 Lot 27 Rodriguez Village, Barangay Makiling, Muntinlupa City.
AILEEN D. CO
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 8th day of December 2008. I hereby
certify that I have personally examined the affiant and I am satisfied that he voluntarily executed
and understood her complaint affidavit.
REPLY AFFIDAVIT
I, LAARNI L. ESTEBAN, of legal age, married and a resident of No. 14 Quirikada St.,
Alabang, Muntinlupa City after having been duly sworn to law hereby depose and state:
2. That AILEEN D. CO has full and actual knowledge of the fact that ABNER A.
ESTEBAN is legally a married man;
3. That contrary to her claim, I and my husband were actually introduced to her
sometime on march 2008 at the Annual Convention of Filipino Entrepreneurs held at
the Cultural Center of the Philippines;
LAARNI L. ESTEBAN
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23rd day of December 2008. I hereby
certify that I have personally examined the Affiant and I am satisfied that he voluntarily executed
and understood her Reply-Affidavit.
LAARNI L. ESTEBAN
Complainant,
- Versus - I.S. No .
For: Complaint for Concubinage
REJOINDER
2) Respondent reiterates her defense that while it is true that she cohabited with ABNER
A. ESTEBAN as husband and wife which resulted to the birth of PETER JOHN C.
ESTEBAN on October 9, 2008, there is no truth to the averment that it is done so
unlawfully, willfully, feloniously and with knowledge that ABNER A. ESTEBAN is a
legally married man since the latter represented himself as a single and unmarried
man;
AILEEN D. CO
Respondent
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _______day of January 2009 in
Muntinlupa City.
I hereby certify that I have personally examined the affiant and I am convinced that she
personally and voluntarily verified the foregoing Rejoinder and she understood the contents
thereof.
MYRNA S. FLORITA
Assistant City prosecutor
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL PROSECUTOR
Muntinlupa City
LAARNI L. ESTEBAN
Complainant,
SUR-REJOINDER
Comes Now, LAARNI L. ESTEBAN, unto this honourable office, respectfully state that:
1. __________________________;
3. That contrary to the respondent’s previous statement that she lived with her parents at
Block 9 Lot 27 Rodriguez Village, Barangay Makiling, Muntinlupa City after the
confrontation that took place at No. 123 National Road, Putatan, Muntinlupa,
respondents AILEEN D. CO and ABNER A. ESTEBAN are still seen living together
at No. 123 National road, Putatan, Muntinlupa;
LAARNI L. ESTEBAN
Complainant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _____day of January, 2009 in Muntinlupa City.
I hereby certify that I have personally examined the affiant and I am convinced that sh
personally and voluntarily verified the foregoing Rejoinder and she understood the contents
thereof.
MYRNA S. FLORITA
Assistant City Prosecutor
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL CAPITOL REGION
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH ______
MUNTINLUPA CITY
Plaintiff,
INFORMATION
The undersigned 4th Assistant City Prosecutor based on the Sworn Statement executed by
Private Complainant, LAARNI ESTEBAN Y LIM of the crime of CONCUBINAGE, committed
as follows:
That in or about the month of July, 2008 and on dates subsequent thereto, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, ABNER ESTEBAN being the lawful husband of private complainant LAARNI
ESTEBAN and without their marriage having been legally dissolved, did, then and there
willfully, ;unlawfully and feloniously cohabit with a woman not his wife, herein co-accused
AILEEN CO despite knowing him to be married in the conjugal house of complainant LAARNI
ESTEBAN and co-accused ABNER ESTEBAN.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
MYRNA S. FLORITA
Assistant City Prosecutor
I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation has been conducted in this case, and that I
have personally examined the complainant and her witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused probably guilty thereof, that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; that he was
given the opportunity to submit controverting evidence and that this Information is being filed
with the approval of the City Prosecutor having been first obtained.
MYRNA S. FLORITA
Assistant City Prosecutor
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20th day of December 209 at City of
Muntinlupa.
DANNY D. LIM
2ND Assistant City Prosecutor
Witnesses:
1. LAARNI ESTEBAN - #878 National road, Putatan, Muntinlupa City and/or #15
Police, Provincial Mobile Group, Bukal Sur, Taguan, Candelaria, Quezon Province
and/or #133 Silver Street, Bernabe Subd., Parañaque City
2. JESUS LADIERO - -do-
3. And other
APPROVED:
FERNANDO R. NEPOMUCENO
City Prosecutor
COMPLAINT
1. That Plaintiff, RONALD O. GALVAN, is a Filipino, of legal age, and a resident of 112
Dita St., San Antonio Village, Makati City, and defendant, NOEL C. MAGPANTAY., is a
Filipino, of legal age, with residence and postal address at 344 Kamagong St., San
Antonio Village, Makati City;
2. That on or about November 3, 2009, at about 3 p.m. in the City of Makati, the said
defendant did then and there, while driving his Sarao jeepney with Plate No. ZLX 623
under the influence of liquor and in a reckless and imprudent manner, bumped the said
jeepney into the residential house of RONALD O. GALVAN situated at 112 Dita St., San
Antonio village, Makati City; and
3. That the said accident caused damage to the front wall of the said residential house to the
damage and prejudice of its owner, RONALD O. GALVAN, in the amount of Php
120,000.00.
1. Ordering the payment of the damages sustained the residential house, and
considering said payment as defendant is entitled to the same; and
2. Ordering costs and other fees to the defendants.
MABEL V. ILUMBA
Counsel for the Plaintiff
CARYL G. SICAY
Notary Public
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
1. That Defendant, NOEL C. MAGPANTAY, is a Filipino, of legal age, with residence and
postal address at 344 Kamagong St., San Antonio Village, Makati City;
2. That Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph two (2) of the complaint and
specifically alleges that on November 3, 2009, he had his dental check up and stayed in
his dentist’s clinic located in Quezon City from 12 p.m. to 5 p.m.;
3. That in support of these allegations, defendant hereby present a receipt and a dental
certificate issued and dated 3 November 2009;
4. That it is physically impossible for the defendant to have participated in the incident as
during that time he was still in the dental clinic.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of cause of
action and that judgement be issued ordering the payment of the costs and attorney’s fees.
LINDA V. FABUNAN
Counsel for the Defendant
LOIDA A. GAMILLA
Notary public
REPLY
COMES NOW, the plaintiff, by the undersigned counsel, and in reply to the defendants
answer, respectfully alleges:
1. That defendant DENIES specifically each and every material allegations made
paragraphs two, three and four ;in the counter-affidavit submitted by the defendant
and alleges that he personally witnessed the incident and saw the plaintiff come out of
the jeepney after it bumped the front portion of his house;
2. That the plaintiff managed to run away from the place of the incident and that his
identity was confirmed by the plaintiff after having found his driver’s license in the
jeepney;
1. Ordering the payment of the damages sustained the residential house, and
considering said payment as defendant is entitled to the same; and
MABEL V. ILUMBA
Counsel for the Plaintiff
CARYL G. SICAY
Notary Public
- Versus -
NOEL C. MAGPANTAY,
Accused.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
REJOINDER
That the accident was caused by a supposed truck that was about to hit the jeepney I was
driving, that by reason, if I was not to hit plaintiff’s residential house it could have had killed me;
That I contrary to the allegations of the complaint, I was not under the influence of
alcohol, thus it cannot be aggravated by this circumstance.
RONALD O. GALVAN
(Affiant)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 13th day of February 2008 affiant
exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 1467890 issued in Tarangan, Samar
on January 3, 2008.
AFFIDAVIT
I, JOEL L. MARINAS, Filipino, of legal age and a resident of 69 Atis St., Farmtown
Subdivision, Quezon City, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby
depose and state that:
1. On July 16, 2009 at around 7:00 PM, I was walking along southbound lane of Taft
Avenue in Vito Cruz, Manila. Upon reaching the pedestrian lane in front of De La
Salle University, I decided to cross the street;
2. While crossing the street, I noticed a red Honda Civic with plate number CBA 222
fast approaching my direction. Within a few seconds, I was hit and was knocked
unconscious;
4. The Honda Civic mentioned earlier is owned and being driven by the respondent,
Rommel Renojo;
5. This affidavit is being executed for the purpose of attesting to the truth of the
foregoing facts and in support of my accusation against respondent, Rommel Renojo
for causing serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
IN WITNESS WHEEOF, i have hereunto set my hand this 17 th day of November 2009
at the City of Manila, Philippines.
JOEL L. MARINAS
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of November, 2009 at the City
of Manila, Philippines.
DARWIN NOTO
Notary Public
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
I, ROMMEL RENOJO, Filipino, of legal age and a resident of 32 Puno St., Hacienda
Village, Pasay City, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and
state that:
1. I was driving my car, a Honda Civic with plate number CBA 222 on the night of July
16, 2009. I passed along Taft Avenue at around 8:00 PM;
2. As I passed along Vito Cruz, Manila, I saw the complainant crossing the street. Since
he was crossing at the pedestrian lane, I slowed down my car.
4. The complainant has not produced any witness considering that the supposed incident
happened in a busy public place;
5. The accusation made by the complainant has no basis and therefore should be
dismissed.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 17 th day of November, 2009
at City of Manila, Philippines.
ROMMEL RENOJO
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 20 th day of November, 2009 at the City
of Manila, Philippines.
DENNIS BUGAYONG
Notary Public
ROMMEL R. RENOJO
Accused
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
REJOINDER
Comes now, ROMMEL R. RENOJO, Filipino, of legal age and a resident of 69 Atis St.,
Farmtown Subdivision, Quezon City, do hereby deposes and says:
That I vehemently and consistently deny the allegations set forth in the complain for
Physical Injuries filed against me;
That contrary to the allegations of the complaint the complainant was walking on the
wrong side of the road, and since the accident happened in the evening, and the street was not
much lighted, I failed to have seen the complainant;
That I accidentally pinned my wheel to the right as there was a passing truck, which
might cause greater damage to the accused,
And that I exercised due diligence, and that the action have prevented greater damage to
property and self;
ROMMEL R. RENOJO
(Affiant)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 13th day of February 2008 affiant
exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 1467890 issued in Tarangan, Samar
on January 3, 2008.
ROMMEL RENOJO
Accused
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
INFORMATION
That on July 16, 2009 at about 7:00 p.m., in the City of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused did there and then unlawfully, hastily and feloniously, and
without justifiable cause hit and ran over one Joel Marinas, with his car, resulting to injuries to
the latter rendering him incapacitated for labor for a period of more than thirty 90 days.
Contrary to law
I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation in this case has been conducted by me in
accordance with law; that I have examined the complainant and her witnesses; that there is a
reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged had been committed; that the accused is
probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the offense charged and was given the
opportunity to submit controverting evidence; and that the filing of this information is with the
prior authority and approval of the city fiscal.
DANIEL BERNABE
Assistant Fiscal
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 1 December 2009 in the City of Muntinlupa,
Philippines.
CHRISTOPHER RAGUINDIN
City Fiscal
List of Witnesses:
VILMA SANTOS
LUIS MANZANO
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, MARIA MAHUBOG, of legal age, married and with residence address at 154-E Vito
Cruz Extension, San Antonio Village, Makati City, after having been duly sworn to according to
law, hereby depose and state:
1. That I am the private complainant in the Criminal Case No. 01 entitled: “People of
the Philippines vs. Juan Dela Cruz”; for Violation of Batas Pamjbansa (BP) Bilang 22
pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 5, Makati City, Philippines.
2. In this regard, the accused Juan Dela Cruz has already paid in full the amount
represented by the checks subject of the above-mentioned case, to wit: Criminal Case
No. 01, Check No. 0054225, amount Php100,000.00.
3. That in view of the payment in full by the accused, which was mis-accounted on my
part, and therefore, I would like to manifest that I am no longer interested in the
prosecution of the aforementioned criminal case and I am respectfully requesting the
Honorable Public Prosecutor to move for the dismissal of the aforementioned cases
against the accused.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 6 th day of October, 2009 at
the City of Manila, Philippines.
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, Juan de la Cruz, of legal age, single, and a resident of 222 F. Jhocson St., Sampaloc,
Manila, after having duly sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and state:
1. I am the complaining witness for Serious Physical Injuries against Jose Santos in the
case entitled “People of the Philippines versus Jose Santos”, Criminal Case No.
333333, metropolitan Trial Court, Branch No. 02, City of Manila;
2. After I have re-examined the facts, events and occurrences surrounding the
commission of the offense and after soul-searching and self-re-examination, I heeby
confirm that the one who inflicted harm on me on June 10, 2009 as alleged in the said
complaint is not Jose Santos, and the filing of the said complaint against him was a
case of mistaken identity.
4. I likewise request the Metropolitan Trial Court, branch No. 02, City of Manila to
dismiss with prejudice the said criminal case.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby set my hand this 18 th day of November 2009 at the
City of Manila.
Juan de la Cruz
Complaining Witness
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 18th day of November 2009 at the City
of Manila, Philippines.
Richmond Ruiz
Public Prosecutor
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
CITY OF MANILA )Sc
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, WALTER FALSARIO, of legal age, single, and a resident of # 123 Main St., Malate,
Manila, after having duly sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and state:
1. I am the complaining witness for Serious Physical Injuuries against Lando Simon in
the case entitled “People of the Philippines versus Lando Simon”, Criminal Case No.
12345, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch No. 11, City of Manila.
2. After my sober and soul searching assessment and analysis of the incident, I have
realized that because I was not wearing my eyeglasses and it was dark, I can not point
out, without a doubt the accused or any other person/s who inflicted harm against me.
3. Since I could not state with certainty and without doubt the liability of Lando Simon,
in fairness to him, I am permanently withdrawing my complaint against him. I clear
him for whatever responsibility or liability to me.
5. I likewise request the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch No. 11, City of Manila to
dismiss with prejudice the said criminal case.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby set my hand this 22 nd day of September 2007 at the
City of Manila.
WALTER FALSARIO
Complaining Witness
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22nd day of January 2008 at the City of
Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No.________;
Page No._______;
Book No. _______;
Series of 2009.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL CAPITOL REGION
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH _____
MUNTINLUPA CITY
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
2. Accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right under Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution, Section 4, rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, relevant
laws and jurisprudence;
3. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution states that, “All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.”
4. Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
The Court, in Hernando was just as succinct in pronouncing that the term
reclusion perpetua as used in Presidential Decree No. 818, merely describes the penalty
actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds twenty
two thousand (P22,000.00) pesos. As used in Presidential Decree No. 818, reclusion
perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense.”
7. Based on the ruling in Hernando, the Department of Justice issued Circular No. 74 on
November 6, 2001 which provided amendment to the 2000 Bail Bond guide
involving the crimes of Estafa under Article 315, 2 (d) as amended by PD 818, AND
Qualified Theft, by recommending bail in these cases even if the amount of fraud or
the value of the property involved is P32,000.00 or over. Notably, in both estafa and
qualified theft, the penalty imposed depends on the amount involved.
9. Accused believes that Circular No. 29 is merely directory and cannot prevail over the
ruling in Hernando, Panganiban and Cenzon which is favorable to the accused. The
ruling recognizes the principle of statutory construction that penal laws are liberally
construed in favor of the accused and strictly against the State.
WHEREFORE, in accordance with law and jurisprudence which recognize the accused’s
rights to bail, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that accused AMABEL
IGNACIO Y GUTIERREZ BE ALLOWED TO POST BAIL AND THE BAIL BE FIXED FOR
HER PROVISIONAL LIBERTY.
NOTICE OF HEARING
Greetings:
Please include the foregoing Motion in the calendar of matters scheduled to be heard on
December 15, 2009 at 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon for the consideration and approval of the
Honorable Court.
Copy furnished:
Public Prosecutor
Regional Trial Court, Branch ____
Muntinlupa City
EXPLANATION
Copy of the Motion was served to the above addressee by personal service.
Accused, through counsel, by way of a special appearance solely for this purpose,
respectfully alleges:
1. That the accused has been charged with Slight Physical Injury and that the bail for
his provisional release has been set at P20,000.00;
2. That the accused is a poor fellow of very limited means such that it is imposible for
him to pay the full amount of his bond and is therefore constrained to request for a
reduction of the amount of bail;
4. As such, accused appeals to the mercy and compassion of this Honorable Court and
respectfully requests that his bail be reduced to P10,000.00.
5. That this motion for reduction of bail is being filed without prejudice to any other
remedy which may be available to the accused and that the accused expressly
reserves the right to question the legality of the issuance of the search warrant or his
warrantless arrest if the circumstances would so warrant.
JOSE M. PARDO
Counsel for the Accused
Republic of the Philippines
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
Quezon City
Accused, through counsel, by way of a special appearance solely for this purpose,
respectfully alleges:
1. That the accused has been charged with Slight Physical Injury and that the bail for
his provisional release has been set at P20,000.00;
2. That the accused is a poor fellow of very limited means such that it is imposible for
him to pay the full amount of his bond and is therefore constrained to request for a
reduction of the amount of bail;
4. As such, accused appeals to the mercy and compassion of this Honorable Court and
respectfully requests that his bail be reduced to P10,000.00.
5. That this motion for reduction of bail is being filed without prejudice to any other
remedy which may be available to the accused and that the accused expressly
reserves the right to question the legality of the issuance of the search warrant or his
warrantless arrest if the circumstances would so warrant.
JOSE M. PARDO
Counsel for the Accused
NOTICE OF HEARING
Greetings:
Please take notice that the foregoing Motion for reduction of Bail shall be submitted for
the consideration and approval of the Honorable Court on Friday, 4 December 2009 at 2:00 p.m.
or as soon as counsel and matter may be heard.
JOSE M. PARDO
Counsel for the Accused
COPY FURNISHED:
Atty. Roman S. Fabunan
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
MANILA (BRANCH I)
Comes now the accused Jose Pabor through undersigned counsel and to his Honorable
Court in the above entitled case respectfully moves to quash the information for the crime of
theft on the grounds that:
ARGUMENT
The information alleges that the accused Jose Pabor is eleven years old with no known
address. Under Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, a person over nine years of
age and under fifteen unless he acted with discernment is exempt from criminal liability.
Moreover, there is no allegation that the accused acted with discernment. Even granting
that he had acted with discernment, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code provides among others that a minor unless sixteen
years of age at the time of the commission of a grave or less grave felony. The court shall
suspend the proceedings and shall commit such minor or to the custody or case of public or
private, benevolent or charitable institution established under the law for the care or education of
orphaned, homeless, defective and delinquent children, or to the case and custody of any other
responsible person in any other place subject to the visitation of the Director of Social Welfare.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the instant information be dismissed and that
the accused be immediately be released for detention.
Please be informed that the foregoing motion to quash is set on Friday, September 9,
1988 at 9:00 am or as soon thereof as counsel may be heard.
Copy furnished:
Branch ______
Lipa City
Plaintiff,
Paragraph 1 of the
-versus-
Accused.
X -------------------------------------------------------x
MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE ARRAIGNMENT OF
THE ACCUSED
Undersigned accused, in the above-entitled case, unto this Honorable Regional Trial Court,
respectfully moves to set aside and abandon the resolution dated November 6, 2009 of the Honorable
Investigating Prosecutor reinstating the assailed resolution finding probable cause in the aforesaid criminal
cases.
Accused received the assailed resolution of the distinguished Assistant City Prosecutor of Lipa on
February 2, 2010 denying his motion for reconsideration on the grounds that accused failed to submit
Accused believed that there is no need to submit additional evidence for the reversal of the first
assailed resolution on the ground that probable cause in the pleading asserting a claim in highly
improbable as the accusatory statements state no cause action and deserve no merit. Moreover, the
arrest is also illegal. The assertion of the good assistant city prosecutor that full blown trial is necessary is
Above complainants police officers alleged in the accusatory statement on or about 11:00 o’clock
in the evening of July 6, 2009 while they were at the headquarters, they were sent by their Chief of Police
to conduct surveillance or monitoring on persons using illegal drugs (shabu). On board their civilian jeep
with plate number NPC 188 traversing the highway of Brgy. Marauoy when a woman flagged them and
reported that was a selling of an illegal drugs (shabu). The woman pointed to a man in white t-shirt and
maong pants (herein accused) the one selling shabu and talking to two women along the road.
Immediately they approached the man (accused ) and upon seeing them and recognizing to be policemen,
the man ran away but on chase they were able to capture the man who scolded them and resisted arrest
and upon search, PO1 Gonzales, confiscated from the hand of the man (accused herein) one small plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance believed to shabu. He was later charged.
On the other hand, responded filed his counter affidavit to the complaint supported by his
witnesses. He alleged that the allegations of the police officers were all fabricated and without legal and
factual bases. It was not true that he was conversing with two women along the road, he was alone at the
side of the road waiting for a ride when the police officers complainants herein arrived and at gunpoint
arrested him. His witness Shirley Perez recounted that SPO1 Renato Laygo was drunk at the time and
mauled Alejandro Calingasan, her fiancé. All the allegations in the complaint were denied by respondent.
After the investigation, the investigating prosecutor rendered a resolution finding probable cause,
denying likewise his motion for reconsideration, hence this motion for judicial determination of probable
cause.
At the outset, the complaint must be treated in violation of the existing rules in operations against
illegal drugs. As alleged in the complaint, the Chief of Police directed the herein complainants police
officers to conduct surveillance or monitoring of illegal drugs and NOT to apprehend drug users that time
because through monitoring and surveillance, the police officers prior to their operations must have the
pre-operation report as one of the requirements. In this case, there is none. Moreover, SPO1 Renato
Laygo was under the influence of liquor during the operation against herein accused. This negates the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty. People of the Philippines versus Alfredo
Scrutinizing the allegations contained in the complaint of the police officers, the Honorable Court
should appreciate it as HIGHLY IMPROBABLE CAUSE. Firstly, alleging among other that they were in
civilian vehicle with plate number NPC 188 at 11:00 o’clock in the evening, woman flagged them down and
reported that selling of illegal drugs (shabu) is in progress. How could the woman know that they were
police officers that time in the night. She was neither identified nor required to execute an affidavit to
substantiate and corroborate the complaint. She was not an informant and therefore may be required to
execute her affidavit. Secondly, respondent was talking o two women and NOT SELLING SHABU to two
women,, third paragraph contained “AGAD NAMANG ITINURO SA AMIN NG NASABING BABAE KUNG SINO
ANG NAGBEBENTA NG SHABU AT NAPANSIN NAMIN AND KANYAANG ITINUTURO AY ISANG LALAKI NA
NAKA PUTTING T-SHIRTY AT MAONG NA PANTALON NA MAY KAUSAP DING DALAWANG BABAE SA TABI NG
KALSADA. He woman does NOT SAY respondent tha time was selling shabu to the two women. The
complaint says “MAY KAUSAP DING DALAWANG BABAE SA TABI NG KALSADA” and did not say selling shabu
to the two women. Hence NO crime is being committed or is attempting to be to be committed or has just
been committed in their presence. The alleged two women were neither invited for identification
purposes no apaprehended for the purpose. Thirdly, the complaint alleged that “AT AGAD ITONG
TUMAKBONG PALAYO AT AMIN ITONG HINABOL . . . . . . . . AT NG AMING RIKISAHIN SIYA AY AKING (PO1
GONZALES) NAKUHA SA KANYANG KAMAY ANG ISANG MALIIT NA PLASTIC SACHET. It was very obvious
that the complaint affidavit of the police officers is highly improbable and does not deserve merit. One
knew that once he was chased by a policeman and yet he was holding illegal drugs, his tendency of course
is to thro it away. The contention that the shabu subject of the complaint was taken from the hands of
respondent is untenable. Very remarkable likewise, is the confrontation that took place in the presence of
the investigating prosecutor when the complainant told the prosecutor on how they could help the
accused in order not to be charged in court. It has been the prior agreement of the accused in order not to
be charged in court. It has been the prior agreement of the accused the complainants police officers that
he (accused) would not file his counter charge both criminal for planting evidence before the Office of the
Ombudsman and administrative case before the Napolcom for mauling him provided that the offense
Legally, the above complaint should be dismissed outrightly on the ground that the arrest has no
legal basis, therefore, unlawful. There is no warrant of arrest against respondent and there are only three
exceptions to the rule; first, the in flagrante delicto rule, second the hot pursuit rule and lastly, the
escaped prisoner rule. The first exception cannot be applied on basis that the offense is not being
committed, or is attempting to be committed or has just been committed in the presence of the
complainants. No actual selling of shabu in the presence of the police officers, nor an attempt or
consummated act of selling under the third paragraph of the complaint. The evidence warranting the
arrest is hearsay. The complainant police officers have no personal knowledge of the offense charged. The
alleged report of the woman that selling of illegal drugs (shabu) is hearsay in evidence and shall not be
admitted by the investigating prosecutor. This contention is discussed already in the preceding paragraph.
Second exception is hot pursuit rule which means that the offense has in fact been committed and the
arresting officers has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. No crime has in fact been committed as
discussed also in the preceding paragraph. The third exception is moreover, inapplicable.
Since the arrest is unlawful, the search is likewise illegal on the ground that it does not fall into the
` Furthermore, violation of article 151 of the revised penal is subsequent to unlawful arrest it must
violation of Section 11 Article 2 of RA 9165 and Article 151 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code be
DISMISSED for lack of probable cause and therefore hold in abeyance the arraignment of the accused.
Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for under the premises.
Alejandro G. Calingasan
Accused
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing motion to the Honorable Court or its kind
Alejandro G. Calingasan
Copy furnished:
Lipa City
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
Prosecutor’s Office
Lipa City
Complainants,
-versus-
Alejandro Guevarra,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Respondent on November 3, 2009, the
Investigating Prosecutor denies the same. There is no new evidence submitted by the respondent
which will justify the reversal of the finding of probable cause. The Motion for Reconsideration
contains mere discussions of the contents of the affidavits already submitted. The allegations in
the counter-affidavit of respondent and that of his witness can well be ventilated in a full blown
trial.
The evidence submitted by the complainants particularly Sworn Statement executed by Renato
Virrey Laygo, PO3 Enrico Pilapil Tapalla and PO1 Dan R. Gonzales; Request for Forensic
Examination; Chemistry Report No. BD-063-09; and inventory of Confiscated/Seized Item
cannot be set aside by the alleged agreement of the parties.
The finding of probable cause for violations of Sec 11, Article 2, Republic Act 9165 and Article
151, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code against Alejandro Guevarra.
Alejandro Guevarra
Renato Virrey Laygo
PO3 Enrico Pilapil Tapalla
PO1 Dan R. Gonzales
ARTURO F. GATCHALIAN,
Plaintiff,
Defendant.
x---------------------------------------x
Complainant, unto this Honorable Court, respectfully moves for the issuance of a hold departure order
against accused ANDRES GUERRA Y ABROGAR and in support thereof states:
1. That she is the complainant in Criminal Case No. 0029-2009 against ANDRES GUERRA Y
ABROGAR;
2. That on March 11, 2009 Honorable Judge Florencio S. Arellano issued a warrat of arrest against
accused;
3. That accused has been hiding since then January 2009 and his non-apprehension has somehow
frustrated the ends of justice;
4. That there is a distinct poswsibility that he will go outside the country to evade the long arm of
the law as per information and affidavit executed by the private complainant;
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing Motion to the HOnorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof for its
consideration and approval.
-versus-
MARISSA A. ADVINCULA
Accused.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
2. It is solemn mandate of the Constitution that an accused is presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven. In order to overcome the said presumption nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The burden is never shifted to
the accused or diminished by the weakness of the defense. For indeed, unless the
prosecution discharges that burden, the accused need not even offer evidence in his
behalf. He would be entitled to an acquittal. (people v Garcia, 215 SCRA 349)
3. In the instant case, the prosecution absolutely failed to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused. The evidence it presented is insufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
3.1 The highly improbable theory of the prosecution was not substantiated.
3.2 The prosecution relied primarily on hearsay, self-serving and inadmissible evidence
to prove its case.
3.3 None of the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses, as well as the documents
offered as evidence, directly, or even logically, point to the accused as the perpetrator
of the crime charged.
3.4 The testimonies of the prosecution’s key witnesses are inconsistent and contradictory
on material points so as to make their testimonies worthless as evidence.
3.5 In sum, the bottom line is that there is gross insufficiency of evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
4 All the foregoing discussions, coupled by the fact of failure of the prosecution to properly
offer its exhibits formally, clearly show that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its
case and to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused.
The presumption can be overcome only by competent and credible proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The reasonable doubt should necessarily pertain to the facts constitutive of the crime
charged. Discrepancies that touch on significant factors, such as those pointed out above, are
crucial on the guilt or innocence of an accused. In criminal prosecution, a reasonable doubt
can be created by many things; it is sufficient to prevent a conviction if the doubt arises from
the evidence adduced or from the lack of evidence. While no test definitely determines which
is and which is not considered reasonable under the law, it must necessarily involve genuine
and irreconcilable contradictions based, not on suppositional thinking, but on the hard facts
constituting the elements of the crime. And these are what the doubt created in this case is
based on. It is not mere possible doubt but intelligent, reasonable and impartial doubt based
on a careful examination and conscious consideration of all the evidence in the case. It is
that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence
leaves the mind of the judge in that condition that he cannot say that he feels an abiding
conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the crime charged. Absolute certainty is not
demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and
this certainty must be every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. 33
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that leave of court be granted
to the accused for him to file a demurrer to evidence.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are being prayed for.
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing Motion to the HOnorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof for
its consideration and approval.
- versus -
MARISSA A. ADVINCULA,
Accused.
x ----------------------------------------x
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
ACCUSED, through counsel, unto this Honorable Court respectfully moves for the
dismissal of the charge against her of Qualified Theft on the following grounds:
1. The highly improbable theory of the prosecution was not substantiated.
5. In sum, the bottom line is that there is gross insufficiency of evidence to sustain
the indictment or to support a verdict of the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
I. PREFATORY STATEMEMENT
1. This is a case of Qualified Theft filed against the herein accused, Marissa Advincula,
former Customer Relations Assistant (CRA) of the Greenhills Branch of AB Banking
Corporation, filed by Carmela Collantes, then Senior Manager of the Audit
Examination Department of said bank, in behalf of the bank as private complainant.
2. Curiously and worthy of note is the fact that the charge was filed shortly following
charges of incriminatory machination and intriguing against honor filed by the accused
herself against the officers of the bank branch of private complainant where the
accused used to work. 1
5. It must be noted at the very outset that the charge of qualified theft of which the
accused is charged hinges entirely and exclusively on the fantastic tale the private
complainant persists to parlay that the accused succeeded in completely deceiving
her superiors at the Greenhills branch of the complainant bank into believing that
the cash collection covered by each of the bank’s official receipts covering the
transactions that are the subject of this case was pocketed by the accused, and that
she (the accused) did this on 644 separate occasions during her stint as Customer
Relations Assistant at said bank for a period of about one year and a half—a gothic
story that defies human reason and insults one’s intelligence.
6. Worse, the prosecution attempted to prove its impossible theory, not by adducing
evidence establishing “the precise degree of participation by the accused” as
required by the Supreme Court in each and every act of the crime of which she
stands charged but by wild presumptions and illogical inferences to show an alleged
criminal pattern based on circumstantial or indirect evidence that does not even
pass the test of admissibility.
II. THE CHARGE AGAINST THE ACCUSED
The Amended Information filed with this Honorable Court on April 27, 2000, charging
Marissa Advincula with the crime of Qualified Theft, reads as follows:
“On or about or sometime between January 1995 to May 1996, in San Juan, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner, being then an
employee of AB Banking Corporation’s Greenhills Branch, who was assigned to
handle the collection and remittance of Safety Deposit box (SDB) rental accounts of
the Bank’s customer and with grave abuse of confidence reposed on her by her
employer, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away cash money amounting to P314,760.00, belonging to AB Corporation,
represented by Carmela Collantes to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the said
amount of P314,760.00.
“Contrary to law.”
III. DISCUSSION AND ARGUMENTS
1. On March 2, 2004, the prosecution rested its case, at least preliminarily (the complete
resting of the prosecution’s case being upon the court’s resolution of the Formal Offer
and Objections thereto 4 ) through a Formal Offer of Exhibits. In the
Comments/Objections to Prosecution’s Formal Offer filed by the accused on April 6,
2004, it emphasized the non-inclusion of several alleged exhibits in the Prosecution’s
Formal Offer, which deprives her of the right to object thereto, as follows:
a. “The prosecution alleges in page 116 of the Formal Offer that the first set of
documents offered for a common purpose starts from Exhibit ‘A’ up to Exhibit ‘P25-
3,’ while the first set actually attached in the formal offer of Exhibits is only from
Exhibit ‘A’ to Exhibit ‘P17-3.’
c. “There are also no portions therein marked as Exhibits ‘A-2’ to ‘D22-2’ contrary to the
prosecution’s allegations.
d. “There are no initials of Carolyn Lim (the accused) in any portion of each of the
documents comprising Exhibits ‘A’ to ‘P25-3’ contrary to the prosecution’s
allegations.”
2. Arguing further on the matter, the accused went on by discussing that these exhibits
are misleading as they are not what the prosecution alleges them to be and that the
above-identified documents, alleged but not found in the formal offer of the
prosecution, may not be considered as having been formally offered. Under the Rules,
the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered (Rule 132,
sec. 35). A formal offer is necessary, since judges are required to base their findings of
fact and their judgment solely and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at
the trial. Opposing parties would be deprived of their chance to examine the document
and to object to its admissibility if this procedure were not followed.
3. In an order dated April 20, 2004, the Honorable Court, confirming the abovecited
objections, returned to the prosecution its Formal Offer of Evidence due to the finding
that some exhibits listed in the Covering Pleading of said Formal Offer were missing
as attachments.
4. Hence, in a hearing of this case dated April 27, 2004, the prosecution withdrew its
Formal Offer for the same reasons stated above. Thus, the accused was constrained to
also withdraw its Comments and Objections in order to adjust its allegations according
to the additional exhibits that were supposed to be attached in the Formal Offer. The
Court, therefore, issued an order giving the prosecution a period of thirty (30) days
within which to file its Formal Offer, and the accused with the same period from
receipt of a copy of the Formal Offer to file its Objections and Comments thereto, after
which the matter shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
5. Subsequently, the prosecution asked, and the court granted, in an order dated July 16,
2004, another fifteen (15) day period from receipt of said order to file its Formal Offer,
giving the prosecution more than ample time to complete its offer.
6. Counsel for the accused received a copy of the prosecution’s NEW Formal Offer of
Evidence on August 3, 2004. Amazingly, this new Formal Offer, consisting of 123
pages, comprises the Cover Pleading only. It failed not only to complete the
attachments as required by this Court, but altogether omitted every and all exhibits
described therein.
7. Despite the fact that the previous Formal Offer (filed by the prosecution on March 3,
2004) has been withdrawn and, thus, considered stricken off the records of the case,
the NEW Formal Offer did not contain any attachment of any documentary evidence,
which effectively deprives the accused of any opportunity to object to any of the
alleged exhibits submitted by the prosecution.
8. Additionally, after a circumspect and painstaking scrutiny, it was found out that the
changes in the cover pleading (as discussed in the accused’s Objections/Comments to
Prosecution’s Formal Offer) constitute only insertions of some exhibits with similar
purposes as the first Formal Offer. The fact that no documentary evidence, originally
attached in the previous formal Formal Offer or otherwise, has been attached in this
new Formal Offer renders the foregoing changes immaterial and inconsequential.
It has not cured, even in the slightest degree, the defects of the previous Formal
Offer of the prosecution which has been excluded by this Honorable Court.
9. Moreover, the introduction of the foregoing changes did not affect the purposes for the
offer of the documentary evidence as there has been no changes whatsoever in the
discussion of the purposes for said offer.
10. It should be stressed that the new Formal Offer did not even incorporate by reference
the incomplete attachments of the previous Formal Offer of Exhibits.
11. On these scores, as this Court has expressed in its July 16, 2004 Order “Failure to
comply within the reglementary period will be considered as a waiver of the
prosecution’s right.” The submission of the Formal Offer by the prosecution, although
made in time, is, in fact, not a compliance at all.
12. The failure of the prosecution to offer a complete exhibit in the previous Formal Offer
and its failure to submit any exhibit on the new Formal Offer should be deemed a
waiver of its right to do so. The delay of the proceedings in this case due to the
unjustified lapses in the prosecution’s offer of evidence has been clearly vexatious
and oppressive, constitutive of a violation of the right to a speedy trial of the
accused.
13. Nevertheless, maintaining the above arguments, if only to obviate any further possible
delay, and in the event that the Honorable Court, for whatever judicious and just
reason there may be, would find no merit in the above discussion, or if the Court
would consider the attachments in the previous Formal Offer as deemed incorporated
in the second Formal Offer, the accused, without admitting the propriety of the new
Formal Offer, interposed its comments and objections both to the withdrawn and the
new Formal Offer of Exhibits of the prosecution. Thus, the following arguments and
discussion in support of the demurrer:
1. In explaining the procedure observed in the handling of Safety Deposit Box rental
payments, that: “First, the Custom(er) Relations Assistant would ask the client to give
the money to the teller… The client goes to the teller where the client makes the
payment…” 18
This directly contradicts the line peddled under oath by the other prosecution
witnesses 19 that the accused, as CRA, invariably received or took delivery of SDB
clients’ rental payments. This testimony even bolsters the fact that, in fact and in
truth, the accused received no money from the bank’s customers.
2. That after the CRA had prepared the income ticket, “the teller presents it to the bank
official for validation.” 20
Carlos Peña, Branch Operations Head of the Greenhills Branch of complainant bank,
at first testified on the witness stand that, on instructions of Ernie Santos, the Acting
Branch Manager, he “requested one of my [his] staff to type the Notice of
Investigation [to the accused]” and then “directly handed it to Mr. Santos.” 22
Fourteen days later, on February 5, 2001, the witness changed his testimony by saying
that he referred the matter first to “our Legal,” and then “drafted it first” 23 before
giving it to a staff member for typing.
“xxx we were just trying to get information from her [fishing expedition?] xxx usap-
usapan lang.” 24 [translation: “It is just mere talk.”]
At any rate, it is essential to note that the effect of this investigation is irrelevant
and baseless evidence, containing mere unfounded self-serving surmises on the
guilt of the accused. The findings in said investigation are immaterial and not
binding in these proceedings. The investigation held by the bank representatives
is expected to be biased in favor of the bank. Although there purports to be
opportunity for the accused to be heard, the partiality of the jury (composed of
officers of the bank itself) rendered such opportunity futile and nugatory.
c. Time of meeting of senior branch staff with the accused on May 29, 1996.
Branch Operations Head Peña testified on February 5, 2001 that he, along with the
other senior branch staff and the accused, had a meeting in the office of Acting Branch
Manager Santos on the alleged anomaly concerning the SDB rental payment of bank
client Peter Li ”at around 11:00 A.M.” and that the Notice of Investigation was
presented to the accused at 11:30 A.M. or 12:00 noon during said meeting. 25
On the other hand, Acting Branch Manager Santos, under direct examination, declared
that the meeting actually took place at 10:00 A.M., not 11:00 A.M. 26 — a full one
hour difference from the meeting time testified to by Carlos Peña.
Prosecution witness Peña said on the witness stand on February 5, 2001 that the Notice
of Investigation issued to the accused was in connection with the case of Mr. Peter Li.
When cross-examined, however, he admitted that there was nothing such contained in
the said Notice, 27 a fact verified by an examination of the document. For his part,
Acting Branch Manager, Santos never mentioned a thing about it.
This particular matter is likewise very material, since it is customary, nay required
standard operating procedure, that a notice of investigation must indicate the purpose
of the investigation, the absence of which exposes the person to be investigated to an
ambush in gross violation of his/her right to due process.
e. Bank Procedures.
In his testimony on February 5, 2001, Branch Operations Head Carlos Peña declared
that he was ignorant of changes in procedures instituted by Branch Cashier Edna
Garcia because he was not informed about such changes, implying that Ms Garcia
could change the procedures without the necessity of informing him. 28
Acting Branch Manager Santos testified that the accused cried inside his office while
the meeting was being conducted. 29
On the other hand, Edna Garcia declared on the witness stand that the crying incident
took place before the meeting and not in the office of Acting Branch Manager
Santos. Operations Head Peña was silent about the matter.
Again, contradictory statements on a very material matter, which usually happen when
a story is concocted in conspiracy.
Ms Garcia also supposedly had the following exchange of words with the accused as
follows:
“Ms Marissa Advincula [accused] cried and told me, among others, that “NOON PA
DURING THE DAYS WHEN KA CLOSE KO SI GINA. SABI NGA NG KA CLOSE KO
PAG KAILANGAN KO NG PERA, GANITO AND GAWIN KO.”[Translation: “Even
then when I was close to Gina. She said that whenever I need money, this is what I
should do.”] She further told me that one of the reasons why she requested for transfer
to another branch is because she could not control herself from doing it anymore. She
even told me “FEELING KO ANG GALING-GALING KO NA. HINDI NILA AKO
NAHUHULI.” 30 [Translation: “I felt I was very good. They cannot catch me.”]
This is an unnatural and preposterous exchange, if such exchange ever took place,
which even caught the unusual attention of the court when the alleged exchange of
words was narrated by the witness.
All the foregoing inconsistencies and contradictions on material points in the
testimonies of the key witnesses negate their value as evidence.
“Moreover, when the alleged eyewitnesses contradict themselves, then the element
of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be lightly disregarded.” 32
5. In sum, the bottom line is that there is
gross insufficiency of evidence to
sustain the indictment or to support a
verdict of the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
All the foregoing discussions, coupled by the fact of failure of the prosecution to
properly offer its exhibits formally, clearly show that the prosecution has miserably
failed to prove its case and to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused.
The presumption can be overcome only by competent and credible proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The reasonable doubt should necessarily pertain to the facts
constitutive of the crime charged. Discrepancies that touch on significant factors, such
as those pointed out above, are crucial on the guilt or innocence of an accused. In
criminal prosecution, a reasonable doubt can be created by many things; it is sufficient
to prevent a conviction if the doubt arises from the evidence adduced or from the lack
of evidence. While no test definitely determines which is and which is not considered
reasonable under the law, it must necessarily involve genuine and irreconcilable
contradictions based, not on suppositional thinking, but on the hard facts constituting
the elements of the crime. And these are what the doubt created in this case is based
on. It is not mere possible doubt but intelligent, reasonable and impartial doubt
based on a careful examination and conscious consideration of all the evidence in
the case. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence leaves the mind of the judge in that condition that he
cannot say that he feels an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the
crime charged. Absolute certainty is not demanded by the law to convict of any
criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty must be every
proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. 33
The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to
embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would
otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual (the accused) pitted
against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their command. Its
inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the
accused must be acquitted and set free if his/her guilt cannot be proved beyond the
whisper of a doubt. The presumption of innocence can only be rebutted by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In order to convict an accused, the circumstances of the case
must exclude all and each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence. For the
slightest possibility of an innocent man being convicted for an offense he has not
committed would be far more dreadful than letting a guilty person go unpunished for a
crime he may have perpetrated.
At this point, it is well worth repeating what we said at the outset: The prosecution
attempted to prove its impossible theory, not by adducing evidence establishing “the
precise degree of participation by the accused” as required by the Supreme Court in
the case of Gutib vs. Court of Appeals 34 in each and every act of the crime of which
she stands charged but by wild presumptions and illogical inferences to show an
alleged criminal pattern based on circumstantial or indirect evidence that does not
even pass the test of admissibility.
We beg to end this exposition by asking the crucial question: Why is it that, out of
643 separate SDB transactions subject of this case, the complainant bank did not
produce a single witness who participated in any of these transactions, such as, for
example, Peter Li, the handling of whose SDB payment was allegedly thoroughly
investigated by the complainant, to testify definitively to whom among the bank
employees concerned his/her SDB cash payment was actually given or delivered?
Why? Why?
In light of the foregoing discussions, the accused stands on firm ground that the weight
of evidence of the prosecution against her lacks sufficient strength to convict her and
thus should fall by itself.
IV. PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court issue an order
DISMISSING the case against the accused for failure of the prosecution to establish
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
August 31, 2004, San Juan, M. M. for Lipa City City.
1
Exhibits “W25 PT” for the prosecution (counter affidavits of Ernie Santos) and Exh.
“T-25 PT” (counter affidavit of Elsa Garcia)
2
People vs. Berroya, 89 SCAD 674.
3
Gutib vs. Court of Appeals G. R. No. 131209, August 13, 1999
4
Cornelio Godoy Vs. Hon. Court Of Appeals [G.R. No. 80814. August 30, 1988.]
5
G.R. No. 135657 January 17, 2001 Jose V. Lagon vs. Hooven Comalco Industries,
Inc.
6
Contrary to prosecution’s allegations, there are no portions of Exhibits “A” to “D22-3
which are marked as Exhibits “A-1” to “D22-1 and “A-2” to “D-2” to D22-2;
7
Prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence, page 116
8
TSN, February 5, 2001, p.18
9
Rule 130 Section 36 of the Rules of Court.
10
(People vs. Bautista, G. R. No. 111149, September 5, 1997).
11
People vs. Parungao, G. R. No. 125812, November 28, 1996.
12
TSN August 8, 2001, page 9
13
Exhibits “V” to “V-18” of the prosecution
14
3rd paragraph of page 5 of the report
15
3rd paragraph of page 6 of the report)
16
Legon vs. Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc. (Jan. 17, 2001).
17
Restaurante Las Conchas vs. Llego; [G.R. No. 119085. September 9, 1999.]
18
TSN, December 18, 2000, p. 3, 2nd par.
19
Collantes, TSN Feb. 20. 2002, pp. 12-13
20
TSN, Dec. 18, 2000, p. 3, 8th par.
21
Gadia, October 7, 2003 TSN, p. 8
22
TSN, Jan. 22, 2001, p. 8, pars. 4 and 6
23
TSN, Feb. 5, 2001, p. 7, last par., and p. 9, 2nd par.
24
TSN, Feb. 5, 2001, p. 23, last par.
25
TSN, February 5, 2001, p. 8, pars. 2 & 6
26
TSN, June 6, 2001, p. 4, par. 5
27
TSN , February 5, 2001, p. 9, par. 5 and last par.
28
TSN, February 5, 2001, p. 14, pars. 2 & 3.
29
TSN,June 6, 2001, p. 5., 15th par.
30
Exh. “T-25 (PT)” – (Counter-Affidavit of Nellie Alar, p. 9, par. 2.21 and 2.22).
31
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Joel Tañeza y Dacal, accused-
appelllant. [G.R. No. 121668. June 20, 2000].
32
People of the Philippines vs. Melchor dela Iglesia, [G.R. Nos. 110991-92. February
24, 1995.]
33
People vs. Lagmay, 105 SCAD 785.
34
G. R. No. 131209, August 13, 1999.
INFORMATION
The undersigned Prosecutor hereby accuses Rachel Ann Dejarme with having violated
Article 315, which she committed as follows: that on or about August 2009 in Taft Avenue,
Manila within jurisdiction of this Court, the accused did then and there, because of her position
as a manager of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Taft Avenue, Manila committed the crime of
estafa, under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Contrary to law.
Jose Santos
Assistant Fiscal
DANILO BERNABE
Assistant Fiscal
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 1 December 2009 in the City of Muntinlupa,
Philippines.
CHRISTOPHER RAGUINDIN
City Fiscal
List of Witnesses:
VILMA SANTOS
LUIS MANZANO
INFORMATION
The undersigned Prosecutor hereby accuses Raymundo S. Ignacio of the Abduction with
Consent, under Article 343 of the Revised Penal Code, after having abducted Abigail Pizarro, 12
years of age, carried out with her consent and with lewd designs.
Contrary to Law.
APPROVED:
ROMMEL GONONG
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
COMPLAINT
1. Plaintiff Eunice Ladiero is of legal age, Filipino, and resident of No. 843 F Samat
1.1. Plaintiff Evelyn Ladiero is of legal age, single, Filipino and a resident of the
same address
1.2. Plaintiff Ekathlyn Ladiero is of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of the
same address.
1.3. Plaintiffs are the surviving spouse and children respectively as well as sole heirs
of the late Retired PNP General Andres Ladiero who died on 20 November 2007
at Quezon City.
Copies of the corresponding Death Certificate, Marriage Contract and Birth Certificates are
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office at the
G/F Oceanworld Building, Quezon City where it may be served with summons and
2.1. Defendant Maria Santos is of legal age, married, Filipino and the incumbent
President of the defendant corporation and is of the same address as that of that
of the defendant corporation where they may be served with summons and other
court processes.
3. During his lifetime, the said deceased Andres Ladiero received from the defendant
corporation the attached Letter dated 20 August 2007 (Annex E hereof) showing that
the said decedent had a deposit account with the said bank.
4. For this reason, upon the death of the decedent, plaintiffs repeatedly requested
defendants for a Statement of Account on the said deposit for the purpose of
preparing an inventory of the estate of the late Andres Ladiero, paying the estate
taxes, and then demanding the release to them of the balance of the said deposit.
Marriage Contract, and Birth Certificates to prove not only that they are the sole
heirs of the late Andres Ladiero but also that the said deposit forms part of the
5. Defendants, however, without any just and lawful cause to give the said Statement of
And produce documents related thereto upon receipt of a subpoena or court order.
6. The reason given by the defendants is manifestly unlawful and unjust considering that
plaintiff owned one half share thereof as her conjugal share while she and her co-
plaintiffs inherited the other half. The Secrecy of the Bank Deposit Laws provides
that a banking institution may even without court intervention give the information
regarding deposits if unauthorized by the owners of the deposits which are in the
to the possibility of paying late payment interest and penalties on estate taxes and are
also constrained to needlessly engage counsel to file and prosecute this case for a fee
other financial institutions from forcing surviving spouses and children and heirs to
PRAYER
a.) To confirm to plaintiffs past and present deposits/placements in the name of the late
b.) To provide plaintiffs Statements of Accounts and all other documents pertinent to
such deposits/placements;
c.) To pay plaintiffs the late payment interests and penalties for estate taxes which
d.) To pay plaintiffs attorney’s fees of PhP30,000.00 plus PhP5,000.00 per appearance
RONALDO VALDEZ
Counsel for the Plaintiffs
PTR # 1234567; 1/9/2001, QC
IBP # 654321; Quezon City
Lot 15, Block 7, Quezon Blvd.
Quezon City
WITNESS WHEREOF, we hereby affix our signature this 19th day of November 2007 at
Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines.
EKATHLYN LADIERO
CTC No. 54100043
Issued on August 1, 2007
Issued at Mandaluyong City
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of November, 2007 at Quezon
City affiants exhibited to me their Community Tax Certificate Nos. as well as their proof of
identity as indicated above.
_________________________,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. __________For:
Rescission of Contract with
Damages
-versus-
_________________________,
Defendant.
x--------------------------------------------x
COMPLAINT
2. Plaintiff is engaged in the trading of rice, sugar and other merchandise while
defendant is the owner of the rice mill and is also engaged in the whole sale of different
varieties of rice;
4. Under the agreement, plaintiff shall pay a down payment equivalent to forty
percent (40%) of the total purchase price and the balance to Be paid when he picks up the
merchandise from defendant’s rice mill on June 30, 2005.
A copy of the agreement dated June 15, 2005 is hereunto attached as Annex “A” and
made an integral part hereof.
A copy of the receipt issued by the defendant is hereto attached as Annex “B” and made
an integral part hereof.
6. On June 30, 2005, plaintiff went to the defendant’s rice mill to pick-up the one
thousand (1,000) cavans of Dinorado rice and to pay the balance of P960,000.00.
7. Defendant, however, informed the plaintiff that he cannot deliver to the plaintiff
the entire one thousand (1,000) cavans of Dinorado rice and that all he has in his rice mill was
only fifty (50) cavans. Defendant instead offered a different variety of rice but of lower quality.
Plaintiff refused and insisted on the refund of P240,000.00 down payment he paid to the
defendant.
9. Plaintiff demanded for the return of the amount he paid to the defendant and for
the rescission of their earlier agreement but his demand fell on deaf ears. A copy of plaintiff’s
demand letter is hereunto attached as Annex “C” and made an integral part hereof.
10. Defendant is evidently guilty of bad guilty of bad faith in refusing to return the
amount paid by the plaintiff without even giving any valid or justifiable reason, which caused
the latter mental anguish, serious anxiety, moral shock and other similar injury, for which the
defendant should be held liable to pay P100,000 as moral damages.
11. By way of example or correction for the public good, and to deter other like-
minded individuals from trampling upon the rights of the others, defendant should likewise be
held liable to pay P100,000.00 as nominal damages.
12. As a result defendant’s wanton refusal to return the amount paid by the plaintiff
and to rescind their earlier agreement, plaintiff was compelled to litigate and for the purpose,
have to engage the services of the undersigned law firm for a fee of P50,000.00.
13. Defendant should likewise be held liable for interest of legal rare, litigation
expenses and cost of suit.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed the judgment be rendered in favour of
plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter:
Plaintiff prays for such relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
Plaintiff/Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ___ day of July 2009 at Biñan,
Laguna.
Verification/Certification
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 28 th day of January 1999 Pasig
City, Philippines.
Plaintiff/Affiant
________________________
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR
CALVIN MARWOOD
and ERIC DAMPIER,
Plaintiffs,
x------------------------------------------------------------------------x
1. He has legal interest in the parcel of lot subject of the instant litigation between
CALVIN MARWOOD and ERIC DAMPIER, as Plaintiffs vs. NATALIE IMBTUGLIA and
instant case embraces an area of Four Thousand Thee Hundred Two (4,302) square meters
and is situated in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA. It is more particularly described as LOT NO.
2210 and was previously covered by Tax Declaration No. 1026 issue in the name of TIM
MARWOOD.
3. Sometime in 1952, the late TIM MARWOOD obtained possession and ownership
4. For almost three (3) years, clearing and planting works on the LOT were made for
possession of the LOT and performed planting and clearing works thereon for and on behalf
the LOT from 1968 to 1979 when he had to leave for work in Russia.
7. During the lifetime of the late TIM MARWOOD, specifically on 29 August 1976,
he executed an Affidavit of Waiver whereby he renounced and waived all his rights and
interests over the LOT, together with another parcel of lot covered by Tax Declaration No.
8. Thus, the late TIM MARWOOD formally handed over full possession of the LOT
9. Sometime in 1980, upon his return from Russia, the movant found the LOT idle
and unused during his absence so he had coconut trees planted thereon. To date, the same
10. To date, the movant has actual and constructive possession of the LOT and is the
11. Sometime, in early 2000, herein movant learned that the Plaintiff herein, CALVIN
MARWOOD, is seeking the issuance of Free Patent Title over the LOT before the
12. He also found, at about the same time, that the Defendant RYAN FISCHER is
likewise seeking title over the LOT, in his capacity as transferee thereof, before the DENR.
13. In light of the foregoing, herein movant filed a Protest-opposition to the all the
aforesaid application for Free patent Title before the Community Environment and Natural
Linndonn, the investigator-on-case, on the aforesaid cases, the dispositive portion of which
reads thus:
16. To date, the aforesaid Free-Patent Application Cases are still pending resolution
by the Office of the Secretary, Department of the Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) at its main office in Manila. This is by virtue of the fact that the recommendations
made by then Land Investigator Frank Linndonn have been forwarded thereto for review.
17. In light of the foregoing, it is manifest that herein movant, SEBASTIAN CAINE,
has a very significant legal interest over the LOT subject of the instant litigation and is so
18. On the other hand, the late MARIAN and TIM MARWOOD died without issue.
19. During their lifetime, they never legally adopted a child, including CALVIN
MARWOOD—a fact expressly admitted by the latter in a sworn statement that she freely
executed.
20. Such being the case, the Defendant CALVIN MARWOOD could never legally
convey ownership over the LOT, in whatever manner, to her co-Plaintiff ERIC DAMPIER
21. Thus, it is most respectfully prayed that movant SEBASTIAN CAINE be allowed
to intervene in the instant case in accordance with Rule 19 of the Rules of Court so that he
would not be prejudiced by the surreptitious filing of the instant case and so that he could
assert his claim against the parties herein as set forth in the attached COMPLAINT.
PRAYER
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court so that he could assert his claim against the parties
herein; and
By:
MACK TAYLOR
Roll No. 010102
IBP NO. NY32432; 02/02/04; CA
PTR No. NY1234567; 0/02/04 CA
NOTICE OF HEARING
CALVIN MARWOOD
Plaintiff
New York, New York
ERIC DAMPIER
Plaintiff
Salt Lake City, Utah
NATALIE IMBRUGLIA
RYAN FISCHER
Chicago, Illinois
Please take notice that the undersigned will submit the foregoing motion for the
consideration of the Honorable Court on Friday, 16 December 2004 at 10:00 am.
MACK TAYLOR
CALVIN MARWOOD
Plaintiff
New York, New York
ERIC DAMPIER
Plaintiff
Salt Lake City, Utah
NATALIE IMBRUGLIA
RYAN FISCHER
Chicago, Illinois
Copies of this motion could not be served upon the counsels for the original to the instant
case as the Firm momentarily lacks available personnel to do so and due to the distance involved.
MACK TAYLOR
___________________________,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. ___________
-versus-
___________________________,
Defendant,
___________________________,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------x
2. That Peter Bato has filed a case for collection against the herein defendant and
they have executed a compromise agreement to settle the said obligations in this manner; (1)
P10,000 which will be due and payable on or before December 25, 2006; (2) P5,000 due and
payable on or before January 30, 2007; (3) P5,000 which will be due and payable on or
before March 17, 2007;
3. That he has a legal and demandable claim against the herein plaintiff which is
seriously overdue;
4. That in order to ensure that the herein he will be able to collect the same and able
to pay his laborer’s, it seeks leave of this Honorable Court to intervene in this case, and have
its claim to be registered and treated as a lien to whatever amount of money to be paid by
herein defendant to the plaintiff, to the extent of P2,000.00 plus corresponding interest
equivalent to 5% interest per annum until it is fully paid.
Plaintiff/Affiant
Assistant Prosecutor
__________________________,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. _____________
-versus-
__________________________,
Defendant,
__________________________,
Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------x
COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION
COMES NOW INTERVENOR, through counsel, and with prior leave of this Honorable
Court in this case, most respectfully states:
2. That the herein intervenor is the contractor of Peter Bato’s Building located at
_______________, and until now, the latter has till outstanding overdue account to
him in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00), a substantial amount of
which shall be used to pay laborer’s wages;
3. That Peter Bato has filed a case for collection against the herein defendant and they
have executed a compromise agreement to settle the said obligations in this manner;
(1) P10,000 which will be due and payable on or before December 25, 2006; (2)
P5,000 due and payable on or before January 30, 2007; (3) P5,000 which will be due
and payable on or before March 17, 2007;
4. That he has a legal and demandable claim against the herein plaintiff which is
seriously overdue;
5. That in order to ensure that the herein he will be able to collect the same and able to
pay his laborer’s, it seeks leave of this Honorable Court to intervene in this case, and
have its claim to be registered and treated as a lien to whatever amount of money to
be paid by herein defendant to the plaintiff, to the extent of P2,000.00 plus
corresponding interest equivalent to 5% interest per annum until it is fully paid.
Plaintiff/Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ____ day of July 2009 at Biñan,
Laguna.
Assistant Prosecutor
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 64, MAKATI CITY
COME NOW< the defendants, AMADO IGNACIO and PEDRO IGNACIO, through the
counsel, most respectfully allege:
2. Plaintiff acted through its employee/agent ROBERT ORTEGA who delivered the
aforesaid stocks and who also collected some of the considerations of the sale but did
not remit the proceeds thereof to defendant AMADO IGNACIO and to the plaintiff;
3. ROBERT ORTEGA has not been made a party to this action. Although defendants are
entitled to indemnity and/or subrogation against him, in respect to plaintiff’s claim.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, defendants move for leave, as 3rd party plaintiff, to file complaint against
ROBERT ORTEGA as 3rd party defendant. Other reliefs deemed just and equitable under the
circumstances are also prayed for.
By:
OLIVER C. RAMIREZ
Counsel
NOTIFICATION
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 3rd PARTY COMPLAINT
for the consideration and approval of the Honorable Presiding Judge, RTC, NCJR, Branch 64,
Makati City preferably on February 26, 2003 at 2:00 o’clock in the p.m. or immediately upon
receipt without further oral arguments.
OLIVER C. RAMIREZ
Counsel
Copy Furnished:
EXPLANATION
Copy of the foregoing Motion was furnished adverse counsel by registered mail due to
lack of manpower to effect personal service.
OLIVER C. RAMIREZ
Counsel
ATHENA P. HERNANDEZ
Plaintiff,
-versus-
-versus-
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
COME NOW, the Third Party Plaintiffs, by the undersigned counsel and unto this
Honorable Court, respectfully alleges that:
WHEREFORE, Lloyd M. Zaragosa and Philtranco demand judgment against third party
defendants Greyhound Bus Co. and a certain John Godinez, driver of said bus that figure
in the accident for all sums that may be adjudged against defendants Zaragosa and
Philtranco in favour of plaintiff, Athena Hernandez.
March 3, 2005.
VERIFICATION
We, LLOYD M. Zaragosa, of legal age, Filipino, married and with residence address at
34 Rose Street, Uptown Village, Cainta, Rizal and JESSICA SANCHEZ, Director and Board
Secretary of the Third Party plaintiff corporation with principal office at Stardust Building, Pasay
City, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and say that:
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and affixed our signatures on
March 3, 2005 at Pasay City.
WE, LLOYD M. ZARAGOSA and JESSICA SANCHEZ, under oath, hereby certify that:
1. I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or agency;
2. No such action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before any court, tribunal
or agency. I hereby undertake notify his Honorable Court within 5 days from such
knowledge.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 4th day of March, 2005 at Quezon City,
affiants exhibiting to me their CTC Nos. 123456 and 678910 both issued on January 5, 2005 at
Cainta, Rizal.
GEORGE B. ESTREGAN
NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 2005
PTR 123456
IBP 678910
Doc No. 11
Page No. 55
Book No. 6
Series of 2005.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Department of Justice
OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
Quezon City
_______________________________,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. ___________
-versus-
_______________________________,
Defendant
x------------------------------------------------------------x
_______________________________,
Third Party Plaintiff,
-versus-
_______________________________,
Third Party Defendant,
x------------------------------------------------------------x
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF, through counsel, and with prior leave of this Honorable
Court to file this Third Party Complaint, most respectfully states:
2. That Ray Langit, plaintiff in Civil Case No. __________________ pending before
this Honorable Court, file complaint against the third party plaintiff, and copy of said
complaint is herewith attached and marked as Annex “A” made integral part hereof.
3. That the 1,000 bags of cement referred to in plaintiff’s complaint was actually
purchased by Rosanna Roces, the owner of the house in 18 Timoteo Cruz, Bf Homes,
Parañaque City, and to whom the same were intended to be delivered and who
actually used the said cement, not the herein third party plaintiff who is merely the
engineer who is managing the construction of the said house and who was requested
to sign the receipt.
4. That the letter of Rosanna Roces (who is on prolonged stay in California due to
lingering illness) acknowledging her liability to pay the said 1,000 of cement is
herewith attached as Annex ‘A” and made an integral part hereof.
Plaintiff/Affiant
Republic of the Philippines
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Fourth Judicial Region
Branch 85
Lipa City
-versus-
ROSEMARIE A. DORANGO,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Defendants, by undersigned counsel, unto the Honorable Court, most respectfully avers that;
1. Defendants earlier filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer seeking an
extension of fifteen (15) days from July 30, 2006 within which to file their Answer to the
above entitled case.
2. The services of the undersigned counsel has just been hired today by the defendants and
it is quite impossible for him, given the limited time of three days from today, to draft and
finalize the Answer for the defendants.
3. Due to time constraints, defendants need an extension, at least, of thirty (30) days from
August 14, 2006 to September 14, 2006 in order for them to file an intelligent Answer or
responsive pleading.
WHEREFORE, for reasons above indicated and in interest of justice and due process,
defendants respectfully prayed the Honorable Court for an extension of thirty (30) days
from August 14, 2006 within which to file their Answer or responsive pleading to the
complaint of the plaintiff.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.
VICTORIA QUIRANTE
PRT # 0577210 / 01-02-08 / Lipa City
IBO # 65347 / 01-03-08 / Batangas City
ROLL No. 43990
Copy furnished:
Atty. Francisco Balderra
Coubsel for the Plaintiff
2/F JR Business Complex
Ayala Highway, Mataas na Lupa
Lipa City
NOTICE / REQUEST / EXPLANATION
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing non-litigated motion to the Honorable Court for its consideration
and approval on August 18, 2006 at 8:30 AM or immediately upon receipt hereof sans further
argument and undersigned counsel is waiving his appearance on such date. The foregoing motion
was served by registered mail due to distance and lack of messengerial staff.
Victoria Quirante
-versus-
DEFENDANT states:
1. That the present action is for the recovery of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00)
as compensation for alleged professional services rendered by the plaintiff, as surgeon, to
the children of the herein defendant.
2. That the nature and extent of said professional services are not averred with sufficient
definiteness or particularity to enable said defendant to properly prepare his answer, since
he has three children, who have availed of his services.
WHEREFORE, the defendant prays that the plaintiff be ordered to set out the names of the
children of the defendant treated by said plaintiff, the nature and dates of such treatment, and the
charges corresponding to each.
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing motion to the Honorable Court or its kind
Consideration and approvable immediately upon receipt hereof.
ARTURO T. MORADA,
Plaintiff,
- versus –
-
Defendants,
x---------------------------------------------x
1. Based on the Complaint, Answer with Counterclaim, and result of the pre-trial, the main issue
apparently involved here is: Whether the Deed of Sale allegedly executed on April 29, 1992 by the late
Maria Templo-Morada (3/4 owner of the 328-square-meter land involved, who died on December 26,
1989) is void, for being a falsified document and thus, for lack of consent to the deed of sale.
2. Plaintiff claims that the subject deed of sale is void, because his mother, Maria T. Morada,
could not have possibly executed it on April 29, 1992 as she already died on December 26, 1989.
3. Defendants argue that all the essential requisites of a contract (consent and capacity of the
contracting parties, and object and cause of the contract) are present, and the deed of sale was executed
in accordance with the formalities and solemnities required by law. (Paragraphs 23 and 24, Answer with
Counterclaim)
4. Defendants admit that Maria T. Morada died on December 26, 1989.they however, claim as
their defense, that it was sometime in 1989 when she and her co-owners (her children Luz T. Morada,
Celso T. Morada and Imelda Morada-Recinto) decided to sell the subject property to raise money for her
hospitalization expenses, and they executed the deed of sale involved. (Paragraph 11, Answer with
Counterclaim)
5. Plaintiff respectfully submits that the above defense is a sham one, and there is no genuine
factual issue on the falsification of the subject deed of sale, because defendants admit that Maria T.
Morada already died on December 26, 1989—2 years, 4 months and 3 days before the execution of the
deed of sale.
6. In Paragraph 19 of their Answer with Counterclaim, defendants assert that the falsification
case (I.S. No. 05-0197) filed by plaintiff against defendants Cynthia Biaquis-de Dios and Gloria Morada-
Biaquis in the Office of the City of Prosecutor of Lipa City, was dismissed for “lack of probable cause”.
7. But the resolution on the falsification case, as contained in a Report and Recommendation
dated May 16, 2005 (copy hereto attached as Annex “A”), shows that what the City Prosecutor’s Office
found as lacking probable cause is the crime of Estafa. The charge of Falsification of Public Document
was dismissed, not for lack of probable cause but, for having prescribed already.
8. More importantly, and contrary to defendants’ claim or defense, the City Prosecutor’s Office
found that falsification of document was indeed committed. The Report and Recommendation dated
May 16, 2005 (on page 3, 1st and 2nd paragraphs) pertinently read as follows:
9. Truly, the deed of sale is a falsified document. The authors of the falsification caused it to
appear that Maria T. Morada had participated in the execution of the deed on April 29, 1992, when she
did not in fact so participate, as she is dead already. This form of falsification falls under Article 171, No.
10. The deed of sale also contains untruthful statements in the narration of facts,
namely” That Maria T. Morada sold the property on April 29, 1992; that she signed the deed of
sale on that date; and that she appeared before a Notary Public and acknowledged the
execution of the deed. This kind of falsification is covered by Article 171, No. 4, in relation to
11. Because the deed of sale is a falsified document, it is void for lack of consent to the deed of
sale. As held in Tan vs. Mandap (429 SCRA 711 G.R. No. 50925, May 27, 2004):
Xxx Mandap, Sr. did not personally appear before a notary
public. Yet the documents stated the contrary. Such falsity raises
doubt regarding the genuineness of the vendor’s alleged consent to
the deeds of sale.
12. Even assuming, for argument’s sake only, that Maria T. Morada signed the deed of sale in
1989, the sale and the transfer of ownership (including the title to the property) to the buyers are still
void, because the deed of sale which was used as basis for the sale and transfer of ownership s a void
13. Further, defendants are already estopped in either asserting that the deed of sale is valid, or
in claiming that the deed of sale was actually signed by Maria T. Morada in 1989 (when she was still
alive).
14. By claiming that the deed of sale was signed by Maria T. Morada in 19809, defendants are
barred by estoppel from claiming that the deed of sale is valid, because the deed was purportedly
executed on Apr9l 29, 1992 – when she is dead already. And by claiming that the deed was executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law, they are also estopped from asserting that it was signed
in 1989, as the deed cannot be considered valid if it was signed in 1989, but falsely made it appear to
proof that their defenses are sham. And rule on estoppel bars them from making these claims.
18. There is also no genuine factual issue on the subsequent donation of the subject property
made by the buyers (defendants-spouses Jesus De Dios and Cynthia Biaquis-De Dios) in favor of
19. Since the purported sale and transfer of ownership of the subject property to defendants-
spouses Jesus and Cynthia De Dios are void for having been made through a falsified deed of sale, the
donation they made to spouses Gerardo and Glora Biaguis and the transfer of ownership and title to the
20. The reason is: As spouses Jesus and Cynthia De Dios had no valid title or ownership over the
subject property, spouses Gerardo and Gloria Biaquis (as donees) did not acquire any valid title or
ownership over it, for the latter merely stepped into the shoes of the former.
On the third issue, petitioners argue that since the sale of subject
properties by ‘Mandap, Sr. to the Basquez spouses is valid, it follows’ that the
subsequent sale of the property by the latter to petitioners is also valid. But
this contention cannot be sustained, since we find that based on the evidence
on record, the sale in favor of the Vasquez spouses is void. Hence, it follows
that the sale to petitioners is also void, because petitioners merely stepped
into the shoes of the Vasquez spouses. Since the Vasquezes as sellers had no
valid title over the parcel of land they sold, petitioners as buyers thereof could
not claim that the contact of sale is valid.
22. Further, defendants’ defenses of latches and prescription are also not genuine. Plaintiff’s
action for declaration of nullity of the sale and donation involved is based on a falsified deed of sale that
is void. Hence, such action is imprescriptible. Article 1410 of the Civil Code provides that:
23. Defendants’ claim that the action prescribes in four (4) years, is clearly baseless. The 4-year
prescriptive period refers to or is applicable to a contract that is voidable on the ground of incapacity of a
party to give consent to a contract, or where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud. (Articles 1390 and 1391, Civil Code). Here, the deed of sale is void for lack of
24. Defendants also cite the law on torrens title, claiming that the action to assail the validity of
the title issued to spouses Gerardo and Gloria Biaquis (donees) prescribed in one (1) year, as a petition
for review of the decree of registration can be availed of within 1 year from the entry of the decree and
25. Defendants are referring to Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529. But this provision or law is
inapplicable here, because it refers to original registration of property wherein a decree of registration
would be issued. This case does not involve titling of property, but the nullity of transfer of ownership
26. Considering that the defenses raised are sham and clearly baseless, and that there is no
need for trial on the alleged factual issues involved, the Honorable Court may validly render a summary
PRAYER
rendered as follows:
(a) Holding that defendants’ defenses – that the deed of sale dated April 29, 1992 and deed
of donation dated January 28, 1997 are valid, and that the action is barred by prescription
(c) Declaring the subject deed of sale, deed of donation, and spouses Gerardo and Gloria
void.
Plaintiff also prays for other or further measures of relief that the Honorable Court may find just,
proper or equitable in the premises, consistent with the summary judgment that may be rendered in this
case.
By :
NITA V. CRUZ
Plaintiff,
VICENTE S. ROSARIO
Defendants.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ANSWER
COMES NOW, the defendant, through the undersigned counsel and in answer plaintiff’s
complaint, in the above-entitled case, respectfully prays:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of March, 2002 at Pasay City,
affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate No. 7761373 issued on January 12, 2002
at Pasay City.
GEORGE B. ESTREGAN
NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 2005
PTR 123456
IBP 678910
Juan Matibay
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 19301
-versus-
Kitz Lozada
Defendant.
x-------------------------------x
ANSWER
COMES NOW, the defendant Kitz Lozada, by and through the undersigned counsel, answering
plaintiff’s complaint alleges that:
3. Defendant admits the allegation in paragraph 6 of the complaint to the effect that he is
the true owner of Toyota Revo with the Plate No. ABC 123 but denies the rests of the
allegations under the influence of liquor.
Pasig City, Philippines, 28 January, 1999.
KITZ LOZADA
Defendant/Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 28th day of January, 1999 at Pasig City,
affiant exhibiting to me he CTC No. 123456 issued on January 2, 1999 at Makati City.
George Balbar
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 20010
PTR:
IBP:
Juan Matibay
Plaintiff,
-versus-
x------------------------------x
Comes now, the defendant Kitz Lozada, by and through the undersigned counsel,
answering plaintiff’s complaint alleges that:
2. Defendant admits paragraph 3, to the effect that he denies responsibility over the
purchased goods, and as
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1. Based on the foregoing affirmative allegations, the Promissory Note signed by the
defendants, unaccompanied by the requisite Disclosure statement, is no force and
effect
2. Moreover, since the sighing thereof was attended with fraud, duress, intimidation,
threat and undue influence, the same is void from its inception.
3. Furthermore, since the terms and conditions contained therein, particularly with
respect to the rates of interest, attorney’s fees, liquidated damages and penalties are
all shocking to the conscience and are wantonly against public policy.
4. That since the penalties and liquidated damages are iniquitous and unconscionable,
the courts, under the circumstances, can reduce the penalties and liquidated damages,
pursuant to Articles 1229 and 2227 of the Civil Code, which provision state:
5. Base on all foregoing, the plaintiff clearly has no cause of action against the
defendants.
PRAYER
3. Any other reliefs through Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under the
foregoing premises.
Manuel Morato
Counsel for defendant
21 Meralco Ave.
Pasig City
PTR:
IBP:
Verification/Certification
1. Kitz Lozada, Filipino, of legal age and address at 71 Shaw Blvd. Pasig City, After
having been duly sworn to law, depose and say
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 28 th day of January 1999 Pasig
City, Philippines.
Kitz Lozada
Defendant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28 th day of January 1999, Pasig City,
defendant having exhibited to me he CTC 123456 issued on January 2, 1999 at Makati City.
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 2010
Doc No.:
Page No.:
Book No.:
Series of 2010:
Copy furnished:
Juan Matibay
Plaintiff,
No. 09301
Kitz Lozada and / or Mar de Leon
Defendants.
x________________________________x
Comes now, the defendant Kitz Lozada by and through the undersigned counsel
answering plaintiff complaint alleges that:
2. Defendants admits paragraph 3 to the effect that he denies responsibility over the
purchased goods and as
4. Defendants Mar de Leon was indeed the principal of therein defendant Kitz Lozada
because he was the foreman of the engaged in the construction of the house of the said
principal;
5. As the foreman whatever purchases he made needed for the construction of the house
were to be charged to his principal, Mar de Leon.
COUNTERCLAIM
6. Because of the suit filed against herein defendant, he was constrained to hire the services
of the undersigned of the counsel in the amount of P 70,000 as attorney’s fees;
7. As a result of this suit, he has spent many sleepless nights which rendered him to be ill
and from his work losing an aggregate amount P 80,000 as income for the past 2 months.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28 th day of January 1999, Pasig City
defendant having exhibited to me he CTC 123456 issued on January 2, 2009 at Makati City.
George Balbar
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 1970
PTR:
IBP:
Doc. No:
Page No.:
Book No.:
Series of 1970.:
Copy furnished:
-versus-
Civil Case No.
19300
Alfredo de Guzman Et al
Defendant.
x___________________x
COMES NOW, Defendants Rex Angel, by and through his undersigned counsel and to this
Honorable Court respectfully states:
2. That he denies paragraph 2 of the complaint, the truth being that it was defendant de
Guzman who applied for and exclusively benefited from the loan with the plaintiff,
answering defendant acting as mere consignor in the promissory note to accommodate
defendant de Guzman and to guarantee the loan;
3. That he lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations contained in paragraph 3,4,5 and 6 of the complaint and therefore, specially
denies the same;
5. That without the knowledge and consent of answering defendant, the principal condition
of the loan was changed and the term of payment thereof was unreasonably extended by
the plaintiff; to the prejudice of the answering defendant.
6. That the allegations in paragraph 1 to 6 of the answer are hereby reproduced and
reiterated;
7. That the filing of the malicious and ground less action by the plaintiff against defendant
has caused the latter mental anguish, serious anxiety and embarrassment and has
besmirched reputation for which, serious anxiety and embarrassment and has besmirched
reputation for which he should be compensated by way of moral damages the amount of
which he should be compensated by way of moral damages the amount of which, though
not capable of pecuniary estimation would not be less than P 5,000.00.
And for his crossclaim against his co-defendant answering defendant further alleges;
8. That he hereby repleads reiterates and reproduces all the material allegations in the
foregoing answer with special / affirmative defenses and in the counterclaim;
9. That defendant de Guzman should reimburse answering defendant on may amount the
matter maybe held answerable or which he may be ordered or suffered to pay under and
by virtue of the present action in favor of plaintiff, answering defendant not having
benefited whatsoever from the loan which defendant de Guzman obtained from plaintiff.
By ordering plaintiff to pay answering defendant moral damages amounting to not less than P
5000 plus exemplary as the Honorable Court may find reasonable plus attorney’s fees of P
500 and the costs of suit;
Answering defendant prays for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable
in the premises.
Manuel Morato
Counsel for defendant
21 Epifanio Delos Santos Ave.
Makati
PTR:
IBP:
Verification / Certifications
I Rex Angel, Filipino of legal age and address at B 71, Lot 86, Lagro, Quezon City, after
having been duly sworn to law depose and say
Witness whereof, I hereunto set my hand this 20 th day of August 1970 at Makati,
Philippines.
Rex Angel
Defendant-Counter
Claimant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10th day of August at Makati City
defendant Counter-Claimaint having exhibited to me he CTC 123456 issued on July 25, 1970 at
Makati City.
George Balbar
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 1970
PTR:
IBP:
Doc. No.:
Page No.:
Book No.:
Series of 1970:
Copy furnished
-versus-
Civil Case No. 19300
Alfredo de Guzman, Et Al
Defendant.
x____________________x
COMES NOW, Defendant Rex Angel, by and through his undersigned counsel, and to
this Honorable Court respectfully states:
2. That he denies paragraph 2 of the complaint, the truth being that it was defendant de
Guzman who applied for and exclusively benefited from the loan with the plaintiff,
answering defendant acting as mere consignor in the promissory note to accommodate
defendant de Guzman and to guarantee the loan;
3. That he lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 3,4,5 and 6 of the complaint and
therefore, specifically denies the same;
4. That the allegations in paragraph 1 to 6 of the answer are hereby reproduced and
reiterated;
5. That the filing of the malicious and ground less action by the plaintiff answering
defendant has caused the latter mental anguish serious anxiety and embarrassment and
has besmirched he should be compensated by way of moral damages the amount of
which, though not capable of pecuniary estimation would not less than P5,000.00.
Answering defendant prays for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable
in the premises.
Manuel Morato
Counsel for defendant
21 Epifanio Delos Santos Ave.
Makati
PTR:
IBP:
Verification / Certification
I Rex Angel, Filipino of legal age and address at B 71, Lot 86, Lagro Quezon City, after
having been duly sworn to law, depose and say.
Rex Angel
Defendant-Counter
Claimant
George Balbar
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 1970
PTR:
IBP:
Doc.No.:
Page No.:
Book No.:
Series of 1970:
Copy furnished:
ARIES S. DE LEON
Petitioner,
LORENE V. BUNDANG
Respondent.
x_____________________________x
submits the following Pre-Trial Brief in compliance with the order of the
Respondent’s life has no direction and has no ambition for better future for
them. Even when after respondent gave birth to a baby boy and has become strong
enough to do and perform some household chores, as well as the usual duties of a
mother, respondent has become too much dependent on petitioner. Petitioner even
had to wash their used clothes and change the baby’s diaper at dawn despite the
fact that respondent knows very well that he (petitioner) still had to go to work for
As time goes by, Petitioner’s marriage with Respondent started to wane. The
Aggravated by the fact that Respondent even refused to come along with Petitioner
in attending the activities of the Medical Society even as she was herself invited to
attend. This was the beginning of their frequent arguments and consequently serious
quarrels. They quarreled a lot, so to speak, and petitioner had surmised that no
Sometime in June 2000, Respondent left their home and stayed with her
parents, leaving their only child (a son) with the Petitioner, and up to the present she
has not returned home. The child who is now more than three (3) years old has
remained under the care and custody of the Petitioner. And under the foregoing
kind of life would he have with a wife so irresponsible, without foresight or thoughtful
personal properties considering the perplexing situations of their marriage and to the
2. Sometime parents, leaving their only child with the Petitioner, and up
to the present she has not returned home. The child who is now more than three (3)
years old has remained under the care and custody of Petitioner.
D. Statement of Issue
Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void by reason of
F. Witness
of the respondent.
G. Trial Dates
Respectfully submitted
ALVIN G. MARASIGAN,
Plaintiff,
ROSEMARIE B. SANTOS,
Defendant.
x---------------------------------------x
POSITION PAPER
Defendant Rosemarie Santos through the undersigned counsel respectfully submits the
This action for annulment filed by plaintiff Alvin Marasigan for his marriage with defendant
Rosemarie B. Reyes on April 19, 2005 was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 100 on the
following grounds:
1. Fraud on account of the defendant’s pregnancy with a child not of the plaintiff’s.
The plaintiff also prays for support and moral damages on account of the foregoing allegations.
eighteen (18) years old when she married herein plaintiff Alvin Marasigan who was then twenty (20)
years old and was about to enter the law school. The ceremony was held on April 19, 2005 at the Manila
a class party where everyone was having the most of the night. After a few exchange of conversations
while getting drunk amidst a loud environment, they drove to a motel and spent the night together. That
Defendant Santos found out her pregnancy a month before her graduation at the St. Paul’s
University – Manila as a Broadcast Journalism student. EXHIBIT A is the original copy of the pregnancy
test done by Dr. Erlinda Colayco, an OB-Gyne of Delos Santos Hospital, on the defendant stating that as
of March 20, 2005, the defendant is carrying a four-week old baby in her womb. The plaintiff however
In a cross examination with the plaintiff, (TSN, July 20, 2007, p. 16), he alleged that on February
22, 2005, he was approached by two bodyguards of the defendant’s father, Atty. Felipe Santos,
accordingly informing him of the ‘misfortune’ that he would be in should he not marry the defendant. A
revolver was accordingly shown to him when the bodyguards sensed his hesitation. Two days after the
incident, the plaintiff allegedly approached personally the defendant’s father invoking his incapability to
enter into marriage. However, Atty. Santos accordingly told him to ‘expect to die’. The defendant denies
the accusations stating that her father, who is a church pastor, could not do such a ‘horrible’ act. Further,
Santos maintains that neither did her father intervene in her personal choices including her personal life.
The defendant added that her father only knew of Marasigan when both of them already decided to get
married, abandoning the contention that Atty. Santos forced Marasigan to marry her.
Moreover, the plaintiff contends that he failed to obtain his parent’s consent when he married
defendant Santos as they were in the United States. Due to the fraud referred to in the preceding
paragraph, the plaintiff was forced to seek help from an elderly couple by the name of Claudio Gunda
and Rosita Ramirez-Gunda who operate a gotohan near his residence to pretend to be his parents thus
making it appear that their marriage was valid. The court has established the correctness of the
accusation through the examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the thumb
mark made by the couple on the subject marriage contract compared to that of thumb marks of the real
parents of plaintiff Marasigan (EXHIBIT D). The court no longer required the couple to testify in court as
ISSUES
The court defined the following issues which the defendant prays to result in the annulment of
1. Fraud on account of the defendant’s pregnancy with a child not of the plaintiff’s.
2. The plaintiff’s consent having been obtained by force, intimidation and undue influence.
ARGUMENTS
The court has established the fact that defendant Santos was known in the same university for
her playfulness with her male buddies. The university’s Guidance Counselor has testified the numerous
instances when the defendant’s attention was called due to her alleged obvious misconduct of
consistently going out with various male acquaintances as complained by the latter’s respective
girlfriends (TSN, July 13, 2007, p.4). Said accusation was not denied by defendant Santos.
Defendant Santos also admitted in court that in her past experiences, some has already
confronted her affront regarding her playful deeds. In fact, defendant Santos also admits the truthfulness
of the plaintiff’s allegation that they were not even lovers when they first had sex. However, it has to be
pointed out that during the cross examination with the plaintiff by the undersigned, the former admitted
that he already knew Santos by name and he has already heard so much about her playful reputation.
ATTY. QUIRANTE:
Q Do you know Rosemarie Santos even before you met in the class party?
A No.
A She looked beautiful that night. When I got the chance of getting near her, I immediately
did.
Q So you were attracted to her. Did you have the hint that she would not decline your
conversation with her?
A Yes.
Q Did you not have any boy talk with your friends regarding Rosemarie?
It had long been held in Carris v. Carris, 24 N.J. Eq. 516 that where a man has had sexual
intercourse with his wife before the marriage, and she is pregnant at the time of marriage, although he
may not be the author of the pregnancy, the marriage will not be annulled. It is only but proper to
abandon the defense of fraud on the regard both the husband and the wife were parties to premarital
immortality. Clearly, the issue of paternity over the couple’s child is not up to resolve the allegation of
fraud as cited in Art. 46, Family Code. Whether or not the child is that of Alvin Marsigan could not be a
valid ground to annul his marriage with herein defendant. The defendant however insists the paternity
of Marasigan. Nonetheless, the petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove his denial on his paternity over
the child for not presenting a more technical, accurate and reliable evidence despite the wide array of
II
Plaintiff Marasigan alleged that if it were not for the force and intimidation applied to him
compelling him to marry Rosemarie Santos, the marriage would not have occurred. This issue is clearly
of no moment because the petitioner dismally proved with sufficient bases that indeed he was forced or
Marasigan brought to the court Allan Colandog, his friend who was accordingly with him when
the guards approached him and as witness Colandog put it, “forced” him to marry Rosemarie. Further,
Colandog testified that the guards showed Marasigan their respective revolvers when the latter
manifested his refusal to the marriage. Marasigan was too affected, avers Colandog, that he shivered in
fear when the guards disappeared. He further recapped that Marasigan got affected to the point that he
missed one of his series of interviews at the University of Santo Tomas as an applicant for admission at
the University of Santo Tomas Faculty of Civil Law (TSN, July 13, 2007, p. 17).
The defendant, despite his denial to the aforementioned facts, first chose not to present any
further evidence to contradict the allegations that have affected her family to the point of separating
herself voluntarily under the guardianship of her parents by living alone in a condominium unit in
Quezon City. Santos was evidently too emotional in her cross examination.
Rosemarie Santos on cross-examination (id, at p. 24).
ATTY AFABLE
A No
Q Then what can you say about the petitioner’s allegation that he was forced and
A I’m so tired of his allegations. These things destroyed my family that I no longer know
how to restore our broken ties. Go on, tell this court every single lie and I will not negate
Q Calm down Ms. Santos. So you are not presenting any evidence to contradict the
allegations?
A No.
Vitiated consent by force and intimidation is a valid ground for annulment as stated in Art. 45,
Family Code. The present family code limits the cases which would constitute fraud sufficient for
However, the petitioner failed to prove in this court the existence of such force and intimidation
when he failed to negate the single evidence that herein defendant later presented. EXHIBIT G and E
submitting Atty. Santos’ passport and Certificate of Appearance respectively, indicating that he was in a
business conference at Istanbul, Turkey on February 19 to 25, 2005, making it impossible for him to meet
the petitioner on February 22, 2005. Marasigan also failed to establish the viability of his allegation that
the guards showed him their guns when the said guards were on leave due to their employer’s absence
Given that these allegations are true, the most that the court can discern over the actions of the
plaintiff prior to the marriage is his reluctance to the marriage. In which case, as interestingly held in
Vales v. Villa, 35 Phil 789 that there must, then, be a distinction to be made between a case where a
person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where he, in
reality, gives no consent at all, as where he executes a contract or performs an act against his will under
a pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of
the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally
speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as
when he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law.
Very clearly, the petitioner is just shopping for grounds to annul his marriage with the plaintiff.
III
Article 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one,
such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and
wife; (emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
True enough, the petitioner was above 18 but below 21 during the marriage. The court very well
established that the petitioner seek help from the Gunda couple for the consummation of the marriage
ceremony. The defendant herself knew that the Gunda couple was not Marasigan’s parents because she
knew that the former’s parents have been in the United States for so long and that they cared so much
for Alvin that they would not miss their son’s marriage without first knowing her would-be wife. The
defendant is definitely of the same stand that they were both not in legal age when they contracted the
The issue now turns out to be whether they were still cohabiting at the time when Alvin turned
21, in squaring off with the qualification in paragraph 1 of Art. 45, Family Code.
As the defense easily established, the couple were still cohabiting as the plaintiff told the court.
ATTY QUIRANTE
Q By the way Alvin, when did Rosemarie live your home to live alone in a condominium?
A Well we lived in the same house but we were not at peace with each other.
Marasigan turned 22 on January 1, 2007. At the time of the interrogation he was already 22 and
seven months. Clearly, if Rosemarie left their home a month before said interrogation, they were still
cohabiting when petitioner Marasigan turned 21. Therefore, Art. 45 of the Family Code could not be
This malady has gone through a weary race. Contrary to what the law provides that the husband
and the wife are obliged to live to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code). The
sanction therefore is the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order” to enforce consortium (Tsoi v. Lao-Tsoi, 334 Phil 294, citing Cuaderno v.
At any rate, it is being implored that this journey of diametrically opposed marriage be settled in
its most peaceful way. That what damage this has caused to the emotions of the parties be repaired and
PRAYER
WHEREFORE premises considered, Defendant respectfully prays that plaintiff’s action for
Other relief just and equitable under the premises is also prayed for.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Copy Furnished:
ALVIN G. MARASIGAN,
Plaintiff,
ROSEMARIE B. SANTOS,
Defendant.
x---------------------------------------x
POSITION PAPER
Defendant Rosemarie Santos through the undersigned counsel respectfully submits the
This action for annulment filed by plaintiff Alvin Marasigan for his marriage with defendant
Rosemarie B. Reyes on April 19, 2005 was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 100 on the
following grounds:
4. Fraud on account of the defendant’s pregnancy with a child not of the plaintiff’s.
The plaintiff also prays for support and moral damages on account of the foregoing allegations.
eighteen (18) years old when she married herein plaintiff Alvin Marasigan who was then twenty (20)
years old and was about to enter the law school. The ceremony was held on April 19, 2005 at the Manila
Prior to the said marriage, Santos and Marasigan were not even acquaintances. They first met in
a class party where everyone was having the most of the night. After a few exchange of conversations
while getting drunk amidst a loud environment, they drove to a motel and spent the night together. That
University – Manila as a Broadcast Journalism student. EXHIBIT A is the original copy of the pregnancy
test done by Dr. Erlinda Colayco, an OB-Gyne of Delos Santos Hospital, on the defendant stating that as
of March 20, 2005, the defendant is carrying a four-week old baby in her womb. The plaintiff however
In a cross examination with the plaintiff, (TSN, July 20, 2007, p. 16), he alleged that on February
22, 2005, he was approached by two bodyguards of the defendant’s father, Atty. Felipe Santos,
accordingly informing him of the ‘misfortune’ that he would be in should he not marry the defendant. A
revolver was accordingly shown to him when the bodyguards sensed his hesitation. Two days after the
incident, the plaintiff allegedly approached personally the defendant’s father invoking his incapability to
enter into marriage. However, Atty. Santos accordingly told him to ‘expect to die’. The defendant denies
the accusations stating that her father, who is a church pastor, could not do such a ‘horrible’ act. Further,
Santos maintains that neither did her father intervene in her personal choices including her personal life.
The defendant added that her father only knew of Marasigan when both of them already decided to get
married, abandoning the contention that Atty. Santos forced Marasigan to marry her.
Moreover, the plaintiff contends that he failed to obtain his parent’s consent when he married
defendant Santos as they were in the United States. Due to the fraud referred to in the preceding
paragraph, the plaintiff was forced to seek help from an elderly couple by the name of Claudio Gunda
and Rosita Ramirez-Gunda who operate a gotohan near his residence to pretend to be his parents thus
making it appear that their marriage was valid. The court has established the correctness of the
accusation through the examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the thumb
mark made by the couple on the subject marriage contract compared to that of thumb marks of the real
parents of plaintiff Marasigan (EXHIBIT D). The court no longer required the couple to testify in court as
The court defined the following issues which the defendant prays to result in the annulment of
4. Fraud on account of the defendant’s pregnancy with a child not of the plaintiff’s.
5. The plaintiff’s consent having been obtained by force, intimidation and undue influence.
ARGUMENTS
The court has established the fact that defendant Santos was known in the same university for
her playfulness with her male buddies. The university’s Guidance Counselor has testified the numerous
instances when the defendant’s attention was called due to her alleged obvious misconduct of
consistently going out with various male acquaintances as complained by the latter’s respective
girlfriends (TSN, July 13, 2007, p.4). Said accusation was not denied by defendant Santos.
Defendant Santos also admitted in court that in her past experiences, some has already
confronted her affront regarding her playful deeds. In fact, defendant Santos also admits the truthfulness
of the plaintiff’s allegation that they were not even lovers when they first had sex. However, it has to be
pointed out that during the cross examination with the plaintiff by the undersigned, the former admitted
that he already knew Santos by name and he has already heard so much about her playful reputation.
Alvin Marasigan on direct-examination (TSN, July 20, 2007, p. 10 to 12).
ATTY. QUIRANTE:
Q Do you know Rosemarie Santos even before you met in the class party?
A No.
A She looked beautiful that night. When I got the chance of getting near her, I immediately
did.
Q So you were attracted to her. Did you have the hint that she would not decline your
conversation with her?
A Yes.
Q Did you not have any boy talk with your friends regarding Rosemarie?
It had long been held in Carris v. Carris, 24 N.J. Eq. 516 that where a man has had sexual
intercourse with his wife before the marriage, and she is pregnant at the time of marriage, although he
may not be the author of the pregnancy, the marriage will not be annulled. It is only but proper to
abandon the defense of fraud on the regard both the husband and the wife were parties to premarital
immortality. Clearly, the issue of paternity over the couple’s child is not up to resolve the allegation of
fraud as cited in Art. 46, Family Code. Whether or not the child is that of Alvin Marsigan could not be a
valid ground to annul his marriage with herein defendant. The defendant however insists the paternity
of Marasigan. Nonetheless, the petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove his denial on his paternity over
the child for not presenting a more technical, accurate and reliable evidence despite the wide array of
II
Plaintiff Marasigan alleged that if it were not for the force and intimidation applied to him
compelling him to marry Rosemarie Santos, the marriage would not have occurred. This issue is clearly
of no moment because the petitioner dismally proved with sufficient bases that indeed he was forced or
Marasigan brought to the court Allan Colandog, his friend who was accordingly with him when
the guards approached him and as witness Colandog put it, “forced” him to marry Rosemarie. Further,
Colandog testified that the guards showed Marasigan their respective revolvers when the latter
manifested his refusal to the marriage. Marasigan was too affected, avers Colandog, that he shivered in
fear when the guards disappeared. He further recapped that Marasigan got affected to the point that he
missed one of his series of interviews at the University of Santo Tomas as an applicant for admission at
the University of Santo Tomas Faculty of Civil Law (TSN, July 13, 2007, p. 17).
The defendant, despite his denial to the aforementioned facts, first chose not to present any
further evidence to contradict the allegations that have affected her family to the point of separating
herself voluntarily under the guardianship of her parents by living alone in a condominium unit in
Quezon City. Santos was evidently too emotional in her cross examination.
A No
Q Then what can you say about the petitioner’s allegation that he was forced and
A I’m so tired of his allegations. These things destroyed my family that I no longer know
how to restore our broken ties. Go on, tell this court every single lie and I will not negate
Q Calm down Ms. Santos. So you are not presenting any evidence to contradict the
allegations?
A No.
Vitiated consent by force and intimidation is a valid ground for annulment as stated in Art. 45,
Family Code. The present family code limits the cases which would constitute fraud sufficient for
However, the petitioner failed to prove in this court the existence of such force and intimidation
when he failed to negate the single evidence that herein defendant later presented. EXHIBIT G and E
submitting Atty. Santos’ passport and Certificate of Appearance respectively, indicating that he was in a
business conference at Istanbul, Turkey on February 19 to 25, 2005, making it impossible for him to meet
the petitioner on February 22, 2005. Marasigan also failed to establish the viability of his allegation that
the guards showed him their guns when the said guards were on leave due to their employer’s absence
plaintiff prior to the marriage is his reluctance to the marriage. In which case, as interestingly held in
Vales v. Villa, 35 Phil 789 that there must, then, be a distinction to be made between a case where a
person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where he, in
reality, gives no consent at all, as where he executes a contract or performs an act against his will under
a pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of
the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally
speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as
when he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law.
Very clearly, the petitioner is just shopping for grounds to annul his marriage with the plaintiff.
III
Article 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one,
such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and
wife; (emphasis supplied).
established that the petitioner seek help from the Gunda couple for the consummation of the marriage
ceremony. The defendant herself knew that the Gunda couple was not Marasigan’s parents because she
knew that the former’s parents have been in the United States for so long and that they cared so much
for Alvin that they would not miss their son’s marriage without first knowing her would-be wife. The
defendant is definitely of the same stand that they were both not in legal age when they contracted the
The issue now turns out to be whether they were still cohabiting at the time when Alvin turned
21, in squaring off with the qualification in paragraph 1 of Art. 45, Family Code.
As the defense easily established, the couple were still cohabiting as the plaintiff told the court.
ATTY QUIRANTE
Q By the way Alvin, when did Rosemarie live your home to live alone in a condominium?
A Well we lived in the same house but we were not at peace with each other.
Marasigan turned 22 on January 1, 2007. At the time of the interrogation he was already 22 and
seven months. Clearly, if Rosemarie left their home a month before said interrogation, they were still
cohabiting when petitioner Marasigan turned 21. Therefore, Art. 45 of the Family Code could not be
This malady has gone through a weary race. Contrary to what the law provides that the husband
and the wife are obliged to live to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code). The
sanction therefore is the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order” to enforce consortium (Tsoi v. Lao-Tsoi, 334 Phil 294, citing Cuaderno v.
At any rate, it is being implored that this journey of diametrically opposed marriage be settled in
its most peaceful way. That what damage this has caused to the emotions of the parties be repaired and
PRAYER
WHEREFORE premises considered, Defendant respectfully prays that plaintiff’s action for
Other relief just and equitable under the premises is also prayed for.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Copy Furnished:
-versus-
NOW COMES the plaintiff in the above entitled case, moves for a rule on the defendant, 324
Contractors, Inc., to answer under oath the following interrogatories:
1. Did 324 Corporation prior to 1st day of October, 2008, enter into a contract with Habaji
Coporation for the servicing, repairing, or inspecting of all or any of the bar fixtures sold
to its customers, any or all parts of which were purchased from the defendant, 324
Contractors, Inc?
3. Was the said contract in force on the 1st day of October, 2008?
4. Did Habaji Corporation at any time prior to the 1st day of October, 2008 purchase from
324 Contractors, Inc any of the bar fixtures with which the restaurant and tavern operated
by Lito Garcia at 336 Camo Street, was equipped prior to the day aforesaid, including a
cooler for the purpose of keeping beef cold and fresh for consumption?
5. Did Habaji Corporation operate its inspection, service and repair department under the
name of the Corporation?
6. What was the relationship, if any, between the aforesaid Habaji Corporation and Huson
Corporation?
7. Did Habaji Corporation by any of its employees, inspect, service, and made repairs on a
certain cooler machine in the tavern aforesaid on the 1st day of October 2008, and at any
other time between that date and the 2nd day of November, 2008?
8. Were Habaji Corporation and Huson Corporation both located at 224 Street on the 2nd day
of November, 2008?
AFFIDAVIT
WILBUR IAN Q. BABULA, being first duly sworn, on oath, deposes and says that he is one of
the attorneys for the plaintiff in the above-entitled cause; that said cause of action arises out of
the escape of certain dangers gases from certain bar fixtures sold to the plaintiff by the defendant,
324 Contractors, Inc.
Affiant is informed and believes that the said bar fictures were inspected, altered, and repairs
attempted to be made by one of the servants and agents of the defendant, Habaji Corporation,
and that said work was done by said Habaji Corporation, by virtue of a certain contract with 324
Corporation; that the said defendant in its answer has denied that it had any such contract with
the defendant, the Habaji Corporation, and that the said fixtures were inspected, altered, or
repaired by its servant or agent, that a same denial has also been made in the answer of the
defendant, Habaji Corporation.
Affiant further says that the evidence required by the answers of the interrogatories herewith
presented, and the list of wsorn documents, are necessary and material in the trial of said cause.
By :
Petitioner,
-versus-
Alejandro Guevarra,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
PETITIONER ROSARIO B. CHAVER, by and through the undersigned counsel, unto this
Honorable Court, most respectfully manifests:
1. That last November 11, 2009, MARIETA GLOBO ECACA, witness for the herein
plaintiff, arrived for a one-month vacation from Qatar where she is currently working;
2. That, her testimony is of utmost importance for the judicial determination of the instant
case.
3. That however, herein witness is constrained, by reason of her work, to go back to Qatar
on December 13, 2007, and, is uncertain as to when departure on December 13, 2009.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honourable Court that
an Order be taken before the Branch Clerk of Court of this Court preferably on December 12,
2009 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
Other relief and remedies, just and equitable in the premises, are likewise prayed for.
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing Motion to the HOnorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof for
its consideration and approval.
JOAN S. GUIAYA
Plaintiff, CIVIL CASE NO. 984353
-versus-
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PLAINTIFF, by counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully moves that judgment on the
pleadings must be directed, on the following grounds;
(1) In his answer to the complaint for a sum of money, the defendant merely alleged that he
had no knowledge and information as to the allegations of the complaint. This kind of
denial, while allowed on certain instances, does not apply when the facts as to which
want of knowledge is asserted are to the knowledge of the court are so plainly and
essentially within the defendant’s knowledge. It amounts to a general denial that would
entitle the plaintiff to judgment on the pleadings.
(2) Moreover, attached to the complaint, as actionable documents is a promissory note
executed by the defendant, to evidence the loan of P1,000,000.00. He did not question its
authenticity under oath. He merely said that he has no knowledge thereof, which is not
sufficient to tender a factual issue and the same impliedly admits the due execution and
authenticity. As to entitle plaintiff on judgment on the pleadings.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that judgment on the pleading be rendered in favour of the
plaintiff, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff as prayed for in the complaint.
Mam:
Please be informed that the undersigned counsel has set the foregoing motion for hearing
on December 5, 2009 at 10am.
DONABEL P. RAMA
Plaintiff,
-versus- CIVIL CASE NO. 954768
FOR: SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE
PILAR B. PILAPIL
Defendant.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
1. The decision in favour of the plaintiff has become final and executor since more than
fifteen (15) days from defendant’s receipt thereof on September 15, 2009 had already
lapsed without a defendant’s appealing therefrom.
2. After a decision has become final, execution is a matter of right on the part of the
prevailing party and ministerial duty of the court to issue writ of execution.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that a writ of execution be issued for the satisfaction of the
judgment date September 30, 2009.
Sir:
Please submit the foregoing for the approval of the Court upon receipt thereof, notice and
hearing not being required.
Service of motion.
Proof of service.
NITA V. CRUZ
Plaintiff,
VINCENT S. CASTRO
Defendants.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
COMES NOW, the petitioner in the above captioned case by and through counsel, and to
this Honorable Court most respectfully states that:
1. On October 21, 2003, this Honorable Court rendered its decision granting the
petitioner’s petition for the issuance of writ of execution;
2. To implement the Decision, this Honorable Court cause the issuance of the writ of
execution dated October 28, 2003;
3. As the date however, the said writ of execution/possession has not been implemented
yet making the same functus officio. Thus necessitating the issuance of an alias writ
of possession for the sheriff to implement the Decision dated October 21, 2003;
4. This motion is filed due to the foregoing reasons only and for the purpose of delaying
the early disposition of this case,
NOTICE OF HEARING
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing motion to the Honorable Court immediately upon receipt
hereof, for its consideration and approval without further oral arguments.
OLIVER C. LOZANO
Counsel
Copy Furnished:
EXPLANATION
The foregoing Motion is being served to the counsel of the defendant by registered mail
instead of personal delivery due to unavailability of personnel to effect personal delivery.
OLIVER C. LOZANO
Counsel
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Regional Office No. 3
Capitol Compound, City of San Fernando 2000, Pampanga
ABAD, EDUARDO P.
Guagua Water District
San Nicolas, Guagua, Pampanga
1. He is entering his appearance for the cause of the General Manager, Eduardo P. Abad of
the Guagua Water District;
2. The order dated November 11, 2009 was received on November 19, 2009 by the office of
the said General Manager directing him to comment within five (5) days from receipt
thereof ending November 24, 2009 why he should not be administratively charged;
3. Due to the preoccupation of the undersigned counsel with other prior commitments of
equal import, he would earnestly seek for time within which to prepare and submit said
comment;
4. The needed time is not intended to delay the soonest administration of justice;
Respectfully submitted
With my conformity: Ex parte:
RIC M. CRUZ
Assisting Counsel
EDUARDO P. ABAD Guagua, Pampanga
General Manager PTR O/R No. 2167795 01-28-2009
IBP O/R No. 75776 01-28-2009
Pampanga Chapter
MCLE Compliance No. III-000529
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
National Capital Judicial Region
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Manila
GINA PARENO
Plaintiff,
-versus- CIVIL Case No.1
x-------------------------------------------------x
DEFENDANT, by the undersigned counsel, and unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully
states that:
1. Defendant engaged the services of undersigned counsel only on November 17, 2009;
2. Defendant was served with Summons and copy of Complaint on November 3, 2009 and
thus has until November 18, 2009 within which to submit an Answer or Responsive
Pleading;
3. However, due to the pressures of equally urgent professional work and prior
commitments, the undersigned counsel would not be able to meet the said decline;
4. As such, undersigned counsel, through an urgent motion for extension of time was
constrained to request for an additional period of five days from November 19, 2009 to
November 24, 2009 within which to submit Defendant’s Answer or Responsive Pleading.
Such motion was granted though a resolution by the court;
5. However, defendant failed to submit the said motion on time for honestly failing to
foresee their inability to prepare and file the intended petition within the reglamentary
period due to prepare due to voluminous and pressing work load on equally important
cases of the undersigned counsel, not to mention his daily court appearances;
6. Moreover, this additional time will also allow the undersigned to interview the available
witness and study this case further;
7. This Second Motion is not intended for delay but solely due to the foregoing reasons.
WHEREFORE, Defendant most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that he be given an
additional period of five days from today within which to submit an answer or other Responsive
Pleading.
Copy furnished:
Atty. Wenceslao Gonzales
Counsel for Complainant
XYZ Bldg. Juan Luna St.
Manila
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
National Capital Judicial Region
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Manila
GINA PARENO
Plaintiff,
-versus- CIVIL Case No. 1
For Sum of money
TITO SOTTO
Defendant.
x--------------------------------------------x
Undersigned counsel, and unto this Honorable Court, mostly respectfully states that:
1. He is the counsel for the Defendant in the above captioned case for sum of money;
2. Defendant engaged the services of undersigned counsel only on November 17, 2009;
3. Defendant was served with Summons and copy of the Complaint on November 3, 2009
and thus has until November 18, 2009 within which to submit an Answer or Responsive
Pleading;
4. Defendant was twice given extension of time to prepare and answer the complaint. The
first time extension of five days was given on November 19, 2009 to end on November
24, 2009.
5. However, defendant failed to submit the said motion on time for honestly failing to
foresee their inability to prepare and file the intended petition within the reglamentary
period due to voluminous and pressing work load on equally important cases of the
undersigned counsel, additional time of five days was also allowed by the Court with no
opposition form the opposing party. Said extension was from November 25, 2009 to
November 30, 2009;
6. Good cause exist to justify the additional requested extension of three more days as
counsel for the defendant had to undergo a minor dental surgery during the previously
requested extension;
WHEREFORE, with indulgence form the Court, counsel for the defendant most humbly request
that a final extension of three days to prepare the answer be granted.
Copy Furnished:
Atty. Wenceslao Gonzales
Counsel for Complainant
XYZ Bldg. Juan Luna St.
Manila
Republic of the Philippines
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
National Capital Judicial Region
Branch 01, Manila
Francis Magalona,
Plaintiff,
Doris Begornia,
Defendant
x---------------------------x
1. The records of the Honorable Court show that Defendant was served with copy of the
summons and of the complaint, together with annexes thereto on March 20, 2009;
2. Upon verification however, the records show that Defendant Doris Begornia has failed to
file her Answer within the reglamentary period specified by the Rules of Court despite
the service of summons and the complaint;
3. As such. It is respectfully prayed that Defendant Doris Begornia be declared in default
pursuant to the Rules of Court and that the Honorable Court proceed to render judgment
as the complaint may warrant.
PRAYER
Notice of Hearing:
Greetings: Please set the foregoing Motion to Declare Defendant in Default on April 30, 2009 at
9:00 o’clock in the morning or at any time convenient to the calendar of the Honorable Court.
Thank You.
Copy Furnished:
Francis Magalona,
Plaintiff,
Doris Begornia,
Defendant
x---------------------------x
1. Ten (10) days after the summons of the complaint was received by this defendant, she
filed a motion to dismiss;
2. Plaintiff has not filed any opposition to said motion and no hearing was held on said
motion to dismiss;
3. While the said motion to dismiss was still pending, this Honorable Court declared
defendant in default;
4. Said order declaring defendant in default is premature and without legal basis since there
is still a pending motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the order declaring the defendant in default
be lifted and that this Honorable Court rule on the aforesaid pending motion to dismiss.
Notice of Hearing:
Greetings: Please set the foregoing Motion to Declare Defendant in Default on April 30, 2009 at
9:00 o’clock in the morning or at any time convenient to the calendar of the Honorable Court.
Thank you.
Copy Furnished:
Atty. Al C. Batonghinog
Counsel for Plaintiff
Cubao, Quezon City
SPECIAL CIVIC ACTIONS
METALINE CORP.
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT
1. Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under the law of the Philippines,
with principal offices at # 654 Tinio St., Kala, Quezon City.
Defendants Joselito M. Figueres and Baltazar R. Donaire are both of legal age and
with residences at # 555 Aguas St., Polar, Quezon City and #543 Manta St., Bagoo,
Quezon City, respectively, where they may be served with summons and other legal
processes.
2. On March 30, 2009, Joselito M. Figueres subscribed to 5,000 shares of stock of plaintiff,
with par value of 100.00 per share, and accordingly , he was issued a certificate of stock
No. 0957, which upon his request, was in blank, he explaining that a blank certificate
would be easy to negotiate and transfer.
5. Plaintiff was thus constrained to file the instant complaint in interpleader and to incur
expenses of litigation, including attorney’s fees in the amount of 500.00, which should be
assessed equally between the defendants.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment, requiring defendants to interplead and litigate their
respectively claims between themselves.
Plaintiff further prays that defendants be ordered to pay expenses of ligation and attorney’s fees
in the amount of 500,000.00 plus costs and other expense to be assessed against them equally.
PEDRO OCAMPO,
Petitioner,
1. Petitioner is of legal age and with residence at Singalong Barangay 695 Zone 75,Malate
Manila. Respondent Regional Trial, Branch 41, Manila, is a court created by law, which
issued the questioned orders ( Annexes A and B ), in Civil Case No. 09-054321, Manila,
where it may be served with summons and other legal processes. Respondent Mario
Magsaysay is of legal age and with residence at General Malvar St., Barangay 695, Zone
75 Malate, Malate where he may be served with summons and other legal processes. He
is the plaintiff in said Civil Case No. 09-054321.
2. On January 12, 2009 private respondent filed a complaint for reconveyance and
cancellation of certificate of title of a parcel of land located in Forbes Parks, Makati City,
alleging as ground therefore that said parcel of land has been registered in the name of
petitioner merely on behalf and in trust for his benefit. Copy of said complaint is attached
hereto as Annex C.
3. On or about January 25, 2009, the respondent trial court issued the summons and required
petitioner to file his answer thereto. instead of answering the complaint, petitioner as
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case on the ground that the parcel of land is
located in Makati city and the Register of Deeds of Makati, which issued the certificate
covering said land, was not impleaded as party defendant.
4. On February 18, 2009, the trial court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss the
requiring petitioner to file his answer. Certified true copy of said order, which was
received on February 23, 2009 is attached hereto as Annex A.
5. On March 3, 2009 or within the 15 day period from receipt of said order Annex A,
petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration, copy of which is attached herewith as
Annex D.
6. On April 1, 2009 the trial court issued an order, copy of which was received on April 7,
2009 denying the motion for reconsideration, Certified true copy of said order is attached
hereto as Annex B.
7. The said Civil Case No. 09-054321 (Annex C) for reconveyance and cancellation of TCT
is outside the jurisdiction of the respondent trial court for the reason that the parcel of
land subject matter thereof is located in Makati City and the Register of Deeds of Makati
City has not been impleaded as party respondent, and the questioned orders Annexes A
and B are null and void for having been issued by the trial court without jurisdiction.
8. Since respondents are proceeding with Civil Case NO. 09-054321 notwithstanding its
lack of jurisdiction, there is need for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, in
connection with which petitioner avers that he is entitled to the relief demand, part of
which consist of restraining the respondents from continuing with the proceeding in Civil
Case NO.09-054321: that the commission or continuance of which during the pendency
of the litigation would work injustice to petitioner, and the petitioner is willing and ready
to post a bond to respondents to the effect that petitioner will pay all damages which
respondents will suffer by reason of the preliminary injunction if the Honorable Court
should finally decide that petitioner was not entitled thereto.
1. Upon the filing of this petition and after due hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining the trial court from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 09-054321,
upon such bond as this Honorable Court may fix, to the effect that petitioner will pay all
damages which respondents will suffer by reason of the preliminary injunction if the
Honorable Court should finally decide that petitioner was not entitled thereto.
2. The petition be given due course.
3. After proceedings, nullifying the trial courts questioned orders Annexes A and B and
commanding respondent trial court to desist from further proceeding in Civil Case No.
09-054321.
JOSE MANUEL
Attorney for Defendant
CRUZ & ASSOCIATES
2nd Floor, RCBC Plaza,
Ayala Avenue, Makati City
Roll NO. 123456
P.T.R. No. 1234567/
Manila / January 10, 2008
IBP NO. 123456 / Manila /
January 20, 2008
MCLE Compliance No. 123456
EMERITUS FLORES
Respondent.
X_________________________________________________x
1. Petitioner is of legal age and with residence at 78 Batangas St., Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa, while respondent is also of legal age and with residence at 8 Tagbilaran st.,
Alabang Hills Muntinlupa where he may be served summons and other legal processes.
2. Petitioner has been permanently appointed as chief of the collection department of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, at the head office in Quezon City as shown by his
appointment paper, copy of which is attached as Annex A.
3. Petitioner is covered by the Civil Service and enjoys security of tenure, pursuant to the
constitution and Civil Service Laws, and he cannot be removed without valid cause and
only after due process of law.
4. On May 29, 2009, petitioner went on official leave as he had be sent to the United States
for study of period of three months. When petitioner returned from his official leave, he
found out that his position as chief of the collection department was occupied by the
respondent, who claimed that he had been appointed therein by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, and he refused to vacate said position to give way to petitioners
assumption of the duties thereof.
5. Petitioner demanded of respondent to vacate the position, as he has been legally
occupying the same and has not been removed there from for cause. And after due
process of law, but the respondent refused and continues to refuse to do so, constraining
the petitioner to file the instant petition for quo warranto.
6. Respondent is a usurper of the office, as petitioner has not been legally removed there
from for cause and after due process as provided by law, the position has not been vacant
to which respondent can be validly appointed, and thus respondent refusal to vacate the
position is unlawful.
7. When confronted about the matter, the commissioner of internal revenue advised the
petitioner to file a quo warranto case which he is filling within one year from the date
respondent was illegally appointed to the position.
8. As a consequence of respondents unlawful usurpation of the position and unlawful
holding and exercising the position, receiving the salaries and monetary benefits arising
there from, petitioner suffered from damages in the monthly of Php 25,000 from
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of Php 500,000 which should be
assessed against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays for judgment:
1. Outstanding respondent from the position of chiefs of the collection department of the
BIR and altogether exclude him therefrom;
2. Adjudging respondent liable for damages in the amount of Php 25,000 a month from
the time he returned from official leave, starting ,May 29, 2009 as well as attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of Php 500,000 which should all be
assessed against respondent.
I, MARIA DIANA T. ABELON, of legal age and with residence at 78 Batangas St., Ayala
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa after having been duly sworn depose and say:
1. That I am plaintiff in this petition;
2. That I have caused the preparation of the said complaint.
3. That I have read the allegations therein contained and that the same are true and correct
of my personal knowledge or based on authentic records,
4. That I have not theretofore commended any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and to, the best of my knowledge, no
such other claim pending therein, and if I should therefore learn that the same action or
similar action or claim has been filed pending, I shall report the fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein the aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
Doc No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2009.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
MUNICIPAL COURT OF NAGA CITY
CAMARINES SUR
Pilar B. Pilapil
Plaintiff,
-versus-
Lito Atienza
Defendant.
x_____________________________________________________x
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff is of legal age, Filipino with residence of Zone 5, Maleniza Compound, San Felipe,
Naga City, while defendant is also legal age, Filipino and with residence at 67 Santa
Monica Village, Magsaysay Avenue, Naga City, where he may be served with summons
and other legal processes.
Plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of land situated in 90 Penafrancia Avenue, Naga City,
covered by TCT No.4539377 of the register of Deeds for Naga City, which is more
particularly described as follows: (technical description of the land)
While plaintiff was in the office of the city assessor of Naga City, checking the tax
declaration of his property covered by TCT No.4539377, he discovered that another
person. Then defendant in the instant case, has another title, namely TCT No. 9745434
covering the same parcel of land described above, which was subsequently issued by the
plaintiff.
Unless defendant’s second TCT No. 9745434 is cancelled and declared null and void, a cloud
of doubt will continue to exist over plaintiff’s title, thereby warranting an action for
quieting of title.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that defendant’s TCT No. 9745434 over the same parcel of
land as that of plaintiff be cancelled and declared null and void, and for such other reliefs
as may be just and equitable in the premises.
I, Pia B. Pilapil of legal age and with residence Zone 5, Maleniza Compound, San Felipe,
Naga City after having been duly sworn depose and say;
That I am the Plaintiff for the above titled case;
That I have caused the preparation by my counsel of said complaint,
That I have read the allegations therein contained and that the same are true and correct of
my personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
PIA B. PILAPIL
Affiant
Doc. No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2009.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GUAGUA PAMPANGA
x_______________________________________x
PETITION
That Petitioner is a Filipino of legal age, a resident of No. 420 San Bartolome Street, San
Miguel, Guagua, Pampanga, Plaintiff may be served orders, notices and processes through
undersigned counsel;
That Defendants are the officials of the Municipality of Guagua with office at the second floor,
Municipal Hall, Plaza Burgos, Guagua, Pampanga, where they may be served with summons
and other processes by this Honorable Court;
That on November 17, 2009, the respondents Municipal Council of Guagua passed and
promulgated the Ordinance No. 24 series of 2009 which in part reads:
SECTION 1 that the following speed limits for vehicular traffic along the National Highway
and the Provincial Roads within the territorial limits of Urdaneta shall be as follows:
Thru crowded streets approaching intersections at blind corners, passing school zones or
thickly populated areas, duly marked with sign post the maximum speed limit allowable shall
be 20 kph.
SECTION 2 that any person or persons caught driving any motor vehicle violating the
provision of this ordinance shall be fined P10.00 for the first offense; P20.00 for the second
offense; andP30.00 for the third and succeeding offenses, the Municipal Judge shall
recommended the cancellation of the license of the offender to the Motor Vehicle Office
(MVO); or failure to pay the fine imposed, he shall suffer a subsidiary imprisonment in
accordance with law.
That the said ordinance was approved by the defendant municipal mayor of the Municipality of
Guagua;
That on November 30, 2009 petitioner was driving his car within Guagua when a member of
Guagua Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was told upon stopping that he had violated
Municipal Ordinance 24 2009 for overtaking a truck. The policeman then asked for plaintiff’s
license which he surrendered, and a temporary operators permit was issued to him. This
incident took place about 200 meters away from a school building, San Miguel, Guagua;
That criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Guagua against petitioner for
violation of Ordinance 24 (S.2009).
That due to the institution of the criminal case, petitioner hereby initiates an action for the
annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the
purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Guagua from enforcing the ordinance for
the following reasons:
When the Municipal Council of Guagua used the phrase “vehicular traffic” (Section 1,
ordinance ) it did not distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor
trucks and buses. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness,
definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that an average man should be
able with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a
penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct.
The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. Contention that a later
enactment of the law relating to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statue is not
sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the original law is erroneous. In thecase at bar,
ordinance validity should be determined vis-à-vis RA 4136 the mother statute (not Act
3992) which was in force at the time criminal case was brought against the petitioner.
An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is among others, that it must not contravene
the statute, for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status
and subordinate to the laws of the state. Following this general rule, whenever there is a
conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way.
The Municipal Council of Guagua did not make any classification of its thoroughfares ,
contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38 RA 4136. The ordinance
refers to only one of the four classifications mentioned in paragraph (b), Section 35. The
classification which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of section 36
which states that no provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any
ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided
in this act.
Delegation of power
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays for judgment declaring that the above mentioned ordinance as
violated of the constitution and is therefore invalid.
Such other relief and remedies as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises are
likewise prayed for.
By
DEXTER GONZALES
IBP No. 97750-33
PTR No. 338653
Roll No. 59384
I Jose Sumaulog, do hereby certify that I am the petitioner of the above entitled case; that I have
not filed any other case in any other court or administrative tribunal involving the same cause of
action; that I am not aware of any pending case involving the same cause; and that should I
hereafter acquire knowledge of such other action, I will notify this Honorable Court thereof
within five (5) days from acquiring such knowledge.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27th of November 2009, by the affiant who is
personally known to me ( or whom I have identified through competent evidence of identity) and
who exhibited his / her Community Tax Certificate No. 44206583 issued at Guagua Pampanga
on January 16, 2009.
By
DEXTER GONZALES
IBP No. 97750-33
PTR No. 338653
Roll No. 59384
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
MANILA
X______________________________________x
PETITION
Petitioner, by the undersigned counsel and unto this Honorable Court, hereby respectfully avers
that:
The petitioner is of legal age, Filipino citizen, with postal address at 123 San Juan, Manila;
The defendant is the Election Officer of the City of Manila with office at second floor,
Commission on Election, Intramuros, Manila where he may be served with summons and
other processes by the Honorable Court;
That the plaintiff, on November 25, 2009 filed his certificate of candidacy to run as city
councilor before the office of the said election officer;
That the defendant refused to accept the said certificate of candidacy on mere ground that he
alleged that the petitioner is a citizen of the United States of America, hence not qualified
to seek public office through election;
That said allegation is baseless in as much as the petitioner is a natural born citizen and has
never acquired foreign citizenship and that the defendant election officer is misinformed
by the other candidate who also at that time filed his certificate of candidacy;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully averred that a writ of mandamus be
issued, compelling the defendant election officer to perform his ministerial duty of accepting the
certificate of candidacy filed by the plaintiff.
By
I Jose Fulgeras, do hereby certify that I am the petitioner of the above entitled case; that I have
not filed any other case in any other court or administrative tribunal involving the same cause of
action; that I am not aware of any pending case involving the same cause; and that should I
hereafter acquire knowledge of such other action, I will notify this Honorable Court thereof
within five (5) days from acquiring such knowledge.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of November,2009 by the affiant who is
personally known to me (or whom I have identified through competent evidence of identity) and
who is exhibited his/her Community tax Certificate No. 3352677 issued at City of Manila on
June 6, 2009.
By
JANE V. ABATA
Herein represented by
MARIA M. REYES
Plaintiff,
CIVIL CASE NO.19022
FOR EJECTMENT
---versus---
DINA RAVELO,
Defendant
x-----------------------------------------------x
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF, through undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court most respectfly alleges:
That plaintiff, herein represented by her attorney-in-fact, MARIA M. REYES, of legal age,
Filipino, married and a resident of Bl 71, Lot 86, Lagro, Quezon City, where he may be
served as summons and other court processes, copy of his special power of Attorney is
also hereto attached as Annex “A”;
That the defendant is of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of Evening Star Drive
Extension, Sitio Mabilog, Barangay Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, where he may be
served with judicial processes;
That he is the true, lawful and registered absolute owner of that parcel of land ( Lot 658-B of
the Subd. Plans Fls-3101-D of Quezon City, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
“B”;
That the plaintiff has declared that the said property under Tax Dec No.B-074-06431, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex “C”;
That the plaintiff has been religiously paying the real estate tax due thereon the latest Tax
Receipt for 1997 is hereto attached as Annex “D”;
That after the relocation survey of the property conducted by Geodetic Engr .Augusto D. Tan
sometime in September 1997,or thereabout it was found out by the defendant and his
family have put up a dwelling unit on the portion of the aforesaid property without the
knowledge and consent of the plaintiff and it seems that the defendant has been occupying
the premises as shown by the improvements introduced therein, for quite a long, long time
already;
That demand to vacate and pay a monthly rental have been made upon the defendant to pay a
minimum of P 100.00 sq. m., but defendant failed and refuse to vacate and to pay rentals,
for which reasons, plaintiffs is constraints to bring this action against the defendant and to
retain the services of counsel therefore and incurred a considerable amount of money for
attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses, as maybe proved in the course of the
proceedings in this case, copy of which is hereto attached as Annexes “E” & “E1”,
respectively.
To pay a monthly rental of minimum of P 100.00 per sq.m. of the area being occupied by him
beginning September 7, 1997 and thereafter, until he and all those claiming rights under
him and actually vacate the premises and peacefully surrender possession thereof to the
plaintiff or to her authorized representatives;
To remove and demolish the dwelling unit or structure he erected therein at his own expense,
otherwise the removal and demolition thereof shall be charged against the defendant; and
To pay attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses incurred in connection therewith.
Plaintiff likewise prays for such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable
under the premises.
JOSELITO M. MENDOZA
IBP OR No. 553736. 11-13-97 for CY 1998
PTRC-QC 8446210, 1-8-97
I, Maria M. Reyes of legal age, Filipino and with address at Blk 71, Lot 86 Lagro, Quezon City,
Philippines after being sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and say:
1. That I am the attorney-in-fact of plaintiff Jane V. Abata and duly authorized to bring action
in the above-entitled case;
2. That I have caused the preparation of the foregoing complaint; I have read the allegations
therein and certify that the same are true and correct of my own personal knowledge;
3. That I certify that plaintiff have not commenced any action involving the same issues,
before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, the different divisions thereof, or in any
other court, tribunal or agency. To the best of my knowledge, no such other actions or
proceedings are pending before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, the different
divisions thereof, or in any other court, tribunal or agency ; and
4. That in the event that any action involving the same should be made known, I hereby
bind myself to report the same within five (5) days there from to this Honorable Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hands this November 15, 1997 at Quezon
City, Metro Manila, Philippines.
MARIA M. REYES
AFFIANT
SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25th day of November 1997, by the affiant who
exhibited me to his Community Tax Certificate No. 16418658E issued at Quezon City,
Philippines on November 25, 1997.
JOSELITO M. MENDOZA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1998
PTRC-QC8446210, 1-8-97
Francis Magalona,
Plaintiff Civil Case No. 02
For: Unlawful Detainer
-versus-
Doris Begornia,
Defendant
x___________________________x
COMPLAINT
He is of legal age and a resident of Paranaque City while the defendant is of legal age and a
resident of the City of Manila.
Last October 1, 2008, he leased to the defendant the house at 911 Taft Ave., Manila City for a
term of one (1) year expiring on September 30, 2009.
The stipulated monthly rental is P 5,000 payable by the end of every month.
The defendant failed to pay the rental due last May to August 2009.
Last September 1, 2009, he demanded that the defendant vacate the said house; however, the
latter has refused.
He had to engage the service of counsel for which he agreed to pay P 5,000 for attorney’s
fees.
PRAYER
Wherefore it is prayed that after due notice and hearing, a judgment be rendered ordering:
The defendant and all persons claiming right under him to vacate the house at 911 Taft Ave.,
Manila City;
The defendant to pay the plaintiff the rentals due since May 1, 2009 until the former shall
have actually vacated said house;
The defendant to indemnify the plaintiff for P 15,ooo as attorney’s fees, and for cost of suit
and expenses of litigation.
Plaintiff further prays for such reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises.
Al C. Batonghinog
Counsel for Plaintiff
Roll No. 123
IBP No. 4567, issued on
October 31, 2008
PTR No. 00001, issued at
Makati City
VERIFICATION
I under oath aver that : (a) I am the plaintiff in the afore-titled case (b) I caused the preparation
of the complaint; (c) I read it and its contents are true of my own knowledge.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of October, 2009 in Makati City, affiant
having exhibited to me his Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on January 10,
2007.
Al C. Batonghinog
Roll No. 123
IBP No. 4567, issued on
October 31, 2008
PTR No. 00001, issued at
Makati City
Doc. No. 13
Page No. 3
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
Under oath, the undersigned hereby certifies that he has not earlier commenced a similar
action against the defendant for the same cause with any other court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of October, 2009 in Makati City, affiant
having exhibited to me his Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on January 10,
2007.
Al C. Batonghinog
Roll No. 123
IBP No. 4567, issued on
October 31, 2008
PTR No. 00001, issued at
Makati City
Doc. No. 14
Page No. 4
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH No. 05
Quirino Province
-versus-
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF, by the Solicitor General, and to this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. Plaintiff is a sovereign entity organized under the Constitution, with the power to sue and
expropriate lands for public use, thru the Department of Public Works and Highways.
2. Defendants Joanna Marinas and Liberty Cunanan are all of legal age and with residence at
Brgy. Zone 1 Gumaca, Quezon Province.
3. For the purpose of widening the national highways, which is a public use, and which starts
from Quirino Province and goes to the Province of Isabela, and in order to ease traffic, there is
need to widen said national highway by six (6) meters, and running parallel thereto needed for
the purpose are the properties of defendants, located in the Province of Quirino and described as
follows:
Bounded by the national road in the east, a private property in the west, north and south
portions, covered by TCT No. 000786 and 000877.
4. The land areas of defendants affected by the widening of the road consist of 100 sq. m of
defendant Joanna Marinas and 300 sq. m of defendant Liberty Cunanan.
5. The affected land areas are not occupied by persons other than the defendants.
6. Plaintiff, prior to filing the complaint, offered to defendants to acquire their lands by
negotiation, but they rejected the offer
7. Plaintiff through the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways
have asked defendants to sell their respective properties that would be affected by the widening
of the road, but they refused, constraining plaintiff to file the complaint for expropriation.
8. The assessed value of defendants lands which are affected by the widening of the road, are
P 150,000 for defendants Joanna Marinas and P 450,000 for defendants Liberty Cunanan.
2. After the deposit of the provisional amounts by plaintiff with the National Treasury or any
authorized bank, awarding forthwith the possession of the lands to plaintiff
After payment by plaintiff of the just compensation of the lands in question to defendants,
ordering the segregation of the land areas affected by a government surveyor and the transfer to
plaintiff of the titles of said land areas, and for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in
the premises.
Al C. Batonghinog
Counsel for plaintiff
Roll No. 123
IBP No. 4567, issued on
October 31, 2008
PTR No. 00001, issued at
GUmaca, Quezon
VERIFICATION
I under oath, aver that: (a) I am the duly authorized representatives of the plaintiff in the afore-
titled case; (b) I caused the preparation of the Complaint; (c) I read it and its contents are true of
my own knowledge.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1 st day of October, 2009 in Gumaca, Quezon
affiant having exhibited to me his Drivers License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on
January 10, 2007.
Al C. Batonghinog
Roll No. 123
IBP No. 4567, issued on
October 31, 2008
PTR No. 00001, issued at
GUmaca, Quezon
Doc. No. 15
Page No. 4
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
Under oath, the undersigned hereby certifies that he has not earlier commenced a similar
action against the defendant for the same cause with any other court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of October, 2009 in Gumaca Quezon,
affiant having exhibited to me his Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on
January 10, 2007.
Al C. Batonghinog
Roll No. 123
IBP No. 4567, issued on
October 31, 2008
PTR No. 00001, issued at
Gumaca, Quezon
Doc. No. 16
Page No. 4
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH NO. 06
BATANGAS CITY
-versus-
Juan Flores,
Defendant
x____________________________________x
COMPLAINT
1. Plaintiff is of legal age and a resident of Brgy. Polomolok Mabini, Batangas Defendant is
of legal age and residing at Brgy. Zone 2 Batangas City.
2. On March 1 , 2008 defendant, borrowed P 1,000,000 from plaintiff, payable within one
year from said date, with 12 % interest per annum, and to secure payment of such loans, he
executed on the same date a real estate mortgage on his residential lot with an area of 1,000 sq.
m located at Brgy. Zone 2, Batangas City, and covered by TCT No. 8909 of the Registry of deeds
of Batangas City, and which is particularly described as follows:
Copy of said real estate mortgage is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex
“A”.
3. It is the condition of such mortgage that upon failure of defendant to pay his obligations
within the stipulated period and suit is filed to effect payment, defendant agreed to pay liquidated
damages of P 50,000 and attorney’s fees of P 120,000.
4. The one year period has expired without defendant paying the principal amount and
interests thereon. Accordingly, plaintiff demanded of defendant to pay his overdue obligations,
but notwithstanding such demands, both verbal and, written, defendants refused and continue to
refuse to pay the same.
b. Issuing a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public auction of the above described parcel
of land, and for disposition of the proceeds thereof in accordance with law, upon failure
of defendant to pay in full his obligations within the period set by law.
Al C. Solis
Counsel for plaintiff
Roll No. 123
IBP No. 4567, issued on
October 31, 2008
PTR No. 00001, issued at
Batangas City
VERIFICATION
I under oath aver that : (a) I am the plaintiff in the afore-titled case (b) I caused the preparation
of the complaint; (c) I read it and its contents are true of my own knowledge.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7th day of October, 2009 in Batangas City,
affiant having exhibited to me her Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Mabini, Batangas on
January 10, 2007.
Al C. Solis
Roll No. 123
IBP No. 4567, issued on
October 31, 2008
PTR No. 00001, issued at
Batangas City
Doc. No. 13
Page No. 3
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdictional Requirements
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
PETITION
COMES NOW petitioner, in the above-titled case, through his undersigned attorney, and to this
Honorable Court respectfully represent:
1. Petitioner Jose S. Reyes is of legal age and a resident of 68 Santol St., Sampaloc, Manila.
Petitioner is the husband of Maria Y. Reyes.
2. That on August 13, 2009, petitioner was taken from her residence by ten (10) police officers
headed by police Superintendent Edgar T. Katoliko, and since then confined, restrained and
deprived of her liberty in the Correctional Institute for Women in Mandaluyong City;
3. That in spite of the fact that petitioner has been confined for nearly four months, no formal
complaint or accusation for specific offense has been filed against her nor any judicial writ or
order for her commitment has at any time been issued so far;
4. That petitioner did not commit any offense for which she may be arrested or deprived of her
liberty by Police superintendent Edgar T. Katoliko by order and the behest of one, Chief of Police
Gardo U. Versoza, whose office is in Camp Crame in Quezon City;
5. That there being no Martial Law or State of Emergency, the confinement of the petitioner under
the circumstances above narrated is utterly illegal.
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that said officers, Police Superintendent Edgar T. Katoliko and
Chief of Police Gardo U. Versoza, or who ever acts in their place and stead, be directed to appear before
this Honorable Court and produce the body of petitioner; and explain forthwith why petitioner should not
be set at liberty without delay.
VERIFICATION
I, Jose S. Reyes of legal age and with residence at 68 Santol St., Sampaloc, Manila, after having
been duly sworn, depose and say:
3. That I have read the allegations therein contained, and that the same are true and correct of
my personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
JOSE S. REYES
Affiant
SUBCRIBED AND SWORN TO before this 27 th day of October, 2009 in Makati City,
Philippines, affiant exhibiting to me his Postal ID No. 000123 issued in Manila on January 5, 2009. I
hereby certify that I have examined the Affiant and that I am fully satisfied that he has voluntarily
executed and understood the contents of his Petition.
Notary Public
Jan. 5, 2009
Jan. 2, 2009
Doc. No._____
Page No._____
Book No._____
Series of 2009.
x_______________________________________________x
PETITION
Aquino, also of legal age and Filipino, with residence address at No. 4 Tamban corner Biya
2. Petitioner MARIA C. AQUINO is the aunt (being the sister of the deceased mother of
the minor children) of the minor children, CHAR C. CONTRERAS, CHRIS C. CONTRERAS,
3. At the times of filing of the instant petition, said minor children are 15, 13 and 7
years of age and all are residing at no. 26 Hyancinth Street, Roxas District, Quezon City,
Metro Manila. Copies of Certificates of Live Birth of Char C. Contreras, Chris C. Contreras
and Cor C. Contreras are attached hereto as Annexes “A”, “B” and “C”, respectively.
4. Irmalyn C. Contreras, the late mother of the said minors, who was then Senior
country for an indefinite period of time and has not returned to the Philippines since
1986.
children inherited:
MINOR CHILDREN
P 1,461,708.42
============
7. In View of the minority of said children as well as the indefinite absence of their
father, it is necessary and convenient that a guardian over their persons and properties be
appointed to give proper care and attention to them, to protect their rights, interest, and
title over the above-described properties and to represent them in all matters affecting
their interests.
8. The Following are the relatives of the minor children, with their ages, addresses,
9. On the other hand, the following are the persons who have the custody and care
over the minor children, with their ages, addresses and relationship with the minor
10. Petitioners are childless and both gainfully employed. Petitioner Luis A. Aquino is a
Senior Associate Attorney with the Villaraza & Cruz Law Offices while petitioner Maria C.
Aquino is an employee of the World Health Organization Regional Office in Manila. The
issued.
11. Gilberto L. Contreras, the father of the minor children, has requested the
petitioners to act as guardians over the persons and properties of the minor children in
his absence. A copy of the affidavit dated 24 September 1993 executed by Gilberto L.
12. The petitioners are willing to post a bond for the issuance of letters of
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after notice and hearing, and upon
posting of such bond as this Honorable Court may direct, the petitioners be appointed
guardians of the persons and all properties of the minor children CHAR C. CONTRERAS,
By:
VERIFICATION
I, MARIA C. AQUINO of legal age, Filipino and with residence address at No. 4 Tamban corner
BIya Streets, Silvina Village, Quezon City, Metro Manila after having been duly sworn in accordance
with law hereby depose and state:
1. I am one of the petitioner in the above-entitled petition.
3. I have read the instant petition and that the allegations therein are true of my own knowledge.
MARIA C. AQUINO
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ___ day of November 2002, affiant personally
appeared and exhibited to me her Employee No. 009-542 and TIN ID No. 925-291-405-000 issued on
October 13, 2000.
Doc. No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2002.
COPY FURNISHED:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Branch 7, Paranaque
In the Matter of the Petition for
Approval of Will of EDMUNDO GALANG DAVID
Deceased.
PAULINO T. GALANG SP PRC No. 9574353
Petitioner.
x_______________________________________________x
1. On February 13, 2009 deceased Edmundo Galang David died in the City of Paranaque, then residing
at 7852 Segudo Mendoza St., Villa Mendoza Subd. Sucat, Paranaque, which was his residence at the
time of his death, leaving a will, a true copy of which is attached thereto as Annex “A” and made an
integral part hereof.
2. Petitioner is of legal age and with residence at 8594 Kabesang Segundo St., Fortunata Village,
Paranaque and is the executor in said will and he hereby consents to act as such executor.
3. The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees and devisees of said decedent are as follows:
4. The deceased left properties, real and personal with a total approximate value of Php 20,000.00
5. Petitioner as named executor, moves and prays that letters testamentary, be issued to him; that he is
competent to serve as executor and is ready to give a hand as required by the Rules of Court.
6. The will has been delivered to the court on July 8, 2009.
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that after due notice, publication and hearing the aforementioned will of
deceased EDMUNDO GALANG DAVID be approved, allowed and that letters testamentary be issued to
herein petitioner.
VERIFICATION
I PAULINO T. GALANG, of legal age and with residence at Kabesang Segundo St., Fortunata Village,
Paranaque after having been duly sworn depose and say;
PAULINO T. GALANG
Affliant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on the 15th day of August 2009, affiant exhibiting to
me Community Tax Certificate No. 985923 issued in Paranaque on January 9, 2009.
ALEXANDRA C. ALIPIO
Notary Public
Doc. No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2009.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Branch 43, Manila
1. Petitioners are husband wife, of legal age, the husband being 27 years of age, while the wife is 26 of
age, Filipino citizens and with residence at Unit 9A EGI Residences, Taft Avenue, Manila.
2. Petitioners are childless and they are in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights; they are of
good moral character; they have not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; they are
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children; they are at least 16 years older that
the person to be adopted; and are in position to support and care for the adoptee and of themselves, in
keeping with the means of the family; and they have undergone pre-adoption services as required by
section 4 of Republic Act No. 8552 as shown by a certification to that effect, true copy of which is
attached hereto as Annex “A”.
3. The name of the adoptee is Sophia Gabrielle Romano the name given her when the adoptee was given
to the petitioners for adoption since the child’s birth and has been taken care of by the petitioners
from age one (1) day until the present, who is now 5 years of age, giving her all health attention by
doctors. The petitioners have loved the adoptee since then and they have developed a kind of parental
love for the child; and the adoptee has known petitioners as her parents, calling the husband as
“Daddy” and the wife as “Mommy”. The birth certificate, which the mother informed the hospital
staff, shows her to be a baby girl without first name and with surname Beltran without any named
father as the child was born out of wedlock on December 25, 2004.
4. The Adoptee is not disqualified by law to be adopted. The adoptee has no estate.
5. The first name, surname or names by which the adoptee is to be known and registered in the Civil
registry is Sophia which is what the adoptee is known by petitioners and by the petitioners’ relatives
and playmates. Attached hereto and made integral parts hereof are the followings:
Birth certificate of the adoptee as Annex “A”; his baptismal certificate, which is attached as Annex “B”;
6. Written consent of the mother of the adoptee, which she had it prepared and she executed or signed it
after the adoptee’s birth; after which she never showed up, nor even glanced at her child; hence the
written consent could not be notarized as she was in a hurry to leave the hospital telling the petitioner
to take good care of the child.
7. The petitioners are childless; they have no legitimate children.
8. child study report on the adopted is attached hereto as Annex “B”.
9. No child study on the biological parents of the adoptee as his mother could no longer be located since
birth of the child, and the child has no known father.
10. Home study report on the petitioners as adopters is made by the court as Annex “C”.
WHEREFORE, petitioners pray that after due notice, publication and hearing a decree of adoption be
issued in favor of petitioners to the effect that henceforth the child Sophia be freed from all legal
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be to all legal intents
and purposes, the child of petitioners and that the surname be changed to cacatian which is the surname of
petitioners spouses.
Counsel
We, Mark Angelo Uy and Marian Reena Uy, of legal age and with residence at Unit 9A EGI Residences
Taft Avenue, Manila after having been duly sworn depose and say:
1. That we are the plaintiffs / petitioners in the above titled complaint / petition.
2. That we have caused the preparation of said complaint / petition.
3. That we have read the allegations therein contained and that the same are true and correct of my
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
4. That we have not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issue in
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and so to the best of my knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein and if we should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, we shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
the aforesaid complaint has been filed.
Notary Public
Doc. No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2009.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
National Capital Judicial Region
Makati, Branch 88
Corazon Putingtae
Petitioner
x________________________________x
PETITION
Petitioner through the undersigned counsel and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges that;
1. She has been a bonafide resident of the City of Makati, Philippines for more than
three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition.
2. That the family name which she carries, namely Putingtae is a derivative of the
Chinese name of her ancestry and said name carries in Tagalog language meaning and
connotation which immediately evoke laughter and abusive comments from those who hear the
same, thereby causing embarrassment to her.
3. Said name has always been a handicap in her social and business dealings.
4. She intends to get married and judging from her bitter experience as a child, she does not want
that her future children shall suffer the same humiliation and inferiority complex which she has
suffered on account of that name.
5. It is her desire to change her family name to Reyes, this being the family name of her best fiend.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner respectfully prays that the Honorable Court issue
judgment after due notice, publication and hearing an order issuing to change her name to Corazon Reyes.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for. Signed January 8, 2009,
Makati City Philippines.
ERIC ARNAIZ
Makati City
I, Corazon Reyes of legal age, Filipino and residing at 9043 Guadalupe Makati City, Philippines after
being sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and say:
a. I have not commenced any other action or proceeding or filed any claim involving the
same issues or matter in any court, terminal or quasi-judicial agency and to the best of my
knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending therein;
b. If I should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or proceeding has been filed or
is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of appeals, or any other tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency, I undertake to report such fact within five (5) days there from to the court
or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have
been filed.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hands this November 11, 2009 at Makati City
Philippines.
CORAZON REYES
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this November 11, 2009 by the affiant who
exhibited me to his Community Tax Certificate No. 0221155448 issued at Manila, Philippines on January
10, 2009.
Doc. No: 3;
Page No. 2;
Book No. 1
Series of 2009
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDITIAL REGION
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
PARANAQUE CITY
BRANCH________
PETITION
COMES NOW, Petitioner KATE PARDO DACUMOS represented by her mother NELIA J. PARDO
through the undersigned Public Attorney and unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully alleges:
1.0 That Petitioner is a minor, Filipino duly represented by her mother NELIA J. PARDO and both
presently residing at Barangay Ubos, Valderama, Antique, where they may be served with
summons and processes of the Court;
2.0 That Respondent Local Civil registrar of Paranaque and National Statistic Office are
government agencies who are impleaded hereto as repositories of all public records relating to
the birth of children born in the Philippines particularly in Paranaque City with office address at
the Ground floor of Paranaque City Hall and East Avenue, Quezon City, respectively;
3.0 That petitioner KATE PARDO DACUMOS was born in Baclaran, Paranaque City on February
4, 1992 of which her Certificate of Live of birth is sought to be corrected in this Petition,
attached hereto as Annex A and made integral part hereof;
4.0 That a perusal of Certificate of Live Birth KATE PARDO DACUMOS would show that the
entry regarding the Date and Place of Marriage of parents is March 10, 1991 Antique, a clearly
erroneous entry since the fact of the matter is that the parents of the petitioner particularly Peter
Bargayo Dacumos and Nenita Jauod are NOT MARRIED.
5.0 In support to herein Petition, Dacumos likewise attached his affidavit of Paternity which was
notarized by Consul General Benito B. Valeriano of the Philippine Consulate General Dubai,
United Arab Emirates and marked as “ ANNEX B”. moreover Nenita Jauod Pardo attached a
Certification from the National Statistics Office dated February 14, 2009 certifying that she
does not appear in the Notarial Indices for Marriages based on the records of 1945-2009
Marriages enrolled in the database as of January 31, 2009 and hereto attached as “ ANNEX C”.
6.0 The necessity of cancellation of said entry with the records of the office of the Civil Registrar
cannot be understated considering that correction would bar future complications, confusion,
misinterpretation, embarrassment and inconvenience on part of minor KATE PARDO
DACUMOS.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that after due notice
and hearing, judgment to forthwith rendered ordering the cancellation of the date and place of marriage in
the Certification of Live Birth of KATE PARDO DACUMOS and to order the Local Civil Registrar of
Paranaque City and directing the National Statistics Office to CANCEL the said error indicated.
It is likewise prayed for such other relief consistent with law and equity.
ROMULO C. TOLENTINO
Public Attorney II
VERIFICATION / CERTIFICATION
I Nelia J. Pardo, of legal age, Filipino and with address at Barangay Ubos, Valderama, Antique
having been sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state, that:
2. I have caused the preparation and filing of the instant Petition the content of which are true
and correct based on personal knowledge and authentic records in my possession;
3. I hereby certify that I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, Court of appeals, the different divisions thereof, or in
any other court, tribunal or agency. To the best of my knowledge, no such other actions or
proceeding are pending before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, the different divisions
thereof, or in any other court, tribunal or agency for that matter:
4. I hereby undertake to notify this Honorable Office within five (5) days from notice, should
I learn of similar action or proceeding filed or is pending before any body, court tribunal
above-mentioned.
NENITA J. PARDO
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me in City of Manila this 11 th day of November 2009
affiant exhibiting to me her Community Tax Certificate No. 445545 issued at the City of Manila on May
8, 2009.
Doc. No. 55
Page No. 17
Book No. 6
Series of 2009
Republic of the Philippines
Branch 01 Manila
Gerald Anderson,
Plaintiff,
Kim Chiu,
Defendants
x__________________________x
COMPLAINT
1. Plaintiff Gerald Anderson is of legal age, single and a resident of Paranaque City ; while
defendant Kim Chui is of legal age, single and a resident of Taft Ave. Manila.
2. Defendant borrowed P 1,000,000 from plaintiff and executed, to residence the loan, a promissory
note on October 1, 2008, which reads as follows:
“ For value received, I hereby promise to pay Gerald Anderson the amount of P 1,000,000,
payable on September 30, 2009, with interest hereon at 12 % per annum without any further
demand. Should I fail to pay the same on due date, and suit is filed to enforce this promissory
note, I further promise to pay 25% of the principal amount as attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation.
Executed on October 1, 2008 at City of Manila.
3. The aforesaid obligation of defendant in the total amount of P 1,000,000 is now overdue but
notwithstanding repeated demands, both oral and written, defendant failed and refused and continues to
refuse to pay said obligation, constructing plaintiff to file the suit and to incur attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation in the amount of 25% of the principal obligation or P 250,000 which should be
assessed by defendant as stipulated in the promissory note.
4. Defendant’s obligation is valid and genuine and accordingly a sufficient cause of action exist
against her.
5. Defendant is about to depart from Philippines with intent to defraud her creditors, as shown by
her securing a passport, her application for immigrant visa to China and selling her properties.
6. There is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be recovered from defendant in the instant
action and the amount due to plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the order of attachment may be
granted above all legal counterclaims.
7. Plaintiff is willing and ready to post a bond executed in favor to the adverse in the amount which
the Honorable Court may fix in the order granting the writ of attachment, conditioned that the latter will
pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by
reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto.
a. Defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of P 1,000,000 with legal interest
thereon form the date the complaint is filed, plus P 250,000 as attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation, until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs; and
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief’s as may be just and equitable in the premises.
Al C. Solis
October 31,2008
VERIFICATION
I under oath, aver that: (a) I am the plaintiff in the afore-titled case; (b) I caused the preparation of
the Complaint; (c) I read it and its content are true of my own knowledge.
Al C. Solis
October 31,2008
Makati City
Doc. No. 13
Page No. 3
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30 th day of October, 2009 in Makati City, affiant
having exhibited to me his Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on January 10, 2007.
Al C. Batonghinog
October 31,2008
Makati City
Doc. No. 14
Page No. 4
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
Republic of the Philippines
XYZ CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
Romulo Mandocdoc,
Defendant
x____________________x
COMPLAINT
1. Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines, with principal office at Escolta, Manila, while defendant is of legal age and with residence at
Trabajo, Manila, where he may be served with summons and other legal processes.
2. Plaintiff, engaged in sale of general merchandise, entered into an exclusive dealership and
distribution agreement with Mayfair Manufacturing of New York, U.S.A., whereby plaintiff as
independent distributor, would exclusively sell Mayfair’s bearing the trademark, “NIKE, in the
Philippines and to protect said trademark from unauthorized use by other”. Copy of said agreement is
attached hereto as Annex “A”.
3. Defendant also engaged in general merchandising, imported wearing apparel from ABC
Company based in New Delhi, India, which carried the trademark NIKE, and began selling the same in
Manila, on or about January 2, 2009, without the consent of plaintiff, nor that of Mayfair Manufacturing
Company of New York, USA, and passing them off as either coming from plaintiff or from the former.
4. As a consequence of defendant’s acts, plaintiff suffered damages and his sale of wearing materials
bearing the mark NIKE has been diminishing, to such an extent that plaintiff has been losing profits of no
less than P 1,000,000 a month starting March 2009.
5. Defendants continues to commit the acts of unfair competition and of illegally interfering with
the agreement executed between plaintiff and Mayfair Manufacturing Company, in violation of plaintiff’s
rights.
6. Unless restrained during the pendency of the instant action, plaintiff will suffer more damages
and defendant will continue violating plaintiff’s rights, as exclusive dealer of said wearing apparel with
the mark, NIKE, and of its rights against unfair competition, and in this connection, plaintiff avers as
follows:
b) He is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consist in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts of perpetually;
c) The commission or continuance of the act complained of during the litigation would probably
work injustice to plaintiff or cause plaintiff irreparable injury not only to its business but also to its
goodwill.
e) Plaintiff is ready and willing to file a bond executed to the defendant enjoined, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to such party all damages which he may sustain
by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the
applicant was not entitled thereto.
1. Upon the filing of this action, a temporary restraining order be issued expert and thereafter a writ
of preliminary injunction issue, restraining defendant or any of his agents and representatives from selling
wearing materials bearing the trademark NIKE, during the pendency of the action, upon such bond which
will be posted by plaintiff in the amount as may be fixed by this Honorable Court.
a) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P 8,000,000 as damages and loss of
profit;
b) Requiring the defendant to account for all his sales of wearing materials with the
trademark NIKE, and to pay all profits realized by him to plaintiff.
c) Making the writ of preliminary injunction that may have been issued permanent.
Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises.
October 30, 2009 at the City of Manila
Al C. Batonghinog
October 31,2008
Makati City
VERIFICATION
I under oath, aver that: (a) I am the duly authorized representative of the plaintiff in the afore-
titled case; (b) I caused the preparation of the Complaint; (c) I read it and its contents are true of my own
knowledge.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30th day of October, 2009 in Batangas City, affiant
having exhibited to me her Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on January 10, 2007.
Al C. Batonghinog
October 31,2008
Makati City
Doc. No. 13
Page No. 3
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
Under oath, the undersigned hereby certifies that he has not earlier commenced a similar action
against the defendant for the same cause with any other court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30th day of October, 2009 in Makati City, affiant having
exhibited to me his Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on January 10, 2007.
Al C. Bonghanoy
October 31,2008
Makati City
Doc. No. 14
Page No. 4
Book No. 7
Republic of the Philippines Pro-form No.
Department of Labor and Employment (NOT FOR SALE)
NATIONAL LABOR AND RELATIONS COMMISSION
Quezon City OFW – LAND BASED
National Capital Region
NETH MERCADO
Complainant /s
-versus- NLRC RAB No. NCR Case No. (L) NCR – 06 05610
ARMANDO LAPID
Other Respondent/s
X----------------------------------------------X
COMPLAINT
Nature of Work / Position Salary for Contract: (800.00 USD FLIGHT DATE
(PHILS)
HOUSEKEEPER
Place of Work / Flag / Vessel Salary Received 800.00 USD Dep:12-2-07 Arrival: 06-16-08
This portion is to be filled vby the complainant officer, unless complainant/ is/are with legal counsel.:
CAUSES OF ACTION
________________________
Signature
R E L I E F
B. OTHER SPECIFY:
C. OTHER RELIEF, JUST AND EQUITABLE UNDER THE PREMISES, ARE LIKEWISE
PRAYED FOR.
ADDRESS:
610 Sampaguita St. Moonwalk II ____________________________
Quezon City NCR 1421 Counsel for Complainant /s
EMPLOYMENT PERIOD:
HOUSEKEEPER ________________________
Salary Rate: IBP NO.
800.00 USD ________________________
VERIFICATION
I/We, NETH MERCADO, having been duly sworn to, (if several, shall subscribe and
sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and state that:
I/We have read the contents hereof and declare the same to b true to the best of my/our
knowledge and belief.
This is to certify that I/We have not filed any similar case with any other court, Quasi-Judicial body on government
agency have I/We filed any other similar complaint involving ther same parties and the same cause of action before
any other Regional Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations Commission.
NETH MERCADO ________________
COMPLAINANT COMPLAINANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23rd day of June, 2008 in Quezon City, affiant exhibiting to
me his/her their Community Tax Certificate NO./s 5044610 issued on January 5, 2008 at Paranaque City.
LB-BFO-RO 402-09151988
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW complaint and to this Batangas Field Office respectfully alleges:
Non-Payment of :
o Wages Wages
Legal / Special Holiday Pay Legal/Special Holiday Pay
Premium Pay for Rest Day Premium Pay for Rest Day
o 13th month Pay / 13th month pay
Overtime Pay Overtime Pay
5 days Service Incentive Pay 5 days Service Incentive Pay
Night Shift Differential Pay Night Shift Differential Pay
Complainant was illegally dismissed last August 10, 2009 and was given 30 days
to effectively her dismissal. The respondent failed to pay the complainant legal and
special holiday pays, premium pay for the rest day, overtime pay, 5 days incentive pay,
night shift differential pay and underpayment of 13th month pay as mandates in the Labor
Code of the Philippines, PD 442, as amended..
VERIFICATION
I, Caithlin May M. Jimenez being duly sworn to in accordance with law, and state
that:
I am the complainant in the above-entitled case and I have caused the separation
and filing of the complaint and I read the contents hereof and declare the same to be true
to the best of knowledge.
This is to certify that I have not filed similar case without any court, Quasi-Judicial body
or government agency.
LB-BFO-RO 402-09151988
ANSWER
2. The income generated from lending and other non-bank financial services and
because of the Asian currency crisis. Consequently, AUTOMATIC LENDING
INVESTOR, temporarily suspended its operations. It advised its employees, including
complainant, not to report for work starting on the first week of March 2009.
AUTOMATIC LENDING INVESTOR indefinitely closed shop effective May 2009;
4. It is worth noting that the closure of business operation is allowed under the Labor
Code, provided separation pay be paid to the terminated employee. Further, it is settled
that the giving of separation benefits is required only in cases not due to serious business
losses or financial reverses.
5. Considering that the complainant was not illegally dismissed, there should be no back
wages needed to be awarded.
HAMLET GARMENTS
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
Plantiff,
-vs-
x--------------------------------x
Defendants by counsel and unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully submits
this Position Paper and in support thereof, avers as follows:
THE PARTIES
Plaintiff is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines with principal place of business located at Golden Haven Village, Carmona,
Laguna.
The parties maybe served with processes and orders of the court in their above-
given respective addresses.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff alleged that defendant defaulted in his payment of the installments due
and that of the contract price of Eighty Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Six Pesos (P80,
376.00) only the total amount of Thirteen Thousand Three Hundred Pesos Ninety Six
Pesos (P13, 396.00) was paid by the defendant leaving a balance of P66, 980.00 plus 5%
interest per month on the unpaid installment amounts due. Hence, this instant petition.
Defendant allege that he could not recall having signed a promissory note with
chattel mortgage in favor of the plaintiff, and that it was his earnest belief that he
transacted only with Motortrade Nationwide Corporation and not with the plaintiff.
The defendants further allege that per their records and contrary to the claim of
the plaintiff, the remaining unpaid balance of their obligation is only Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10, 000.00). Because of the manifest discrepancy in their respective records,
reconciliation is necessary.
Moreover, defendants claim that the plaintiff already took possession of the
motorcycle subject of the chattel mortgage, a manifest act of foreclosure on the part of
the latter.
PRAYER
REINSTATEMENT AND PAYMENT OF BACK WAGES
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the circumstances are likewise prayed for.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
16TH Floor, Makati City Hall
Makati City
By:
I, PAUL CHRISTIAN LOZANO, subscribing under oath, depose and state that:
x-------------------------------------------------------x
STATEMENT OF COMMENTS
4. Assuming for the sake of argument that there was indeed a proper
investigation conducted, if the complainant was found to have been guilty of
the act ascribed to him, it is beyond comprehension why then did respondent
not include him in the case it filed against the employees found responsible
for the theft. One could only surmise that the respondent did not find him in
the alleged theft, and therefore no just cause for his termination.
Respectfully submitted this ___ of December 2007, Makati City for Quezon City.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
16TH Floor, Makati City Hall
Makati City
By:
Respondents
REJOINDER
[To Respondents’ Reply]
COMES NOW complainant Christopher Allan V. Pascua, assisted by counsel and unto
this Honorable Office herein submits his Rejoinder and respectfully avers as follows:
The fact is disputed that on January 1, 2006 complainant Pascua was left by the
respondents without any position in the respondent company. This bold claim is supported by no
less than the categorical admission of facts by the respondents in paragraph 2 of their Reply
which for emphasis, clarity and ready reference we hereby quote herein as follows:
“2. it is true that effective January 1, 2006, the respondent company effected a
reorganization of the Small Medium Enterprises Group. It is also true that complaint Pascua was
not given any position under the reorganized structure.xxx”
With the foregoing statement, respondents have clearly admitted the fact the effective
January 1, 2006, complaint Pascua was indisputable placed by the respondents in a
floating status because they themselves categorically declared that complainant Pascua
“was not given any position in the reorganized structure” maliciously leaving
complainant Pascua in an embarrassing situation where he remains to be employed with,
but without occupying any position in, the respondent company. Having this clear
admission on hand, we respectfully believe that the only issue left to be resolved in this
case is whether such act of putting complaint Pascua in a “floating status” is tantamount to
his dismissal. This issue, as we have sufficiently explained in our previous papers
submitted to the decisions of the Supreme Court on the same subject matter. To further
give emphasis on an otherwise clearly settled matter, the Supreme Court in the case of
Blue Dairy Corporation and / or Edison T. Aviquetero and Pedro G. Miguel vs. NLRC and
Elvira R. Recalde4 aptly said its piece on the issue of constructive dismissal in this wise:
From the foregoing, it is glaringly evident that fate suffered by complainant Pascua in the
hands of the herein respondents amounts to constructive dismissal tantamount to illegally
dismissing him.
In their attempt to evade the issue, they are hiding under their hopeless claim that
“complainant Pascua was dismissed in actuality” allegedly evidenced by the memo dated
March 29, 2006. With all due respect, allow us to at least set the records straight once
and for all. While we do not deny the fact that there was indeed a memo dated March 29,
2006, the same however does not negate the fact that the “floating status” of complainant
Pascua was effected as early as January 1, 2006. Hence, the illegality of the respondents
act of putting complainant Pascua in a “floating status” at an early date cannot anymore
be cured by a termination memo issued on a later date. To allow the same would be to
create an absurdity of the highest order, for it will amount to allowing the cart to be put
in front of the horse which by any stretch of the imagination cannot be justified as
logically possible. Furthermore, what becomes more evident, with the issuance by the
respondents of the termination memo on a later date is the fact that such issuance of the
termination memo was only an afterthought on their part designed to give a semblance of
legality to an otherwise illegal act effected as early as January 1, 2006.
All the foregoing would only lead a reasonable man to conclude that respondents
are already desperately seeking ways and means to redeem themselves, from their
irreversible error of constructively dismissing complainant Pascua, even to the extent of
coming up with amusing and misleading statements and arguments.
At the onset, we would like to reiterate our clear position that the real issue ought
to be resolved in this particular case is whether or not complainant Manaog was
constructively dismissed on January 1, 2006. However, since the respondents herein are
trying to muddle the issue by desperately clinging their self-professed issue of “actual
dismissal based on poor performance”, we deemed it necessary to refute such allegation
on the merits to finally put a rest on an irrelevant issue which respondents are trying to
inject in this case.
In this paper we will be dwelling more on the issue of the alleged “remiss
performance” of complainant Pascua on the projects assigned to him. The projects being
referred to by the respondents were [1] Own The Fort; [2] Greenhills Christian
Fellowship; [3] Batman Kiosk. We shall be explaining the events and circumstances
surrounding these projects in seriatim for an orderly explanation and understanding of
the same.
[a] No Right of Way Agreement has yet been entered into between Innove and
BCDA [Administrator of The Fort]; and
[b] Innove, at the time, has not yet secured a permit for underground installation
in The Fort;
This project was in fact regularly handled by complainant Pascua as shown by the
fact that he made a “sales call” to two (2) locators of The Fort namely MGC and Every
Nation. As per the regular course of things, complainant gathered requirements from the
prospective clients to show that they are qualified to become clients of the respondent
company. After gathering those requirements complainant Pascua immediately submitted
a Network Facility Request (NFR) to determine whether Innove has an existing and
available facility in the area sufficient to cover the requirements of the clients. However,
the same yielded a negative result and as a consequence of which the NFR for the clients
became pending as an installation to these prospective clients would be dependent on
whether Innove would be allowed to use existing ducts. Attached herein as Annex “A” is
an email dated August 23, 2005 from Arnold Pasa to Maria Glenda Castro showing that
there was a demand for lines by the clients MGC and Every Nation but which
requirements were not able to materialize due to the absence of facility in the area since
at that time Innove has yet to secure a permit for underground installation in The Fort.
With respect to the market place, which is also a target site in The Fort,
complainant Pascua likewise did what is required of him by initiating talks with possible
clients. In fact he was almost able to close a deal with Station Square East Commercial
Corporation (SSECC) through Engr. Jeffrey P. Uy where it not for the absence of a
Memorandum of Agreement for Right of Way between Innove and BCDA. Attached
herein as Annexes “B” to “B-2” is an email trail the latest of which was dated July 13,
2005 from Virgilio Moreno to Complainant Pascua that the proposed MOA was not yet
signed at the same time the negotiations were being undertaken by complainant Manaog.
With the foregoing, it can be clearly deducted that complainant Pascua did his
part in the implementation of the above Project but the same did not materialize not
through his fault but through the absence of facility in the area as well as the absence of
the MOA for right of way between respondent company and BCDA.
In the particular Project, respondents again allege that complainant was remiss in
the discharge of his duties. We assert otherwise.
This Project was initially handled Mr. Roselino Barbosa who came from the
group of complainant Pascua. During such time the Outside Plant already informed the
group of complainant Pascua of the difficulty of serving the client Greenhills Christian
Fellowship (GCF) in addition to the fact that the location of the client (which is in Daan
Hari Las Pinas) is still a non-service area back then. In this regard, Mr. Allan Soco, the
Immediate Supervisor of the herein complainant Pascua, instructed Mr. Barbosa through
an email dated March 31, 2005 to inform the client of (GCF) that the Project will not be
pursued “due to line take up vs. amount needed investment”. Attached herein as Annex
“C” is a copy of the email of Mr. Allan Soco to Mr. Barbosa dated March 31, 2005 which
forms an integral part of this Rejoinder.
Thereafter, is the effort of complainant Pascua to find other solutions to close the
amount of GCF and complainant Pascua personally attended to the client. However,
since the client prefers a Makati number (which respondent Company cannot provide
then since the available facility is only for Cavite number) the only solution is the
installation of a wireless Radio Link which according to the group of Mr. Dennis Monzon
will cost about P1.008 Million. In this regard, complainant sent an email dated April 20,
2005 to Mr. Allan Soco recommending to defer the project which recommendation was
approved by Mr. Soco in an email dated April 20, 2005. Attached herein as Annex “D’ is
email of complainant dated April 20, 2005 as well as the email of Mr. Allan Soco dated
April 21, 2005 both forming an integral part of this Rejoinder.
The Batman Kiosk Project is not the sole responsibility of complainant Pascua,
but instead, of the whole Sales Team. The ten (10) supposed Batman Kiosk to be put up is
divided among Residential Group with two (2), Strat Group with three (3) Business
Group with five (5) commitments. Henceforth, complainant Pascua, being merely a part
of the Business group is only supposed to contribute for the materialization of the five (5)
Batman Partners committed. This claim is supported by the email dated July 7, 2005 sent
to Allan Soco to the entire group asking for at least one (1) kiosk per Account Manger
(AM). Attached herein as Annex “E” is a copy of the email of Mr. Soco dated July 7, 2005
which forms an integral part of this Rejoinder.
Notwithstanding the above commitment of only at least one (1) kiosk per AM,
complainant was actually able to initially recruit ten (10) Batman partners as evidenced
by the email dated August 29, 2005 to Maria Glenda Castro et.al. Attached herein as
Annex “F” is a copy of such email which forms an integral part of this Rejoinder.
However, due to problems beyond the control of complainant such as wrong facility,
expired reservation and absence of required documents among others, these initial
recruits failed to ultimately become partners for the Batman Project. This only goes to
show that complainant did his part in the Project and the alleged failure should not be
solely imputed upon him.
In the case of complainant Pascua, respondents failed to show that they subjected
him to this process, which perforce, becomes part and parcel of the administrative due
process. What respondents did with complainant was that they allowed complainant to
continue to perform with his duties and responsibilities without calling his attention on
his alleged poor performance and immediately subjected him to the penalty of
termination for a supposed first offense without going through the “Timing and Sequence
of Disciplinary Process” where a first infraction should only be treated with the penalty of
VERBAL WARNING.
As to the totally irrelevant statement made by the respondents in paragraph 7 of their threatening
complainant Pascua with the filing of a criminal case for Estafa, suffice it to state that the same is a clear
manifestation on the part of the respondents of their desperate effort to create some sort of leverage with
respect to this case knowing fully well that complainant position in this Labor Case is more tenable ad
meritorious.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered it is most respectfully prayed unto this Honorable Office
that the relief prayed for in our Position Paper be granted.
Other relief just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
Quezon City
PAULINO M. PANOY
FELIPE G. MARCELINO
Respondent
x________________________x
SURREJOINDER
I PAULINO M. PANOY, married of legal age with postal address at 1855 Dapitan St., Sampaloc,
Manila, after having been duly sworn in accordance with law do hereby depose and say:
1. After proclaiming with almost infallible conviction that he personally knows herein
undersigned as an illegitimate son of Bonifacio Panoy., respondent steps back and feigns good faith.
However, his prior vehement allegation of personal knowledge greatly revolts against the slightest hint of
good faith which he now grapples in palpable desperation. Respondent know deep within he has perjured
himself and could not look at his own handiwork of deceit and malice getting back at him in the eye;
2. Herein undersigned reiterates all the allegations facts and arguments he has clearly
laid down in his complaint and reply and incorporates the same in this Surrejoinder;
3. However herein undersigned intends to summarily and effectively answer and rebut
respondents allegation that the element of materiality is lacking in the present case. Contrary to what
respondent erroneously believes, a matter is material not only when it is directed to prove a fact in issue.
In prosecutions for perjury, a matter is material if it is the “main fact which was the subject of the inquiry,
or any circumstances which tends to prove that fact xxx:” (United State vs. Estraña 16 Phil. 520, 1910) if
the principal issue to be resolved is whether respondent deceived herein undersigned and as a result the
latter was robbed of his rightful share as true heir to his damage and prejudice (tantamount to saying
respondent committed estafa), then to say that herein undersigned is a bastard son (which is a deliberate
falsehood) is unmistakably material. Because if indeed it were true that herein undersigned is illegitimate
then there will be no basis for an accusation of estafa, for no damage or prejudice may be suffered by an
heir excluded by the law on intestate succession. ( And this is the whole point of respondents defense in
both the simulation of Birth and Estafa charges, for crying out loud!);
4. Respondents’ rejoinder affidavit again offers nothing but plain and ugly denial. “
Denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony
of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. ( People of the Philippines vs. Edwin
Belibet, manny Banoy and Ronnie Rosero G.R. No. 91260, July 25, 1991) to reiterate, suffice it to say
that respondents convenient defense of denial, as well as his feigned good faith, is evidentiary in nature, a
matter best threshed out in full blown trial.
5. There are four (4) elements of the crime of perjury to be taken into account in
determining whether there is a prima facie case, to wit: (a) that the accused made a statement under oath
or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement of affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement or affidavit, the
accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) that the sworn statement or
affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. ( Honorio Saavedra, Jr. vs
DOJ, RTC Pasig, branch 67 and Gregorio M. Ramos G.R. No. 93173, September 15, 1993) all of these
elements are present in the present case;
6. “ There are two essential elements of proof of perjury: (1) the statement made by the
defendant must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defendant did not believe those
statements to be true. Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an integral act. It may be
proved by his admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state of mind of the accused may be
determined by the things he says and does, from proof of motive to lie and of the objective falsity itself
and from other facts tending to show that the accused really know the things he claimed not to know.”
(Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice. 475 SCRA 495) All the circumstances and proof that undersigned has
laid in his two complaint clearly reveals Felipe’s elaborate plan of deceit, cunning and manipulation
which is all but innocent in nature it s criminal as a matter of fact and law. They more than satisfy the
abovementioned elements of proof of perjury.
7. Finally, herein undersigned would like to reiterate that whatever issues respondent has
raised in his counter-affidavit and rejoinder-affidavit they are properly matters of defense the truth of
which are best ferreted out in a judicial proceeding. The complaint, reply as well as this surrejoinder has
briefly yet sufficiently alleged facts and circumstances that clearly establishes probable cause enough to
engender a well-founded belief that respondent should be place in trial for the crime ascribed to him;
8. That I am executing this Affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing and for the
purpose of charging Felipe G. Maecelino of violation of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal
Code.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand on this 22 nd day of May 2008 at Manila,
Philippines.
PAULINO M. PANOY
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22nd day of May 2008 in the city of Paranaque.
Administering Officer
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff avers that:
1.) They were the nursing students who took the Nursing Board Exam last July 2007
however failed the same;
2.) That Defendants-students of Emilio Aguinaldo College (EAC) also took the Nursing
Board Exam in July 2008 and passed the same with each and everyone of them obtaining
the unbelievable grade of 99.99%.
3.) That Defendants-Members of the Board of Nursing were all in conspiracy with herein
Defendants-students of EAC to surreptitiously distribute advance copies of the Board
questions prior to the examination date on 12 July 2008.
4.) That Defendants-students had complete knowledge of what the questions were hence
they took the exam to the great disadvantage of the other hopeful examinees;
5.) That despite having cheated in the examination, Defendants-students, now licensed
nurses, willfully, unlawfully and guiltlessly continue to work as nurses for different
hospitals and health centers.
PRAYER
Wherefore, it is prayed that after due notice and hearing a judgment be rendered ordering:
Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises.
VERIFICATION
We, under oath, aver that: a.) We are the plaintiff in the afore-entitled case; b.) We caused the
preparation of the Complaint; c.) We read it and its contents are true of our own knowledge.
SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nd day of December 2009 at Manila. I hereby
certify that I have examined the Complainants and that I am fully satisfied that they have
voluntarily executed and understood the contents of their Complaint.
Under oath, the undersigned hereby certify that they have not earlier commenced a similar action
against the defendants for the same cause with any other court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency.
(Sgd.)
MEMBERS OF THE SAMAHAN
NG MGA NURSING STUDENTS
SA UST
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nd day of December 2009 at Manila. I hereby
certify that I have examined the Complainants and that I am fully satisfied that they have
voluntarily executed and understood the contents of their Complaint.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
ANSWER
Now come the defendants, by the undersigned counsel, in the above0entitled case to this
Commission most respectfully allege:
That by virtue of this unwarranted and malicious act initiated by the plaintiff, defendants were
forced to engage counsel in the sum of P200,000.00.
PROOF OF SERVICE
VERIFICATION
We, under oath, aver that: a.) We are the defendants in the afore-entitled case; b.) We caused the
preparation of the Answer; c.) We read it and its contents are true of our own knowledge.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of December 2009 at Manila. I hereby
certify that I have examined the Defendants and that I am fully satisfied that they have
voluntarily executed and understood the contents of their Answer.
Vs
JOSEPH IGNACIO
POSITION PAPER
After due consideration of the evidence presented by both parties, the sex scandal video
that circulated to the public had caused irreparable damages to my client Maricar Aguinaldo, It
caused a great humiliation from the society, she being an actress in the local showbiz industry.
Needless to say is that it was really Dr. Joseph Ignacio who recorded the video and also the one
who caused the proliferation of the sex video involving him and the complainant Maricar
Aguinaldo.
The acts of the respondent Dr. Joseph Ignacio, a member of the Medical Profession is
immoral, unethical and thus warrants revocation of his license as a Medical Practitioner. The
respondent’s action has tainted the reputable name of Medical Profession. The commission
should be vigilant of the actions and behaviour of its members, to do otherwise is to degrade the
high standard of professionalism and the medical profession.
Drastic actions to regulate the unworthy members would be of paramount importance for
the improvement of the standard in the admission of the members of the Medical Profession.
Indeed, the acts of Dr. Ignacio against Ms. Aguinaldo proved that he was not worthy to be a
member of the Profession for only those with moral ethical personality fits the profession.
It is respectfully prayed for, that this honourable commission revoke the license of Dr.
Joseph Ignacio on the ground of immorality and unethical practice.
Vs
Comes now unto this honourable commission, the complainant thru counsel respectfully
submits:
I
II
STIPULATION OF FACTS
That it is of common knowledge that a sex scandal involving the complainant Maricar
Aguinaldo and the respondent Dr. Joseph Ignacio has been circulating in the public. Needless to
say, those acts committed by Dr. Ignacio is an immoral act and was unethical for he was a
member of the Medical Profession.
The acts of Dr. Joseph Ignacio in committing in recording their sexual acts is a
manifestation that he is unfit to be a member of the Medical Profession, for to do such acts is an
indication of one’s the mental status or sanity.
The sex video causes great humiliation to the complainant Maricar Aguinaldo, a showbiz
personality. Revocation of License of the respondent would somehow lessen if not totally
compensate the damages incurred by the complainant from the ruthless act by the respondent Dr.
Joseph Ignacio.
III
EVIDENCE TO BE PRESENTED
IV
WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED
X-----------------------------------X
COMPLAINT
Complainant, through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Board respectfully avers
that:
1. Complainant, Juan Dela Cruz, is of legal age, presently residing at 123 ABC Street, Quezon City.
For the purpose of this complaint, he can be served with orders, resolutions or decision and
other processes of this Honorable Board.
2. Respondent NEW SAN JOSE BUILDERS, INC. is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines with office address at 234 ASD St. Quezon City where it can be
served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Board.
3. Respondent entered into a Project Agreement with the GSIS to develop and construct “GSIS
METRO HOMES”, a residential and commercial Condominium Project, located at 345 FGH St. Sta.
Mesa Manila, owned and operated by GSIS.
4. Under the agreement the respondent is authorized to receive and acknowledge the purchase
price of the Condominium unit sold on Cash Basis and to remit to the GSIS its share of the selling
price.
5. Complaint applied for a unit on the said project. However the complaint did not have sufficient
money to cover the whole amount of the GSIS approved selling price and the total cost of the
subject condominium unit of Php 500,000.00 so they requested the respondent to accept the
payment on staggered basis, which the latter allowed.
6. Thus the complainant paid Php 10,000 as reservation fee covered by official receipt. Eventually
the complainant was required to sign a pro-forma Memoradum of Agreement relative to the sale
of the Condominium Unit.
7. Subject to the MOA the complaint religiously paid and complied with its obligation and has fully
paid the purchase price including its interest of the Condominium Unit as early as Novemenber
1999.
8. Despite the full payment of the purchase price the respondent failed to comply with its
obligation notwithstanding repeated demands.
9. The complainant requested the assistance of the GSIS, as the owner of the Condominium
Project. It was affirmed that despite full payment the respondent did not coordinate with the
GSIS and not remitted the purchase price to the GSIS.
10. GSIS tried to communicate with the respondent but the latter still refused to comply with its
obligation.
11. The above mentioned acts or omissions of the respondent are clear violations of the mutual
covenant as provided by the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the parties.
12. To date, respondent, despite repeated demands verbal and written has failed to fulfill its
obligations, prompting the undersigned counsel upon the instruction of the complainant to
institute instant complaint. For his professional services, complainant is obliged to pay an
attorney’s fees of not less than Php 50,000, for which the respondent should be held liable.
13. As proximate result of the respondent above mentioned act or omissions complaint suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety, and besmirched reputation, wounded feeling,
moral shock, and social humiliation, for which the respondent should be made to pay damages
in the sum of not less than Php 200,000.
14. To serve as a lesson for having acted in bad faith, wanton and reckless disregard of the
complainant’s right and as reminder that economic power of the developer will never justify
reckless disregard of the rights of others, an exemplary damages should be awarded in the
amount of Php 10,000.
RELIEF
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Board that after due proceedings,
judgment be rendered in favor of the compliant and against the respondent as follows:
1. Ordering the respondent to coordinate with the GSIS as regards the subject condominium unit
and remit to GSIS the amount corresponding its share on the selling price of the subject
Condominium Unit;
2. Ordering the respondent to prepare the corresponding and final DEED of Absolute Sale for the
execution of the herein parties and GSIS, as owner of the GSIS METRO HOMES particularly the
subject Condominium Unit;
3. Cancelling the License to Sell previously issued by this Honorable Board to respondent NEW SAN
JOSE BUIlDERS, INC;
4. Ordering the respondent to pay herein complainant the following:
a. Moral Damages in the amount of Php 200,000
b. Exemplary Damages in the amount of Php 100,000
c. Attorney’s fees in the amount of Php 50,000
d. Cost of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premise are likewise prayed for.
I, JUAN DELA CRUZ, of legal age, single, Filipino citizen, resident of 123 ABC Street, Quezon City
after having been duly sworn at in accordance with the law, hereby depose and state:
IN WITNESS WHEROF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this day of August 10, 2010.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this August 10, 2009 affiant exhibiting to me is driver’s
license NO. 12345.
Doc. No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2010
Republic of the Philippines
Quezon City
Nobio Sardinas ,
Plaintiff
-versus-
Juanito Sarmiento
Defendant
ANSWER
COMES NOW THE defendant in the above entitled case through undersigned counsel and to this
Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
2. That he denies the allegations in paragraph 3 of the complaint as he has no knowledge of the
condominium buyer.
AS COUNTERCLAIM
3. That due to the filing of the entirely baseless and unjustified complaint without any valid cause of
action, defendant’s reputation was destroyed causing him sleepless nights and mental stress,
suffering mental and mental damages in an amount to be assessed by the Honorable Court;
4. That the defendant in order to defend himself from the unfounded suit had to engage the services
of counsel in the amount of P 40, 000.00.
VERIFICATION
JUANITO SARMIENTO, of legal age, after having been duly sworn, deposes and says: That he
is the defendant in the above-entitled case; that he caused the preparation of the above answer; and
that he has read the allegations thereof and the same is true and correct of his own knowledge;
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27th day of November, 2009 at Quezon City,
affiant exhibiting to me this Residence Certificate No. 634219 issued in Quezon City on November
15, 2009.
Notary Public
Doc. No 30
Page No. 8
Book no.3
Series of 2009
REPLY
(TO THE ANSWER to the THIRD-PARTY Complaint with Counter Claim)
1. The baseless and desperate denial of GSIS to comply with what is being legally mandated of it
fell short of any reasonable and legal argument to support its claims.
2. The Project Agreement entered into between the NSJBI and GSIS which covers the subject
property in dispute, clearly grants NSJBI the power to sell and dispose of the units constructed
therein to interested and prospective buyers. The aforesaid power and authority is embedded in
the Article IV of the Project Agreement which reads in this wise:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, respondent and third-party complainant NSJBI, most respectfully prays that
judgment be rendered dismissing the instant complaint against NSJBI for utter lack of merit.
Other just and equitable relief are likewise prayed for.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
March 30, 2009, Quezon City
Explanation
The foregoing Reply was filed with this Honorable Office and served upon the other party
through registered mail due to the distance and lack of office personnel.
Copy Furnished:
Quezon City
Complainant
Respondent
POSITION PAPER
This is a complaint for specific performance, declaration of nullity of the mortgage contract, damages or
in the alternative for sum of money and damages filed by complainant spouses Marcial Santos and
Elizabeth Santos against the respondents.
1. The lot in question is a 54-square meter lot with a two-storey townhouse, designated as
Townhouse No.8.
2. Townhouse No. 8 is located at No. 65 General Lim Street, Heroes Hill, Quezon City and is on a
portion of the land covered by TCT No. 195187
3. Respondent spouses Ted and Robina Camat (spouses Camat) bought Townhouse No.8 from
Trans-American Sales and Exposition represented by its developer Bernardo Garcia (Garcia) on
August 6 1988
4. Respondent spouses Camat paid Garcia P850,000 as evidenced by contract of sale and
provisional receipt. According to spouses Camat, they took possessions of townhouse No. 8 upon
its completion of its construction.
5. In December of 1988, Garcia bought from Marcial and Elizabeth Santos (spouses Santos) various
constructions materials. As payment to spouses Santos, Garcia executed an absolute DEED of
Sale over townhouse No. 12. However, on 1 March 1990, spouses Santos and Garcia executed
DEED of Exchange with Addendum whereby spouses Santos transferred to Garcia townhouse
No. 12 , in exchange Garcia transferred to spouses Santos townhouse No.8
6. The contracts executed by Garcia with spouses Camat and spouses Santos were not registered
with the Register of Deeds. This was because TCT No. 195187 was still being reconstituted and it
was only on 17 August 1989 that TCT 7285 was issued in its stead.
7. On 10 May 1990, Garcia and his wife Trudis (spouses Garcia ) executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over townhouse No.8 in favor of spouses Rodolfo and Rosario Angeles Espejo
(spouses Espejo) as security.
8. As spouses Garcia failed to pay their indebtedness, spouses Espejo foreclosed the mortgage on 12
October 1990. At the public auction, spouses Espejo were the highest bidder.
ISSUE
Whether or not the complainant has the right over the property.
As between spouses Camat and spouses Santos, spouses Camat have a better right to the property.
Neither of the sales were registered, spouses Camat have a better right being the first possessor in
good faith.
The registration of the mortgage cannot defeat the right of spouses Camat since the mortgage was
executed by one who was no longer owner of the property. Spouses Espejo failed to prove that they
were mortgagees in good faith.
The respondents contend that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over cases involving the declaration of
nullity of a mortgage contract filed against the mortgagee alone; and (2) Section 18 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 (PD 957) merely requires the project owner or developer to seek prior authority from
NHA before mortgaging the subdivision lot or condominium unit but the law does not grant the
HLURB the authority to invalidate the mortgage contract if the requisite authority from NHA is not
obtained.
Based on the foregoing factual statements, it is very clear that respondent have a better right over the
property as being the first possessor in good faith.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
On February 6, 2009
Quezon City
VERIFICATION
TED AND ROBINA CAMAT, of legal age, after having been duly sworn, depose and say: That they are
the respondent in the above-entitled case; that they caused the preparation of the above position paper;
that the allegations are true and correct of their own knowledge;
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27 th day of November 2009 at Quezon City,
affiant exhibiting to me Residence Certificate No. 947267 issued in Quezon City on November 20, 2009.
Notary Public
Page No. 3
Book No. 6
Series of 2009
Complainants,
-versus- HLURB CASE NO._______
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
NOTICE OF APPEAL
notice that it is appealing to the Office of the President the Decision dated 30 July 2009 of the Third
Division, Board of Commissioners, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in HLURB Case
No.________ entitled “Juan dela Cruz vs. New San Jose Biulders Inc. represented by its President Rey
Vergara and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)”, denying the separate appeals filed by
A copy of the decision of the Third Division, Board of Commissioners, Housing and Land Use
In compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as amended, counsel respectfully
manifests that service of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was done by registered mail, personal service
not being practicable due to distance, time and personnel constraints.
COPY FURNISHED:
Quezon City