01 GREGORIO LLANTINO and BELINDA LLANTINO vs.CO LIONG CHONG 5.
5. The Llantinos filed their complaint to quiet title with damages before
alias JUAN MOLINA
G.R. No. L-29663 August 20, 1990
Facts:
1. Plaintiffs aver that they owned a commercial-residential land in
Virac, Catanduanes, which sometime in 1954 they leased to the
defendant who was then a Chinese national and went by the name
of Co Liong Chong. The lease was for a period of 13 years, for the
sum of P6,150.00 for the whole period.
2. The defendant was placed in possession of the property but knowing
that the period of the least would end with the year 1967,
petitioners requested private respondent for a conference but the
latter did not honor the request and instead he informed the
petitioners that he had already constructed a commercial building
on the land worth P50,000.00; that the lease contract was for a
period of sixty (60) years, counted from 1954; and that he has
become a naturalized Filipino citizen in 1961 and that his name is no
longer Co Liong Chong but Juan Molina.
3. The claim of Chong came as a surprise to the Llantinos because they
did not remember having agreed to a sixty-year lease agreement as
that would virtually make Chong the owner of the realty which, as a
Chinese national, he had no right to own and neither could he have
acquired such ownership after naturalization subsequent to 1954.
4. On December 16, 1967, in order to avoid a court litigation the
Llantinos once more invited Chong to a conference about the matter
but again Chong ignored the invitation.
the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes
6. The trial court rendered a Decision finding the contract of lease
entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendant on October 5,
1954, valid and in accordance with law and the complaint is
dismissed with costs against the plaintiffs.
7. Petitioners contend that when the contract which is sought to be
declared void was entered into by and between the parties, private
respondent was still a Chinese national. However, they do not
dispute the right of private respondent to hold the landholding in
dispute under a contract of lease but they cannot fathom how
Congress could have thought of a lease contract which shall be for
an indefinite period and yet say that the period to be valid should
not exceed 99 years.
8. Private respondent argued that even though he was still an alien
when he entered into the contract of lease, he was not prohibited
by law to do so. In fact, prior to his becoming a naturalized Filipino
citizen in 1961, the appellants did not question his right to enter into
that contract so that the parties are in pari delicto. He constructed a
building on the property worth P40,000.00 and prays that he be
awarded P30,000.00 for moral damages and P2,000.00 for
Attorney's fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the contract of lease entered into by and between the
petitioners and private respondent on October 5, 1954 for a period of
sixty (60) years is valid (YES. Valid, decision affirmed.)
Ruling:
1
1. The position of private respondent is well taken.
a. The lower court correctly ruled that the defendant-appellee
Chong had at the time of the execution of the contract, the right
to hold by lease the property involved in the case although at the
time of the execution of the contract, he was still a Chinese
national
b. It has been established that there is only one contract and there
is no option to buy the leased property in favor of Chong. There
is nothing in the record, either in the lease contract or in the
complaint itself, to indicate any scheme to circumvent the
constitutional prohibition.
c. The Llantinos themselves admit openly that right from the start
and before entering into the contract, Chong had merely asked
them for a lease of the premises to which they agreed.
d. Under the terms of the contract there is nothing to prevent the
Llantinos from disposing of their title to the land to any qualified
party but subject to the rights of the lessee Chong. Neither is
there under the terms of the said contract to indicate that the
ownership of the Llantinos of the leased premises has been
virtually transferred to the lessee (Rollo, p. 59; Appellee's Brief,
p. 14).
2. Under the circumstances, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period
is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property
on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.
a. Aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from use
of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the
Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights
such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and
share our fortune and misfortune, Filipino citizenship is not
impossible to acquire
3. The only instance where a contract of lease may be considered
invalid is, if there are circumstances attendant to its execution, which
are used as a scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition.
a. If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy,
a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell
or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years,
then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer
of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not
only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus
fruendi, and jus abutendi) — rights, the sum of which make up
ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred,
tomorrow the use, the next day the disposition, and so on, until
ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are
consolidated in an alien
4. Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject contract is prohibited,
the same can no longer be questioned presently upon the
acquisition by the private respondent of Filipino citizenship. It was
held that sale of a residential land to an alien which is now in the
hands of a naturalized Filipino citizen is valid.
a. A contract is the law between the contracting parties, and when
there is nothing in it which is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy or public order, the validity of the contract
must be sustained
b. The issue of the nature of the contract in the case at bar was
never raised in the basic pleadings or in the pre-trial
c. It is too late to raise an issue on appeal in the Supreme Court
when it has not been raised in the lower court
d. Moreover, contracts which are not ambiguous are to be
interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be
interpreted beyond their obvious intendment
2
02 THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA
PADILLA, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:p
FACTS:
 Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December
4, 1970 but have been separated since February 15, 1981.
 On June 4, 1974, a “Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights” was
executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and
the house in favor of “Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Thomas Cheesman, and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration
Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City .
 Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer
being made only to his wife.
 Thereafter, tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the
name only of Criselda Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive
management and administration of said property, leasing it to tenants. This
happened without any protest from Thomas.
 Criselda sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or
consent of Cheesman. The deed described Criselda as being “of legal age,
married to an American citizen...”
 Subsequently, Thomas filed a suit in the CFI against Criselda and Estelita
Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the
transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent.
 During the Pre-trial, the sale was declared void ab initio and the the delivery
of the property to Thomas as administrator of the conjugal partnership
property was ordered.
 However, the judgment was set aside on a petition for relief filed by the
Estrellita, grounded on "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence" which
had seriously impaired her right to present her case adequately. Estelita
Padilla filed a supplemental pleading as her own answer to the complaint and
a motion for summary judgment.
 The Trial Court found that —
o The evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption
that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership and
that the immovable in question was in truth Criselda’s paraphernal property;
o The legal presumption in Article 160 could not apply because the husband-
plaintiff is an American citizen and therefore disqualified under the
Constitution to acquire and own real properties; and
o The exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the knowledge
of her husband “had led Estelita to believe that the properties were the
exclusive properties of Criselda and on the faith of such a belief she bought
the properties from her and for value” and therefore, Thomas was estopped
to impugn the transfer.
 Thomas appealed the judgment, as well as the act of the Trial Court of
granting Estelita’s petition for relief and its resolution of matters not
subject of said petition. IAC affirmed the Summary Judgment and found no
reversible error. Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Thomas correctly availed of the remedy of appeal to
SC? – NO
[COMMENTO: We’re familiar with the Persons related issue –– The foreigner
husband has no capacity or personality to question the sale of the property
because it would be an indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition.
Aliens are prohibited from acquiring lands of the public domain.]
RULING: An order of the CFI granting a petition for relief under Rule 38 is
interlocutory and is not appealable.
 QUESTION OF FACT vs. QUESTION OF LAW: The conclusions made by
the trial court were derived from evidence adduced by the parties, the facts
set out in the pleadings or otherwise appearing on record—are conclusions
or findings of fact. As distinguished from a QUESTION OF LAW—which
exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts" — "there is a QUESTION OF FACT when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or when
the "query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, their relation; to each other and to the whole and
the probabilities of the situation."
 The RULE is that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in
a petition for the review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
presented to the Supreme Court.
 The appellate jurisdiction of the SC is limited to reviewing errors of law,
accepting as conclusive the factual findings of the lower court upon its own
assessment of the evidence.
3
 CA was created precisely to take away from the SC the work of examining
the evidence, and confine its task to the determination of questions which do
not call for the reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of
witnesses.
 The rule of conclusiveness of the factual findings or conclusions of the CA is
subject to certain exceptions. However, none of which is present in the case
at bar.
 Both the Trial Court and the IAC reached the same conclusions on the 3
factual matters, after assessment of the evidence and determination of the
probative value thereof and these determinations will not be disturbed.
o The facts on record adequately proved fraud, mistake or excusable
negligence by which Estelita Padilla's rights had been substantially
impaired; that the funds used by Criselda Cheesman was money she had
earned and saved prior to her marriage to Thomas Cheesman, and that
Estelita Padilla did believe in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the
sole owner of the property in question.
 An order of a CFI granting a petition for relief under Rule 38 is
interlocutory and is NOT appealable. The failure of the party who
opposed the petition to appeal from said order, or his participation in
the proceedings subsequently had, cannot be construed as a waiver of
his objection to the petition for relief so as to preclude his raising the
same question on appeal from the judgment on the merits of the main
case.
 Such a party need not repeat his objections to the petition for relief, or
perform any act thereafter in order to preserve his right to question the
same eventually, on appeal, it being sufficient for this purpose that he has
made of record "the action which he desires the court to take or his
objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor."
 The prayer in a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is not
necessarily the same prayer in the petitioner's complaint, answer or other
basic pleading. Once a petition for relief is granted and the judgment
subject thereof set aside, and further proceedings are thereafter had, the
Court in its judgment on the merits may properly grant the relief sought in
the petitioner's basic pleadings, although different from that stated in his
petition for relief.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against

petitioner.

4
03 LILJEDAHL V. GLASSGOW making them liable (Hilger, after finding out that there was a
Short summary: Morgagee sues the transferee of the Mortgagor for the deed saying the said statement, he returned the deed and
amount due. Transferee argues that in accordance with lex situs, he is rescinded the contract).
not liable. The court held that he is, it being assumed that the parties 4. The parties may be presumed to have contracted with reference
contracted w/ the reference to lex contractus. to the law of Iowa, where the contract was executed and to be
FACTS: performed, and that they intended to be bound in accordance
1. BAILEY (DEBTOR-MORTGAGOR) executed a mortgage in favor of therewith.
Foskett (original CREDITOR).
2. Foskett assigned the proceeds of the loan and the mortgage to
Liljedahl. Land mortgaged was in Colorado, principal loan
payable in Iowa.
3. Bailey sold the mortgaged land to GLASSGOW w/ a deed
containing a blank space for the insertion of the name of the
grantee (and w/ a statement as follows: "grantee assumed and
agreed to pay the plaintiff's mortgage"). Glassgow, though, did
not put his name on the blank space.
4. Glassgow later transferred the land to another. Liljedahl now
sues Glassgow as the grantee of the land.
ISSUE: WON Glassgow is liable? YES. Apply Colorado Law
RATIO:
1. Instruments of conveyance primarily or directly relating to the
tile follow lex rei sitae; personal covenants or agreements in
instruments of conveyance follow law of the place where the
same is executed and to be performed.
2. Contracts made and to be performed in a particular state are
made with reference to the law of that state. Glassgow and Hiatt
were residents of Iowa, the mortgage was payable in Iowa (in
Shenandoah), delivery by Bailey to Glassgow is presumed to be
in Iowa also.
3. Evidence was introduced before the jury that Glassgow and
Hilger (also a subsequent transferee) understood the legal
implications of accepting a deed containing the statement

5
04 POLLY CAYETANO v. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS (CFI Manila) and
NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts:
 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father,
Hermogenes and her sisters, Nenita, Remedios and Marieta as
the surviving heirs.
 As Hermogenes was the only compulsory heir, he executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself
the ownership of the entire estate of Adoracion.
 Nenita filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of Adoracion,
which was allegedly executed in the US and for her appointment
as administratrix of the estate.
o Testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her
death and was a permanent resident of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
o Testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with
her sister in Malate
o Testatrix made her last will and testament in 1975,
according to the laws of Pennsylvania, nominating
Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor
o Last will was presented, probated, allowed, and
registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of
Philadelphia
 Opposition was filed by Hermogenes.
o He believes that the will in question is a forgery
o Intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void.
o Pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions could not
apply as they would work injustice and injury to him.
 Hermogenes, through his counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss
Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he
has verified the veracity of the will and now confirms the same
to be truly the probated will of Adoracion.
CFI: Last Will and Testament is admitted to and allowed probate in the
Philippines, and Nenita is appointed Administratrix of the estate.
Note: Hermogenes died and left a will, which has been questioned by
his children and forced heirs, and which appointed Polly Cayetano as
the executrix.
Issue: WON the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by
a decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for
the forced heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession. YES.
Held:
 [Procedural Concerns]: No proof that the motion to withdraw
was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty. Loyola
was not his counsel of record.
 [Relevant to Topic: General rule: Probate court's authority is
limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed
o Intrinsic validity of the will comes after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
o Exception: Where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue.
 Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited
Hermogenes and judge should have denied its reprobate
outright, Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American
citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia.
6
 o Under Art. 16(2) and 1039 NCC, the law which governs
Adoracion's will is the law of Pennsylvania, which is the
national law of the decedent.
 As regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the
national law of the decedent must apply.
o Bellis v. Bellis: Whatever public policy/good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave… the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
 Settlement of the estate of Adoracion was correctly filed with
the CFI Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and
proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and
permanent resident of Pennsylvania and not a "usual resident of
Cavite" as alleged by Polly.
o Polly is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the probate court in the petition for relief since it
cannot be invoked to secure affirmative relief, against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed for lack

of merit.

7
05 In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON
STREET, J.
Facts:
 Biographical facts about Emil Johnson:
o Born in Sweden in 1877. He migrated to the US and lived
in Chicago, Illinois from 1893-1898. Married Rosalie
Ackeson in 1898 and thereafter embarked for the PH as
a US soldier. He had a daughter, Ebba. After being
discharged as a soldier, Emil lived in the PH and was
divorced by Rosalie in 1902 on the ground of desertion.
In 1903, Emil visited the US and procured a Certificate of
Naturalization. From Chicago, Emil flew to Sweden to
visit his parents and Ebba then proceeded to Manila,
where he lived until his death. In Manila, he married
Alejandra Ibanez with whom he had three children,
Mercedes, Encarnacion and Victor. The other two
children in the will were borne to the deceased Simeona
Ibanez.
 Feb 4 1916 – Emil died in Manila. He left a holographic will, dated
September 9, 1915, signed by him and two witnesses. His estate
was valued at P231,800.
 Feb 9 1916 – the will was presented for probate in CFI Manila
citing that Johnson was a citizen of US at the time of his death
and his will was executed in accordance with Illinois laws and
therefore can be probated in the Philippines under section 636
of the Code of Civil Procedure:
Will made here by alien. — A will made within the
Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or
country, which is executed in accordance with the law of
the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and
which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own
state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in
the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if
executed according to the laws of these Islands.
 After the requisite publication and hearing, the will was
admitted to probate in March 1916 and Victor Johnson was
appointed administrator.
 By the will in question, the testator gives to his brother Victor
one hundred shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-
Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother in Sweden, the
sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of
P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibañez, the sum of P75 per month,
if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez, spinster, P65 per
month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to
the testator's five children — Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor,
Eleonor and Alberto.
 In June 1916, Ebba entered an appearance challenging the
admission to probate.
Issues:
(I) The order admitting the will to probate was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court and void because made without notice
to the petitioner;
(II) The judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should
be set aside because the testator was not a resident of the State
of Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the laws of that
State.
Held/Ratio:
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the probate proceedings.
Admission to probate affirmed.
Re Jurisdiction of the Court
Recall: Court acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceedings
based on Sec 636.
8

Ebba claims that Sec 636 is not applicable because it refers to
wills of aliens and since the word “state” is not capitalized, then
said provision does not apply to a United States citizen residing
in the PH. Therefore, court has no jurisdiction.
Court held that the words “another state or country” includes
the United States and the States of the American Union and the
Sec 636 is not limited to wills of aliens. It is a rule of
hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of
low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can
never control against the intelligible meaning of the written
words. Furthermore, the epigraph, or heading, of a section,
being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of
the provision, cannot have the effect of limiting the operative
words contained in the body of the text. Therefore, if Emil H.
Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the United
States and of the State of Illinois, his will was provable under Sec
636 in the courts of the Philippine Islands, provided the
instrument was so executed as to be admissible to probate
under the laws of the State of Illinois.
Re Lack of Notice
Ebba claims that she was not given ample opportunity to appear
personally or by a representative in the probate proceedings.
When the court issued the order of publication, the court was
apprised of the fact the she lived in the US. Hence, the court
should have appointed a later hearing date.
Court found that the date set was proper and regular. The
remedy of Ebba was to file an appeal. Also, under Sec 113 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, Ebba has six months from March 1916
(order admitting will to probate) to file an application for relief
from a judgment, order, or proceeding taken against her
through her mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect. True enough, Ebba was able to file her petition within
just three months or in June. Therefore, the March 1916 order
cannot be declared void merely because Ebba was unavoidably
prevented from appearing in the original hearing.
2. Emil is a US citizen. The Illinois laws that were violated by the
will were not presented in court.
Re Foreign Laws
CFI mistakenly took judicial notice of Illinois laws. Sec 275 of the
Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the courts to take judicial
notice of the acts of the legislative department of the US and not
of the multifarious laws of the various American States. The
proper rule is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the
American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of
the issues in any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
However, even if the CFI made such mistake, the court order still
cannot be invalidated because the supposed non-
compliance/violations to Illinois laws were not raised by the
petitioner. Ebba merely stated in general terms that the will in
question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal
property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of
law. The affidavits by which the petition is accompanied contain
no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no authority in
the appellant's brief which might tent to raise a doubt as to the
correctness of the conclusion of the trial court.
Re US Citizenship
9
As evidence of Emil’s US Citizenship, a certificate of
naturalization was presented. This certificate is incontrovertible
proof that upon the date stated (1903), Emil became a citizen of
the US. Even if Emil later resided in the PH, this does not have
the effect of cancelling his US citizenship because (1) there is no
evidence that Emil abandoned Illinois as his permanent
domicile, and (2) there are no naturalization laws in the PH at
that time.

10
06 In the matter of the will of Jennie Rider Babcock.
BEATRICE BABCOCK TEMPLETON, vs. WILLIAM RIDER BABCOCK
FACTS: Beatrice Babcock Templeton filed a petition with the CFI Manila
to secure probate of a paper writing purporting to express the wishes
of Jennie Rider Babcock, deceased, with reference to the post
mortem disposition of all her property.
This paper is written wholly in the handwriting of the deceased and
bears her proper signature. The testatrix eft her stock and money to
her three grandchildren, bearing the surname Templeton, but the she
further stated that all interest and dividends are to be given to her only
daughter, Mrs. Templeton, as well as her jewelry and personal effects
"for their support until the youngest is of age."
Templeton alleged that testatrix was at the time of her death a resident
of the State of California, though temporarily residing in Manila at the
time of her death; and the parties have agreed that this paper could be
proved in the State of California as the holographic will of the deceased.
NOTE: The aforesaid instrument is admittedly of a testamentary
character, but it is not executed as a will under the provisions of law
generally governing the execution of the wills made in the Philippine
Islands.
ISSUE: Whether the testatrix, at the time will was made, had the status
of a citizen of the State of California. YES. CITIZEN OF CALIFORNIA. Will
to be probated under the laws of California.
Note: The citizenship (to a specific state) of a person born in the United
States, as was the testatrix in this case, is dependent upon the place of
residence, or domicile.
Argument of Templeton, mother of the three children who are principal
beneficiaries of the will: the testatrix acquired a legal domicile in the
State of California by residence therein over two periods of time
between 1917 and 1923, and that such domicile was never lost.
Argument of oppositor Babcock, the brother of the proponent: testatrix
had never acquired a legal domicile in the State of California, or that, if
she had, such domicile had been lost under the conditions presently to
be discussed.
HELD: The deceased had acquired a domicile in the State of California
RATIO:
1. The deceased had voted in California elections. Though not
conclusive of acquisition of domicile, voting in a place is an
important circumstance and, where the evidence is scanty, may
have decisive weight. The exercise of the franchise is one of the
highest prerogatives of citizenship, and in no other act of his life
does the citizen identify his interests with the state in which he
lives more than in the act of voting.
2. First, her son-in-law, Templeton, owned a home in San Francisco
in which he lived, without any apparent intention of removing
from the state;
Secondly, upon arriving in San Francisco, the testatrix
established herself as a practitioner in Christian Science, a cult
to which she was attached:
Thirdly she engaged in political activities, taking part in a parade
advertising a cause in which she was interested, and she voted
in at least one general election that occurred in that state;
Fourthly, she formed an attachment for California, and in many
conversations thereafter with intimate friends, she referred to
California as her home state expressed her intention of
returning there and building a home in which to live.
3. In the passenger manifest of the vessel upon which she came to
Manila, she wrote New York City to be her "Last Permanent
Residence." HELD: No probative force. The Passenger Manifest
gave the passenger no choice about indicating whether New
York was the place of last residence or the place of last
11
 permanent residence. Papers of this character are not
commonly written with legal precision; and the circumstances
that she had lived many years in Manila and was coming back to
this city, sufficiently explains why she claimed to be a resident
of Manila in that declaration without making any conclusive
commitment as to the place of her domicile in law.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the domicile thus acquired was subsequently
lost by removal from said state.
HELD: No. Not removed.
RATIO:There are no declarations of the testatrix in evidence which
would tend to show that, upon removal to New York, she had any
intention of acquiring a legal domicile in that state
ISSUE 3: Whether or not the will should be admitted here in the PH as
the will of a citizen of the PH after the testatrix established herself in
these Islands as a place of permanent abode
HELD: NO. However long the testatrix had resided in the Philippine
Islands, she at no time had any intention of residing here permanently.
In the contrary, her repeated declarations reveal a fixed intention of
returning ultimately to the United States.
A citizen of the United States cannot acquire citizenship in the Philippine
Islands by residence here, however long continued.
Which state of the American Union has the best claim to her citizenship,
a question, which, as we have already seen, turns upon domicile; and
there is no other state whose citizenship she can claim, with as good
right as the State of California. Massachusetts, the place of her marital
abode, has not been entered in the competition. It is between California
and New York.
As between these two states, California was surely the state of her legal
domicile, acquired by choice and by residing therein. Furthermore, this
California domicile has not been supplanted by a later domicile acquired
in New York.

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07 Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator,
petitioner-appellee, vs. ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
G.R. No. L-22595|November 1, 1927| ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Facts:
 The judicial administrator of this estate of deceased Joseph Brimo
filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
 The oppositor argued that the partition in question puts into effect
the provisions of Joseph Brimo's will which are not in accordance
with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are
void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which
provides that “legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional
rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which
it may be situated.”
 The oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are
not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not
present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the
matter.
Issue: What law governs the partition of the decedent’s estate? Turkish
law but it is presumed to be the same as that of Philippine law.
Held:
In the absence of evidence on Turkish laws, they are presumed to be
the same as those of the Philippines.
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are.
He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity
to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error
of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of
partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the
Turkish laws on the matter.
The oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent
evidence, so there is no error on the part the trial court when it denied
giving the oppositor another opportunity to do so.
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of
the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force,
must be complied with and executed.
The approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not
erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion
of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the
persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration
that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the
will. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will
to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
The provision in the will which states that the distribution of the
property be made in accordance with Philippine law is void, being
contrary to law, because it expressly ignores the testator's national law
when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions. Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions
above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in
said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as
to the herein oppositor.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and
requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said
clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
DISPOSITIVE: The distribution of this estate be made in such a manner
as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees,
13
and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is
approved in all other respects.

14
08 Testate Estate of Amos Bellis v. Edward Bellis (1967)
Bengzon, J:
Facts:
- Amos Bellis, an American citizen, was born and resided in Texas.
He had 5 legitimate children by his first wife, 3 legitimate children by his
second wife and 3 illegitimate children.
- He executed a will in the Philippines, directing that his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order
and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the
foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children in equal shares
- On July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on
September 15, 1958.
- As executor of the will, People’s Bank and Trust Company paid
$240,000 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the 3
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis, amounts totalling P40,000 each.
- When the executor submitted its Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis filed their oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children.
- The CFI of Manila overruled the oppositions and approved the
executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national
law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.
- Appellants argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16
of the Civil Code. “Art 17(3)-- Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their
acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.”
Issue: WON Texas or Philippine law should apply  Texas Law
Ratio:
- The parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death. Even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile)
should govern, the same would still refer to Texas law.
- Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs
theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.
- Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
- Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph 3 of
the Civil Code prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil
Code. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
15
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article"
when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the
new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new.
It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art.
16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
- Whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to
the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
- Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two
wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine
estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Such intention would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void
- The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

16
09 IN RE: TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO
SUNTAY VS IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954
Doctrine: Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to
the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the
proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
FACTS: Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines,
died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving
real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy,
Fookien province, China, and children by his first marriage with Manuela
T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana,
Aurora, Emiliano, and children with his second marriage to Maria
Natividad Lim Billian namely Jose, Jr. and Silvino.
Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Apolonio Suntay was declared administrator. After
his death, Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate.
Maria Natividad filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been
executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late
Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will
and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said
will. An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the
will and this Court held the evidence before the probate court sufficient
to prove the loss of the will and remanded the case to the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings.
Silvino Suntay, claiming that he had found among the files,
records and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese
characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and
that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district
court, Province of Fookien, China, filed a petition in the intestate
proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in the
Philippines or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China.
Witnesses were presented to prove the existence of the will allegedly
left by Jose Suntay.
Lower Court Ruling: Dissallowed alleged will and testament executed in
Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament
executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B.
Suntay.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the wills allegedly left by Jose SUntay can be
probated.
RATIO: Upheld decision of the Court of First Instance. Granting that
there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay, and that it was in
existence at the time of, and note revoked before his death, the
testimonies of the witnesses presented fall falls short of the legal
requirement that the provisions of the lost will must be "clearly and
distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses." Credible witnesses
mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts from or upon
hearsay are neither competent nor credible witnesses.
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy,
China, the law on the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according
to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and
recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the
Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly
authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the
Philippines, by the executor or other person interested,
17
 in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony,
and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be and even if it were so it does not measure same as those provided for
given as in case of an original will presented for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity
allowance. of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all
Section 3 provides: interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no
allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the
a certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and Philippines
attested by the seal of the courts, to which shall be The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, does
attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the
the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof
originally proved and allowed in such court. cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and
court must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot
execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or
competent evidence. However, there was no evidence presented to allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be
prove this point. The unverified answers to the questions propounded allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.
by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of
China, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible,
because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does not
qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law
on procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse
party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the
witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it
appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of
Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting
witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court
of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof
that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the
Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that
the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the

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10 Vda. De Perez v. Tolete

19
11 Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated

20