THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 121791. December 23, 1998.]

ENRIQUE SALAFRANCA , petitioner, vs . PHILAMLIFE (PAMPLONA)

VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., BONIFACIO DAZO and
THE SECOND DIVISION, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC) , respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; EMPLOYMENT; ELEVEN YEARS

OF SERVICE RENDERS EMPLOYEE REGULAR. — On the outset, there is no dispute that
petitioner had already attained the status of a regular employee, as evidenced by his eleven
years of service with the private respondent. Accordingly, petitioner enjoys the right to
security of tenure and his services may be terminated only for causes provided by law. cdasia

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TERMINATION; SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL GROUNDS. — Viewed

in this light, while private respondent has the right to terminate the services of petitioner,
this is subject to both substantive and procedural grounds. The substantive causes for
dismissal are those provided in Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code, while the
procedural grounds refer to the observance of the requirement of due process. In all these
instances, it is the private respondent, being the employer, who must prove the validity of
the dismissal. These requirements are mandatory and non-compliance therewith renders
any judgment reached by the management void and inexistent.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GROSS NEGLIGENCE AND SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, MUST BE
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT, NOT SUFFICIENT. — While private respondent
imputes "gross negligence," and "serious misconduct" as the causes of petitioner's
dismissal, not a shred of evidence was offered in support thereof, other than bare and
uncorroborated allegations. The facts and circumstances regarding such alleged
infractions were never explained. While it is true that private respondent, through its
president Bonifacio Dazo, executed an af davit narrating the alleged violations of the
petitioner, these were never corroborated by concrete or competent evidence. It is settled
that no undue importance should be given to a sworn statement or af davit as a piece of
evidence because, being taken ex parte, an af davit is almost always incomplete and
inaccurate. Furthermore, it must be noted that when petitioner was terminated in 1992,
these alleged infractions were never raised nor communicated to him. In fact, these were
only revealed after the complaint was led by the petitioner in 1993. Why there was a delay
was never adequately explained by private respondent. Likewise, we note that Dazo
himself was not presented as a witness to give the petitioner an opportunity to cross-
examine him and propound clari catory questions regarding matters averred in his
af davit. All told, the foregoing lapses and the belated submission of the af davit, cast
doubt as to the credibility of the allegations. In sum, the dismissal of the petitioner had no
factual basis whatsoever. The rule is that unsubstantiated accusations without more, are
not tantamount to guilt.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ESSENCE OF DUE .PROCESS. — The essence of due process is to
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 afford the party an opportunity to be heard and defend himself, to cleanse his name and
reputation from any taint. It includes the twin requirements of notice and hearing. This
concept evolved from the basic tenet that one's employment or profession is a property
right protected by the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. Hence, an individual's
separation from work must be founded on clearly-established facts, not on mere
conjectures and suspicions.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL WITHOUT DUE PROCESS, AN INVALID AND OBNOXIOUS
EXERCISE OF MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE. — Dismissal, being the ultimate penalty that
can be meted out to an employee, should be based on a clear or convincing ground. As
such, a decision to terminate an employee without fully apprising him of the facts, on the
pretext that the twin requirements of notice and hearing are unnecessary or useless, is an
invalid and obnoxious exercise of management prerogative.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; TERMINATION BASED ON AMENDED BY-LAWS CANNOT IMPAIR
OBLIGATION OF EXISTING CONTRACTS OR RIGHTS. — Admittedly, the right to amend the
by-laws lies solely in the discretion of the employer, this being in the exercise of
management prerogative or business judgment. However this right, extensive as it may be,
cannot impair the obligation of existing contracts or rights. If private respondent wanted
to make the petitioner's position co-terminus with that of the Board of Directors, then the
amendment must be effective after petitioner's stay with the private respondent, not
during his term. Obviously, the measure taken by the private respondent in amending its
by-laws is nothing but a devious, but crude, attempt to circumvent petitioner's right to
security of tenure as a regular employee guaranteed under the Labor Code.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEAL; ISSUES CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL; CASE AT BAR. — In the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, it is
noteworthy that private respondent never raised the issue of compulsory retirement, as a
cause for terminating petitioner's service. In its appeal before the NLRC, this ground was
never discussed. In fact, private respondent, in justifying the termination of the petitioner,
still anchored its claim on the applicability of the amended by-laws. This omission is fatal
to private respondent's cause, for the rule is well-settled that matters, theories or
arguments not brought out in the proceedings below will ordinarily not be considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
8. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; PERIOD FOR FILING. — Under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a petition for certiorari must now be instituted within sixty days of receipt of
the assailed judgment, order or resolution. However, since this case arose in 1995 and the
aforementioned rule only took effect on July 1, 1997 then the old rule is applicable. Since
prior to the effectivity of the new rule, a special civil action of certiorari should be instituted
within a period of three months, the instant petition which was led on September 20,
1995 or two months and twenty-two days thereafter, was still within the reglementary
period.
9. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION,
EMPLOYEE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES AND REINSTATEMENT. —
However, since we have already ruled petitioner's dismissal as without just cause and
lacking due process, the award of backwages and reinstatement is proper. An illegally
dismissed employee is entitled to its full payment as long as the cause of action accrued
after March 21, 1989. Considering that petitioner was terminated from the service on
December 9, 1992, which is after March 21, 1989, he is entitled to full backwages from the
time of the illegal dismissal without any qualification or deduction. TSHEIc

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 10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF SEPARATION PAY PROPER WHERE REINSTATEMENT IS
NO LONGER FEASIBLE. — In this particular case, reinstatement is no longer feasible since
petitioner was already 70 years old at the time he was removed from his employment. As a
substitute thereof, separation pay is generally awarded, the amount of which must be
equivalent to one-month salary for every year of service.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; RETIREMENT BENEFITS; BASIS OF COMPUTATION. — As regards the
issue of retirement pay, private respondent asserts that the correct amount should be one-
half (1/2) month salary for every year of service. This time we agree with private
respondent's contention. The pertinent law is Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7641, which reads: . . . In the absence of a retirement plan or
agreement providing for retirement bene ts of employees in the establishment, an
employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more but not beyond sixty- ve (65)
years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five
(5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay
equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at
least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; TERMINATION; MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE NOT ENTITLED TO 13TH
MONTH PAY. — With respect to the issue that petitioner, being a managerial employee, is
not entitled to thirteenth month pay, Memorandum Order No. 28, as implemented by the
Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law dated November 16,
1987, provides: "Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 851 is hereby modi ed to the extent
that all employers are hereby required to pay all their rank and le employees a 13th month
pay not later than December 24 of every year." Clearly, therefore, the foregoing exempts
managerial employees from this bene t. Of course, this does not preclude an employer
from granting other bonuses, in lieu of the 13th month pay, to managerial employees in its
discretion. cSEaTH

13. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT EFFECTED IN

OPPRESSIVE MANNER WARRANTS AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. —
Finally, we cannot simply ignore private respondent's malicious scheme to remove
petitioner from his position which is contrary to good customs and effected in an
oppressive manner, thus warranting an award of moral and exemplary damages to the
petitioner.
14. ID.; ID.; ATTORNEY'S FEES; AWARDED EMPLOYEE WHO WAS FORCED TO
LITIGATE TO PROTECT HIS RIGHTS AND INTERESTS. — Moreover, since petitioner was
forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his right and interests, he is entitled to
attorney's fees. ECcTaH

DECISION

ROMERO , J : p

Petitioner Enrique Salafranca started working with the private respondent Philamlife
Village Homeowners Association on May 1, 1981 as administrative of cer for a period of
six months. From this date until December 31, 1983, petitioner was reappointed to his
position three more times. 1 As administrative of cer, petitioner was generally responsible
for the management of the village's day to day activities. 2 After petitioner's term of
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 employment expired on December 31, 1983, he still continued to work in the same
capacity, albeit, without the benefit of a renewed contract. cda

Sometime in 1987, private respondent decided to amend its by-laws. Included therein was
a provision regarding of cers, speci cally, the position of administrative of cer under
which said of cer shall hold of ce at the pleasure of the Board of Directors. In view of this
development, private respondent, on July 3, 1987, informed the petitioner that his term of
of ce shall be coterminus with the Board of Directors which appointed him to his position.
Furthermore, until he submits a medical certi cate showing his state of health, his
employment shall be on a month-to-month basis. 3 Oddly, notwithstanding the failure of
herein petitioner to submit his medical certi cate, he continued working until his
termination in December 1992. 4 Claiming that his services had been unlawfully and
unceremoniously dispensed with, petitioner led a complaint for illegal dismissal with
money claims and for damages. 5
After the submission by the parties of their respective position papers and other
pleadings, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision 6 ordering private respondent to pay the
petitioner the amount of P257,833.33 representing his backwages, separation pay and
13th month pay. In justifying the award, the Labor Arbiter elucidated:
"Respondents' contention that complainant's term of employment was co-
terminus with the term of Of ce of the Board of Directors, is wanting in merit.
Records show that complainant had been hired in 1981 while the Amendment of
the respondents' By-Laws making the position of an Administrative Of cer co-
terminus with the term of the Board of Directors was made in 1987. Evidently, the
said Amendment would not be applicable to the case of complainant who had
become a regular employee long time before the Amendment took place.
Moreover, the Amendment should be applied prospectively and not retroactively."

On appeal by the private respondent, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
and rendered a new one 7 reducing petitioner's monetary award to only one-half (½) month
pay for every year of service representing his retirement pay. In other words, the NLRC
viewed the dismissal of the petitioner as a valid act by the private respondent.
"The fact that he continued to perform the function of the of ce of administrative
of cer without extension or re-appointment thereafter, to our mind, did not in any
way make his employment permanent as in fact, he was even reminded of the
nature of his position by then president of the association Jaime Y. Ladao in a
letter of 3 July 1987. His reply to the aforesaid letter, claiming his employment
regular, and viz a viz, referring to submit his medical certi cate, notwithstanding,
to our mind, merely underscored the need to de ne his position as, in fact, the
Association's Rules and Regulations were amended if but to put to rest the tenural
(sic) limit of the of ce of the Administrative Of cer in accordance with its earlier
intention, that it is co-terminus with that of the members of the Board of Directors.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. Respondents are
hereby ordered to pay herein appellee one half (½) month pay for every year of
service representing his retirement pay."

In view of the sudden turn of events, petitioner has elevated the case to this Court
assigning the following errors: 8
1. The NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that the employment
of the Petitioner is not purely based on considerations of Employer-Employee
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 relationship.
2. Petitioner was illegally dismissed by private respondents.

As to the rst assigned error by the petitioner, we need not dwell on this at length. We
agree with the Solicitor General's observation that an employer-employee relationship
exists between the petitioner and the private respondent. 9
"xxx xxx xxx
The rst element is present in this case. Petitioner was hired as Administrative
Of cer by respondents. In fact, he was extended successive appointments by
respondents.

The second element is also present since it is not denied that respondent PVHA
paid petitioner a fixed salary for his services.

As to the third element, it can be seen from the Records that respondents had the
power of dismissal over petitioner. In their letter dated December 7, 1992,
respondents informed petitioner that they had decided to discontinue his services.
In their Position Paper submitted to the Labor Arbiter, respondents stated that
petitioner 'was dismissed for cause.' (p. 17, Record).

With respect to the fourth and most important element, respondents controlled the
work of petitioner not only with respect to the ends to be achieved but also the
means used in reaching such ends."

Relative to the second assigned error of the petitioner, both the Solicitor General and the
private respondent take the stance that petitioner was not illegally dismissed. 1 0 On this
aspect, we disagree with their contentions.
On the outset, there is no dispute that petitioner had already attained the status of a
regular employee, as evidenced by his eleven years of service with the private respondent.
Accordingly, petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure 1 1 and his services may be
terminated only for causes provided by law. 1 2
Viewed in this light, while private respondent has the right to terminate the services of
petitioner, this is subject to both substantive and procedural grounds. 1 3 The substantive
causes for dismissal are those provided in Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code, 1 4
while the procedural grounds refer to the observance of the requirement of due process.
1 5 In all these instances, it is the private respondent being the employer, who must prove
the validity of the dismissal. 1 6
Having reviewed the records of this case carefully, we conclude that private respondent
utterly failed to substantiate petitioner's dismissal, rendering the latter's termination
illegal. At the risk of being redundant, it must be stressed that these requirements are
mandatory and non-compliance therewith renders any judgment reached by the
management void and inexistent. 1 7
While private respondent imputes "gross negligence," and "serious misconduct" as the
causes of petitioner's dismissal, 1 8 not a shred of evidence was offered in support thereof,
other than bare and uncorroborated allegations. The facts and circumstances regarding
such alleged infractions were never explained. While it is true that private respondent,
through its president Bonifacio Dazo, executed an af davit narrating the alleged violations
of the petitioner, 1 9 these were never corroborated by concrete or competent evidence. It
is settled that no undue importance should be given to a sworn statement or af davit as a
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 piece of evidence because, being taken ex-parte, an af davit is almost always incomplete
and inaccurate. 2 0 Furthermore, it must be noted that when petitioner was terminated in
1992, these alleged infractions were never raised nor communicated to him. In fact, these
were only revealed after the complaint was led by the petitioner in 1993. Why there was a
delay was never adequately explained by private respondent.
Likewise, we note that Dazo himself was not presented as a witness to give the petitioner
an opportunity to cross-examine him and propound clari catory questions regarding
matters averred in his af davit. All told, the foregoing lapses and the belated submission
of the af davit, cast doubt as to the credibility of the allegations. In sum, the dismissal of
the petitioner had no factual basis whatsoever. The rule is that unsubstantiated
accusations without more, are not tantamount to guilt. 2 1
As regards the issue of procedural due process, private respondent justi es its non-
compliance therewith in this wise: LexLib

"The Association Of cers, being his peers and friends had a problem however in
terminating his services. He had been found to have committed infractions as
previously enumerated. PVHA could have proceeded with a full-blown
investigation to hear these charges, but the ordeal might break the old man's
heart as this will surely affect his standing in the community. So they decided to
make their move as discreetly (but legally) as possible to save the petitioner's
reputation. Terminating him in accordance with the provision of the by-laws of
the Association without pointing out his numerous faults and malfeasance in
of ce and with one-half month pay for every year of service in accordance with
the Retirement Law was the best and only alternative."

We are not impressed. The reasoning advanced by the private respondent is as puerile as
it is preposterous.
The essence of due process is to afford the party an opportunity to be heard and defend
himself, to cleanse his name and reputation from any taint. It includes the twin
requirements of notice and hearing. 2 2 This concept evolved from the basic tenet that
one's employment or profession is a property right protected by the constitutional
guaranty of due process of law. 2 3 Hence, an individual's separation from work must be
founded on clearly-established facts, not on mere conjectures and suspicions. 2 4
In light of the foregoing, private respondent's arguments are clearly baseless and without
merit. In truth, instead of protecting petitioner's reputation, private respondent succeeded
in doing exactly the opposite — it condemned the petitioner without even hearing his side.
It is stating the obvious that dismissal, being the ultimate penalty that can be meted out to
an employee, should be based on a clear or convincing ground. 2 5 As such, a decision to
terminate an employee without fully apprising him of the facts, on the pretext that the twin
requirements of notice and hearing are unnecessary or useless, is an invalid and obnoxious
exercise of management prerogative.

Furthermore, private respondent, in an effort to validate the dismissal of the petitioner,

posits the theory that the latter's position is coterminus with that of the Village's Board of
Directors, as provided for in its amended by-laws. 2 6
Admittedly, the right to amend the by-laws lies solely in the discretion of the employer, this
being in the exercise of management prerogative or business judgment. However this
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 right, extensive as it may be, cannot impair the obligation of existing contracts or rights.
Prescinding from these premises, private respondent's insistence that it can legally
dismiss petitioner on the ground that his tenure has expired is untenable. To reiterate,
petitioner, being a regular employee, is entitled to security of tenure; hence, his services
may only be terminated for causes provided by law. 2 7 A contrary interpretation would not
nd justi cation in the laws or the Constitution. If we were to rule otherwise, it would
enable an employer to remove any employee from his employment by the simple
expediency of amending its by-laws and providing that his/her position shall cease to exist
upon the occurrence of a specified event.
If private respondent wanted to make the petitioner's position co-terminus with that of the
Board of Directors, then the amendment must be effective after petitioner's stay with the
private respondent, not during his term. Obviously, the measure taken by the private
respondent in amending its by-laws is nothing but a devious, but crude, attempt to
circumvent petitioner's right to security of tenure as a regular employee guaranteed under
the Labor Code. 2 8
Interestingly, the Solicitor General is of the view that what actually transpired was that
petitioner was retired from his employment, considering the fact that in 1992 he was
already 70 years old and not terminated. 2 9
While there seems to be a semblance of plausibility in this contention for the matter of
extension of service of such employee or of cial is addressed to the sound discretion of
the employer, still we have no doubt that this was just a mere after-thought — a dismissal
disguised as retirement.
In the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, it is noteworthy that private respondent never
raised the issue of compulsory retirement, 3 0 as a cause for terminating petitioner's
service. In its appeal before the NLRC, this ground was never discussed. In fact, private
respondent, in justifying the termination of the petitioner, still anchored its claim on the
applicability of the amended by-laws. This omission is fatal to private respondent's cause,
for the rule is well-settled that matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the
proceedings below will ordinarily not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. 3 1
Undaunted, private respondent now asserts that the instant petition was led out of time,
3 2 considering that the assailed NLRC decision was received on June 28, 1995 while this
petition was led on September 20, 1995. At this juncture, we take this opportunity to
state that under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for certiorari must now be
instituted within sixty days of receipt of the assailed judgment, order or resolution. 3 3
However, since this case arose in 1995 and the aforementioned rule only took effect on
July 1, 1997 then the old rule is applicable. Since prior to the effectivity of the new rule, a
special civil action of certiorari should be instituted within a period of three months, 3 4 the
instant petition which was led on September 20, 1995 or two months and twenty-two
days thereafter, was still within the reglementary period.
With respect to the issue of the monetary award to be given to the petitioner, private
respondent argues that he deserves only retirement pay and nothing more. This position
would have been tenable had petitioner not been illegally dismissed. However, since we
have already ruled petitioner's dismissal as without just cause and lacking due process,
the award of backwages and reinstatement is proper. 3 5

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 In this particular case, reinstatement is no longer feasible since petitioner was already 70
years old at the time he was removed from his employment. As a substitute thereof,
separation pay is generally awarded, 3 6 the amount of which must be equivalent to one-
month salary for every year of service. 3 7
With respect to the amount of backwages which, incidentally is different from separation
pay, 3 8 it is now settled that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to its full payment
as long as the cause of action accrued after March 21, 1989 . 3 9 Considering that petitioner
was terminated from the service on December 9, 1992, which is after March 21, 1989, he is
entitled to full backwages from the time of the illegal dismissal without any quali cation or
deduction. 4 0
As regards the issue of retirement pay, private respondent asserts that the correct amount
should be one-half (½) month salary for every year of service. This time we agree with
private respondent's contention. The pertinent law is Article 287 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7641, which reads:
"Art. 287. Retirement. — Any employee may be retired upon reaching the
retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other
applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement
bene ts as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining
agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employee's
retirement bene ts under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall
not be less than those provided herein.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement bene ts
of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty
(60) years or more, but not beyond sixty- ve (65) years which is hereby declared
the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least ve (5) years in the said
establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at
least one-half (½) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six
(6) months being considered as one whole year.

xxx xxx xxx."

With respect to the issue that petitioner, being a managerial employee, is not entitled to
thirteenth month pay, Memorandum Order No. 28, as implemented by the Revised
Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law dated November 16, 1987,
provides:
"Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 851 is hereby modi ed to the extent that all
employers are hereby required to pay all their rank and le employees a 13th
month pay not later than December 24 of every year."

Clearly, therefore, the foregoing exempts managerial employees from this bene t. Of
course, this does not preclude an employer from granting other bonuses, in lieu of the 13th
month pay, to managerial employees in its discretion.
Finally, we cannot simply ignore private respondent's malicious scheme to remove
petitioner from his position which is contrary to good customs and effected in an
oppressive manner, thus warranting an award of moral and exemplary damages to the
petitioner. 4 1 Moreover, since petitioner was forced to litigate and incur expenses to
protect his right and interests, he is entitled to attorney's fees. 4 2
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 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED The NLRC decision
dated June 15, 1995 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Philamlife
Village Homeowners Association is ORDERED: (1) to pay petitioner Enrique Salafranca
separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service; (2) to pay his full
backwages in accordance with our ruling in Bustamante v. NLRC ; 4 3 (3) to pay his
retirement pay in accordance with Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7641, (4) to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amount of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos and ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, respectively; 44 and (5) to pay
ten (10%) percent of the total amount due to petitioner, as attorney's fees. Consequently,
the respondent NLRC is ORDERED to COMPUTE the total monetary bene ts awarded in
accordance with this decision and to submit its compliance thereon within thirty (30) days
from notice of this decision.
SO ORDERED. cda

Kapunan, Purisima and Pardo, JJ ., concur.

Footnote
1. Annex "B," "C," "D" of Petition, pp. 26-29.

2. Ibid., p. 59.
3. Id., p. 61.
4. Id., p. 30.
5. Id., pp. 35-36.
6. Id., pp. 137-144.
7. Rollo, pp. 174-186.
8. Id., p. 10.
9. Comment, Rollo, pp. 254-255.
10. Id., p. 255.
11. Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)-Manila v. NLRC , 261 SCRA 189
(1996).
12. San Miguel Jeepney Service v. NLRC, 265 SCRA 38 (1996).
13. Manuel v. N.C. Construction Supply, 282 SCRA 326 (1997); Shoppers Gain Supermart v.
NLRC, 259 SCRA 411 (1996).
14. ART. 282. Termination by employer . — An employer may terminate an employment for
any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person

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 of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative: and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation
of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the
workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving
devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in
cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due
to serious business losses or nancial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent
to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (½) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1)
whole year.

15. Brahm v. NLRC, 280 SCRA 828 (1997); Jamer v. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 (1997).
16. Sanyo Travel Corporation v. NLRC, 280 SCRA 129 (1997).
17. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRC, 210 SCRA 277 (1992).
18. Comment, Rollo, p. 189.
19. Rollo, pp. 73-77.
20. People v. Ragay, 277 SCRA 106 (1997).
21. RDS Trucking v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123491, August 27, 1998.
22. MGG Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 259 SCRA 664 (1996).
23. JMM Production and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 319 (1996).
24. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 (1997).
25. Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, 252 SCRA 237 (1996).
26. Rollo, p. 60.
27. Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution; San Miguel Jeepney Services v. NLRC ,
265 SCRA 35 (1996).
28. Article 279, Labor Code, as amended.
29. Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 362-363.
30. Position Paper, Rollo, pp. 66-71.

31. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, 259 SCRA 459 (1996).

32. Rollo, p. 194.

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 33. Sec. 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
34. People's Security, Inc. v. NLRC , 226 SCRA 146 (1993): PAL Employees Savings and
Loan Association, Inc. v. NLRC, 260 SCRA 758 (1996).
35. Judy Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111934, April 29, 1998.
36. Escobin, et al. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118159, April 15, 1998.
37. International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. NLRC , G.R. No. 106331, March 9, 1998; Iriga
Telephone Company, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119420, February 27, 1998.
38. Indophil Acrylic Mfg. Corp. v. NLRC, 226 SCRA 723 (1993).
39. Highway Copra Traders v. NLRC , G.R. No. 108889, July 30, 1998; Ala Mode Garments,
Inc. v. NLRC, 268 SCRA 497 (1997).
40. Bustamante v. NLRC , 265 SCRA 61 (1996), Lopez v. NLRC , G.R. No. 124548, October 8,
1998.
41. Zamboanga City Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC , 243 SCRA 47 (1995); Lopez v.
Javier, 252 SCRA 68 (1996).
42. Rasonable v. NLRC, 253 SCRA 623 (1996).
43. Supra, note 40.
44. Quijano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126561, July 8, 1998.

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