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CIVIL LAW REVIEW Kinds of Specific Law.

-- Every law commands,


bec. it is obligatory; but it commands in 3
Introduction different ways:

TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE, Commentaries & it commands that something be done, in w/c
Jurisprudence, Volume 1, hereinafter cited as case it is mandatory;
Tolentino: it commands that something should not be done,
in w/c case it is prohibitory; &
Concepts of Law - The term law may be it commands that what it permits to be done
understood in 2 concepts: in the general or abstract should be tolerated or respected, in w/c case
sense, and in the specific or material sense. it is permissive.

In the general sense, law is defined as the Codification of Laws.


“science of moral rules, founded on the rational A code is a collection of laws of the same kind; a
nature of man, w/c govern his free activity, for the
realization of the individual & social ends, of a body of legal provisions referring to a
nature both demandable & reciprocal.” (Sanchez particular branch of law.
Roman.)
Reasons for codification:
In the specific sense, it is defined as “a rule the necessity of simplifying & arranging the many
of conduct, just, obligatory, promulgated by juridical rules scattered in several laws &
legitimate authority, & of common observance & customs;
benefit.” (ibid.) the necessity of unifying various legislation in the
same country; &
Foundation of Law.-- Law rests upon the
concepts of order, co-existence, & liberty. the necessity of introducing reforms occasioned
by social changes.
Characteristics of Law:
1. it is a rule of human conduct; Balane:
2. promulgated by competent authority;
There are two great models of a modern
3. obligatory and
civil code, the French Civil Code (Code Napoleon)
4. of general observance. and the German Civil Code {BGB or Buogeoliches
Gesetzbuch [Beuo w/c means "town," "that w/c
General Divisions of Law.-- Law in its most has reference to a citizen;" buch w/c means
comprehensive sense has been divided into 2 "book;" BGB means "a law book governing
general groups: divine law & human law. By divine citizens."]
law is meant that in w/c God himself is the legislator
who has promulgated the law; by human law is
Changes fr. the Old Civil Code in the New
meant that w/c is promulgated by man to regulate
human relations. Civil Code:

Human law is in turn divided into 2 main Creation of new rights.-- E.g., in the case of
classes: general or public law & individual or spurious children who were given rights for
private law. These in turn are sub-divided as the first time (successional right, right of
follows: support, etc.). New provisions on Human
Relations (Articles 33-36), Reformation of
General or public law: Instruments (Art. 1359), two additional
International law; quasi-contracts (Art. 2174 & 2175), moral &
Constitutional law; nominal damages (Arts. 2217 & 2221).
Administrative law;
Criminal law; Adoption of new solutions like Art. 461 (change in
Religious law. the river course), Art. 1256 (consignation),
Art. 1658 (lease.)
Individual or private law:
Civil law; Clarification of old provisions like Art. 275
Mercantile law; (Legitimation), Art. 992 (illegitimate children's
Procedural law. right to inherit ab intestato), Art. 1410 (void
contracts)
Omission of certain subjects, e.g., dowry w/c is very UMALI V. ESTANISLAO 209 SCRA 446
western. In the Phils., we have the opposite of (1992)
dowry, the bigay-kaya. These contracts were
abolished- censos, usus & habitation Facts: RA 7167 was enacted granting certain
(subsumed in easement & lease.) tax exemptions. Sec.3 of such law stated that
the law would take effect upon its approval. The
Civil Law Defined. law was approved on Dec.19, 1991 by the
“the mass of precepts w/c determine & regulate the President. It was published in a newspaper of
relations of assistance, authority & obedience general circulation on Jan.14, 1992.
among the members of a family, & those w/c exist
among members of a society for the protection of Issue: Did RA 7167 take effect upon its
private interests.” (Sanchez Roman.)
approval on Dec.19, 1991 or on Jan.30, 1992, 15
days after its publication?

Art. 1. This Act shall be known as the “Civil Held: Reiterating Tanada v. Tuvera, the clause
Code of the Philippines.” “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the
date of effectivity & not to the requirement of
publication itself w/c cannot in any event be
Tolentino: omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislator may make the law effective
Civil Code defined.-- A civil code is a collection of immediately upon approval, or on any other date
laws w/c regulate the private relations of the w/o its previous publication.
members of civil society, determining their Publication is indispensable in every case,
respective rights & obligations, w/ reference to
persons, things, & civil acts. but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen (15) day period shall be
Sources of the Civil Code: shortened or extended.
The Civil Code of 1889;
The codes, laws, & judicial decisions, as well as the BALANE CASES:
works of jurists of other countries, such as
Spain, the various states of the American Union, PESIGAN V. ANGELES 129 SCRA 174
etc.;
Doctrines laid down by the SC of the Phils.; Held: The word “laws” in Art. 2 includes circulars
Filipino customs & traditions; & regulations w/c prescribe penalties. Publication
Philippine statutes, such as the Marriage Law, the is necessary to apprise the public of the contents
Divorce Law, the Code of Civ. Proc. & the Rules of the regulations & make the said penalties
of Court. binding on the persons affected thereby.
The Code Commission itself
Works of jurists & commentators of various nations
(added by Jurado, CIVIL LAW REVIEWER.)
PEOPLE V. VERIDIANO 132 SCRA 523

Held: When PR Go Bio, Jr. committed the act


Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days complained of in May '79, there was no law
following the completion of their publication either penalizing such act. BP 22 became effective only
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general on June 29, ’79, 15 days after its publication.
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise Before the public may be bound by its contents,
provided. (as amended by EO 200.) especially its penal provisions, the law must be
published & the people officially informed of its
contents. For, if a statute had not been
published before its violation, then, in the eyes of
Balane: the law, there was no such law to be violated &,
consequently the accused could not have
The Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 committed the alleged crime.
according to the case of Lara v. del Rosario (isang
letter na lang, ako na ‘to a! – Obiter Master™), one TANADA V. TUVERA 136 SCRA 27
year after its publication, reckoned fr. the date of
actual release Held: The publication of all presidential
issuances “of a public nature” or “of general
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applicability” is mandated by law. The clear object is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
of the law is to give the general public adequate to a valid delegation.
notice of the various laws w/c are to regulate their
actions & conduct as citizens. W/o such notice & Interpretative regulations & those merely
publication, there would be no basis for the internal in nature, i.e., regulating only the
application of the maxim ignorantia legis non personnel of the administrative agency & not the
excusat. It would be the height of injustice to public, need not be published. Neither is
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the publication required of the so-called letters of
transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice instructions issued by administrative superiors
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. It is concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
needless to say that the publication of presidential by their subordinates in the performance of their
issuances “of a public nature” or “of general duties.
applicability” is a requirement of due process. It is
a rule of law that before a person may be bound by Publication must be in full or it is no
law, he must first be officially & specifically informed publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
of its contents. public of the contents of the laws. The mere
mention of the number of the PD, the title of
TANADA V. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 such decree, its whereabouts, the supposed date
of effectivity, & in a mere supplement of the OG
Held: [T]he clause "unless it is otherwise cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This
provided" refers to the date of effectivity & not to is not even substantial compliance.
the requirement of publication itself, w/c cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean Balane:
that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, General application of the provision: The
w/o its previous publication. law takes effect on the 16th day.

Publication is indispensable in every case, General rule: It must be published either in the
but the legislature may in its discretion provide that OG or in a newspaper of gen. circ.
the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or Exception: The law itself may provide for a
extended. different mode of publication, either as to form
(published in some other way provided it is a
It is not correct to say that under the reasonable mode of publication) or effectivity
disputed clause publication may be dispensed w/ date (a reasonable period fr. publication; cannot
altogether. The reason is that such omission would be immediately upon approval).
offend due process insofar as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to Rationale.-- The rationale for requiring
govern it. publication is to give notice to the public in
determining their actions so as to conform to the
Conclusive presumption of knowledge of law. "How can I follow something the existence
the law.-- The conclusive presumption that every of w/c I do not know?"
person knows the law presupposes that the law has
been published if the presumption is to have any Q: Is a law granting citizenship required to be
legal justification at all. published?
A: Yes. The SC ruled that “The term laws
The term laws should refer to all laws & not should refer to all laws & not only to those of
only to those of general application, for strictly general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
speaking all laws relate to the people in general relate to the people in general albeit there are
albeit there are some that do not apply to them some that do not apply to them directly.”
directly. (Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 S 446, 453.)

RULE: All statutes, including those of local


application & private laws, shall be published as a Art. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one
condition for their effectivity, w/c shall begin 15 fr. compliance therew/.
days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
Tolentino:
Coverage.-- Covered by this rule are PDs
& EOs promulgated by the Pres. in the exercise of Reasons for Presumption of Knowledge of
legislative powers. Administrative rules & Law.
regulations must also be published if their purpose

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If laws will not be binding until they are actually
known, then social life will be impossible, bec.
most laws cannot be enforced due to their
being unknown to many;
it is absurd to absolve those who do not know the
law & increase the obligations of those who BALANE CASE:
know it;
it is almost impossible to prove the contrary, when a KASILAG V. RODRIGUEZ 69 PHIL 217
person claims ignorance of the law;
in our conscience, we carry norms of right & wrong, Held: Gross & inexcusable ignorance of the law
& a sense of duty, so that our reason indicates may not be the basis of GF but excusable
many times what we have to do; & in more ignorance may be such basis (if it is based upon
complicated juridical relations, there are lawyers ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the
who should be consulted.
petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws bec. he is
What Laws Covered.-- Philippine laws are not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the
covered. There is no conclusive presumption of improvements he proceeded on the well-
knowledge of foreign laws. Even our courts cannot grounded belief that he was not violating the
take judicial notice of them. Ignorance of a foreign prohibition regarding the alienation of the land.
law will not be a mistake of law but a mistake of In taking possession thereof & in consenting to
fact. receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a
jurist does, that the possession & enjoyment of
And w/ respect to local laws, the article is the fruits are attributes of the contract of
limited to mandatory & prohibitory laws. It does
antichresis & that the latter, as a lien, was
not include those w/c are merely permissive.
(Manresa.) prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the
petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of sec.
No Exceptions Admitted.-- The rule is based on 116 is excusable & may be the basis of GF.
public interest & is designed precisely to avoid
abuse through allegation that the law has not come
to the knowledge of a party. But it has been held Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
by our CA that the rule should not be applied w/
equal force to minors who, due to their lack of unless the contrary is provided.
intelligence, must be treated differently. (Peo. v.
Navarro, 51 OG 4062.)
Tolentino:
Mistake of Fact.-- Ignorance may either be of
law or of fact. Ignorance of fact (ignorantia facti) Concept of Retroactive Law.-- A retroactive
may excuse a party fr. the legal consequences of law is one intended to affect transactions w/c
his conduct; but not ignorance of law, for ignorantia occurred, or rights w/c accrued, before it became
juris neminem excusat. operative, & w/c ascribes to them effects not
inherent in their nature, in view of the law in
Difficult Question of Law.-- In specific instances force at the time of their occurrence.
provided by law, mistake as to difficult legal
questions has been given the same effect as a It is one w/c creates a new obligation &
mistake of fact, e.g., Art. 526, par. 3 w/c provides: imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability,
“Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law in respect to transactions or considerations
may be the basis of good faith.” already past. (Balane quoting Tolentino.)

Reason for the Article.-- A law that has not


Balane: yet become effective cannot be considered as
conclusively known by the people. To make a
Art. 3 creates a conclusive presumption w/c law binding even before it has taken effect may
in some instances may be unreasonable or harsh. lead to arbitrary exercise of legislative power.
But the alternative is worse, w/c is anarchy. Bec.
the law realizes its severity, it is sometimes Exceptions to Rule:
mitigated in several provisions such as Art. 526,
par.3 (quoted above). When the law itself so expressly provides.--
However, this has two exceptions:
when the retroactivity of a penal statute will
make it an ex post facto law, &

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when the retroactive effect of the statute will compliance is a matter of convenience rather
constitute an impairment of the obligation of than substance.
contract. Mandatory laws are statutory provisions w/c
relate to matters of substance, affect
In case of Penal statutes.-- Penal laws shall substantial rights & are the very essence of
have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the the thing required to be done.
accused who is not a habitual criminal, even
though at the time of the enactment of such Balane:
laws final sentence has already been rendered.
(Art. 22, RPC.) A mandatory law is one w/c prescribes
some element as a requirement, e.g., Art. 804
In case of Remedial statutes.-- Remedial w/c requires that a will must be in writing.
statutes are those w/c refer to the method of
enforcing rights or of obtaining redress of their A prohibitory law is one w/c forbids
invasion. something, e.g., Art. 818 w/c forbids joint wills.
In case of Curative statutes.-- Curative statutes Balane quoting Jurado:
are those w/c undertake to cure errors &
irregularities, thereby validating juridical or
administrative proceedings, acts of public Exceptions to the above provision.
officers, or private deeds & contracts w/c When the law itself authorizes its validity.--
otherwise would not produce their intended “Law” here refers to the juridical order in its
consequences by reason of some statutory totality.
disability or the failure to comply w/ come Where the law itself authorizes its validity, but
technical requirement. But these statutes punishes the violator (e.g., where the
cannot violate constitutional provisions, nor marriage was solemnized by a person who
destroy vested rights of a 3rd person. They does not have legal authority, but the party
cannot affect a judgment that has become final. or parties believing in GF, that such person
has authority to do so, then the marriage is
In case of laws interpreting others.-- These valid but the person who solemnized the
are laws w/c are intended to clarify doubts or same shall be criminally liable.)
interpret an existing law. Where the law merely makes the act voidable
(e.g., a marriage celebrated through violence
In case of laws creating new rights.-- The or intimidation or physical incapacity or fraud
principle that a new law shall not have is valid until it is annulled).
retroactive effect only governs rights arising fr. Where the law declares the act as void, but
acts done under the rule of the former law; but recognizes legal effects arising fr. it (e.g.,
if a right be declared for the first time by a new children born of void marriage are classified
law it shall take effect fr. the time of such as illegitimate children entitled to the rights in
declaration, even though it has arisen fr. acts Art. 176, FC).
subject to the former laws, provided that it does
not prejudice another acquired right of the
same origin. Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
If the law is of an emergency measure & authorized policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to
by the police power of the State. (added by
a third person w/ a right recognized by law.
Balane.)

Tolentino:
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of
Elements of Right.-- Every right has 3
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except elements: (1) the subjects, (2) the object, &
when the law itself authorizes their validity. (3) the efficient cause.
The subjects of rights are persons; rights exist
only in favor of persons. There are 2 kinds of
Tolentino: subjects:
the active subject, who is entitled to demand the
Mandatory & Directory Laws. enforcement of the right; &
Directory laws are those provisions w/c are mere the passive subject, who is duty-bound to suffer
matter of form, or w/c are not material, do not its enforcement.
affect any substantial right, & do not relate to Things & services constitute the object of rights.
the essence of the thing to be done, so that
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The efficient cause is the fact that gives rise to the
legal relation. Renunciation of Real Rights.-- According to
Valverde, while the renunciation of a personal
Kinds of Rights.-- Rights may be classified into right requires the consent of the debtor (as in
political & civil; the former include those referring case of remission or condonation) the
to the participation of persons in the gov't of the renunciation of a real right is unilateral &
State, while the latter include all others. depends upon the exclusive will of the owner of
Civil rights may be further classified into: the right.
the rights of personality;
family rights; &
patrimonial rights. PEOPLE V. DONATO 198 SCRA 130 (1991)
The rights to personality & family rights are
not subject to waiver; but patrimonial rights can Facts: PR was charged w/ rebellion. After the
generally be waived. filing of the information, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed. Said petition was dismissed on
Renunciation or Waiver.-- Waiver is defined as the basis of the agreement of the parties under
the relinquishment of a known right w/ both w/c PR would remain in the legal custody &
knowledge of its existence & an intention to would face trial before the court having custody
relinquish it. Voluntary choice is the essence of over his person. On June 1987, Pres. Aquino
waiver. issued EO 187 w/c restored the penalty for
rebellion to prision mayor. PR filed a petition for
bail, w/c was granted.
Balane:
Issue: Did PR waive his right to bail when he
Exceptions to the Rule that Rights can be
waived: entered into the agreement?
If the waiver is contrary to one of the 5
considerations (law, public order, public policy, Held: While it is true that bail cannot be denied
morals or good customs); to PR for he is charged w/ a bailable offense, he
if the waiver would be prejudicial to a 3rd party w/ is not entitled to the same as he had waived his
a right recognized by law. right to bail when he agreed to remain in legal
custody.
Elements of a Valid Waiver:
Existence of a right;
The doctrine of waiver extends to the
Knowledge of existence thereof;
An intention to relinquish the right (implied in this is rights & privileges of any character, & since the
the capacity to dispose of the right.) (Balane word “waiver” covers any conceivable right, it is
quoting Herrera v. Borromeo, 152 S 171.) the general rule that a person may waive any
matter w/c affects his property, & any alienable
right or privilege of w/c he is the owner or w/c
Tolentino: belongs to him or to w/c he is legally entitled to,
provided such rights & privileges do not infringe
The renunciation must be made in a clear & on the rights of others, & further provided the
unequivocal manner. The formality required by law waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by
for such renunciation, if any, should be followed; if law, & does not contravene public policy.
no particular formality is required, the renunciation
may even be tacit, provided the intent to renounce
can be clearly established. Rights guaranteed to one accused of a
crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) Those in
Scope of Waiver.-- The doctrine of waiver is w/c the state, as well as the accused, is
generally applicable to all rights & privileges to w/c interested, & (b) those w/c are personal to the
a person is legally entitled, w/n secured by contract, accused, w/c are in the nature of personal
conferred by statute, or guaranteed by the Consti., privileges. Those of the first class cannot be
provided such rights & privileges rest in the waived, those of the second may be.
individual & are intended for his sole benefit.

Waiver of Obligations.-- Generally, obligations This Court has recognized waivers of


cannot be renounced. But a person may exempt constitutional rights such as the rights against
himself fr. an obligation w/c is inherent in a right, unreasonable searches & seizures, the right to
upon the renunciation of such right. For example, counsel & to remain silent, & the right to be
see Art. 628. heard. The right to bail is another of the
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constitutional rights w/c can be waived. It is a right
personal to the accused & whose waiver would not
be contrary to law, public order, morals or good Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or
customs, or prejudicial to a third person w/ a right interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
recognized by law. form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent Balane: This is a common law principle. This
ones, & their violation or non-observance shall not shows that our New Civil Code is not a full-
be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the blooded Civil Law scion.
contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be Tolentino:


inconsistent w/ the Constitution, the former shall be
void & the latter shall govern. Decisions not Source of Law.--
Jurisprudence, in our system of gov't, cannot be
considered as an independent source of law; it
Administrative or executive acts, orders & cannot create law. But the Court's interpretation
regulations shall be valid only when they are not of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. date it was originally passed, since the
construction merely establishes contemporaneous
legislative intent that the interpreted law carried
Balane: Leges posteriores priores contrarias into effect.
abrogant.
Doctrine of stare decisis.-- The doctrine of
stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined & decided, it
Tolentino:
should be deemed settled & closed to further
argument. The doctrine, however, is flexible; so,
Reason for the Article.-- Since laws are that when, in the light of changing conditions, a
promulgated by competent authority of the State, rule has ceased to be of benefit & use to society,
they can cease to have effect only through the will the courts may rightly depart fr. it.
of the State.

Repeal of Laws. - 2 kinds of repeal of a law:


express or declared repeal, contained in a special PEOPLE V. LICERA 65 SCRA 270 (1975)
provision of a subsequent law, &
implied or tacit repeal, w/c takes place when the Facts: In 1965, Licera was charged w/ illegal
provisions of the subsequent law are possession of firearms. He invoked as his legal
incompatible or inconsistent w/ those of an justification for his possession of the Winchester
earlier law. rifle his appointment as secret agent by Governor
Leviste. He claims that as secret agent, he was a
Requisites of Implied Repeals:
the laws cover the same subject matter, & “peace officer” &, thus, pursuant to People vs.
the latter is repugnant to the earlier. Macarandang, was exempt fr. the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess
Repeal of Repealing Law.-- When a law w/c firearms.
expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the
law first repealed shall not be revived unless Issue: Is he exempt?
expressly so provided. But if the prior law was
repealed, not expressly but by implication, the Held: In the case of People vs. Macarandang,
repeal of the repealing law will revive the prior law, the SC interpreted Sec .879, RAC that the
unless the language of the last law provides
otherwise. appointment of a civilian as a secret agent to
assist in the maintenance of peace & order
Lapse of Laws. – There are laws w/c, w/o any sufficiently places him w/in the category of a
repeal, cease to have effect bec. they lapse by their “peace officer”, thereby exempted fr. the
own terms, as a (1) law for a fixed period, or (2) requirements relating to firearm licenses.
w/o express provision; the intent of the law may
indicate that its effectivity shall be for a limited Art. 8, NCC decrees that judicial decisions
period, as the case of the Emergency Powers Act. applying or interpreting the laws or the
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Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal CO VS. CA 227 SCRA 444
system. These decisions, although in themselves
not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. Facts: In payment for his share of the expenses
The application or interpretation placed by the of a salvaging operation, petitioner issued a
courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date check on Sept.1, 1983 in favor of the salvaging
of the enactment of the said law since the Court's firm. This was dishonored by the bank.
application or interpretation merely establishes the Petitioner was then charged w/ violation of BP
contemporaneous legislative intent that the 22. The lower court convicted him. Upon
construed law purports to carry into effect. appeal, petitioner alleged that the lower court
should not have relied upon the ruling in Que vs.
People vs. Mapa revoked the Macarandang People, w/c stated that a check issued merely to
precedent only in 1967. Certainly, a new doctrine guarantee the performance of an obligation is
abrogating an old rule should only operate nevertheless covered by BP 22. He contends that
prospectively & should not adversely affect those when he issued the check, the delivery of a
favored by the old rule, especially those who relied “bouncing” check as guarantee for an obligation
thereon & acted on good faith thereof. was not considered a punishable offense, as
pronounced in Circular No.4 dated Dec.15, 1981
of the Ministry of Justice. The CA rejected his
PEOPLE V. PINUILA 55 O.G. 23 P. 4228 argument & affirmed his conviction; it stated that
(1958) the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage
of new law but was merely a construction or
Facts: Pinuila was charged w/ murder. In the interpretation of an existing one.
course of the trial, the court dismissed the case on
question of jurisdiction. Upon appeal, the SC Held: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
remanded the case, following the doctrine in People the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
vs. Salico w/c held that an appeal by the the legal system of the Philippines (Art.8, NCC).
government fr. an order of dismissal for lack of SC decisions, although in themselves not laws,
jurisdiction when such jurisdiction really existed, w/c are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
order of dismissal was based on or prompted by a mean. However, when a SC doctrine is overruled
MTD filed by the accused himself, did not place him & a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
in jeopardy. Pinuila was convicted. He appeals. should be applied prospectively, & should not
Meanwhile, the SC had abandoned the Salico apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine, it not being in accordance w/ the law on doctrine & acted on the faith thereof.
double jeopardy.

Issue: Will the new doctrine apply to Pinuila? Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence,
Held: No. The new doctrine cannot be applied to obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
this case. The doctrine enunciated in People v.
Salico has long become final & conclusive & has
become the law of the case. It may be erroneous, Balane: In a situation contemplated by this
judged by the law on double jeopardy as recently Art., the judge will be guided by customs &
interpreted by the SC. Even so, it may not be principles of right & justice.
disturbed & modified. The SC's recent interpretation
of the law may be applied to new cases, but
certainly not to an old one finally & conclusively Tolentino:
determined. The rule is founded on the policy of
ending litigation, & to be necessary to enable an Applicability of Article.-- This article does not
appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily & apply to criminal prosecutions, bec. when there is
effectively. no law punishing an act, the case must be
dismissed, however, reprehensible the act may
seem to the judge.
Paras, dissenting: This is a criminal case, hence,
an interpretation favorable to the accused must be Obscurity or Deficiency of Law.-- If the law
given retroactive effect. is vague or obscure, the court should clarify it in
the light of the rules of statutory construction; if
it is silent or insufficient, the court should fill the
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deficiency by resorting to customs or general Balane: Custom can be applied suppletorily only
principles of law. if custom is not contrary to any law.

Concept of Customs.-- Custom may be defined


as the juridical rule w/c results fr. a constant & Tolentino: The Courts will not recognize the
continued uniform practice by the members of a force of a custom in opposition to positive law.
social community, w/ respect to a particular state of
facts, & observed w/ a conviction that it is juridically
obligatory.
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact,
Requisites of Custom: according to the rules of evidence.
plurality of acts, or various resolutions of a juridical
question raised repeatedly in life;
uniformity, or identity of the acts or various Tolentino:
solutions to the juridical questions;
general practice by the great mass of the social Requisites of Custom. – In order that custom
group; may have the force of suppletory rule, it must
continued performance of these acts for a long have the following requisites:
period of time; plurality of acts, or various resolutions of a
general conviction that the practice corresponds to juridical question raised repeatedly in life;
a juridical necessity or that it is obligatory; & uniformity, or identity of the acts or various
the practice must not be contrary to law, morals or solutions to the juridical question;
public order. general practice by the great mass of the social
group;
Custom distinguished fr. Law.-- As to origin, continued performance of these acts for a long
custom comes fr. the society, while law comes fr. period of time;
the governmental power of the State; the former is general conviction that the practice corresponds
a spontaneous, while the latter is a conscious to a juridical necessity or that it is obligatory;
creation. &
the practice must not be contrary to law, morals,
As to form, custom is tacit, being or public order.
manifested in acts or usages, while law is express,
manifested in solemn & official form. The former is Non-existence of Custom. – When the alleged
unwritten law, the latter is written law. custom or usage is not known to those who have
the best means of knowing it, this ignorance is, in
What Custom Applied.-- When the place where some sense, positive evidence of its non-
the court is located & the domicile of the parties are existence.
different, & each place has a different custom, it is
to be presumed that they knew the custom of their
domicile & not that of the court's location. If the
BALANE CASE:
domiciles of the parties are different & they have
different customs, Manresa believes that there is no
reason for making a preference, & the matter YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES 167 SCRA 737
should be treated as if there is no custom. Sanchez
Roman sustains the view, however, that in the Held: Custom is defined as “a rule of conduct
absence of reasons for preference, the general rule formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
should be to apply the custom of the place for the (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding &
performance or consummation of the juridical act. obligatory.” The law requires that “a custom
must be proved as a fact, according to the rules
of evidence.” On this score the Court had
occasion to state that “a local custom as a source
Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation of right can not be considered by a court of
or application of laws, it is presumed that the justice unless such custom is properly established
lawmaking body intended right & justice to prevail. by competent evidence like any other fact.” The
same evidence, if not one of a higher degree,
should be required of a foreign custom.
Art. 11. Customs w/c are contrary to law,
public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced. Art. 13. When the laws speaks of years,
months, days or nights, it shall be understood
that years are of three hundred sixty-five days

9
each; months, of thirty days; days of twenty-four
hours; & nights fr. sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they NAMARCO V. TECSON 29 SCRA 70 (1969)
shall be computed by the number of days w/c they
respectively have. Facts: On Oct.14, 1955, the CFI-Mla. rendered
In computing a period, the first day shall be judgment in a civil case, Price Stabilization Corp.
excluded, & the last day included. vs. Tecson, et al. Copy of this decision was
served on Oct.21, 1955 upon defendants in said
case. On Dec.21, 1965, NAMARCO, as successor
Balane: Art. 13 has been superseded by Sec. 31, to all the properties, assets, rights, & choses in
Book I of EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) w/c action of Price, as pltff in that case & judgment
provides that: creditor therein, filed w/ the same court, a
complaint against defendants for the revival of
the judgment rendered therein. Def. Tecson
Sec. 31. Legal Periods.-- "Year" shall be moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the
understood to be twelve (12) calendar months; ground of prescription of action, among others.
"months" of thirty (30) days, unless it refers to a The motion was granted by the court. Hence,
specific calendar month in w/c case it shall be the appeal to the CA w/c was certified to the SC,
computed according to the number of days the upon the ground that the only question raised
specific month contains; "day," to a day of twenty therein is one of law.
four (24) hours; & "nights," fr. sunset to sunrise.
Issue: WON the present action for the revival of
a judgment is barred by the statute of limitations.
Baviera: This article applies only to legal
Held: Pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action
provisions & not to contracts, where the
for judgement must be brought w/in 10 yrs fr.
parties may stipulate on the manner of
the time the judgment sought to be revived has
computing years, months & days.
become final. This in turn, took place on Dec.21,
1955 or 30 days fr. notice of the judgment. The
issue is thus confined to the date on w/c the 10
Tolentino: yrs fr. Dec.21, 1955 expired. Pltff alleges that it
was Dec.21, 1965, but appellee maintains
Meaning of “Week.”-- The term “week,” when
otherwise. He alleges that when the law speaks
computed according to the calendar, means a
period of 7 days beginning on Sunday & ending on of years, it shall be understood that years are of
Saturday, but where the word is used simply as a 365 days each. And, 1960 & 1964 being leap
measure of duration of time & w/o reference to the years, therefore 10 yrs of 365 days each, or an
calendar, it means a period of 7 consecutive days aggregate of 3650 days, fr. Dec.21, 1955,
w/o regard to the day of the week on w/c it begins. expired on Dec.19, 1965.

Meaning of “Month.”-- There are several senses The action to enforce a judgment w/c
in w/c the term “month” may be understood. A became final on December 21, 1955 prescribes in
“lunar” mo. is composed of 28 days. A “calendar”
mo. as designated in the calendar, w/o regard to 10 years. Since the Civil Code computes “years”
the no. of days it may contain, etc. The Code, in terms of 365 days each, the action has
however, does not use “month” in either of these prescribed on December 19, 1955, since the two
senses, but strictly in a legal sense, as a period intervening leap years added two more days to
composed of 30 days. the computation. It is not the calendar year that
is considered.
Computation of Time.-- When the act & the
period are contractual, not required by law, court
order, or rule of court, the exception referring to
QUIZON V. BALTAZAR 76 SCRA 560 (1977)
Sundays & holidays does not apply, & the act must
be done on the last day, even if the latter should be
a Sunday or a holiday. This is in consonance w/ the Facts: Petitioners were charged w/ serious oral
rule that the contract is the law between the defamation, a crime w/c prescribes in 6 months.
contracting parties. They moved to quash the information on the
ground that the offense charged had prescribed.
Petitioners counted the months according to their
10
number of days. The lower court denied their when the offense is committed in a public or
motion, computing the months as having 30 days. armed vessel of a foreign country.

Offenses in Merchant Vessels.-- A merchant


Held: The RPC provides that an action for serious
vessel of foreign registry does not enjoy the
oral defamation prescribes in six months. The extraterritorial privilege of foreign public or war
months should be computed by the regular 30 days, vessels. An offense committed on such vessel
not the calendar months. Hence, where the crime while it is in a Phil. port, constituting a breach of
was committed on November 11, 1963, & the action public order & a viol. of the policy established by
was filed exactly 180 days later, said action was the legislature, is triable in Phil. ports.
filed on time.

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights &


Art. 14. Penal laws & those of public security duties, or to the status, condition & legal capacity
& safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or of persons are binding upon citizens of the
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the Philippines, even though living abroad.
principles of public international law & to treaty
stipulations.
Tolentino:

Balane: Theories on Personal Law. –


Domiciliary theory – the personal laws of a
There are 2 principles involved here: person are determined by his domicile.
Nationality theory – the nationality or citizenship
Territoriality - means that our criminal laws are determines the personal laws of the
enforceable only w/in Phil. territory. Exception individual. This is followed by our Civil Code.
to the territoriality principle is Art. 2 of RPC.
Generality - means that w/in the Phil. territory, Capacity to Contract.-- If under the law of the
our criminal laws will apply to anyone, citizen or State of w/c a party to a contract is a citizen, he
alien. Exceptions: (1) treaty stipulations w/c is already of age at the time he enters into the
exempted some persons w/in the jurisdiction of contract, he cannot set such contract aside on t
the Phil. courts. & (2) ambassadors (consuls he ground of minority, even if under the laws of
are subject to the jurisdiction of our criminal the Phils. he is still a minor. (Government vs.
courts) (Schneckenburger v. Moran.) Frank, 13 P 238.)

Renunciation of Allegiance.-- The question


Tolentino: of how a citizen may strip himself of the status as
such citizen is governed by his national law.
Applicability of Laws to Aliens. – Every
sovereign state has absolute & exclusive power of BALANE CASES:
government w/in its own territory. Aliens owe a
local & temporary allegiance to the government of TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO 15 SCRA 355
the country where they are; they must, therefore,
obey its laws, & may prosecuted for violating them. Held: At the time the divorce decree was issued,
Escano, like her husband, was still a Filipino
On the other hand, aliens enjoy the civil citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law
rights guaranteed by the Consti to all the under Art. 15, NCC. Philippine law, under the
inhabitants of the State. They come under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute
protection of the Bill of Rights in the same manner divorce but only provides for legal separation.
as citizens.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign
Exemption under International Law.-- Under divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a
the theory of extraterritoriality, foreigners may be patent violation of the declared policy of the
exempted fr. the operation of the Phil. laws in the State. Moreover, recognition would give rise to
following cases: scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy
when the offense is committed by a foreign citizens to the detriment of those members of our
sovereign while in Phil. territory; society whose means do not permit them to
when the offense is committed by diplomatic sojourn abroad & obtain absolute divorce outside
representatives; & the Phils. Therefore, a foreign divorce bet.
Filipino citizens, sought & decreed after the

11
effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition generally governed by the law of the place of
as valid in this jurisdiction. execution (Art. 17, par. 1.) But the distribution
VAN DORN V. ROMILLO 139 SCRA 139 of the estate is governed by the law of the nation
of the deceased.
Held: Only Phil. nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being The distribution of the estate may involve
considered contrary to our concept of public policy various questions:
& morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, w/c may be recognized in the Phils., The order of succession in cases of intestacy;
provided they are valid according to their national The intrinsic validity of the testamentary
law. provisions in case of testate succession;
The extent or amount of property w/c each heir
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released is entitled to inherit;
PRs fr. the marriage according to American law, The capacity of certain heirs to succeed, &
under w/c divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, Questions of preterition, disinheritance, &
pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the collation.
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband All these matters are governed by the
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. law of the nation of the decedent, irrespective of
the nature & location of the properties left by him
at the time of his death.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal
Applicability of Foreign Law.-- The second
property is subject to the law of the country where par. of this article can be invoked only when the
it is situated. deceased was vested w/ a descendible interest in
prop. w/in the jurisdiction of the Phils.
However, intestate & testamentary successions,
both w/ respect to the order of succession & to the The intrinsic validity of the provisions of
amount of successional rights & to the intrinsic the will of a foreigner who dies in the Phils. is to
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be be determined by the laws of his own state or
regulated by the national law of the person whose country, & not by those of the Phils. Thus, a
condition in a will of a foreigner that his legatee
succession is under consideration, whatever may be
respect his order that his prop. be distributed
the nature of the property & regardless of the according to the laws of the Phils. instead of the
country wherein said property may be found. laws of his own country, was held illegal &
considered as not written.
Balane:

In Art. 16 par. 1 provides that the lex situs Art. 17. The forms & solemnities of contracts,
or lex rei sitae governs real or personal prop. This
wills, & other public instruments shall be gov-
rule applies even to incorporeal property. In Tayag
v. Benguet Consolidated, the SC said that Phil. erned by the laws of the country in w/c they are
courts have jurisdiction over shares of stocks executed.
located in the Phils.
When the acts referred to are executed
before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Tolentino: Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country,
the solemnities established by Philippine laws
Law on Property. – Property is subject to the shall be observed in their execution.
laws of the country in w/c it is located; Savigny
bases this principle upon a voluntary submission to
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their
local laws implied in the holding of property w/in
the country. Real property is governed by lex situs, acts or property, & those w/c have for their
the law of the space where the land is situated. object public order, public policy & good customs
Personal property follows the modern doctrine shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
mobilia sequuntur personam (movables follow the judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
owner). conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Law on Succession.-- The law governing


succession may be considered fr. the point of view Balane: The rule in par. 1 is known as the lex
of (a) the execution of wills, & (b) the distribution loci celebrationis.
of property. The formalities of execution of will are
12
Tolentino:
BELLIS V. BELLIS 20 SCRA 358 (1967)
Validity & Effects of Obligations.-- The code
fails to mention the law w/c shall govern the validity Facts: Amos Bellis, born in Texas & an American
& effects of obligations: citizen, had 5 legitimate children w/ his 1st wife, 3
First, the law designated by the parties shall be
legitimate children w/ his 2nd wife & 3 illegitimate
applied;
If there is no stipulation on the matter, & the children. He executed a will in the Philippines
parties are of the same nationality, their where he bequeathed P120T to his 3 illegit
national law shall be applied; children & the rest of his estate to all his legit
If this is not the case, the law of the place of children. He died while a resident of Texas. The
perfection of the obligation shall govern its will was admitted to probate. Two illegit children
essence & nature, & the law of the place of the filed their opposition to the project of partition on
performance shall govern its fulfillment; the ground that they were deprived of their
However, if these places are not specified & they legitimes. The lower court overruled the
cannot be deduced fr. the nature &
opposition, applying Art.16, NCC where the
circumstances of the obligation, then the law of
the domicile of the passive subject shall apply. national law of the decedent (in this case, Texan
(Manresa & Valverde.) law) would govern & w/c did not provide for
legitimes.

AZNAR V. GARCIA 61 O.G. NO. 46 P. 7303 Held: Renvoi is not applicable where the
(1963) decedent is the national & the domiciliary of the
same country. Where the testator was a citizen
Facts: Edward Christensen, a U.S. citizen executed of Texas & domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic
a will in Manila where he bequeathed to Maria validity of his will should be governed by his
Helen Christensen P3,600 & the rest of his property national law. Since Texas law does not require
to his daughter Maria Lucy. The executor thus legitimes, then his will w/c deprived his
made the project of partition in accordance w/ the illegitimate children of the legitimes is valid.
will. Helen opposed said partition insofar as it Whatever the public policy or good customs
deprived her of her legitime as an acknowledged involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has
natural child & that the distribution should be not intended to extend the same to the
governed by Phil. laws. The lower court ruled that succession of foreign nationals for it has
since the deceased was a U.S. citizen, the specifically chosen to leave the amount of
successional rights & intrinsic validity of his will are successional rights to the decedent’s national law.
to be governed by California Law under w/c a
testator has the right to dispose of his property in
the way he desires. Baviera: Why was Texas law applied when
there was no proof of Texas law?
Issue: Which law should apply, Philippine law or
California law?
Other Conflict of Law Rules:
Held: Where the testator was a citizen of
California, & domiciled in the Philippines, the Art. 829. A revocation done outside the
amount of successional rights should be governed Philippines, by a person who does not have his
by his national law. However, since the conflicts of domicile in this country, is valid when it is done
law rules of California provides that in case of citi- according to the law of the place where the will
zens who are residents of another country, the law was made, or according to the law of the place in
of the country of domicile should apply, then w/c the testator had his domicile at the time; & if
Philippine law on legitimes was applied. Hence, the revocation takes place in this country, when it
under Philippine laws, the acknowledged natural is in accordance w/ the provisions of this Code.
daughter cannot be deprived of her legitime.
Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed
by the law of the nation of the decedent.

13
Art. 1753. The law of the country to w/c the
goods are to be transported shall govern the liability The national law of the parties
of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or govern the essential or intrinsic
deterioration. requirements, namely:

Art. 26, FC. All marriages solemnized outside 1. legal capacity


the Philippines in accordance w/ the laws in force in 2. consent
the country where they were solemnized, & valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, Art. 80, FC. In the absence of a contrary
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property
(5) & (6), 36, 37 & 38. relations of the spouses shall be governed by
Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen & a celebration of the marriage & their residence.
foreigner is validly celebrated & a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien This rule shall not apply:
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Where both spouses are aliens;
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under With respect to the extrinsic validity of
Philippine law. contracts affecting property not situated in the
Philippines & executed in the country where the
property is located; &
Q: Would the ruling in Tenchavez still be the same, With respect to the extrinsic validity of
even after the amendment introduced in Art. 26 by contracts entered into in the Philippines but
EO 227?
affecting property situated in a foreign country
A: Yes, bec. the Tenchavez spouses are Filipinos.
Art. 26 par. 2 does not apply to them. whose laws require different formalities for their
extrinsic validity.
Requisites of Art. 26 par. 2:
one of the spouses is a foreigner HUMAN RELATIONS
a divorce decree is obtained
the divorce decree is obtained at the instance of the
foreign spouse Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise
under the divorce decree, the foreigner-spouse of his rights & in the performance of his duties,
acquires the capacity to remarry. act w/ justice, give everyone his due, & observe
honesty & good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,


Baviera: willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Q: Suppose at the time of the marriage, both
spouses are Filipinos. Afterwards, one Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss
becomes naturalized. Would Art. 26 par. 2 or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
still be applied? to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
A: No. This would be a circumvention of the
law. The 2nd paragraph applies only to mixed
marriages fr. the very beginning & not when GLOBE MCKAY V. CA 176 SCRA 778 (1989)
one subsequently becomes naturalized. It
contemplates a situation where one party Facts: PR was an employee of Globe McKay.
was already a foreigner at the time of the He discovered some fraudulent transactions w/c
marriage he reported to the GM. The GM later accused
him of being the crook & that he was a swindler.
This refers to the formal or extrinsic He was asked to leave his things & desk open for
requirements only, namely: inspection. Police investigation was also
conducted w/c found him innocent. The lie
1. authority of the solemnizing officer detector test also showed negative results.
2. valid marriage license These notw/standing, 6 criminal cases for estafa
3. marriage ceremony were filed against him. In the meantime, he was
14
dismissed fr. work. Pending the case, he sought PNB V. CA 83 SCRA 237 (1978)
employment in another company, w/c rejected him
in view of a letter sent by Globe’s GM labeling him Facts: PR entered into a contract of lease of
as dishonest. PR thus filed for damages against sugar allotment w/ a certain Tuason. PR offered
Globe. The lower court ruled for PR. the use of her sugar quota at P2.50/picul. But,
as the sugar quota was mortgaged to PNB bec. of
Held: Affirmed. While an employer has the right a loan by PR, the lease had to be approved by
to dismiss an employee who was involved in PNB. The branch manager recommended the
anomalous transactions, the right of dismissal price to be raised to P2.80/picul, to w/c Tuason
should not be exercised in an abusive manner, such agreed. However, the BOD of PNB disapproved
as by making accusations of being a crook, forcing said lease, requiring at least P3/picul. Because of
him to take a forced leave, threatening to file a this, the contract did not materialize & PR
hundred suits against him. Hence, the employer is suffered losses.
liable for damages.
Held: The law makes it imperative that every
Although Art.19 provides only for the rule of person must in the exercise of his rights & in the
conduct for the guidance of human relations & performance of his duties, act w/ justice, give
maintenance of social order & does not provide a everyone his due, & observe honesty & good
remedy for its violation, an action for damages faith. This PNB failed to do. Time was of the
under Art. 21 or 22 would be proper. Art. 21 was essence in the approval of lease of sugar quota
adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the allotments since the same must be utilized during
statutes, w/c leave so many victims of moral the milling season, otherwise it may be
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually reallocated. Certainly, PNB knew that the
suffered material & moral injury. In view of the agricultural year was about to expire & that by its
circumstances of the case, PR has a right to recover disapproval of the lease, PR would be unable to
damages under Art. 19 in relation to Art. 21. utilize her sugar quota. While the BOD of PNB
had the power to approve the lease of the sugar
VELAYO V. SHELL 54 O.G. NO. 46 P. 7303 quota allotments of its debtor, its act in unduly
(1956) refusing to grant such approval when the terms
of the lease were reasonable constitutes a
Facts: CALI, a domestic corporation engaged in violation of Art. 21 of the Civil Code.
the air transportation business was a debtor of Shell
Phils. It called for a meeting w/ all its principal Baviera: The Board of Directors should have
creditors to inform the latter of its state of been held liable, not the bank.
insolvency. In the meeting, a C-54 plane owned by
CALI, w/c was in the U.S., was mentioned. As the
creditors failed to reach an agreement as to the BALANE V. YU CHIANG 54 O.G. NO. 3, P.
division of its assets, a committee was formed w/ 687 (1957)
Shell’s GM as its head. Unknown to the other
creditors, bec. of the information fr. the meeting, Facts: Marcela Balane, a 19-year old girl,
Shell Phils assigned its credit to Shell U.S., w/c agreed to cohabit w/ Yu Chiang in view of a
immediately brought a collection suit against CALI & notarial instrument signed by the latter. In such
had the C-54 plane attached. Thus, this action by instrument, it provided that as he could not yet
Velayo, as the assignee of CALI’s assets. marry Marcela due to some inconveniences, it is
their understanding & agreement to live together,
Held: Shell Phils. acted in bad faith when it made that Yu Chiang obliges himself to support Marcela
a hasty assignment of its credits w/o informing the & their offspring. When Marcela got pregnant &
other creditors, in violation of the agreement among asked Yu to marry her, he refused. He similarly
all the creditors of CALI to settle the division of refused to support the child. The lower court
CALI’s assets amicably. Such move enabled Shell ruled in Marcela’s favor in her action for support
Phils. to collect the entire amount of its credit to the & recognition.
prejudice of other preferred creditors. Such
betrayal of confidence violated Art. 19 as Held: Evidence shows that at the time of
implemented by Art.21. cohabitation, there was no impediment to their
marriage. The instrument tends to show that

15
there was a promise of marriage. Even w/o the
latter, Yu is liable for damages for “defloration & LAGUNZAD V. GONZALES 92 SCRA 476
cohabitation”. Under the NCC, it is not necessary (1979)
that there is a breach of a promise of marriage in
order that Marcela may recover damages. Art. 21 is Facts: Petitioner began the filming of “The
applicable. There is not question that Marcela Moises Padilla Story”. Because Padilla’s mother &
suffered moral damages by reason of having been her sisters objected to some parts of the story
induced to live w/ Yu in a manner that is contrary to relating to Moises’ private life, a licensing
morals & good customs, as a result of w/c she bore agreement was entered into between them
a child w/c Yu now refuses to recognize & support. where P agreed to pay a certain sum to the
family. P failed to pay fully so an action was filed
against him. The lower court ruled for PR.
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, Held: Affirmed. Being a public figure ipso facto
acquires or comes into possession of something at does not automatically destroy in toto a person's
the expense of the latter w/o just or legal ground, right to privacy. The right to invade a person's
shall return the same to him. privacy to disseminate public information does
not extend to fictional or novelized representation
Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing of a person, no matter how public a figure he or
damage to another's property was not due to the she may be. The licensing agreement is valid &
fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall has the force of law between the parties as the
be liable for indemnity if through the act or event provisions thereof are not contrary to law,
he was benefited. morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. Petitioner should comply w/ it in good
Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other faith. That said agreement violates his freedom
relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvan- of expression cannot be upheld.
tage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age The right of freedom of expression,
or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for indeed, occupies a preferred position in the
his protection. hierarchy of civil liberties. However, it is limited
by the clear & present danger rule & the
Art. 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses balancing of interest test. The latter requires the
for pleasure or display during a period of acute court to take conscious & detailed consideration
public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the interplay of interest observable in a given
of the courts at the instance of any government or situation. The interests observable in this case
private charitable institution. are the right to privacy & freedom of expression.
Taking into account the interplay of those
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, interest, we hold that under the particular
personality, privacy & peace of mind of his circumstances presented, & considering the
neighbors & other persons. The following & similar obligations in the contract, the validity of such
acts, though they may not constitute a criminal contract must be upheld bec. the limits of
offense, shall produce a cause of action for freedom of expression are reached when
damages, prevention & other relief: expression touches upon matters of essentially
Prying into the privacy of another's residence; private concern.
Meddling w/ or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another;
Intriguing to cause another to be alienated fr. AYER V. CAPULONG 160 SCRA 865 (1988)
his friends;
Vexing or humiliating another on account of his Facts: Ayer Productions Ltd. started the filming
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, of “The Four Day Revolution”. PR Senator Enrile
physical defect, or other personal condition. manifested that he would not approve of the use,
appropriation or exhibition of his name, picture,
or that of his family in said production. PR
claimed that the film violated his right to privacy.

16
Held: Senator Enrile cannot object to his inclusion Issue: WON the def could still be prosecuted for
in the movie on the EDSA Revolution by invoking his the collection of the amount stated in the said
right to privacy. The right of privacy is not an receipt in a civil case after he had been acquitted
absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's by the court on a charge of estafa based on the
privacy has long been regarded as permissible said receipt.
where that person is a public figure & the
information sought to be elicited fr. him or to be Held: Yes. Nowhere in the decision rendered in
published about him constitutes matters of a public the crim case is found an express declaration that
character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot the fact fr. w/c the civ axn might arise did not
be invoked to resist publication & dissemination of exist. The phrase “ that the guilt of the def has
matters of public interest. The right of privacy of a not been satisfactorily established is held to be
public figure is necessarily narrower than that of an equivalent to a declaration that the acquittal was
ordinary citizen. based on reasonable doubt & does not preclude a
suit to enforce the civ liab for the same act or
As distinguished fr. Lagunzad v. Gonzales, omission under Art 29.
w/c involved a film biography necessarily including
at least his immediate family, the subject matter of MENDOZA V. ARRIETA [91 S 113 (1979)]
the movie in this case is one of public concern &
does not relate to the individual or public life of Facts: Three-way vehicular collision resulted in
Senator Enrile. the crim prosecution of Montoya, truck driver &
Salazar, jeepney driver. Mendoza, owner of the
Benz filed a crim vs. Montoya & a civ case vs.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal Salazar. The court rendered a decision absolving
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt Salazar fr. any liability in view of its findings that
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a the collision was the result of Montoya’s
civil action for damages for the same act or negligence. Montoya was found guilty of damage
omission may be instituted. Such action requires to property thru reckless imprudence but Salazar
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of was acquitted & absolved fr. civ & crim liab. No
the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to damages were awarded to Mendoza since he
file a bond to answer for damages in case the filed civ case vs. Salazar & not Montoya.
complaint should be found to be malicious. Mendoza again filed a civ case vs. Salazar &
Timbol, the owner of the truck.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so Issue: WON res judicata bars complaint
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that vs. Timbol
effect, it may be inferred fr. the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. Held: NO. There is no res judicata, the parties
& causes of action being different. Furthermore,
under Art. 31 of the Civil Code, When the civil
action is based on an obligation not arising fr.
crime, the civil action may proceed independently
MENDOZA V. ALCALA [2 S 1032 (1961)]
of the criminal proceedings regardless of result of
the latter. Citing Garcia v. Florido, "As we have
Facts: Def Mendoza was charged w/ estafa.
stated at the outset, the same negligent act
While the crim case was pending, plaintiff Alcala
causing damages may produce a civil liability
filed a civil case based on the very same receipt
arising fr. crime or create an action for quasi-
upon w/c the crim axn was predicated. The crim
delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a
court acquitted the def. The civ court ruled against
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a
Mendoza. On appeal, the appellate court dismissed
distinct & independent negligence, having always
plaint Alcala on the ground that when the court
had its own foundation & individuality. Some
makes an express finding that the facts upon w/c
legal writers are of the view that in accordance
the decision may be based do not exist, the same is
w/ Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-
conclusive & is a bar to the prosecution based on
delict may proceed independently of the criminal
the same set of facts.
proceeding for criminal negligence & regardless
of the result of the latter. Hence, the proviso in
Section 2 of Rule 111 (requiring reservation of
17
civil actions) w/ reference to Articles 32, 33, & 34 of
the Civil Code, is contrary to the letter & spirit of the
said articles, for these articles were drafted & are
intended to constitute as exceptions to the general PADILLA V. CA [129 S 558 (1990)]
rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.
The proviso, w/c is procedural, may also be Facts: The Mayor was sued for grave coercion.
regarded as an unauthorized amendment of TC convicted them. CA reversed & acquitted
substantive law, Articles 32, 33 & 34 of the Civil them on the ground of reasonable doubt but at
Code, w/c do not provide for the reservation the same time ordered them to pay actual
required in the proviso." damages.

However, a civil action for damages against Issue: WON the acquittal based on reasonable
the owner-driver of the jeep would not prosper bec. doubt extinguishes the civ liab of accused.
civil liability arising fr. crime co-exists w/ criminal
liability in criminal cases. Hence, the offended party Held: NO. Such acquittal will not bar a civil case
had the option to prosecute on civil liability arising for damages arising fr. the demolition of petition-
fr. crime or fr. quasi-delict. His active participation in er's market stalls. The acquittal on the ground
the criminal case implies that he opted to recover that their guilt has not been proven beyond
the civil liability arising fr. crime. Hence, since the reasonable doubt refers to the element of Grave
acquittal in the criminal case, w/c was not based on Coercion (the acts should have been
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages can no denominated malicious mischief/ threat) & not to
longer be instituted. the fact of that the stalls were demolished. Under
the Rules of Court, the extinction of penal action
carries w/ it the extinction of civil only if there is a
REPUBLIC V. BELLO [120 S 203 (1983)] declaration that facts fr. w/c civil may arise did
not exist. Also, Art. 29 of the Civil Code does not
Facts: Def Arceno was a cashier & disbursing state that civil liability can be recovered only in a
officer of the Capiz Agric School. He was charged separate civil action. The civil liability can be
for malversation of public funds. He was acquitted recovered either in the same or a separate
by the CFI. The prov fiscal then filed a civ case for action. The purpose of recovering in the same
the recovery of the amount he failed to account. action is to dispense w/ the filing of another civil
The court dismissed said case on the ground that it action where the same evidence is to be
was barred by prior judgment. presented, & the unsettling implications of
permitting reinstitution of a separate civil action.
Issue: WON the acquittal of Arceno in the crim However, a separate civil action is warranted
case bars the filing of the civ axn vs. him. when (1) additional facts are to be established;
(2) there is more evidence to be adduced; (3)
Held: NO. The evid of the prosecution is not there is full termination of the criminal case & a
enough to establish the guilt of the accused as it separate complaint would be more efficacious
opens an avenue leading to a belief that the than a remand. Hence, CA did not err in
accused might be innocent. The evid presented by awarding damages despite the acquittal.
the state did not remove the possibility that Arceno
might not be guilty. In the crim case, the LC REYES V. SEMPIO-DY [141 S 208 (1986)]
declared that his acquittal was upon a finding that
the evid of the prosec was not suff to establish the Facts: A crim complaint for intriguing vs. honor
guilt of A beyond reasonable doubt. There is no was filed vs. D. She immediately pleaded guilty
finding that fact upon w/c the civ case is based & was sentenced to pay P50 as fine. Reyes,
does not exist. The civ axn barred by such a represented by her private prosecutor, was not
declaration is the civ liab arising fr. the offense able to adduce evid to prove damages & neither
charged w/c is impliedly instituted w/ the crim axn. was she able to make a reservation of her rt. to
A person may be acquitted of malversation but he file a separate civ axn. Instead, she filed a sep
could be liable for the restoration or at least proper civ axn arising fr. the same defamatory words.
accting of the funds if he shld spend them for LC dismissed the case.
purposes w/c are unauthorized.
Issue: WON plaintiff is barred fr. filing the sep
civ axn.
18
Rule 111, Sec. 2. Institution of separate civil
Held: NO. The failure of the plaint Reyes to file a action. - Except in the cases provided for in
sep civ axn did not foreclose her rt. to file a sep Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has
complaint for damages. Under A33, there is no been commenced, the civil action w/c has been
requirement that as a condition precedent to the reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment
filing of a sep civ axn for damages a reservation to has been rendered in the criminal action.
file said civ axn be first made in the crim case &
such reservation is not necessary, provision of R111 (a) Whenever the offended party shall have
S2 notw/standing. instituted the civil action (arising fr. the crime -
Baltic) as provided for in the first paragraph of
MAXIMO V. GEROCHI [144 S 326 (1986)] section 1 hereof before the filing of the criminal
action is subsequently commenced, the pending
Facts: Panghilasan was charged w/ estafa. civil action shall be suspended, in whatever stage
Maximo intervened in the case thru her private before final judgment it may be found, until final
prosec. LC acquitted Panghilasan for failure to judgment in the criminal action has been ren-
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt & found dered. However, if no final judgment has been
if the accused had any oblig, it is simply civil in rendered by the trial court in the civil action, the
nature that could be properly ventilated w/in the same may be consolidated w/ the criminal action
context of civ law. MFR was filed by plaintiff upon application w/ the court trying the criminal
praying that the accused who admitted her civ liab action. If the application is granted, the evidence
be sentenced to pay the value of the checks. LC presented & admitted in the civil action shall be
denied. deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal
action, w/o prejudice to the admission of
Issue: WON the LC should ruled on the civ liab of additional evidence that any party may wish to
the accused. present. In case of consolidation, both the crimi-
nal & the civil actions shall be tried & decided
Held: YES. Citing Padilla v. CA, the court may jointly.
acquit & at the same time order payment of civil
liability in the same case. The rationale is that there (b) Extinction of the penal action does not
is no reason to require a separate civil action where carry w/ it extinction of the civil, unless the
the facts to be proved in the civil case have been extinction proceeds fr. a declaration (need not
proven in the criminal case, & due process has be an express declaration- Baltic) in a final
already been accorded to the accused, & to prevent judgment that the fact fr. w/c the civil might arise
needless clogging of court dockets & unnecessary did not exist. (Rules of Court.)
duplication of litigation.
Sect 3. When civ axn may proceed
independently. - In the cases provided for in Arts
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud & 32,33,34 & 2176 of the CC, the independent civ
physical injuries, a civ axn for damages, entirely axn w/c has been reserved may be brought by
separate & distinct fr. the criminal action, may be the offended party, shall proceed independently
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall of the crim axn, & shall require only a
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, preponderance of evid.
& shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Sec 5. Elements of prejudicial Q - The 2
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal essential elements of a prej Q are: a) the civ axn
police force refuses or fails to render aid or involves an issue similar or intimately related to
protection to any person in case of danger to life or the issue raise in the crim axn; & b) the
property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable resolution of such issue determines WON the
for damages, & the city or municipality shall be crim axn may proceed.
subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action
herein recognized shall be independent of any Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
criminal proceedings, & a preponderance of Q. - A petition for suspension of the crim axn
evidence shall suffice to support such action. based upon the pendency of a prejudicial Q in a
civ axn may be filed in the office of the fiscal or
the court conducting the preliminary

19
investigation. When the crim axn has been filed in & independently of the crim axn. Such sep civ
court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed axn under A33 may be brought even w/o
in the same crim axn at any time before the reservation & proceeds to trial & final judgment
prosecution rests. irrespective of the result of the crim axn. Plaint’s
civ axn did not arise fr. nor depend upon the
result of the crim axn but fr. the def’s act of
infliction of phys injuries. Plaint derived no
ABELLANA V. MARAVE [57 S 106 (1974)]
enforceable rt. fr. the judgment of conviction.
Facts: Abellana was charged w/ physical inj thru
MADEJA V. CARO [126 S 295 (1983)]
reckless imprudence. He was found guilty &
sentenced to pay damages in favor of Rs. However,
Facts: Madeja filed a crim case vs. Japzon for
A appealed the case tot he CFI w/c reversed & tried
homicide thru reckless imprudence. She reserved
the case de novo. In the meantime, Rs waived
her rt. to file a sep civ axn for damages. While
their rt. to the civ axn impliedly instituted w/ the
the crim case was pending, she filed a civ axn for
crim case & reserved their rt. to file a sep axn.
damages. Judge Caro dismissed the civ case bec
under R111S3(a), the axn may be instituted only
Issue: WON Rs can still reserve their rt. to file a
after final judgment has been rendered in the
sep civ axn before the CFI.
crim axn.
Held: YES. The argument that a sep civ axn can
Issue: WON the civ axn vs. J may proceed
be legally filed & allowed only at the institution of
independently of the crim axn vs. her.
the crim axn & never on appeal is untenable. This
ignores what is explicitly prov in S7 of R123, that an
Held: YES. An independent civil action under
appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew in
Art. 33 may proceed independently of the
the CFI as if it had been orig. instituted in that
criminal case. Citing Carandang v. Santiago [97 P
court. The fact that an offended party failed at the
94 (1955)], "The term "physical injuries" is used
initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civ
in the generic sense, not the crime of physical
suit thru oversight is not a bar to the institution of
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It
an indep civ axn bec a substantive rt. granted by
includes not only physical injuries but
S33 CC may not be frittered away by a construction
consummated, frustrated & attempted homicide."
w/c would render it nugatory. Also, grant of power
Defamation & fraud are also used in their generic
given to SC to promulgate rules relating to pleading,
sense bec. there are no specific provisions in the
etc, does not extend to any diminution, increase or
Revised Penal Code using these terms as means
modif of substantive rts.
of offenses defined therein.
ESCUETA V. FANDIALAN [61 S 278 (1974)]
Baviera: The separate civil action should
Facts: D was convicted of physical injuries by the have been based on 2176 because the
CFI w/c was affirmed by the CA. This became final death here was caused by negligence. If
on 8/31/55. On 6/56, plaintiff having reserved his the death is intentional, A33 will apply.
rt. to institute a sep civ axn, filed w/ the CFI a This provision was based on the US
complaint to enforce def’s civil liab under A100 RPC, concept of intentional torts, such as
but such was later dismissed for lack of interest in battery, defamation. If physical inj were
1962. After 7 yrs, plaintiff refiled the civ case. CFI caused by negligence, clearly A2176 on Q-
dismissed on the ground of prescription--the phys delict should apply.
injuries having been committed 16 yrs ago.

Issue: Under A33, when does the plaint’s cause of Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be
axn accrue: fr. the date of the commission or fr. injured by a criminal offense, charges another w/
final conviction? the same, for w/c no independent civil action is
granted in this Code or any special law, but the
Held: WHEN COMMITTED. Applic period is 4 justice of the peace finds no reasonable ground
years. Plaint’s civ axn for damages would have to believe that a crime has been committed, or
been implicitly instituted w/ the crim axn but plaint the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to
expressly reserved his rt. to institute the civ axn sep institute criminal proceedings, the complainant

20
may bring a civil action for damages against the necessary; there is no need in this case to decide
alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported the nullity of the second marriage or to determine
by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the the existence of the grounds for annulling the
defendant's motion, the court may require the same.
plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in
case the complaint should be found to be malicious. Issue: WON an axn to annul the second
marriage is a prejudicial Q in a prosec for bigamy
If during the pendency of the civil action, an
information should be presented by the prosecuting Held: YES. The civil case for annulment is a
attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until prejudicial question to be determined before the
the termination of the criminal proceedings. criminal case can proceed. Consent is an
essential element of a valid marriage. Without
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions, w/c must be consent, the marriage is void. But the question of
decided before any criminal prosecution may be invalidity cannot ordinarily be decided in the
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by criminal action for bigamy & since the prosec for
rules of court w/c the Supreme Court shall promul- bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the
gate & w/c shall not be in conflict w/ the provisions second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary
of this Code. that a decision in a civil axn to the effect that the
second marriage contains all the essentials of
marriage must first be secured.
Rule 111, Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial
question. - The two (2) essential elements of a LANDICHO V. RELOVA [22 S 731 (1968)]
prejudicial question are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or Facts: First wife filed a complaint vs. P for
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal bigamy. One month later, P’s second wife filed a
action; petition to annul their marriage on the ground
(b) the resolution of such issue determines that P forced, threatened & intimidated her into
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. marrying him. P moved to suspend the hearing
(Rules of Court.) of the crim case pending the decision on the Q of
the validity of the second marriage. This was
Rule 111, Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of denied.
prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of
the criminal action based upon the pendency of a Issue: WON a prejudicial Q exists.
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in
the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the Held: Parties to a second marriage should not
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
has been filed in court for trial, the petition to only competent courts having such authority.
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of
any time before the prosecution rests. (ibid.) the first marriage is beyond Q. A party who
contracts a second marriage then assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Balane:
"The mere fact that there are actions to
Bigamy - Art. 349, RPC. Contracting of second or annul the marriages entered into by accused in a
subsequent marriage: bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial
before legal dissolution of first marriage questions" are automatically raised in civil actions
before declaration of presumptive death of absent as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case.
spouse. In order that the case of annulment of marriage
be considered a prejudicial question to the
bigamy case against the accused, it must be
MERCED V. DIAZ [109 P 156 (1960)] shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage
must be the one that was obtained by means of
Facts: Merced filed a complaint for annulment of duress, force & intimidation to show that his act
second marriage w/ EC. EC filed a complaint for in the second marriage must be involuntary &
bigamy vs. M. LC held that the judicial declaration cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime
of nullity of a second & bigamous marriage is not of bigamy. The situation in the present case is
21
markedly different. At the time the petitioner was Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj). That except for
indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage purposes of succession, when two persons perish
ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or
indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the conflagration, & it is not shown who died first, &
petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the there are no particular circumstances fr. w/c it
ground of force, threats & intimidation. And it was can be inferred, the survivorship is determined fr.
only later that petitioner as defendant in the civil the probabilities resulting fr. the strength & age
action, filed a third party complaint against the first of the sexes, according to the following rules:
spouse alleging that his marriage w/ her should be 1. If both were under the age of fifteen
declared null & void on the ground of force, threats years, the older is deemed to have survived;
& intimidation. Assuming the first marriage was null 2. If both were above the age of sixty, the
& void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact younger is deemed to have survived;
would not be material to the outcome of the 3. If one is under fifteen & the other above
criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the 4. If both be over fifteen & under sixty, & the
same must be submitted to the judgment of a sex be different, the male is deemed to have
competent court & only when the nullity of the survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, & so 5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, & the
long as there is no such declaration, the other between those ages, the latter is deemed
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, to have survived.
he who contracts a second marriage before the (kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage or more persons who are called to succeed each
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy." other, as to w/c of them died first, whoever
alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of proof, they
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or shall be considered to have died at the same
more persons who are called to succeed each other, time. (Rules of Court.)
as to w/c of them died first, whoever alleges the
death of one prior to the other, shall prove the
same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that BALANE CASE:
they died at the same time & there shall be no
transmission of rights fr. one to the other. JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO [93 P 257]

Tolentino: Where there are facts, known or


knowable, fr. w/c a rational conclusion can be
This article applies only when the question of made, the presumption (in the Rules of Court)
survivorship involves persons "who are called to does not step in, & the rules of preponderance of
succeed each other." Hence, it cannot apply to evidence controls.
other cases w/c do not involve succession.
When the persons involved would succeed each Are there particular circumstances on
other, however, then this article applies, record fr. w/c reasonable inference of
whether the death be actual or merely survivorship bet. AJ & her son can be drawn? Is
presumed fr. absence or other circumstances. Francisco Lopez' (the sole witness) testimony
competent & sufficient for the purpose?
Are Rules of Court Repealed?-- There is every
indication that the Code Commission intended to It is our opinion that the testimony
repeal the presumptions on survivorship under the contains facts quite adequate to solve the
Rules of Court, bec. the presumptions laid down problem of survivorship bet. AJ & JN, Jr. & keep
therein are sometimes absurd & mere guesswork. [I the statutory presumption out of the case. It is
Tolentino 176] believed that in the light of the conditions painted
by Lopez, a fair & reasonable inference can be
arrived at, namely: that JN, Jr. died before his
mother.
Compare w/ Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj), (kk)
While the possibility that the mother died
before the son can not be ruled out, it must be
noted that this possibility is entirely speculative &
must yield to the more rational deduction fr.
22
proven facts that it was the other way around. JN, facts to go by, you do not use either
Jr., was killed, while running, in front of, & 15 presumption. Art. 43 as well as Sec. 5 (jj) of R
meters fr. the Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he 131 cannot be applied if there are facts to go by.
must have negotiated that distance in 5 seconds or
less, & so died w/in that interval fr. the time he In questions other than succession (like
dashed out of the bldg. AJ could have perished insurance, resolutory conditions, reserva troncal,
w/in those 5 or fewer seconds, but the probabilities donation inter vivos), apply Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj)
that she did seem very remote.
The case did not resolve the issue as to
According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse w/n there is a conflict bet. Art. 43 & R 131, Sec. 5
of the club occurred about 40 minutes after JN, Jr. (jj) of the ROC. To reconcile the two, the
died, & it was the collapse that killed AJ. The CA following rules may be of help:
said that the interval bet. JN, Jr.'s death & the Art. 43 applies only when succession is involved;
breaking down of the edifice was "minutes." Even ROC [referring to Sec. 5 (jj) R 131] applies
so, it was much longer than 5 seconds, long enough only when 2 persons perish in the same
to warrant the inference that AJ was still alive when calamity.
her son expired. When succession is involved but the persons did
not perish in the same calamity, apply Art.
The CA mentioned several causes, besides 43; When the persons perished in the same
the bldg.’s collapse, by w/c AJ could have been calamity but succession is not involved, apply
killed. All these causes are speculative. xxx Nor ROC.
was AJ likely to have been killed by falling beams When neither element is present, neither
bec. the bldg. was made of concrete & its collapse, provision will apply.
more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, The conflict will arise only when succession is
these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly, involved & 2 persons died in the same
not w/in the brief space of 5 seconds bet. her son's calamity. In case of conflict, Art. 43 will
departure & his death. apply (this is only an opinion.)

It will be said that all this is indulging in RAM: The 1988 Revised Rules on Evidence
inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii) of R removed whatever conflict there was bet. the
123 does not require that the inference necessary ROC & Art. 43 of the NCC. In fact, Art. 43 is now
to exclude the presumption therein provided be substantially reproduced as Sec. 5 (kk) of R 131
certain. It is the "particular circumstances fr. w/c it of the ROC.
(survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to
be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In
speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond LAW ON PERSONS
doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may
be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."

In conclusion, the presumption that AJ died Tolentino:


before her son is based purely on surmises,
speculations, or conjectures w/o any sure Concept of Person.-- In a juridical sense, the
foundation in evidence. The opposite theory is term "person" is now understood as any being,
deduced fr. established facts w/c, weighed by physical or moral, real or juridical & legal,
common experience, engender the inference as a susceptible of rights & obligations, or of being the
very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of subject of legal relations. (Sanchez Roman.)
preponderance of evidence by w/c civil cases are
decided, this inference ought to prevail. Classes of Persons.-- (1) human beings or
men, called natural persons; & (2) entities
formed by the association of men, known as
juridical persons, or as artificial, fictitious,
Balane: abstract, or moral persons.
In Sec. 5 (jj) of R 131, there is no presumption of Status of persons.-- The status of a person is
simultaneity but of survivorship. the legal condition or class to w/c one belongs in
society; it is the legal or juridical position of the
Q: Did the court in Joaquin v. Navarro rule w/c of individual in society, or w/ regard to the rest of
the 2 presumptions prevail over the other? Did it the community.
apply either presumption?
A: No to both questions. The status of a person may be political or
civil.
The presumption applies only if there is no
evidence as to who died first. If there are enough
23
Civil status may be grouped into 3 classes: aptitude for the holding & enjoyment of rights.
(a) status as a member of the society; (b) status On the other hand, capacity to act refers to the
as member of a family; & (c) status w/ respect to aptitude for the exercise of rights, & is often
the person himself. referred to merely as "capacity."

The qualities w/c create a status are only Comparison.--


those inherent in the person himself. Juridical capacity (JC) is just one, indivisible,
irreducible, & essentially the same for all
Characteristics of status.-- The status of a men; it is an inherent & ineffaceable attribute
person is outside the commerce of man; hence, (1) of man, & attaches to him by the mere fact
it is inalienable, (2) it is imprescriptible, (3) it of his being a man.
cannot be the object of compromise, (4) the action But capacity to act (CA) is conditional & variable.
to claim it cannot be renounced, & (5) the rights It is acquired & may be lost. The mere
arising fr. it cannot be exercised by creditors. existence of man is not sufficient to confer
capacity to act, bec. this capacity requires
both intelligence & will; xxx Thus, JC can
I. Civil Personality exist w/o CA, but the existence of the latter
implies that of the former.

Tolentino: Balane: JC has no degrees, either you have it


or not. CA has degrees.
Personality is the quality derived fr. being a
person. While a person is any being susceptible of
rights & obligations, personality is the aptitude of JURIDICAL CAPACITY TO ACT
that becoming the subject, active or passive, of CAPACITY
juridical relations. fitness to be the subject power to do acts w/
of legal relations legal effect
Characteristics.-- inherent in every natural acquired & may be lost
It is not a being, but a quality of certain beings; person
it is not a physical element, but a juridical concept; lost through death subject to restrictions:
it is not an object of contract, or of possession, & minority, etc.
cannot be impaired by agreement;
it is a matter of public interest.
Tolentino:
A. ELEMENTS
Capacity of Public Interest.-- The capacity or
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, w/c is the fitness to incapacity of persons depends upon the law &
be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every cannot be modified, extended, or restricted by
natural person & is lost only through death. agreement. Both JC & CA are not rights, but
Capacity to act, w/c is the power to do acts w/ legal qualities of persons; hence, they cannot be
effect, is acquired & may be lost. alienated or renounced.

Art 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state


of being a deaf-mute, prodigality & civil interdiction
are mere restrictions on capacity to act & do not
exempt the incapacitated person fr. certain B. RESTRICTIONS ON CAPACITY TO ACT
obligations, as when the latter arise fr. his acts or fr.
property relations, such as easements. 1. MINORITY.

Tolentino:
Tolentino: The unemancipated minor cannot enter
into contracts (Art. 1327); but he may be
Capacity may be (1) juridical capacity, & estopped fr. disavowing his contract if he has
(2) capacity to act. The union of these 2 forms the misled the other party as to his age. The SC has
full civil capacity. (Balane calls the 2 the held that:
constitutive elements of personality.)
xxx [T]he sale of real estate, effected by
Juridical capacity is synonymous to legal minors who have already passed the ages of
capacity & to personality. They all refer to the puberty & adolescence & are near the adult age,

24
when they pretend to have already reached their Sec 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act,
majority, while in fact they have not, is valid, & they existing wills, bequests, donations, grants,
cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse
themselves fr. compliance w/ the obligation insurance policies & similar instruments
assumed by them or seek their annulment. This containing references & provisions favorable to
doctrine is entirely in accord w/ the provisions of minors will retroact to their prejudice.
our law on estoppel. (Mercado vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil.
215. Sec 5. This act shall take effect upon
completion of its publication in at least 2
But there is authority to the effect that newspapers of gen circulation.
misrepresentation of an incapacitated person does
not bind him.
Approved, Dec 13, 1989.
"xxx Misrepresentation made by a party as
to his age does not estop him fr. denying that he A. CIVIL ACTS
was of age or fr. asserting that he was under age,
at the time he entered into the contract, for the Art 797. Persons of either sex under 18 yrs
breach of w/c an action is brought. Under the
of age cannot make a will.
principle of estoppel, the liab. resulting fr.
misrepresentation has its juridical source in the
capacity of the person making the Art 1489. All persons who are authorized in
misrepresentation to bind himself. If the person this Code to obligate themselves, may enter into
making the misrepresentation cannot bind himself a K of sale, saving the modifications contained in
by contract, he cannot also be bound by any the ff. articles.
misrepresentation he may have made in connection
therew/. A person entering into a contract must Where necessaries are sold & delivered to a
see to it that the other party has sufficient capacity minor or other person w/o capacity to act, he
to bind himself." (Young vs. Tecson, 39 OG 953.)
must pay a reasonable price therefor.
Necessaries are those referred to in Art 290.

RA 6809 An Act Lowering the age of majority


fr. 21 to 18 years Art 14 FC. In case either or both of the
contracting parties, not having been emancipated
Sec 1. Art 234 of EO 209, the Family code is by a previous marriage, are between the ages of
hereby amended to read as follows: 18 & 21, they shall, in addition to the
requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit tot
“Art 234. Emancipation takes place by the he local civil registrar, the consent to their
attainment of majority. Unless o/w provided, marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent
majority commences at the age of 18 years.” or guardian, or persons having legal charge of
them, in the order mentioned. Such consent
Sec 2. Arts 235 & 237 of the same Code is also shall be manifested in writing by the interested
hereby amended to read as follows: party, who personally appears before the proper
local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit
“Art 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental made in the presence of 2 witnesses & attested
autho over the person & property of the child who bef any official authorized by law to administer
shall then be qualifies & responsible for all acts of oaths. The personal manifestations shall be
civil life, save the excs established by existing laws recorded in both application for marriage license,
in special cases. & the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be
attached to said applications.
“Contracting marriage shall require parental
consent until the age of 21.”
B. DELICTS
“Nothing in this Code shall be construed to
derogate fr. the duty or responsibility of parents & Art 101. par 3 RPC. Should there be no
guardians for children & wards below 21 yrs of age person having such insane, imbecile or minor
mentioned in the second & third pars of 2180 of under his authority, legal guardianship or control,
CC”. or if such person be insolvent, said insane,
imbecile or minor shall respond w/ their own

25
property, excepting prop exempt fr. execution, in (1327, par. 2, & he cannot personally accept
or repudiate an inheritance (1048.)
accordance w/ civil law.

C. QUASI-DELICTS Art 1327. The ff. cannot give consent to a K:


1) Unemancipated minors;
Art 2182 NCC. If the minor or insane person 2) Insane or demented persons, & deaf-
causing damage has no parents or guardian, the mutes who do not know how to write.
minor or insane person shall be answerable w/ his
own property in an axn vs. him where a guardian Art 820. Any person of sound mind & of the
ad litem shall be appointed. age of 18 yrs or more, & not blind, deaf or dumb
& able to read & write, may be a witness to the
execution of a will mentioned in 805 of this Code.
2. INSANITY OR IMBECILITY.

Tolentino: 4. CIVIL INTERDICTION

Insanity includes the various forms of mental Tolentino:


disease, either inherited or acquired, in w/c This is an accessory penalty imposed upon
there is a perversion of the mentality, as when persons who are sentenced to a principal penalty
the person is suffering fr. illusions, not lower than reclusion temporal (Art. 41, RPC.)
hallucinations, or delusions, unnatural exaltation Art. 34 of the RPC provides:
or depression, or insane ideas of persecution or
power.
An insane person cannot make a valid will or
testament (Art. 798); & he cannot validly give Art. 34. Civil interdiction shall deprive the
consent to contracts (Art. 1327, par. 2.) offender during the time of his sentence of the
Imbecility is a defect in the quantity of mental rights of parental authority, or guardianship,
development. The mental ages up to the either as to the person or property of any ward,
completed eighth year are included. of marital authority, of the right to manage his
property, & of the right to dispose of such
A. CIVIL ACTS property by any act or any conveyance inter
Art 1323. An offer becomes ineffective upon vivos.
the death, civil interdiction, insanity, or insolvency
of either party before acceptance is conveyed. Art. 135. Any of the ff. shall be considered
suff cause for judicial separation of property:
Art 1327. The ff. cannot give consent to a K: 1) that the spouse of the petitioner has been
1) Unemancipated minors; sentenced to a penalty w/c carries w/ it civil
2) Insane or demented persons, & deaf- interdiction;
mutes who do not know how to write. xxx

Art 1399. When the defect of the K consists in Art 142. The administration of all classes of
the incapacity of one of the parties, the exclusive property of either spouse may be
incapacitated person is not obliged to make any transferred by the court to the other spouse:
restitution except insofar as he has been benefited xxx
by the thing or price received by him. 3) When one spouse is sentenced to a
penalty w/c carries w/ it civil interdiction;
xxx
3. DEAF-MUTISM

Tolentino 5. PRODIGALITY.
can make a valid will, so long as its content have
been communicated or made known to him in R 92 Sec 2. Under this Rule, the word
some practicable manner (Art. 807.) But when “incompetent” includes persons suffering the
the deaf-mute does not know how to read &
write, he cannot give consent to contracts penalty of civil interdiction or who are
hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf & dumb who
26
are unable to read & write, those who are of the filing of a petition by or vs. him, w/ a view of
unsound mind, even though they have intervals, & giving preference to any creditor or person
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason having a claim vs. him or who is under any
of age, disease, weak mind, & other similar liability for him, procures any part of his property
causes, cannot w/o outside aid, take care of to be attached, sequestered, or seized on
themselves, & manage their property, becoming execution, or makes any payment, pledge,
thereby an easy prey for deceit & exploitation. mortgage, assignment, transfer, sale or
conveyance of any part of his property, either
directly or indirectly, absolutely or conditional, to
Tolentino: anyone, the person receiving such payment,
A spendthrift or prodigal is "a person who, by pledge, mortgage, assignment, transfer, sale or
excessive drinking, gambling, idleness or conveyance, or to be benefited thereby, or by
debauchery of any kind shall so spend, waste or
lessen his estate as to expose himself or his such attachment or seizure, having reasonable
family to want or suffering. cause to believe that such debtor is insolvent &
Prodigality in itself does not limit the capacity of a that such attachment, sequestration, seizure,
person to act. It seems erroneous to include payment, pledge, mortgage, conveyance,
prodigality in the Art. 38 bec. as a circumstance transfer, sale or assignment is made w/ a view to
w/c limits capacity, bec. there is no specific prevent his property fr. coming to his assignee in
provision of law w/c implements this general insolvency, or to defeat the object of, or in
provision. It is not the circumstance of anyway hinder, impede or delay the operation of
prodigality, but the fact of being under
or to evade the provisions of this Act, such
guardianship, that restricts the capacity to act
of the spendthrift. attachment, sequestration, seizure, payment,
pledge, mortgage, transfer, sale, assignment or
conveyance is void, & the assignee or the
6. INSOLVENCY. receiver, may recover the property of the value
thereof as assets of such insolvent debtor. If
such payment, pledge, mortgage, conveyance,
sale, assignment, or transfer is not made in the
Art 1919. Agency is extinguished:
usual & ordinary course of business of the debtor,
xxx
or if such seizure is made under a judgment w/c
3) By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or
the debtor has confessed or offered to allow, that
insolvency of the principal or agent;
fact shall be prima facie evidence of fraud. Any
xxx
payment, pledge, mortgage, conveyance, sale,
assignment, or transfer of property or whatever
Art 1810. The property rts of a partner are:
character made by the insolvent w/in one month
1) His rts in the specific partnership
before the filing of the petition in insolvency by or
property;
vs. him, except for a valuable pecuniary
2) His interest in the partnership; &,
consideration made in GF, shall be void. All
3) His rt. to participate in the
assignments, transfers, conveyances, mortgages,
management.
or encumbrances of real estate shall be deemed
under this section, to have been made at the
Art 2238. So long as the conjugal partnership
time the instrument conveying or affecting such
or absolute community subsists, its property shall
realty was filed or recorded in the office of the
not be among the assets to be taken possession of
Reg. of Deeds of the province or city where the
by the assignee for the payment of the insolvent
same is situated.
debtor’s obligations, except insofar as the latter
have redounded to the benefit of the family. If it is
the husband who is insolvent, the administration of Tolentino:
When a person has been adjudicated an
the conjugal partnership or absol community may,
insolvent, he cannot dispose of his prop.
by order of the court, be transferred to the wife or existing at the time of the commencement of
to a third person other than the assignee. the insolvency proceedings; & no payments
of prop. or credit can be made to him.
ACT NO. 1956 (INSOLVENCY LAW)

Art 70. If any debtor, being insolvent, or in 7. ALIENAGE


contemplation of insolvency, w/in 30 days before

27
Constitution associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain.
Art. XII, Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum & other mineral Art. XII, Sec. 8. Notw/standing the
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests provisions of Section 6 of this Article, a natural-
or timber, wildlife, flora & fauna, & other natural born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
resources are owned by the State. With the excep- Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
tion of agricultural lands, all other natural resources private lands subject to limitations provided by
shall not be alienated. The exploration, law.
development, & utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control & supervision of the State. Art. XII, Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or
Such activities may be directly undertaken by the any other form of authorization for the operation
State, or it may enter into co-production, joint of a public utility shall be granted except to
venture, production-sharing agreements w/ Filipino citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
citizens, or corporations or associations at least associations organized under the laws of the
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period of capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such
not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive
more than twenty-five years, & under such terms & in character or for a longer period than fifty
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or granted except under the condition that it shall
industrial uses other than the development of water be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by
power, beneficial use may be the measure & limit of Congress when the common good so requires.
the grant. The State shall encourage equity participation in
public utilities by the general public. The
The State shall protect the nation's marine participation of foreign investors in the governing
wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, & body of any public utility shall be limited to their
exclusive economic zone, & reserve its use & proportionate share in its capital, & all executive
enjoyment to Filipino citizens. & managing officers of such corporation or
association must be citizens of the Philippines.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as Art. XVI, Sec. 11. (1) The ownership &
well as cooperative fish farming, w/ priority to management of mass media shall be limited to
subsistence fishermen & fishworkers in rivers, lakes, citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations,
bays, & lagoons. cooperatives or associations, wholly owned &
managed by such citizens.
The President may enter into agreements w/
foreign-owned corporations involving either The Congress shall regulate or prohibit
technical or financial assistance for large-scale monopolies in commercial mass media when the
exploration, development, & utilization of minerals, public interest so requires. No combination in
petroleum, & other mineral oils according to the restraint of trade or unfair competition therein
general terms & conditions provided by law, based shall be allowed.
on real contributions to the economic growth &
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, (2) The advertising industry is impressed w/
the State shall promote the development, & use of public interest, & shall be regulated by law for the
local scientific & technical resources. protection of consumers & the promotion of the
general welfare.
The President shall subsequently notify the
Congress of every contract entered into in Only Filipino citizens or corporations or
accordance w/ this provisions w/in thirty days fr. its associations at least seventy per centum of the
execution. capital of w/c is owned by such citizens shall be
allowed to engage in the advertising industry.
Art. XII, Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or The participation of foreign investors in the
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or governing body of entities in such industry shall

28
be limited to their proportionate share in the capital
thereof, & all the executive & managing officers of Art. 39. The following circumstances, among
such entities must be citizens of the Philippines. others, modify or limit capacity to act: age,
insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-
mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
Art. XIV, Sec. 4. (2) Educational institutions, alienage, absence, insolvency & trusteeship. The
other than those established by religious groups & consequences of these circumstances are
mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of governed by this Code, other codes, the Rules of
the Philippines, or corporations or associations at Court, & in special laws. Capacity to act is not
least sixty per centum of the capital of w/c is owned limited on account of religious belief or political
by such citizens. The Congress may, however, opinion.
require increased Filipino equity participation in all
educational institutions. A married woman, eighteen years of age or
over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in
The control & administration of all educational cases specified by law.
institutions shall be vested in Filipino citizens.

No educational institution shall be established Balane:


exclusively for aliens & no group of aliens shall
comprise more than one-third of the enrolment in There is a lapse in the enumeration. Art. 38
any school. The provisions of this subsection shall enumerates 6 circumstances limiting,
not apply to schools established for foreign modifying or restricting capacity to act
diplomatic personnel & their dependents &, unless whereas Art. 39 enumerates 11. The two
otherwise provided by law, for other temporary articles could have been merged into one
article.
foreign residents.

Tolentino:
Tolentino:
The enumeration made here is not exclusive of
Citizenship may affect the right of persons in other circumstances modifying capacity to act.
matters where the State may validly
discriminate between aliens & its citizens for Guardianship of Incompetents.-- For
reasons of public policy, w/o doing violence to definition of incompetents, see Rule 93, Sec. 2,
the equal protection of the laws. See ROC, infra.
constitutional provisions, infra.
Even w/o guardianship, persons under
civil interdiction, deaf-mutes who do not know
Balane: how to read & write, & those of unsound mind,
are of limited capacity. W/ respect, however, to
Incapacitated persons (fr. Tolentino)-- They hospitalized lepers, prodigals, & those who
may have obligations arising fr. all sources, except cannot take care of themselves & manage their
contracts. They have obligations arising fr. law, prop., it is the fact of guardianship w/c will limit
such as those imposed on family relations. their capacity to act.

Incapacitated persons are also civilly liable Family Relations.-- Ascendants &
for crimes committed by them, even if they are descendants, brothers & sisters, & collateral
exempted fr. criminal liab. (Art. 101, RPC.) They relatives w/in the 4th civil degree (as cousins),
are liable for quasi-delicts, under the express cannot validly marry; their marriage would be
provisions of Articles 2181 & 2182. incestuous or against public policy & void.
Husband & wife, during the marriage, cannot
They are liable on quasi-contracts, on the give donations to each other.
principle that nobody can unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another. Absence.-- A person is absent when he
disappears fr. his domicile, & his whereabouts are
Where necessaries are delivered to a minor unknown (381.) He cannot properly administer
or other incapacitated person, he must pay a his properties, & so another person is appointed
reasonable price therefore. (Art. 1489.) to administer them.

29
Physical condition.-- Physical incapacity to enter A child already conceived at the time of the
into the married state, or impotence, is a ground for death of the decedent is capable of succeeding
annulment of marriage [Art. 55(5), FC], & a person
who is blind, or deaf or dumb, cannot be a witness provided it be born later under the conditions
to the execution of a will. (820.) prescribed in article 41.
II. KINDS OF PERSONS

BALANE/ BAVIERA CASE:


A. NATURAL PERSONS
GELUZ V. CA [2 S 801 (1961)]

1. COMMENCEMENT OF FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the


PERSONALITY defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in
1948-- thru her aunt. In 1950, she became
pregnant by her present husband before they
ART. 37. Juridical capacity, w/c is the fitness were legally married. During to conceal her
to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in pregnancy fr. her parent, she had herself aborted
every natural person & is lost only through death. by def. After the marriage w/ the pltff., she
Capacity to act, w/c is the power to do acts w/ legal again became pregnant. As she was employed in
effect, is acquired & may be lost. the COMELEC & her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by
ART. 40. Birth determines personality; but the def. in Oct 1953. Less than 2 years later, she
conceived child shall be considered born for all again became pregnant. On 2/21/55, she again
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be repaired to the def's clinic. Nita was again
born later w/ the conditions specified in the aborted of a 2-month old fetus, in consideration
following article. of the sum of P50.

It is the third & last abortion that


constitutes pltff's basis in filing this action &
Tolentino:
award of damages The CA & the trial court
Personality fr. Birth.-- Birth means the removal predicated the award of damages upon the
of the fetus fr. the mother's womb. provisions of the initial par. of Art. 2206 of the
NCC.
Conceived Child.-- The personality of the
conceived child has 2 characteristics: (1) it is HELD: This award, we believe, to be error for
essentially limited, bec. it is only for purposes the said art., in fixing an award for the death of a
favorable to the child, & (2) it is provisional or person, does not cover the case of an unborn
conditional, bec. it depends upon the child being fetus that is not endowed w/ personality.
born alive later, such that if it is not born alive, its
personality disappears as if it had never existed.
Parents of unborn fetus cannot sue for
Period of Conception.-- Legally, in a normal damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman
child, the period of conception is the first 120 days who voluntarily procured her abortion could not
of the 300 days preceding the birth of the child. recover damages fr. the physician who caused
the same. (1) Since an action for pecuniary
The ff. provisions of the NCC are relevant: damages on account of personal injury or death
pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived & action could derivatively accrue to the parents or
unborn children may be accepted by those persons heirs of an unborn child. In fact, even if a cause
who would legally represent them if they were of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child,
already born. the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place
ART. 1025. In order to be capacitated to fr. one that lacked juridical personality (or
inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living juridical capacity, as distinguished fr. capacity to
at the moment the succession opens, except in case act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional
of representation, when it is proper. personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro
nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Cod,

30
bec. that same article expressly limits such in water; this means that air has penetrated into
provisional personality by imposing the condition the lungs by breathing.
that the child should be subsequently born alive:
Viability Not Required.-- Viability means that
"provided it be born later w/ the condition specified
the child is capable of living, & this is determined
in the following article." In the present case, there is by the extent of the development of its organs.
no dispute that the child was dead when separated
fr. its mother's womb. Premature Birth.-- In this case, if the child
does not live 24 hours completely separated fr.
(2) This is not to say that the parents are the mother's womb, it does not acquire juridical
not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such personality. This is an absolute requirement for
damages must be those inflicted directly upon fetuses w/c have an intrauterine life of less than
them, as distinguished fr. the injury or violation of 7 mos. (Balane quoting Manresa & JBL.)
the rights of the deceased, his right to life &
"The aborted creature does not reach the
physical integrity. Because the parents cannot category of a natural person & consequently is
expect either help, support or services fr. an unborn not born in the contemplation of law." (Geluz v.
child, they would normally be limited to moral CA, supra.)
damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the spes hominis that was the This is so, even if the child is killed
fetus, i.e., on account of distress & anguish before the period lapses & it can be proved that it
attendant to its loss, & the disappointment of their could have survived that period if it had not been
parental expectations (Art. 2217, CC), as well as to prevented by the willful act of another. On the
other hand, juridical personality is acquired even
exemplary damages, if the circumstances should
if the survival for 24 hours is caused only by
warrant them (Art. 2230, CC). But in this case, medical or scientific means w/o w/c the child
there is no basis for an award of moral damages, would have died before the lapse of that period.
evidently bec. the husband's indifference to the
previous abortions clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned w/ the frustration of his parental Balane:
hopes & affection.
Outline of Articles 40 & 41

1. For civil personality to be acquired, one must


ART. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is be born.-- A fetus is born after it is completely
considered born if it is alive at the time it is separated fr. the mother's womb w/c is produced
completely delivered fr. the mother's womb. by the cutting of the umbilical cord; after the
However, if the fetus had an intrauterine life of less separation, the child now survives by itself.
than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies
w/in twenty-four hours after its complete delivery fr. There was an additional requirement in
the maternal womb. the OCC: only that fetus is considered born w/c
has a "uniform form." This has been taken out in
the NCC.

Tolentino: The question of determining the exact


duration of intrauterine life is a problem even
Separation from Mother.-- This is produced by medical science is not equipped to answer as of
the cutting of the umbilical cord, whether the the moment.
removal takes place naturally or by surgical
operation. 2. Once birth occurs, personality for favorable
purposes retroacts fr. the moment of
Alive at Birth.-- The duration of extra-uterine life conception.-- The retroactivity rule is qualified--
is immaterial; for acquisition of juridical personality, only for purposes favorable to the child.
it is enough that the child lives even for an instant.

Test of Life.-- The general opinion is that 2. EXTINGUISHMENT


independent life required for juridical personality
can be shown only by complete respiration. The cry A. CONTRACTS
of the child, although it is not a necessary sign of
life, is evidence that it has acquired complete
respiration. Another indication of complete
respiration is the floating of the lungs when placed

31
ART. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by RUFO MAURICIO CONST. VS. IAC
death. The effect of death upon the rights &
obligations of the deceased is determined by law, FACTS: Cabiliza was charged w/ homicide &
by contract & by will. damage to prop. thru reckless imprudence when
the dump truck he was driving sideswiped a car
owned by Solidum causing the latter’s death.
During the pendency of his appeal of the TC’s
Tolentino:
conviction, C died. A Notice of death w/
Natural Death.-- This art. refers to natural or manifestation of the intention of RMC as er of C
physical death, bec. this is the only kind of death to proceed w/ the case was filed bec. RMC was
recognized by present legislation. The law does not subsid liable. The criminal liability of C was
recognize the so-called "civil death," known to extinguished but the civil liability was not & bec C
legislation in the past, by virtue of w/c a man who was insolvent, a subsid writ of exec was enforced
was alive was considered dead for all purposes bec. vs. RMC
of a conviction for crime or of the taking of a
religious profession. HELD: The contention of RMC (P) that C’s death
wiped out not only his primary civil liability but
Balane: Physical death & legal death are the also his er’s subsidiary liability is w/o merit. The
same. death of the accused during the pendency of his
appeal or before the jdmt vs. him became final &
exec extinguishes his crim. Liability but not his
ART. 777. The rights to the succession are civil liability should the obligation arise not fr. a
transmitted fr. the moment of death of the crime (since no crime was committed, the
decedent. accused not having been convicted by final jdmt-
still innocent) but fr. quasi-delict as in this case.
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the The liability of the er would not be subsidiary but
property, rights & obligations of a person w/c are solidary w/ his driver (unless said er can prove
not extinguished by his death. there was no negligence on his part at all, that is,
if he can prove due diligence in the selection &
ART. 1919. Agency is extinguished: supervision of his driver). And in CAB since er
was not a party in the crim. Case, he is given the
(3) By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or opportunity to present his defense so the hearing
insolvency of the principal or of his agent. on the motion to quash the subsid WOE must be
xxx reopened.

ART. 1830. Dissolution (of partnership) is PEOPLE VS. BAYOTAS


caused:
xxx FACTS: Bayotas was charged w/ rape & during
(5) By the death of any partner. the pendency of his appeal of his conviction, he
xxx died. The SC dismissed the crim aspect of the
case & the only issue left to be resolved is WON
ART. 603. Usufructuary is extinguished: B’s civil liability arising fr. the offense survives his
death.
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a
contrary intention clearly appears; HELD: The SC held that it depends on the kind
of civil liability you are enforcing against the
ART. 1311. Contracts take effect only between accused.
the parties, their assigns & heirs, except in case
where the rights & obligations arising fr. the If the civil liab arises fr. CRIME
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by Death of the accused pending appeal of his
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not conviction extinguishes his crim. liability AS
liable beyond the value of the property he received WELL AS THE CIVIL LIAB BASED SOLELY ON
fr. the decedent. THE CRIMINAL ACT
In recovering civil liab ex delicto, the same has to
be determined in the crim action, rooted as it
is in the ct’s pronouncement of guilt or
32
innocence of the accused. In such cases, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
extinction of the crim action due to the death of possible deprivation of right by prescription.
the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies
concomitant extinction of the civil liab. MORS
OMNIA SOLVI – death dissolves all things. B. CRIM LIABILITY

If the claim for civil liab is predicated on a SOURCE


OF OBLIGATION OTHER THAT THE DELICT ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally
The claim survives notw/standing the death of the extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
accused. Art 1157 of the NCC enumerates extinguished:
these other sources of oblig fr. w/c the civil liab
may arise as a result of the same act/omission. (1) By the death of the convict, as to the
Where the civil liability survives, an action for personal penalties; & as to pecuniary penalties,
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by liability therefor is extinguished only when the
way of filing a SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION & death of the offender occurs before final
subject to Sec. 1, R111 of the 1985 Rules on judgment.
Crim. Pro.
This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/admin of the accused, B. JURIDICAL PERSONS
depending on the source of oblig upon w/c the
same is based.

MANSION BISCUIT CORP VS. CA ART. 44. The following are juridical persons:

FACTS: Ty Tek Suan (TTS) as pres. Of ETBC (1) The State & its political subdivisions;
ordered biscuits fr. MBC issuing 4 postdated checks
w/c later bounced. An information for violation of (2) Other corporations, institutions & entities
BP 22 was filed against TTS & his co-signee SG. for public interest or purpose, created by law;
The LC granted the MTD bec. the checks were not their personality begins as soon as they have
covered by BP 22 bec they were issued to been constituted according to law;
guarantee payment of obligation (pursuant to Min.
of Justice Circular. The TC also held that no civil (3) Corporations, partnerships & associations
liability can be enforced due to acquittal of both for private interest or purpose to w/c the law
accused. Civil liab can be enforced only in a sep. grants a juridical personality, separate & distinct
action on the agmt. guaranteed by the checks. fr. that of each shareholder, partner or member.
While MBC appealed the case in the CA, TTS died.

HELD: The civil liab cannot be enforced bec it was Tolentino:


not the personal liab of TTS but of the corp. MBC is
actually enforcing a contractual, not a tortuous Concept -- A juridical person is an abstract
liability. Assuming that it is a tortuous claim, it must being, formed for the realization of collective
purposes to w/c the law has granted capacity for
still be addressed against the corp. bec the checks rights & obligations. The members may change
were issued for the corp’s obligs. Necessarily, any but the juridical person remains subsisting w/o
claim for tortuous liability must be ventilated in a alteration. Its personality is manifested only in
separate action vs. the proper party. the realm of patrimonial relations; it has no
family & personal rights.
Bayotas ruling reiterated, adding that:
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a Balane:
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the A juridical person is an organic unit resulting fr. a
group of persons or mass or property to w/c the
prosecution of the criminal action & prior to its
State grants or recognizes personality & capacity
extinction, the private-offended party instituted to hold patrimonial rights independent of those of
together therew/ the civil action. IN such case, the component members. (quoting Ruggiero.)
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the crim case,
conformably w/ provisions of Art. 1155 of the NCC, BALANE CASE:
33
Code & the Revised Admin. Code; & chartered
BARLIN V. RAMIREZ [7 P 41] cities, by their respective charters.

Facts: The def., Ramirez, having been appointed Corporations created by special charter
by the pltff parish priest, took possession of the are governed primarily by such charter; & those
church on 7/5/01. He administered if as such under created under general law are governed by the
the orders of his superiors until 11/14/02. His Corporation Code.
successor having been then appointed, the latter
made a demand on this def. for the delivery to him Partnerships & associations must be
of the church, convent, & cemetery, & the sacred governed primarily by their contracts of
ornaments, books, jewels, money, & other prop. of association, & only secondarily by law, bec.
the church. The def., by a written document of that partnerships are created by contract, & it is a
date, refused to make such delivery, stating that fundamental rule that the contract has the force
"the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction w/ the parish of law between the contracting parties.
priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/
the Pope at Rome & his representatives in these ART. 46. Juridical persons may acquire &
Islands, & to join the Filipino Church, the head of possess property of all kinds, as well as incur
w/c is at Mla. obligations & bring civil or criminal actions, in
conformity w/ the laws & regulations of their
In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against
organization.
def., alleging in his amended complaint that the
Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the
church bldg., the convent, cemetery, the books, Tolentino:
money, & other prop. belonging thereto, & asking
that it be restored to the possession thereof & that Capacity of Juridical Persons.-- The juridical
the def. render an account of the prop. w/c he had person is not completely at par w/ natural
received & w/c was retained by him, & for other persons as to capacity, bec. it cannot exercise
relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of rights w/c presuppose physical existence, such as
the pltff. family rights, making of wills, etc.

HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Extinguishment of Capacity.-- The juridical
Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in capacity of artificial persons is extinguished upon
the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made w/ the termination of its existence in accordance w/
reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost the law governing it or w/ its articles of asso. or
a thousand years any other personality in Europe, & incorp.
w/c existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished
in Antioch, & when idols were still worshipped in the
temple of Mecca," does not require serious
consideration. ART. XII, SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain
are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, & national parks. Agricultural lands
of the public domain shall be limited to
ART. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1
agricultural lands. Private corporations or
& 2 of the preceding article are governed by the
associations may not hold such lands of the
laws creating or recognizing them.
public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
Private corporations are regulated by laws of
more than twenty-five years, & not to exceed one
general application on the subject.
thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
Partnerships & associations for private interest
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
or purpose are governed by the provisions of this
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or
Code concerning partnerships.
grant in excess of twelve hectares.

Taking into account the requirements of


Tolentino: conservation, ecology & development & subject
to the principles of agrarian reform, the Congress
What Governs Juridical Persons.-- The State is shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the
governed by the provisions of the Consti; provinces
public domain w/c may be acquired, developed,
& municipalities are governed by the Local Gov't
held or leased & the conditions therefor.

34
Domicile of Origin.-- Domicile of the parents of a
person at the time he was born
ART. XII, SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary
Domicile of Choice.-- Domicile chosen by a
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or person to change his original domicile. Aside
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or fr. the 2 requisites mentioned above, a third
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the requisite must be present in domicile of
public domain. (ibid.) choice, animus non revertendi (intention not
to return to one's old domicile as his
permanent place.)
(not in Baviera's outline) Domicile by Operation of Law.-- E.g., Art. 69, FC.

Three Rules in Domicile:


ART. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations,
A man must have a domicile somewhere.
institutions & other entities for public interest or A domicile once established remains until a new
purpose mentioned in No. 2 of article 44, their one is acquired.
property & other assets shall be disposed of in A man can have only 1 domicile at a time.
pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If
nothing has been specified on this point, the Domicile & Residence. Domicile is not the
property & other assets shall be applied to similar same as residence. Domicile is residence plus
purposes for the benefit of the region, province, city habituality.
or municipality w/c during the existence of the
Importance of Understanding Domicile.--
institution derived the principal benefits fr. the
In case of revocation of wills (Art. 829), place of
same. performance of obligation (Art. 1251, par. 3),
renvoi (Aznar v. Garcia.)

ART. 48. Superseded by Art. IV, Sec. 1 of the


1987 Constitution
ART. 51. When the law creating or
recognizing them, or any other provision does not
ART. IV, SEC. 1. The following are citizens of
fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same
the Philippines:
shall be understood to be the place where their
legal representation is established or where they
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
exercise their principal functions.
the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship FAMILY CODE
upon reaching the age of majority; &
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance
w/ law. NOTE: The FC took effect on August 3, 1988
following its complete publication in the Manila
Chronicle on August 4, 1987.
ART. 49. Naturalization & the loss &
reacquisition of citizenship of the Philippines are (Arts. 1-54 follow Prof. Ruben Balane's Outline)
governed by special laws.

ART. 50. For the exercise of civil rights & the MARRIAGE
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is the place of their habitual residence. A. DEFINITION

Balane: Tolentino:

Requisites of Domicile: (1) physical presence; Definitions of Marriage.-- The term marriage
(2) animus manendi (intent to remain) (Gallego v. has 2 distinct meanings. In one sense, it is
Vera, 73 P 453.) limited to the procedure by w/c a man & a
woman become husband & wife. In this concept,
Three kinds of Domicile: it is defined as "that act by w/c a man & a

35
woman unite for life, w/ the intent to discharge
towards society & one another those duties w/c
result fr. the relation of husband & wife." Tolentino:

In the second sense, marriage is a status Differentiated fr. Ordinary Contracts:


involving duties & responsibilities w/c are no longer
matter for private regulations, but the concern of As to parties: Ordinary contracts (0C) may be
the State. xxx As such, it is defined as "the civil entered into by any no. of persons, whether
status of one man & one woman, legally united for of the same or different sex, while marriage
life, w/ rights & duties w/c, for the establishment of (M) can be entered into only by one man &
families & the multiplication of the species, are, fr. one woman;
time to time may thereafter be, assigned by law to
matrimony." (Balane quoted Tolentino on the As to contractual rights & obligations: In
meaning of marriage.) OC, the agreement of the parties have the
force of law bet. them while in M, the law
Purposes of Marriage.-- In general: (1) fixes the duties & rights of the parties;
reproduction, (2) education of the offspring, & (3)
mutual help. The immediate purpose is the As to termination: OC can be terminated by
constitution of a complete & perfect community bet. mutual agreement of the parties, while M
2 individuals of different sexes; the remote purpose cannot be so terminated; neither can it be
is the preservation of the human race. terminated even though one of the parties
subsequently becomes incapable of
performing his part; &
ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of
As to breach: Breach of OC gives rise to an
permanent union between a man & a woman en- action for damages, while breach of the
tered into in accordance w/ law for the obligations of a husband or a wife does not
establishment of conjugal & family life. It is the give rise to such an action; the law provides
foundation of the family & an inviolable social penal & civil sanctions, such as prosecution
institution whose nature, consequences, & incidents for adultery or concubinage, & proc. for legal
are governed by law & not subject to stipulation, sep.;
except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage w/in the As to effect: OC do not create status, M does.
(no. 5 was added by Balane.)
limits provided by this Code.

Balane:
Tolentino:
Quite logically, marriage is the starting
Marriage a Social Institution.-- Marriage is a point of any family relation bec. in our legal
contract only in form, but in essence it is an system, the family is the keystone of society, the
institution of public order, founded on custom & basic unit of society. And marriage is the
morality. It is a contract sui generis w/c cannot be keystone of the family. This is a value
compared to any other contract. judgement. Marriage does not have to be the
keystone of the family. But we choose it to be
Characteristics: (1) It is civil in character, bec. it that way.
is established by the State independently of its
religious aspect; (2) it is an institution of public xxx Much arguments have been raised
order or policy, governed by rules established by regarding the status of children on the distinction
law w/c cannot be made inoperative by the of legitimate fr. illegitimate children. There are
stipulation of the parties; (3) it is an institution of those who propose the abolition of the distinction
natural character, bec. one of its objects is the as it is not the fault of the illegitimate child that
satisfaction of the intimate sentiments & needs of he is such. But one of the unintended
human beings for the organic perpetuation of man. consequence of abolishing the distinction is to
erode the institution of marriage. Are we ready
to take that path?
Balane:

Marriage is a contract. Art. 52, NCC provides Tolentino:


that M is not a mere contract. Art. 1, FC, on the
other hand provides that M is a special contract. Principal Effects of Marriage:
Both emphasize that M is not just a contract.
36
personal & economic relations bet. the sps., w/c the seduction. If the offended woman has been
become sources of impt. rights & duties; led to submit to carnal intercourse by the promise
the legitimacy of sexual union & of the family; of marriage, she should be entitled to damages,
the personal & economic relations bet. parents & not only on the basis of tort or quasi-delict, but
children, w/c gives rise to considerable rights & under the provisions of art. 21.
duties;
the family rel'p, fr. w/ flow various juridical xxx The essence of the action would not
consequences, such as impediments to be the breach of the contract, but the tortuous or
marriage, right to support, & rights to wrongful act or seduction accomplished through
inheritance; the deceitful promise.
incapacity of the sps. to make donations to each
other; Abuse of right.-- Even when there has been no
disqualification of the sps. to testify against each seduction, we believe that under art. 19,
other; damages, may under certain circumstances, be
modification of crim. liab., such as by way of recovered against a party who repudiates a
exemption when one spouse defends the other contract to marry; but the basis of the action
fr. unlawful aggression or is his accessory after cannot be the mere breach of contract itself, but
the fact, or mitigation when the crime is some act constituting an abuse of right.
committed in vindication of a grave offense to
the spouse, or aggravation when the injured is Unjust enrichment.-- Another legal basis in
the spouse of the offender, such as in parricide. connection w/ a breach of contract to marry is
art. 22 on unjust enrichment. xxx Gifts to the
Contract to Marry.-- Where parties mutually person to whom the donor is engaged to be
agree to marry each other at some future time, married are considered legally as conditional, &
there is a contract to marry. xxx It can be upon breach of the engagement by the donee,
distinguished fr. an ordinary contract in that the may be recovered by the donor. (see Domalagan
promise of either party cannot be enforced by court v. Bolifer, 33 P 471.)
action, bec. the consent to the actual marriage must
be purely voluntary. Oral Agreement.-- Under 1403 "an agreement
made in consideration of marriage, other a
Breach of Promise.-- There is repudiation where mutual promise to marry," shall be unenforceable
before the time set for the performance of the by action, unless the same, or some note or
marriage, one party declares that he will not carry it memorandum thereof, be in writing, & subscribed
out, or refuses to further communicate w/ or the party sought to be charged. (Statute of
maintain a suitor's relation w/ the other party, or Frauds.)
puts himself in a position where he cannot execute
the contract, as when he marries another. It seems to us that the writing is not
necessary in an action for damages for breach of
Damages for Breach.-- [T]he action for breach a contract to marry. First, where the party who
of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, sues for damages has already given the
apart fr. t he right to recover money or property consideration for the promise of the def., it is
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such unjust to deny the action on the plea of the
promise." (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 P 866.) Statute of Frauds. Second, the Statute should
apply only when the action is to enforce the
We believe that an action based purely on contract; but not when it is for damages for
breach of the contract to marry, will not lie. xxx It breach.
is true that she may suffer fr. wounded feelings &
mental anguish, & these are recognized as elements
of moral damages under article 2217; but before GOITIA V. CAMPOS RUEDA [35 P 252]
such damages can be recovered, there must first be
a right of action, & there is no law granting a right FACTS: This is an action for support by G (wife)
of action on breach of contract to marry. However,
we believe that if the action for damages is based against R (husband). After 1 mo. of marriage, R
on tort or quasi-delict, or on articles 19, 21, or 22 of repeatedly demanded fr. G to perform "unchaste
the present Code, there would be a sufficient legal & lascivious acts on R's genitals." Bec. of G's
basis or right of action for damages. refusal, R maltreated G by word & deed, inflicting
bodily injuries on G. To escape R's lewd designs
Effect of Seduction.-- xxx [I]t is possible legally & avoid further harm, G left the conjugal home &
to base an action upon the carnal knowledge of the took refuge in her parent's house. G filed an
pltff. by the def., or upon the seduction, as a fact action for support w/ the trial court. this was
separate fr. the contract to marry. The promise to
dismissed on the ground that R could not be
marry would only be the means of accomplishing

37
compelled to give support if G lived outside of the
conjugal home, unless there was legal sep. G
appealed. Balane:

HELD: Marriage is something more than a mere There are two kinds of requisites, the essential &
contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, & the formal.
obligations of w/c rest not upon the agreement of
There are three essential requisites:
the parties but upon the general law w/c defines &
prescribes those rights, duties, & obligations. legal capacity of the contracting parties,
Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of w/c consent freely given &
in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a difference in sex (other commentators opine that
relation for life & the parties cannot terminate it at this third is already included in legal
any shorter period by virtue of any contract they capacity.)
may make. The reciprocal rights arising fr. this
relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law 3 formal requisites:
determines fr. time to time & none other. When
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer,
the legal existence of the parties is merged into one
(2) a valid marriage license &
by marriage, the new relation is regulated & (3) some form of ceremony.
controlled by the state or gov't. upon principles of
public policy for the benefit of society as well as the Distinction.-- Absence, Defect, Irregularity
parties. And when the object of a marriage is of Requisites:
defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to
one of the parties & productive of no possible good Absence of a requisite, whether essential or
to the community, relief in some way should be formal, renders the marriage void. Absence
obtainable. means a total want of a requisite.

E.g., the total absence of a marriage license


The law provides that the H, who is obliged (absence of a formal requisite) w/c renders
to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either the M void.
by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her
in his own home at his option. However, the option A defect in the essential requisite makes the
given by law is not absolute. The law will not marriage voidable
permit the H to evade or terminate his obligation to
support his wife if the wife is driven away fr. the E.g., where the consent of either party was
vitiated by intimidation.
conjugal home bec. of the H's own wrongful acts.
In this case, where the wife was forced to leave the An irregularity in the formal requisite does not
conjugal abode bec. of the lewd designs & physical affect the validity of the marriage but this is w/o
assaults of the H, the W may claim support fr. the H prejudice to the criminal, civil or administrative
for separate maintenance even outside of the liability of erring officials.
conjugal home.
E.g., where the marriage license was
B. REQUISITES OF A VALID MARRIAGE issued w/o complying w/ the 10-day
posting requirement. (Art. 17, FC.)
1. Difference in Sex (an essential
requisite)-- Arts. 2 par. 1, 4 par. 1, 39
ART. 4. The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Art. 35 (2).
ESSENTIAL
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable as provided in Article
45. ART. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless
these essential requisites are present:
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or Legal capacity of the contracting parties who
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be must be a male & a female;
civilly, criminally & administratively liable.

38
Consent freely given in the presence of the Between parties where one, w/ the intention
solemnizing officer. to marry the other, killed that other person’s
spouse or his or her own spouse.

Balane: The phrase "who must be a male & a


female" was not found in the NCC. 1. B. CONSENT OF
CONTRACTING PARTIES

ART. 4. The absence of any of the essential or


formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab ART. 14. In case either or both of the
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). contracting parties, not having been emancipated
xxx by a previous marriage, are between the ages of
eighteen & twenty-one, they shall, in addition to
ART. 39. The action or defense for the the requirements of the preceding arts., exhibit to
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall the local civil reg., the consent to their marriage
not prescribe. xxx of their father, mother, surviving parent or
guardian, or persons having legal charged of
them, in the order mentioned. Such consent
1. A. LEGAL CAPACITY shall be manifested in writing by the interested
party, who personally appears before the proper
local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit
ART. 5. Any male or female of the age of made in the presence of two witnesses &
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the attested before any official authorized by law to
impediments mentioned in Arts. 37 & 38, may administer oaths. The personal manifestation
contract marriage. shall be recorded in both application for marriage
license, & the affidavit, if one is executed instead,
ART. 37. Marriages between the following are shall be attached to said application.
incestuous & void fr. the beginning, whether the
relationship between the parties be legitimate or ART. 15. Any contracting party between the
illegitimate: age of 21 & 25 shall be obliged to ask their
parents or guardian for advice upon the intended
Between ascendants & descendants of any marriage. If they do not obtain such advice, or if
degree; & it be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not
be issued till after 3 months following the
Between brothers & sisters, whether of the full completion of the publication of the application
or half blood. therefore. A sworn statement by the contracting
parties to the effect that such advice has been
ART. 38. The following marriages shall be void sought, together w/ the written advice given, if
fr. the beginning for reasons of public policy: any, shall be attached to the application for
marriage license. Should the parents or guardian
Between collateral blood relatives, whether refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be stated
legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil in the sworn statement.
degree;
Between step-parents & step-children; ART. 16. In the cases where parental
Between parents-in-law & children-in-law; consent or parental advice is needed, the party or
Between the adopting parent & the adopted parties concerned shall, in addition to the
child; requirements of the preceding articles, attach a
Between the surviving spouse of the adopting certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister
parent & the adopted child; authorized to solemnize marriage under Art. 7 of
Between the surviving spouse of the adopted this Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited
child & the adopter; by the proper gov’t agency to the effect that the
Between an adopted child & a legitimate child contracting parties have undergone marriage
of the adopter; counseling. Failure to attach said certificate of
Between adopted children of the same adopter; marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance
& of the marriage license for a period of three

39
months fr. the completion of the publication of the ART. 3. The formal requisites of marriage
application. Issuance of the marriage license w/in are:
the prohibited pd shall subject the issuing officer to Authority of the solemnizing officer;
administrative sanctions but shall not affect the A valid marriage license except in the cases
validity of the marriage. provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; &
A marriage ceremony w/c takes place w/ the
Should only one of the contracting parties need appearance of the contracting parties before the
parental consent or parental advice, the other party solemnizing officer & their personal declaration
must be present at the counseling referred to in the that they take each other as husband & wife in
preceding paragraph. the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.

EIGENMANN VS. GUERRA


2.a Authority of the Solemnizing Officer
FACTS: E filed an action for annulment of his
marriage to G based on the ff. Grounds: 1. P was ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
between 16-20 at the time of the celebration of the
marriage & the same was done w/o the consent of Any incumbent member of the judiciary w/in
his mother; & 2. His consent was obtained thru the court’s jurisdiction;
threats, intimidation & force exerted by G’s father. Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any
LC dismissed the complaint. church or religious sect duly authorized by his
church or religious sect & registered w/ the civil
HELD: In his application for marriage license, E registrar general, acting w/in the limits of the
represented himself to be over 25 yrs of age, written authority granted him by his church or
making G believe that he was capacitated to marry religious sect & provided that at least one of the
him w/o need of parental consent. Now he is contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing
precluded under the doctrine of estoppel fr. officer’s church or religious sect;
asserting or proving otherwise. Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the
cases mentioned in Art. 31; (articulo mortis)
The claim of P that his consent was not Any military commander of a unit to w/c a
freely given is w/o factual basis. The remark of G’s chaplain is assigned, ;in the absence of the latter,
father was merely an admonition expected fr. during military operation, likewise only in the
parents & not the kind of threat envisioned by law cases mentioned in Art. 32;
as would invalidate a marriage. Any consul –general, consul or vice-consul in
the case provided in Art. 10
With respect to the interpretation of Art. 15
& 45 (1), the written & sworn consent refers only to
the issuance of a marriage license, & such formal PEOPLE VS. WHIPKEY
req’t is not essential to the validity of a marriage
solemnized under a license if the other requisites FACTS: W was a 21 yr.-old American who
are present. In fact, what the art. Declares as a married FP in 1969. FP discovered in the local
voidable marriage is one solemnized w/o the civil registrar a marriage K between W & one GP.
consent of the parent, etc, & it may be inferred that P was charged w/ bigamy & was convicted.
the consent may be given in any form-written or
oral, or even implied fr. the acts. CAB E’s mother HELD: In order that a person may be held guilty
was present at the time of the celebration of the of bigamy, the second & subsequent marriage
marriage & did not object thereto. must have all the essential elements of a valid
marriage. IN CAB, the 2 nd marriage was not
validly celebrated, there were certain formal &
FORMAL essential requisites that were lacking.

First was the lack of authority of the


2. Some Form of Ceremony (a formal solemnizing officer. Rev. Diaz’s authority to
requisite.)-- Articles 3 par. 3, 4 par. 1, 6 solemnize marriages expired on May 1, 1970 &
the ceremony took place on May 14, 1970.
40
provision is worded broadly. There is no set
Second requirement that was lacking was an formula for the declaration, no particular
essential req.: W, being a foreigner, was required words are required. It does not even have to
be oral provided that there is sufficient
by law to secure fr. his country’s diplomatic or
manifestation of their will that they take each
consular services a certificate of legal capacity to other as H & W.
marry, w/c he did not do.
Presence of at least 2 witnesses of legal age.
Also there was no proof that FP, being Some say that the absence of this 3rd
under 23, had secured a sworn statement that she requisite renders the marriage void. Others
had sought parental advice. say it is only an irregularity.

Tolentino: Tolentino:

It is not necessary to the validity of the


Ceremony of Marriage.-- The requirement of a
marriage that the contracting parties should
marriage ceremony prevents the recognition in the
recite precisely the words of the statute. It is
Phils. of what are known as "common law
enough that the words employed evidence
marriages." A common law marriage is a present
mutual consent.
agreement bet. a man & a woman w/ capacity to
enter into such rel'p, to take ea. other as H & W,
Failure to Sign or Issue Certificate.-- The
followed by cohabitation.
certificate is merely of evidentiary value, & failure
to sign the same does not render the marriage a
nullity. The consent can be proved by other
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or competent evidence, such as the testimony of the
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab solemnizing officer, of the parties themselves, of
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). the witnesses to the marriage, & of others
xxx present at the wedding.

Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for MARTINEZ V. TAN [12 P 731]
the solemnization of the marriage is required. It Facts: Pltff. Rosalia Martinez commenced this
shall be necessary, however for the contracting action for the cancellation of the cert. of marriage
parties to appear personally before the solemnizing & for damages. Pltff. claimed that what took
officer & declare in the presence of not less than place before the justice of the peace did not
two witnesses of legal age that they take each other constitute a legal marriage under Gen. Orders
as husband & wife. This declaration shall be No. 68, Sec. 6, "No particular form for the
contained in the marriage certificate w/c shall be ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties
signed by the contracting parties & their witnesses must declare, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage, that they take each
& attested by the solemnizing officer.
other as husband & wife." CFI found for def.
In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when HELD: The parties addressed a signed petition
the party at the point of death is unable to sign the to the justice of the peace stating that they had
marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of agreed to marry, & asking the justice of the
the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of peace to marry them. Before the justice of the
said party, w/c fact shall be attested by the peace, they stated under oath that they ratified
solemnizing officer. the contents of their petition & insisted on what
they asked for. This statement was signed by
them, in the presence of witnesses that they
produced. A certificate was then made out by
Balane: the justice of the peace, signed by him & the
witnesses, stating the parties had been married
Requisites of some form of ceremony: by him. Both the parties knew the contents of
the document w/c they signed. Under the
Personal appearance of the contracting parties in circumstances, what took place before the justice
the presence of the solemnizing officer. This of the peace amounted to a marriage.
rules out proxy marriages.
(not in Balane’s outline)
The declaration that they declare in some manner
that they take each other as H & W. This
41
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized on home assignment in the Phils. cannot
solemnize marriages.
publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the
office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, Salonga, Private International Law II, 1995
as the case may be, & not elsewhere, except in ed. (hereinafter Salonga):
cases of marriages contracted at the point of death
or in remote places in accordance w/ Article 29 of Consular Marriages.-- xxx The prevailing rule
this Code, or where both of the parties request the is that a marriage performed before a consular or
solemnizing officer in writing in w/c case the diplomatic agent empowered by a sending State
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place to officiate marriages is valid in the receiving
designated by them in a sworn statement of that State only if the latter has agreed to his acting in
that capacity.
effect.
2. REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUANCE

Sempio-Dy: This provision is only directory, not


A. APPLICATION
mandatory, so that non-compliance therew/ will not
invalidate the marriage.

Art. 11. Where a marriage license is required,


SAN GABRIEL V. SAN GABRIEL [56 O.G. P. each of the contracting parties shall file
3555 (1960)] separately a sworn application for such license w/
the proper local civil registrar w/c shall specify
The mere fact that the marriage took place the following:
on a Sunday also would not necessarily vitiate the
marriage on the ground that it constitutes a (1) Full name of the contracting party;
violation of the requirement that the marriage shall (2) Place of birth;
be solemnized publicly in the office of the judge in (3) Age & date of birth;
open court.
(4) Civil Status;
(5) If previously married, how, when &
2.b Marriage License
where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
(6) Present residence & citizenship;
Art. 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the (7) Degree of relationship of the contracting
local civil registrar of the city or municipality where parties;
either contracting party habitually resides, except in (8) Full name, residence & citizenship of the
marriages where no license is required in father;
accordance w/ Chapter 2 of this Title. (9) Full name, residence & citizenship of the
Sempio-Dy: The solemnizing officer is not mother; &
required to investigate w/n the license was issued in (10) Full name, residence & citizenship of the
the place required by law. (People v. Jansen 54 P guardian or person having charge, in case the
176.)
contracting party has neither father nor mother &
is under the age of 21 years.

Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens The applicants, their parents or guardians
abroad may be solemnized by a consul- general, shall not be required to exhibit their residence
consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the certificates in any formality in connection w/ the
Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license & securing of the marriage license.
the duties of the local civil registrar & of the
solemnizing officer w/ regard to the celebration of
marriage shall be performed by said consular
B. PROOF OF CAPACITY
official.

Sempio-Dy: By "Filipinos citizens abroad" may Art. 12. The local civil registrar, upon
mean Filipinos permanently residing abroad or who receiving such application, shall require the
are mere transients or on vacation there. Consuls presentation of the original birth certificates or, in

42
default thereof, the baptismal certificates of the When Proof of Age Dispensed With:
contracting parties or copies of such documents
When the parents of the contracting parties
duly attested by the persons having custody of the
appear personally bef. the local civ. reg. &
originals. These certificates or certified copies of the swear to the correctness of their ages;
documents required by this Article need not be When the local civ. reg. is convinced, by merely
sworn to & shall be exempt fr. the documentary looking at the parties that they have the
stamp tax. The signature & official title of the required ages;
person issuing the certificate shall be sufficient When a party has formerly married, but is
proof of its authenticity. widows, or divorced, or the previous
marriage has been invalidated. (see art.
If either of the contracting parties is unable to 13.)
produce his birth or baptismal certificate or a
certified copy of either bec. of the destruction or
loss of the original, or if it is shown by an affidavit Art. 27. In case either or both of the
of such party or of any other person that such birth contracting parties are at the point of death, the
or baptismal certificate has not been received marriage may be solemnized w/o the necessity of
though the same has been required of the person a marriage license & shall remain valid even if the
having custody thereof at least 15 days prior to the ailing party subsequently survives.
date of the application, such party may furnish in
lieu thereof his current residence certificate or an Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so
instrument drawn up & sworn to before the local located that there is no means of transportation
civil registrar concerned or any public official to enable such party to appear personally before
authorized to administer oaths. Such instrument the local civil registrar, the marriage may be
shall contain the sworn declaration of two witnesses solemnized w/o the necessity of a marriage
of lawful age, setting forth the full name, residence license.
& citizenship of such contracting party & of his or
her parents, if known, & the place & date of birth of Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two
such party. The nearest of kin of the contracting preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall
parties shall be preferred as witnesses, or in their state in an affidavit executed before the local civil
default, persons of good reputation in the province registrar or any other person legally authorized to
or the locality. administer oaths that the marriage was
performed in articulo mortis or that the residence
The presentation of birth or baptismal of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay,
certificate shall not be required if the parents of the is so located that there is no means of
contracting parties appear personally before the transportation to enable such party to appear
local civil registrar concerned & swear to the personally before the local civil registrar & that
correctness of the lawful age of said parties, as the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain
stated in the application, or when the local civil the ages & relationship of the contracting parties
registrar shall, by merely looking at the applicants & the absence of a legal impediment to the
upon their personally appearing before him, be marriage.
convinced that either or both of them have the
required age. Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required
in the last preceding article, together w/ a legible
copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by
the person solemnizing the marriage to the local
Tolentino:
civil registrar of the municipality where it was
Documents Required.-- To prove the ages of performed w/in the period of 30 days after the
the contracting parties, the ff. may be required by performance of the marriage.
the local civ. registrar:
Original or certified copies of birth certificates. Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis
In the absence of birth certs., the original or between passengers or crew members may also
certified copies of baptismal certs. be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane
In the absence of the above documents, the party pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the place
may present his residence cert. or the affidavit is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of
of 2 witnesses.
call.

43
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is HELD: A mere defect or irregularity in the
a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority issuance of a license does not affect the validity
to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between of the marriage. It is the complete absence of a
persons w/in the zone of military operations, license w/c makes such marriage void. IN CAB,
whether members of the armed forces or civilians. since the regular form was not available, the OR
issued by the proper official served as the license
Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among itself & not just a mere evidence of payment.
members of the ethnic cultural communities may be Since all the req. for the issuance of the license
performed validly w/o the necessity of marriage has been fulfilled, the receipt can be considered a
license, provided that they are solemnized in valid license for all intents & purposes. Thus, D is
accordance w/ their customs, rites or practices. guilty of bigamy!
LORIA VS. FELIX
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the
marriage of a man & a woman who have lived FACTS: F & M had been living together as
together as husband & wife for at least five years & Husband & Wife. During the early part of the
w/o any legal impediment to marry each other. The liberation, M became seriously ill. The priest,
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in upon learning that these 2 souls have been living
an affidavit before any person authorized by law to together w/o the benefit of marriage asked them
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also to ratify their union accdg to Catholic rites. The
state under oath that he ascertained the marriage was celebrated in articulo mortis. M
qualifications of the contracting parties & found no recovered for a while, but she died a yr. later.
legal impediment to the marriage. The P’s, claiming to be M’s grandnephews &
nieces, demanded that F deliver the props left by
their grant aunt. F claims his right over the props
as M’s widower.
Tolentino:

This art. intends to facilitate & encourage the HELD: F is entitled to the props bec the
marriage of persons who have been living together marriage was valid. P’s allege that the marriage
in a state of concubinage for more than 5 yrs. The was invalid bec the priest failed to make & file the
publicity & other attendant inconveniences in affidavit required by Secs. 20-21. SC- It was the
securing the marriage license, might be priest’s obligation-non-compliance w/ it should
embarrassing to such persons & deter them fr. bring no serious consequences to the married
legalizing their union. pair, specially where it was caused by the
emergency.
Sempio-Dy: Besides, the marriage of the parties
The law permits marriages in articulo
will result in the legitimization of natural children
born to them during their cohabitation. mortis w/o marriage license but it requires the
priest to make the affidavit & file it. Such
affidavit contains the date usually required for the
Note: The fact of absence of legal impediment bet. issuance of a Marriage license & it substitutes for
the parties must be present at the time of the the latter. If a marriage celebrated w/o the
marriage, not during their 5-yr. cohabitation. license is not voidable, then this marriage should
not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.

PEOPLE VS. DAVID


2.C. MARRIAGE CEREMONY
FACTS: D & complainant EG applied for a marriage
license & were issued, in lieu of Prov. Form #95A, ART. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite
an official receipt, for lack of the regular form. for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
Subsequently, they were married. EG found out It shall be necessary, however for the contracting
that D was previously married to LG so she filed a parties to appear personally before the
suit for bigamy. D’s defense was that the 2nd solemnizing officer & declare in the presence of
marriage was void for lack of a valid marriage not less than two witnesses of legal age that they
license take each other as husband & wife. This
declaration shall be contained in the marriage

44
certificate w/c shall be signed by the contracting Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless
parties & their witnesses & attested by the these essential requisites are present:
solemnizing officer.
In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties
when the party at the point of death is unable to who must be a male & a female; xxx
sign the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for
one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the A. AGE.
name of said party, w/c fact shall be attested by the
solemnizing officer. Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized impediments mentioned in Articles 37 & 38, may
publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open contract marriage.
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the
office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul,
as the case may be, & not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted at the point of death Tolentino:
or in remote places in accordance w/ Article 29 of
Age of Consent.-- The age for each party
this Code, or where both of the parties request the provided in Art. 5 is generally known as the "age
solemnizing officer in writing in w/c case the of consent." for marriage. Eighteen yrs. is the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place "age of consent" bec. below this age, a party to a
designated by them in a sworn statement of that marriage cannot give a binding valid consent.
effect.
Balane: 18 yrs. old is an absolute minimum.
Art. 22.

Tolentino:
SAN GABRIEL V. SAN GABRIEL Age of Legal Capacity.-- For a perfect consent
that would result in a valid binding marriage, the
FACTS: This is an action for support by the wife & parties should be 21 yrs. of age. The age of 21
her child. Husband counter-claimed for annulment is, thus, the "age of legal capacity" to marry.
of the marriage on the grounds of irregularity in the
celebration of the marriage & the issuance of the Effect of Penal Law.-- Under Art. 344, RPC,
marriage license. the marriage of the offender w/ the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit
the penalty already imposed upon him.
HELD: The mere fact that the marriage took place
on a Sunday also would not necessarily vitiate the Q: If the victim of the crimes of rape, seduction,
marriage on the ground that it constitutes a abduction, & acts of lasciviousness happens to
violation of the requirement that the marriage shall be a girl less than 18 yrs. old, can she validly
be solemnized publicly in the office of the judge in marry the offender?
open court.
A: We believe that she can. It is submitted that
The facts that the applications were signed the circumstances contemplated by the RPC are
of an exceptional character, & should be
by a clerk & not by the Assistant Local Reg. And
considered as an exception to the provisions of
that the marriage license itself was not signed by the FC on the legal capacity to marry. xxx If
the LCR but by a clerk do not necessarily vitiate the merely bec. she is below the age of consent she
marriage if all the essential requisites for its validity will not be permitted to marry the offender, then
were complied w/. These irregularities are primarily we will have the absurd case where the law gives
for the lookout of the subscribing officer. a remedy w/ one & denies it w/ the other hand.

3. Legal Capacity (an essential requisite.)-- Art. 35. The following marriages shall be
Art. 2 par. 1 void fr. the beginning:

45
(1) Those contracted by any party below
eighteen years of age even w/ the consent of Balane:
parents or guardians;
xxx This kind of marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation for a reasonable period of time after
the minor reaches the age of 21. Here
ratification can set in even before the prescription
Balane: There is here an absolute absence of an sets in.
essential requisite.
Art. 39. The action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of not prescribe. xxx
the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
B. RELATIONSHIP.
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought
to have the marriage annulled was 18 years of age Art. 37. Marriages between the following are
or over but below 21, & the marriage was incestuous & void fr. the beginning, whether the
solemnized w/o the consent of the parents, guard- relationship between the parties be legitimate or
ian or person having substitute parental authority illegitimate:
over the party, in that order, unless after attaining
the age of 21, such party freely cohabited w/ the (1) Between ascendants & descendants of
other & both lived together as husband & wife; any degree; &
xxx (2) Between brothers & sisters, whether of
the full or half blood.

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be


Tolentino:
void fr. the beginning for reasons of public policy:
Want of Parental Consent.-- The law does not
expressly authorize the parent whose consent is Between collateral blood relatives, whether
required, to ratify the marriage. xxx We believe legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
that xxx the ratification by the parent whose degree;
consent is wanting must be recognized as sufficient
to validate the marriage, provided such ratification Between step-parents & step-children;
is made before the party to the M reaches 21 yrs.
old. Art. 47, par. 1 recognizes the right of such Between parents-in-law & children-in-law;
parent to ask for the A of the M bef. the child who
has married w/o parental consent reaches the age
of 21. This right can be waived. Besides, if the Between the adopting parent & the adopted
nullity proceeds fr. the absence of consent, there is child;
no juridical reason why such defect cannot be cured
by subsequent confirmation. xxx Between the surviving spouse of the adopting
parent & the adopted child;

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage Between the surviving spouse of the adopted
must be filed by the following persons & w/in the child & the adopter;
periods indicated herein:
Between an adopted child & a legitimate child
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article of the adopter;
45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not
give his or her consent, w/in five years after Between adopted children of the same
attaining the age of 21; or by the parent or adopter; &
guardian or person having legal charge of the xxx
minor, at any time before such party reached the
age of 21; Tolentino:
xxx
Collateral Blood Relatives.-- Marriages bet.
nephews & aunts, uncles & nieces, & first cousins
46
are prohibited under par. (1). This prohibition is
based on scientific opinion as well as on public The delivery of the common children's
opinion. They are contrary to good morals. presumptive legitime.
Although not conclusive, there is scientific & expert
opinion that, except in rare cases, children of first
cousins suffer fr. organic defects, & in many
instances are idiots, weak-minded, deaf, Art. 35. The following marriages shall be
nearsighted, etc., in other words, their marriage void fr. the beginning:
tends to weaken the race. xxx

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous


Art. 39. The action or defense for the marriages not falling under Article 41;
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall xxx.
not prescribe. xxx (6) Those subsequent marriages that are
void under Article 53.

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous


c. Prior Marriage.
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remar-
riage on the basis solely of a final judgment
Balane:
declaring such previous marriage void.
There are 3 kinds of marriage that are void
bec. of a prior marriage:
Tolentino:
A bigamous or polygamous marriage, not falling
under Art. 41. [F]or purposes of remarriage it would be
necessary to such void M to secure a final
There are 3 requisites under Art. 41: judgement declaring it null & void fr. the
beginning. W/o such final judgment, the
Absence of the prior spouses for at least 4 previous void marriage would constitute an
consecutive yrs. or at least 2 impediment to the remarriage, & a marriage
consecutive yrs. if it falls under Art. license may be denied. This article applies only
391, NCC. when a license is to be obtained for a subsequent
marriage.
The spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. DOMINGO V. CA [226 SCRA 572 (1993)] -
The institution by the spouse present of a
A spouse may petition for the declaration of
summary proceeding of presumptive
death of the absent spouse. A nullity of her marriage for a purpose other than
declaration by the court of the her remarriage.
presumptive death is of course
required. Facts: Delia Domingo filed a pet. for decl. of
nullity of her marriage w/ Roberto Domingo, on
In Art. 40 where the marriage was contracted after the ground that, unknown to her, he was
a void ab initio marriage w/c has not been previously married at the time of their marriage.
declared void by final judgment. She prays that their marriage be declared null &
void &, as a consequence, to declare that she is
In Art. 53 in case of a subsequent marriage w/c
does not comply w/ the requirements of Art. the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired
52. during the marriage & to recover them fr. him.

In Art. 52, you have to do 3 things: Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on
the ground that the marriage being void ab initio,
Judgment of annulment or nullity of the petition for decl. of nullity is unnecessary
marriage must be registered in the citing Peo. v. Aragon & Peo. v. Mendoza.
appropriate registry. Roberto claims that decl of nullity is necessary
The registration of the partition & under Art. 40, FC only for the purpose of
distribution of the properties of the remarriage. The lower court denied the motion.
spouses in the appropriate civil registry. CA affirmed the denial.
47
preclude their retroactive application to pending
HELD: The Declaration of nullity of a marriage actions. The retroactive application of procedural
under Art. 40 may be resorted to even for a laws is not violative of any right of a person who
purpose other than remarriage. may feel that he is adversely affected. The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Art. may attach to, nor arise fr., procedural laws.
40 is the position of the word "solely." xxx. As it is
placed, it is meant to qualify "final judgment." Had
the provision been stated as follows: "The absolute Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely person during the subsistence of a previous
for purposes of remarriage...," the word "solely" will marriage shall be null & void, unless before the
qualify "for purposes of remarriage" & the husband celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
would have been correct. spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years & the spouse present had a well-founded
That Art. 40 as finally formulated included belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
the significant clause denotes that such final In case of disappearance where there is danger
judgment declaring the previous marriage void need of death under the circumstances set forth in the
not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only 2 years shall be sufficient.
ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES [243 SCRA 32
(1995)] For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding
Facts: This is an administrative complaint filed by paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
Atienza for Gross Immorality & Appearance of summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
Impropriety against J. Brillantes, Presiding Judge of the declaration of presumptive death of the
MTC, Mla. It was alleged in the complaint that absentee, w/o prejudice to the effect of
Brillantes has been cohabiting w/ Yolanda De Castro reappearance of the absent spouse.
(w/ whom Atienza had 2 children) when he
(Brillantes) was already married to one Zenaida Article 391. The following shall be presumed
Ongkiko w/ whom he has 5 children. xxx Resp. dead for all purposes, including the division of the
denies having been married to Ongkiko, although estate among the heirs:
he admits having 5 children w/ her. He alleges that
while he & Ongkiko went through a marriage (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a
ceremony, the same was not valid for lack of sea voyage, or an aeroplane w/c is missing, who
marriage license. The second marriage bet. the two has not been heard of for four years since the
also lacked the required license. He claims that loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
when he married De Castro in LA, California, he
believed, in all GF & for all legal intents & purposes, (2) A person in the armed forces who has
that he was single bec. his first marriage was taken part in war, & has been missing for four
solemnized w/o a license. years;

HELD: Under the FC, there must be a judicial decl. (3) A person who has been in danger of
of the nullity of a previous marriage bef. a party death under other circumstances & his existence
thereto can enter into a 2nd marriage. (Art. 40.) has not been known for four years.
Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into
after the effectivity of the FC regardless of the date
of the first marriage. Said art. is given "retroactive Tolentino: The period was reduced in the FC to
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair 2 years in the foregoing cases.
vested or acquired rights in accordance w/ the NCC
or other laws." (Art. 256, FC.) This is particularly
true w/ Art. 40 w/c is a rule of procedure. Resp. REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO [220 SCRA 20
has not shown any vested right that was impaired (1993)]
by the application of Art. 40 to his case.
The declaration of presumptive death under Art.
The fact that procedural statutes may 41, FC is available only for the purpose of
somehow affect the litigants' rights may not remarriage.
48
founded belief that she was already dead. For
Facts: Gregorio Nolasco was a seaman. During instance, when he arrived in Antique, instead of
one of the calls of his ship to England, he met Janet seeking the help of local authorities or of the
Monica Parker, a British subject. From that chance British Embassy, he secured another seaman's
meeting, Janet lived w/ Nolasco on his ship for 6 contract & went to London. We do not consider
mos. When Nolasco's contract expired in 1960, that walking into a major city w/ a simple hope of
Janet went w/ him in returning home to San Jose, somehow bumping into one particular person
Antique. In Jan. 1982, Nolasco married Janet in there xxx can be regarded as a reasonable
Catholic sites in Antique. diligent search. The Court also views Nolasco's
claim that Janet declined to give any info. as to
After the marriage, Nolasco obtained her personal background even after marrying
another employment contract as a seaman, leaving Nolasco as too convenient an excuse to justify his
his pregnant wife w/ his parents. Sometime, in failure to locate her.
1/83, while working overseas, Nolasco received a BIENVENIDO V. CA [237 SCRA 676 (1994)]
letter fr. his mother informing him that Janet had
already given birth to his son. The letter also When a man contracts a subsequent marriage
informed him that Janet left Antique after giving while the first marriage is subsisting, the second
birth. xxx marriage as a general rule is void for being
bigamous. He who invokes that the second
In 88, or 5 yrs. after the disappearance of marriage is voidable for being an exception under
Janet, Nolasco filed an action for the decl. of Art. 83 of the NCC has the burden of proving it.
presumptive death of his wife Janet under Art. 41,
FC, claiming that all his efforts to look for her Facts: Aurelio Camacho married Conseja
proved fruitless. Velasco in '42. In '62, w/o this marriage being
dissolved, Aurelio married Luisita Camacho in
xxx The trial court granted the petition. Tokyo. In '67, Aurelio met Nenita Bienvenido.
CA affirmed the ruling. Hence this petition for Aurelio courted & won her & they cohabited until
review. Aurelio's death in '88. In '82, Aurelio bought a
house & lot. In the deed of sale & in the TCT in
HELD: A petition to declare an absent spouse his name, he was described as single. In '84, he
presumptively dead may not be granted in the sold the said house & lot to Nenita. When Aurelio
absence of any allegation that the spouse present died, Luisita filed an action to annul the sale to
will remarry. Nenita alleging that it was in fraud of her as the
legitimate wife of Aurelio. Nenita opposed the
There are 4 requisites for the declaration of action claiming that she was a buyer in GF. The
presumptive death under Art. 41: trial court upheld the sale in favor of Nenita. The
CA reversed. Hence, this petition for review.
That the absent spouse has been missing for 4
consecutive years, or 2 consecutive yrs. if the
disappearance occurred where there is a HELD: There is no presumption that the
danger of death under the circumstances laid marriage bet. Aurelio & Luisita is valid. As a
down in Art. 391. general rule, under Art. 83, NCC, a subsequent
That the spouse present wishes to remarry marriage contracted while the previous one is still
That the spouse present has a well-founded belief subsisting is void. There are exceptions to this
that the absentee is dead. rule but he who is invoking the exception has the
That the present spouse files a summary burden of proving the existence of the conditions
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive for the said exception to arise. In the case at
death of the absentee. bar, the burden of proof was on Luisita to show
that at the time of her marriage to Aurelio,
The Court believes that resp. Nolasco failed Aurelio's first wife had been absent for at least 7
to conduct a search for his missing wife w/ such yrs. & that he had no news that she was alive.
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" She failed to discharge this burden. What
that she is dead. The Court considers the applies, therefore, is the general rule xxx.
investigation allegedly conducted by Nolasco in his Consequently, there is no basis for holding that
attempt to ascertain the whereabouts of Janet as to the prop. in question was prop. of his conjugal
sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-
49
partnership bet. Luisita & Aurelio bec. there was no his mere reappearance, even if made known to
partnership in the first place. the spouses in the 2nd M, will not terminate such
M.
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in [I]t is incorrect to say that the first M is
the preceding Article shall be automatically dissolved by the celebration of the 2nd. It would
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of be more accurate to say that since the 2nd M has
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is been contracted bec. of a presumption that the
a judgment annulling the previous marriage or former spouse is dead, such presumption
declaring it void ab initio. continues in spite of his physical reappearance, &
by fiction of law, he must be regarded as legally
an absentee, until the subsequent M is
A sworn statement of the fact & circumstances
terminated as provided by law. The result of this
of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil is the suspension of the legal effects of M as to
registry of the residence of the parties to the him as long as the 2nd M subsists.
subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, w/ due notice to the spouses of
the subsequent marriage & w/o prejudice to the GOMEZ V. LIPANA [38 S 615 (1958)]
fact of reappearance being judicially determined in
case such fact is disputed. Where a husband & his second wife fr. whom he
concealed his first marriage, acquired properties
Balane: during their marriage, the second marriage being
void, is subject to collateral attack in the intestate
Marriage under Art. 41 is valid unless terminated proceedings instituted by the judicial administra-
under Art. 42. Notice that the law uses the term trix for the forfeiture of the husband's share
"terminated" & not annulled. This is bec. marriage under Article 1417, Spanish Civil Code (no longer
under Art. 41 is a good marriage.
in force) . "The legal situation arising fr. these
The effect of the affidavit of reappearance facts is that while insofar as the second wife was
is that the subsequent marriage is terminated concerned, she having acted in good faith, her
unless it is judicially challenged. marriage produced civil effects & gave rise, just
the same, to the formation of the conjugal
partnership wherein she was entitled to an equal
Tolentino: share upon dissolution." The only JUST AND
EQUITABLE solution is to give one-half of the
If both parties to the subsequent marriage acted in properties to the second wife, & the other half to
BF (knowing that the absent spouse is alive), the the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
said marriage is void ab initio under Art. 44.

Q: If only one party has acted in BF, is the M valid? CONSUEGRA V. GSIS [37 S 315 (1971)]
A: If the spouse who contracted the 2nd M knew
that in spite of the absence of his spouse for the Where the husband designated his
period provided in 41 said absent spouse was second family as beneficiaries of his life insurance
alive, his 2nd M should be considered void as policy, upon his death, both his first wife &
bigamous under 35(4), bec. an essential element second family share 50-50 in the benefits. Since
in 41 to make it an exception is wanting. the first marriage has not been dissolved, his wife
remains as his legal heir. Although the second
If such present spouse has acted in GF &
the declaration of presumptive death has been marriage is presumed void, having been
obtained, the BF of the 2nd spouse will not affect contracted during the subsistence of the first
the validity of the M, but the provisions of 43 will marriage, there is a need for a judicial declaration
operate against him, such as the revocation of of its nullity, w/c is no longer possible, the death
donations by reason of M made to him, of his of the husband having terminated the second
designation as beneficiary in any insurance of the conjugal partnership of gains.
innocent spouse, & his disqualification to inherit fr.
the innocent spouse.
Baviera: The court should not have applied
When No Action Taken.-- If the absentee Gomez v. Lipana, since there is no
reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the provision in the Civil Code giving effect to a
subsequent M, either by affidavit or by court action, void marriage in good faith.

50
(5) The spouse who contracted the
PEOPLE V. MENDOZA [95 S 845 (1954)] subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit fr. the innocent spouse by
A subsequent marriage contracted by any person testate & intestate succession.
during the lifetime of his spouse is illegal & void fr.
its performance, & no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity. A prosecution for bigamy Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent
based on said void marriage will not lie. marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall
be void ab initio & all donations by reason of
marriage & testamentary dispositions made by
PEOPLE V. ARAGON [100 P 1033 (1957)] one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law.
- cited People v. Mendoza

Tolentino:
Baviera: As a defense in bigamy, there is no
need for judicial declaration of nullity of a If the subsequent marriage is not
void marriage; as far as determination of terminated by the subsequent reappearance or
property relations is concerned, there is a by judicial declaration, but by death, do these
need for such judicial declaration for effects arise?
purposes of remarriage.
A: It is submitted that generally if a subsequent
M is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the
effects of dissolution of valid M shall arise. The
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent GF or BF of either spouse can no longer be
marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall raised, bec., as in annullable or voidable M, the M
produce the following effects: cannot be questioned except in a direct action for
annulment.
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage
But if both parties acted in BF, under 44,
conceived prior to its termination shall be consid-
the M is void ab initio. In such case, the validity
ered legitimate, & their custody & support in case of of the M can be attacked collaterally at any time,
dispute shall be decided by the court in a proper & the effects provided on 44 can be applied even
proceeding; if the dissolution is by death of one of the
spouses.
(2) The absolute community of property or the
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved & liquidated, but if either spouse Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her marry again after complying w/ the requirements
share of the net profits of the community property of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise,
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in the subsequent marriage shall be null & void.
favor of the common children or, if there are none,
the children of the guilty spouse by a previous Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition &
spouse; distribution of the properties of the spouses, &
the delivery of the children's presumptive
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil
remain valid, except that if the donee contracted registry & registries of property; otherwise, the
the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to same shall not affect third persons.
said donee are revoked by operation of law;
Art. 39. The action or defense for the
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall
designation of the other spouse who acted in bad not prescribe. xxx
faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if
such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; &
D. CRIME.

51
other spouse must not himself/ herself be
impotent.
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void
fr. the beginning for reasons of public policy:
This kind of marriage cannot be ratified
Xxx by ratification.
(9) Between parties where one, w/ the
intention to marry the other, killed that other Tolentino:
person's spouse, or his or her own spouse.
xxx The physical incapacity referred to by the
law as a ground for A of M, is impotence
[impotentia copulandi/ coeundi as distinguished
Balane:
fr. impotentia generandi (sterility)], or that
physical condition of the H or the W in w/c sexual
Art. 38 (9) used to be Art. 80 (6) of the NCC. Two intercourse w/ a normal person of the opposite
changes were made: (1) the killing must be w/ the sex is impossible.
intention to marry the other; (2) conviction is not
required, a preponderance of evidence being Impotence refers to lack of power to
sufficient. copulate, the absence of the functional capacity
for the sexual act. The defect must be lasting to
be a ground for annulment. The test of
Tolentino: impotence is not the capacity to reproduce, but
the capacity to copulate. (Sarao v. Gueverra.)
Killing of Spouse.-- It is submitted that a criminal
conviction for the killing is not necessary to render The refusal of the wife to be examined
the marriage void under the FC. The removal of the does not create the presumption of her
requirement by the FC must be taken as deliberate. impotency bec. Filipino girls are inherently shy &
bashful. The trial court must order the physical
examination of the girl, bec. w/o proof of
Art. 39. The action or defense for the impotency, she is presumed to be potent. To
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall order her to submit to a physical examination
does not infringe on her constitutional right
not prescribe. xxx
against self-incrimination (Sempio-Dy citing
Jimenez v. Canizares, Aug. 31, 1960.)

Triennial Cohabitation.-- This doctrine


provides that if the wife be a virgin & apt after 3
E. PHYSICAL CAPABILITY. yrs. of cohabitation, the H will be presumed to be
impotent, & the burden will be upon him to
overcome the presumption & does not prevent
impotency to be proved by another proper
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of evidence.
the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxx Balane: Some commentators say that this is
disputable presumption is applicable in our
jurisdiction.
(5) That either party was physically incapable
of consummating the marriage w/ the other, & such
incapacity continues & appears to be incurable;
Tolentino:
xxx
Action Barred.-- The action on this ground is
barred in the following cases: (1) If the other
Balane: party had knowledge of the incurable impotence
bef. the M, bec. this would imply that he
Physical Incapacity: Requisites: (1) The renounces copulation, w/c is a personal right; (2)
incapacity exists at the time of the celebration of If both spouses are impotent, & such impotence
the M; (2) Such incapacity must be permanent (it existed bef. the M, continues, & appears
continues to the time when the case for annulment incurable, bec. in this case an impotent pltff could
is being tried) & incurable ; (3) It must be not have expected copulation w/ the other
unknown to the other contracting party; (4) the spouse.

52
Q: Why Were No Examples of
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage
Psychological Incapacity Given in this
must be filed by the following persons & w/in the Article?
periods indicated herein: A: The Committee did not give any examples of
xxx psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the
(5) For causes mentioned in numbers 5 & 6 of provisions under the principle of ejusdem
Article 45, by the injured party, w/in five years after generis. Rather, the Committee would like the
the marriage. judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts & researchers in psychological disciplines,
& by decisions of Church tribunals w/c, although
F.PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken fr.
Canon Law.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
Q: Is the Psychologically Incapacitated
who, at the time of the celebration, was psycho-
Person Disqualified fr. Marrying Again?
logically incapacitated to comply w/ the essential A: The Committee believes that there is no need
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be to disqualify the psychologically incapacitated fr.
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only contracting another marriage bec. the fact of his
after its solemnization. (As amended by E.O. No. psychological incapacity for marriage would be
227) revealed anyway when he applies for a marriage
license for the 2nd marriage, & the other party is
thus placed on guard to conduct discreet
investigation about the matter.
Sempio-Dy:
General Characteristics of term
Provision is Taken fr. Canon Law.-- Par. 3 of "Psychological Incapacity": It must exhibit
Can 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law provides gravity, antecedence & incurability: (1) Gravity,
that: if the subject cannot carry out the normal &
ordinary duties of marriage & family shouldered
"Matrimonial Consent by any average couple existing under ordinary
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: circumstances of life & work; (2) antecedence, if
xxx the roots of the trouble can be traced to the
history of the subject before the marriage
3. Those who, bec. of causes of a psychological although its overt manifestation appear only after
nature, are unable to assume the essential the wedding; & (3) incurability, if treatments
obligations of marriage. required exceed the ordinary means of the
subject, or involve time & expense beyond the
The Committee decided to adopt par. 3 of reach of the subject.
the New Code of Canon Law as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of marriage for the following Q: Who can File the Action to Declare the
reasons: (1) As a substitute for divorce; (2) As a Marriage Void?
solution to the problem of Church-annulled A: Either party, i.e., even the psychologically
marriages; (3) As an additional remedy to parties incapacitated can file the action.
who are imprisoned by a marriage that exists in
name only as they have long separated bec. of the Q: What is the Status of the Children under
inability of one of them to perform the essential this Article?
obligations of marriage. A: The children conceived or born before the
decree of nullity of marriage are considered
Psychological Incapacity Distinguished fr. legitimate (Art. 54.)
Vice of Consent.-- Psychological incapacity is not
a question of defective consent but a question of
fulfillment of a valid consent.
SANTOS V. CA [240 SCRA 20 (1995)]
Psychological Incapacity Distinguished fr.
Insanity.-- Mental incapacity or insanity of some Meaning of "psychological incapacity" confined to
kind, like physical incapacity, is a vice of consent, the most serious cases of personality disorders
while psychological incapacity is not a species of demonstrative of insensitivity or inability to give
vice of consent. meaning & significance to the marriage.

53
celebrated before the effectivity of this Code &
Facts: On 9/20/86, Leouel Santos & Julia Rosario falling under Article 36, such action or defense
Bedia exchanged vows bef. a mun. trial judge of shall prescribe in 10 years after this Code shall
Iloilo City. They lived w/ the wife's parents. One have taken effect. (As amended by E.O. No. 227)
yr. later, a child was born of their marriage.
Quarrels marred the marriage bec. of frequent
interference by Julia's parents. On 5/18/88, Julia Tolentino:
left for the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel's
pleas. For the first time in 7 mos. Julia called him Retroactivity of Art. 36.-- By providing for a
up by long distance promising to return home once 10-yr prescriptive period for marriages of this
her contract expires in 1/89. She never did. When nature solemnized bef. the effectivity of the FC,
Leouel was in the US in 1990 to undergo a training the latter has actually given a retroactive effect to
program under the auspices of the AFP, he tried to the present article.
locate Julia, but to no avail. Hence this action in We submit that this is a juridical mistake.
Negros Oriental, under Art. 36, FC. Summons was It is like an ex post facto provision translated into
the filed of civil law. It contravenes the
served by publication. Julia opposed the complaint,
provisions of Art. 255 w/c allows retroactivity of
claiming it was Leouel who had been irresponsible & the FC provisions only when it does not impair or
incompetent. But she filed a manifestation stating prejudice vested or acquired rights.
she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
From an order of the lower court dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit, & the CA affirming said C. VOID MARRIAGES
order, Leouel filed this petition for certiorari.
HELD: It should be obvious, looking at all the
disquisition, including, & most importantly, the ART. 35. The following marriages shall be
deliberations of the FC Revision Committee itself, void fr. the beginning:
that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity"
in Art. 36 has not been meant to comprehend all Those contracted by any party below
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise eighteen years of age even w/ the consent of
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, parents or guardians;
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, & like Those solemnized by any person not legally
circumstances. xxx Art. 36 cannot be taken & authorized to perform marriages, unless such
construed independently of, but must stand in marriages were contracted w/ either or both
conjunction w/, existing precepts in our marriage parties believing in good faith that the
law. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) so;
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive Those solemnized w/o license, except those
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly covered by the preceding Chapter;
must be assumed & discharged by the parties to the Those bigamous or polygamous marriages
marriage w/, as so expressed by Art. 68, FC include not falling under Article 41;
their mutual obligations to live together, observe Those contracted through mistake of one
love, respect & fidelity & render help & support. contracting party as to the identity of the other;
(Balane: This is a tentative definition of &
psychological incapacity.) There is hardly any doubt Those subsequent marriages that are void
that the intendment of the law has been to confine under Article 53.
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to party who, at the time of the celebration, was
give meaning & significance to the marriage. This psychologically incapacitated to comply w/ the
psychological condition must exist at the time the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
marriage is celebrated. xxx. likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization. (As
amended by E.O. No. 227)
Art. 39. The action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall
not prescribe. However, in the case of marriages Tolentino:

54
celebrated before the effectivity of this Code &
Originally, this article provided that the falling under Art. 36, such action or defense shall
action to declare the nullity of this marriage shall prescribe in 10 yrs. after this code shall have
prescribe in 10 yrs. after its celebration. This was
repealed by EO227, even before the FC took effect. taken effect-now repealed)
Therefore, the action for the declaration of nullity of
this marriage does not prescribe. ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remar-
But if the marriage had been solemnized riage on the basis solely of a final judgment
before the FC took effect, EO 227 provides that the declaring such previous marriage void.
actions shall prescribe in 10 yrs. after the effectivity
of the FC or on Aug.3, 1998. ART. 41. A marriage contracted by any
person during the subsistence of a previous
NOTE: THERE IS A NEW LAW PASSED THIS YR.
OR LAST YEAR REMOVING THE 10 YR marriage shall be null & void, unless before the
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR THOSE MARRIAGES celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
CELEBRATED BEFORE THE FAMILY CODE. IN spouse had been absent for four consecutive
OTHER WORDS, THE ACTION TO DECLARE THE years & the spouse present had a well-founded
MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, WHETHER IT WAS belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
CELEBRATED BEFORE OR AFTER THE FC, IS In case of disappearance where there is danger
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE. of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only 2 years shall be sufficient.
ART. 37. Marriages between the following are
incestuous & void fr. the beginning, whether the For the purpose of contracting the
relationship between the parties be legitimate or subsequent marriage under the preceding
illegitimate: : paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
(1) Between ascendants & descendants of summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
any degree; & the declaration of presumptive death of the
(2) Between brothers & sisters, whether of the absentee, w/o prejudice to the effect of
full or half blood. reappearance of the absent spouse.

ART. 38. The following marriages shall be void


fr. the beginning for reasons of public policy:
ART. 42. The subsequent marriage referred
to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of
legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there
degree;
is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
(2) Between step-parents & step-children;
declaring it void ab initio.
(3) Between parents-in-law & children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent & the adopted
A sworn statement of the fact &
child;
circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the
in the civil registry of the residence of the parties
adopting parent & the adopted child;
to the subsequent marriage at the instance of
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the
any interested person, w/ due notice to the
adopted child & the adopter;
spouses of the subsequent marriage & w/o preju-
(7) Between an adopted child & a legitimate
dice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
child of the adopter;
determined in case such fact is disputed.
(8) Between adopted children of the same
adopter; &
ART. 43. The termination of the subsequent
(9) Between parties where one, w/ the
marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
intention to marry the other, killed that other
produce the following effects:
person’s spouse or his or her own spouse.
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage
ART. 39. The action or defense for the
conceived prior to its termination shall be consid-
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall
ered legitimate, & their custody & support in case
not prescribe. (However, in the case of marriage

55
of dispute shall be decided by the court in a proper locate Julia, but to no avail. Hence this action in
proceeding; Negros Oriental, under Art. 36, FC. Summons
was served by publication. Julia opposed the
(2) The absolute community of property or the complaint, claiming it was Leouel who had been
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be irresponsible & incompetent. But she filed a
dissolved & liquidated, but if either spouse manifestation stating she would neither appear
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her nor submit evidence. From an order of the lower
share of the net profits of the community property court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, &
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in the CA affirming said order, Leouel filed this
favor of the common children or, if there are none, petition for certiorari.
the children of the guilty spouse by a previous HELD: It should be obvious, looking at all the
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent discussions, including, & most importantly, the
spouse; deliberations of the FC Revision Committee itself,
that the use of the phrase "psychological
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall incapacity" in Art. 36 has not been meant to
remain valid, except that if the donee contracted comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses
the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
said donee are revoked by operation of law; authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, & like circumstances. xxx Art. 36
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the cannot be taken & construed independently of,
designation of the other spouse who acted in bad but must stand in conjunction w/, existing
faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if precepts in our marriage law. Thus correlated,
such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; & psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit marital covenants that concomitantly must be
fr. the innocent spouse by testate & intestate assumed & discharged by the parties to the
succession. marriage w/, as so expressed by Art. 68, FC
include their mutual obligations to live together,
ART. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent observe love, respect & fidelity & render help &
marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be support. (Balane: This is a tentative definition of
void ab initio & all donations by reason of marriage psychological incapacity.) There is hardly any
& testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
the other are revoked by operation of law. confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity"
to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning & significance to the
SANTOS V. CA
marriage. This psychological condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated. Xxx
Meaning of "psychological incapacity" confined to
the most serious cases of personality disorders
In the book, “Canons & Commentaries
demonstrative of insensitivity or inability to give
on Marriage,” this psychological incapacity
meaning & significance to the marriage.
consists of the ff:
true inability to commit oneself to the essential of
FACTS:On 9/20/86, Leouel Santos & Julia Rosario
marriage;
Bedia exchanged vows bef. a mun. trial judge of
this inability to commit oneself must refer to the
Iloilo City. They lived w/ the wife's parents. One
essential obligations of marriage: the
yr. later, a child was born of their marriage.
conjugal act, the community of life & love,
Quarrels marred the marriage bec. of frequent
the tendering of mutual help, the
interference by Julia's parents. On 5/18/88, Julia
procreation & education of offspring;
left for the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel's
the inability must be tantamount to a
pleas. For the first time in 7 mos. Julia called him
psychological abnormality. The mere
up by long distance promising to return home once
difficulty of assuming these obligs, w/c could
her contract expires in 1/89. She never did. When
be overcome by normal effort, obviously
Leouel was in the US in 1990 to undergo a training
does not constitute incapacity. The canon
program under the auspices of the AFP, he tried to
contemplates a true psychological disorder
56
w/c incapacitates a person fr. giving what is owned in common & in proportion to respective
due. It must be proved not only that the contributions. Said contributions are prima facie
person is afflicted by a psychological defect, presumed to be equal.
but that the defect did in fact deprive the
person at the moment of giving consent, of the Arts. 50-52 in rel to Art 102 & 109 apply
ability to assume the essential duties of only to voidable /valid marriages & exceptionally
marriage & consequently of the possibility of to void marriages under Art. 40.
being bound by these duties.

PI should be characterized by DOMINGO V. CA


gravity;
juridical antecedent; & A spouse may petition for the declaration of
incurability. nullity of her marriage for a purpose other than
her remarriage.

VALDEZ VS. RTC FACTS:Delia Domingo filed a pet. for decl. of


nullity of her marriage w/ Roberto Domingo, on
FACTS: AV (h) & CG(s) were married & they begot the ground that, unknown to her, he was
5 children. AV sought the declaration of nullity of previously married at the time of their marriage.
their marriage on the ground of mutual She prays that their marriage be declared null &
psychological incapacity (PI) to comply w/ their void &, as a consequence, to declare that she is
essential marital obligations. The RTC granted said the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired
petition & ordered them to liquidate their properties during the marriage & to recover them fr. him.
accdg to Art. 147 of the FC in relation to Arts. 50-52
. The question is WON Arts. 50-52 in relation to Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on
Arts. 102 & 109 govern such liquidation of prop in the ground that the marriage being void ab initio,
void ab initio marriages based on Art. 36. the petition for decl. of nullity is unnecessary
citing Peo. v. Aragon & Peo. v. Mendoza.
HELD: NO. In void marriages, regardless of the Roberto claims that decl of nullity is necessary
cause thereof, the prop. relations of the parties under Art. 40, FC only for the purpose of
during the pd of cohabitation is governed by Arts. remarriage. The lower court denied the motion.
147 or 148. CA affirmed the denial.

Art. 147 – This peculiar kind of ownership applies HELD: The Declaration of nullity of a marriage
when a man & a woman, suffering no legal under Art. 40 may be resorted to even for a
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live purpose other than remarriage.
together as husband & wife under a void marriage
or w/o benefit of a marriage. Under this prop Crucial to the proper interpretation of
regime, property acquired by both spouses through Art. 40 is the position of the word "solely." xxx.
their work & industry shall be governed by the rules As it is placed, it is meant to qualify "final
on equal co-ownership & any prop acquired during judgment." Had the provision been stated as
the union is prima facie presumed to have been follows: "The absolute nullity of a previous
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
did not participate in the acquisition of the prop remarriage...," the word "solely" will qualify "for
shall still be considered as having contributed purposes of remarriage" & the husband would
thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the have been correct.
care & maintenance of the family household.
(Unlike CPG, fruits of sep. prop. are not included in That Art. 40 as finally formulated
co-ownership) included the significant clause denotes that such
final judgment declaring the previous marriage
Art. 148 – This applies when the common-law void need not be obtained only for purposes of
spouses suffer fr. a legal impediment to marry each remarriage.
other or when they do not live exclusively w/ each
other as husband & wife. Only the prop acquired
by both of them through their ACTUAL joint
contributions of money, prop or industry shall be
57
TUASON VS. CA same, to the formation of the conjugal
partnership wherein she was entitled to an equal
FACTS: VT filed a pet for annulment or share upon dissolution." The only JUST AND
declarations of nullity of her marriage to ET on grds EQUITABLE solution is to give one-half of the
of psy incapacity of ET who was a druggie, properties to the second wife, & the other half to
physically abusive, etc. ET in his answer alleged the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
that it was VT who was a druggie. Bec ET was not
able to attend one of the scheduled hearings, the VDA. DE CONSUEGRA V. GSIS
LC decided on the basis of VT’s evid & ruled in her
favor. VT filed for Dissolution of their CPG. ET filed FACTS: JC contracted 2 marriages. One w/ RD &
a pet for Relief of Jdmt of the dec. annulling the the 2nd w/ BB (iloveyoubb!). When JC died, the
marriage. proceeds of his LIFE INSURANCE POLICY were
paid to BB & children bec they were the
HELD: The order for annulment of their marriage beneficiaries named in the policy. JC also had
was valid. A final & executory jdmt or order of the RETIREMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS but w/o any
RTC may be set aside on the grd of fraud, accident, beneficiaries named. RD filed a claim as JC’s only
mistake or excusable negligence (FAME). The legal heir. BB also filed a claim stating that since
failure of his counsel to notify his in not excusable they were the beneficiaries in the Life insurance
bec notice sent to counsel is binding upon the policy, they are the ones entitled to receive the
client. ret. Ins benefits. The GSIS & the LC ruled that
RD was entitled to 1/2 & BB & children were also
The absence of the prosecuting officer did entitled to 1/2.
not render the order void although in granting
annulment of marriage & legal sep, the pros. Atty. HELD: Affirmed. The LC correctly cited the
or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State case of Lao v. Dee Tim wherein it was held that:
for the purpose of preventing any collusion bet. the “since the first marriage has not been dissolved
parties & to take care that their evidence is not or declared void, the CPG established by that
fabricated or suppressed(Arts. 48 & 60 of FC), bec marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife
in the CAB, ET actively participated in the lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of
proceedings by filing several pleadings & cross- her husband under the NCC, entitled to share in
examining the witnesses of his wife. It is crystal his estate upon his death should she survive
clear that every stage of the litigation was him….. Although the second marriage is
characterized by a no-holds barred contest & not by presumed void ab initio, having been contracted
collusion. during the subsistence of the first marriage, there
is a need for a judicial declaration of its nullity.
GOMEZ V. LIPANA And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed
by the 2nd marriage was dissolved before judicial
FACTS: J contracted 2 marriages in his life, one w/ declaration of nullity, the only just & equitable
M in 1930 & another w/ I in 1939. In 1943 J & I solution in this case would be to recognized the
acquired a lot in Cubao. In 1958 I died intestate. right of the 2nd wife to her share of 1/2 in the
Pets, as I’s heirs, filed an action for forfeiture of J’s prop acquired by her husband, & consider the
share in the prop. Under the existing law (OCC), a other half as pertaining to the CPG of the first
party who has caused the nullity of the marriage marriage.”
shall have no part in the CPG.

HELD: Where a husband & his second wife fr. Baviera: The court should not have applied
whom he concealed his first marriage, acquired Gomez v. Lipana, since there is no
properties during their marriage, the second provision in the Civil Code giving effect to a
marriage being void, is subject to collateral attack in void marriage in good faith.
the intestate proceedings instituted by the judicial
administratrix for the forfeiture of the husband's
share under Article 1417, Spanish Civil Code (no NOTES: Under the NCC, there is a need for a
longer in force) . "The legal situation arising fr. jud declaration of nullity of marriage for the
these facts is that while insofar as the second wife purpose of marrying again. The old rule that a
was concerned, she having acted in good faith, her marriage w/c is void ab initio need no judicial
marriage produced civil effects & gave rise, just the decree of nullity is abandoned for the purpose of
58
remarriage. Thus, under the FC, even if the but below 21, & the marriage was solemnized
marriage is one that is void fr. the beginning, the w/o the consent of the parents, guardian or
2nd marriage would still be void if the parties to the
1st marriage did not have that marriage decreed a person having substitute parental authority over
nullity. the party, in that order, unless after attaining the
age of 21, such party freely cohabited w/ the
This is also for the purpose of protecting other & both lived together as husband & wife;
the parties of the 2nd marriage fr. prosecution for That either party was of unsound mind,
bigamy. unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited w/ the other as husband & wife;
That the consent of either party was obtained
PEOPLE V. MENDOZA by fraud, unless such party afterwards, w/ full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud,
FACTS: M married J in 1936. During the freely cohabited w/ the other as husband & wife;
subsistence of this marriage, M again married O in That the consent of either party was obtained
1941. The 1st wife died in 1943 so M married C in by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless
1949. This last marriage gave rise to his the same having disappeared or ceased, such
prosecution for bigamy. party thereafter freely cohabited w/ the other as
husband & wife;
HELD: M is not liable for bigamy. The law in force That either party was physically incapable of
at the time M contracted the 2nd marriage provided consummating the marriage w/ the other, & such
that a subsequent marriage contracted by any incapacity continues & appears to be incurable;
person during the lifetime of his spouse is illegal & or
void fr. its performance, & no judicial decree is That either party was afflicted w/ a sexually-
necessary to establish its invalidity. transmissible diseases found to be serious &
appears to be incurable.
Thus, when M married C, he was suffering
NO impediment as it can be considered that he has
no spouse by 1st marriage bec. she died, & he had JIMENEZ VS. CANIZARES (109 P 273)
no spouse by 2nd marriage bec their marriage was
void by operation of law. Facts: J filed an axn for annulment of his
marriage on the ground that the orifice of his
PEOPLE V. ARAGON wife’s genitalia was too small to allow the
penetration of a male organ for copulation. The
Same as People v. Mendoza wife did not file an answer nor attend the
hearings. She refused to submit to a medical
Baviera: As a defense in bigamy, there is no examination.
need for judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage; as far as determination of Issue : WON marriage may be annulled solely on
property relations is concerned, there is a the basis of the husband’s testimony
need for such judicial declaration for
purposes of remarriage. Held : No. The existence of the legal grounds
enumerated by law must be proved by
indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. The
D. VOIDABLE MARRIAGE presumption is in favor of potency; the
husband’s testimony alone is insufficient
1. GROUNDS FOR evidence. The wife must submit to a physical
ANNULMENT examination w/c in CAB is not self- incriminating
as she isn’t being charged w/ a crime. Wife’s
refusal to be examined doesn’t give rise to the
Art. 45 FC. A marriage may be annulled for any presumption arising out of suppression of
of the following causes, existing at the time of the evidence, i.e., that it is adverse. Women of this
marriage: country are shy by nature & wouldn’t submit to a
physical examination unless compelled by
That the party in whose behalf it is sought to competent authority.
have the marriage annulled was 18 yrs. old or over

59
PAULINO V. CRUZ (4 C.A. REP 1207) given a right of action under Art. 47 par. 2, any
time before the death of the insane spouse.
Facts: Maria Paulino filed an axn to annul her
Sexually Transmissible Disease. (45.6) --
marriage to Cruz on the ground that her uncle
The reason for this cause for A is the danger to
made her sign documents - w/c turned out to be an the health of the other spouse & offspring, giving
application for a marriage license & marriage rise to possibility of avoidance of sexual relations,
contract - through force, threat, intimidation & & the failure to attain one of the purpose of M,
fraudulent misrepresentation. Maria didn’t cohabit that is, the procreation of children & raising of a
w/ Cruz, but was convicted of adultery when she family.
ran away w/ Patricio Cabrera 19 days after the
alleged marriage. Ratification of Voidable Marriage.-- The law
does not fix a definite period during w/c this
cohabitation should last in order to constitute
Issue: WON marriage may be annulled despite
ratification. xxx It is submitted that when the
conviction of adultery cohabitation has continued for such a length of
time, after the cause of nullity has ceased to
Held: Yes. The conviction of adultery is exist, as to give rise to a reasonable inference
immaterial; a married woman may be convicted of that the party entitled to bring the action for
adultery even if the marriage is subsequently nullity prefers to continue w/ the M, there is
declared void. Maria’s testimony showed that her ratification w/c purges the M of its original defect.
uncle slapped her & pushed her head against a post
so that Maria signed what was supposed to be an Ratification refers to the right of action
itself; prescription refers only to the remedy.
“agreement” to marry Cruz in fear. Maria’s
There can be no remedy where there is no more
grandfather testified that his son (uncle) pointed a right of action.
gun at him when he tried to stop the latter fr.
forcing Maria to marry Cruz. Marriages Not Subject to Ratification (the
law does not provide for their ratification):
Concurring (Gatmaitan): Marriage license was
secured on the same day that it was applied for. It Where one of the spouses is incurably impotent;
was therefore void for lack of the required 10 days Where one of the spouses has an incurable
of publication. sexually transmissible disease;

The defect of the M in these 2 cases is


not one that merely affects consent. Ratification
TOLENTINO : cures a defect in consent; it cannot cure a
physical defect.
Party of Unsound Mind. (45.2) -- The test of
unsoundness of mind is WON the party at the time The action to annul in these cases will
of the M was capable of understanding the nature & exist as long as the period of prescription has not
consequences of the M. Insanity must exist at the expired.
time of the M, to avoid it.
A marriage where a sane spouse marries an
Somnambulism has the same effect as insane spouse w/o the knowledge of the
insanity. (Sanchez Roman.) insanity. Although the insane spouse can
ratify the M after recovering reason, the sane
Burden of Proof -- Presumption of the law is spouse cannot be barred fr. asking for A even
generally in favor of sanity, & he who alleges the if he has continued to cohabit w/ the insane
insanity of another has the burden of proving it. spouse after learning of such insanity.
But once general insanity is proved to exist, it is
presumed to continue; & if a recovery or a lucid
interval is alleged, the burden to prove such BALANE :
allegation is on the person making it.
Force, Intimidation & Undue Influence.--
Ratification -- Par. 2 gives the right of action to Definitions of "violence," "intimidation," & "undue
annul to the insane spouse & provides for influence" are in Arts. 1335 to 1337 NCC.
ratification after regaining reason. No right of
action is given to the sane spouse; this is based on
the assumption that he knew of the insanity of the Art. 1335. There is violence when in order to
other party & is placed in estoppel. But if he did not wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is
know of such insanity at the time of the M, he is employed.

60
There is intimidation when one of the (2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that
contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable & at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by
well-grounded fear of an imminent & grave evil a man other than her husband;
upon his person or property, or upon the person or
property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, (3) Concealment of sexually transmissible
to give his consent. disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the
time of the marriage; or;
To determine the degree of intimidation, the
age, sex & condition of the person shall be borne in (4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual
mind. alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism
existing at the time of the marriage.
A threat to enforce one's claim through
competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
does not vitiate consent. character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
Art. 1336. Violence or intimidation shall annul action for the annulment of marriage.
the obligation, although it may have been employed
by a third person who did not take part in the
contract. BUCCAT VS. BUCCAT [72 P 19]

Art. 1337. There is undue influence when a There has been no misrepresentation or
person takes improper advantage of his power over fraud when the husband at the time of the
the will of another, depriving the latter of a marriage knew that the wife was pregnant; the
reasonable freedom of choice. The ff. marriage cannot be annulled. The child was born
circumstances shall be considered: the confidential, less than 3 months after the celebration of the
family, spiritual & other relations between the marriage. As the woman was at an advanced
parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have stage of pregnancy at the time of the marriage,
been unduly influenced was suffering fr. mental such condition must have been patent to the
weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress. husband.

Sexually-Transmissible Disease. -- Requisites: ANAYA VS. PALAROAN [36 S 97]


(1) Disease must be sexually transmissible; (2)
Disease is found to be serious; (3) It must be Husband’s non-disclosure to his wife of his
apparently incurable; (4) STD must exist at the premarital relationship w/ another woman, who
time of the marriage; (5) It was unknown to the
other party when the M was solemnized; & (6) the was his relative, does not constitute the fraud
other party must himself/ herself be free fr. STD. A w/c is a ground for annulment of marriage.
marriage where either party was afflicted w/ STD Fraud as a vice of consent in marriage is limited
may not be ratified by cohabitation bec. exclusively by law to those kinds or species of
cohabitation may be suicidal. fraud enumerated in the provision. Congress’
intention to confine the circumstances that can
Note: There are 2 voidable marriages w/c cannot constitute fraud as a ground for annulment may
be ratified: (1) voidable marriage bec. of be deduced fr. the fact that, of all the causes of
impotence (here, there will be contradiction in nullity enumerated in the article, fraud is the only
terms; how can you cohabit if you are impotent?);
one given special treatment in a subsequent
& (2) voidable marriage due to STD.
article w/in the chapter on void & voidable
marriages.

Art. 46 FC. Any of the following circumstances


shall constitute fraud referred to in No. 3 of the TOLENTINO :
preceding Article:
Marriage through Fraud.-- FC limits the cases
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by w/c would constitute fraud sufficient for
final judgment of the other party of a crime annulment of M to those enumerated in Art. 46.
involving moral turpitude; Bec. of the enumeration, w/c must be considered

61
as restrictive, no other case of fraud may be age of 21, or by the parent or guardian or person
admitted. having legal charge of the minor, at any time
Concealment of Pregnancy.-- Where a man has before such party has reached the age of 21;
had sexual intercourse w/ his wife before the M, &
she is pregnant at the time of M, although he may (2) For causes mentioned in no. 2 of Art. 45,
not be the author of the pregnancy, the M will not by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of
be annulled. This is based on the theory that there the other's insanity or by any relative or guardian
is no fraud, bec. the man knows his wife to be or person having legal charge of the insane at
unchaste, as he was himself a party to her any time before the death of either party, or by
premarital immorality. the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after
regaining sanity;
Concealment of Diseases.-- Compared w/ Art.
45 (6):
(3) For causes mentioned in no. 3 of Art. 45,
Under 45 (6), STD is an independent cause for by the injured party, w/in five years after
annulment. Under 46, concealment of a STD discovery of the fraud;
constitutes fraud under par. 3.
(4) For causes mentioned in no. 4 of Art. 45,
Under 45 (6), the STD existing at the time of the M by the injured party, w/in five years fr. the time
must be found to be serious & appear to be the force, intimidation or undue influence
incurable. Under Art. 46 (3), the STD need not
disappeared or ceased;
be serious or incurable. To be aground for A, it
must have been "concealed" by the sick party.
It is the fraud that is the ground for A. (5) For causes mentioned in nos. 5 & 6 of
Art. 45, by the injured party, w/in 5 years after
This difference has a very impt. the marriage.
consequence. If the disease falls under Art 45 (6),
the M is not subject to ratification by continued
cohabitation. If the disease falls under Art. 46 (3),
the ground for A is fraud, & the M is ratified under BAVIERA: What in 1988 if wife discovered
par. 3 of Art. 45, if the spouse who is well, after husband had a venereal disease 2 years
knowing of the disease of the other, continues to after the marriage?
cohabit w/ him or her as H & W. A: Apply Art. 47(5)
Effect of Cure -- Rehabilitation or recovery will
not bar the action. The defect of the M is not the
disease, addiction or alcoholism itself but the fraud ART. 48 FC. In all cases of annulment or
w/c vitiated the consent of the other party. declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecution atty. or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
BALANE: take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties & to take care that evidence is not
To find what crimes involve moral turpitude, you go fabricated or suppressed.
by decisions of the SC. Crimes against property are
generally considered crimes of moral turpitude.
Homosexuality.-- Sexual orientation is not In the cases referred to in the preceding
enough. One has to be a practicing homosexual. paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.

2. ACTION FOR ANNULMENT Art. 49 FC. During the pendency of the action
& in the absence of adequate provisions in a
written agreement between the spouses, the
Art. 47 FC. The action for annulment of Court shall provide for the support of the spouses
marriage must be filed by the following persons & & the custody & support of their common
w/in the periods indicated herein: children. The Court shall give paramount
consideration to the moral & material welfare of
(1) For causes mentioned in no. 1 of Art. 45, said children & their choice of the parent w/
by the party whose parent or guardian did not give whom they wish to remain as provided for in Title
his or her consent w/in 5 years after attaining the IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation
rights of the other parent.
62
VILLAROMAN VS. ESTEBAN [73 O.G.
11736]
TOLENTINO VS. VILLANUEVA [56 S 1]
Facts: Jorge V. & Carmencita E. claimed that
Facts: Tolentino filed an axn to annul his marriage they were 25 & 23 yrs. old, respectively, when
to Helen based on fraud, as he discovered they applied for their marriage license. Jorge was
immediately after the marriage that Helen was really only 18 yrs. old. For awhile, Jorge stayed
pregnant despite their having no sexual relations w/ Carmencita in Manila on weekends but stayed
(i.e., Helen left the house immediately after the & studied in Baguio (as shown by his transcripts)
marriage celebration). Helen was declared in most of the time, but when he turned 19 & 9
default when she failed to file a responsive pleading mos. old, he abandoned her & their child. Jorge
despite service of summons. CFI also ordered the filed an axn to annul the marriage on the basis of
fiscal to determine WON there was collusion, but age & lack of parental consent. Carmencita
Tolentino refused to show his evidences to the fiscal contends that he is estopped as he himself stated
& to submit to his interrogation. that he was 25 on the marriage license.

Issue: WON CFI correctly dismissed the axn due Issue: WON marriage was null & void
to the fiscal’s lack of intervention
Held: Yes. The principle of estoppel cannot
Held: Yes. The fiscal’s investigation is a apply to defeat a suit for annulment on the
prerequisite to annulment where the defendant ground that plaintiff was not of age when he
defaulted. Marriage is more than a mere contract, contracted marriage. The legal capacity of the
thus, the prohibition against annulling a marriage contracting parties is a matter of law. The
based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of causes for annulment enumerated by (then) Art.
judgment or by non-appearance of defendant. 85 CC, including the ages (<20 yrs. if male &
When the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins <18 yrs. if female) of the contracting parties
the Court to direct the prosecuting officer to requiring parental consent, cannot be modified or
intervene for the State. altered by their joint acts or omissions, or by that
of either of them. Further, staying w/ the wife
JOCSON VS. ROBLES [22 S 521] only on Sats. & Sundays indicates transient
sexual intercourse, not cohabitation. This, & the
Facts : Gloria Jocson filed an axn for annulment & conduct of the man in abandoning his wife before
for damages on the ground that her marriage to reaching the age of majority or even, accd’g to
Robles was bigamous (she discovered that he had his wife, 9 mos. after he attained legal age,
married a Josefina Fausto 1st). Robles also claimed negates the intention on his part to confirm or
that their marriage was invalid bec. he had been ratify a defective marriage by cohabiting & living
coerced to marry her by her parents & brothers. He w/ the woman as her husband.
filed a M for summary judgment supported by
affidavits of the Gloria's father & brothers. Gloria
also submitted the case for judgment on the TOLENTINO :
pleadings. The court denied both, & dismissed the
case when both failed to attend a scheduled Insanity. Where the sane spouse knew of the
hearing.. insanity of the other, he is estopped to seek
annulment where he has lived w/ the wife
claimed to have been insane for several years &
Issue: WON denials & dismissal was correct
children have been born to them.
Held: Yes. The court correctly denied the motion Conviction of Crime: Requisites: (1) The
for summary judgment in view of the Civil Code crime involves moral turpitude & (2) There has
provisions (Arts. 88 & 1011) expressly prohibiting been a conviction.
the rendition of a decree of annulment of marriage
upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of Effect of Collusion.-- If the parties succeed in
judgment. The affidavits of the wife's father & obtaining a decree of annulment by collusion
brothers amounts to these methods not notw/standing observance of Art. 48, such decree
must be held to be absolutely void if no cause
countenanced by the Civil Code.
really existed. It would be against public policy.

63
Action to Annul Marriage.-- Annulment of M is
an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the NOTE: The word 'delivered' in par. 1 is
parties, & status affects or binds the whole world.
The res is the relation bet. the parties, or their
wrong according to DLC as it is violative of
marriage tie. Art. 777; it is contrary to principles of
succession.

BALANE :
Art. 52 FC. The judgment of annulment or of
Marriage under 45(3) & 47(3) can be
absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition &
ratified by cohabitation for a reasonable period w/c
may set in even before the 5-yr. prescriptive period distribution of the properties of the spouses, &
has expired. the delivery of the children's presumptive legi-
times shall be recorded in the appropriate civil
registry & registries of property; otherwise, the
3. EFFECT OF ANNULMENT same shall not affect their persons.

Art. 53 FC. Either of the former spouses may


Art. 50 FC. The effects provided for by
marry again after complying w/ the requirements
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) & (5) of Article 43 & by
of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise,
Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to
the subsequent marriage shall be null & void.
marriages w/c are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 & 45.
Art. 54 FC. Children conceived or born
before the judgment of annulment or absolute
The final judgment in such cases shall provide
nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has
for the liquidation, partition & distribution of the
become final & executory shall be considered
properties of the spouses, the custody & support of
legitimate. Children conceived or born of the
the common children, & the delivery of their
subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
likewise be legitimate.
been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Art. 165 FC. Children conceived & born
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the
outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless
absolute community or the conjugal partnership
otherwise provided in this Code. (referring to Art.
shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
54.)
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling & the lot
on w/c it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance w/ the provisions of Articles 102 & 129. BAVIERA: If child was conceived or born
before final judgment of a void or
Art. 51 FC. In said partition, the value of the annullable marriage, it is still legitimate.
presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of TOLENTINO:
the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property
or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual Effects of Voidable Marriages.-- A voidable
agreement judicially approved, had already provided marriage is valid & produces all its civil effects,
for such matters. until it is set aside by judgment of a competent
court in an action for annulment.
The children or their guardian, or the trustee of
Under the FC, the rule applicable to
their property, may ask for the enforcement of the
marriages void fr. the beginning applies to
judgment. voidable marriages. (see Art. 50, FC. )
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein As to children born in voidable marriages,
prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate the NCC & the FC have the same rule; the
successional rights of the children accruing upon the children are legitimate.
death of either or both of the parents; but the value
of the properties already received under the decree Effects of the Setting Aside Any Defective
of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered Marriages (whether void ab initio, or voidable,
as advances on their legitime.
64
or a subsequent marriage terminated upon
reappearance of a spouse presumed to be dead): Liability for Damages.-- [I]t is submitted that
in an appropriate case, damages may be
(1) There will be a liquidation, partition, & recovered by an injured party fr. another
distribution of the properties of the spouses. responsible for the nullity of a void or voidable
marriage. The basis of the liability will be the
Liquidation involves the inventory of the commission of an unlawful act or BF. Arts. 20 &
properties & payment of the obligations of the 21 of the NCC can serve as the legal basis for an
spouses & of the marriage. action for damages.

Partition is the process in w/c the remaining


properties will be divided into the various portions BALANE:
to be allocated to all the parties.
General rule:
Distribution is the delivery to the spouses & Children of voidable marriage are legitimate.
the children, in the proper cases, of the shares or Children conceived & born of a void marriage are
properties allocated to them respectively in the illegitimate. There are two exceptions (Art.
partition. 54 FC):
1. Art. 36 (psychological incapacity)
2. Art. 53
(2) In determining the share of each spouse in the
properties of the M, the properties, or their value,
that had been donated in consideration of M by the E. CONFLICT OF LAW RULE
innocent spouse to the spouse in BF, shall be
revoked by operation of law & returned to the
innocent spouse to become part of his distributable
prop. Art. 26 FC. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines in accordance w/ the laws in force
(3) The children conceived or born bef. the in the country, where they were solemnized, &
judgment becomes final are considered legitimate. valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
The judgment shall provide for their custody &
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35
support. Their presumptive legitime fr. each parent
(as if the parent died & they inherit fr. him or her (1), (4), (5) & (6), 36, 37, 38.
on the date of final judgment) shall be delivered to
them in cash, prop. or securities. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
& a foreigner is validly celebrated & a divorce is
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
designation of the spouse in BF as beneficiary in the spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
former's life insurance policy. Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (as amended by E.O. 227,
(5) The spouse in BF shall be disqualified to inherit
dated July 17, 1987.)
fr. the innocent spouse even under a will or
testament.
Art. 35
(6) The conjugal dwelling & the lot on w/c it is built (1) - below 18
will be given to the spouse w/ whom the common (4) - bigamous or polygamous
children choose to remain, unless the parties agree (5) - mistake as to identity
otherwise. (6) - non-registration w/ the LCR of the ff:
(7) If both spouses acted in BF, all donations by
judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of
reason of M fr. one to the other, & all testamentary
provisions made by one in favor of the other, are the marriage
revoked by operation of law. partition & distribution of properties of the
spouses
(8) The judgment, the partition & distribution of delivery of the children's presumptive
the prop. of the spouses, & the delivery of the legitimes
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry. Art. 36 - psychological incapacity
Art. 37 - incestuous marriages
(9) After all the foregoing, the former spouses are
Art. 38 - marriages that are void as against
free to marry again; otherwise, the subsequent M
shall be void. public policy.

65
BAVIERA: The second paragraph of Art. 26
was brought about by the ruling of the SC
BAVIERA: Art. 26 par. 2 applies only to mixed in Van Dorn v. Romillo.
marriages & not to a spouse who has become
naturalized, i.e., doesn’t apply to a Filipino
spouse who thereafter becomes a US citizen JOVITO SALONGA, Private International
& then divorces his spouse, who is still a Law II, 1995 ed. :
Filipino.
Philippine Law on Formal Validity.-- Phil.
Bar Q: In 1971, A & B, both Filipinos, got law adheres to the imperative rule: a marriage
married. In 1980, they established life in the formally valid where celebrated is valid elsewhere
US. In 1987, they both applied for & were (the maxim locus regit actum is applied
granted US citizenship. In 1989, A, the compulsorily; the law of the place of celebration,
the lex loci celebrationis, is solely decisive.) Par.
husband, successfully applied for divorce. In
1 of Art. 17, NCC embodies the maxim locus regit
1990, he married another woman. Valid? actum: "The forms & solemnities of contracts,
wills, & other public instruments, shall be
A: Divorce was valid. Both became US governed by the laws of the country in w/c they
citizens before they filed for divorce. are executed."
American law governs.
To establish a valid foreign marriage, 2
things must be proven, namely, (1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact;
VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO [139 S 139 ]
& (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence. (Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, supra.)
Facts: Alice Reyes is a Filipino citizen. She
married Richard Upton, a US citizen, in HK. They Marriage by Proxy.-- Proxy marriages, where
resided in the Phils. & had 2 children. In 1982, they permitted by the law of the place where the
obtained a divorce in Nevada, where Alice later proxy participates in the marriage ceremony, are
remarried Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, Upton filed entitled to recognition in countries adhering to
a suit in RTC-Pasay City to ask for an accounting & the lex loci celebrationis rule, at least insofar as
to obtain the right to manage Alice’s shop (The formal validity is concerned.
Galleon Shop in Ermita), alleging that it was
conjugal property.
BAVIERA: Marriage by proxy abroad affects
Issue: Effect of foreign divorce on the parties formal requisite only. It can be argued as
valid.
Held: Pursuant to his national law, Upton is no
longer Alice’s husband & he has no standing to sue
as her husband entitled to exercise control over SALONGA (cont’d.):
conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own
representation before the Nevada court fr. asserting Philippine Law on Substantive Validity.--
his rights over alleged conjugal property in the W/ reference to marriages celebrated abroad,
Phils. To maintain, as the husband does, that under Phil. law primarily refers to the law of the place of
celebration. xxx The general rule expressed in
our laws, the wife has to be considered still married
the formula "valid where celebrated, valid
to him & still subject to a wife's obligations under everywhere" admits of at least 2 exceptions: (1)
CC cannot be just. In CAB, the wife should not be in the case of Filipino nationals who marry abroad
obliged to live together w/, observe respect & before Phil. consular or diplomatic officials; (2) in
fidelity, & render support to her husband, & he the saving clause of Art. 26 par. 1.
should not continue to be one of her heirs w/
possible rights to conjugal property. She should Art. 26 par. 1 of the FC is a domestic,
not be discriminated against in her own internal rule applicable only to Filipino nationals.
country if the ends of justice are to be served. However, universally incestuous marriages--
such as those bet. parents & children or bet.
brothers & sisters-- will be considered void here,
whatever may be the nationality of the spouses.

66
As a general rule, a marriage should be parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male
upheld if valid according to the law of the place of party is a Muslim & the marriage is solemnized in
celebration, unless the M itself or the enjoyment of
the incidents of the marital relationship would accordance w/ Muslim law or this Code in any
offend the strongly-held notions of decency & part of the Philippines.
morality of a State that has a close relationship to
the contracting parties. (2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim
& non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance w/
Art. 26 par. 2 applies to a situation where Muslim law or this Code (Muslim Code), the Civil
the alien spouse was the one who obtained the Code of the Philippines shall apply.
divorce decree abroad capacitating him or her to
remarry, in w/c case the Filipino spouse shall
Art. 29. (1) (Subsequent Marriage) By
likewise have the capacity to remarry.
divorcee - (1) No woman shall contract a subse-
TOLENTINO: quent marriage unless she has observed an idda
of three monthly courses counted fr. the date of
This rule seems to place a Filipino citizen on a plane divorce. However, if she is pregnant at the time
of inequality. The reason for this is that our law of the divorce, she may remarry only after deliv-
does not allow the Filipino to seek a foreign divorce, ery.
hence, if he obtains one, it is not recognized in the
Phils. He is subject to the Phil. law on status,
wherever he goes.
BAVIERA: Q: A Christian woman married a
BALANE: Muslim under the Muslim Code. Then they
got married under Catholic rites. Muslim
If the marriage w/c is solemnized abroad is void divorced her. Can the wife remarry?
under Phil. law, it is considered void in the Phils.
A: Yes, if she observes the conditions of
Art. 29, PD 1803. The first marriage
Exceptions: Art. 35, paragraphs 2 & 3. celebrated under the Muslim Code governs.
This is the only instance where we recognized The church rites just ratified the first
foreign divorce. Take note that the requirements in
marriage.
Art. 52 need not be complied w/ bec. there is no
such requirement in Art. 26, par. 2.

Requisites.-- There are four requisites for this G. PENAL SANCTIONS - ACT 3613,
Article to apply: THE MARRIAGE LAW, SECS. 30-42
The marriage must be one between a Filipino & a * Secs. 30-36 were superseded by New Civil
foreigner
Code; now Title I of Family Code
Divorce is granted abroad.
Divorce must have been obtained by the alien
spouse Sec. 37. Influencing parties in religious
Divorce must capacitate the alien spouse to respects. - Any municipal secretary or clerk of the
remarry. Municipal Court (now Local Civil Registrar), who
directly or indirectly attempts to influence any
Query: Suppose the foreign spouse was a former contracting party to marry or refrain fr. marrying
Filipino citizen. Does the law require that the
foreign spouse was already a foreigner at the time in any church, sect, or religion or before any civil
the marriage was contracted? authority, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor &
shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by
A: There is no Supreme Court ruling on this. But a imprisonment for not more than one month & a
1993 DOJ opinion tells us that Art. 26 does not fine of not more than two hundred pesos.
require that the alien spouse was already a
foreigner at the time of the marriage. Sec. 38. Illegal issuance or refusal of license.
- Any municipal secretary (now Local Civil
Registrar) or clerk of the Municipal Court of
F. MUSLIM CODE (P.D. 1083) Manila (Local Civil Registrar) who issues a
marriage license unlawfully or who maliciously
Art. 13. (1) Application. The provisions of this refuses to issue a license to a person entitled
Title shall apply to marriage & divorce wherein both thereto or fails to issue the same w/in twenty-
67
four hours after the time when, according to law, it pesos nor more than two thousand pesos, nor
was proper to issue the same, shall be punished by both, in the discretion of the court.
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more
than two years, or by a fine of not less than two Sec. 43. Unlawful signboards. - Any person
hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. who, not being authorized to solemnize marriage,
shall publicly advertise himself, by means of signs
Sec. 39. Illegal solemnization of marriage. - or placards placed on his residence or office or
Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage w/o through the newspapers, as authorized to
being authorized by the Director of the Philippine solemnize marriage, shall be punished by impris-
National Library (now Director of National Library) onment for not less than one month nor more
or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to than two years, or by a fine of not less than fifty
exhibit his authorization in force when called upon pesos nor more then two thousand pesos, or
to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents, both, in the discretion of the court.
guardians, or persons having charge; & any bishop
or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion Sec. 44. General penal clause. - Any violation
or sect the regulations & practices whereof require of any provision of this Act not specifically
banns or publications previous to the solemnization penalized, or of the regulations to be
of a marriage in accordance w/ section ten promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be
(superseded by Art. 60, New Civil Code, now under punished by a fine of not more then two hundred
Art. 12, EO No. 209, as amended), who authorizes pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one
the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest
or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of the Sec. 45. Disqualification of priests &
provisions of this act, shall be punished by ministers. - Any priest or minister of the gospel or
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more any denomination, church, sect, or religion
than two years, or by a fine of not less than two convicted of the violation of any of the provisions
hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. of this Act or of any crime involving moral
turpitude, shall, in addition to the penalties
Sec. 40. Marriages in improper places. - Any incurred in each case, be disqualified to
officer, minister, or priest solemnizing marriage in a solemnize marriage for a period of not less than
place other than those authorized by this Act, shall six months nor more than six years at the
be punished by a fine of not less than twenty five discretion of the court. (As amended by Act No.
pesos nor more than three hundred pesos, or both, 4236).
in the discretion of the court.

Sec. 41. Failure to deliver marriage certificate. BAVIERA: This resulted fr. the Tripoli
- Any officer, priest or minister failing to deliver to Agreement.
either of the contracting parties one of the copies of
the marriage contract or to forward the other copy
to the authorities w/in the period fixed by law for
IV. LEGAL SEPARATION
said purpose, shall be punished by imprisonment for
not more than one month or by a fine of not more
than three hundred pesos, or both, in the discretion
TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO [15 S 355 (1965)]
of the court.
Facts: Vicenta E., a “sheltered colegiala” fr.
Sec. 42. Affidavit on marriage "in articulo
Cebu, secretly but validly married Pastor T., an
mortis." - Any officer, priest, or minister who,
ex-army officer & engineer. They eventually
having solemnized a marriage in articulo mortis or
became estranged bec. of the opposition of V’s
any other marriage of exceptional character, shall
parents to the marriage. Due to the scandal, V
fail to comply w/ the provisions of Chapter II of this
went to Misamis Occidental & then to the US to
Act (Chapter 2, Title III, New Civil Code, now Title I,
study. In the US, she secured a divorce fr. a
Family Code), shall be punished by imprisonment
Nevada court, while her parents got her a decree
for not less than one month nor more than two
of annulment fr. the Church. V later married
years, or by a fine of not less than three hundred
Russel Moran, w/ whom she had children. They
live in California; V became an American citizen

68
on Aug. 1958. In 1955, Pastor filed a complaint the latter, only the property relation is affected, &
against V for legal separation against V’s parents. the spouses may be actually living together.
He asked for P1M damages.
Legal Separation & Separation of
Spouses.-- Legal Separation (LS) can be
Issue: WON legal sep’n should be granted effected only be decree of the court; but the
spouses may be separated in fact w/o any
Held: YES. A foreign divorce between Filipino judgment of the court. Under the NCC, any
citizens, sought & decreed after the effectivity of contract for personal separation between
the NCC, is not entitled to recognition in the Phils., husband & wife shall be void & of no effect. [Art.
& neither is the marriage contracted w/ another 221 (1), NCC.] With the repeal of Art. 221, & the
party by the divorced consort subsequent to the omission fr. the FC of a similar provision, the rule
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in this prior to the NCC is restored, & such agreements
are again valid.
country. A marriage celebrated after a foreign
decree of divorce is adulterous, & justifies an action Foreign Divorces.-- A foreign divorce bet.
for legal separation on the part of the innocent Filipino citizens, sought & decreed after the
consort of the 1st marriage. The invalid divorce effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to
also entitles the innocent spouse to recover recognition as valid in the Phils. This is still the
damages (P25th moral damages; basis - 2176). rule under the FC.
However, an action for alienation of affection
against the parents of one’s consort does not lie in
the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives A. GROUNDS
on their part.

BAVIERA: What is important is the citizenship ART. 55. A petition for legal separation may
at the time of marriage. be filed on any of the following grounds:

Loophole: supposing the wife became an (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly
American citizen first, then divorced her abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
Filipino husband, would it still constitute as common child, or a child of the petitioner;
adultery giving rise to legal separation? [NO] (2) Physical violence or moral pressure to
compel the petitioner to change religious or
political affiliation;
Annulment & Legal Separation Distinguished: (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or
(1) Annulment (A) is caused by some circumstance induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child
existing at the time of the M, while the cause of of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
legal separation (LS) arises after the celebration of connivance in such corruption or inducement;
the M; (2) an A of M terminates the marital bond (4) Final judgment sentencing the
bet. the parties while LS does not; & (3) A of M,
respondent to imprisonment of more than six
once final, cannot be set aside so as to restore the
marital relation, while LS may be terminated & years, even if pardoned;
marital relations resumed by the reconciliation of (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of
the parties. the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the
respondent;
Tolentino: (7) Contracting by the respondent of a
subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
Divorce & Its Kinds.-- Divorce is the dissolution Philippines or abroad;
or partial suspension, by law, of the marital relation; (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
the dissolution being termed divorce fr. the bond of (9) Attempt by the respondent against the
matrimony, or a vinculo matrimonii; the suspension life of the petitioner; or
being known as divorce fr. bed & board, or a mensa (10) Abandonment of petitioner by
et thoro. The former is sometimes also called
respondent w/o justifiable cause for more than
absolute, & the latter relative divorce.
one year.
Legal Separation & Separation of Property.--
In the former, there is a suspension of common For purposes of this Article, the term "child"
marital life, both as to person & property, while in shall include a child by nature or adoption.

69
the celebration of the marriage. If the defect had
existed at the time of the marriage, but the
BALANE: marriage had been ratified by continued
cohabitation or the action to annul has
This is an exclusive enumeration. prescribed, it is submitted that the action for LS
may not be subsequently brought.
Observe that some grounds would tend to
overlap w/ the grounds for annulment. In such a
Par. (7).-- TOLENTINO: Would this include a
subsequent marriage by a person after a
case, the aggrieved party has the option, either to
declaration of presumptive death of the other
bring an action for annulment or for LS.
spouse? It is submitted that every subsequent
Par. (1).-- TOLENTINO: The violence must be marriage, where there is a subsisting prior
marriage, should give the other spouse the right
of a serious degree, but does not have to amount to
to ask for LS.
an attempt against the life of the petitioner., w/c is
covered by par. (9). The violence must be
repeated, to the extent that common life w/ def.
Par. (8).-- TOLENTINO: Sexual Infidelity.--
Under the NCC, the act of a wife in having sexual
becomes extremely difficult for the plaintiff.
intercourse w/ any other man not her husband
It is submitted that the repeated physical will constitute adultery. On the other hand,
concubinage is committed by the husband in
violence or the grossly abusive language should be
three ways: (1) by maintaining a mistress in the
committed only by one spouse & not by both to
conjugal dwelling: (2) by having sexual
each other.
intercourse w/ the other woman under
Par. (2).-- TOLENTINO: The physical violence scandalous circumstances; & (3) by cohabiting w/
her in any other place. xxx To equalize the
or moral pressure to compel the plaintiff to change
situation of husband & wife in this respect, the FC
religious or political affiliation need not be repeated.
makes "sexual infidelity" sufficient ground for
A single incident would be enough.
either to justify the grant of LS.
BALANE: The pressure must be undue. It
Sexual Perversion.-- This includes all unusual
becomes undue when the other spouse is deprived
or abnormal sexual practices w/c may be
of the free exercise of his or her will.
offensive to the feelings or sense of decency of
Par. (3).-- TOLENTINO: If both spouses agree either the husband or the wife. But if the act of
sexual perversion is by free mutual agreement,
that the wife or a daughter engage in prostitution,
neither party can ask for LS, bec. they are equally
neither one should be allowed to obtain LS, on the
guilty of the perverse act.
principle that a person should come to court w/
clean hands.
BALANE: Sexual Perversion is a flexible
Par. (4).-- TOLENTINO: The crime for w/c the concept. It is basically, a cultural thing.
def. was convicted is immaterial.

Par. (5).-- BALANE: This ground does not have GANDIONCO VS. PENARANDA [155 SCRA
to exist at the time of the marriage. Distinguish this 725]
fr. Art. 46 (4).
A civil action for LS based on concubinage may
Par. (6).-- BALANE: Questions.-- (1) Will proceed ahead, or simultaneously w/, a criminal
knowledge of one party that the other was a lesbian action for concubinage, bec. said civil action is
or a homosexual bar the action for LS? (2) Does not one "to enforce the civil liability arising fr. the
homosexuality contemplate sexual orientation or
does it contemplate only homosexual practice? offense" even if both the civil & criminal actions
arise fr. or are related to the same offense. A
decree of LS, on the ground of concubinage may
BAVIERA : Homosexuality refers to practice, be issued upon proof of preponderance of
not by nature; if by nature, then Art. 36 will evidence in the action for LS. No criminal
apply. proceeding or conviction is necessary.

Par. (9).-- TOLENTINO: An attempt against


TOLENTINO: the life of the plaintiff spouse, as a ground for LS,
implies that there is intent to kill. xxx [But] the
On pars. 5 & 6.-- These grounds can be reason for
actions for LS only when they come to exist after
70
act against the life of the plaintiff spouse must be Facts: Socorro Matubis & Zoilo Prexedes were
wrongful in order to constitute a ground for LS. married in 1943. In 1944, they agreed to live
separately. In 1948, they executed an
agreement whereby each relinquished his/her
BAVIERA: Even if repeated physical violence, right over the other as husband/wife, couldn’t
this can fall under No. 1. prosecute the other for concubinage or adultery,
wasn’t entitled to support nor could claim
anything fr. the other. In 1955, Zoilo cohabited
Par. (10).-- TOLENTINO: Under Art. 101, "the & had a child w/ another woman. Alleging
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a
period of three months or has failed w/in the same abandonment & concubinage, Socorro filed an
period to give any information as to his or her axn for legal sep’n.
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have
no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. Issue: WON agreement contained consent w/c
barred the axn for legal sep’n

Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall Held: Yes. The wife’s condonation & consent
be denied on any of the following grounds: are necessarily the import of par. 6(b) of the
agreement. The second part of the agreement
Where the aggrieved party has condoned the constituted a license to commit a ground for legal
offense or act complained of; sep’n. The condonation & consent were express.
Where the aggrieved party has consented to The law (then Art. 100 CC) provides that legal
the commission of the offense or act complained of; separation may be claimed only by the innocent
Where there is connivance between the parties spouse provided the latter has not condoned or
in the commission of the offense or act constituting consented to the adultery or concubinage
the ground for legal separation; committed by the other spouse; plaintiff having
Where both parties have given ground for legal condoned &/or consented in writing to the
separation; concubinage committed by the defendant
Where there is collusion between the parties to husband, she is now undeserving of the court's
obtain the decree of legal separation; or sympathy.
Where the action is barred by prescription.

TOLENTINO: LS is a personal right & does not BAVIERA: The stipulation, though void, was
survive death. equivalent to express consent.

BALANE: There are other grounds not found in


Art. 56 : Par. (2).-- Consent.-- TOLENTINO: Consent is
the agreement or conformity in advance of the
(1) Death of either party pendente lite. (Lapuz v. commission of the act w/c would be a ground for
Eufemio, supra.) and LS.
(2) Reconciliation pendente lite. (Art. 66 par. 1.)
Par. (3).-- Connivance.-- TOLENTINO:
Connivance is distinguished fr. consent in that
Par. (1).-- TOLENTINO: Condonation as consent is unilateral, or an act of only one
Defense.-- Condonation is the forgiveness of a spouse. Connivance implies agreement, express
marital offense constituting a ground for LS, & bars or implied, by both spouses to the ground for LS.
the right to LS.
It may be express or implied. It is express when Par. (4).-- Recrimination.-- TOLENTINO:
signified by words or writing, & it is implied when it Recrimination is a countercharge in a suit for LS
may be inferred fr. the acts of the injured party. that the complainant is also guilty of an offense
constituting a ground for LS. This defense is
based on the principle that a person must come
BALANE: Condonation is pardon w/c comes after to court w/ clean hands.
the offense.
Par. (5).-- Effect of Collusion.-- TOLENTINO:
Collusion is the agreement bet. husband & wife
MATUBIS VS. PRAXEDES [109 P 788 (1960)] for one of them to commit, or to appear to
commit or presented in court as having
committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress
71
evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of the pleadings will not be considered, since
enabling the other to obtain LS. provisions on marriage are substantive in
nature. Prescription here is not a mere
B. LIMITATION OF ACTION
statute of limitations but a substantive
right.

Art. 57. In action for legal separation shall be


filed w/in five years fr. the time of the occurrence of DE OCAMPO V. FLORENCIANO (2/23/60)
the cause.
Facts: De Ocampo & Florenciano married in
1938. In 1951, De Ocampo discovered that his
TOLENTINO: wife was having illicit relations. De Ocampo sent
here to Manila to study beauty culture, but the
Law does not encourage LS, & provides for wife still dated around. In 1952, they began
prescription of the action even when the offended living apart. In 1955, De Ocampo surprised his
party has not had knowledge of the cause. xxx If wife in the act w/ a Nelson Orzame. He told her
plaintiff does not come to know of the ground for he would file a pet’n for legal sep’n. Wife agreed
LS, & 5 yrs. expire fr. the date of its occurrence, he so long as she wasn’t criminally charged w/
cannot sue for LS.
adultery. CFI & CA denied pet’n bec. there was
confession of judgment, condonation & consent.
BROWN VS. YAMBAO [54 O.G. 1827 (1957)]
Issue: WON there was confession of judgment
Facts: While Brown was interred by the Japanese
& collusion
fr. 1942-45, Juanita Yambao, his wife, committed
adultery w/ Carlos Field & bore the latter’s child.
Held: NO. Decree granted. Art. 101 NCC
Brown found out only when he was released in
doesn’t exclude as evidence an admission or
1945. They executed an agreement liquidating the
confession made by the guilty spouse outside the
conjugal partnership & assigning some properties to
court. It merely prohibits a decree of sep’n
Yambao. Thereafter, they lived separately, &
based solely on such confession. Here, there was
Brown had children w/ another woman. In 1955,
other evidence to prove adultery. The confession
he filed an axn for legal separation on the ground of
of judgment prohibited is when the defendant
adultery, praying that the agreement be ratified.
confesses in court the right of the plaintiff to the
CFI-Manila denied it on the ground of consent,
judgment sought or files a pleading expressly
connivance & prescription under Art. 102 NCC (axn
agreeing to the plaintiff’s demand. Further,
prescribes 1 year fr. time plaintiff became cognizant
collusion cannot be inferred fr. the mere fact that
of the cause & w/in 5 years fr. the cause’s
the guilty party confesses to the offense, & proof
occurrence).
that the defendant desires the sep’n & makes no
defense is not by itself collusion.
Issue: WON Brown’s axn is already barred

Held: Yes. Brown did not petition for LS until 10


C. HEARING
years after he learned of his wife’s adultery. Even if
the wife did not interpose the defense of
prescription, the courts can take cognizance
thereof, bec. actions seeking a decree of legal Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in
separation or annulment of marriage involve public no case be tried before six months shall have
interest, & it is the policy of our law that no such elapsed since the filing of the petition.
decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto
appear on the record. Also, the husband was guilty
of commission of the same offense by living w/ TOLENTINO: This is intended to give the
another woman. Evidence of his misconduct & the spouses a chance to reconcile.
wife’s failure to set it up as a defense were proper
BALANE: Incidental matters may be heard even
subjects of the fiscal’s inquiry / intervention. during the six-month cooling-off period.

BAVIERA: This is an exception to the Rules of RUFUS RODRIGUEZ, The FAMILY CODE of
Court provision that defenses not raised in the Philippines Annotated, 2nd ed.: During
72
the six month period, the court may still act to the children’s custody, alimony, & support
determine the custody of the children, alimony & pendente lite. Law expressly enjoins that these
support pendente lite. should determined by the court accd’g to the
circumstances. Evidence not affecting the cause
of separation, like the actual custody of the
SOMOSA-RAMOS VS. VAMENTA [46 S 110 children, the means conducive to their welfare &
(1972)] convenience during the pendency of the case,
should be allowed so that the court may
Facts: Lucy Somosa-Ramos sued her husband determine w/c is best for their custody.
Clemente for legal sep’n on the grounds of
concubinage & for attempting against her life. She
also sought a writ of preliminary mandatory
Art. 59 FC. No legal separation may be
injunction so that her paraphernal & exclusive
decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward
property under Clemente’s management could be
the reconciliation of the spouses & is fully
returned to her. Clemente moved to suspend the
satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation
hearing of the petition due to the 6 month cooling-
is highly improbable.
off period; Judge Vamenta granted his motion.

Held: An ancillary remedy of preliminary


mandatory injunction is not barred by the six-month TOLENTINO: The effort of the Court is not
limited to the period before trial (at least 6 mos.)
statutory suspension of trial in an action for legal but may be continued even after trial & before
separation. Art. 103 NCC is not an absolute bar to judgment is rendered.
the hearing of a motion for prel. injunction prior to
the expiration of the 6 months period. The law
remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for PACETE VS. CARRIAGA [231 SCRA 321]
judicial power to assert itself, e.g., Art. 104 NCC
(now Art. 61, FC), in w/c there appears to be a Art. 58 FC mandates that an action for LS must
recognition that the question of management of the "in no case be tried before six months shall have
spouses' respective property need not be left elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously
unresolved even during the 6 months period. An in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off"
administrator may even be appointed for the period. In this interim, the court should take
management of the prop. of the conjugal steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
partnership.
Art. 60 FC. No decree of legal separation
ARANETA VS. CONCEPCION [99 P 709
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
(1956)]
confession of judgment.
Facts: Luis Araneta filed an axn for LS against
In any case, the Court shall order the
Emma, his wife. After the issues were joined,
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
Emma filed an Omnibus petition to secure custody
take steps to prevent collusion between the
of their 3 minor children, a monthly support of P5th,
parties & to take care that the evidence is not
the return of her passport, & to enjoin Luis fr.
fabricated or suppressed.
ordering his hirelings fr. harassing her. Luis prayed
that the parties be required to submit their
evidences, alleging that his wife isn’t entitled to See De Ocampo case, supra, for ruling on
custody bec. she abandoned the children & that confession of judgment.
CPG assets cannot justify her claim for support.
Judge Concepcion denied Luis’ prayer but granted
Emma’s pet’n on the ground that Art. 103 NCC (now 1. RIGHTS & OBLIGS
Art. 58 FC) prohibits the introduction of any OF PARTIES
evidence on the merits or incidents of the case.

Issue: WON evidence may be admitted Art. 61 FC. After the filing of the petition for
legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to
Held: Yes. The 6 month cooling-off period does live separately fr. each other.
not override other provisions, e.g., determination of

73
The court, in the absence of a written
Alimony "pendente lite."-- During the
agreement between the spouses, shall designate
pendency of the suit for legal separation upon a
either of them or a third person to administer the complaint filed & admitted, it is the duty of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership court to grant alimony to the wife & to make
property. The administrator appointed by the court provisions for the support of the children not in
shall have the same powers & duties as those of a the possession of the father.
guardian under the Rules of Court. Should def. appear to have means to pay alimony
& refuses to pay, either an order of execution
may be issued or a penalty for contempt may be
imposed, or both.
SABALONES VS. CA [230 SCRA 79]
Custody of the Children.-- While the action is
In an action for legal separation, where the spouses pending, the custody of the children may be
did not agree as to who will administer the conjugal determined in one of two ways: (1) by
partnership, the Court may appoint one of the agreement of the spouses w/c shall not be
spouses. Such appointment may be implied, as disturbed unless prejudicial to the children; & (2)
when the trial court denied the petitioner any share by court order, w/c shall be based on the sound
in the conjugal properties (thus also disqualifying discretion of the judge, taking into account the
welfare of the children as the ruling
him as administrator thereof.) That designation
consideration.
was in effect approved by the CA when it issued in
favor of the resp. wife the preliminary injunction
now under challenge.
LERMA VS. CA [61 S 440 (1974)]
Art. 62 FC. During the pendency of the action
for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall Facts: Lerma filed a criminal complaint for
likewise apply to the support of the spouses & the adultery against Diaz, the wife, & Ramirez. 3
custody & support of the common children. months later, Diaz filed an axn against Lerma for
legal sep’n &/or separation of properties, custody
Art. 49 FC. During the pendency of the action & of their children & support, & an urgent petition
in the absence of adequate provisions in a written for support pendente lite for her & the youngest
agreement between the spouses, the Court shall son. Lerma opposed, setting up the adultery
provide for the support of the spouses & of their charge as his defense. Trial court & CA granted
common children. The Court shall give paramount Diaz’s application for support pendente lite. A
consideration to the moral & material welfare of year later, Diaz was found guilty of adultery.
said children & their choice of the parent w/ whom
they wish to remain as provided for in Title IX. It Issue: WON adultery may be invoked as a
shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of defense against a claim for support pendente lite
the other parent.
Held: Yes. The wife having been convicted of
adultery, she is not entitled to support pendente
TOLENTINO: lite. Art. 292 NCC contemplates the pendency of
a court action & a prima facie showing that the
Effects of Filing Petition: action will prosper; it doesn’t preclude the loss of
The spouses can live separately fr. each other the right in certain cases. Diaz having been
The administration of the common prop., whether convicted of adultery, the probable failure of her
in absolute community or conjugal partnership
suit for legal sep’n can be foreseen. Further, the
of gains, shall be given by the Court to either of
the spouses or to a third person, as is best for right to separate support & maintenance
the interests of the community. presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause
In the absence of a written agreement of the to claim legal separation. The loss of the
spouses, the Court shall provide for the support substantive right to support in such a situation is
bet. the spouses & the custody & support of the incompatible w/ any claim for support pendente
common children, taking into account the lite.
welfare of the children & their choice of the
parent w/ whom they wish to remain. 2. EFFECT OF DEATH OF
When the consent of one spouse to any transaction
A SPOUSE
of the other is required by law, judicial
authorization shall be necessary, unless such
spouse voluntarily gives such consent.
74
LAPUZ SY VS. EUFEMIO [43 S 177 (1972)] decree of LS, the law on intestate succession
should take over the disposition of the remaining
Facts: Carmen Lapuz Sy was abandoned by her properties w/c were allocated to the deceased
husband, Eufemio. She later discovered that he spouse, i.e., properties allocated to the deceased
was cohabiting w/ another woman. She filed a spouse by virtue of the liquidation of conjugal
pet’n for legal separation. Before the trial could be assets shall be distributed in accordance w/ the
completed, Carmen died in a vehicular accident. laws on intestate succession.
Eufemio moved for dismissal. Granted. Carmen’s
self-assumed substitute, Lapuz, appealed.
D. DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
Issue: WON death of a party abates an axn for
legal sep’n, even if the axn involves property rights. 1. EFFECTS

Held: Yes. Death of the plaintiff before a decree Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall
of legal separation abates such action. "An action have the following effects:
for legal separation w/c involves nothing more than
bed-& board separation of the spouses is purely (1) The spouses shall be entitled to live
personal. The NCC recognizes this by: (1) allowing separately fr. each other, but the marriage bonds
only the innocent spouse (& no one else) to claim shall not be severed;
legal separation; (2) providing that the spouses can,
by their reconciliation, stop or abate the (2) The absolute community or the conjugal
proceedings & even rescind a decree of LS already partnership shall be dissolved & liquidated but the
granted. Being personal, it follows that the death of offending spouse shall have no right to any share
one party to the action causes the death of the of the net profits earned by the absolute
action itself - actio personalis moritur cum persona." community or the conjugal partnership, w/c shall
Even if property rights are involved, bec. these be forfeited in accordance w/ the provisions of
rights are mere effects of the decree of legal Article 43 (2);
separation, being rights in expectation, these rights
do not come into existence as a result of the death Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent
of a party. Also under the ROC, an action for legal marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
separation or annulment of marriage is not one w/c produce the following effects: xxx
survives the death of spouse.
MACADANGDANG V. CA [108 S 314 (1981)] (2) The absolute community of property or
the conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
Facts: Filomena & Antonio Macadangdang were shall be dissolved & liquidated, but if either
able to expand their buy & sell business in Davao spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his
del Norte into merchandising, trucking, or her share of the net profits of the community
transportation, milling etc. However, their marriage property or conjugal partnership property shall be
deteriorated. They separated. Upon returning fr. forfeited in favor of the common children or, if
Cebu, Filomena discovered Antonio’s illicit affairs. there are none, the children of the guilty spouse
She instituted an axn for legal sep’n, w/c the trial by a previous marriage or, in default of children,
court granted. She filed a pet’n for the appointment the innocent spouse;
of an administrator of the CPG. TC granted, CA
affirmed. Antonio appealed to SC, but died during (3) The custody of the minor children shall be
the pendency of the appeal. awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the
provisions of Article 213 of this Code; &
Issue: Effect of his death on the appt. of an
administrator Art. 213. In case of separation of the
parents, parental authority shall be exercised by
Held: The death of a spouse after a final decree the parent designated by the Court. The Court
of legal separation has no effect on the decree. shall take into account all relevant considerations,
The law (Art. 106 NCC) clearly spells out the effect especially the choice of the child over seven years
of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
property, i.e., dissolution & liquidation of the CPG or
ACP. Upon the liquidation & distribution
conformably w/ the law on the effects of a final
75
No child under seven years of age shall be Art. 64. After the finality of the decree of
separated fr. the mother, unless the court finds legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke
compelling reasons to order otherwise. the donations made by him or by her in favor of
the offending spouse, as well as the designation
(4) The offending spouses shall be disqualified of the latter as a beneficiary in any insurance
fr. inheriting fr. the innocent spouse by intestate policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the irrevocable. The revocation of the donation shall
offending spouse made in the will of the innocent be recorded in the registries of property in the
spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. places where the properties are located.
Alienations, liens & encumbrances registered in
good faith before the recording of the complaint
BALANE: for revocation in the registries of property shall
be respected. The revocation of or change in the
There are four (4) other effects designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take
effect upon written notification thereof to the
Donation propter nuptias may be revoked by the insured.
innocent spouse. (Art. 64.)
Designation of the guilty spouse in the insurance The action to revoke the donation under this
policy may be revoked. (id.)
Article must be brought w/in 5 years fr. the time
Cessation of the obligation of mutual support. (Art.
198.) the decree of legal separation become final.
Wife may continue using the surname before the
decree of legal separation. (Art. 372, NCC.)
2. RECONCILIATION

TOLENTINO:

Support & Assistance.-- After the decree of LS, Art. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a
the obligation of mutual support bet. the spouses corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly
ceases; however, the court may order the guilty signed by them shall be filed w/ the court in the
spouse to give support to the innocent spouse. same proceeding for legal separation.
(Art. 198.)

Successional Rights.-- The guilty spouse, by


TOLENTINO:
virtue of the decree of LS becomes disqualified to
succeed the innocent spouse. She would not even
be entitled to the legitime. xxx But if the will is Concept of Reconciliation.-- Reconciliation is
executed after the decree, the disposition in favor a mutual agreement to live together again as
of the offender shall be valid. husband & wife. It must be voluntary mutual
agreement.
It is submitted that the fact of resuming
common life is the essence of reconciliation &
LEDESMA VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF terminates the legal separation even if the joint
PEDROSA manifestation has not been filed in court.
[219 SCRA 806]
BALANE:
The law mandates the dissolution & liquidation of
the prop. regime of the spouses upon finality of the Contrary view.-- Technically, what will set
decree of LS. Such dissolution & liquidation are aside the decree of LS is the filing of a joint
necessary consequences of the final decree. This verified manifestation of reconciliation. Without
legal effect of the decree of legal separation ipso that, the court cannot act motu proprio.
facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable
incident of, the judgment decreeing the LS for the Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the
purpose of determining the share of each spouse in preceding Article shall have the following conse-
the conjugal assets. (citing Macadangdang v.CA) quences:

(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still


pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever
stage; &

76
submit that this is not restrictive & does not limit
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be the spouses to the regime they had before the
set aside, but the separation of property & any decree of LS. The spouses are placed in the
forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already same position as before the marriage & could
effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to establish the property regime they want, as if
revive their former property regime. making a marriage settlement. xxx If they do
not agree on any system, then by law their new
The court order containing the foregoing shall regime will be that of separation of property.
be recorded in the proper civil registries.

V. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS


BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
BALANE:

Effects of Reconciliation:
Tolentino:
Custody over the children.-- Joint custody is
restored. Dual Aspect of Family Relations.-- There are 2
Compulsory & intestate succession is restored. aspects in family relations, one internal & another
Testamentary succession.-- There is no revival. external. In the internal aspect, w/c is essentially
Reconciliation will not necessarily revive the natural & moral, the family is commonly known
institution of the guilty spouse in the will of the to be sacred & inaccessible even to the law. It is
innocent spouse.
Donation propter nuptias will remain revoked. only in the external aspects, where third persons
& the public interest are concerned, that the law
fixes rules regulating family relations.
Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former A. IN GENERAL
property regime referred to in the proceeding Article
shall be executed under oath & shall specify:

(1) The properties to be contributed anew to Art. 68. The husband & wife are obliged to
the restored regime; live together, observe mutual love, respect &
(2) Those to be retained as separated fidelity, & render mutual help & support.
properties of each spouse; &
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their
addresses & the amounts owing to each. BALANE:

The agreement of revival & the motion for its These are called legal obligations but they are
approval shall be filed w/ the court in the same more of a statement of policy. An action for
specific performance is not proper to enforce
proceeding for legal separation, w/ copies of both these obligations. The only possible
furnished to the creditors named therein. After due consequences are found in Art.100 for ACP & 127
hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measures for CPG.
to protect the interest of creditors & such order
shall be recorded in the proper registries of With regard to the mutual obligation of fidelity,
properties. there are consequences both civil & criminal
(adultery or concubinage.).
The recording of the order in the registries of
With respect to support, there are legal
property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed
provisions in the FC w/c carry out the duty.
or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has
sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's
claim. TOLENTINO:

Right of Cohabitation.-- Marriage entitles the


TOLENTINO: husband & wife to each other's society, that is,
they are mutually entitled to cohabitation or
consortium. This means that they shall have a
New Regime.-- The FC authorizes the spouses to
agree to "revive their former property regime." We
77
common life, under the same roof, to better fulfill Among them are: (1) the legitimacy of defense
those obligations inherent in the matrimonial status. of a spouse (Art. 11, RPC); (2) the increase in
penalty in a crime by one spouse against the
Scope of Right.-- The right of cohabitation person of the other (Art. 246, id.); (3) the
includes domestic & sexual community of the incapacity of one spouse to testify against the
spouses, the extent of both of w/c will differ other (R123, Sec. 26, ROC); (4) the right of one
according to the circumstances. xxx [T]he spouses spouse to object to adoption of or by the other
will be considered as living together, although (Arts. 185 & 188); & (5) the prohibition of
driven by the stress of circumstances or pecuniary donations between them (Art. 87.)
difficulties to separate, if there is no intention on the
part of either to sever their marital relations Legal Sanction.-- The only aspect of the
permanently. obligation of mutual help for w/c there is a legal
sanction is the duty to support. This can be
But for the purpose of the law, only the enforced by court action. But the law cannot
tangible & material aspect of cohabitation can be penetrate to the intimate relations in the home in
taken into account. The law is powerless to impose order to enforce the mutual obligations of care,
that intimacy of life w/c is the basis of conjugal of moral assistance, & of mutual affection &
peace & happiness. regard.

Sexual Relations.-- Although a husband is Position of Spouses in the Family.-- The


entitled to sexual relations w/ his wife, & it is not perfect parity of rights & duties of H & W has to
rape to force the wife to have sexual relations be reconciled w/ the need for unity of direction in
against her will, this right is not absolute. The right the family. Since the power of direction cannot
involves only normal intercourse. be vested at the same time in 2 persons, the
existence of a head of the family becomes
Legal Sanction for Cohabitation.-- Cohabitation imperative; & both nature & tradition have given
by the parties must be spontaneous & cannot be this prerogative to the husband
imposed by the law or the courts. The only possible
sanction is patrimonial in nature. If the husband This power of the H as head of the
refuses to live w/ the wife, he can be compelled to family, however, is not composed of rights &
pay her a pension, & indemnity for damages; & if prerogatives, but of duties & responsibilities, bec.
the wife refuses to live w/ the husband, he can the H does not use it for his personal benefit but
refuse to support her. for the greater & higher interests of the family.

Use of Force.-- The husband cannot by the use of Chastisement of Wife.-- Chastisement is
force, even of public authority, compel the wife to unlawful, & it has been held that the H should
return home. Such remedy would be a violation of not be permitted to inflict personal chastisement
personal dignity & security. xxx Modern law abhors upon his wife, even for the grossest outrage.
imprisonment for debt, & coercive measures to The only possible exception to this rule under our
compel the wife to live w/ the husband would be law is that given in Art. 247 of the RPC, w/c
worse than imprisonment for debt. provides that:

Remedies for Interference.--Any person who


Art. 247. Any legally married person who,
interferes w/ the right of the spouses to
cohabitation may be held liable for damages under having surprised his spouse in the act of
Art. 26, FC. committing sexual intercourse w/ another person,
shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
Mutual Fidelity.-- This fidelity is the loyalty w/c immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them
each should observe toward the other, the wife any serious physical injury, shall suffer the
having nothing to do w/ another man, nor the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them
husband w/ another woman. physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be
Mutual Help.-- Mutual help involves care during exempt fr. punishment.
sickness, & bearing the inconvenience caused by
such sickness, of the other spouse. The
obligation of mutual help, however, is not limited to
material assistance & care during sickness. It Love Between Spouses.-- Mutual love cannot
extends to everything that involves moral be compelled or imposed by court action.
assistance, & mutual affection & regard.

There are positive legal provisions w/c Art. 69. The husband & wife shall fix the
reveal the scope of this duty & implement the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
general rule laid down in the present article. court shall decide.

78
TOLENTINO:
The court may exempt one spouse fr. living w/
the other if the latter should live abroad or there are What Properties Answerable.-- The order of
liability for family support of the different
other valid & compelling reasons for the exemption.
properties of the marriage is: first, the
However, such exemption shall not apply if the community prop., then the income of the spouses
same is not compatible w/ the solidarity of the or fruits of their separate properties, & finally, the
family. separate properties of the spouses. The liability
of the spouses for the support of the family being
BALANE: The power to fix residence is joint. joint, this may mean that they contribute equally,
Whatever residence is fixed should bind both regardless of the value of the respective
parties. properties of the spouses. However, this would
not be equitable. The better rule seems to be
TOLENTINO: The right to fix family domicile that the contribution should be proportionate to
includes the right to change it, so long as the the properties of the spouses.
spouses agree to the transfer.
Management of Household.-- In view of the
Separate Residence.-- It can be said that any of silence of the law on how the disagreement bet.
the grounds for LS would be sufficient for a spouse the spouses in the management of the household
to have a separate domicile, if he or she prefers shall be settled, the custom should be observed,
that to LS. & the wife's position should be given priority.

Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects
the support of the family. The expenses for such his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits
support & other conjugal obligations shall be paid fr. acts w/c tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury
the community property &, in the absence thereof, to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party
fr. the income of or fruits of their separate may apply to the court for relief.
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of
said income or fruits, such obligations shall be
satisfied fr. their separate properties. Tolentino:

What Relief May Be Granted.-- Under the NCC,


BALANE: when one party applies for relief bec. of the acts
or negligence of the other spouse, "the court may
Art. 70 is an implementation of the third duty of the counsel the offender to comply w/ his or her
spouses, that of support. Correlate this w/ Art. 194. duties, & take such measures as may be proper."
Notw/standing this omission in the FC, we believe
Where to get the funds? There are three that the court has full freedom to determine the
sources in the order of priority: kind of relief that may be given. The relief,
however, must be lawful.
1. From the common property
2. From the income or fruits of the separate
property
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any
* Note: Numbers 1 & 2 are different legitimate profession, occupation, business or
sources only if the property relationship is ACP. In activity w/o the consent of the other. The latter
CPG, numbers 1 & 2 will be the same. may object only on valid, serious, & moral
grounds.
3. From the separate property themselves.
In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide whether or not:
Art. 71. The management of the household
shall be the right & duty of both spouses. The ex- (1) The objection is proper, &
penses for such management shall be paid in (2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to
accordance w/ the provisions of Article 70. the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued
prior to the objection, the resulting obligation
shall be enforced against the community

79
property. If the benefit accrued thereafter, such cohabitation of married people shows that the
obligation shall be enforced against the separate policy of the practice is extremely questionable.
property of the spouse who has not obtained As such, the only remedy the husband is entitled
consent. to is a judicial declaration that his wife has
absented herself w/o sufficient cause. She is
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the admonished that it is her duty to return.
rights of creditors who acted in good faith. (words
in italics were omitted in the text that Malacañang PEREZ VS. PEREZ [109 P 656 (1960)]
released.)
Facts: Antonio Perez, on his own behalf & as
guardian ad litem of his adoptive son, Benigno,
filed a civil case against Angela Tuason de Perez,
TOLENTINO:
his wife & Benigno's mother founded on 3 causes
Disposition of Products of Activity.-- May the of action. The 1st & 2nd causes alleged that
husband or wife engaged in a profession or Angela was squandering her estate, & the CPG,
business freely dispose of the products of such respectively on Jose Boloix, & that she should be
activity? A distinction should be observed. placed under guardianship due to her prodigality.
In the 3rd COA, Antonio asked for P185th in
If the disposition is in the course of the damages bec. the wife kept threatening to have a
professional or commercial activity, the spouse child by another man just so she could put
should be free to dispose of the products of such Antonio in an embarrassing position. Angela filed
activity. xxx But if the funds will be used to buy
real estate, then the spouse should act jointly, if the a MTD. Trial court dismissed the case on the
property regime of the marriage is absolute ground that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject
community or conjugal partnership of gains, bec. matter bec. only the Domestic Relations Court
such funds are common prop. of the marriage. had jurisdiction over COA's falling under Art.
116CC.

B. OBLIGATION TO LIVE TOGETHER Issue: WON “injury” as used in Art. 116 CC


(now Art. 72 FC) refers to economic damage

ARROYO VS. ARROYO [42 P 54 (1921)] Held: No. "Material injury" as used in Art. 116
(now Art. 72 FC) does not refer to patrimonial
Facts: In 1920, Dolores Arroyo left the conjugal (economic) injury or damage, but to personal
home. After Mariano’s unsuccessful efforts to induce (i.e., physical or moral) injury to one of the
her to resume marital relations, he initiated this spouses, since Art. 116 lies in the chapter
action to compel her to return to the matrimonial concerning personal relations between husband &
home & live w/ him as a dutiful wife. The wife wife. However, TC was correct: this COA is
admitted the fact of marriage & that she had left primarily predicated on the grant of guardianship
w/o her husband’s consent, but averred as a due to the alleged prodigality of the wife, since
defense that she had been compelled to leave by that allegation is reiterated & the remedy of
her husband’s cruel treatment of her. injunction sought against further or future acts of
disposition (no annulment of her past
Issue: WON court can compel cohabitation transactions is demanded) must be based on the
wife's being subject to guardianship. Thus, all
Held: You’re kidding, right? It is not w/in the COA's in Antonio’s complaint were exclusively
province of the courts to compel one of the spouses cognizable by the Domestic Relations Court at
to cohabit w/ & render conjugal rights to the other. that time.
Where the property rights a spouse are invaded, an
action for restitution of such rights can be
maintained. But SC is disinclined to sanction the V. PROPERTY RELATIONS
doctrine that an order, enforceable by process of BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution
of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best,
an order can be effective to compel the spouses to A. IN GENERAL
live under the same roof; however, the experience
of countries where courts compelled the
80
Art. 74. The property relations between regime. In the absence of marriage settlements,
husband & wife shall be governed in the following or when the regime agreed upon is void, the
order: system of absolute community of property as
established in this Code shall govern.
(1) By marriage settlements executed before
the marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this Code; & Property regimes w/c may govern:
(3) By the local customs.
1.Absolute Community of Property
2.Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Tolentino:
3.Separattion of Property
4.If that agreed upon is void, or if none agreed
A marriage settlement is a contract executed on, then ACP
before the marriage, between the intended
husband & wife, by w/c the enjoyment or
devolution of property is regulated. It is also called
an ante-nuptial contract. Art. 76. In order that any modification in
the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be
Balane: made before the celebration of the marriage,
subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128,
The husband & wife can agree on anything they 135 & 136.
want. This follows the principle of autonomy of
contract. Note the order given in Art 74: (1) the
marriage settlement; (2) the provisions of the Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the
Family Code; (3) local custom. preceding Article shall have the following
consequences:
In the absence of a marriage settlement, or
when such marriage settlement is void, the ACP (1) The legal separation proceedings, if still
regime governs. pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever
stage; &
An exception to the immediately preceding
rule is when the 1st marriage is dissolved by reason
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall
of death, & the 2nd marriage was entered into
before the liquidation of the 1st....the Code requires be set aside, but the separation of property &
a mandatory separation of property (130(3)) any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse
already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses
All modifications to the marriage settlement agree to revive their former property regime.
must be made before the marriage is celebrated,
except: Art. 66, 67, 128, 135 & 136. The court order containing the foregoing
shall be recorded in the proper civil registries.
General rule: once marriage is celebrated, there is
already a property regime & this cannot be
Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former
changed:
property regime referred to in the preceding
Except: Article shall be executed under oath & shall
specify:
legal separation (ACP/CPG is dissolved)
revival of former property regime upon (1) The properties to be contributed anew to
reconciliation the restored regime;
petition of one spouse for separation in case of (2) Those to be retained as separated
abandonment or failure to comply w/ marital properties of each spouse; &
obligations
judicial dissolution of regime: joint petition or (3) The names of all their known creditors,
petition by one spouse for cause. (Art 135/136) their addresses & the amounts owing to each.

The agreement of revival & the motion for its


approval shall be filed w/ the court in the same
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the
proceeding for legal separation, w/ copies of both
marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of
furnished to the creditors named therein. After
absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains,
due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take
complete separation of property, or any other
measures to protect the interest of creditors &
81
such order shall be recorded in the proper registries the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis
of properties. for the grant of the decree of judicial separation
The recording of the order in the registries of property.
of property shall not prejudice any creditor not
listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a
sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's verified petition w/ the court for the voluntary
claim. dissolution of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, & for the separa-
Art. 128. If a spouse w/o just cause abandons tion of their common properties.
the other or fails to comply w/ his or her obligations
to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the All creditors of the absolute community or of
court for receivership, for judicial separation of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the
property, or for authority to be the sole personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in
administrator of the conjugal partnership property, the petition notified of the filing thereof. The
subject to such precautionary conditions as the court shall take measures to protect the creditors
court may impose. & other persons w/ pecuniary interest.

The obligations to the family mentioned in the


preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or Tolentino:
property relations.
Rule: Whatever regime of property relation that
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the the spouses may adopt is unchangeable & cannot
other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling be altered, once the marriage has been
w/o intention of returning. The spouse who has left celebrated. Spouses cannot even abandon the
the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months agreement made in the marriage settlement &
substitute the regime of ACP bec. such is only
or has failed w/in the same period to give any
suppletory in character, to be applied when there
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be is no agreement in a marriage settlement.
prima facie presumed to have no intention of
returning to the conjugal dwelling. Exception: In the case of judicial separation
during the marriage.
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be
considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of
property: Art. 77. The marriage settlements & any
modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been the parties & executed before the celebration of
sentenced to a penalty w/c carries w/ it civil the marriage. They shall not prejudice third
interdiction; persons unless they are registered in the local
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been civil registry where the marriage contract is re-
judicially declared an absentee; corded as well as in the proper registries of
(3) That the loss of parental authority of the property.
spouse of the petitioner has been decreed by the
court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has Baviera: Marriage settlement/ modification
abandoned the latter or failed to comply w/ his or 1. in writing
her obligations to the family as provided for in 2. signed by the parties
Article 101. 3. executed before the marriage
(5) That the spouse granted the power of 4. not prejudice 3Ps unless registered
administration in the marriage settlements has
abused that power; &
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses Balane:
have been separated in fact for at least one year &
reconciliation is highly improbable. Formal requirement of a marriage settlement:
in writing
in a public or private instrument
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) & to bind third persons, it must be
(3), the presentation of the final judgment against recorded in the registry of property.

82
Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage
settlements executed by a person upon whom a
Art. 78. A minor who according to law may sentence of civil interdiction has been
contract marriage may also enter into marriage pronounced or who is subject to any other
settlements, but they shall be valid only if the disability, it shall be indispensable for the
persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to guardian appointed by a competent court to be
the marriage are made parties to the agreement, made a party thereto.
subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code.
Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary
Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting stipulation in a marriage settlements, the
parties, not having been emancipated by a previous property relations of the spouses shall be
marriage, are between the ages of 18 & 21, they governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the
shall, in addition to the requirements of the place of the celebration of the marriage & their
preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, residence.
the consent to their marriage of their father,
mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons This rule shall not apply:
having legal charge of them, in the order
mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in (1) Where both spouses are aliens;
writing by the interested party, who personally (2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of
appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in contracts affecting property not situated in the
the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two Philippines & executed in the country where the
witnesses & attested before any official authorized property is located; &;
by law to administer oaths. The personal (LEX SITUS- contract - abroad - property -
manifestation shall be recorded in both applications abroad)
for marriage license, & the affidavit, if one is
executed instead, shall be attached to said (3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of
applications. contracts entered into in the Philippines but
affecting property situated in a foreign country
whose laws require different formalities for their
Re: Title IX (Parental Authority) extrinsic validity.

Balane:

The rule here remains unchanged by R.A.


6809...a minor between 18-21 can enter into a Balane:
marriage settlement but the parents or guardians
must sign (not enough that they simply give their Does this article imply that the couple can validly
consent; signing indispensable). stipulate that a foreign law shall govern their
relation?
A creditor is entitled to assume that the
property regime is ACP if the marriage settlement is Art. 80(3) seems inconsistent w/ Art. 17 (1)
not recorded...except where the creditor had actual NCC....Balane believes that this article (80(3))
knowledge. should be suppressed.

Tolentino: Tolentino:

Persons who must sign (in order)- When the spouses are both Filipinos, or when
one is a Filipino & the other is a foreigner, their
1. Father property relations shall be governed by:
2. Mother
3. Surviving Parent or Guardian Their marriage settlement where they
4. Person w/ legal charge of them may stipulate what laws shall govern
their property relations;
If there is no such stipulation, the laws of
the Philippines shall apply regardless

83
of where they live & where the MINOR
marriage is celebrated.

However, the laws of the Philippines will


not apply w/ respect to property located in a foreign Art. 78. A minor who according to law may
country, whether the marriage settlement is entered contract marriage may also enter into marriage
into in the Philippines or in the country where the settlements, but they shall be valid only if the
property is located. Art. 16, NCC: real property as persons designated in Article 14 to give consent
well as personal property is subject to the law of the to the marriage are made parties to the
country where it is stipulated. agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of
this Code.

Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements


or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in Baviera:
consideration of a future marriage, including Art. 14 - father, mother, surviving parent or
donations between the prospective spouses made guardian, or persons having legal charge of
therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does them, in the order mentioned.
not take place. Title IX - Parental authority
However, stipulations that do not depend upon
the celebration of the marriage shall be valid.
CIVIL INTERDICTION

Balane:
Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage
This article is inconsistent w/ Art. 86(1) settlements executed by a person upon whom a
sentence of civil interdiction has been
Suppose that donation propter nuptias are pronounced or who is subject to any other
made but the marriage is not celebrated...what disability, it shall be indispensable for the
happens to the donations? guardian appointed by a competent court to be
Art. 81...Void made a party thereto.
Art. 86...revocable

If the marriage is not celebrated, the DPN


should be void. C. FORMALITY

Donation Propter Nuptias (requisites)


Art. 76. In order that any modification in the
made before marriage marriage settlements may be valid, it must be
in consideration of marriage -consideration must be made before the celebration of the marriage,
understood in layman's terms, i.e. what
subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128,
motivates one to make the donation.
in favor of one or both of the betrothed. 135, & 136.

Recipient may be one or both of the betrothed Art. 77. The marriage settlements & any
Donor can be anybody. modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by
the parties, & executed before the celebration of
the marriage. They shall not prejudice third
Tolentino: persons unless they are registered in the local
civil registry where the marriage contract is
The marriage settlement is an accessory contract recorded as well as in the proper registries of
dependent for its existence upon the marriage;
property.
thus, if the marriage does not exist, the terms of
the marriage settlement cannot subsist.

D. CONFLICT OF LAW
B. CAPACITY TO EXECUTE MARRIAGE
SETTLEMENT

84
Art. 80. In the absence if a contrary stipulation
This article pertains to donation propter nuptias,
in a marriage settlement, the property relations of
w/c excludes:
the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws,
regardless of the place of the celebration of the 1. donations made in favor of the spouses after
marriage & their residence. the celebration of the marriage

This rule shall not apply: 2. donations in favor of future spouses, made
before the celebration of the marriage, but not in
(1) Where both spouses are aliens; consideration of the marriage
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of
contracts affecting property not situated in the 3. donations made in favor of persons other than
the spouses, even though they may be founded
Philippines & executed in the country where the
on the marriage.
property is located; &
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of Such donations are governed by the
contracts entered into in the Philippines but provisions on ordinary donations.
affecting properties situated in a foreign country
whose laws require different formalities for their Donations in consideration of marriage may be
extrinsic validity. given:

1.by the spouses to each other


E. EFFECT OF MARRIAGE NOT 2.by the parents to one or both of the spouses
TAKING PLACE 3. by third persons to either or both of the
spouses

Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the


settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding SERRANO V. SOLOMON
articles in consideration of a future marriage,
including donations between the prospective Facts: Before the marriage, the future husband,
spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the Melchor Solomon, executed a purported
marriage does not take place. However, stipulations donation propter nuptias w/c provides that (1) he
that do not depend upon the celebration of the donates all his properties to his future children, if
marriage shall be valid. any; or (2) if there are none & he dies before his
wife, one-half of his properties & those acquired
during the marriage shall go to his brothers &
F. DONATIONS BY REASON OF sisters; or (3) if there are no children & his wife
MARRIAGE dies before him, one half of all his properties &
those acquired during the marriage shall go TO
THOSE WHO REARED HIS WIFE (plaintiff). His
1. Before the celebration of marriage wife, Alejandra, predeceased him, dying w/o
2. In consideration of marriage issue. Estanislao Serrano, who had reared
3. In favor of one or both of the future spouses Alejandra, filed an action to enforce the donation.
CFI declared the donation null & void.

1. NATURE Issue: WoN this was a donation proper nuptias


& if so, WoN it was a valid donation

Art. 82. Donations by reason of marriage are Held: There is no valid donation propter nuptias.
those w/c are made before its celebration, in While the donation was made before the
consideration of the same, & in favor of one or both marriage, it was not made in consideration of
of the future spouses. marriage, bec. marriage was not the only
consideration for the donation since other
conditions were imposed. The marriage would
Tolentino: have to be childless & one of the spouses would
have to die before the other before the donation
The marriage is the very reason for the would operate. And even if in consideration of
existence of the donation; it is the purpose & the marriage, it was not in favor of one or both of
determining cause w/o w/c there is no donation.
85
the spouses, but IN FAVOR OF 3rd PERSONS or Donations of future property shall be
persons other than the spouses. governed by the provisions on testamentary
succession & the formalities of wills.
It is not a valid donation inter vivos bec. it
was not accepted by the donee in the same or a Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be
different instrument. It is not a donation mortis made orally or in writing.
causa bec. it did not comply w/ the formalities of
wills. Hence, the donation is void. An oral donation requires the simultaneous
delivery of the thing or of the document
representing the right donated.
Art. 85. Donations by reason of marriage of
property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In If the value of the personal property donated
case of foreclosure of the encumbrance & the exceeds five thousand pesos (P5,000), the
property is sold for less than the total amount of the donation & the acceptance shall be made in
obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void.
the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than (Civil Code.)
the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall
be entitled to the excess. Art. 749. In order that the donation of an
immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
public document, specifying therein the property
2. FORM donated & the value of the charges w/c the
donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same


Art. 83. These donations are governed by the
deed of donation or in a separate public
rules on ordinary donations established in Title III
document, but it shall not take effect unless it is
of Book III of the Civil Code, insofar as they are not
done during the lifetime of the donor.
modified by the following articles.
If the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
Tolentino: an authentic form, & this step shall be noted in
both instruments.
The principal modifications under the Family Code
of the general rules on donations are:

Donations propter nuptias do not require express Balane: This article applies only if the regime
acceptance by the donee. agreed upon is one other than the ACP. If the
If made by minors (below 21), they must be w/ the regime is ACP, there is really no sense in making
consent of those required to give consent to the DPN's to each other, bec. DPN's made between
marriage. the two become community property. In a CPG
They cannot exceed 1/5 of the present property of & a regime of Absolute Separation, DPN's made
the donor, when made by the future spouses to are not communalized.
each other.
They can include future property. The ordinary limitations to donations apply. i.e.
They are not revoked by the subsequent birth or one cannot donate all of his/her property, leaving
appearance of children. nothing to him/herself.
They are revoked by the non-performance of the
marriage & other causes under Art. 86, FC. With regard to future property, a donation may
be made only by will, & only as to the disposable
portion.
Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a
regime other than the absolute community of 3. DISTINGUISHED FR. DONATIONS INTER
property, they cannot donate to each other in their VIVOS
marriage settlements more than one-fifth (1/5) of
their present property. Any excess shall be A. CONSIDERATION & DONEE
considered void.

86
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous Held. NONE. A donation made to a grandchild
advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses of a wife by a previous marriage falls under the
during the marriage shall be void, except moderate prohibition Article 133 of the Civil Code (Art. 87,
gifts w/c the spouses may give each other on the FC). Said prohibition applies notw/standing the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition fact that the provision mentions only legitimate
shall also apply to persons living together as children. (9 Manresa 236).
husband & wife w/o a valid marriage.
MATABUENA V. CERVANTES

Balane: This article does not refer to donation Facts: Felix Matabuena & Petronila Cervantes
propter nuptias. lived as common law spouses During said
Tolentino: relationship, Matabuena made a donation inter
vivos of a parcel of land in favor of Cervantes.
The basis of this provision is the principle of Six years later, they were legally married.
unity of personality of the spouses during the Matabuena died. His sister, Cornelia, filed an
marriage, & is intended to avoid possible transfer of action to recover the land, claiming the donation
property fr. one spouse to the other due to passion made in favor of Cervantes was void under Art.
or avarice. 133 of the NCC, w/c prohibits donations made
It also applies to the parties in what are between the spouses during the marriage, except
called “common law” marriages; otherwise, the donations mortis causa & moderate gifts. LC for
condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out Cervantes.
to be better than those in legal union.
Issue: WoN the prohibition against donation
Rule: Donations made by one spouse to the other inter vivos between the spouses during the
during the marriage are patent nullity. marriage applies to common law relationships?
Exception: Gifts of moderate value. To
Held: YES. Art. 133 of the Civil Code (Art. 87
determine this, consider the social position of the
family, its usage’s or customs, & other FC) considers as void a "donation between the
circumstances of the parties. spouses during the marriage". Policy
considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality require that the
same prohibition should apply to a common-law
Art. 82. Donations by reason of marriage are
relationship. Citing Buenaventura v. Bautista, if
those w/c are made before its celebration, in
the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in
consideration of the same, & in favor of one or both
favor of the other consort & his descendants bec.
of the future spouses.
of fear of undue & improper pressure & influence
upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law, then there is every reason to apply
NAZARENO V. BIROG the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband & wife w/o the benefit of
Facts: Juan Abeno was married to Andrea nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to
Rodriguez. They had a daughter, Alberia, the such irregular connection for thirty years
mother of Bonifacio. When Juan died, Andrea bespeaks greater influence of one party over the
married Cirilo Braganza. they did not have any other, so that the danger that the law seeks to
children but their grandson Bonifacio lived w/ them. avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, it
Braganza executed a deed of donation of a parcel of would not be just that such donation should
land in favor of Bonifacio, who was then a minor. subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred
Donation was accepted by his parents. However, guilt should turn out to be better. So long as
Cirilo remained in possession of the land, & later marriage remains the cornerstone of our family
sold different portions to Ariola & Birog. Bonifacio law, reason & morality alike demand that the
filed an action to recover said property. disabilities attached to marriage should likewise
attach to concubinage.
Issue: Won Bonifacio has a cause of action
against them
B. REVOCATION

87
Art. 765. The donation may also be revoked at (2) When the marriage takes place w/o the
the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude consent of the parents or guardian as required by
in the following cases: law;
(3) When the marriage is annulled, & the
(1) If the donee should commit some offense donee acted in bad faith;
against the person, honor or the property of the (4) Upon legal separation, the donee being
donor, or of his wife or children under his parental the guilty spouse;
authority; (5) If it is w/ a resolutory condition & the
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any condition is complied w/;
criminal offense, or any act involving moral (6) When the donee has committed an act of
turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the
the crime or the act has been committed against Civil Code on donations in general.
the donee himself, his wife or children under his
authority; Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent
(3) If he unduly refuses to give him support marriage referred to in the preceding Article
when the donee is legally or morally bound to give (Marriage after declaration of presumptive death
support to the donor. of absent spouse) shall produce the following
effects:
Balane: For acts of ingratitude, refer to Art. 765 of xxx
the NCC. (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall
remain valid, except that if the donee contracted
the marriage in bad faith, such donations made
Art. 760. Every donation inter vivos, made by to said donee are revoked by operation of law.
a person having no children or descendants,
legitimate or legitimated by subsequent marriage, Art. 50. The effects provided for by
or illegitimate, may be revoked or reduced as paragraphs (2), (3), (4), & (5) of Article 43, & 44
provided in the next article, by the happening of shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages
any of these events: w/c are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 & 45.
(1) If the donor, after the donation, should
have legitimate or legitimated or illegitimate The final judgment in such cases shall
children, even though they be posthumous; provide for the liquidation, partition & distribution
(2) If the child of the donor, whom the latter of the properties of the spouses, the custody &
believed to be dead when he made the donation, support of the common children, & the delivery of
should turn out to be living; their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters
(3) If the donor should subsequently adopt a had been adjudicated in previous judicial
minor child. (Civil Code.) proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of
Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may the absolute community or the conjugal partner-
be revoked by the donor in the following cases: ship shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation.
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially In the partition, the conjugal dwelling &
declared void ab initio except donations made in the the lot on w/c it is situated, shall be adjudicated
marriage settlements, w/c shall be governed by in accordance w/ the provisions of Articles 102 &
Article 81; 129.

Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the


settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding Baviera: Art. 86 FC compared to Art. 43 FC
articles in consideration of a future marriage, Even if marriage does not take place, can
including donations between the prospective be revoked
spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the Need for action to revoke bec. the law says
marriage does not take place. However, stipulations "may"
that do not depend upon the celebration of the If in bad faith, no need for action to
marriage shall be valid. revoke, Art. 60 FC, by operation o law.

88
The donation shall be inofficious in all that it
SOLIS V. BARROSO may exceed this limitation. (Civil Code.)

Facts: Juan Lambino & Maxima Barroso made a


donation propter nuptias of some lands in favor of
their son Alejo Lambino & Fortunata Solis, in a
Baviera:
private document, in consideration of their
as to spouses, not > 1/5 of present
marriage. One of the conditions is that in case of
property
death of one of the donees, 1/2 of those lands
as to 3Ps, not limit provided not officious
would revert to the doors while the surviving donee
(Art. 750 CC)
would retain the other half. The two eventually got
donee beware that donation revocable!
married, & the donors delivered the possession of
the land to them. Later, Alejo died. In the same
year, Juan died, after w/c Maxima recovered Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all
possession of the donated lands. Solis filed an the present property of the donor, or part
action against Barroso, demanding that she thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or
execute the proper deed of donation & transfer 1/2 in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of
of the property. LC for plaintiff. himself, & of all relatives who, at the time of the
acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to
Issue: Can Fortunata compel the execution of the be supported by the donor. Without such
said deed? reservation, the donation shall be reduced on
petition of any person affected.
Held: NO. A donation propter nuptias of lands in a
private instrument is not valid bec. the law requires Art. 751. Donations cannot comprehend
donations of real property to be made in a public future property.
instrument. A donation propter nuptias is not
onerous & thus must necessarily be contained in a By future property is understood anything
public instrument. While the marriage is indeed its w/c the donor cannot dispose of at the time of
consideration it is not so in the sense of being the donation.
necessary to give birth to the obligation. In fact, a
donation propter nuptias remains valid even if the
marriage does not take place, provided it is not Art. 1070. Wedding gifts by parents &
revoked w/in the period allowed by law. The ascendants consisting of jewelry, clothing, &
marriage in donation propter nuptias is rather a outfit, shall not be reduced as inofficious except
resolutory condition w/c, as such, presupposes the insofar as they may exceed one-tenth of the sum
existence of the birth of the obligation. w/c is disposable by will.

The only exceptions to the rule requiring Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a
the donation to be contained in a public document regime other than the absolute community of
are: 1) onerous & remuneratory donations insofar property, they cannot donate to each other in
as they do not exceed the value of the charge their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of
imposed, & 2) those w/c are to take effect upon the their present property. Any excess shall be
donor’s death, w/c are governed by the rules on considered void.
testamentary succession.
Donations of future property shall be
governed by the provisions on testamentary
C. EXTENT OF PROPERTY DONATED succession & the formalities of wills.

Art. 752. The provisions of article 750 MATEO V. LAGUA


notw/standing, no person may give or receive, by
way of donation, more than he may give or receive Facts: Souses Cipriano & Alejandra Lagua
by will. donated 2 lots to their son Alejandro in
consideration of the latter’s marriage to Bonifacia
Mateo. Alejandra later died, & Bonifacia lived w/
her in-laws, who cultivated said lots. Bonifacia
89
was given the owner’s share of the harvest until commencement of the community regime at any
1956. Said lots were later sold by Cipriano to his other time shall be void.
younger son Gervacio. Bonifacia sued the spouses.
LC declared the sale null & void. Cipriano &
Gervacio also filed suit for the annulment of the Balane:
donation on the ground that it prejudiced the There is ACP when:
legitime of Gervacio. LC dismissed the suit on the -there is no marriage settlement
ground of prescription. CA reversed, but merely -there is a marriage settlement & the
reduced the donation. parties agree on ACP
-the marriage settlement is void.
Issue: WoN the donation propter nuptias may be Importance: see Art. 92 (1)
reduced for being inofficious/
Tolentino: The property regime of the spouses
commences at the precise moment (not the date)
Held: YES. A donation propter nuptias may be
the marriage is celebrated.
revoked for being inofficious. It is wrong to say
that a donation propter nuptias has an onerous
consideration, the marriage in this case being
Waiver not allowed
merely the occasion or motive, not the causa.
Being liberalities, they remain subject to reduction
for being inofficious upon the donor's death if it Art. 89. No waiver of rights, interests, shares
infringes on the legitime of any of the donor's heirs. & effects of the absolute community of property
The donation in this case was not annulled in its during the marriage can be made except in case
entirety, but only to the extent that it infringed on of judicial separation of property.
the legitime of the donor's heir.
When the waiver takes place upon a judicial
Note that under Art 43(3), a donation is separation of property, or after the marriage has
revoked by operation of law, under the been dissolved or annulled, the same shall
circumstances therein provided. However, Art. appear in a public instrument & shall be recorded
86(1) provides that any revocation in elective, not as provided in Article 77.
automatic.
Art. 77. The marriage settlements & any
modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by
G. ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY the parties & executed before the celebration of
the marriage. They shall not prejudice third
persons unless they are registered in the local
Tolentino: civil registry where the marriage contract is
recorded as well as in the proper registries of
Under this regime, the husband & the wife property.
are joint owners of all the properties of the
marriage. The properties w/c each spouse The creditors of the spouse who made such
brings into the marriage, & those w/c they waiver may petition the court to rescind the
acquire during the marriage, all form a waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to
common mass, w/c, after dissolution of the cover the amount of their credits.
marriage or of the community, is divided
between the spouses, or their respective
heirs, equally or in proportion the parties Tolentino:
have establish4ed, irrespective of the value
each one may have originally owned. The article limits itself to prohibiting the waiver of
the benefits of such community. Such waiver
may be made by a spouse in favor of a particular
When commences
person, in w/c case there is an assignment of
rights; or it may be made in general terms, in w/c
Art. 88. The absolute community of property case the share renounced accrues to the other
between spouses shall commence at the precise spouse or his heirs. The renunciation, however,
moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any does not deprive the spouse renouncing of his
stipulation, express or implied, for the right to his separate property or capital, nor does
it relieve him of personal obligations.
90
Suppose A & B married under the Family Code. A
Co-ownership inherited fr. his father before the marriage & this
becomes community property. If A inherits fr. his
mother during the marriage, this becomes
Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall paraphernal property.
apply to the absolute community of property
between the spouses in all matters not provided for The fruits of separate property remain separate
in this Chapter. under the ACP but become community property
under the CPG.

The following example illustrates an instance


What Constitutes Community Property where the CPG regime is stricter:

Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this A marries B (ACP). They bring nothing
Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the commu- into the marriage. All that they inherit, they get
nity property shall consist of all the property owned during the marriage. The property thus inherited
by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the is separate, & the fruits thereof are likewise
separate.
marriage or acquired thereafter.
Given the same set of facts, except that
the governing regime is CPG, what the spouses
Tolentino: inherit during the marriage is separate, but the
The patrimony of either spouse existing at fruits are communalized. It is in this sense that
the time of the marriage is automatically the CPG regime is stricter.
converted into common property, w/o the
Tolentino: The properties mentioned under this
necessity of any juridical act transmitting article are known as reserved property. Absent
ownership of the individual objects. any agreement excluding certain properties, all
the patrimony of the spouses are reserved.

Exceptions Presumption

Art. 92. The following shall be excluded fr. the Art. 93. Property acquired during the
community property: marriage is presumed to belong to the
community, unless it is proved that it is one of
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by those excluded therefr.
gratuitous title by either spouse, & the fruits as well
as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly
provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they Charges Upon & Obligations of the
shall form part of the community property; Absolute Community
(2) Property, for personal & exclusive use of
either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of Art. 94. The absolute community of property
the community property; shall be liable for:

(3) Property acquired before the marriage by (1) The support of the spouses, their
either spouse who has legitimate descendants common children, & legitimate children of either
[under CC - children only, but JBL loved his spouse; however, the support of illegitimate
grandchildren] by a former marriage, & the fruits as children shall be governed by the provisions of
well as the income, if any, of such property. this Code on Support;
(2) All debts & obligations contracted during
the marriage by the designated administrator-
spouse for the benefit of the community, or by
Baviera: Relate to Art. 51 & 53 both spouses, or by one spouse w/ the consent
of the other;
(3) Debts & obligations contracted by either
Balane: spouse w/o the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have been benefited;

91
(4) All taxes, liens, charges & expenses, community property's benefit. Any obligation
including major or minor repairs, upon the incurred by the husband to be chargeable against
community property; the community property, must be incurred in the
(5) All taxes & expenses for mere preservation legitimate pursuit of his career, profession,
made during marriage upon the separate property business, & w/ an honest belief that he is doing
of either spouse used by the family; right for the benefit of the family.
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to
commence or complete a professional or vocational GELANO V. C.A.
course, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar Held: It was an error for the court to hold the
as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; spouses liable jointly & severally on an obligation
(8) The value of what is donated or promised that redounded to the benefit of the community.
by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate The community partnership, as a single &
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or separate entity, should be liable for the
completing a professional or vocational course or obligation.
other activity for self-improvement;
(9) Antenuptial debts of either spouse other G-TRACTORS V. C.A.
than those falling under paragraph (7) of this
Article, the support of illegitimate children of either Held: The obligation incurred here redounded
spouse, & liabilities incurred by either spouse by to the benefit of the community partnership, &
reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of thus was a partnership obligation. The land
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of where the logging concession was located
the debtor-spouse, the payment of w/c shall be belonged to the family & not to the husband
considered as advances to be deducted fr. the share exclusively. Furthermore, the obligation was
of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the incurred to enhance productivity for the logging
community; & business, a commercial enterprise for gain, w/c
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses the husband, as administrator had every right to
unless the suit is found to be groundless. enter into on behalf of the community
partnership. The realization of actual profits &
If the community property is insufficient to benefit on the part of the partnership is not
cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling required, it being sufficient to show that the
under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily transaction normally benefits the partnership.
liable for the unpaid balance w/ their separate
properties. Gambling

Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the


Balane: marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweep-
stakes, or any other kind of gambling, whether
Liabilities of the ACP. permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by
94.1 in case of illegitimate children of either spouse, the loser & shall not be charged to the
the community is only subsidiarily liable. community but any winnings therefr. shall form
94.2 all that is required in this case is a part of the community property.
determination of the purpose of the obligation
contracted
Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment &
Tolentino: The ACP is liable for the support of the Disposition of the Community Property
spouses, their common children, & legitimate
children of either spouse in a previous marriage. Art. 96. The administration & enjoyment of
the community property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
LUZON SURETY V. DE GARCIA husband's decision shall prevail, subject to re-
course to the court by the wife for proper
Held: Any debt contracted by the husband- remedy, w/c must be availed of w/in five years fr.
administrator w/ the intention of binding the the date of the contract implementing such
community property, must redound to the decision.

92
Art. 134. In the absence of an express
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or declaration in the marriage settlements, the
otherwise unable to participate in the administration separation of property between spouses during
of the common properties, the other spouse may the marriage shall not take place except by
assume sole powers of administration. These judicial order. Such judicial separation of property
powers do not include the powers of disposition or may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.
encumbrance w/c must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In Art. 135. Any of the following shall be
the absence of such authority or consent, the considered sufficient cause for judicial separation
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, of property:
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse & the (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has
third person, & may be perfected as a binding been sentenced to a penalty w/c carries w/ it civil
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse interdiction;
or authorization by the court before the offer is (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has
w/drawn by either or both offerors. been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the
spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the
Baviera: Better: unenforceable until ratified court;
void tapos = continuing offer - weird (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has
abandoned the latter or failed to comply w/ his or
her obligations to the family as provided for in
Balane:
Article 101;
Ownership, administration, enjoyment & disposition
of Community property-all joint responsibility &
right of both spouses. In case of a spouse's Art. 101. If a spouse w/o just cause
unjustified refusal to give his/her consent, the abandons the other or fails to comply w/ his or
other may go to court. her obligations to the family, the aggrieved
There is no provision on alienation & encumbrance spouse may petition the court for receivership,
but it is understood that the same is included. for judicial separation of property or for authority
to be the sole administrator of the absolute
Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of community, subject to such precautionary
his or her interest in the community property. conditions as the court may impose.

Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any The obligations to the family mentioned in
community property w/o the consent of the other. the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental
However, either spouse may, w/o the consent of or property relations.
the other, make moderate donations fr. the
community property for charity or on occasions of A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the
family rejoicing or family distress. other when he or she has left the conjugal
dwelling w/o intention of returning. The spouse
who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of
Balane: All donations must be made jointly, three months or has failed w/in the same period
except moderate donations. to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to
Dissolution of Absolute Comm Regime have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling.
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(5) That the spouse granted the power of
(1) Upon the death of either spouse; administration in the marriage settlements has
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation; abused that power; &
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared
void; or (6) That at the time of the petition, the
(4) In case of judicial separation of property spouses have been separated in fact for at least
during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. one year & reconciliation is highly improbable.

93
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) &
(3), the presentation of the final judgment against
the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis Effect of separation in fact
for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of
property. Art. 100. The separation in fact between
husband & wife shall not affect the regime of
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified absolute community except that:
petition w/ the court for the voluntary dissolution of
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal
of gains, & for the separation of their common home or refuses to live therein, w/o just cause,
properties. shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any
All creditors of the absolute community or of transaction of the other is required by law,
the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the judicial authorization shall be obtained in a
personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in summary proceeding;
the petition notified of the filing thereof. The court
shall take measures to protect the creditors & other (added in FC)
persons w/ pecuniary interest.
(3) In the absence of sufficient community
Art. 137. Once the separation of property has property, the separate property of both spouses
been decreed, the absolute community or the shall be solidarily liable for the support of the
conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in family. The spouse present shall, upon proper
conformity of this Code. petition in a summary proceeding, be given
judicial authority to administer or encumber any
During the pendency of the proceedings for specific separate property of the other spouse &
separation of property, the absolute community or use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the
the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of latter's share.
the spouses & their children.

Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute (note: need for judicial authority)
community or of the conjugal partnership, the
provisions on complete separation property shall Tolentino:
apply.
Separation in fact refers to the actual definite
separation of the persons of husband & wife,
thereby terminating cohabitation or common life
Balane: under the same roof, w/o judicial order. As a
rule, the ACP is not affected by such separation,
Note that dissolution of the ACP is not except as provided in this article. The spouse who
synonymous w/ dissolution of the marriage. In leaves the conjugal home w/o justification, &
cases involving 99.2 & 99.4, there is dissolution of refuses to return thereto, loses his right to be
the ACP although the marriage is not dissolved. supported by the other spouse; but his obligation
to support the other is not extinguished. If
But dissolution of the marriage there is no one at fault, the obligation to support
automatically results in dissolution of the ACP. each other & the common children continues.
Note that when a marriage is declared as a
nullity, there is no ACP to dissolve. The dissolution
in this case is governed by the rules on co- Art. 101. If a spouse w/o just cause
ownership. abandons the other or fails to comply w/ his or
In case of liquidation, the following provisions her obligations to the family, the aggrieved
apply: spouse may petition the court for receivership,
for judicial separation of property or for authority
(1) dissolution under 99.1...Art 103 governs to be the sole administrator of the absolute
liquidation community, subject to such precautionary
(2) dissolution under 99.2...Art 63 & 64 apply conditions as the court may impose.
(3) dissolution under 99.3...Art 50-52 apply
(4) dissolution under 99.4...Art 134-137 apply

94
The obligations to the family mentioned in the (1) The support of the spouses, their
preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or common children, & legitimate children of either
property relations. spouse; however, the support of illegitimate
children shall be governed by the provisions of
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the this Code on Support;
other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling (2) All debts & obligations contracted during
w/o intention of returning. The spouse who has left the marriage by the designated administrator-
the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months spouse for the benefit of the community, or by
or has failed w/in the same period to give any both spouses, or by one spouse w/ the consent
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be of the other;
prima facie presumed to have no intention of (3) Debts & obligations contracted by either
returning to the conjugal dwelling. spouse w/o the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have been benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges & expenses,
Baviera: This applies even if husband gives including major or minor repairs, upon the
support. community property;
(5) All taxes & expenses for mere
preservation made during marriage upon the
separate property of either spouse used by the
Tolentino:
family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to
Abandonment implies a departure w/ the avowed
intent never to return, followed by prolonged commence or complete a professional or
absence w/o just cause, & w/o in the meantime vocational course, or other activity for self-
providing in the least for one’s family although able improvement;
to do so. There must be absolute cessation of (7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar
marital relations, duties & rights, w/ the intention of as they have redounded to the benefit of the
perpetual separation. family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised
by both spouses in favor of their common
Liquidation of the Absolute Community legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of
Assets & Liabilities commencing or completing a professional or
vocational course or other activity for self-
How liquidated improvement;
(9) Antenuptial debts of either spouse other
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute than those falling under paragraph (7) of this
community regime, the following procedure shall Article, the support of illegitimate children of
apply: either spouse, & liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime of a quasi-delict, in
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive
separately all the properties of the absolute commu- property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of
nity & the exclusive properties of each spouse. w/c shall be considered as advances to be
deducted fr. the share of the debtor-spouse upon
(2) The debts & obligations of the absolute liquidation of the community; &
community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of (10) Expenses of litigation between the
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance w/ their
separate properties in accordance w/ the provisions If the community property is insufficient to
of the second paragraph of Article 94. cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling
under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be
(Forfeiture of net profits) solidarily liable for the unpaid balance w/ their
separate properties.)
Art. 94. The absolute community of property
shall be liable for: (3) Whatever remains of the exclusive
properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them.

95
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the
absolute community shall constitute its net assets, The delivery of the presumptive legitimes
w/c shall be divided equally between husband & herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
wife, unless a different proportion or division was ultimate successional rights of the children
agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless accruing upon the death of either or both of the
there has been a voluntary waiver of such share as parents; but the value of the properties already
provided in this Code. For purposes of computing received under the decree of annulment or
the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance w/ absolute nullity shall be considered as advances
Articles 43, No. (2) & 63, No. (2), the said profits on their legitime.)
shall be the increase in value between the market
value of the community property at the time of the (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the
celebration of the marriage & the market value at parties, in the partition of the properties, the
the time of its dissolution. conjugal dwelling & the lot on w/c it is situated
shall be adjudicated to the spouse w/ whom the
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent majority of the common children choose to
marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall remain. Children below the age of seven years
produce the following effects: are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless
xxx the court has decided otherwise. In case there is
no such majority, the court shall decide, taking
(2) The absolute community of property or the into consideration the best interests of said
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be children.
dissolved & liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the community property Balane:
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or if there are none, Basic steps in liquidation:
the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent 1) inventory (Art. 102) -3 sets: community
spouse. property
list of separate property of wife
list of separate property of husband
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall
have the following effects: 2) payment of community debts - pay out of
xxx community assets first...if not enough, then pay
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal out of separate property...the husband & the wife
partnership shall be dissolved & liquidated but the shall be solidarily liable
offending spouse shall have no right to any share of
the net profits earned by the absolute community or 3) deliver to each spouse his or her respective
the conjugal partnership, w/c shall be forfeited in share
accordance w/ the provisions of Article 43 (2).
4) division of the net community assets -note the
xxx
special rule w/ regard to the family home...also
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common take note that even after death, the family home
children shall be delivered upon partition, in ac- remains undivided.
cordance w/ Article 51.
5) delivery of presumptive legitimes
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the
presumptive legitimes of all common children, The presumptive legitimes are given in the
computed as of the date of the final judgment of following cases:
the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property
or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual reappearance of former spouse (102.5; 43.2) w/c
terminates the second marriage
agreement judicially approved, had already provided annulment, not the declaration of nullity, of the
for such matters. marriage
legal separation (102.5;63.2)
The children or their guardian, or the trustee of other cases of dissolution of the ACP/CPG
their property may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.

96
Effect of death
Balane:
Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage
The application of this article is possible only for
by death, the community property shall be
marriages contracted before 3 August 1988.
liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement e.g., In 1955 A married B. A died. ACP/CPG was
of the estate of the deceased. not liquidated. In 1965, B remarried to C. 1995
C died. B wants to liquidate both marriages. He
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, will then have to apply Art. 104. For property
the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community whose origin he is unsure of, the
property either judicially or extra-judicially w/in one ratio/proportion; peso/years formula may be
year fr. the death of the deceased spouse. If upon used.
the lapse of the said period, no liquidation is made,
x = no. of years of marriage 1
any disposition or encumbrance involving the
y = capital of marriage 1
community property of the terminated marriage A = duration of marriage 2
shall be void. B = capital of marriage 2

x = 8 years
y = P2 M
A = 30
Should the surviving spouse contract a B = P3 M
subsequent marriage w/o compliance w/ the
formula:
foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of
complete separation of property shall govern the xy
property relations of the subsequent marriage. x value of the property = share of marriage 1
xy + AB

Balane: AB
x value of the property = share of marriage 2
xy = AB
Liquidation of the ACP may be done in the
settlement proceedings of the deceased spouse's
Note that in cases of marriages under the Family
estate. Liquidation in such a case (death) may
likewise be done judicially or extrajudicially. The law Code made subject to mandatory absolute
separation, Art. 104 will never apply.
requires that liquidation be done w/in one(1) year
fr. death...if not: any disposition or encumbrance is
VOID (103.2) & the subsequent marriage shall be
made subject to a mandatory regime of separation H. CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
of property...the 2nd marriage shall be valid, but GAINS
subject to mandatory absolute separation of
property.
Tolentino:

Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the This is a partnership formed by the marriage of
community properties of two or more marriages the husband & wife, by virtue of w/c, they place
contracted by the same person before the effectivity in a common fund the fruits of their separate
of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the properties & of their work or industry & divide in
respective capital, fruits & income of each equal parts, upon the dissolution of the union,
community shall be determined upon such proof as the profits & benefits indiscriminately obtained by
may be considered according to the rules of either of the spouses during the marriage. It is
evidence. In case of doubt as to w/c community formed by the husband & the wife, each of whom
the existing properties belong, the same shall be has his or her own property & debts. the
divided between the different communities in legislator did not intend to effect a mixture of the
proportion to the capital & duration of each. debts or properties between the spouses. The
law establishes complete separation of capitals--a
complete independence of the capital account fr.
Baviera: No actual case yet the account of benefits pertaining to the conjugal
partnership. This constitutes an insurmountable

97
obstacle to the presumption of solidarity between who made such waiver may petition the court to
the spouses. rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount
sufficient to cover the amount of their credits.

General Provisions Art. 77. The marriage settlements & any


modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by
Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the parties & executed before the celebration of
the marriage settlements that the regime of conju- the marriage. They shall not prejudice third
gal partnership of gains shall govern their property persons unless registered in the local civil registry
relations during the marriage, the provisions in this where the marriage contract is recorded as well
Chapter shall be of supplementary application. as in the proper registries of property.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also
apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity Tolentino:
of this Code, w/o prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance w/ the Civil Code or other There is no co-ownership between the spouses in
laws, as provided in Article 256. the properties of the CPG. Hence, neither spouse
can alienate in favor of another his/her interest in
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect the partnership or in any property belonging to it;
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or neither spouse can ask for a partition of the
acquired rights in accordance w/ the Civil Code or properties before the partnership is legally
other laws. dissolved.

Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal


partnership of gains, the husband & wife place in a Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be
common fund the proceeds, products, fruits & governed by the rules on the contract of
income fr. their separate properties & those partnership in all that is not in conflict w/ what is
acquired by either or both spouses through their expressly determined in this Chapter or by the
efforts or by chance, & upon dissolution of the spouses in their marriage settlements.
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be
divided equally between them, unless otherwise
agreed in the marriage settlements. ANSALDO V. SHERIFF

Held: The bank accounts garnished herein were


conjugal property & the same may not be levied
Balane: Note that at the start of the marriage, the
common fund is at 0 balance. upon to pay for personal obligations. The money
in the bank accounts were earned as fruits
derived fr. paraphernal property. As such, they
became assets of the conjugal partnership. No
Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 & 89 proof was shown here that the obligations were
shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains. contracted for the benefit of the partnership.
Furthermore, the sheriff may not levy on 1/2 of
the amount in these accounts as the supposed
Art. 88. The absolute community of property share of the husband. A spouse's share in the
between spouses shall commence at the precise conjugal assets is merely inchoate & cannot be
moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any determined until after dissolution of the
stipulation, express or implied, for the partnership.
commencement of the community regime at any
other time shall be void.
1. EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF EACH
Art. 89. No waiver of rights, interests, shares & SPOUSE
effects of the absolute community of property, or
after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled,
the same shall appear in a public instrument & shall
be recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors

98
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive land was declared solely in the wife's name,
property of each spouse: although the house built thereon was declared in
(1) That w/c is brought to the marriage as his the name of the spouses. Under such circum-
or her own; [PLATA V. YATCO] stances, the Court held that the subject lot was
(2) That w/c each acquires during the marriage the paraphernal property of the wife & thus liable
by gratuitous title; for her personal debts.
(3) That w/c is acquired by right of redemption,
by barter or by exchange w/ property belonging to
only one of the spouses; & Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage,
(4) That w/c is purchased w/ exclusive money encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or
of the wife or of the husband. her exclusive property, w/o the consent of the
other spouse, & appear alone in court to litigate
Tolentino: All property already owned by a w/ regard to the same.
spouse prior to the marriage, & brought to the
marriage, is considered his or her separate
property. Balane: The proceeds of the loan pertain to the
borrower. The borrower in this case was the
Balane: partnership, regardless of the fact that the
separate property of the wife was used as a
Although the terms are used interchangeably, the security in obtaining the loan.
technical definitions of the following terms are as
follows:
PALANCA V. SMITH BELL
1. paraphernal property: exclusive property of the
Held: When a loan is negotiated by a husband
wife
2. capital: exclusive property of the husband. upon property belonging to his wife, w/ the
The owner has absolute dominion over his separate consent of the latter, the money becomes
property. conjugal property, & if the funds are later
With regard to separate property, the owner spouse invested in the construction of a house, the
may sue alone. With regard to the fruits of building is likewise conjugal property & is liable
such separate property, since the same belongs for debts of the husband. The property in
to the partnership, both spouses must join in question was a parcel of land belonging to the
initiating suit. wife w/c was given by the husband as a guaranty
for a loan contracted by him. The money
e.g. In a case where the separate property is
being leased out...the owner spouse may sue alone obtained through the loan was later used for the
for eviction, but must be joined by the other spouse construction of the house.
in a suit over rentals.

Art. 112. The alienation of any exclusive


Art. 110. The spouses retain ownership, property of a spouse administered by the other
possession, administration & enjoyment of their automatically terminates the administration over
exclusive properties. such property & the proceeds of the alienation
shall be turned over to the owner-spouse.
Either spouse may, during the marriage,
transfer the administration of his or her exclusive Art. 113. Property donated or left by will to
property to the other by means of a public the spouses, jointly & w/ designation of
instrument, w/c shall be recorded in the registry of determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee-
property of the place where the property is located. spouse as his or her own exclusive property, & in
the absence of designation, share & share alike,
w/o prejudice to the right of accretion when
ONG V. CA proper.
Held: The mere use of the surname of the
husband in the tax declaration of the subject Art. 753. When a donation is made to
property is not sufficient proof that said property several persons jointly, it is understood to be in
was acquired during the marriage & is therefore equal shares, & there shall be no right of
conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel of

99
accretion among them, unless the donor has to eject her fr. the property & she claimed a 3rd
otherwise provided. party claim averring ownership of the property.

The preceding paragraph shall not be applicable ISSUE: WON P Plata is bound by the detainer
to donations made to the husband & wife jointly, judgment vs. Begosa in civil case
between whom there shall be a right of accretion, if
the contrary has not been provided by the donor. HELD: NO. There may be a well-known
(Civil Code.) presumption that persons openly living together
as husband & wife are legally married to each
other. The prior marriage to Begosa to someone
Accretion - The right of heirs or legatees to unite else does not necessarily exclude the possibility
or aggregate w/ their shares or portions of the of a valid subsequent marriage to Plata.
estate the portion of any co-heir or legatee who However, Villanueva could not ignore the
refuses to accept it, fails to comply w/ a condition, paraphernal character of the property in
becomes incapacitated to inherit, or dies before, the question, w/c had been acquired by Plata while
testator. (Black's Law Dictionary, p. 19) still single.
Tolentino: When property is donated or left by
It is true that Begosa signed the
will, to the spouses jointly w/ express designation of
shares, the designated share of each spouse is his mortgage as a co-mortgagor, but by itself alone
or her own separate property. If there is no that circumstance would not suffice to convert
designation of shares, they share equally. the land into conjugal property, considering it
was paraphernal in origin.

Art. 114. If the donations are onerous, the Since the property was paraphernal, &
amount of the charges shall be borne by the exclu- the creditors & purchasers were aware of it, the
sive property of the donee-spouse, whenever they fact being clearly spread on the land records, it is
have been advanced by the conjugal partnership of plain that Plata’s possession, therefore was not
gains. derived fr. Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment
vs. the husband alone cannot bind or affect the
Art. 115. Retirement, benefits, pensions, wife’s possession of her paraphernal, w/c by law
pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs & similar she holds & administers independently, & w/c she
benefits shall be governed by the rules on may even encumber or alienate w/o his
gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper knowledge or consent. (Art. 136, 137, 140 CC)
in each case.
A. PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION OR EXCHANGE
PLATA VS. YATCO

FACTS: Amalia Plata purchased a parcel of land in ROSETE V. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF


Caloocan for w/c the Provincial Register of Deeds
issued a TCT in Plata’s name. She sold the property Facts: Rosete’s husband, Fularon was convicted
to Saldana who obtained a TCT. 7 months of murder & sentenced to indemnify the heirs of
afterwards, Saldana resold the same property to the victim. A writ of execution was issued & four
Plata married to Begosa & a new title issued to parcels of land belonging to the CPG were levied
Plata. upon. Wife later redeemed said properties using
money obtained fr. her father. An alias writ of
Plata, in consideration of a loan of P3,000, execution was issued to satisfy the balance of the
mortgaged to Villanueva married to Leano, the indemnity & 2 parcels of land were levied upon.
identical property of w/c the mortgagor Plata Sale was conducted. Wife asked that the sale be
declares to be hers as absolute owner. For failure to declared null & void.
pay the mortgage, the same was extrajudicially
foreclosed & sold to the mortgagee Villanueva as Issue: WoN the properties redeemed by P w/
the highest bidder. Villanueva, sued Begosa alone funds obtained fr. her father has become
for illegal detainer & obtained judgment vs. him. A paraphernal property & as such beyond the reach
WOE was duly issued, but Plata resisted all efforts of further execution

100
Held: YES. Sale is null & void. The properties Art. 117. The following are conjugal
were part of the paraphernal property of the wife & partnership properties:
as such beyond the reach of further execution. A
PROPERTY IS CONSIDERED TO BELONG (1) Those acquired by onerous title during
EXCLUSIVELY TO THE WIFE WHEN ACQUIRED BY the marriage at the expense of the common
HER BY RIGHT OF REDEMPTION, AND WITH fund, whether the acquisition be for the
MONEY BELONGING EXCLUSIVELY TO HER. partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) Those obtained fr. the labor, industry,
The interest w/c a wife has in conjugal work or profession of either or both of the
partnership property in this jurisdiction may be spouses;
likened to that of a wife in a homestead in American (3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due
jurisdiction. That interest in known as “inchoate or received during the marriage fr. the common
right of dower” or “contingent interest”. By virtue property, as well as the net fruits fr. the exclusive
of this inchoate right, a wife has a right of property of each spouse;
redemption of a homestead as successor in interest (4) The share of either spouse in the hidden
of her husband. treasure w/c the law awards to the finder or
owner of the property where the treasure is
Notes: found;
The right of redemption belongs to the conjugal
(5) Those acquired through occupation such
partnership
Successor in interest-right to succeed to the interest as fishing or hunting;
of the debtor by operation of law (6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of
the partnership in excess of the number of each
kind brought to the marriage by either spouse; &
2. CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY (7) Those w/c are acquired by chance, such
as winnings fr. gambling or betting.

However, losses therefr. shall be borne


Art. 116. All property acquired during the
exclusively by the loser-spouse.
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have
been made, contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved. CASTILLO V. PASCO
TORELA V. TORELA
Facts: Marcelo Castillo married Macaria Pasco, a
widow who survived 2 husbands. C later died & P
Held: While it is true that all property acquired
married a fourth time. During the marriage of C &
during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as
P, the spouses Gonzales sold the litigated
above stated, nonetheless, the party who invokes
fishpond to them. for P6T, to be paid in 3
the presumption must first prove that the property
installments: P1T upon execution of the deed;
was acquired during the marriage. This proof is a
P2T on 1/25/33, & P3T w/in a year after. Upon
condition sine qua non for the application of the
C’s death, the loan was still unpaid. P consigned
presumption.
P12,300 & P752.43 as down payment. Petitioner
heirs of C claim it should be considered conjugal
MENDOZA V. REYES
property for having been acquired during the
marriage. CA ruled it was paraphernal as it was
Held: The presumption of conjugality is a strong
bought w/ the exclusive funds of the wife. It said
one. Proof of acquisition of the property in dispute
wifey was a woman of means, while C died w/o
during the marriage suffices to render the statutory
enough assets to pay his debts.
presumption operative.
Issue: to whom does the fishpond belong?
MAGALLON V. MONTEJO
Held: The fishpond is 1/6 paraphernal & 5/6
Held: The presumption of conjugality does not
conjugal. The first P1000 was paid out of the
apply in a case where there is no proof of marriage
paraphernal property of the wife. Of this
between the spouses.
amount, P600 was a debt owed to the wife by
the vendor. It is presumed that this debt could

101
bind only the wife since there was no showing that Actual damages are conjugal property bec. the
the husband authorized the wife to contract this ticket is presumed to have been bought using
debt. The P400 was paid out of proceeds fr. the common funds.
What about moral damages? Not conjugal. Arose
sale of the wife's paraphernal property. The rest of
out of the personal anguish of the spouse (of
the purchase price was paid out of partnership being late for take-off when he had to take a
funds. The fact that the loan entered into to pay shit at the beach).
this purchase price was secured by mortgages over
paraphernal property belonging to the wife did not
make these obligations (loans) paraphernal. The Balane:
mortgage was merely an accessory obligation. The Rule: Under 117.1, where conjugal funds were
principal obligation w/c is the loan pertained to the spent, then the property acquired belongs to the
conjugal partnership. partnership
Except: 109.3 (pacto de retro acquisition where
the right to redemption belongs to one spouse)
Under the applicable law, the Spanish Civil
Code, the property acquired for onerous
consideration during the marriage was deemed
CHEESMAN V. IAC
conjugal or separate property depending on the
source of funds employed for its acquisition.
Held: Even if the wife used conjugal funds to
purchase the lot in question, petitioner, who is an
alien, cannot recover or hold the lot so acquired
ZULUETA V. PAN AM
in view of the constitutional prohibition against
aliens acquiring residential lots other than by
Facts: Spouses Z & their daughter were
hereditary succession. He therefore had no
passengers aboard the plane. Mr. Z was late. He
personality to question the subsequent sale of
was ordered by the captain to have their baggage
the same property by his wife on the theory that
examined, & he refused so they were refused
in so doing, he is merely exercising the
passage. Upon arrival, he filed this suit to recover
prerogative of a husband in respect to conjugal
damages. The spouses separated & the wife
property. To sustain such a theory would permit
agreed to a compromise w/ Pan-Am for P50,000.
indirect controversion of the constitutional
Because of such, she moved to have the case
prohibition.
dismissed insofar as she is concerned. P hubby
argues that the wife cannot bind the CPG w/o the
husband’s consent except in cases provided by law.
A. BOUGHT ON INSTALLMENTS
Issue; Can the wife bind the CPG w/o her
husband’s consent?
Art. 118. Property bought on installments
Held: NO. The payment is effective insofar as it is paid partly fr. exclusive funds of either or both
deductible fr. the award & bec. it is due fr. the spouses & partly fr. conjugal funds belongs to the
defendant Pan Am, w/ or w/o the compromise buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested
agreement. However, the compromise agreement before the marriage. In either case, any amount
is ineffective insofar as the CPG is concerned. advanced by the partnership or by either or both
spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or
The damages involved belong to the CPG owners upon liquidation of the partnership.
bec. they arose fr. a breach of K of carriage for w/c
the plaintiffs paid their fare using funds presumably
belonging to the CPG. The said damages fall under Baviera: In case of property bought on
153 (1), the right thereto having been acquired by installment, partly fr. exclusive property &
onerous title during marriage. Thus, damages partly fr. conjugal funds, the test to
belong to the CPG. determine ownership is to look at when
ownership vested. If ownership vested
before marriage, then the property is
Notes: exclusive. If ownership vested after
marriage, then property is conjugal.
No conjugal partnership as the contract of carriage
is personal to the passenger spouse

102
e.g. certificate in her favor to Espiritu. Later, spouses
1985 - A buys property fr. BF payable in sold 1/2 of the property to Martin, w/ a right to
installments...A pays installments w/ exclusive redeem in 12 years. Evangelista died w/ a will,
property bequeathing her 1/2 interest in the unsold
1990 - A marries B. The subsequent amortizations
on the property are then paid w/ conjugal funds. portion of the land to her husband. Her husband
& collateral relatives survived her. Meanwhile,
Test: when title was vested. Espiritu completed payments for the redemption
if title was vested before 1990, then the property is of the property fr. Martin. Thus, a deed of resale
exclusive. issued in his favor. Plaintiff collateral heirs of
if title was vested only after full payment of Evangelista filed suit, claiming the lot was the
amortizations, then the property is conjugal. paraphernal property of Evangelista w/c she
brought into the marriage. Husband claims the
lot was conjugal. TC ruled Espiritu owned the
JOVELLANOS V. CA entire lot (both halves) since the payments were
completed during their marriage. This appeal.
Facts: Daniel married Leonor in 1955. During this
marriage, Daniel entered into a contract of lease & Issue: WoN the lot was the paraphernal
conditional sale w/ Philam. In 1959, Leonor died. property of Evangelista or the property of her
In 1967, Daniel married Annette. In 1975, the full conjugal partnership w/ Espiritu
amount of the lease was paid. Thus Philam
executed in favor of Daniel a deed of absolute sale. Held: Paraphernal. Ownership of the lot vested
Daniel died in 1985. Annette claims that the in Evangelista upon the issuance to her in 1910
property is part of the CPG. of her marriage to of a sales certificate, resulting in the lot becoming
Daniel . Petitioner children of the first marriage her property long before her marriage in 1923.
claim that said property is CPG of the first marriage. The equitable & beneficial title to the land passes
to the purchaser the moment the first installment
Issue: WoN the property in dispute belongs to the is paid & a certificate of sale is issued. Friar lands
2nd marriage? bought by a woman before her marriage were
her paraphernal properties, although some of the
Held; YES.. Under the agreement, the lessee had installment were paid for w/ conjugal funds
only the right of possession over the prop, as well during the marriage. The conjugal partnership
as the temporary use & enjoyment of the same. would only be entitled to reimbursement for the
The conditional sale was thus in the nature of a expenses.
contract to sell whereby ownership is not
transferred upon delivery but only upon full Assignment of the sales certificate to
payment of the purchase price. The right of Daniel Espiritu was null & void as it falls under the
over the contract was merely an inchoate & prohibition against donations between the
expectant right. Full ownership was vested only spouses during the marriage.
upon the execution of the absolute deed of sale in
1975. The lot being the paraphernal property of
Evangelista before the sale, its redemption must
be deemed as having revested ownership in her
Historical Background heirs. What Espiritu had for the portion
redeemed by him is a lien for the amount he
PLATA V. YATCO, SUPRA paid.

ALVAREZ V. ESPIRITU
Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit
Facts: The Director of Lands issued in favor of
payable w/in a period of time belongs to one of
Consolacion Evangelista sales certificate involving
the spouses, the sums w/c may be collected
friar lands administered under Act No. 1120. The
during the marriage in partial payments or by
same was payable in 18 annual installment , the
installments on the principal shall be the exclusive
first on July 1, 1910. In 1923, she married Pedro
property of the spouse. However, interests falling
Espiritu. During their marriage, the installments
due during the marriage on the principal shall
were paid w/ conjugal funds, & 1927 completed
belong to the conjugal partnership.
payments. Evangelista later assigned the sales

103
VITUG V. MONTEMAYOR [93 P 939 (1953)]

Balane: Facts: Clodualdo Vitug begot 3 children during


his first marriage, one of them is herein Pet.,
Test is when is payment due. Florencia Vitug. After his first wife died, Clodualdo
married Donata, herein Respondent. During their
Suppose: marriage, R inherited land fr. her parents valued
A lent P1M to B
at P9,000 w/c was converted by the joint industry
in the promissory note, it is stipulated that payment
shall be on 100 equal monthly installments & & efforts of the spouses into a fishpond & sold at
that interest shall be at 20% p.a. profit (P116,000). The proceeds of w/c were used
payments start on Oct 1985 to buy 30 parcels of land. The deed of sale & the
A marries B in August 1986 TCT were executed in the name of Donata. When
Clodualdo died, R did not include in the inventory
all installments due before August 1986 are of his property said 30 parcels of land. P
paraphernal opposed, claiming the lots are conjugal, thus they
for installments due after August 1986: have a share fr. their father’s half.
principal is exclusive property
interest during the marriage pertain to the
partnership...already civil fruits. Held: The 30 parcels of land are conjugal. Upon
the failure to prove by concrete evidence that the
conversion of the agricultural lands were done
B. IMPROVEMENTS AT EXPENSE OF
using the exclusive funds of R, the
CONJUGAL FUNDS OR THROUGH WORK OR
PRESUMPTION IS THAT THE EXPENSE WAS
INDUSTRY OF A SPOUSE
CONJUGAL. Also, since the conversion was done
w/ the industry & efforts of both spouses & that
the value of the improvements on the
paraphernal property of the wife exceeded its
Art. 120. The ownership of improvements,
original value, the entire property became
whether for utility or adornment, made on the sepa-
conjugal property subject to reimbursement of
rate property of the spouses at the expense of the
the value of the agricultural land at the time of
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The name
or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal
in the deed of sale & the TCT are of no moment.
partnership, or to the original owner- spouse,
subject to the following rules:
MARAMBA V. LOZANO [20 S 474 (1967)]
When the cost of the improvement made by the
Facts: In an action by Pltf Maramba vs.
conjugal partnership & any resulting increase in
Defendant (D) Spouses Lozano, jmt was
value are more than the value of the property at the
rendered ordering D to pay P3,500. A WOE was
time of the improvement, the entire property of one
issued & the land titled in the name of D was
of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
levied upon. D opposed contending that the land
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value
was her paraphernal property & the obligation is
of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of
joint. The lower court ruled that the liability of D
the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be
& her husband was joint, so D is liable only to 1/2
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise
of the jmt debt. Pltf contends that the land levied
subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
upon, even if originally paraphernal became
improvement.
conjugal by virtue of the construction of a house
thereon at the expense of the CPG, hence it may
In either case, the ownership of the entire
be made to answer for the entire indebtedness.
property shall be vested upon the reimbursement,
w/c shall be made at the time of the liquidation of
Held: Since there is no showing that the
the conjugal partnership.
property was acquired during the marriage, the
fact that the title is in the wife's name determines
that it is paraphernal property. The construction
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND of a house built fr. conjugal funds on the
exclusive property of one of the spouses does not
automatically make it conjugal. It is true that in
the meantime, the conjugal partnership may use
104
both the land & the building, but it does so not as Held: Untenable. To the owner of realty also
an owner but in the sense of the right of usufruct. belongs, by right of accession, the improvements
The ownership of the land remains the same until made thereon. Buildings, crops & other
the value thereof is paid & payment can only be improvements upon the land belong to the
demanded upon the liquidation of the CPG (w/c is owner of the realty. To this rule there is an
not shown in the CAB). Consequently, the property exception in case of married persons. Par. 2 of
being paraphernal, it cannot be levied upon to Art. 1404 CC (now Art. 120, FC) provides that
answer for the liability of the deceased husband. buildings constructed during the marriage, on
land belonging to one of the spouses, are
The land belonging to one of the spouses conjugal property, but the owner of the realty
upon w/c the spouses have built a house becomes shall be entitled to credit for the value of the
conjugal property only when the conjugal land. This exception, however, is limited to
partnership is LIQUIDATED & the INDEMNITY PAID buildings & does not apply to crops & other
to the owner of the land. improvements, w/ respect to w/c the general rule
applies. Expenses incurred in making such crops
However, see CANULLAS V. FORTUN & improvements are conjugal expenses, for w/c
the conjugal property must be reimbursed.
CALTEX V. FELIAS [108 P 873 (1960)] [Tabotabo v. Molero, 22 P 418] CAB, widow is
entitled only to be reimbursed for ½ the
Facts: Felias spouses donated to their daughter a expenses.
parcel of land, making it her paraphernal property.
When she got married a jmt was rendered against Case rule: ART. 120 only refers to "BUILDINGS"
her husband & the lot she inherited & the house not crops, however, see NOTE below.
thereon were levied upon.
NOTE: Under the FC, there is a uniform rule,
Held: While it is true that bldg. constructed at the that is, whether or not the improvement consists
expense of the partnership on the land belonging to of a bldg., trees or other ornaments, one rule
one of the spouse would automatically make the lot would apply, ART. 120.
conjugal subject to reimbursement, said rule will not
apply in the case at bar. The CA found that at the CANULLAS V. FORTUN [129 S 675 (1984)]
time the bldg. was constructed on the lot, said
property still belonged to the parents / Felias Facts: The Canullas family lived in a house
spouses bec. the donation was not made to their owned by the husband's father. When the latter
daughter until March 1928, whereas the bldg. was died, the husband inherited the land, but later
constructed in 1927. The rule applicable w/ respect abandoned his family to live w/ a concubine to
to the building constructed thereon before the whom he sold the land. Upon the husband's
donation is that of accessory following the principal. death, the concubine filed an action to quiet title,
The donation transmitted to her the rights of a w/c the wife opposed on the ground that the
landowner over a building constructed on it. Thus, house & coconut trees planted on the land came
being paraphernal, the lot & the building are not fr. conjugal funds & therefore became conjugal
answerable for the obligations of the husband. property.
Held: SC annulled the sale to the concubine,
DOMINADO V. DERAYUNAN [49 S 452 considering that the construction of the house on
(1926)] the exclusive property of the husband IPSO
FACTO made the land conjugal property, w/ the
Facts: Domingo, the late husband of pet’r Elisa, conjugal partnership liable to the husband for the
was the exclusive owner of the land in question. value of the land, to be reimbursed at the
Using conjugal funds, almost 1,500 coconut trees liquidation of the CPG.
were planted on it. When Domingo died, the
probate court adjudicated to his widow 1/2 of the The better rule than Maramba v. Lozano,
expenses incurred in sowing said trees. Widow is Padilla v. Paterno, w/c held that the conversion
objected, claiming that she should receive not 1/2 of the paraphernal properties to conjugal assets
of the expenses incurred but 1/2 of all the coconut should be deemed to retroact to the time the
trees. conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon
or at the very least, to the time immediately
before the death of the owner spouse that ended
105
the conjugal partnership. They can not be irrigation ditches P2M
considered to have become conjugal property only
as of the time their values were paid to the estate but bec. of the irrigation ditches, the value of the
land increases to P4.8M
of the deceased spouse bec. by that time the
the plus value in this case is P1.8M
conjugal partnership no longer existed & it could the net value of the improvement is P3.8 M
not acquire the ownership of said properties. The in this case, the entire property becomes
acquisition by the partnership of these properties conjugal.
was subject to the suspensive condition that their
values would be reimbursed to the owner spouse at Under the Family Code, the value to be paid
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership; once as reimbursement shall be such value at the time
paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition of improvement...in this sense, the Family Code
should be deemed to retroact to the date the departs fr. the Padilla ruling
obligation was constituted. [Art. 1187, NCC].
Whether or not the FC modifies the Padilla
ruling insofar as it held that ownership shall vest
only after full payment at the time of
NOTES: This cannot be applied bec. there is no liquidation...Balane is unsure.
conjugal partnership of the first marriage w/c has
been dissolved, nor has there been a Art. 120 applies only on the assumption that
reimbursement yet. But the SC made a somersault the improvement exists at the time of
to do justice & remove the land fr. the hands of the liquidation...if the property is destroyed before
concubine. The cited decision in Padilla was taken liquidation, then 120 does not apply.
out of context since it was not even the ratio but a
mere statement of JBL Reyes. If prior to dissolution, the property & the
improvement thereon is sold--then the right of
the CPG under 120 follows the property...the
BALANE REVIEWER right of the CPG under 120 is inchoate.

A. Cases Notes:

The following are the steps to be followed in


PADILLA V. PADILLA
liquidating the CPG:
The mere construction of a building fr.
common funds does not automatically convey the 1. inventory of CP assets
ownership of the wife's land (paraphernal) to the 2. restitution of advances made to each spouse
conjugal partnership. The ownership of the land is
e.g. Art. 122.3
retained by the wife until she is paid the value of 3. payment of debts to each spouse e.g. Art. 120
the lot as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal 4. payment of obligations to 3rd parties
partnership. The partnership maintains a 5. delivery of exclusive properties
usufructuary right over the said property during the 6. payment of losses & deterioration of movables
marriage & until liquidation. belonging to each spouse (reason: CPG is a mere
usufructuary of separate properties...not true for
PADILLA V. PATERNO ACP)
The separate properties in this case never 7. division
became conjugal bec. the conjugal improvements 8. delivery of presumptive legitimes
constructed thereon were destroyed before the
value of the paraphernal land on w/c these
improvements were erected was paid to the spouse
who owned the paraphernal land. As held in Padilla 3. OBLIGATIONS & CHARGES OF
v. Padilla, payment of such value occurs only at final CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
liquidation.

B. Notes Art. 121 The conjugal partnership shall be


liable for:
'Plus value' refers to what the improvement
contributes to the increase in the value of the whole (1) The support of the spouses, their
thing.
common children, & the legitimate children of
Suppose: either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the
land P3M provisions of this Code on Support;

106
(2) All debts & obligations contracted during the that of fines & indemnities imposed upon them,
marriage by the designated administrator- spouse as well as the support of illegitimate children of
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, either spouse, may be enforced against the
or by both spouses or by one of them w/ the partnership assets after the responsibilities
consent of the other; enumerated in the preceding Article have been
(3) Debts & obligations contracted by either covered, if the exclusive property or if it should
spouse w/o the consent of the other to the extent have no exclusive property or if it should be
that the family may have been benefited; insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of
(4) All taxes, liens, charges & expenses, the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for
including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal what has been paid for the purposes above-men-
partnership property; tioned.
(5) All taxes & expenses for mere preservation
made during the marriage upon the separate
property of either spouse; CUATICO V. MORALES [61 O.G. 869 (1964)]
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to
commence or complete a professional, vocational, Facts: Cuatico filed a collection case against the
or other activity for self-improvement; Morales spouses. A money jmt was rendered
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as against the husband, who contracted the loan,
they have redounded to the benefit of the family; signing the promissory note alone. A WOE was
(8) The value of what is donated or promised issued & a writ of garnishment was issued
by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate against the salary of the husband. Husband
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or opposed contending that the salaries of spouses
completing a professional or vocational course or are conjugal & therefore, may not be liable for
other activity for self-improvement; & personal obligations of one of the spouses absent
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses proof of benefit to the family.
unless the suit is found to be groundless.
Held: The salaries of the spouses constitute part
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to of the conjugal partnership w/c may answer only
cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be for charges upon & liabilities of the conjugal
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance w/ their partnership. In order to make the conjugal
separate properties. partnership liable for the personal obligations of
the spouses, it must be shown that the debt was
contracted during the marriage by the husband
Art. 123. Whatever may be lost during the for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Under
marriage in any game of chance, or in betting, the New Civil Code, there is NO PRESUMPTION
sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling that debts & obligations contracted during the
whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be marriage by the husband are conjugal. (De la
borne by the loser & shall not be charged to the Cruz v. De Gula).
conjugal partnership but any winnings therefr. shall
form part of the conjugal partnership property. On the contention that at least 1/2 of the
CPG belongs to the husband & thus, could be
A. CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED validly levied upon, it must be said that as long as
BY EITHER SPOUSE the conjugal partnership subsists, there can be
no one-half share of the husband or wife. Only
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts when the conjugal partnership is liquidated, &
contracted by the husband or the wife before or there is a net remainder, may the same be
during the marriage shall not be charged to the divided equally between husband & wife. The
conjugal partnership except insofar as they interest of each in the conjugal partnership
redounded to the benefit of the family. property is inchoate & is a mere expectancy. Any
levy on the conjugal partnership property to
Neither shall the fines & pecuniary indemnities satisfy the money judgment against the husband
imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. is null & void. (Ansaldo v. Sheriff of Manila)

However, the payment of personal debts


contracted by either spouse before the marriage,

107
LUZON SURETY V. DE GARCIA [30 S 111 Art. 122, par. 3. However, the payment of
(1969)] personal debts contracted by either spouse
before the marriage, that of fines & indemnities
Facts: Husband Vicente Garcia acted as a imposed upon them, as well as the support of
guarantor on a surety bond. Principal debtor illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
defaulted & the surety was sued. A jmt was enforced against the partnership assets after the
rendered against the husband & a writ of responsibilities enumerated in the preceding
garnishment was issued against the sugar quedans Article have been covered, if the spouse who is
belonging to the Garcia spouses. bound should have no exclusive property or if it
should insufficient; but at the time of the liquida-
Held: The conjugal partnership is not liable on an tion of the partnership, such spouse shall be
indemnity agreement executed by the husband to charged for what has been paid for the purposes
accommodate a third party in favor of a surety above-mentioned.
company in the absence of proof of any benefit to
the conjugal partnership.
ALVAREZ V. LIM [61 O.G. 1529 (1964)]
PEREZ V. LANTIN [23 S 367 (1968)]
Facts: Pltf filed an action for support of 4 minor
Facts: Pet’r, Damaso Perez purchased shoe leather illegitimate children begotten by her w/
in connection w/ his business, & for failure to pay defendant. TC ordered D to pay pltf monthly
the same, a collection suit was filed against him. support. D appealed contending that his income
Judgment was held for the creditor & the shares of fr. business, being conjugal is not liable for his
stocks owned by the husband were attached for the illegitimate children.
satisfaction of the judgment debt. Wife of Perez
opposed, alleging that the said shares were Held: The illegitimate children of the husband
conjugal assets w/c could not be made to answer should be supported fr. his exclusive property. In
for the liability of Pet’r. the absence of exclusive property of the husband
or in case of its insufficiency, the support of said
Held: Untenable. All properties of the marriage are illegitimate children may be imposed against the
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership partnership assets after the responsibilities
unless it is proved otherwise. The party who invokes enumerated in Art. 161 CC (Art. 121 FC) have
this presumption must first prove that the property been covered, provided that at the time of the
was acquired during the marriage. Hence, proof of liquidation of the partnership the husband shall
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine be charged for what has been paid for the
qua non for the operation of the presumption. In purpose.
this case, there is no evidence as to when the
shares of stocks were acquired, the fact that they PEOPLE V. LAGRIMAS [29 S 153 (1969)]
are registered in the name of the husband alone is
an indication that the shares belong exclusively to Facts: Husband was convicted of murder. A
him. WOE was issued & conjugal properties were
levied upon to enforce his civil liability. On appeal
Also, the contention of P that the debt was by the wife, the judge declared the attachment
personal is devoid of merit. The obligation was null & void on the ground that fines & indemnities
contracted for use in P’s business. It is well-settled imposed against either spouses may be imposed
that debts contracted by the husband for & in the only after the charges enumerated under Art. 161
exercise of the industry & profession by w/c he have been covered. Hence, there must first be a
contributes to the support of the family cannot be liquidation of the CPG.
deemed to be his exclusive & private debts. (In
short, it was presumed that the debts by H Held: Reversed. Fines & indemnities imposed
redounded to the family’s benefit.) upon either husband or wife may be enforced
against partnership assets after the
responsibilities imposed in Art. 161 CC (Art. 121
B. CHARGES UPON CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
FC) have been covered, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if it
should be insufficient. The reason is that if they

108
were allowed to be enforced only after liquidation, Art. 134. In the absence of an express
the effect would be to exempt the accused fr. civil declaration in the marriage settlements, the
liability & the heirs of the offended party would be separation of property between spouses during
made to suffer still further. the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order. Such judicial separation of property
may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be


considered sufficient cause for judicial separation
4. ADMINISTRATION OF CONJUGAL of property:
PARTNERSHIP (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has
been sentenced to a penalty w/c carries w/ it civil
interdiction;
Art. 124. The administration & enjoyment of (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has
the conjugal partnership property shall belong to been judicially declared an absentee;
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the (3) That loss of parental authority of the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, w/c court;
must be availed w/in five years fr. the date of the (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has
contract implementing such decision. abandoned the latter or failed to comply w/ his or
her obligations to the family as provided for in
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or Article 101;
otherwise unable to participate in the administration (5) That the spouse granted the power of
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may administration in the marriage settlements has
assume sole powers of administration. These abused that power; &
powers do not include the powers of disposition or (6) That at the time of the petition, the
encumbrance w/c must have the authority of the spouses have been separated in fact for at least
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In one year & reconciliation is highly improbable.
the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition shall be void. However, the transaction In the cases provided for in Numbers (1),
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part (2), (3), the presentation of the final judgment
of the consenting spouse & the third person, & may against the guilty or absent spouse shall be
be perfected as a binding contract upon the enough basis for the grant of the decree of
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by judicial separation of property.
the court before the offer is w/drawn by either or
both offerors. Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a
verified petition w/ the court for the voluntary
Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any dissolution of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership property w/o the consent of conjugal partnership of gains, & for the sepa-
the other. However, either spouse may, w/o the ration of their common properties.
consent of the other, make moderate donations fr.
the conjugal partnership property for charity or on All creditors of the absolute community or of
occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the
personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in
the petition notified of the filing thereof. The
5. DISSOLUTION court shall take measures to protect the creditors
& other persons w/ pecuniary interest.
Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates:
Art. 137. Once the separation of property has
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
been decreed, the absolute community or the
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated
(3) When the marriage is annulled or decreed
in conformity w/ this Code.
void;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property
During the pendency of the proceedings for
during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
separation of property, the absolute community

109
or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal
of the spouses & their children. partnership regime, the following procedure shall
apply:
Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing
community or of the conjugal partnership, the separately all the properties of the conjugal part-
provisions on complete separation of property shall nership & the exclusive properties of each
apply. spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal
Art. 127. The separation in fact between partnership in payment of personal debts &
husband & wife shall not affect the regime of obligations of either spouse shall be credited to
conjugal partnership, except that: the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition
or refuses to live therein, w/o just cause, shall not of property or for the value of his or her exclusive
have the right to be supported; property, the ownership of w/c has been vested
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any by law in the conjugal partnership.
transaction of the other is required by law, judicial (4) The debts & obligations of the conjugal
authorization shall be obtained in a summary partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal
proceeding; assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
partnership property, the separate property of both balance w/ their separate properties, in
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of accordance w/ the provisions of paragraph (2) of
the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition Article 121.
in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority
to administer or encumber any specific separate Art. 121. xxx
property of the other spouse & use the fruits or If the conjugal partnership is insufficient
proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall
be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance w/ their
Art. 128. If a spouse w/o just cause abandons separate properties.)
the other or fails to comply w/ his or her obligations
to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive
court for receivership, for judicial separation of properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
property, or for authority to be the sole delivered to each of them.
administrator of the conjugal partnership property, (6) Unless the owner had been indemnified
subject to such precautionary conditions as the fr. whatever source, the loss or deterioration of
court may impose. movables used for the benefit of the family,
belonging to either spouse, even due to
The obligations to the family mentioned in the fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse fr.
preceding paragraph refer to marital parental or the conjugal funds, if any. ( e.g. car, even if lost
property relations. due to FE, unlike in ordinary usufruct)
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the partnership properties shall constitute the profits,
other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling w/c shall be divided equally between husband &
w/o intention of returning. The spouse who has left wife, unless a different proportion or division was
the conjugal dwelling for a period of 3 months or agreed upon in the marriage settlements or
has failed w/in the same period to give any unless there has been a voluntary waiver or
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
prima facie presumed to have no intention of (8) The presumptive legitimes of the
returning to the conjugal dwelling. common children shall be delivered upon partition
in accordance w/ Article 51.

6. LIQUIDATION OF THE CONJUGAL Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the
PARTNERSHIP ASSETS & LIABILITIES presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of
the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property

110
or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual Art. 131. Whenever the liquidation of the
agreement judicially approved, had already provided conjugal partnership properties of two or more
for such matters. marriages contracted by the same person before
the effectivity of this Code is carried out simul-
The children or their guardian, or the trustee of taneously, the respective capital, fruits & income
their property, may ask for the enforcement of the of each partnership shall be determined upon
judgment. such proof as may be considered according to the
rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to w/c
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein partnership the existing properties belong, the
prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate same shall be divided between & among the
successional rights of the children accruing upon the different partnerships in proportion to the capital
death of either or both of the parents; but the value & duration of each.
of the properties already received under the decree
of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered Art. 132. The Rules of Court on the
as advances on their legitime. administration of estates of deceased persons
shall be observed in the appraisal & sale of
property of the conjugal partnership, & other
NOTES: Presumptive only; collationable, matters w/c are not expressly determined in this
considered as donations bec. of collation Chapter.
- actual computation at the time of death of the
parent; legitime at the time of death can even be Art. 133. From the common mass of property
less than the presumptive legitimes.) support shall be given to the surviving spouse &
to the children during the liquidation of the
inventoried property & until what belongs to
(9) In the partition of the properties, the them is delivered; but fr. this shall be deducted
conjugal dwelling & the lot on w/c it is situated that amount received for support w/c exceeds
shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
be adjudicated to the spouse w/ whom the majority
of the common children choose to remain. Children
below the age of seven years are deemed to have E. SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the 1. DURING MARRIAGE
court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children.
Art. 134. In the absence of an express
Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage declaration in the marriage settlements, the
by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be separation of property between the spouses
liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement during the marriage shall NOT take place except
of the estate of the deceased. by judicial order. Such judicial separation of
property may either be voluntary or for sufficient
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, cause.
the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal
partnership property either judicially or extra-
judicially w/in one year fr. the death of the TODA V. COURT OF APPEALS
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the said
period no liquidation is made, any disposition or The separation of property is not affected by the
encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership mere execution of the contract or agreement of
property of the terminated marriage shall be void. the parties but by the decree of the court
approving the same. The conjugal partnership is
Should the surviving spouse contract a dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of
subsequent marriage w/o compliance w/ the separation of property.
foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of
complete separation of property shall govern the Balane: A petition may be filed for the
property relations of the subsequent marriage. dissolution of the AC or the CP by:
both spouses: voluntary dissolution (134/136)
petition for sufficient cause (135)

111
cannot dissolve extrajudicially during subsistence of Balane: Under Art. 135.4, Balane believes that
marriage Art. 128 should be included here.

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a
considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of verified petition w/ the court for the voluntary
property: dissolution of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, & for the separa-
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been tion of their common properties.
sentenced to a penalty w/c carries w/ it civil
interdiction; All creditors of the absolute community or of
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the
judicially declared an absentee; personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse the petition notified of the filing thereof. The
of petitioner has been declared by the court; court shall take measures to protect the creditors
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has & other persons w/ pecuniary interest.
abandoned the latter or failed to comply w/ his or
her obligations to the family as provided for in Art. 137. Once the separation of property has
Article 101; been decreed, the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated
Art. 101. If a spouse w/o just cause abandons in conformity w/ this Code.
the other or fails to comply w/ his or her obligations
to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the During the pendency of the proceedings for
court for receivership, for judicial separation of separation of property, the absolute community
property or for authority to be the sole or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the
administrator of the absolute community, subject to support of the spouses & their children.
such precautionary conditions as the court may
impose. Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute
community or of the conjugal partnership, the
The obligations to the family mentioned in the provisions on complete separation of property
preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or shall apply.
property relations.
Art. 139. The petition for separation of
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the property & the final judgment granting the same
other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling shall be recorded in the proper local civil
w/o intention of returning. The spouse who has left registries & registries of property.
the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months
or has failed w/in the same period to give any Art. 140. The separation of property shall not
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prejudice the rights previously acquired by
prima facie presumed to have no intention of creditors.
returning to the conjugal dwelling.
Art. 141. The spouses may, in the same
(5) That the spouse granted the power of proceedings where separation of property was
administration in the marriage settlements has decreed, file a motion in court for a decree
abused that power; & reviving the property regime that existed
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses between them before the separation of property
have been separated in fact for at least one year & in any of the following instances:
reconciliation is highly improbable. (1) When the civil interdiction terminates;
(2) When the absentee spouse reappears;
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) & (3) When the court, being satisfied that the
(3), the presentation of the final judgment against spouse granted the power of administration in
the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis the marriage settlements will not again abuse
for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of that power, authorizes the resumption of said
property. administration;

112
(4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive fr.
home w/o a decree of legal separation resumes justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal
common life w/ the other; case.
(5) When the parental authority is judicially
restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof; If the other spouse is not qualified by reason
(6) When the spouses who have separated in of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other
fact for at least one year, reconcile & resume just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable
common life; or person to be the administrator.
(7) When after voluntary dissolution of the
absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership has been judicially decreed upon the
joint petition of the spouses, they agreed to the 3. REGIME OF SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
revival of the former property regime. No voluntary
separation of property may thereafter be granted.
Art. 143. Should the future spouses agree in
The revival of the former property regime shall the marriage settlements that their property
be governed by Article 67. relations during the marriage shall be governed
by the regime of separation of property, the
Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former provisions of this Chapter shall be of suppletory
property regime referred to in the preceding Article application.
shall be executed under oath & shall specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to
the restored regime; present or future property or both. It may be
(2) Those to be retained as separated total or partial. In the latter case, the property
properties of each spouse; & not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their absolute community.
addresses & the amounts owing to each.
Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of,
The agreement of revival & the motion for its possess, administer & enjoy his or her own
approval shall be filed w/ the court in the same separate estate, w/o need of the consent of the
proceeding for legal separation, w/ copies of both other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings fr.
furnished to the creditors named therein. After due his or her profession, business or industry & all
hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measures fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received
to protect the interest of creditors & such order during the marriage fr. his or her separate
shall be recorded in the proper registries of property.
properties.
Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family
The recording of the order in the registries of expenses in proportion to their income, or, in
property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the
or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has current market value of their separate properties.
sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's
claim. The liability of the spouses of creditors for
family expenses shall, however, be solidary.
Art. 142. The administration of all classes of
exclusive property of either spouse may be
transferred by the court to the other spouse:
VII. UNION W/O MARRIAGE

(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of


the other;
(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an Art. 147. When a man & a woman who are
absentee; capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty w/ each other as husband & wife w/o the benefit
w/c carries w/ it civil interdiction; or of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages & salaries shall be owned by them in equal

113
shares & the property acquired by both of them The same rule & presumption shall apply to joint
through their work or industry shall be governed by deposits of money & evidences of credit.
the rules on co-ownership.
If one of the parties is validly married to
[no provision in OCC, judicial decisions only; another, his or her share in the co-ownership
only in NCC; Baviera says the use of the words shall accrue to the absolute community or
"capacitated" & "void marriage" is malabo; jigsaw conjugal partnership existing in such valid
puzzle provision] marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her share
In the absence of proof to the contrary, shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the
properties acquired while they lived together shall last paragraph of the preceding Article.
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts work or industry, & shall be owned by them The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
who did not participate in the acquisition by the faith.
other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former's efforts consisted in the care & maintenance Baviera: If no common children, no
of the family & of the household. surviving descendant, kanino ngayon?
apply exclusive property
[basis: MAXEY V. CA - H & W, equality of the
sexes]
YAPTINCHAY V. HON. TORRES & VIRGINIA
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
YAPTINCHAY [28 S 489 (1969)]
inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation & owned in common,
Facts: Isidro Yaptinchay had 3 children by his
w/o the consent of the other, until after the
legal wife, Josefina; one of w/c is the respondent
termination of their cohabitation.
in this case. However, he lived w/ his paramour
Teresita (pet’r) for 19 years. When Isidro died
[Baviera - so that it won't be better than legal
intestate, Teresita was appointed as admntrix of
relationships]
the properties incl. a North Forbes house where
Isidro & Teresita lived in for years. But the
When only one of the parties to a void marriage
appointment was opposed by the first wife. CFI
is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
sustained the opposition & appointed Virginia
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
(the daughter) to be the admntrix & ordered T to
common children. In case of default of or waiver by
deliver possession of the North Forbes house to
any or all of the common children or their
V.
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
Held: Where a married man & his mistress lived
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
together for 19 years, & the mistress seeks to
descendants, such share shall belong to the
repossess their love nest in Forbes Park, she
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
must show her actual contribution in the
place upon termination of the cohabitation.
construction of the house during the cohabitation
in order for the rules on co-ownership to apply.
[Baviera - there is a right of representation
Her unsupported assertions cannot override the
even by the grandchildren]
prima facie presumption that the house, having
been constructed on the lot of the man during his
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling
marriage to his legitimate wife constitutes
under the preceding Article, only the properties
conjugal property.
acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry
JUANIZA V. JOSE [89 S 306 (1979)]
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of
Facts: Eugenio Jose is the registered owner of a
proof to the contrary, their contributions &
jeepney w/c was involved in an accident & was
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
held liable for damages. He was married to
Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting w/

114
defendant-appellant Rosalia Arroyo for 16 years. man & a woman not legally married & their
CFI ordered both Euguenio & Rosalia to pay corresponding right to an equal share in
damages, jointly & severally, based on Art. 144 CC. properties acquired through their joint efforts
Arroyo opposed this ruling & asked the Court to during cohabitation was recognized through
absolve her fr. liability. judicial decisions. Art. 144 of the NCC, codified
these judicial precedents w/ some modifications;
Held: His common-law wife cannot claim co- co-ownership arises even if the common-law wife
ownership over the jeepney bec. Art. 144 CC (Art. is not gainfully employed, or does not work.. Art.
147 FC) applies only when the parties are not 144 recognizes that it would be unjust &
incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all aspects
to the conjugal partnership w/ the lawful wife. Also, except for the req. of a valid marriage, must
the common-law wife not being the registered abandon the home & her children & go to earn a
owner cannot be held liable for damages caused by living or engage in business before the rules on
its operation. co-ownership would apply.

Baviera disagrees, it is not necessary that Balane:


there be no impediment to marry bec. Art.
147 FC covers even void marriages. As in the case of Maxey, a common-law wife who
is not gainfully employed contributes to the
co-ownership as a homemaker.
MAXEY V. CA [129 S 187 (1984)] the law in this case provides for a special kind of
co- ownership...w/c cannot be terminated, &
Facts: Melbourne Maxey & Regina Morales started wherein the share may not be encumbered
living together as husband & wife in 1903. During or disposed of w/o the consent of the other.
this period, Maxey acquired several parcels of land.
They were married only in 1919, after w/c Regina
died. Maxey then married Julia, & using a power of VII. THE FAMILY
atty., sold the lands to Defs- spouses Macayra.
Plaintiffs are the children of Maxey & Regina who A. AS AN INSTITUTION
prayed for the annulment of the sale alleging that
the lots were common properties of their parents &
the sale was w/o their consent. CFI applied Art. 144
CC w/c provides that a state of co-ownership ART. 149. The family, being the foundation
governs relationships w/o the benefit of marriage or of the nation, is a basic social institution w/c
even in void marriages. The CA reversed on the public policy cherishes & protects. Consequently,
ground that there was no evidence that the lots family relations are governed by law & no
were acquired through joint efforts, Melbourne custom, practice or agreement destructive of the
being the one who was employed & Regina was family shall be recognized or given effect.
not. Also, Art.144 should not be applied
retroactively. ART. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband & wife;
Held: Under Art. 144 CC (Art. 147 FC), co- (2) Between parents & children;
ownership arises even if a common-law wife does (3) Among other ascendants & descendants;
not work or is not gainfully employed. The Filipino &
woman traditionally runs the household & holds the (4) Among brothers & sisters, whether of the
family purse even if she does not contribute full or half-blood.
thereto.

The wedding in 1903 was not valid. In this BALANE: The enumeration under 150 of who is
case, the couple got married only in 1919 after a member of a family is exclusive for the purpose
living as common-law spouses before that. But stated in Art. 151
considerations of justice dictate that Art. 144 be
retroactively applied. Prior to the NCC, the
formation of an informal civil partnership between a

115
ART. 151. No suit between members of the (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
same family shall prosper unless it should appear fr. brothers & sisters, whether the relationship be
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the
toward a compromise have been made, but that the family home & who depend upon the head of the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts family for legal support.
were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
ART. 155. The family home shall be exempt
This rule shall not apply to cases w/c may not fr. execution, forced sale or attachment except:
be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home;
BALANE: If on either side of the litigation, a third (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
party is present in addition to the family member, premises before or after such constitution;
then Art. 151 does not apply. (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders, materialsmen & others who
have rendered service or furnished material for
ALAVADO V. CITY GOV'T the construction of the building.

HELD: Persons dwelling together in apparent ART. 156. The family home must be part of
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any the properties of the absolute community or the
counter-presumption or evidence special to the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such properties of either spouse w/ the latter's
is the common order of society, & if the parties consent. It may also be constituted by an
were not what they thus hold themselves out as unmarried head of a family on his or her own
being, they would be living in the constant violation property.
of decency & of law. Nevertheless, property that is the subject
of a conditional sale on installments where
ownership is reserved by the vendor only to
B. FAMILY HOME guarantee payment of the purchase price may be
constituted as a family home.

ART. 152. The family home, constituted jointly ART. 157. The actual value of the family
by the husband & the wife or by an unmarried head home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitu-
of a family, is the dwelling house where they & their tion, the amount of three hundred thousand
family reside, & the land on w/c it is situated. (P300,000) in urban areas & two hundred
thousand (P200,000) in rural areas, or such
amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.
BALANE: An unmarried head of a family may
constitute a family home. In any event, if the value of the currency
changes after the adoption of this Code, the
value most favorable for the constitution of a
ART. 153. The family home is deemed family home shall be the basis of evaluation.
constituted on a house & lot fr. the time it is occu-
pied as a family residence. From the time of its For purposes of this Article, urban areas are
constitution & so long as any of its beneficiaries deemed to include chartered cities & munici-
actually resides therein, the family home continues palities whose annual income at least equals that
to be such & is exempt fr. execution, forced sale or legally required for chartered cities. All others are
attachment except as hereinafter provided & to the deemed to be rural areas.
extent of the value allowed by law.

ART. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home BALANE: Under the NCC, there was no
are: provision for adjustment of the value of the
family home. The ceiling was pegged at
(1) The husband & wife, or an unmarried
P30,000. Under the FC, this ceiling was
person who is the head of a family; & increased. The FC further provided for a
flexibility clause under Art. 157.2 "value most
116
favorable for the constitution of a family home shall ART. 161. For purposes of availing of the
be the basis..." benefits of a family home as provided for in this
Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the
beneficiary of, only one family home.
ART. 158. The family home may be sold,
alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the ART. 162. The provisions in this Chapter
owner or owners thereof w/ the written consent of shall also govern existing family residences
the person constituting the same, the latter's insofar as said provisions are applicable.
spouse, & a majority of the beneficiaries of legal
age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide.
NOTES: The main change fr. the provisions of
the NCC is that under the FC, there is de facto or
BALANE: Although this article states that the automatic constitution of the family home
consent of the head & a majority of the
beneficiaries is required before The rationale behind this is to protect the
alienation/encumbrance of the family home, the law family fr. the tragic consequence of losing the
is not clear as to the consequences of not obtaining dwelling to creditors.
such consent. Under 1403, it would seem as if the
contract shall be unenforceable. Baviera cases:

ART. 159. The family home shall continue


despite the death of one or both spouses or of the MODEQUILLO V. BREVA [185 S 766 (1990)]
unmarried head of the family for a period of ten
years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, FACTS: A judgment was rendered against
& the heirs cannot partition the same unless the Modequillo as a result of w/c certain goods &
court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule chattels belonging to him were levied upon. M
shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property filed a motion to set aside levy of execution on
or constituted the family home. the ground that the levied residential land is
where the family home is built. As such, he
ART. 160. When a creditor whose claim is not contended that this land is exempt fr. execution
among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a under Arts. 152 & 153 of the FC.
judgment in his favor, & he has reasonable grounds
to believe that the family home is actually worth HELD: Under the Family Code, a family home is
more than the maximum amount fixed in Article deemed constituted on a house & lot fr. the time
157, he may apply to the court w/c rendered the it is occupied as a family residence. There is NO
judgment for an order directing the sale of the NEED to constitute the same judicially or
property under execution. The court shall so order if extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the
it finds that the actual value of the family home family actually resides in the premises, it is,
exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of therefore, a family home as contemplated by law.
the time of its constitution. If the increased actual Thus, the creditors should take the necessary
value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 precautions to protect their interest before
& results fr. subsequent voluntary improvements extending credit to the spouses or head of the
introduced by the person or persons constituting family who owns the home.
the family home, by the owner or owners of the
property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same Art. 162 FC simply means that all existing
rule & procedure shall apply. family residences at the time of the effectivity of
the Family Code (AUGUST 3, 1988), are
At the execution sale, no bid below the value considered family homes & are prospectively
allowed for a family home shall be considered. The entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
proceeds shall be applied first to the amount under the Family Code. Art. 162 FC does not
mentioned in Article 157, & then to the liabilities state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V
under the judgment & the costs. The excess, if any, have a retroactive effect.
shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.
GAYON V. GAYON

117
HELD: Art. 222 of the CC (Art. 151 NCC) is an HELD: Earnest efforts towards a compromise is
exception to the general rule & should thus be a condition precedent to filing of suits between
construed strictly. Inasmuch as a sister-in-law, members of the same family, non-compliance of
nephew, niece are not included in the enumeration w/c, the complaint is assailable at any stage of
contained in Art. 217, then it follows that this case the proceedings for lack of cause of action.
does not fall w/in Art. 222. Failure to seek a
compromise before the filing of the complaint does
not bar the action. ART. 2035. No compromise upon the
following questions shall be valid:
WAINRIGHT V. VERSOZA (1) The civil status of persons;
HELD: Compromise on future support is (2) The validity of marriage or a legal
proscribed. An attempt to compromise future separation;
support is not a condition precedent to the filing of (3) Any ground for legal separation;
a suit therefor & it need not be alleged in the (4) Future support;
complaint. A showing of previous efforts to (5) The jurisdiction of courts;
compromise future support would be superfluous. (6) Future legitime. (Civil Code.)

MANACOP VS. CA [215 SCRA 773] ART. 215. No descendant shall be


compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against
HELD: It does not mean that Articles 152 & 153 his parents & grandparents, except when such
FC have a retroactive effect such that all existing testimony is indispensable in a crime against the
family residences are deemed to have been descendant or by one parent against the other.
constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the FC & are
exempt fr. execution for the payment of obligations BALANE: Art. 160 provides the remedy of the
incurred before the effectivity of the FC. creditor where the value of the family home is in
excess of the ceiling
Art. 162 simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the The family home will be sold (but replacement
FC, are considered family homes & are prospectively should exist). The value for such replacement
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home should be set aside. Any excess shall accrue to
the creditor.
under the FC. Art. 162 does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive
effect.
IX. PATERNITY & FILIATION
MAGBALETA V. GONONG
Paternity - includes maternity; means the
HELD: Where one of the parties to a civil litigation relationship or status of a person w/ respect to
is not a member of the family while some of the his or her child.
family members are adverse parties to the said suit,
lack of earnest efforts to reach a compromise Filiation - means the status of a person w/
should not be considered a jurisdictional requisite to respect to his or her parents.
the maintenance of an action.
Note that under the Family Code, there are no
DE GUZMAN V. GENATO more sub-distinctions under the classification of
illegitimate children.
HELD: Substantial compliance of the requirement
of earnest efforts towards a compromise is enough.
It is not necessary that the plaintiff should expressly Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by
use the terms of the statute, i.e. "that earnest nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be
efforts towards a compromise have been made, but legitimate or illegitimate.
that the same have failed" in his pleadings in order
to comply w/ the requirement. Art. 164. Children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
O'LAO V. CO CHO CHIT

118
Children conceived as a result of artificial Art. 165. Children conceived & born outside a
insemination of the wife w/ the sperm of the valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise
husband or that of a donor or both are likewise provided in this Code.
legitimate children of the husband & his wife,
provided, that both of them authorized or ratified
such insemination in a written instrument executed BAVIERA: The clause “unless otherwise
& signed by them before the birth of the child. The provided in this Code” refers to Art. 54.
instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry
together w/ the birth certificate of the child.

Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be


BALANE: impugned only on the following grounds:
Legitimate - conceived or born during the marriage; (1) That it was physically impossible for the
the presumption is always in favor of legitimacy. husband to have sexual intercourse w/ his wife
w/in the first 120 days of the 300 days w/c
Artificial insemination: 3 ways permissible: immediately preceded the birth of the child bec.
artificial insemination husband (AIH)--using the of:
sperm of the husband--homologous (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
artificial insemination donor (AID) -- heterologous have sexual intercourse w/ his wife;
artificial insemination combined (AIC)
(b) the fact that the husband & wife were
living separately in such a way that sexual inter-
course was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, w/c
Requirements: absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;

authorization/ratification of both spouses; (2) That it is proved that for biological or


written instrument; other scientific reasons, the child could not have
the document should be executed & signed before been that of the husband, except in the instance
the child's birth;
registration in the Civil Registry is not a requirement provided in the second paragraph of Article 164
for validity. (artificial insemination); or

Presumption of Legitimacy. The presumption of (3) That in case of children conceived


legitimacy is an example of a quasi-conclusive through artificial insemination, the written
presumption. This presumption may be rebutted authorization or ratification of either parent was
only on the grounds provided in Art. 166. obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence.
To impugn legitimacy, show that during the
1st 120 days of the 300 days preceding the birth,
there was physical impossibility of access between
husband & wife. ANDAL V. MACARAIG [100 SCRA 73]

Physical impossibility of access may be shown by Facts: The H died on 1/1/43. The boy whose
preponderance of evidence: legitimacy is in question was born on 6/17/43. If
the boy is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled
may show impotence;
to inherit the land in question. Lower court
that the spouses were living separately & sexual
intercourse was not possible; or declared the boy as the legitimate child of the H
serious illness making sexual intercourse impossible. & owner of the land.

Art. 166.1 has no application when the conception HELD: The boy is presumed to be the legitimate
is by artificial insemination. son of said H & his W, he having been born w/in
300 days following the dissolution of the
Suppose the consent or ratification was obtained marriage. The presumption can only be rebutted
through the means mentioned in 166 (3) but the by proof that it was physically impossible for the
semen used was that of the husband...will this
rebut the quasi-conclusive presumption? H to have access to her W during the first 120
days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of
the child. The fact that the wife has committed
adultery cannot overcome this presumption.
119
Although the H was suffering fr. serious riage is considered to have been conceived
tuberculosis, yet there is no evidence of impotence during such marriage, even though it be born
nor does it prevent carnal intercourse. w/in the three hundred days after the termination
of the former marriage.
MACADANGDANG V. CA [100 SCRA 73]
Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
HELD: The child Rolando is presumed to be the child born after three hundred days following the
legitimate son of resp. & her spouse. This termination of the marriage shall be proved by
presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.
proof that there was physical impossibility of access
between the spouses in the first 120 days of the Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy
300 days w/c preceded the birth of the child. of the child shall be brought w/in one year fr. the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil
register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any
Art. 167. The children shall be considered of his heirs, should reside in the city or
legitimate although the mother may have declared municipality where the birth took place or was
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced recorded.
as an adulteress.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his
heirs do not reside at the place of birth as
BAVIERA: If W, who is married to H, is a defined in the first paragraph or where it was
victim of rape, the child conceived shall not recorded, the period shall be two years if they
be acknowledged by the rapist. REASON: It should reside in the Philippines; & three years if
is possible that the child is the husband’s. abroad. If the birth of the child has been
concealed fr. or was unknown to the husband or
his heirs, the period shall be counted fr. the
discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or
of the fact of registration of said birth, w/cever is
earlier.
CHUA KENG GIAP V. IAC [158 SCRA 18]

HELD: In the case of Sy Kao v. CA, Sy Kao flatly &


unequivocably declared that she was not the LIM VS. IAC [166 SCRA 451]
petitioner's mother.
xxx HELD: The finding of the trial court & the CA
Who better than Sy Kao herself would know that Violeta Cabatbat was not born of Esperanza
if Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than Cabatbat is a factual finding based on the
any one else, it was Sy Kao who could say-- as evidence presented at the trial, & hence, it is
indeed she has said these many years-- that Chua conclusive upon Us.
Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.
Petitioner's recourse to Art. 263, NCC,
now Art. 170, FC is not well-taken. This legal
Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated & the
provision refers to an action to impugn
mother contracted another marriage w/in three
legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case bec. this
hundred days after such termination of the former
is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of
child, but an action of the prvt resps. to claim
proof to the contrary:
their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage
deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child
is considered to have been conceived during the
at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor
former marriage, provided it be born w/in three
an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by
hundred days after the termination of the former
legal fiction of Esperanza, Violeta is not a legal
marriage;
heir of the deceased.
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days
following the celebration of the subsequent mar-
120
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn Compulsory Recognition
the filiation of the child w/in the period prescribed in
the preceding article only in the following cases: To compel the father to acknowledge the
(1) If the husband should die before the child, e.g., the rapist is compelled to
expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; acknowledge child begotten thru rape.
(2) If he should die after the filing of the
complaint, w/o having desisted therefr.; or Proof: Open & continuous possession of
(3) If the child was born after the death of the status as child – not secret; known to the
husband. community.

Proof: Where there is cohabitation, that


BALANE: Art. 170-171 .Anent who can impugn the conception coincided w/ the period of
the legitimacy of a child--the period for such must cohabitation.
be reckoned fr. knowledge of either the birth or the
recording of such birth...choice of reckoning Proof: In an authentic handwriting of the
point...except when birth is concealed, then the father – handwritten instrument signed by
reckoning period is fr. discovery or knowledge of him.
birth or discovery or knowledge of recording,
w/cever is earlier.
HOWEVER, the child has to bring action
during lifetime of putative parent.
EXCEPTION: Putative parent dies during
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is minority of the child.
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a BALANE: With regard to open & continuous
public document or a private handwritten possession of the status of a legitimate child...the
instrument & signed by the parent concerned. possession in this case of such status must not be
sporadic or intermittent possession of such status
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the for an appreciable time is sufficient...it need not
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: be for the lifetime of the child.
(1) The open & continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of DIAZ VS. CA [129 SCRA 621]
Court & special laws.
HELD: Absence of maternal surname of the
decedent in his certificate of admission to the
Phil. Bar does not disprove legitimacy, as
BAVIERA:
dropping of maternal surname in documents is
commonplace.
Under the NCC: Recognition of Filiation other
than legitimate
Although the last will & testament cannot
prove pedigree, it is not considered as
Voluntary Recognition
independent evidence but collectively w/ other
Putative father acknowledges child as his in
evidence on record to prove decedent's
the record of birth under oath & signed by
legitimacy.
him.

Acknowledgment is contained in a last will & Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may
testament. be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
& shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
Acknowledges child before a court of record. child die during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
Acknowledgment is contained in an authentic five years w/in w/c to institute the action.
document, e.g., ITR, SSS Application.

121
The action already commenced by the child Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish
shall survive notw/standing the death of either or their illegitimate filiation in the same way & on
both of the parties. the same evidence as legitimate children.

BAVIERA: Unless it falls under the 2


exceptions,
BAVIERA: The action must [MAY - typo
(1) child dies during minority error corrected by Baviera] be brought
(2) child is in a state of insanity w/in the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on
the right to file this action is not the second paragraph of Article 172, in w/c
transmissible to heirs. case the action may [MUST - Baviera] be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
BALANE: The action in this case is generally
intransmissible except when the child dies during
minority, or the child dies in a state of insanity or Balane: The FC rules were meant to liberalize
the child dies pendente lite the rules of the NCC on illegitimacy...there is no
more need for recognition (w/c was required
under the NCC) proof of illegitimacy is now
MARQUINO VS. IAC [233 SCRA 348] sufficient.
HELD: Under Art. 285 (Civil Code), the right of
action for the acknowledgment of natural children JAO VS. CA [152 SCRA 359]
can never be transmitted -- her death tolled the
action. In an action for compulsory recognition, the HELD: Blood grouping tests are conclusive as to
party in best position to oppose the same is the non-paternity but not as to paternity. The fact
putative parent himself. (However, Art. 285 was that the blood type of the child is a possible
already superseded by Art. 173, FC, Child can now product of the mother & the alleged father does
bring the action during his lifetime even after the not inconclusively prove that the child is born by
death of parents. But Art. 173 cannot be given such parents; but if the blood type of the child is
retroactive effect bec. it will prejudice the vested not the possible blood type when the blood of the
rights of the heirs of the putative parent transmitted mother & the alleged father are crossmatched,
to them after the latter's death. then the child cannot possibly be that of the
alleged father.
DLC: The action for compulsory recognition
commenced by the illegitimate child during the The cohabitation between the mother &
lifetime of the putative parent is abated by the the supposed father cannot be a ground for
death of such parent. compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could
not have produced the conception of the child.
Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the This would be the case, for instance, if the
right: cohabitation took place outside of the period of
(1) To bear the surnames of the father & the conception of the child. Likewise, if it can be
mother, in conformity w/ the provisions of the Civil proved by blood tests that the child & the
Code on Surnames; supposed father belong to different blood groups,
(2) To receive support fr. their parents, their the cohabitation by itself cannot be a ground for
ascendants, & in proper cases, their brothers & recognition.
sisters, in conformity w/ the provisions of this Code
on Support; UYGUANGCO VS. CA [178 SCRA 684]
(3) To be entitled to the legitime & other
successional rights granted to them by the Civil HELD: Case cites Art. 172 (2nd par.): when the
Code. action is based on second par. of Art.172, the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent. 2nd par of 172: In the absence of

122
the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by: a) open & continuous possession, b) BALANE: Anent legitimated children...the
other means allowed by the Rules of Court. parents of the child must not be disqualified fr.
marrying one another at the point of conception.
While PR admits that he has none of the
So if the parents of the child, at the latter's
documents mentioned in par.1, he insists that he conception, were 16 & 15 years old, the child
has nevertheless been in "open & continuous may not be legitimated.
possession of the status of a legitimate child." The
problem of PR is that since he seeks to prove his
filiation under par. 2, he is now barred bec. of his
Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a
alleged father's death in 1975. The putative father's
subsequent valid marriage between parents. The
death in 1975, made the Civil Code applicable to
annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect
him & not the Family Code. Thus, PR cannot prove
the legitimation.
his illegitimate filiation bec. of his father's death.
Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the
same rights as legitimate children.
MENDOZA VS. CA [201 SCRA 675]
Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall
retroact to the time of the child's birth.
HELD: To establish "the open & continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is
Art. 181. The legitimation of children who
necessary to comply w/ certain jurisprudential
died before the celebration of the marriage shall
requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the
benefit their descendants.
concession of status shall continue forever but only
that it shall not be of an intermittent character while
Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only
it continues. The possession of such status means
by those who are prejudiced in their rights, w/in
that the father has treated the child as his own,
five years fr. the time their cause of action
directly & not through others, spontaneously & w/o
accrues.
concealment though w/o publicity (since the relation
is illegitimate.) There must a showing of permanent
intention of the suppose father to consider the child
as his own, by continuous & clear manifestation of Baviera Cases:
affection & care.
TAYAG V. CA 209 S 588 (1992)]

FACTS: E. Cuyugan, in her capacity as mother &


Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
guardian of minor Chad, filed a Claim for
surname & shall be under the parental authority of
Inheritance against the admin of the estate of
their mother, & shall be entitled to support in
Tayag. E contended that she had an amorous
conformity w/ this Code. The legitime of each
relationship w/ & that as a consequence thereof,
illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the
she gave birth to C. E presented as evidence
legitime of a legitimate child.
several letters fr. T w/c provide, inter alia, “I have
vowed to recognize him & be my heir. After all,
we love each other & Chad is the product of our
BALANE: Anent the right of an illegitimate child in love…”
compulsory & intestate succession...the illegitimate
child shall be entitled to 1/2 of the share of the
legitimate child. HELD: An action to compel recognition & an
action to claim inheritance may be joined in one
complaint. There is no absolute necessity
requiring that the action to compel
Art. 177. Only children conceived & born
acknowledgment should have been instituted &
outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the
the conception of the former, were not disqualified
action in w/c the same plaintiff seeks additional
by any impediment to marry each other may be
relief in the character of heir.
legitimated.

123
Under Art. 285 of the Civil Code, if the This prohibition merely refers to
mother or father died during minority, an action for VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION & not to a
recognition of natural based on oral proof may be compulsory one. It merely refers to the act of
brought by the child before the expiration of four recognition & does not prevent inquiry into the
years fr. attainment of majority. identity of the other party in case an action is
brought in court to contest recognition.
However, under Art. 175 of the Family
Code, if the action is based on oral proof, it must be NOTE: Arts. 276-280 have been repealed
filed during the lifetime of the parent. The Family by the FC. Ma’am says that although the
Code cannot be given retroactive effect bec. it will mother’s testimony is admissible, its
impair vested rights. The right of action of the child probative value is insignificant.
has already vested by the filing of the case under
the Civil Code, before the enactment of the Family BAVIERA: Under the NCC, the family home
Code . Such right can no longer be prejudiced or is constituted either:
impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Judicially – all creditors are notified. FH is
BENITEZ V. CA [229 S 468 (1994)] exempt EXCEPT as to taxes &
encumbrances.
FACTS: The spouses Benitez owned several
properties. During their lifetime, they raised since Extrajudicially – mere sworn statement
childhood one Marissa-Benitez Badua. Upon their registered w/ the Registry of Deeds.
death (H & W), the collateral relatives of the H Exempts only as regards debts contracted
prayed for the issuance of letters of admin in their AFTER constitution. Exceptions: taxes,
favor alleging that M is not related to the spouses encumbrances.
by blood, nor is she legally adopted. As such, M
should not be considered a legal heir.

HELD: The claim for inheritance of a child who is X. ADOPTION


not the biological or adopted child of deceased was
denied, on the ground that Articles 164, 166, 170, &
171 of the Family Code do not contemplate a WHAT IS ADOPTION?
situation where a child is alleged not to be the child
by nature or biological child of a certain couple. A fiction created by law to give (establish) a
Rather, these articles govern a situation where the relation of people where none previously existed.
husband or his heirs denies as his own a child of his
wife. A juridical act, proceeding in rem, w/c creates
between two persons a relationship similar to
RODRIGUEZ VS., CA [245 SCRA 150] that w/c results of legitimate paternity & filiation.

Adoption, in modern trends, is deemed not


FACTS: A. Agbulos brought an action for merely an act to establish the relation of paternity
recognition & support against Rodriguez. During & filiation but one w/c gives the child a legitimate
the trial, A presented his mother as a witness. status.
When she was asked to reveal the identity of A’s
father, R’s lawyer raised a timely objection.. R It is in this sense that adoption is now defined as
contends that the mother should not be allowed to a "juridical act w/c creates between two persons
reveal the name of A’s father since it is prohibited a relationship similar to that w/c results fr.
by Art. 280, NCC. legitimate paternity & filiation.

Since adoption establishes the relationship of


HELD: Art. 280 provides that when the father or
paternity & filiation, it must as a consequence
the mother makes the recognition separately. He or involve two perspectives - fr. that of the adopting
she shall not reveal the name of the person w/ parent & fr. that of the adopted child.
whom she had the child; neither shall he or she
state any circumstance whereby the other party As used in the family law the relationship of
may be identified. paternity & filiation is that w/c exists between
parents & their children. This tie or relationship
may arise only either fr. nature, when a child is

124
born, or by legal fiction, as when a child is legally In addition, the adopter must be at least
adopted. sixteen years older than the person to be
Paternity is the state or condition of being a father, adopted, unless the adopter is the parent by
whereas "filiation" is the descent of son or nature of the adopted, or is the spouse of the
daughter, w/ regard to his or her father, mother, & legitimate parent of the person to be adopted.
their ancestors.

Under family law, "paternity" generally includes BALANE: This article gives the basic rule: the
"maternity" w/c is the status of being a mother. adopter need not be married & need not be
childless...the adopter may still adopt so long as
he is able to support his legitimate or illegitimate
PURPOSE OF ADOPTION children.
To provide homes, parental care & education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children & give
them the protection of society & family in the Art. 185. Husband & wife must jointly adopt,
person of the adopter, & at the same time, allow except in the following cases:
childless couples or persons to experience the joys
of parenthood & give them legally a child in the (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their illegitimate child; or
natural parental instincts (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
Promotion of the best interest & welfare of the child legitimate child of the other.

NATURE OF ADOPTION PROCEEDING REPUBLIC V. CA [227 SCRA 401]

Adoption as a juridical act is a proceeding in rem. FACTS: Hughes, a natural born US citizen
married Mabunay, a Filipina. Subsequently, M
Proceedings in rem are court actions where the
whole world is a party, whether w/in or w/o the was naturalized as a US citizen. The spouses
territorial jurisdiction of the forum, such that the filed a petition for adoption of the three minor
decree made is binding on all persons, whether niece & nephews of M.
personally notified or merely through constructive
notice. ISSUE: WON the couple is allowed by law to
adopt said minors.
Consequently, no court may entertain a petition for
adoption unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the HELD: In cases where the spouses are required
subject matter of the case & over the parties, but
to jointly adopt, both of them must be qualified
also, over the res - i.e., the personal status of both
the person to be adopted & person adopting. to adopt.

Testamentary & extrajudicial adoptions practiced in While H, a natural born US citizen, is not
some countries are not recognized in this permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional
jurisdiction. cases enumerated in par. 3 of Art. 184, M,
however, can qualify pursuant to par. 3 (a) of the
WHO MAY ADOPT same Art. The problem in her case lies, however,
w/ Art. 185 w/c requires H & W to adopt jointly, a
condition that must be read along together w/
Art. 183. A person of age & in possession of Art. 184. The spouses who are required by law
full civil capacity & legal rights may adopt, provided to adopt jointly must both be qualified to so
he is in a position to support & care for his children, adopt. In this case, while M is qualified, H is not.
legitimate or illegitimate, in keeping w/ the means Hence, they cannot adopt.
of the family.

Only minors may be adopted, except in the Art. 186. In case husband & wife jointly
cases where the adoption of a person of majority adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child
age is allowed in this Title of the other, joint parental authority shall be

125
exercised by the spouses in accordance w/ this
Code. Evelyn, on the other hand, appears to
qualify pursuant to par. 3 (a) of Art. 184. She
was a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption
WHO MAY NOT ADOPT
cannot be granted in her favor alone w/o
violating Art. 185 w/c mandates that H & W
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt: should adopt jointly. Art. 185 requires a joint
(1) the guardian w/ respect to the ward prior to adoption by the H & W, a condition that must be
the approval of the final accounts rendered upon read along w/ Art. 184.
the termination of their guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude; WHO MAY BE ADOPTED
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to General Rule: Only a minor may be adopted.
adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate Exception: Art. 182 3rd paragraph... & the case
child of his or her Filipino spouse; or where prior to adoption, the child had already
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen been de facto adopted.
& seeks to adopt jointly w/ his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter.
WHO MAY NOT BE ADOPTED
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions
may adopt Filipino children in accordance w/ the Art. 187. The following may not be adopted:
rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided (1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is
by law. a child by nature of the adopter or his or her
spouse, or prior to the adoption, said person had
been consistently considered & treated by the
BALANE: Anent the disqualification of an alien fr. adopter as his or her own child during minority.
adopting, RA 8043 provides for inter-country (2) An alien w/ whose government the
adoption. The Implementing Rules & Regulations Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic
have already been approved (Dec.26, 1995)...even relations; &
if alien is not in the Philippines, he may now adopt (3) A person who has already been adopted
under ICAL
unless such adoption has been previously
Q: Suppose A is a foreigner & B is a former Filipina. revoked or rescinded.
B has a nephew C. Can A & B adopt C?

A: No. B can adopt X under Art. 184.3. But under BALANE: Suppose a child has been previously
Art. 185, B cannot adopt X w/o joining her husband adopted, but is to be adopted now by the spouse
(Republic v. Toledano) of the previous adopter. Applying Art. 187.3
literally, the spouse may not adopt. There is a
Art. 184 should be read together w/ Art. 185. need to reconcile the apparent conflict between
Art. 185 & Art. 187.3

REPUBLIC V. TOLEDANO [233 SCRA 9]


WHERE FILED
HELD: In case the husband & wife are required
by law to adopt jointly, both of them must be Sec. 1, Rule 99. Venue. A person desiring to
qualified to & not disqualified to adopt. adopt another or have the custody of a minor
shall present his petition to the CFI of the
There can be no question that Alvin Clouse province, or the municipal or justice of the peace
(a natural born US citizen) is not qualified to adopt court of the city or municipality in w/c he resides.
under any of the exceptions found in Art. 184. In In the City of Manila, the proceedings
the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen. In shall be instituted in the JDRC.
the second place, Solomon is neither his relative by
consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. PROCEDURE

126
Sec. 4, Rule 99. Order for hearing. - If the
Sec. 2, Rule 99. Contents of petition. The petition & consent filed are sufficient in form &
petition for adoption shall contain the same substance, the court, by an order reciting the
allegations required in a petition for guardianship, to purpose of the petition, shall fix a date & place
wit: for the hearing thereof, w/c date shall not be
(a) The jurisdictional facts; more than six (6) months after the entry of the
(b) The qualifications of the adopter; order, & shall direct that a copy of the order be
(c) That the adopter is not disqualified by published before the hearing at least once a
law; week for three (3) successive weeks in some
(d) The name, age, & residence of the newspaper of general circulation published in the
person to be adopted & of his relatives or of the province, as the court shall deem best.
persons who have him under their care;
(e) The probable value & character of the Sec. 5, Rule 99. Hearing & judgment. - Upon
estate of the person to be adopted. satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed
in the order that such order has been published
Sec. 3, Rule 99. Consent to adoption. - There as directed, that the allegations of the petition
shall be filed w/ the petition a written consent to are true, & that it is a proper case for adoption &
the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years the petitioner or petitioners are able to bring up
of age or over & not incompetent, & by the child's & educate the child properly, the court shall
spouse, if any, & by each of its known living parents adjudge that thenceforth the child is freed fr. all
who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate, or has legal obligations of obedience & maintenance w/
not abandoned such child, or if there are no such respect to its natural parents, except the mother
parents by the general guardian or guardian ad when the child is adopted by her husband, & is,
litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of to all legal intents & purposes, the child of the
an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent petitioner or petitioners, & that its surname is
society or person, by the proper officer or officers of changed to that of the petitioner or petitioners.
such asylum, home, or society or by such person; The adopted person or child shall
but if the child is illegitimate & has not been thereupon become the legal heir of his parents by
recognized, the consent of the father to the adoption & shall also remain the legal heir of his
adoption shall not be required. If the person to be parents.
adopted is of age, only his or her consent & that of
the spouse, if any, shall be required. In case of death of the adopted person or
child, his parents & relatives by nature, & not by
Art. 188. The written consent of the following adoption, shall be his legal heir.
to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1)The person to be adopted, if ten years of Sec. 6, Rule 99. Proceedings as to child
age or over; whose parents are separated. Appeal. - When
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal husband & wife are divorced or living separately
guardian, or the proper governmental instrumental- & apart fr. each other, & the question as to the
ity; care, custody, & control of a child or children of
(3) The legitimate & adopted children, ten years their marriage is brought before a CFI by petition
of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents; or as an incident to any other proceeding, the
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or court, upon hearing the testimony as may be
over, of the adopting parent, if living w/ said parent pertinent, shall award the care, custody, &
& the latter's spouse, if any; & control of each such child as will be for its best
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting interest, permitting the child to choose w/c
or to be adopted. parent it prefers to live w/ if it be over ten years
of age, unless the parent so chosen be unfit to
take charge of the child by reason of moral
BALANE: 188.2 will not apply to the father of an depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or
illegitimate child...who has no parental authority poverty.
over the child.
If, upon such hearing, it appears that both
parents are improper persons to have the care,
custody, & control of the child, the court may

127
either designate the paternal or maternal grandpar- recognized legal association, or any appointed de
ent of the child, or his oldest brother or sister, or officio counsel upon being informed of such fact,
some reputable & discreet person to take charge of to represent the DSWD in the proceedings. The
such child, or commit it to any suitable asylum, costs of such proceedings shall be de officio.
children's home, or benevolent society.
dependent child - one who is w/o a parent,
The court may in conformity w/ the provisions guardian or custodian; or one whose parents,
of the Civil Code order either or both parents to guardian or other custodian for good cause
support or help support said child, irrespective of desires to be relieved of his care & custody; & is
who may be its custodian, & may make any order dependent upon the public for support.
that is just & reasonable permitting the parent who
is deprived of its care & custody to visit the child or abandoned child - one who has no proper
have temporary custody thereof. parental care or guardianship, or whose parents
or guardians have deserted him for a period of at
Either parent may appeal fr. an order made in least six continuous months.
accordance w/ the provisions of this section.
Neglected child - one whose basic needs
No child under five (5) years of age shall be have been deliberately unattended or
separated fr. its mother, unless the court finds there inadequately attended. Neglect may occur in two
are compelling reasons therefor. (as amended by ways:
PD 603)
a) physical neglect - when the child is
malnourished, ill clad & w/o proper shelter.
Sec. 7, Rule 99. Proceedings as to vagrant or
abused child. - When the parents of any minor child A child is unattended when left by himself
are dead or by reason of long absence or legal or w/o provisions for his needs &/or w/o proper
physical disability have abandoned it, or cannot supervision.
support it through vagrancy, negligence, or
misconduct, or neglect or refuse to support it, or b) emotional neglect - when children are
treat it w/ excessive harshness or give it corrupting maltreated, raped or seduced; when children are
orders, counsels, or examples, or cause or allow it exploited, overworked or made to work under
to engage in begging, or to commit offenses against conditions not conducive to good health; or are
the law, the proper CFI, upon petition filed by some made to beg in the streets or public places, or
reputable resident of the province setting forth the when children are in moral danger, or exposed to
facts, may issue an order requiring such parents to gambling, prostitution & other vices.
show cause, or, if the parents are dead or cannot
be found, requiring the fiscal of the province to Art. 156, PD 603. Legal Custody. - When any
show cause, at a time & place fixed in the order, child shall have been committed in accordance w/
why the child should not be taken fr. its parents, if the preceding article & such child shall have been
living; & if upon the hearing it appears that the accepted by the DSWD or any duly licensed child
allegations of the petition are true, & that it is for placement agency or individual, the rights of his
the best interest of the child, the court may make natural parents, guardian, or other custodian to
an order taking it fr. its parents, if living; & exercise parental authority over him shall cease.
committing it to any suitable orphan asylum, Such agency or individual shall be
children's home, or benevolent society or person to entitled to the custody & control of such child
ultimately placed, by adoption or otherwise, in a during his minority, & shall have authority to care
home found for it by such asylum, children's home, for, educate, train & place him out temporarily or
society, or person. for custody & care in a duly licensed child
placement agency.
Art. 162, PD 603. Adoption of Dependent or
Abandoned or Neglected Child. - Upon the filing of Such agency or individual may intervene in
an application by any person to adopt a dependent, adoption proceedings in such manner as shall
abandoned or neglected child in the custody of any best inure to the child's welfare.
institution or individual mentioned in Article 156, it
shall be the duty of the provincial or city fiscal, any

128
Sec. 8, Rule 99. Service of judgment. - Final
orders or judgments under this rule shall be served Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the
by the clerk upon the civil registrar of the city or estate of the adopted shall be governed by the
municipality wherein the court issuing the same is following rules:
situated.
(1) Legitimate & illegitimate children &
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION descendants & the surviving spouse of the
adopted shall inherit fr. the adopted, in
accordance w/ the ordinary rules of legal or
Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following
intestate succession;
effects:
(2) When the parent, legitimate or
illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted child shall be
adopted concur w/ the adopters, they shall divide
deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters &
the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the
both shall acquire the reciprocal rights & obligations
parents or ascendants & the other half, by the
arising fr. the relationship of parent & child,
adopters;
including the right of the adopted to use the
(3) When the surviving spouse or the
surname of the adopters;
illegitimate children of the adopted concur w/ the
(2) The parental authority of the parents by
adopters, they shall divide the entire estate in
nature over the adopted shall terminate & be vested
equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the
in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the
spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted
spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted,
& the other half, by the adopters.
parental authority over the adopted shall be
(4) When the adopters concur w/ the
exercised jointly by both spouses;
illegitimate children & the surviving spouse of the
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir
adopted, they shall divide the entire estate in
of his parents & other blood relatives.
equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the
illegitimate children, one-third by the surviving
spouse, & one-third by the adopters;
LAZATIN VS. CAMPOS [92 SCRA 440] (5) When only the adopters survive, they
shall inherit the entire estate; &
HELD: Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in (6) When only collateral blood relatives of the
rem, w/c creates between two persons a adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal
relationship similar to that w/c results fr. legitimate or intestate succession shall apply.
paternity & filiation. Only an adoption made
through the court, or in pursuance w/ the procedure
laid down under Rule 99, RC is valid in this
BALANE: This provision is defectively drafted.
jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is It only gives rules w/ regard to intestate
wholly & entirely artificial. To establish the relation, succession...it does not give rules on
the statutory requirements must be carried out, legitimes...who are the adopted's compulsory
otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. heirs & how much are their legitimes.

The fact of adoption is never presumed, but


must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming
its existence. On the contrary, the absence of a WHO MAY FILE PETITION FOR
record of adoption raises the presumption of its RESCISSION OR REVOCATION?
non-existence. Secondary evidence is admissible
only after establishing the prior existence of the A minor or other incapacitated person, through a
instrument lost or destroyed. Declarations of the guardian or guardian ad litem
deceased, made in his lifetime, of any intention to
adopt is not sufficient to establish the fact of Grounds: for the same causes that authorize
deprivation of parental authority
adoption.

(Note: Records of a court order granting adoption


even if not registered w/ the civil registry, proves
such adoption, & cannot be collaterally attacked in
an intestate proceeding.) The adopter

129
served upon the civil registrar concerned, w/in
Grounds: thirty (30) days fr. rendition thereof, who shall
forthw/ enter the action taken by the court in the
If the adopted person has attempted against the life
of the adopter; register.
When the adopted minor has abandoned the home
of the adopter for more than three (3) years; Sec. 5, Rule 100. Time w/in w/c to file
When by other acts the adopted person has petition.- A minor or other incapacitated person
repudiated the adoption. (Sec. 1, Rule must file the petition for rescission or revocation
100) of adoption w/in the five (5) years following his
majority, or if he was incompetent at the time of
the adoption, w/in five (5) years following the
Art. 191. If the adopted is a minor or otherwise recovery fr. such incompetency.
incapacitated, the adoption may be judicially
rescinded upon petition of any person authorized by The adopter must also file the petition to set
the court or proper government instrumentality aside the adoption w/in five (5) years fr. the time
acting on his behalf, on the same grounds the cause or causes giving rise to the rescission
prescribed for loss or suspension of parental or revocation of the same took place.
authority. If the adopted is at least eighteen years
of age, he may petition for judicial rescission of the EFFECTS
adoption on the same grounds prescribed for
disinheriting an ascendant. Art. 193. If the adopted minor has not
reached the age of majority at the time of the
Art. 192. The adopters may petition the court judicial rescission of the adoption, the court in the
for the judicial rescission of the adoption in any of same proceeding shall reinstate the parental
the following cases: authority of the parents by nature, unless the
latter are disqualified or incapacitated, in w/c
(1) If the adopted has committed any act case the court shall appoint a guardian over the
constituting a ground for disinheriting a descendant; person & property of the minor.
or
If the adopted person is physically or
(2) When the adopted has abandoned the mentally handicapped, the court shall appoint in
home of the adopters during minority for at least the same proceeding a guardian over his person
one year, or, by some other acts, has definitely or property or both.
repudiated the adoption.
Judicial rescission of the adoption shall
extinguish all reciprocal rights & obligations
PROCEDURE between the adopters & the adopted arising fr.
the relationship of parent & child. The adopted
Sec. 2, Rule 100. Order to answer. - The court shall likewise lose the right to use the surnames
in w/c the petition is filed shall issue an order of the adopters & shall resume his or her sur-
requiring the adverse party to answer the petition name prior to the adoption.
w/in fifteen (15) days fr. receipt of a copy thereof.
The order & copy of the petition shall be The court shall accordingly order the
served on the adverse party in such manner as the amendment of the records in the proper
court may direct. registries.

Sec. 3, Rule 99. Judgment. - If upon trial, on


the day set therefor, the court finds that the alle- INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION ACT
gations of the petition are true, it shall render
judgment ordering the rescission or revocation of BAR Q: 1980 – H & W were Filipinos. In 1986,
the adoption, w/ or w/o costs, as justice requires. they became naturalized US citizens. 3 years
later, they seek to adopt a relative w/in the 4th
Sec. 4, Rule 100. Service of judgment. - A degree of consanguinity. Can they do so?
certified copy of the judgment rendered in
A: YES. Under RA 8552, as former Filipino
accordance w/ the next preceding section shall be citizens, they are allowed to adopt said relative.

130
(3) Parents & their legitimate children & the
legitimate & illegitimate children of the latter;
BAVIERA: RA 8552
(4) Parents & their illegitimate children & the
TESTAMENTARY: Adopted is a compulsory legitimate & illegitimate children of the latter; &
heir of adopter but the adopter is NOT necessarily a (5) Legitimate brothers & sisters, whether of
compulsory heir of adopted. Neither is the the full or half-blood.
biological parent a compulsory heir of the adopted.

Basis: RA 8552 Sec. 17. Compared w/ the FC,


there is no reciprocal rights & obligations between BAVIERA: Under the NCC, the illegitimate
adopter & adopted. children of legitimate children, in other
words illegit grandchild, under (3) & (4)
INTESTATE: Adopter & adopted have reciprocal are not included.
rights & obligations. They are therefore legal heir
of each other.

EXCLUDED: Parents by nature who are not the Art. 196. Brothers & sisters not legitimately
adopters. (unlike the FC) related, whether of the full or half-blood, are
likewise bound to support each other to the full
C. Sec. 18 – Last sentence is confusing. extent set forth in Article 194, except only when
the need for support of the brother or sister,
being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the
claimant's fault or negligence.
XI. SUPPORT
Art. 197. For the support of legitimate
ascendants, descendants, whether legitimate or
BAVIERA: Judgment of support never illegitimate, & brothers & sisters, whether
becomes final. Reason: always subject to legitimately or illegitimately related, only the
modification. separate property of the person obliged to give
support shall be answerable provided that in case
RA 6809 – Under Art. 2180 of the NCC, the the obligor has no separate property, the
liability of parents for tortuous acts of their absolute community or the conjugal partnership,
children BELOW 21 still exists. (In other if financially capable, shall advance the support,
words, even if the age of majority is lowered w/c shall be deducted fr. the share of the spouse
to 18, for purposes of Art. 2180, children obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute
below 21 are still considered minors—Fritzie) community or of the conjugal partnership.

Art. 194. Support comprises everything BALANE: Support of a legitimate child should
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, come fr. community property...this article speaks
medical attendance, education & transportation, in of legitimate descendants other than legitimate
children
keeping w/ the financial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be


supported referred to in the preceding paragraph Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal
shall include his schooling or training for some separation or for annulment of marriage, & for
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses &
of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in their children shall be supported fr. the properties
going to & fr. school, or to & fr. place of work. of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership. After final judgment granting the
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the petition the obligation of mutual support between
succeeding articles, the following are obliged to the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal
support each other to the whole extent set forth in separation, the court may order that the guilty
the preceding article: spouse shall give support to the innocent one,
(1) The spouses; specifying the terms of such order.
(2) Legitimate ascendants & descendants;

131
LERMA V. CA [61 SCRA 440]
However, in case of urgent need & by special
HELD:- Adultery is a good defense against a circumstances, the judge may order only one of
petition for support. TA petition in bad faith, such them to furnish the support provisionally, w/o
as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty prejudice to his right to claim fr. the other
of an act w/c constitutes the ground for legal obligors the share due fr. them.
separation, can't be considered as w/in the
intendment of the law granting separate support. When two or more recipients at the same
Under Art. 303, the obligation to give support shall time claim support fr. one & the same person
cease when the recipient, be he a forced heir or legally obliged to give it, should the latter not
not, has committed some act w/c gives rise to have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the
disinheritance; & under Art. 291, one of the causes order established in the preceding article shall be
for disinheriting a spouse is when the spouse has followed, unless the concurrent obligees should
given cause for legal separation. The right to be the spouse & a child subject to parental
separate support or maintenance, even fr. the authority, in w/c case the child shall be preferred.
conjugal partnership property presupposes the
existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse
claiming such right to live separately. BALANE: Art. 200 establishes the order for
recipients of support
REYES V. INES-LUCIANO [88 SCRA 803]
Q: X is being asked for support by different
HELD: While it is true that the adultery of the wife people who are entitled to it. What are the
is a defense in an action for support, the alleged things to remember?
adultery must be established by competent A:
satisfy all if possible
evidence. Mere allegation that the wife has
if he does not have enough to satisfy all, then he
committed adultery will not bar her fr. the right to should go by the order under Art. 200.
receive support pendente lite. During the hearing of
the application for support pendente lite, adultery
must be properly proved to defeat the action for
support. Art. 201. The amount of support, in the
cases referred to in Articles 195 to 196, shall be
in proportion to the resources or means of the
(Note: But if both spouses are guilty of infidelity or
giver & to the necessities of the recipient.
if there has been consent or condonation of the acts
constituting infidelity, the right to support remains.)
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in
the preceding article shall be reduced or
increased proportionately, according to the
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are reduction or increase of the necessities of the
obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve recipient & the resources or means of the person
upon the following persons in the order herein obliged to furnish the same.
provided:
Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall
(1) The spouse; be demandable fr. the time the person who has a
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree; right to receive the same needs it for
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; maintenance, but it shall not be paid except fr.
(4) The brothers & sisters. the date of judicial or extra-judicial demand.

Support pendente lite (See Rule 61) may be


BALANE: It is important to remember the order of claimed in accordance w/ the Rules of Court.
preference given in this article.
Payment shall be made w/in the first five
days of each corresponding month. When the
Art. 200. When the obligation to give support recipient dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to
falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the return what he has received in advance.
same shall be divided between them in proportion
to the resources of each.

132
BALANE: There are two basic rules w/ regard to give support. This Article shall apply particularly
support: (1) demandable when needed & (2) when the father or mother of a child under the
payable when demanded
age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails
Demand for support may either be judicial or to give support to the child when urgently
extrajudicial. needed.

Q: X needed support fr. his father Y fr. 1 Jan 1996. Art. 208. In case of contractual support or
However, X called his father to demand support that given by will, the excess in amount beyond
only on 1 April 1996. On 1 June 1996, he filed a that required for legal support shall be subject to
suit against the father for support The Court orders levy on attachment or execution.
support to be given. From what date should the
amount of support be computed?
Furthermore, contractual support shall be
A: The entitlement for support shall retroact to 1 subject to adjustment whenever modification is
April 1996, the date when extra-judicial demand necessary due to changes in circumstances
was made. manifestly beyond the contemplation of the
parties.
Q: Suppose no extra-judicial demand was made?
A: Then the reckoning date shall be the date when
the suit is filed..(judicial demand). SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
Q: Suppose demand is made but subsequently the
Rule 61, Sec. 1. Application. - The plaintiff, at
claimant is able to support himself?
A: Then he is entitled to support during such time the commencement of the proper action, or at
that he was unable to support himself...even if any time afterwards but prior to final judgment,
payment for such support is made after he had may file an application for support pendente lite,
already recovered & been able to support himself. stating the grounds for the claim & the financial
conditions of both parties, & shall be
Support in arrears...being an ordinary civil action, accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other
may be renounced...however, the right to receive authentic documents in support thereof.
future support may not be renounced. Any
renunciation that effect shall be void.
Rule 61, Sec. 2. Notice. - Notice of the
application shall be served upon the adverse
party who shall have three (3) days to answer,
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support unless a different period of time is fixed by the
shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either court.
by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving &
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who Rule 61, Sec. 3. Answer. - The answer shall
has a right to receive support. The latter alternative be in writing & accompanied by affidavits,
cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal depositions or other authentic documents
obstacle thereto. supporting the same.

Art. 205. The right to receive support under this Rule 61, Sec. 4. Hearing. - After the answer
Title as well as any money or property obtained as is filed, or after the expiration of the time for its
such support shall not be levied upon an filing, a day will be set for hearing. The facts in
attachment or execution. issue shall be proved in the same manner as is
provided in connection w/ motions.
Art. 206. When, w/o the knowledge of the
person obliged to give support, it is given by a Rule 61, Sec. 5, Order. - The court shall
stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the determine provisionally the pertinent facts, &
same fr. the former, unless it appears that he gave shall render such order as equity & justice may
it w/o intention of being reimbursed. require, having due regard to the necessities of
the applicant, the means of the adverse party,
Art. 207. When the person obliged to support the probable outcome of the case, & such other
another unjustly refuses or fails to give support circumstances as may aid in the proper
when urgently needed by the latter, any third elucidation of the question involved. If the
person may furnish support to the needy individual, application is granted, the court shall fix the
w/ right of reimbursement fr. the person obliged to
133
amount of money to be provisionally paid, & the UNSON V. NAVARRO [101 SCRA 183]
terms of payment. If the application is denied, the
trial of the principal case on its merits shall be held HELD: Mother of child is having an affair w/
as early as possible. brother-in-law. With this premise in view, it is in
the best interest of the child to be freed fr. the
Rule 61, Sec. 5. Enforcement of order. - If obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral
defendant fails to comply w/ an order granting influence that the mother has placed herself.
support pendente lite, he must be ordered to show The situation might affect the moral & social
cause why he should not be punished for contempt. outlook of the child who is in her formative years
Should the defendant appear to have means to pay & most impressionable stage in her life.
support & refuses to pay, either an order of
execution may be issued or a penalty for contempt
may be imposed, or both. Art. 210. Parental authority & responsibility
may not be renounced or transferred except in
the cases authorized by law.
XII. PARENTAL AUTHORITY

SANTOS VS. CA [242 SCRA 407]


Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right & duty of
parents over the person & property of their HELD: The right of custody accorded to parents
unemancipated children, parental authority & springs fr. the exercise of parental authority.
responsibility shall include the caring for & rearing Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman
of such children for civic consciousness & efficiency Law is the juridical institution whereby parents
& the development of their moral, mental & physical rightfully assume control & protection of their
character & well-being. unemancipated children to the extent required by
the latter's needs. It is a mass of rights &
obligations w/c the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children's physical preservation &
MEDINA V. MAKABILI [27 SCRA 502]
dev't, as well as the cultivation of their intellect &
the education of their hearts & senses. As
HELD: While the law recognizes the right of a
regards parental authority, "there is no power,
parent to the custody of his/her child, courts must
but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of
not lose sight of the basis principle that in all
duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the
question on the care, custody, education & property
welfare of the minor.
of the children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount, & that for compelling reasons, even a
Parental authority & responsibility are
child under seven may be ordered separated fr. the
inalienable & may not be transferred or
mother.
renounced except in cases authorized by law.
The right attached to parental authority, being
Patria potestas has been transformed fr.
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
"jus vitae ac necis (the right of life & death) of the
parental authority only in cases of adoption,
Roman Law, under w/c the offspring was virtually a
guardianship & surrender to a children's home or
chattel of his parents into a radically different
an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts
institution. The obligational aspect of parents to
the custody of a minor to another, such as a
rear & care for their children is now supreme. The
friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
right of parents to the company & custody of their
given is merely temporary custody & it does not
children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of
constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
parental duties to provide the children w/ adequate
Even if a definite renunciation is manifested, the
support, education, moral, intellectual & civic
law still disallows the same.
training & development.
The father & mother, being the natural guardians
The best interest of the minor can override
of unemancipated children, are duty-bound &
the right of parents to the custody of their children
entitled to keep them in their custody & company
the parent/s is/are proved to be remiss in these
sacred duties.

134
Only in cases of the parent's death, absence or grandparents, except when such testimony is
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be indispensable in a crime against the descendant
exercised by the surviving grandparent. or by one parent against the other.

Art. 211. The father & the mother shall jointly


exercise parental authority over the persons of their Substitute & Special Parental Authority
common children. In case of disagreement, the
father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially
judicial order to the contrary. appointed guardian, the following persons shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the
Children shall always observe respect & child in the order indicated:
reverence toward their parents & are obliged to (1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in
obey them as long as the children are under Art. 214;
parental authority. (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty
one years of age, unless fit or disqualified; &
Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either (3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty
parent, the parent present shall continue exercising one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving
parent shall not affect the parental authority over Whenever the appointment of a judicial
children, unless the court appoints another person guardian over the property of the child becomes
to be the guardian of the person or property of the necessary, the same order of preference shall be
children. observed.
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned,
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent neglected or abused children & other children
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into similarly situated, parental authority shall be
account all relevant considerations, especially the entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless heads of children's homed, orphanages & similar
the parent chosen is unfit. institutions duly accredited by the proper
government agency.
No child under seven years of age shall be
separated fr. the mother, unless the court finds Art. 218. The school, its administrators &
compelling reasons to order otherwise. teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care shall have special parental
authority & responsibility over the minor child
ESPIRITU V. CA [242 SCRA 362] while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
HELD: Whether a child is under or over seven
years of age, the paramount criterion must always Authority & responsibility shall apply to all
be the child's interest. Discretion is always given to authorized activities whether inside or outside the
the court to decide who can best assure the welfare premises of the school, entity or institution.
of the child, & award the custody on the basis of
that consideration.
EXCONDE V. CAPUNO [101 P 843]

Art. 214. In case of death, absence or FACTS: Capuno, a student & a Boy Scout,
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental attended a Rizal Day parade. He drove a jeep
authority shall be exercised by the surviving recklessly resulting in the death of two
grandparent. In case several survive, the one passengers. Father was held solidarily liable for
designated by the court, taking into account the damages.
same consideration mentioned in the preceding
article, shall exercise the authority. HELD: SC, in an obiter, exculpated the school
(not a party to the case) on the ground that it
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in was not a school of arts & trades. Justice JBL
a criminal case to testify against his parents & Reyes, w/ whom Padilla concurred, dissented
135
arguing that it was the school authorities who
should be held liable. Liability under this rule, he HELD: It is immaterial whether the semester
said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; & 2) has already ended for students were there for a
heads of schools of arts & trades in particular. The legitimate purpose. He was still in the custody of
modifying clause "of establishment of arts & trades the school authorities. Even the mere savoring of
should apply only to "heads" & not to "teachers". the company of his friends in the school premises
is a legitimate purpose w/c would also bring him
MERCADO V. CA [109 P 414] in the custody of the school. The school principal
& dean are not liable bec. they are not teachers-
FACTS: A student cut a classmate w/ a razor in-charge, but are merely exercising general
blade. Parents of victim sued the culprit's parents authority, not direct control & influence. But
for damages. even the teacher-in-charge is not liable bec. there
is no showing that the teacher was negligent in
HELD: SC held in an obiter again (school not a enforcing discipline upon Daffon nor had he
party again) that the school was not liable; it's not waived observance of school rules & regulations.
an establishment of arts & trades. Custody His absence when the tragedy happened cannot
requirement had not been proved as this be considered against him bec. he was not
"contemplates a situation where the student lives & supposed or required to report to school on that
boards w/ the teacher, such that the control, day. So who is liable here? It's probably the
direction & influence on the pupil supersedes those dean of the boys. He had earlier confiscated an
of the parents. unlicensed gun fr. one of the students & returned
it to the latter w/o taking disciplinary action or
reporting the matter to higher authorities. But
while he was clearly negligent, it does not
necessarily link him to the shooting since it was
PALISOC V. BRILLANTES [41 SCRA 548] not shown that the gun was the one used to kill
petitioner's son. Who is really liable here?
FACTS: (supersedes obiter in Exconde & Nobody, since none of them was found to have
Mercado) A 16 year old student was killed by been charged w/ the custody of the offending
classmate w/ fist blows in the school laboratory. student, or has been remiss in the discharge of
his duties. While the court deeply sympathizes
HELD: Although wrongdoer was already of age & w/ the petitioners, the court cannot extend
was not boarding w/ the school, head & teacher material relief as a balm to their grief.
were held solidarily liable w/ him. The phrase "so
long as (the students) remain in their custody" PASCO V. CFI [160 SCRA 784]
means the protective & supervisory custody that the
school & its heads exercise over the pupils & HELD: Art. 2180, NCC w/c refers to liability of
students for as long as they are at attendance in teachers or heads of establishments of arts &
the school, including recess time. There is nothing trades for damages caused by students who are
in the law that requires that for such liability to in their custody, does not apply to the school or
attach, the pupil or student who commits the the university itself or to educational institutions
tortuous act must live & board in the school as w/c are not schools of arts & trades. The
erroneously held by the lower court, & the dicta in provision concerned speaks only of "teachers or
Mercado (as well as in Exconde on w/c it relied) heads."
must now be deemed to have been set aside.
YLARDE V. AQUINO [163 SCRA 697]
Note: (By JBL) Even students already of age were
covered by the provision since they were equally in HELD: As regards the principal, We hold that he
the custody of the school & subject to its discipline. cannot be made responsible for the death of child
Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school
AMADORA V. CA [160 SCRA 315] & not a school of arts & trades. Under Art. 2180,
it is only the teacher & not the head of an
FACTS: Amadora's son was shot to death by academic school who should be answerable for
Daffon, a classmate at school auditorium. The son torts committed by their students. This Court
was in school to submit physics project. The school went on to say that in a school of arts & trades, it
contends that the semester had already ended.
136
is only the head of the school who can be held Five (5) points to remember:
liable.
The rules are not limited to schools of arts &
trade...now "all schools".
Where the school is academic rather than
technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for Authority & responsibility apply to activities inside
the tort committed by the student will attach to the & outside...provided the activity is an
teacher in charge of such student following the first authorized one.
par. of the provision. This is the gen. rule. In the
case of establishments of arts & trades, it is the The liability of the school administrators &/or
head thereof, & only he, who shall be held liable as teachers is solidary & primary...the liability of
an exception to the gen. rule. In other words, the parents is subsidiary.
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of
Negligence is presumed...the burden is on the
their students except where the school is technical
school/teacher to prove diligence.
in nature, in w/c case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable. Scope of liability of school extends only to
damage caused by the child in the course of
SALVOSA V. IAC [166 SCRA 274] an authorized school activity.

HELD: Under the penultimate par. of Art. 2180,


teachers or heads of establishments of arts & trades Q: Suppose the injuries were inflicted on the
are liable for "damages caused by their pupils & student by persons other than fellow students.
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in A: Then do not apply 219 nor 2180NCC. The
their custody." The rationale of such liability is that school is liable in such a case based on culpa
so long as the student remains in the custody of a contractual (PSBA v. CA)...school is liable for
teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in injury caused by elements coming fr. outside of
loco parentis (as to the student) & (is) called upon the school.
to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct
of the (student.) Likewise, "the phrase used in (Art.
2180)-- so long as the (students) remain in their Liability for injuries caused by students:
custody' means that the protective & supervisory
A. Below 18 (RA 6809)
custody that the school & its heads & teachers
exercise over the pupils & students for as long as school admi/ teachers are principally & solidarily
they are at attendance in the school, including liable. Negligence is prima facie presumed.
recess time.
parents/guardian is subsidiarily liable.

Art. 219. Those given the authority &


B. 18 & above
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally & solidarily liable for damages caused by (Art 2180 NCC continues to apply)
the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor.
The parents, judicial guardians or the persons applies to academic & non-academic institutions.
exercising substitute parental authority over said
minor shall be subsidiarily liable. academic institutions: liability attaches to
teacher.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in non-academic institutions: liability attaches to
head of establishment.
the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is
proved that they exercised the proper diligence
required under the particular circumstances.
Effect of Parental Authority Upon the
Persons of the Children
All other cases not covered by this & the
preceding articles shall be governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Art. 220. The parents & those exercising
parental authority shall have w/ respect to their
BALANE: Arts. 218 & 219 unemancipated children or wars the following
rights & duties:
137
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian
educate & instruct them by right precept & good of the child's property, or a guardian ad litem
example, & to provide for their upbringing in when the best interests of the child so require.
keeping w/ their means;
(2) To give them love & affection, advice & Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or
counsel, companionship & understanding; incapacity, the individual, entity or institution
(3) To provide them w/ moral & spiritual exercising parental authority, may petition the
guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self- proper court of the place where the child resides,
discipline, self-reliance, industry & thrift, stimulate for an order providing for disciplinary measures
their interest in civic affairs, & inspire in them over the child. The child shall be entitled to the
compliance w/ the duties of citizenship; assistance of counsel, either of his choice or
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve & maintain appointed by the court, & a summary hearing
their physical & mental health at all times; shall be conducted wherein the petitioner & the
(5) To furnish them w/ good & wholesome child shall be heard. However, if in the same
educational materials, supervise their activities, proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault,
recreation & association w/ others, protect them fr. irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when
bad company, & prevent them fr. acquiring habits the circumstances so warrant, the court may also
detrimental to their health, studies & morals; order the deprivation or suspension of parental
(6) To represent them in all matters affecting authority or adopt such other measures as it may
their interests; deem just & proper.
(7) To demand fr. them respect & obedience;
(8) To impose discipline on them as may be Art. 224. The measures referred to in the
required under the circumstances; & preceding article may include the commitment of
(9) To perform such other duties as are the child for not more than thirty days in entities
imposed by law upon parents & guardians. or institutions engaged in child care or in
children's homes duly accredited by the proper
government agency.
LUNA V. IAC [137 SCRA 7]
The parent exercising parental authority shall
HELD: The manifestation of the child Shirley that not interfere w/ the care of the child whenever
she would kill herself or run away fr. home if she committed but shall provide for his support. Upon
should be taken away fr. the petitioners proper petition or at its own instance, the court
(grandparents) & forced to live w/ her natural may terminate the commitment of the child
parents is a circumstance that would make the whenever just & proper.
execution of the judgment in the special proc.
inequitable, unfair, unjust, if not illegal. The threat
may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a
wholesome family life that will provide her w/ love,
care & understanding, guidance & counseling, &
moral & material security. But what if the threat is
for real. Besides, in her letters to the members of
the court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as Effect of Parental Authority Upon the
selfish & cruel & who beat her often; & that they do Property of the Children
not lover her. To return her to the custody of the
private resps. would be traumatic & cause
irreparable damage to the child. Art. 225. The father & the mother shall,
jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of their unemancipated common child
Art. 221. Parents & other persons exercising w/o the necessity of a court appointment. In case
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the of disagreement, the father's decision shall
injuries & damages caused by the acts or omissions prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
of their unemancipated children living in their contrary.
company & under their parental authority subject to
the appropriate defenses provided by law.

138
Where the market value of the property or the the latter's support & education, unless the title
annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the or transfer provides otherwise.
parent concerned shall be required to furnish a The right of the parents over the fruits &
bond in such amount as the court may determine, income of the child's property shall be limited
but not less than 10% of the value of the property primarily to the child's support & secondarily to
or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the collective daily needs of the family.
the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
Art. 227. If the parents entrust the
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall management or administration of any of their
be filed in the proper court of the place where the properties to an unemancipated child, the net
child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign proceeds of such property shall belong to the
country, in the proper court of the place where the owner. The child shall be given a reasonable
property or any part thereof is situated. monthly allowance in an amount not less than
that w/c the owner would have paid if the
administrator were a stranger, unless the owner,
grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any
The petition shall be docketed as a summary case, the proceeds thus given in whole or in part
special proceeding in w/c all incidents & issues shall not be charged to the child's legitime.
regarding the performance of the obligations
referred to in the second paragraph of this Article
shall be heard & resolved. BALANE: This article refers to profectitious
property owned by the parents & given to the
The ordinary rules on guardianship should be child for administration
merely suppletory except when the child is under
substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a The child is entitled to reasonable allowance...not
less than what a 3rd person would get if
stranger, or a parent has remarried, in w/c case the
management was entrusted to such 3rd person,
ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. administration belongs to the child.

PINEDA V. CA [226 SCRA 754] Suspension or Termination of Parental


Authority
HELD: It is clear fr. Art. 225 that regardless of the
value of the unemancipated common child's
property, the father & mother ipso jure become the Art. 228. Parental authority terminates
legal guardian of the child's property. However, if permanently:
the market value of the prop. or the annual income (1) Upon the death of the parents;
of the child exceeds P50,000, a bond has to be (2) Upon the death of the child;
posted by the parents concerned to guarantee the (3) Upon emancipation of the child.
performance of the obligations of a general
guardian. It must, however, be noted that the 2nd Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a
par. of Art. 225 speaks of the market value of the final judgment, parental authority also termi-
property or the annual income of the child," w/c nates:
means, therefore, the aggregate of the child's prop.
or annual income; if this exceeds P50T, a bond is (1) Upon adoption of the child;
required. There is no evidence that the share of (2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
each of the minors in the proceeds of the group (3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment
policy in question is the minor's only property. W/o of the child in a case filed for the purpose;
such evidence, it would not be safe to conclude (4) Upon final judgment of a competent court
that, indeed, that is his only property. divesting the party concerned of parental
authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or
Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated incapacity of the person exercising parental
child earned or acquired w/ his work or industry or authority.
by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the
child in ownership & shall be devoted exclusively to

139
Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon owed to the child; completely w/held her
conviction of the parent or the person exercising the presence, her love, her care, & the opportunity to
same of a crime w/c carries w/ it the penalty of civil display maternal affection; & totally denied her
interdiction. The authority is automatically support & maintenance. Her silence & inaction
reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon have been prolonged to such a point that her
pardon or amnesty of the offender. abandonment of the child & her total
relinquishment of parental claim over her, can &
Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the should be inferred as a matter of law.
purpose or in a related case may also suspend
parental authority if the parent or the person
exercising the same: Art. 232. If the person exercising parental
(1) Treats the child w/ excessive harshness or authority has subjected the child or allowed him
cruelty; to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or shall be permanently deprived by the court of
example; such authority.
(3) Compels the child to beg, or
(4) Subject the child or allows him to be Art. 233. The person exercising substitute
subjected to acts of lasciviousness. parental authority shall have the same authority
over the person of the child as the parents.
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to
include cases w/c have resulted fr. culpable In no case shall the school administrator,
negligence of the parent or the person exercising teacher or individual engaged in child care
parental authority. exercising special parental authority, inflict
corporal punishment upon the child.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the
welfare of the child so demands, the court shall
deprive the guilty party of parental authority or XII. EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF
adopt such other measures as may be proper under MAJORITY
the circumstances.

The suspension or deprivation may be revoked RA No. 6809 - An Act lowering the age of
& the parental authority revived in a case filed for majority fr. 21 to 18 years
the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court
finds that the cause therefor has ceased & will not Sec. 1. Art. 234 of the FC is hereby amended
be repeated. to read as follows:
Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by
the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise
CHUA V. CABANGBANG [27 SCRA 792] provided, majority commences at the age of
eighteen years.
HELD: Abandonment is one of the grounds for
depriving parents of parental authority over their Sec. 2. Arts 235 & 237 of the FC are also
children. amended to read as follows:

Petitioner surrendered the custody of her Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate
child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until parental authority over the person & property of
1963, or after the lapse of a period of 5 long years, the child who shall then be qualified &
before she brought action to recover custody. Her responsible for all acts of civil life, save the
claim that she did not take any step to recover her exceptions established by existing laws in special
child bec. the Cabangbangs were powerful & cases.
influential, does not deserve any modicum of Contracting marriage shall require
credence. parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
Nothing in this Code shall be construed
For 5 long yrs. & thereafter, she did not to derogate fr. the duty or responsibility of
once move to recover the child. She continuously parents & guardians for children & wards below
shunned the natural & legal obligations w/c she

140
21 years of age mentioned in the 2 nd & 3rd pars. Of
Art. 2180 NCC. Art. 2180. xxx The father &, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
Sec. 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing for the damages caused by the minor children
wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies who live in their company.
& similar instruments containing references &
provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to Guardians are liable for damages caused by
their prejudice. the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority & live in their company.
Sec. 5. This Act shall take effect upon (Civil Code.)
completion of its publication in at least 2
newspapers of general circulation.
TOLENTINO: The last par. of Art. 236 is even
Approved, Dec. 13, 1989. more anomalous. Upon emancipation of a child
after reaching 18 years, parental authority
ceases, & yet responsibility for his torts continues
TOLENTINO: RA 6809 provides that its effectivity until he reaches 21 years of age. This is a case
of responsibility w/o authority.
on existing wills, bequests, donations, grants,
insurance policies & similar instruments containing
references & provisions favorable to minors will not
retroact to their prejudice. BALANE: Under the present law, there are 2
classifications of emancipation:

Perfect emancipation where the emancipated is


Art. 235. (Repealed by RA 6809) qualified for all acts of civil life. Perfect
emancipation is attained upon reaching the
Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental age of 21 yrs. old.
authority over the person & property of the child
who shall then be qualified & responsible for all acts Imperfect Emancipation. An 18 yr.-old, although
of civil life, save the exceptions established by emancipated needs parental consent for
marriage. Parents or guardians continue to
existing laws in special cases.
be liable under Art. 2180 until he reaches the
age of 21 yrs. old.
Contracting marriage shall require parental
consent until the age of 21.
BALIWAG TRANSIT V. CA [169 S 849]
Nothing in this Code shall be construed to
derogate fr. the duty or responsibility of parents & HELD: Since the suit is one for breach of
guardians for children & wards below 21 years of contract of carriage, the Release of Claims
age mentioned in the second & third paragraphs of executed by the victim, as the injured party,
Article 2180 of the Civil Code (as amended by RA discharging Fortune Insurance & Baliwag fr. any
6809) & all liability is valid. He was then of legal age, a
graduating student of Agricultural Engineering, &
had the capacity to do acts w/ legal effect (Art.
TOLENTINO: 37 in relation to Art. 402.) Thus, he could sue &
be sued even w/o the assistance of his parents.
Requisites of Marriage.-- A marriage of a person
bet. 18 & 21 years will still require parental consent,
w/o w/c the marriage will be voidable. This is an
anomalous situation. An emancipated person, who Art. 237. (Repealed by RA 6809)
can enter into any contract & qualified for all acts of
civil life, is still required to have parental consent for
marriage. The provisions on marriage should have XIV. SUMMARY JUDICIAL
been adjusted. PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY
LAW
Quasi-delicts of Children.
Scope of Application

141
Art. 244. In case of non-appearance of the
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, spouse whose consent is sought, the court shall
the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all inquire into the reasons for his failure to appear,
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary & shall require such appearance, if possible.
court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in
an expeditious manner w/o regard to technical Art. 245. If, despite all efforts, the
rules. attendance of the non-consenting spouse is not
secured, the court may proceed ex parte &
render judgment as the facts & circumstances
Separation in Fact Between Husband & Wife may warrant. In any case, the judge shall
endeavor to protect the interests of the non-
Art. 239. When a husband & wife are separated appearing spouse.
in fact, or one has abandoned the other & one of
them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction Art. 246. If the petition is not resolved at the
where the consent of the other spouse is required initial conference, said petition shall be decided in
by law but such consent is w/held or cannot be a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits,
obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the
alleging the foregoing facts. sound discretion of the court. If testimony is
needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if be heard & the subject matter of their
any, embodying the transaction, &, if none, shall testimonies, directing the parties to present said
describe in detail the said transaction & state the witnesses.
reason why the required consent thereto cannot be
secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be
by the parties shall be submitted to & approved by immediately final & executory.
the court.
Art. 248. The petition for judicial authority to
Art. 240. Claims for damages by either spouse, administer or encumber specific separate
except costs of the proceedings, may be litigated property of the abandoning spouse & to use the
only in a separate action. fruits or proceeds thereof for the support of the
family shall also be governed by these rules.
Art. 241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall,
upon proof of notice to the other spouse, be Incidents involving Parental Authority
exercised by the proper court authorized to hear
family cases, if one exists, or in the regional trial
court or its equivalent, sitting in the place where Art. 249. Petitions filed under Articles 223,
either of the spouses resides. 225 & 235 of this Code involving parental
authority shall be verified.
Art. 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or
to the transaction is required, of said petition, incapacity, the individual, entity or institution
ordering said spouse to show cause why the exercising parental authority, may petition the
petition should not be granted, on or before the proper court of the place where the child resides,
date set in said notice for the initial conference. The for an order providing for disciplinary measures
notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the over the child. The child shall be entitled to the
petition & shall be served at the last known address assistance of counsel, either of his choice or
of the spouse concerned. appointed by the court, & a summary hearing
shall be conducted wherein the petitioner & the
Art. 243. A preliminary conference shall be child shall be heard. However, if in the same
conducted by the judge personally w/o the parties proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault,
being assisted by counsel. After the initial irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when
conference, if the court deems it useful, the parties the circumstances so warrant, the court may also
may be assisted by counsel at the succeeding order the deprivation or suspension of parental
conferences & hearings. authority or adopt such other measures as it may
deem just & proper.

142
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person
Art. 225. The father & mother shall, jointly during the subsistence of a previous marriage
exercise legal guardianship over the property of shall be null & void, unless before the celebration
their unemancipated common child w/o the of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
necessity of a court appointment. In case of been absent for four consecutive years & the
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death
Where the market value of the property or the under the circumstances set forth in the
annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
parent concerned shall be required to furnish a absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
bond in such amount as the court may determine,
but not less than 10% of the value of the property For the purpose of contracting the
or annual income, to guarantee the performance of subsequent marriage under the preceding
the obligations prescribed for general guardians. paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
A verified petition for approval of the bond summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the declaration of presumptive death of the
the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign absentee, w/o prejudice to the effect of
country, in the proper court of the place where the reappearance of the absent spouse.
property or any part thereof is situated.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the
The petition shall be docketed as a summary presumptive legitimes of all common children,
special proceeding in w/c all incidents & issue computed as of the date of the final judgment of
regarding the performance of the obligations the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property
referred to in the second paragraph of this Article or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
shall be heard & resolved. agreement judicially approved, had already
provided for such matters.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be
merely suppletory except when the child is under The children or their guardian, or the trustee
substitute parental authority, or the guardian is of their property, may ask for the enforcement of
stranger, or a parent has remarried, in w/c case the the judgment.
ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes
Art. 235. (Repealed by RA 6809) herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children
Art. 250. Such petitions shall be filed in the accruing upon the death of either or both of the
proper court of the place where the child resides. parents; but the value of the properties already
received under the decree of annulment or
Art. 251. Upon the filing of the petition, the absolute nullity shall be considered as advances
court shall notify the parents or in their absence or on their legitime.
incapacity, the individuals, entities or institutions
exercising parental authority over the child. Art. 69. The husband & wide shall fix the
family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
Art. 252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall court shall decide.
also govern summary proceedings under this
Chapter insofar as they are applicable. The court may exempt one spouse fr. living
w/ the other if the latter should live abroad or
Other Matters Subject to Summary Proceedings there are other valid & compelling reasons for the
exemption. However, such exemption shall not
Art. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 & 3 apply if the same is not compatible w/ the
hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings solidarity of the family.
filed under Article 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 & 217,
insofar as they applicable. Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or

143
activity w/o the consent of the other. The latter may the absence of such authority or consent, the
object only on valid, serious, & moral grounds. disposition or encumbrance shall be void. Howev-
er, the transaction shall be construed as a
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide continuing offer on the part of the consenting
whether or not: spouse & the third person, & may be perfected as
a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
(1) The objection is proper, & other spouse or authorization by the court before
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the offer is w/drawn by either or both offerors.
the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued
prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned,
be enforced against the separate property of the neglected or abused children & other children
spouse who has not obtained consent. similarly situated, parental authority shall be
entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the heads of children's homes, orphanages & similar
rights of creditors who acted in good faith. institutions duly accredited by the proper
government agency.
Art. 96. The administration & enjoyment of the
community property shall belong to both spouses XV. FINAL PROVISIONS
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the Art. 254. If any provision of this Code is held
court by the wife for proper remedy, w/c must be invalid, all the other provisions not affected
availed of w/in five years fr. the date of the contract thereby shall remain valid.
implementing such decision.
Art. 255. This Code shall have retroactive
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
otherwise unable to participate in the administration vested or acquired rights in accordance w/ the
of the common properties, the other spouse may Civil Code or other laws.
assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or Art. 256. Effectivity (August 3, 1988)
encumbrance w/c must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the XVI. CARE AND EDUCATION OF CHILDREN
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing Art. 363. In all questions on the care,
offer on the part of the consenting spouse & the custody, education & property of children, the lat-
third person, & may be perfected as a binding ter's welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse be separated fr. her child under seven years of
or authorization by the court before the offer is age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for
w/drawn by either or both offerors. such measure.

Art. 124. The administration & enjoyment of the


conjugal partnership property shall belong to both Baviera Cases:
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, w/c FLORES V. ESTEBAN [51 O.G. 9, P. 4525
must be availed of w/in five years fr. the date of the (1955)]
contract implementing such decision.
FACTS: Flores (father) filed a petition for habeas
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or corpus in order to get the custody of his
otherwise unable to participate in the administration legitimate son who is living w/ F’s mother in law.
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may However, it was shown that it was not the father
assume sole powers of administration. These who was claiming custody but the paternal
powers do not include the powers of disposition or grandfather.
encumbrance w/c must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In

144
HELD: As against the paternal grandparent, the a friend, even in a document, what is given is
maternal grandparent may be given substitute merely TEMPORARY CUSTODY & it does not
parental authority if it will be for the best interest & constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
welfare of the child. It should be considered that
the maternal grandmother is almost a mother to the Further, only in case of the parents’
child since he was 20 days old, & there exists death, absence or unsuitability may substitute
mutual love between the grandmother & the child. parental authority be exercised by the surviving
This is w/o prejudice to the obligation of the father grandparent.
to contribute to his maintenance.

XVII. FUNERALS
LUNA V. IAC [137 S 7 (1985)]

FACTS: Luna is married to Hizon, the latter having Art. 305. The duty & the right to make
an illegitimate child, Santos. Santos got married to arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be
Salumbides & they had a child, Shirley, the subject in accordance w/ the order established for
of this child custody case. support, under Art. 294. In case of descendants
of the same degree, or of brothers & sisters, the
Several months after Shirley’s birth, her oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants,
parents gave her to the Luna couple. However, the paternal shall have a better right.
when the Lunas returned fr. their trip to the US,
they learned that Shirley’s natural parents took her Art. 306. Every funeral shall be in keeping
& refused to return her to the Lunas. The SC ruled w/ the social position of the deceased.
that Shirley’s natural parents are entitled to the
child’s custody. Said judgment had become final & Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance
executory. w/ the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the
absence of such expression, his religious beliefs
HELD: In child custody cases, an execution of final or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In
judgment of appellate courts awarding child custody case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be
to the child's biological parents may be stayed decided upon by the person obliged to make
where during hearings on execution the child arrangements for the same, after consulting the
manifests that she will kill herself & escape if given other members of the family.
to custody of her biological parents. In child custody
cases, the child's welfare & future is paramount & Art. 308. No human remains shall be
execution of a final judgment, w/c may run contrary retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed w/o
thereto, may be set aside. The best interest of the the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles
minor can override procedural rules & even the 294 & 305.
rights of parents to custody of their child.
Art. 309. Any person who shows disrespect
SANTOS V. CA [242 S 407] to the dead, or wrongfully interferes w/ a funeral
shall be liable to the family of the deceased for
FACTS: Santos (father) was married to Bedia. damages, material & moral.
They had a child, Leoul, who had been in the
custody of his maternal grandparents since birth. Art. 310. The construction of a tombstone or
When the child turned 3, S abducted the boy. The mausoleum shall be deemed a part of the funeral
Bedias then filed a Petition for Custody of the boy. expenses, & shall be chargeable to the conjugal
partnership property, if the deceased is one of
HELD: Since the Bedias failed to show that S is an the spouses.
unfit & unsuitable father, S is entitled to the custody
of his son.
XVIII. USE OF SURNAMES
Parental authority is inalienable & may not
be transferred or renounced except in cases of
adoption, guardianship & surrender to a children’s TOLENTINO:
home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as
145
Concept of Name.-- A name is a word or
combination of words by w/c a person is known & Art. 364. Legitimate & legitimated children
identified, & distinguished fr. others, for the
convenience of the world at large in addressing him, shall principally use the surname of the father.
or in speaking of or dealing w/ him. (Balane quotes
Tolentino on this.)
REPUBLIC V. MARCOS [182 S 223]

HELD: (1) The trial court did not acquire


jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings,
i.e., the various names & aliases of the petitioner
w/c she wished to change to "Mary Pang De la
Characteristics of Name.— Cruz/" The omission of her other alias-- "Mary
Pang"-- in the captions of the court's order & of
It is absolute, intended to protect the individual fr. the petition defeats the purpose of the
being confused w/ others; publication. For a publication of a petition for a
change of name to be valid, the title thereof
it is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can should include, first, his real name, & second, his
be w/o a name;
aliases, if any." (Jesus Ng Yao Sing v. Republic,
it is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at 16 S 483.) [T]he reason for the rule requiring
the start, & may be changed only for good the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted &
cause & by judicial proceedings; the other names or aliases of the applicant in the
title of the petition or in the caption of the
it is outside the commerce of man, &, therefore, published order is that the ordinary reader only
inalienable & intransmissible, by act inter vivos glances fleetingly at the caption of the published
or mortis causa; order or the title of the petition in a spec. proc.
for a change of name. Only if the caption or the
it is imprescriptible.
title strikes him bec. one or all of the names
mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed
BALANE: to read the contents of the order.

Surname.-- A surname is that w/c identifies the (2) The court erred in granting a change of
family fr. w/c a person belongs & is passed fr. name. The reasons offered for changing the
parent to child. name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her
daughter in law grew up w/, & learned to love &
Basic Principles: recognize Alfredo De la Cruz as her own father";
A person's real name is that w/c appears in the Civil (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security; &
Registry. (3) that Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this petition.
If you want to change your real name, you have to
go through judicial proceedings, a petition for
change of name. Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a
However, a person can use other names w/c are change of name. The general rule is that a
authorized by CA 142 as amended by RA 6085 change of name should not be permitted if it will
(re: use of pseudonym.) give a false impression of family relationship to
another where none actually exists. [O]ur laws
Some guidelines regarding change of name do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the
surname of a person not their father, for to
In a petition for change of name, courts are allows them to adopt the surname of their
generally strict. You have to show sufficient
mother's husband, who is not their father, can
cause;
However, in a petition for injunction or in a criminal result in confusion of their paternity.
case for violation of CA 142, courts will
generally be more liberal (Legamia v. IAC, infra. Another reason for disallowing the
Tolentino v. CA, infra.) provided it does not petition for change of name is that it was not
cause confusion, there is no fraud or BF; filed by the proper party. The petition must be
In case of adoption where the woman adopts alone, filed by the person desiring to change his/her
it is the maiden name that should be given the name, even if it may be signed & verified by
child. (Johnston v. Republic, infra.) some other person in his behalf. In this case,

146
however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen
not by May Sia.
Art. 367. Natural children by legal fiction
Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman shall principally employ the surname of the
Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have father.
reached the age of majority, may file the petition to
change her name. The decision to change her Art. 368. Illegitimate children referred to in
name, the reason for the change, & the choice of a article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother.
new name & surname shall be hers alone to make.
It must be her personal choice. Art. 369. Children conceived before the
decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter. Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name & surname & add
her husband's surname;
JOHNSTON V. REPUBLIC [7 S 1040] (2) Her maiden first name & her husband's
surname; or
HELD: The provision of law (341, par. 2) w/c (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a
entitles the adopted minor to the use of the word indicating that she is his wife, such as
adopter's surname, refers to the adopter's own "Mrs."
surname & not to her surname acquired by virtue of
marriage. Petitioner-appellant's real surname is
Valdes & not Johnston, & as she made the adoption TOLENTINO:
singly w/o the concurrence of her H, & not as a
married woman, her name as adopter was her Husband's Surname Optional.-- The word "may"
maiden name. The adoption created a personal is used, indicating that the use of the husband's
relationship bet. the adopter & the adopted, & the surname by the wife is permissive rather than
obligatory.
consent of Isabel Valdes' H, to the adoption by her
individually, did not have the effect of making him Right of Wife not Exclusive.-- The wife cannot
an adopting father, so as to entitle the child to the claim an exclusive right to use the husband's
use of Johnston's own surname. surname. She cannot be prevented fr. using it;
but neither can she restrain others fr. using it.
Since adoption gives the person adopted
the same rights & duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter (341, par. 1, NCC), much TELMO V. REPUBLIC [73 S 29]
confusion would indeed result, if the minor child
herein were allowed to use the surname of the HELD: (1) A change of name is a proc. in rem.
spouse who did not join in the adoption. Jurisdiction to hear & determine the petition for
change of name is acquired after due publication
of the order containing certain data, among w/c
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both is the name sought to be adopted, w/c should be
parents shall principally use the surname of the indicated in the title of the petition
father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a
natural child shall employ the surname of the The reason for the rule is that the
recognizing parent. ordinary reader "glances fleetingly at the captions
of the published orders or the titles of the
petitions. Only if the caption or the title strikes
TOLENTINO: him does the reader proceed to read on. And
the probability is great that the reader does not
This rule applies even when the recognition was at all notice the other names &/or aliases or the
made first by the mother & later by the father, bec. applicant if these are mentioned only in the body
no distinction is made in the law. It applies to all of the order or petition.
illegitimate children.

147
As the title of the petition in this case & the There is no usurpation of the petitioner's
order setting it for hearing were deficient, the lower name & surname in this case so that the mere
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the proc. use of the surname Tol. by pvt. resp cannot be
said to have injured the petitioner's rights. The
(2) A married woman may use her husband's usurpation of name implies some injury to the
surname. It is axiomatic that if she desires judicial interests of the owner of the name. It consists in
authorization to change the spelling of his surname, the possibility of confusion of identity bet. the
her H should initiate the proceeding. In the instant owner & the usurper. It exists when a person
case, the anomaly is that the H did not ask for designates himself by another name.
judicial authority to change the spelling of his
surname. It was his wife who filed the petition. The following are the elements of
The irregularity in the petition is obvious. usurpation of a name: (1) there is an actual use
of another's name by def.; (2) the use is
It is true that the wife submitted to the unauthorized; & (3) the use of another's name is
court her H's affidavit of conformity to the change in to designate personality or identify a person.
the spelling of his surname. But that would not None of these elements exists in the case at bar
prevent him & their children fr. using the old & neither is there a claim by petitioner that the
spelling. And in that event, confusion & error might pvt resp. impersonated her.
arise.

TOLENTINO V. CA [162 S 66] Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage,


& the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume
HELD: A divorced woman may continue using the her maiden name & surname. If she is the
surname of her former husband.. There is no merit innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden
in the petitioner's claim that to sustain the private name & surname. However, she may choose to
resp.'s stand is to contradict Articles 370 & 371 of continue employing her former husband's
the NCC. It is significant to note that Sen. Tolentino surname, unless:
himself in his commentary on Art. 370 states that
"the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the (1) The court decrees otherwise; or
husband's surname. She cannot be prevented fr. (2) She or the former husband is married
using it; but neither can she restrain others fr. using again to another person.
it."
Art. 372. When legal separation has been
Art. 371 is not applicable to the case at bar granted, the wife shall continue using her name
bec. Art. 371 speaks of annulment while the case & surname employed before the legal separation.
before us refers to absolute divorce where there is a
severance of valid marriage ties. The effect of
divorce is more akin to the death of the spouse TOLENTINO: This is so bec. her married status
where the deceased woman continues to be is not affected by the separation, there being no
referred to as the Mrs. of her H even if the latter severance of the vinculum.
has remarried rather than to annulment since in the
latter case, it is as if there had been no marriage at Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased
all. husband's surname as though he were still living,
in accordance w/ article 370.
The pvt. resp. has established that to grant
the injunction to the petitioner would be an act of
serious dislocation to her. She has given proof that TOLENTINO: Inasmuch as there is no more
she entered into contracts w/ 3rd persons, acquired vinculum actually existing w/ the deceased
prop. & entered into other legal relations using the husband, & considering that the widow has her
surname Tolentino. The petitioner, on the other own independent personality, the use of the
hand, has failed to show that she would suffer any former husband's surname is optional, & not
legal injury or deprivation of legal rights inasmuch obligatory, for her.
as she can use her H's surname & be fully protected
in case the resp. uses the surname Tolentino for
illegal purposes.

148
Art. 374. In case of identity of names & change of name, there must exist a proper &
surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to reasonable cause or compelling reason.
use such additional name or surname as will avoid
confusion. The grant of change of name of resps.
would not eliminate but enhance confusion as
Art. 375. In case of identity of names & they would be having not only 2 names but 3,
surnames between ascendants & descendants, the including the names they are seeking. Pvt. resps.
word "Junior" can be used only by a son. do not only want to legalize their use of American
Grandsons & other direct male descendants shall names, by w/c they claim they are usually
either: known, but also a new family name (Yap Tan)
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's w/c includes that of their mother but w/c they
surname; or never used before. It becomes more confusing
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, & so on. considering that the pvt. resps. are not using the
family name of their father (Lim), but that of the
Art. 376. No person can change his name or first husband of their mother who was surnamed
surname w/o judicial authority. Tan.

The supposed ugly meaning of the name


of resp. Tan Ay Gho is not enough reason to
TOLENTINO:
justify change of name. The alleged offensive-
Sufficient Cause Necessary.-- Examples of sounding name, being a given name, was chosen
sufficient causes are: for her, & not one imposed by law as in the case
of a family name.
when the name is ridiculous, or tainted w/ dishonor,
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
when the right to a new name is a consequence of
a change of status, such as when a natural child YASIN V. SHARI’A 7 [241 S 606]
is acknowledged or legitimated;
when the change is necessary to avoid confusion;
having continuously used & been known since HELD: The true & real name of a person is that
childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of his given to him & entered in the civil register. While
alien parentage; it is true that under Art. 376 of the NCC, no
A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase person can change his name or surname w/o
signs of a former alien nationality w/c unduly judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name
hamper social & business life. (Republic v. that may be changed is the true & official name
Marcos, supra.) recorded in the Civil Register.
The imposition in a will or donation of the condition
that the beneficiary change his name is not
Petitioner's registered name is Hatima
sufficient cause.
Centi y Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner
Effect of Change on Children.-- When a father does not seek to change her registered maiden
changes his name, this will not affect the names of name but instead, prays that she be allowed to
his children. The children who are of age are resume the use of her maiden name in view of
independent of the father, & their names can be the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris
changed only upon their own petition. The names Yasin, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in
of the minor children, however, may be changed on accordance w/ Muslim Law.
petition of the father, if the same justification exists
w/ respect to them.
Even under the NCC (w/c applies
For legal purposes, the true or official name suppletorily to the Code of Muslim Personal
of a person is that w/c is recorded in the civil Laws), the use of the H's surname during the
register. marriage, after annulment of the marriage &
after the death of the H is permissive & not
obligatory except in case of legal separation.
REPUBLIC V. AVILA [122 S 483]
When a woman marries a man, she need
HELD: A change of name is a mere privilege & not not apply &/or seek judicial authority to use her
a matter of right. It should not be abused nor H's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her
allowed for trivial & flimsy reasons. To justify a H's full name or by adding her H's surname to her
149
maiden first name. The law grants her such right. reputation & the value of his work are reflected in
Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no such designation.
longer exists as in the case of death of the H or
Bec. a pseudonym is intended only to be
divorce, the widow or divorcee need not seek
used in connection w/ a particular activity--
judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status literary, artistic, scientific or professional-- it
in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of should not be employed in any other sphere of
her former husband's name is optional & not activity. It can never be used in relations w/ the
obligatory for her. State.

When Entitled to Protection.-- A pen or stage


Art. 377. Usurpation of a name & surname may
name is protected only when it is well known as
be the object of an action for damages & other the designation of a particular writer or artist,
relief. such that it can be considered as practically
indicating his person in the field of activity where
it is used.
TOLENTINO:

The usurpation of name implies some injury to the Art. 380. Except as provided in the
interests of the owner of the name. It consists in preceding article, no person shall use different
the possibility of confusion of identity, or the names & surnames.
appearance of some family relations between the
owner & the usurper.
TOLENTINO: It is the duty of a person in
dealing w/ the govt. & its agents, to use his true
name. In private relations, however, this is not
Elements of Usurpation.— obligatory, provided there is no wrongful or
unlawful purpose.
that there is an actual use of another's name by the
defendant; Alias Names in Business.-- The law permits the
that the use is unauthorized; & use of assumed or alias names for business
the use of another's name is to designate purposes, provided that such names are duly
personality or identity of a person. registered.

Art. 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of LEGAMIA V. IAC [131 S 479]
another person's surname gives a right of action to
the latter. HELD: In the case at bar, C had been living w/ E
for almost 20 yrs. He introduced her to the
public as his wife & she assumed that role & his
name w/o any sinister purpose or personal
TOLENTINO: This article would seem to cover
cases where one's name is used by another, but not material gain in mind. She applied for benefits
for the purpose of designating personality or upon his death not for herself but for Michael
identifying a person. who as a boy of tender years was under her
guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not
have meant to criminalize what C had done
Art. 379. The employment of pen names or especially bec. some of them probably had their
stage names is permitted, provided it is done in own Corazons.
good faith & there is no injury to third persons. Pen
names & stage names cannot be usurped.
Baviera cases:

TOLENTINO
REPUBLIC V. CA 209 S 191
Pseudonym - conventional fictitious name freely
chosen by a person to disguise his personality. It FACTS: Wong (formerly Alcala, Jr.), a Muslim
designates a person in a particular activity, & his Filipino, was adopted by a Chinese couple. Upon

150
reaching the age of 22, he filed a petition to change borne in mind that the change of surname of
his name fr. Wong to Alcala. Reason: His surname adopted child is more an incident rather than the
embarrassed & isolated him fr. his relatives & object of adoption. There is therefore no
friends since his name suggests a Chinese ancestry. prohibition against reversion. Further, his
adoptive parents have permitted him to use his
HELD: A person’s name is the designation by w/c former name.
he/she is known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by w/c a person is
distinguished fr. other individuals &, also, as the MOORE V. REPUBLIC 62 OG NO. 34, P.
label or appellation w/c he/she bears for the 6100 (1963)
convenience of the world at large addressing him,
or in speaking of or dealing w/ him. FACTS: Elaine, a US citizen, was formerly
married to Velarde, also a US citizen, out of
A name has the ff. characteristics: whose wedlock a child named William Velarde
was born. The couple got divorced & Elaine
It is absolute, intended to protect the individual fr. married Moore. The minor William lived w/ the
being confused w/ others; spouses. In view of the harmonious relationship
it is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can between the stepdad & stepson, E filed a petition
be w/o a name; to change her son’s name to William Velarde
it is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at Moore.
the start, & may be changed only for good
cause & by judicial proceedings; HELD: Not allowed. If a child born out of
it is outside the commerce of man, &, therefore, wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the
inalienable & intransmissible, by act inter vivos 2nd husband of the mother, should the 1st
or mortis causa; husband die or be separated by divorce, there
it is imprescriptible. may result a confusion as to the son’s real
paternity. In the long run, the change may
The state has an interest in the names borne by redound to the prejudice of the child in the
individuals. A change of name is not a matter of community.
right but of sound judicial discretion. Among the
grounds w/c have been held valid for a change of Besides, the child is still a minor. When
name are: he reaches the age of majority, he may decide
the matter for himself. For the present, E’s
When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or action is premature.
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
when the change results as a legal consequence, as LLANETA V. AGRAVA [57 S 29]
in legitimation;
when the change will avoid confusion; FACTS: Teresita's mother, Anatacia Llaneta, was
having continuously used & been known since once married to Serafin Ferrer w/ whom she had
childhood by a Fil. Name, unaware of their alien but 1 child. In 1942 Serafin F. died & about 4
parentage; yrs. later Anatacia had relations w/ another man
sincere desire to adopt a Fil. Name to erase signs of out of w/c Teresita was born. Shortly after
former alienage, all in good faith & w/o Teresita's (T) birth, Atanacia (A) brought her to
prejudicing anybody; Mla. where all of them lived w/ A's mother-in-law,
when the surname causes embarrassment & there Victoria vda. de Ferrer. T was raised in the
is no showing that the desired change of name household of the Ferrers, using the surname of
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change Ferrer in all her dealings & throughout her
of name would prejudice the public. schooling.

Although the law prescribes the surname When she was about 20 yrs. old, she
that a person may employ, it does not go so far as applied for a copy of her birth cert. in Irosin,
to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was
surname provided there is judicial sanction. required to present it in connection w/ a
scholarship granted to her. It was then that she
An adopted child shall bear the surname of discovered that her registered surname is
the adopter. However, it must nevertheless be
151
Llaneta-- not Ferrer-- & that she is the illegitimate Australian wife. Upon his return to the Phil., S
child of A & an unknown father. married Elenita.

On the ground that her use thenceforth of ISSUE: WON P is allowed by law to use the
the surname of Llaneta, instead of Ferrer, w/c she surname of S.
had been using since she acquired reason ,would
cause untold difficulties & confusion, T petitioned HELD: NO. The alleged marriage between P &
the court below for change of name. After trial, S never took place. No evidence was presented
resp. Judge, denied her petition. Hence, the other than the testimonies of P & her counsel to
present recourse. prove such alleged marriage. Further, S
vigorously denied that he was married to P. In
HELD: The petition is granted. The petitioner has view of the non-existence of P’s marriage w/ S, &
established that she has been using the surname the latter’s marriage w/ E, it is not proper for P to
Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all her continue representing herself as S’s wife.
records in school & elsewhere, put her name down
as T. Ferrer; that her friends & associates know her Art. 370 CC authorizes a married woman
only as T. Ferrer; & that even the late Serafin F.'s to used the surname of her husband; impliedly, it
nearest of kin have tolerated & still approve of her also excludes others fr. doing likewise.
use of the surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift
at this time by the petitioner to the name of T BAVIERA: The remedy to prevent someone
Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing in fr. using one’s surname is injunction.
the birth cert.) would result in confusion among the
persons & entities she deals w/ & entail endless &
vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her CALDERON V. REPUBLIC 19 S 721 (1967)
new name. The petitioner has established that she
has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as FACTS: Gertrudes is an illegitimate child, the
she can remember; that all her records in school & result of a bigamous marriage between del Prado
elsewhere, put her name down as T. Ferrer; that (M) & Adolfo (F). C alleges that using the
her friends & associates know her only as T. Ferrer; surname del Prado carries w/ it the stigma of
& that even the late Serafin F.'s nearest of kin have legitimacy. Calderon is the surname of her foster
tolerated & still approve of her use of the surname father & she, through her mother, filed this
Ferrer. petition in order to be allowed to use said
surname.
The resp. court places reliance on the
decisions of this court w/c disallowed such change HELD: GRANTED. A petition to change name is
of name as would give the false impression of granted only where to do so is clearly for the best
family relationship. The principle remains valid but interest of the child. While the NCC provides that
only to the extent that the proposed change of a natural child by legal fiction may use the
name would in great probability cause prejudice or surname of the father, this does not mean that
future mischief to the family whose surname it is such child cannot adopt another’s surname w/
that is involved or to the community in general. the latter’s consent & for justifiable reasons. If a
legitimate child may secure a change o f name
SILVA V. PERALTA 110 P 57 (1960) through judicial proceedings, there is no reason
why an illegitimate child cannot.
FACTS: Silva, a US citizen & an officer of the US
Army, is married to an Australian. When S met Further, a change of name does not alter family
Peralta, he made her believe that he is still single. relations, rights or duties, legal capacity, civil
As such, P accepted his marriage proposal. The status or citizenship. What is altered is only the
two, according to P, we married in 1945. However, label or appellation by w/c a person is known.
no documents of marriage were prepared bec. there
were no available printed forms. The two then NALDOZA V. REPUBLIC [112 S 568]
started to live together & fr. such “marriage”, a son
was born. FACTS: Zosima Naldoza was married to
Dionesio Divinagracia on 5/30/70. They begot 2
S was wounded & was brought to the US children named Dionesio, Jr. & Bombi Roberto.
for operation. During this time, he divorced his
152
Zosima's husband left her after she confronted him Concept of Absence.-- Juridically, the absence
w/ his previous marriage w/ another woman. He referred to in the Code, is that special legal status
never returned to the conjugal abode. He allegedly of one who is not in his domicile, his whereabouts
being unknown, & it is uncertain whether he is
swindled Cong. Maglana in the sum of P50, 000, &
dead or alive. (Balane quotes Tolentino on this.)
other persons. The classmates of Dionesio, Jr. & Where the absentee disappeared under
Bombi allegedly teased them about their father normal circumstances & w/o apparent danger,
being a swindler. Two criminal cases for estafa there is ordinary absence; but where the
were filed in court against the father. disappearance was under extraordinary
circumstances, or w/ apparent danger, it is called
Desirous of obliterating any connection bet. qualified absence.
her 2 minor children & their scapegrace father,
Zosima, on 8/10/78, filed in CFI-Bohol a petition
wherein she prayed that the surname of their 2 Balane (quoting Castan): Absence has legal
children be changed fr. Divinagracia to Naldoza, her consequences w/c vary according to the degree
or stage of absence.
surname. After due publication & hearing, the trial
court dismissed the petition. Stages of Absence:

ISSUE: W/n two minors should be allowed to (1) Temporary or provisional absence w/c
discontinue using their father's surname & should happens as soon as a person disappears fr. his
use only their mother's surname. domicile & his whereabouts are unknown, leaving
no administrator of his prop. (Articles 381-383);
HELD: No. We hold that the trial court did not err
in denying the petition for change of name. The 2 (2) Normal or declared absence w/c is one
juridically declared after 2 yrs. since the last news
minors, who are presumably legitimate, are
was heard fr. him, or 5 yrs. if he left an
supposed to bear principally the surname administrator (Articles 384-389);
Divinagracia, their father's surname (Art. 364.)
(3) Definite or presumptive death w/c takes
To allow them, at their mother's behest, to place when after the period provided by law, a
bear only their mother's surname & to discard person is presumed dead; the period varies
altogether their father's surname, thus removing the according to circumstances. (Articles 390-396.)
prima facie evidence of their paternal provenance or (a) ordinary presumptive death
ancestry, is a serious matter in w/c, ordinarily, the (b) qualified presumptive death
minors & their father should be consulted. The
mother's desire should not be the sole
consideration. PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN CASE OF
ABSENCE
The change of name is allowed only when
there are proper & reasonable causes for such
change. Where, as in this case, the petitioners are Art. 381. When a person disappears fr. his
minors, the courts should take into account whether domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, & w/o
the change of name would redound (to) their leaving an agent to administer his property, the
welfare or would prejudice them. judge, at the instance of an interested party, a
relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to
To allow the change of surname would represent him in all that may be necessary.
cause confusion as to the minors' parentage &
might create the impression that the minors are This same rule shall be observed when under
illegitimate since they would carry the maternal similar circumstances the power conferred by the
surname only. That would be inconsistent w/ their absentee has expired.
legitimate status as indicated in their birth records.

Balane: Requisites for Provisional Absence:


XVIII. ABSENCE Absence for an appreciable period w/c depends
upon the circumstances;
Immediate necessity for his representation in
Tolentino: some specific urgent matter;
Absentee left no agent or the agency has expired

153
provisional absence. Notice that in provisional
absence, the power of administration is for a
specific matter.
Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the
preceding article having been made, the judge shall
take the necessary measures to safeguard the
REYES V. ALEJANDRO [141 S 65]
rights & interests of the absentee & shall specify the
powers, obligations & remuneration of his
Facts: In a petition filed on 10/25/69, Erlinda
representatives, regulating them, according to the
Reynoso prayed for the declaration of the
circumstances, by the rules concerning guardians.
absence of her husband Roberto L. Reyes
alleging that her H had been absent fr. their
Art. 383. In the appointment of a
conjugal dwelling since 4/62 & since then had not
representative, the spouse present shall be
been heard fr. & his whereabouts unknown. The
preferred when there is no legal separation.
petition further alleged that her H left no will or
any prop. in his name nor any debts.
If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse
present is a minor, any competent person may be
After hearing, the court a quo dismissed
appointed by the court.
the petition on the ground that since Roberto
Reyes left no prop there was no necessity to
declare him judicially an absentee.
Tolentino: Appointment Necessary.-- Unless
the wife has been appointed an administratrix or
trustee of the properties of her absent husband, she HELD: The need to have a person judicially
has no capacity to maintain an action to recover declared an absentee is when he has properties
possession of such properties. w/c have to be taken cared of or administered by
a representative appointed by the Court (384) ;
the spouse of the absentee is asking for
separation of prop (191, NCC) or his wife is
asking the court that the administration of all
classes of prop. in the marriage be transferred to
her (196, NCC.) The petition to declare the
DECLARATION OF ABSENCE husband an absentee & the petition to place the
management of the conjugal properties in the
hands of the wife may be combined &
Art. 384. Two years having elapsed w/o any adjudicated in the same proceedings.
news about the absentee or since the receipt of the
EASTERN SHIPPING V. LUCERO [124 S
last news, & five years in case the absentee has left
425] -
a person in charge of the administration of his
property, his absence may be declared.
Facts: On 2/16/80, the petitioner co. received 3
radio messages fr. Capt. Lucero on board M/V
Tolentino: Computation of Period.-- If there Eastern Minicon, the last of w/c, received at 9:50
has been no news of or fr. the absentee since his P.M. of that day, was a call for immediate
disappearance, the period must be computed fr. the assistance in view of the existing "danger;" "sea
date of disappearance. But if there has been news water was entering the hatch;" the vessel "was
fr. or about him, the period should be counted fr. listing 50 to 60 degrees port," & they were
the time referred to by the news, or the time when "preparing to abandon the ship any time." After
the news was sent. this message, nothing more has been heard fr.
the vessel or its crew until the present time.
Balane: The declaration of absence is has for its
sole purpose to enable the taking of necessary On 7/16/80, Mrs. Lucero filed a
precautions for the administration of the prop. (of complaint w/ the National Seamen Board for
the absentee.) (quoting Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 P payment of her accrued monthly allotment w/c
179.) the Co. had stopped since 3/80 & for continued
payment of said allotments until M/V Minicon
A general power of administration is shall have returned to the port of Mla.
granted w/c is broader than that granted for a mere

154
On 5/19/81, the Board rendered judgement (2) When the death of the absentee is
in favor of Mrs. L & held that the presumption of proved & his testate or intestate heirs appear;
death could not be applied bec. the 4-yr period [Art. (3) When a third person appears, showing by
391(1)] had not yet expired. On appeal, the NLRC a proper document that he has acquired the
affirmed said decision. absentee's property by purchase or other title.

HELD: We are unable to agree w/ the reasoning of In these cases the administrator shall cease
the resp. NLRC. in the performance of his office, & the property
shall be at the disposal of those who may have a
There is enough evidence to show the right thereto.
circumstances attending the loss & disappearance
of the M/V Eastern Minicon & its crew. The
foregoing facts, quite logically, are sufficient to lead PRESUMPTION OF DEATH
us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk &
that the persons aboard had perished w/ it. Upon Tolentino: Judicial Declaration Not
this premise, the rule on presumption of death Necessary.-- The presumption of death is
under Art. 391(1) must yield to the rule of created by law, & arises w/o any necessity of a
preponderance of evidence. Where there are facts, judicial declaration. The presumption can be
known or knowable, fr. w/c a rational conclusion availed of in any action or proc.; but there can be
can be made, the presumption does not step in, & no independent proceeding for the express
the rule of preponderance of evidence controls. purpose of securing a judicial declaration that a
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 P 257.) person is presumptively dead, except for
purposes of re-marriage under the Family Code.

Art. 385. The following may ask for the Balane: Under the NCC, no action was allowed
declaration of absence: for the declaration of presumptive death bec. it
becomes res judicata w/c is illogical when the
(1) The spouse present; person declared dead turns out to be alive. But
(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may this is no longer true under the FC w/c requires a
declaration of presumptive death for purposes of
present an authentic copy of the same;
remarriage. (see Art. 41.)
(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law
of intestacy;
(4) Those who may have over the property of Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it
the absentee some right subordinated to the being unknown whether or not the absentee still
condition of his death. lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.
Art. 386. The judicial declaration of absence
shall not take effect until six months after its The absentee shall not be presumed dead for
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the
Art. 387. An administrator of the absentee's age of seventy-five years, an absence of five
property shall be appointed in accordance w/ article years shall be sufficient in order that his
383. succession may be opened.

Art. 388. The wife who is appointed as an


Tolentino: For Re-Marriage of Spouse
administratrix of the husband's property, cannot
Present.-- Under the FC (41), if a spouse has
alienate or encumber the husband's property or been absent for 4 yrs. & the spouse present has
that of the conjugal partnership, w/o judicial a well-founded belief that the spouse is already
authority. dead, the former can ask for the declaration of
presumptive death of the latter, in a summary
Art. 389. The administration shall cease in any proceeding.
of the following cases:
Balane: Q: When Does Presumptive Death
(1) When the absentee appears personally or Set In?
A: It depends on the age of the person.
by means of an agent;

155
In normal presumptive death (the absentee Missing in War.-- The term "war" is construed
was 75 or below), 7 years is required for all generally; it is not limited to war as understood in
purposes except for succession, e.g., for insurance, international law, but includes all military
suspensive condition, retirement benefits, etc. & 10 operations or undertakings in armed fighting.
years for purposes of succession. The presumption in case of persons missing in
war, applies not only to soldiers, but also to those
In qualified presumptive death (the who are employed by or render services to the
absentee is over 75), one single period of 5 yrs. for armed forces (such as nurses, doctors, etc.),
all purposes. Notice 390 states that only 5 yrs. of those who render voluntary service (such as
absence is required in order that succession may be guides & guerrillas), & those who follow or stay
opened. But what if succession is not involved? If w/ the armed forces (such as reporters,
only 5 yrs. is required in cases involving succession, photographers, etc.) It is however, necessary
w/ more reason should 5 yrs. only be required if that such disappearance be during military
succession is not involved. operations.

In Danger of Death.-- The death should be


considered to have taken place on the day of the
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead danger. xxx If the danger continues for several
for all purposes, including the division of the estate days, xxx the more logical view seems to be that
among the heirs; the period should be computed fr. the last day of
such danger; in cases of expeditions or similar
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea ventures of w/c nothing is heard after it has
voyage, or an aeroplane w/c is missing, who has started, the date when it should have been
not been heard of for four years since the loss of completed, if favorably concluded, is to be taken
the vessel or aeroplane; into account.
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken
part in war, & has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death Art. 392. If the absentee appears or w/o
under other circumstances & his existence has not appearing his existence is proved, he shall
been known for four years. recover his property in the condition in w/c it may
be found, & the price of any property that may
have been alienated or the property acquired
Tolentino: therew/; but he cannot claim either fruits or
rents.
Modification under the FC.-- For purposes of
securing a decl of presumptive death under these
circumstances, under the FC for purposes of Tolentino: The rights of the possessors of the
remarriage of a spouse present, an absence of 2 absentee's prop. are dependent upon the
yrs. of the absent spouse will be enough. presumed death of the latter; hence, if he
reappears, those rights cease. For this reason,
Presumptive Death of Missing Persons.-- The the possession is conditional & cannot be the
persons presumed dead under this article cannot be basis of prescription. Neither will the action of
considered as merely absentees; they are more the absentee to recover his prop. prescribe.
properly called missing persons. xxx [T]he
presumptive date of death is fixed on the very day
of the occurrence of the event fr. w/c the death is EFFECT OF ABSENCE UPON THE
presumed; & if such date cannot be fixed, the court CONTINGENT RIGHTS OF THE ABSENTEE
determines the middle of the period in w/c the
event could have happened.

Loss of Vessel or Aeroplane.-- These terms Art. 393. Whoever claims a right pertaining to
must be understood in their broad meanings. a person whose existence is not recognized must
Vessels will include all watercraft, & aeroplanes will prove that he was living at the time his existence
include all aircraft. was necessary in order to acquire said right.
The loss of the vessel must be during a sea
voyage w/c include not only voyages in the open Tolentino: For the acquisition of rights by an
sea but also passage along the mouth or river, absentee, life is not presumed before the date of
canals, etc. in the course of such voyage. However, presumptive death.
trips w/c are only inland waters are not included.

156
Art. 394. Without prejudice to the provision of trustee or administrator may be applied for by
the preceding article, upon the opening of a any of the following:
succession to w/c an absentee is called, his share
shall accrue to his co-heirs, unless he has heirs, (a) The spouse present;
assigns, or a representative. They shall all, as the (b) The heirs instituted in a will, who may
case may be, make an inventory of the property. present an authentic copy of the same;
(c) The relatives who would succeed by the
law of intestacy; &
Art. 395. The provisions of the preceding article (d) Those who have over the property of the
are understood to be w/o prejudice to the action or absentee some right subordinated to the
petition for inheritance or other rights w/c are condition of his death.
vested in the absentee, his representative or
successors in interest. These rights shall not be Sec. 3. Contents of petition. - The petition
extinguished save by lapse of time fixed for for the appointment of a representative, or for
prescription. In the record that is made in the the declaration of absence & the appointment of
Registry of the real estate w/c accrues to the co- a trustee or an administrator, must show the
heirs, the circumstance of its being subject to the following:
provisions of this article shall be stated.
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
Art. 396. Those who may have entered upon (b) The names, ages, & residences of the
the inheritance shall appropriate the fruits received heirs instituted in the will, copy of w/c shall be
in good faith so long as the absentee does not presented, & of the relatives who would succeed
appear, or while his representatives or successors in by the law of intestacy,
interest do not bring the proper actions. (c) The names & residences of creditors &
others who may have any adverse interest over
Art. 43. If there is doubt, as between two or the property of the absentee;
more persons who are called to succeed each other, (d) The probable value, location & character
as to w/c of them died first, whoever alleges the of the property belonging to the absentee.
death of one prior to the other, shall prove the
same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that Sec. 4. Time of hearing; notice & publication
they died at the same time & there shall be no thereof. - When a petition for the appointment
transmission of rights fr. one to the other. of a representative, or for the declaration of
absence & the appointment of a trustee or
Rule 107, Rules of Court - ABSENTEES administrator, is filed, the court shall fix a date &
place for the hearing thereof where all concerned
may appear to contest the petition.
Sec. 1. Appointment of representative. - When
a person disappears fr. his domicile, his Copies of the notice of the time & place fixed
whereabouts being unknown, & w/o having left an for the hearing shall be served upon the known
agent to administer his property, or the power heirs, legatees, devisees, creditors & other
conferred upon the agent has expired, any interested persons, at least ten (10) days before
interested party, relative or friend, may petition the the day of the hearing, & shall be published once
Court of First Instance of the place where the a week for three (3) consecutive weeks prior to
absentee resided before his disappearance, for the the time designated for the hearing, in a
appointment of a person to represent him newspaper of general circulation in the province
provisionally in all that may be necessary. In the or city where the absentee resides, as the court
City of Manila, the petition shall be filed in the shall deem best.
Juvenile Domestic Relations Court.
Sec. 5. Opposition. - Anyone appearing to
Sec. 2. Declaration of absence; who may contest the petition shall state in writing his
petition. - After the lapse of two (2) years fr. his grounds therefor, & serve a copy thereof on the
disappearance & w/o any news about the absentee petitioner & other interested parties on or before
or since the receipt of the last news, or of five (5) the date designated for the hearing.
years in case the absentee has left a person in
charge of the administration of his property, the Sec. 6. Proof at hearing; order. - At the
declaration of his absence & appointment of a hearing, compliance w/ the provisions of section
157
4 of this rule must first be shown. Upon satisfactory a thing, but it is not prop.; it is not susceptible of
appropriation.
proof of the allegations in the petition, the court
shall issue an order granting the same & appointing Purposes of Legal Protection: (1) to protect
the representative, trustee or administrator for the the feelings of those related to the deceased; (2)
absentee. The judge shall take the necessary to avoid dangers to the health of the living; & (3)
measures to safeguard the rights & interests of the to allow scientific investigation & study.
absentee & shall specify the powers, obligations &
remuneration of his representative, trustee or Right to the Corpse.-- The corpse is outside
administrator, regulating them by the rules the commerce of man. A contract for valuable
concerning guardians. consideration disposing of the corpse, except
when expressly permitted by law, would be void
as contrary to morals.
In case of declaration of absence, the same
shall not take effect until six (6) months after its xxx There is, however, a certain right to
publication in a newspaper of general circulation the possession of the corpse, for the purpose of
designated by the court & in the Official Gazette. decent burial, & for the exclusion of intrusion by
third persons who have no legitimate interest in
Sec. 7. Who may be appointed. - In the it.
appointment of a representative, the spouse
present shall be preferred when there is no legal Any person charged by law w/ the duty
of burying the body of a deceased person is
separation. If the absentee left no spouse, or if the
entitled to the custody of such body for the
spouse present is a minor or otherwise purpose of burying it, except when an inquest is
incompetent, any competent person may be required by law for the purpose of determining
appointed by the court. the cause of death; &, in case of death due to or
accompanied by a dangerous communicable
In case of declaration of absence, the trustee or disease, such body shall until buried remain in
administrator of the absentee's property shall be the custody of the local board of health or local
appointed in accordance w/ the preceding health officer, or if there be no such, then in the
paragraph. custody of the municipal council. (Sec. 1104,
Revised Admin. Code.)
Sec. 8. Termination of administration. - The
trusteeship or administration of the property of the
absentee shall cease upon order of the court in any Art. 305. The duty & the right to make
of the following cases: arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be
in accordance w/ the order established for
(a) When the absentee appears personally or support, under Art. 199 of the Family Code. In
by means of an agent; case of descendants of the same degree, or of
(b) When the death of the absentee is proved & brothers & sisters, the oldest shall be preferred.
his testate or intestate heirs appear; In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a
(c) When a third person appears, showing by a better right.
proper document that he has acquired the
absentee's property by purchase or other title. Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are
obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve
In these cases the trustee or administrator shall upon the following persons in the order herein
cease in the performance of his office, & the provided:
property shall be placed at the disposal of those
who may have a right thereto. (1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree;
(4) The brothers & sisters. (Family Code.)
XIX. FUNERALS

Tolentino: Right to make funeral


Tolentino:
arrangements.-- If there are no persons who
are bound to support the deceased, or if there
Juridical Nature of Corpse.-- The corpse cannot are but they are w/o means to defray the funeral
be the subject of rights, bec. juridical personality is
extinguished by death. Evidently, it is an object or
158
expenses, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance
municipal authorities. w/ the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the
Same; Subject to waiver.-- The persons who absence of such expression, his religious beliefs
are preferred in the right may waive this right or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In
expressly or impliedly, in w/c case the right & duty case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be
immediately descend to the person next in the decided upon by the person obliged to make
order prescribed by law. arrangements for the same, after consulting w/
the other members of the family.
Extent of Right.-- Under our law, it seems that
the person entitled to the custody of the corpse Art. 308. No human remains shall be
cannot exclude the friends & other relatives of the
retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed w/o
deceased; such exclusion, w/o just cause, would be
an abuse of right prohibited by Art. 19, NCC, or an the consent of the persons mentioned in Art. 199
act contrary to good customs under Art. 21. The of the Family Code & 305 (of the Civil Code.)
members of the family of the deceased, of course,
cannot be excluded, bec. they would have an
inherent right to witness the interment. Tolentino: Exhumation of Corpse For
Evidential Purposes.-- Although the present
art. prohibits exhumation w/o the consent of the
BALANE CASE: persons obliged to support the deceased in life,
the right of such persons must yield to public
interests when the exhumation appears to be
absolutely essential to the administration of
EUGENIO V. VELEZ
justice such as where there is no other way to
prove a material fact except by exhumation of a
HELD: We hold that the provisions of the NCC body w/c has been interred.
unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Art.
144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a Disposition of Corpse by Deceased.--
lawfully wedded spouse. Philippine Law does not Although a person cannot dispose of his corpse
recognize common law marriage. Petitioner vis-à- by act inter vivos or mortis causa as prop., he
vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to may provide the manner in w/c it shall be
her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry disposed of by those called upon to do so.
her in her lifetime (being himself legally married to RA 349 recognizes the validity of an
another woman.) authorization given by a person to use parts of
his corpse for medical, surgical, & scientific
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was purposes.
correctly awarded to her surviving brothers &
sisters. Sec. 1103 (b) of the Rev. Admin. Code Corpses w/c are to be buried at public
provides: expense may also be used for scientific purposes,
"If the deceased was an unmarried man or under certain conditions.
woman, or a child, & left any kin, the duty of burial
Performance of Autopsies.-- An autopsy may
shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the either be private or official. If it is private, it
deceased, if they be adults & w/in the Phils. & in cannot be performed w/o the consent of the
the possession of sufficient means to defray the persons having a right to the corpse. On the
necessary expenses." other hand, in the higher interests of the State,
official autopsies may be performed regardless of
the wishes of the persons entitled to the corpse.
Art. 306. Every funeral shall be in keeping w/
the social position of the deceased.
Art. 309. Any person who shows disrespect
to the dead, or wrongfully interferes w/ a funeral,
Tolentino: This article does not provide for a shall be liable to the family of the deceased for
sanction for its enforcement. However, the damages, material & moral.
sanctions may be found in other provisions of the
law. Art. 310. The construction of a tombstone or
mausoleum shall be deemed a part of the funeral
expenses, & shall be chargeable to the conjugal

159
partnership property, if the deceased is one of the (12) recovery of citizenship;
spouses. (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; &
(16) change of name.
XX. CIVIL REGISTER
Art. 409. In cases of legal separation,
adoption, naturalization & other judicial orders
mentioned in the preceding article, it shall be the
Art. 407. Acts, events & judicial decrees
duty of the clerk of the court w/c issued the
concerning the civil status of persons shall be
decree to ascertain whether the same has been
recorded in the civil register.
registered, & if this has not been done, to send a
copy of said decree to the civil registry of the city
or municipality where the court is functioning.
Balane: Correlate Art. 407 w/ Art. 7, PD 603.
Art. 410. The books making up the civil
register & all documents relating thereto shall be
Sec. 7. Non-disclosure of Birth Records. - The considered public documents & shall be prima
records of a person's birth shall be kept strictly facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
confidential & no information relating thereto shall
be issued except on the request of any of the
following:
BALANE CASE:
(1) The person himself, or any person
SERMONIA V. CA
authorized by him;
(2) His spouse, his parent or parents, his direct
HELD: (1) The rule on constructive notice
descendants, or the guardian or institution legally-
cannot apply in the crime of bigamy
in-charge of him if he is a minor;
notw/standing the possibility of its being more
(3) The court or proper public official whenever
favorable to the accused. As the CA succinctly
absolutely necessary in administrative, judicial or
explains--
other official proceedings to determine the identity
xxx [T]he principle of constructive notice
of the child's parents or other circumstances
should not be applied in regard to the crime of
surrounding his birth; &
bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact
(4) In case of the person's death, the nearest of
that a bigamous marriage is generally entered
kin.
into by the offender in secrecy fr. the spouse of
Any person violating the prohibition shall
the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at least two
bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a
months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five
place where the offender is not known to be still
hundred pesos, or both, in the discretion of the
a married person, in order to conceal his legal
court. (P.D. 603, The Child & Youth Welfare Code.)
impediment to contract another marriage.
xxx [T]he criminal cases cited by the
Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the
petitioner wherein constructive notice was
civil register:
applied involved land or prop. disputes &
certainly, marriage is not prop.
(1) Births;
(2) marriages;
The non-application to the crime of
(3) deaths;
bigamy of the prin. of constructive notice is not
(4) legal separations;
contrary to the policy that penal laws should be
(5) annulments of marriages;
construed liberally in favor of the accused. To
(6) judgments declaring marriages void fr. the
compute the prescriptive period for the offense of
beginning;
bigamy fr. registration thereof would amount to
(7) legitimations;
almost absolving offenders thereof for liab.
(8) adoptions;
therefor. xxx
(9) acknowledgements of natural children;
(10) naturalization;
(11) loss or
160
(2) The rule on constructive notice will make de petition for the cancellation or correction of any
rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the entry relating thereto, w/ the Court of First
marriages listed in the National Census Office & in Instance of the province where the corresponding
various local civil registries all over the country to civil registry is located.
make certain that no subsequent marriage has been
contracted w/o the knowledge of the legitimate Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or
spouse. correction. - Upon good & valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be
(3) More importantly, while Sec. 52 of PD 1529 cancelled or corrected;
(Prop. Reg. Dec.) provides for constructive notice to
all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, (a) births;
lien, etc. affecting registered land filed or entered in (b) marriage;
the office of the Register of Deeds for the province (c) deaths;
or city where the land to w/c it relates lies fr. the (d) legal separations;
time of such registration, there is no counterpart (e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
provision either in Act 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil (f) judgments declaring marriages void fr. the
Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413, NCC, w/c leads to beginning;
the conclusion that there is no legal basis for (g) legitimations;
applying the constructive notice rule to documents (h) adoptions;
registered in the Civil Register. (i) acknowledgments of natural children;
(j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship;
Art. 411. Every civil registrar shall be civilly (l) civil interdiction;
responsible for any unauthorized alteration made in (m) judicial determination of filiation;
any civil register, to any person suffering damage (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor, &
thereby. However, the civil registrar may exempt (o) changes of name.
himself fr. such liability if he proves that he has
taken every reasonable precaution to prevent the Sec. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or
unlawful alteration. correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar & all persons who have
Art. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be or claim any interest w/c would be affected
changed or corrected, w/o judicial order. thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

Sec. 4. Notice & publication. - Upon the filing


Tolentino: Changes or corrections in entries in the of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
Civil Registry may be sought by 2 different the time & place for the hearing of the same, &
procedures: (1) summary procedure for the cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
correction of clerical errors, & (2) adversary, the persons named in the petition. The court shall
litigious, or contentious procedure for changes of a also cause the order to be published once a week
substantial character. for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
Corrections to be made in the civil register of general circulation in the province.
may be either clerical or substantial. The
proceeding under Art. 412 & Rule 108 of the Rules Sec. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar & any
of Court may either be summary or adversary in person having or claiming any interest under the
nature. Even substantial or material errors in the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
civil register may be corrected provided the may, w/in fifteen (15) days fr. notice of the
appropriate remedy is availed of. petition, or fr. the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto.

RULE 108 - CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. - The court in


OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY w/c the proceeding is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, & may also grant
Sec. 1, Who may file petition. - Any person preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
interested in any act, event, order or decree rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
concerning the civil status of persons w/c has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
161
Sec. 7. Order. - After hearing, the court may to the other party, & afforded the latter an
either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting opportunity to contest it. xxx"
the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either
case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be Provided that the trial court has
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
annotate the same in his record. have been fully & properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party's case, & where the
Balane: Recapitulate.-- An error in an entry in evidence has been thoroughly weighed &
the Civil Register can only be corrected by court considered, the suit or proceeding is
order. The proper action to file depends on "appropriate."
whether the error is merely clerical or substantive.
If merely clerical, summary proceeding for [T]he persons who must be made parties
correction is enough; if substantive, adversary to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
proceeding is required. correction of an entry in the civil register are--
REPUBLIC V. VALENCIA [141 S 462 (1986)] (1) the civil registrar, & (2) all persons who
have or claim any interest w/c would be affected
Facts: Resp. Leonor Valencia, for & in behalf of thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it
her minor children, Bernardo Go & Jessica Go filed becomes the duty of the court to-- (1) issue an
w/ the CFI-Cebu a petition for the cancellation &/or order fixing the time & place for the hearing of
correction of entries of birth of her 2 minor children the petition, & (2) cause the order for hearing to
in the Civil Registry of Cebu. The petition seeks to be published once a wk for 3 consecutive weeks
change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go in a newspaper of gen. circ. in the province. The
& Jessica Go fr. "Chinese" to "Filipino" & their status following are likewise entitled to oppose the
fr. "Legitimate" to "Illegitimate," & changing also petition-- (1) the civil registrar, & (2) any person
the status of the mother fr. "married" to "single." having or claiming any interest under the entry
The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu filed a motion to whose cancellation or correction is sought.
dismiss on the ground that the corrections sought
are not merely clerical but substantial. The lower If all these procedural requirements have
court denied the motion to dismiss. From the been followed, a petition for correction &/ or
decision of the lower court, oppositor-appellant cancellation of entries in the record of birth even
Republic appealed. if filed & conducted under R 108, ROC can no
longer be described as "summary." There can be
HELD: [I]f the subject matter of a petition is not no doubt that when an opposition to the petition
for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless & is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person
innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or having or claiming any interest in the interest in
citizenship, w/c is indisputably substantial as well as the entries sought to be cancelled &/ or corrected
controversial, affirmative relief cannot be granted in & the opposition is actively prosecuted, the
a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is proceedings thereon become adversary
also true that a right in law may be enforced & a proceedings.
wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate
remedy is used. This court adheres to the principle In this case, the court took note of the
that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be fact that all the procedural requirements have
corrected & the true facts established provided the been followed & hence the recorded proceedings
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of that actually took place could very well be
the appropriate adversary proceeding. regarded as that proper suit or appropriate
xxx action.

What is meant by appropriate adversary In the instant case, a pet. for cancellation
proceeding? Black's Law Dictionary defines &/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go
"adversary proceeding" as follows: & Jessica Go in the Civ. Reg.- Cebu City was filed
by resp. L. Valencia on 1/27/70, & pursuant to
"One having opposing parties; contested, the order of the trial court dated 2/4/70, the said
as distinguished fr. an ex parte application, one of pet. was published once a wk for 3 consecutive
w/c the party seeking relief has given legal warning wks. in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of gen.
circ. in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly
162
served on the Sol-Gen., the Local Civ. Registrar & REPUBLIC V. FLOJO
Go Eng. The order likewise set the case for hearing
& directed the local civ. registrar & the other resps. HELD: The contention is w/o merit. While the
or any person claiming any interest under the Court has, indeed previously ruled that changes
or corrections authorized under Art. 412, w/c
entries whose corrections were sought, to file their
envisions a summary proc., relate only to
opposition to the said pet. An opposition to the pet. harmless & innocuous alterations, such as
was consequently filed by the Rep. on 2/26/70. misspellings or errors that are visible to the eyes
Thereafter, a full blown trial followed w/ resp. L. or obvious to the understanding & that changes
Valencia testifying & presenting her documentary in the citizenship of a person or his civil status are
evid. in support of her pet. The Rep. on the other substantial as well as controversial, w/c can only
hand, cross-examined resp. L.V. be established in appropriate adversary proc., the
rule has been relaxed in the case of Rep. v.
Valencia.

In the instant case, there is no doubt


that the proc. conducted in the lower court was
BALANE CASES: an adversary proc. & "appropriate" in that "all
relevant facts have been fully & properly
developed, where the opposing counsel have
BARRETO V. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA been given the opportunity to demolish the
opposite party's case, & where the evidence has
ISSUE: W/n the supposed erroneous entry as to been thoroughly weighed & considered." The
the sex of Rosario B., as indicated in the birth questioned order states in part:
record, is a clerical error that may be changed by
means of a petition for correction filed by one After the required publ. of the order of
Domingo B. who claims to be the same person as Notice of hrng. dated 8/22/78 in the Cagayan
Rosario B. Valley Weekly Journal, has been complied w/ &
notice to the Sol-Gen, petitioner adduced
HELD: We hold that the petition is not warranted evidence on 10/17/78. No written opposition was
bec. under the facts of this case, the alleged error is interposed by resp. but at the hrng. , Asst. Prov.
not clerical in nature. If the name in the record of Fiscal Gonzales appeared for & in behalf of the
birth were Domingo B. & his sex was indicated Sol-Gen.
therein as female, it might be argued that the error
would be clerical. But that is not the fact in the REPUBLIC V. BAUTISTA
case. The situation is more complicated. A person
named Domingo B. claims he is Rosario B. & that HELD: We are constrained to deny the instant
the word "female" in the latter's birth record is a pet. for review. The issue now bef. us has been
mistake. resolved in the case of Rep. v . Valencia wherein
the court held that the proceedings under Art.
It is settled that the summary proc. for 412 & Rule 108, ROC may either be summary or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Art. adversary in nature. If the correction sought to
412, NCC & R 108, ROC is confined to "innocuous or be made in the civ. reg. is clerical, then the
clerical errors, such as misspellings & the like, errors procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
understanding" or corrections that are not nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, &
controversial & are supported by indubitable the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
evidence.
In Rep. v. Valencia, we postulated that
A clerical error is one made by a clerk in the appropriate remedy may well be a pet. filed
transcribing or otherwise, &, of course, must be by way of SP for the cancellation &/or correction
apparent on the face of the record, & capable of of substantial entries in the civ. reg. w/ the
being corrected by reference to the record only. requisite parties, notices, publications & the
proceedings to be taken thereafter pursuant to
The alleged error in this case cannot be Secs. 3, 4 & 5 of R108 bec. then the proc. will be
determined by reference to the record. There is a adversary in character.
need to determine w/n Rosario B. & Domingo B. are
one & the same person & to ascertain why Domingo In the present case, the records show
was registered in the record of birth as Rosario. that the Pasay City Local Civ. Reg. & the Sol-Gen.
were made parties to the pet. The proper notice
was published once a wk for 3 consecutive wks.
in the Rizal Weekly Bulletin, a newspaper of gen.
163
circ. The Rep. appeared thru a trial atty. of the Art. 441. To the owner belongs:
Office of the Sol-Gen. who was present & did not The natural fruits;
object to the presentation of evidence, xxx.
The industrial fruits;
REPUBLIC V. CARRIAGA The civil fruits;

HELD: In the case at bar, not only have the Art. 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous
procedural requirements been complied w/ but a products of the soil, & the young & other
trial was duly conducted wherein the pvt. resp. was products of animals. Industrial fruits are those
given the chance to present his evidence while the produced by lands of any kind through
fiscal was likewise given every opportunity to cultivation or labor.
present his opposition. The safeguards in Rep. v. Civil fruits are the rentals of buildings,
Valencia were followed.
the price of leases of lands & other property &
True, the City Fiscal decided not to submit the amount of perpetual or life annuities or other
any evidence in opposition to the averments in the similar income.
petition, but the pvt. resps submitted satisfactory
evidence to prove his case. Art. 443. He who receives the fruits has the
obligation to pay the expenses made by a third
REPUBLIC V. CFI person in their production, gathering &
preservation.
HELD: In the instant case, we hold that an
appropriate adversary proc. has taken place. xxx Art. 444. Only such as are manifest or born
are considered as natural or industrial fruits. With
The controverted order dated 3/31/73, by
respect to animals, it is sufficient that they are in
itself, indicates sufficient compliance w/ the
requirements of an appropriate adversary proc. the womb of the mother although unborn.
The publ. requirement has been complied w/. In
the hrng., the pvt. resp. presented his evidence. 2. BUILDING, PLANTING,
Opposition by the petitioner thereto was received by SOWING.
the court. And fr. this proc., it was conclusively
established that no marriage bet. pvt. resp. &
Dolores D. Balance, mother of the child, took place
on 1/7/69; that the pvt. resp. hardly knew Dolores Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown
& never had any extramarital relations w/ her; & on the land of another & the improvements or
that he is very much a married man & his wife is repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the
still living. The record of the case does not show land, subject to the provisions of the following
any rebuttal of the evidence of the pvt. resp. articles.

ZAPANTA V. CIVIL REGISTRAR Art. 446. All works, sowing & planting are
presumed made by the owner at his expense,
HELD: The records show that the publ.
unless the contrary is proved.
requirement has already been complied w/. The
next step would thus be for the court a quo to
consider the pet. before it to be, in substance, an Art. 447. The owner of the land who makes
adversary proc. & to allow petitioner & all adverse & thereon personally or through another, paintings,
interested parties their day in court. constructions or works w/ the materials of
another, shall pay their value; & if he acted in
Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the bad faith, he shall also be obliged in the
registration of civil status shall be governed by reparation of damages. The owner of the
special laws. (See Act No. 3613, as amended) materials shall have the right to remove them
only of he can do so w/o injury to the work
constructed, or w/o the plantings, constructions
or works being destroyed. However, if the
II. Right of Accession
landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the
materials may remove them in any event, w/ a
A. REAL PROPERTY
right to de indemnified for damages.
1. NATURAL INCREMENT.
Art. 448. The owner of the land on w/c
anything has been built, sown or planted in good

164
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own This provision shall not apply if the
the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the owner makes use of the right granted in article
indemnity provided for in articles 546 & 548, or to 450. If the owner of the materials, plants or
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price seeds has been paid by the builder, planter or
of the land, & the one who sowed, the proper rent. sower, the latter may demand fr. the landowner
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged the value of the materials & labor.
to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the buildings or trees. In such case, he Art. 456. In the cases regulated in the
shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land preceding articles, good faith does not necessarily
does not choose to appropriate the buildings or exclude negligence, w/c gives right to damages
trees after the proper indemnity. The parties shall under article 2176.
agree upon the terms of the lease, & in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
FILIPINAS COLLEGE INC. VS. TIMBANG
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad 106 SCRA 247
faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown w/o right to indemnity. Facts: There are three parties involved: the
Timbang spouses who own the lot; Blas who built
Art. 450. The owner of the land w/c anything a school building on said lot; & Filipinas Colleges
has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may Inc. who purchased the building fr. Blas.
demand the demolition of the work, or that the
planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace The CA declared that Filipinas
things in their former condition at the expense of (Petitioners) has acquired the rights of the
the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may Timbangs (Respondents) to the lot & had to pay
compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the value of the land; that should Filipinas fail to pay,
land, & the sower the proper rent. it loses its right to the land & the Timbangs will
become the owners. Thus, the Timbangs must
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding exercise their option under article 448 to
articles, the landowner is entitled to damages fr. the appropriate the building or compel Filipinas to
builder, planter or sower. acquire the land. Filipinas was also ordered to
pay Blas the value of the buildings.
Art. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad
faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary Filipinas failed to pay the amount, so the
expenses of preservation of the land. Timbangs, in exercising their option under art.
448 chose to compel Filipinas to acquire the land.
Art. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the The Timbangs contend that since builder in good
part of the person who built, planted or sowed on faith has failed to pay the price of the land after
the land of another but also on the part of the they failed to exercise their option, the builder
owner of such land, the right of one & the other not only lost their right of retention under Art.
shall be the same as though both acted in good 456 but also that they, as landowners
faith. automatically became the owners of the land.
It is understood that there is bad faith on
the part of the landowner whenever the act was Issue: Is there merit in the contention of the
done w/ his knowledge & w/o opposition on his Timbangs?
part.
Held: Without merit.
Art. 454. When the landowner acted in bad
faith & the builder, planter or sower proceeded in There is nothing in Art. 448 & Art. 546
good faith, the provisions of article 447 shall apply. w/c would justify the conclusion that upon failure
of the builder to pay the value of the land, when
Art. 455. If the materials, plants or seeds such is demanded by the landowner, the latter
belong to a third person who has not acted in bad becomes automatically the owner of the
faith, the owner of the land shall answer subsidiarily improvement under Art. 445. So what is the
for their value & only in the event that the one who recourse left to the parties in such an eventuality
made use of them has no property w/ w/c to pay. where the builder fails to pay the value of the

165
land? While the Code is silent on this point, owned by P. Indeed, P built the road in good
guidance may be had fr. the previous decisions of faith & as such it may be argued that P is entitled
this Court: to have possession of the road until after it has
been reimbursed of the expenses it has incurred.
(1) In Miranda v. Fadullon, the builder might be However, provisions governing the rights of
made to pay rental only, leave things as they builder in good faith on private land cannot be
are, & assume the relation of lessor & lessee; applied here bec. public interest is involved.
(2) In Ignacio v. Hilario, owner of the land may
have the improvement removed; or
(3) In Bernardo v. Bataclan, the land & the BAVIERA: Art. 448 does not apply bec. it is
improvement may be sold in a public auction, public property. Remedy of Calapan is
applying the proceeds first to the payments of reimbursement either fr. the toll fees
the value of the land, & the excess if any, to be collection or payment of construction
delivered to the owner of the house in payment expense w/ legal interest.
thereof.

BAVIERA: If bldg. Is sold to pay for the value IGNACIO V. HILARIO, 76 PHIL. 605
of the land, then the builder becomes part-
owner of the land.) Facts: The Lower Court declared Plaintiffs Hilario
& Dres the owners of the land in question but
conceded to Defendants Ignacios the ownership
CALAPAN LUMBER CO. V. COMMUNITY of the houses & granaries built by them on said
SAWMILL CO. 11 SCRA 346 lot w/ the rights of possessor in GF. Thereafter, P
filed a motion praying that since they chose
Facts: Plaintiff Calapan Lumber Co. undertook the neither to pay the building nor to sell the land,
completion & construction of a provincial road in said D’s defendants should be ordered to remove
Calapan. By virtue of a Provincial Board Resolution, the structures & restore P in the possession of
P was granted sole right to use the said road the lot. LC granted the motion.
provided that after 20 years, it shall donate the said
road to the province. It also provided that other Issue: WON order of LC is in accord w/ the law.
grantees of lumber concessions may use said road
only w/ P’s permission. Upon the recommendation Held: No. Decision reversed.
of the Director of Public Works, on the ground that
said road is a public road, the Provincial Board Owner has the option of paying the value
revoked the earlier resolution & issued a new of the building or selling the land, He cannot, as
resolution declaring the said road a toll road, P’s here did, refuse to either to pay or sell &
proceeds of w/c are to be paid to P as compel the owner of the building to remove it
reimbursement of expenses it incurred in finishing form the land where it is erected. He is entitled to
the road. such remotion only when, after having chosen to
sell the land, the other party fails to pay for the
Notw/standing said resolution, P brought same.
action to prohibit Defendant Lao Kee at al (other
lumber concessionaires) fr. using said road. The GRANA V. CA, 60 O.G. 1964
Lower Court ruled for P, declaring that the
questioned road is the private property of P. Facts: Plaintiffs Bongato & Sanchez filed an
action to recover 87 sq. m of land fr. Defendants
Issue: WON the road in question belongs to Grana & Torralba, on the ground that D’s land
Calapan as the latter’s private property. originally surveyed to have 295 sq. m., on
resurvey was found to have 230 sq. m., the
Held: No. Decision reversed. difference being part of their (P’s) land w/c is
adjacent to PR’s land. The D’s have constructed
The fact that the completion of the road in good faith a portion of their house on the
was done at the expense of P does not convert said disputed piece of land.
road into a private one in the absence of proof that
said land (upon w/c the road was constructed) was

166
The Lower Court ordered D’s to vacate & accordingly ordered to comply w/ the same by
deliver the said land to P’s & pay monthly rentals of buying the building erected on his land & pay the
P10 fr. the time of the filing of the complaint until value thereof fixed by the court, that duty is
they vacate the said land. CA affirmed. converted into a money obligation w/c can be
enforced by execution, regardless of the
Issue: WON LC decision is correct. unwillingness & inability of the party concerned to
pay the amount.
Held: Yes. Affirmed.

There is no evidence that the first survey BAVIERA: Rules on builder in GF not
was erroneous. Also, the difference w/ the second applicable bec. builder must be in concept
survey is only 65 sq. m. while the land P’s claiming of an owner. In CAB, it was in the concept
is 87 sq. m. Besides, said land of P’s is covered by of a lessee or usufructuary only)
a Torrens title w/c is indefeasible. However, CA
correctly ruled that D’s constructed a portion of
their house on P’s land in good faith. Thus, P’s have FELICES V. IRIOLA, 50 O.G. 3123
the option under Art. 448. E.g. (1) appropriate the
land upon payment of proper indemnity or (2) sell Facts: Felices was the grantee of a homestead
to defendants said portion of land. over parcel of land. F sold said land to Iriola w/
the condition that the deed of absolute sale be
It is the opinion of the Court though that it executed later after 5 years or as soon as allowed
would be impractical for P’s to buy that portion of by law, pursuant to Art. 141. Two years, F tried
the house standing on their land, for that will render to recover the land but I refused unless he was
the whole building useless. The more workable paid the value of the improvements thereon.
solution is for P’s to sell to D’s that part of the land Court found that improvements were made only
on w/c was constructed a portion of D’s house. If after he was informed that P wanted to recover
D’s are unwilling to buy, then they must vacate the the land thus in BF so not entitled to
land & must pay rentals until they do so. reimbursement. Sale was declared null & void as
it violated the 5-year prohibitive period of sale
TAYAG V. YUSECO, 103 PHIL. 484 under the law. I contends that they both knew
that the sale was void so both are in BF, thus Art.
Facts: As payment to defendant Atty. Yuseco’s 453 applies.
legal services, Maria offered him 2 parcels of land
for D to build a house thereon. A contract of lease Issues: WON I should be reimbursed on the
was executed covering said lots. Thereafter, D basis of I’s theory.
constructed buildings thereon. Later, said lands
were sold by Maria to her daughter, the Plaintiff Held: No.
Tayag. P asked D to remove the house on said lots
or pay monthly rentals. D refused. In the action for Art. 453 cannot be applied as the
ejectment, D was declared a builder in GF & P was improvements in question were made only after F
given the option in Art. 448. P signified his intention had tried to recover the land & even during the
to appropriate the buildings so proceedings pendency of the action in the LC. After I refused
continued to determine its value. However, after to restore the land, F could no longer be
determination of the value of the buildings, P failed regarded as having impliedly assented or
to pay. However, P alleged that even if she had conformed to the improvements made thereafter.
already made a choice, she cannot be compelled to I continued to act in BF when he made the
pay the price fixed by the court bec. of her inability improvements after he was asked to restore
to pay the same. possession of it to F.

Issue: WON the owner can validly refuse to pay for (Note : Penalty for bad faith: forfeit
the improvements on his land constr4ucted in GF? improvements w/o any right to reimbursement.)

Held: No. IGNAO V. IAC, 193 SCRA 17

Once a party has made his choice, & had


duly informed the court of said choice, & is
167
Facts: Petitioner Ignao & his uncles, Private Art. 457. To the owners of the lands
Respondents Juan & Isidro Ignao were co-owners adjoining the banks of the rivers belong the
of a parcel of land. Pursuant to an action for accretion w/c they gradually receive fr. the
partition filed by the P, Lower Court directed effects of the current of the waters.
partition of the same, allotting 2/8 thereof to PR’s,
& the rest to P. No actual partition was effected. A
few years later, P brought action to recover Tolentino:
possession against PR’s alleging that the houses
built thereon by PR’s exceeded their 2/8 portion.  takes place when the deposit of sediment has
Lower Court held that PR’s were builders in GF & reached a level higher than the highest level
gave P the option in Art. 448. But adopted Grana of water during the year; must be exclusive
ruling as to the workable solution. Thus, P was work of nature
ordered to sell part of the land occupied by the
houses of PR’s Requisites:
(1) deposit be gradual & imperceptible
(2) made through the efforts of the current of
Issue: WON Art.448 is applicable to a builder in GF the water
on a property held in common. (3) land where accretion takes place is adjacent
to the banks of the river
Held: Yes.
Banks of a River: refer to those lateral
As a rule, Art. 448 cannot apply where a strips or zones of its bed w/c are washed by the
co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned stream only during such high floods as do not
in common for then he did not build, plant or sow cause inundation or to the point reached by the
river at high tide
upon the land that exclusively belongs to another,
but of w/c he is a co-owner. However, when the co-
Property Reviewer:
ownership is terminated by the partition & it
appears that the house of PR’s overlaps or occupies  deposits made by human intervention are not
a portion of the land pertaining to P w/c PR’s included
obviously built in GF, then Art. 448 should apply.
NB: But if owner constructs works for the purely
defensive purposes against the damaging action
BAR QUESTIONS. of the water, & bec. of this, deposits accumulate,
the deposits are deemed to be alluvion & will
Q: A owns land worth 500,000. belong to the riparian owner
B built in a house on it worth 100,000 .
Both A & B are in GF. The owner of the riparian land does not
A: A has the option to buy the house for the same have to make an express act of possession as the
is a necessary & useful expense. alluvion belongs to him fr. the time that the
deposit created by the current of the water
Q: If A’s lot increased to P550,000, how much will A becomes manifest
pay to B?
A: A will pay necessary & useful expenses. Reasons for the rule:

Q: Assuming house is P900,000. (1) to compensate the owners for the losses w/c
A: A can compel B to buy land. Does not fall they may suffer by erosion due to the
under the exception. destructive forces of the waters
(2) to compensate them for the burdens of legal
Q: In what situations may forced lease arise? easements w/c are imposed upon them
A: If A chose that B buy the land, but the value of (3) bec. it is the owner of the contiguous land
the land is considerably more than the value of the who can utilize the increment to the best
bldg. advantage
(4) bec. this is the only feasible solution since the
previous owner can no longer be identified
(5) definition: the gradual deposit of sediment by
3. ALLUVION natural action of a current of fresh water, not
sea water, the original identity of the deposit
being lost

168
Art. 458. The owners of estates adjoining IGNACIO VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS 103
ponds or lagoons do not acquire the land left dry by PHIL 335
the natural decrease of the waters, or lose that
inundated by them in extraordinary floods. Facts: Petitioner Ignacio filed an application for
registration of a parcel of mangrove land in
Navotas, alleging that he owned such by right of
accretion. Such land adjoins a parcel owned by
Tolentino:
 only for ponds & lagoons him w/c he acquired fr. the government by virtue
 lagoons: a small lake, ordinarily of fresh water, of a free patents title. It was established that
& not very deep, fed by floods, the hollow bed land was formed by accretion & alluvial deposits
of w/c is bound by elevations of lands caused by the action of Manila Bay. Director
opposed, contending that parcel is a foreshore
land & thus, part of the public domain.
REPUBLIC VS. CA 131 SCRA 532
Issue: WON the parcel of land is owned by
Facts: Santos del Rio filed an application for Ignacio by right of accretion
registration of a parcel of land situated near the
shore of Laguna de Bay. Director of Lands opposed Held: NO. Land is part of the public domain.
alleging that since a portion of the land sought to A457 is not applicable since it refers to deposits
be registered is covered w/ water 4-5 months a on the banks of the rivers , while accretion in the
year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna or case at bar was caused by action of the Manila
is at least a foreshore land w/c brings it under Art. Bay. Applying the Law of Waters w/c state that
502, a property of public dominion and hence, not accretions caused by action of the sea form part
subject of registration. of the public domain. A determination by the
Government that such land is no longer
Issue: WON land should be registered in favor of necessary for purposes of public utility or for the
Santos del Rio establishment of special industries or for the
coastguard service & a declaration that they are
Held: Under A74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, part of the property of the owners of the
lake bed is defined as the ground covered by waters adjacent estates are required.
when at their highest ordinary depth. Meaning, the
highest depth of the water during the dry season, COMPANIA GEN. VS. VIDE 56 OG NO. 7, P.
such depth being the regular, common, natural one 1418
w/c occurs most of the time of the year. Although
lakes are subject to the same gravitational forces Facts: Compania General owned a vast tract of
w/c cause formation of tides in seas & oceans, such land bounded on the east & southeast by the
is not a regular daily occurrence in lakes. Thus, the Cagayan River. Vide was granted a homestead
alternation of high tides & low tides could hardly patent & later on, an OCT over a 3 hectare
account for the rise in the water level of Laguna de property located east of Compania’s land. Santos
Bay as observed 4-5 months a year during the rainy filed a sales application over a 3 hectare land
season. Rather, it is the rains w/c bring about the located south of Compania’s land. Petitioner
inundation of a portion of the land in question. sought to recover said parcels of land fr. Vide &
Water level w/c causes the submersion of the land Santos claiming that they were accretions formed
occurs during a shorter period than the level of by the continuous action of the Cagayan River.
water at w/c the land is completely dry. The latter
thus should be considered its highest ordinary Issue: WON land forms an island or are
depth. accretions to Compania’s land

Neither can it be foreshore land, w/c is a Held: Island. Accretion may be defined as an
strip of land that lies between the high & low water addition to the riparian land gradually &
marks & is alternately wet & dry according to the imperceptibly made by the water to w/c the land
flow of the tide. The submersion in water of a is contiguous. Here, Compania failed to show
portion of the land in question is due to the rains & that the addition was gradual & imperceptible.
not due to the flux & reflux of tides. Also, in order to acquire land by accretion, there
should be a natural & actual continuity of the
accretion to the land of the riparian owner. Here,
169
there is a natural depression between the hacienda of A84 (Sorry guys, hindi sinabi kung ano ang
& the land w/c served as a natural dividing line. provision)
This shows that at no time was the disputed land
part of the hacienda. The accretion therefore could 4. AVULSION
not have started fr. C’s land. The general rule is
that accretions belong to the land fr. w/c they begin Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river,
& in order to entitle the riparian owner to alluvion, creek or torrent segregates an estate on its bank
the accretion must begin fr. his land & not fr. some a known portion of land & transfers it to another
other point so as to finally reach his land. state, the owner of the land to w/c the
segregated portion belongs retains the ownership
Said land actually started as an island & of it, provided that he removes the same w/in
therefore part of the public domain. Where the title two years.
to the bed of a stream rests in the State, islands
formed by accretion to such bed belongs to the Tolentino:
State & not to the owner of either shore, & where
an island springs up in the midst of a stream, it is  portion of land must be such that it can be
an accretion to the soil of the bed of the river & not identified as coming fr. a definite tenement;
to the land of the riparian owner, although it must be a compact mass
afterwards became united w/ the mainland.  may also be by other forces of nature, if no
provision on the matter is provided
YOROBE VS. SORETA 63 OG NO. 4, P. 1133  if not removed, land is adjudicated to owner
of land to w/c it has been transferred, even if
removal is impossible
Facts: Yorobe owns land bounded on the north by
 also applies where land is deposited on the
Pualino Galicia, east by Bula Lake, south by a surface or on top of another tenement; if
canal, & on the west by the Bicol River. He brings known portion is broken or soil loosens such
this action to exclude defendants fr. his land who that it mixes w/ that of the tenement, there
entered & occupied the northeastern portion is no more known portion--> the owner of
thereof. Defendants contend that Yorobe bought the tenement w/ w/c the soil is merged
only 6.7 hectares of land such that he cannot becomes owner of such soil
expand said land by appending to its eastern part  where known portion does not unite w/
about 30 hectares of land left by when the water of another tenement, owner preserves the right
of ownership over said portion
Bula Lake recedes after the rainy season, invoking
A458.
Property Reviewer:
Issue: WON a lake is considered a pond or lagoon Avulsion refers to the transfer of a known
& the law applicable is A458 portion of land fr. one tenement to another by
the force of the current
Held: NO. Lake is a body of water surrounded by
land, or not forming part of the ocean, & occupying General Rule is that original owner
a depression below the ordinary drainage level of retains title to the land w/c has been transferred
the region. Pond is a body of stagnant water; to another tenement, except when there is
abandonment or upon expiration of two years,
smaller than a lake. And lagoon is a body of
whether the failure to remove be voluntary or
shallow water at the mouth of the river or involuntary, & irrespective of the area of the
connected w/ the sea. A pond or lagoon is not known portion that has been transferred
considered as a lake.
Reasons for the 2-year restriction:
What is applicable is A77 of the Law of
Waters w/c provides that lands covered by the  impractical to preserve w/o qualification the
water of a lake only temporarily & accidentally & for ownership over the portion
 owner of the tenement to w/c the known
the shorter period of time of the year are property
portion was moved may be deprived of the
of private ownership. Even if the two parcels of use of a portion of his property
land claimed by appellants may be considered as  retention of ownership of known portion may
accretions gradually deposited by accession or require the establishment of an easement
sediments fr. the water of Bula Lake, still plaintiff over the other tenement
should be considered as the owner of the land bec.

170
 there is a likelihood of cohesion between the the dike towards the river & encroaching upon it.
known portion of the land & the tenement w/c The land is not even dry but under two meters
has been transferred of water. What the respondents claim as
Effect of owner’s failure to remove land w/in
accretion is really an encroachment of a portion
the 2-year period: adjudicated to owner of the land
to w/c it has been transferred of the Meycauayan river by reclamation. The
reason behind the law giving the riparian owner
Why? Because the transfer of land creates a the right to any land or aluvion deposited by a
conflict of rights---right of ownership of the original river is to compensate him for the danger of loss
owner vs. the right of accession of the owner of the that he suffers bec. of the location of his land.
tenement to w/c it has been transferred. Thus the Notes: Can a creek left dry be acquired? NO,
remedies of the law are: creek is actually an arm of a river so part of the
 to preserve the right of the original owner to public property w/c can not be acquired privately
recover & remove his property
 to create a prescription in favor of the person
asserting accession if the 2-year period is 5.ABANDONED RIVER BEDS
waived

Art. 461. River beds w/c are abandoned


Art. 460. Trees uprooted & carried away by the
through the natural change in the course of the
current of the waters belong to the owner of the
waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose
land upon w/c they may be cast, if the owners do
lands are occupied by the new course in
not claim them w/in six months. If such owners
proportion to the area lost. However, the owners
claim them, they shall pay the expenses incurred in
of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the
gathering them or putting them in a safe place.
right to acquire the same by paying the value
thereof, w/c value shall not exceed the value of
the area occupied by the new bed.
Property reviewer:
 article refers to uprooted trees only; even if the
owner of the land upon w/c the trees may have
been cast transplants them on his own to Tolentino:
preserve them, former owner still preserves his
ownership w/in 6 months express act by new owners unnecessary;
automatic
must be a natural change in the course of a
stream; if through works constructed by
REPUBLIC VS. CA 132 SCRA 514
concessionaires authorized by the
government, concession may grant it to the
Facts: Private respondents filed an application for former; if no grant, follow article w/o
the registration of three lots adjacent to their prejudice to a superior right of 3rd persons
fishpond property in Meycauayan, Bulacan alleging w/ sufficient title
that said lots belong to them due to accretion. This if river bed dries up, continues to be property of
was opposed by the Republic, contending that what public dominion
actually happened was that Prs merely transferred
their dikes further down the river bed such that
whatever accretion may have taken place was man- Property Reviewer:
made & not natural. Requisites:
Issue: WON subject lands should be registered in it must be sudden so the old river bed can be
favor of private respondents identified (unless river disappears &
abandonment applies)
Held: NO. There is no accretion. The change must be permanent: rules do not apply to
requirement that the deposit should be due to the temporary overflowing
effect of the current of the river is indispensable.
Abandonment by the owner of the bed -
This excludes those caused by human intervention.
change of bed must be natural; otherwise,
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In becomes the subject of a state grant
CAB, evidence showed that the alleged alluvial
deposits came into being not bec. of the sole effect
of the river current but as a result of the transfer of
171
Art. 462. Whenever a river, changing its course high floods as do not cause inundations The
by natural causes, opens a new bed through a intent of the law is clear in considering the banks
private estate, this bed shall become of public for all legal purposes as part of the riverbed.
dominion. Since, undeniably, all riverbeds are part of public
ownership, it follows that the river banks, w/c
form part of them, are also of public ownership.
Tolentino: natural bed of a river: ground covered
by its waters during ordinary floods; of public
ownership

Art. 58, PD 1067 (Water Code) When the


river or stream suddenly changes its course to PRESENTACION VS. EUGENIO 51 OG NO.
traverse private lands, the owner of the affected 4, P. 1899
lands may not compel the government to restore
the river in its former bed; nor can they restrain the Facts: Plaintiff owns a parcel of land partially
government fr. taking steps to revert the river or bound on the southeast by the Pampanga River.
stream to its former course. The owner of the land A portion of the river was closed by constructing
thus affected, are not entitled to compensation for a fish trap. Consequently, its bed dried up & the
any damage sustained thereby. However, the current eroded a portion of the land lying south
former owners of the new bed shall be the owners of the old bed, leaving a certain portion of 10
of the abandoned bed in proportion to the area lost has. This portion, w/c is sandwiched by the old
by each. bed & the new river became a veritable island &
was used for grazing purposes since 1916.
The owners of the affected lands may Defendant claims that it is part of the land for
undertake to return the river or stream to its old w/c he filed a homestead application, & w/c he
bed at their own expense, provided that permit is subsequently occupied.
secured fr. the Secretary of Public Works,
Transportation & Communication & works Issue: WON the land to the south of the old
pertaining thereto are commenced w/in 2 years fr. river bed belongs to plaintiff or is part of public
the change in the course of the river or stream. domain

Held: PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. Said


land is not an accession to pltff’s property but a
HILARIO VS. CITY OF MANILA APRIL 27,
part of the public domain. It cannot be deemed
1967
an accession as there is no proof that the same
was formed subsequent to pltff’s land w/c is
Facts: The Hilario estate was bounded on the west
north of the Pampanga River. Plaintiff’s land &
side by the San Mateo River, & on the NW side, a
the land in question must have co-existed since
bamboo & lumber post dike or ditch was
time immemorial, otherwise the old Pampanga
constructed, further fortified by a stone wall built on
river must have been as wide as a kilometer or
the north side. A great flood occurred & inundated
more, covering at this vicinity as big as 10
the entire place. The river destroyed the dike, left
hectares, more or less, w/c is the area of the very
its original bed & meandered into the Hilario estate,
land in dispute.
segregating a lenticular piece of land fr. the rest
thereof. The disputed area is on the eastern side of
Def. is also not entitled to it. The
this strip w/c now stands between the old river bed
consequent abandonment of the bed of a river,
site & the new course.
bec. of a change of its course, does not ipso
facto divest the public fr. its ownership thereof,
Issue: When a river, leaving its old bed, changes
unless there is an indication of an intention on
its original course & opens a new one through
the part of the government to acquiesce in the
private property, would the new riverbanks lining
change of the course of the stream.
said course be of public ownership also
ISLANDS IN RIVERBEDS
Held: YES. Art. 73 of the Law of Waters defines
banks of a river as those lateral strips or zones of its
bed w/c are washed by the stream only during such

172
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river if nearer one margin or bank --- to the nearer
riparian owner
divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land
islands formed gradually by successive
or a part thereof isolated, the owner of the land accumulations of deposits by the waters of
retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion the river, as in alluvion
of land is separated fr. the estate by the current. new isles formed between an existing island &
the opposite river bank
Art. 464. Islands w/c may be formed on the islands formed by the sea
seas w/in the jurisdiction of the Philippines, on if w/in territorial waters --- belong to the state
lakes, & on navigable or floatable rivers belong to if outside territorial waters --- belong to the first
the State. occupant

JAGUALING VS. COURT OF APPEALS 194


Tolentino:
SCRA 607
belong to patrimonial property of the State w/c may
sell them
navigable river: one w/c in its natural state affords Facts: Private respondents Eduave, et al are the
a channel for useful commerce & not such as is owners of land forming part of an island in a
only sufficient to float a banca or canoe non-navigable river. In 1964, said land was
eroded due to Typhoon Ineng, destroying the
Art. 465. Islands w/c through successive bigger portion & improvements thereon. Due to
accumulation of alluvial deposits are formed in non- the movements of the river deposits on the land
navigable & non-floatable rivers, belong to the that was not eroded, the area was increased.
owners of the margins or banks nearest to each of Later, Eduave et al allowed petitioners to
them, or to the owners of both margins if the island introduce improvements thereon & live there as
is in the middle of the river, in w/c case it shall be caretakers. Petitioners however later denied PR’s
divided longitudinally in halves. If a single island claim of ownership so PR filed action to quiet title
that formed be more distant fr. one margin than fr. over the property. RTC dismissed complaint. CA
the other, the owner of the nearer margin shall be reversed, ruling that the island was formed by
the sole owner thereof. the branching off of the Tagalon River &
subsequent thereto, the accumulation of alluvial
deposits. Eduaves were declared as the lawful &
true owner of the land.
Tolentino:
given to those nearest to the island since they are
in the best position to cultivate & attend to the Issue: Who has a better right to the island?
exploitation of such island
does not include: Held: Eduave. CA has sufficient basis for the
those w/c are formed by the branching of a river finding that the property of PR actually existed &
those w/c are known portions of land fr. a tenement was identified prior to the branching-off or
& deposited in the middle of the stream (to division of the river. Even if that was not
former owner) established, Prs are nevertheless entitled to said
all are effects of action of the water ( Alluvion,
land. Clearly, the land in question is an island
Avulsion, Change in River Current, Formation of
Island) that appears in a non-floatable & non-navigable
lahar is more of accretion than avulsion river. And it is not disputed that Prs are the
accretion is not automatically covered by Torrens owners of the parcel of land along the margin of
system but owner has to apply the river & opposite the island. Applying A465,
the island belongs to the owner of the parcel of
Notes: land nearer the margin. More accurately, bec.
Requisite: the island must have been formed by the island is longer than the property of Prs, they
deposits ( or the accumulation of sediment) not are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that
identifiable
What are included: portion w/c corresponds to the length of their
islands formed in non-navigable & non-floatable property along the margin of the river. If
rivers because those formed in navigable & however, the riparian owner fails to assert his
floatable rivers belong to the state claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse
if equidistant fr. both banks --- goes to the riparian possession of the third parties, as indeed even
owners, by halves accretion to land titled under the Torrens system
must itself still be registered. Ps thus may
173
acquire said land by acquisitive prescription. But qualification: a claim of right based on
here, Ps possession cannot be considered to be in acquisitive prescription or adverse possession has
good faith, so 30 years of possession is needed. been held to constitute a removable cloud on title

the court has not only the:


power to remove an existing cloud, but also the
III. ACTION TO QUIET TITLE power to prevent the casting of a cloud on the
title to property – relief will be granted if the
ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on: threatened or anticipated cloud is one w/c if
title to real property or it existed or completed, will necessarily cast a
any interest therein, cloud upon plaintiff’s title
by reason of any:
instrument,
record, ART. 477. The plaintiff must have:
claim, legal or
encumbrance or equitable title to, or
proceeding interest in the real property
w/c is apparently valid or effective but is in w/c is the subject-matter of the action. He
truth & in fact: need not be in possession of said property.
invalid,
ineffective,
voidable, or TOLENTINO: general rule: in order to maintain
unenforceable, & an action to quiet title or remove a cloud thereon,
may be prejudicial to said title, the plaintiff must have a legal title to the property
an action may be brought to remove such cloud in question or some interest therein
or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a ART. 478. There may also be:
cloud fr. being cast upon title to real property or an action to quiet title or
any interest therein. remove a cloud therefr.
when the:
contract,
TOLENTINO: instrument or
“cloud” on title or matter complained of: other obligation
must have a prima facie appearance of validity or has been:
legal efficacy extinguished or has
semblance of title appearing in some legal form terminated, or has been
but w/c is in fact unfounded. barred by extinctive prescription.
invalidity or inoperativeness of the instrument is
not apparent on its face, &
has to be proved by extrinsic evidence TOLENTINO:
title & liens w/c have lost their force or failed to
illustrations of clouds removable by action: enforce them ;
title or lien w/c appears to have been procured by lien, interest, or title w/c has become barred &
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation unenforceable by reason of delay & laches or
forged instrument the running of the statute of limitations;
unauthorized or prohibited conveyances or ex. mortgages w/c are unenforceable by reason
encumbrances by incapacitated persons of the expiration of the period of limitations;
conveyance w/c is executed by one whose title to ex. liens acquired by virtue of judgments or
the property had been divested levies of execution w/c have become barred
grant w/c is shown to have been subject to a by limitations or by delay in enforcing them;
condition precedent, where it appears that the have been held to be removable as clouds.
condition has not been performed

general rule: cloud w/c may be removed by a suit ART. 479. The plaintiff must return to the
to quiet title must be a written assertion of defendant:
ownership of or an interest in property

174
all benefits he may have received fr. the latter, for the reformation of an instrument,
or to quiet title to real property or remove
reimburse him for expenses that may have clouds therefr., or
redounded to the plaintiff’s benefit. to consolidate ownership under Art. 1607 of
the Civil Code,
ART. 480. The principles of the general law on may be brought under this Rule.
the quieting of title are hereby adopted insofar as
they are not in conflict w/ this Code.
BUCTON V. GABAR

TOLENTINO: FACTS: In 1946, Josefina bought a parcel of


In a suit to quiet title, defendant may set up land fr. the Villarin spouses, payable in
equitable as well as legal defenses: installments. Josefina, then entered into a verbal
acquisition of title by adverse possession (however, agreement w/ Nicanora whereby the latter would
when the property is in the possession of the pay 1/2 of the price (P3,000.00) & would then
plaintiff, action to quiet title thereto is
imprescriptable) own 1/2 of the land.
prior adjudication of the question, under the rule of
res judicata Nicanora paid P1,000 in 1946 & P400 in 1948.
Both were evidenced by receipts issued by
The court will decree such relief as is necessary to Josefina.
completely & finally dispose of the controversy.
In order to afford complete relief to the parties, the After payment of the P1,000, Nicanora took
court may determine incidentally the status & possession of the portion of the land indicated to
ownership of the legal title to the property, or them by Josefina & built thereon a nipa house.
the right to the possession thereof.
Subsequently, the nipa house was demolished &
replaced by a house of strong materials, w/ 3
apartments for rental purposes.
ART. 481. The procedure for the quieting of
title or the removal of a cloud therefr. shall be In 1947, the Villarin spouses executed a deed
governed by such rules of court as the Supreme of sale in favor of Josefina. Nicanora then sought
Court shall promulgate. to obtain a separate title for their portion of the
land but Josefina refused on the ground that the
1997 RULES OF COURT, RULE 63. Declaratory entire land was still mortgaged w/ the PNB as
relief & similar remedies guarantee for a loan.

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any Nicanora continued enjoying possession of
person interested under a: their portion of the land, planting fruit trees &
deed, receiving rentals fr. the buildings.
will,
contract or In 1953, w/ Josefina’s consent, Nicanora had
other written instrument, the land resurveyed & subdivided preparatory to
whose rights are affected by a: their obtaining separate titles thereto. A fence
statute, was thereafter erected to demarcate the division.
executive order or Nicanora continued to insist on obtaining a
regulation, separate title but Josefina refused.
ordinance, or
any other governmental regulation Nicanora engaged the services of Atty.
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring Bonifacio Regalado, & then Atty. Aquilino
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Pimentel, Jr. to intercede, but to no avail. Hence,
to determine any question of construction or case in TC. TC rendered judgment for Nicanora.
validity arising, &
for a declaration of his rights or duties, On appeal, the CA reversed on the ground
thereunder. that since Nicanora’s right of action is allegedly
based on the receipt executed in 1946, the same
An action: has prescribed pursuant to Art. 1144 of the CC

175
w/c must be brought w/in 10 years fr. the time the FACTS: In 1918, a deed of sale over 2 parcels of
right of action accrues. When the complaint was land was executed in favor of 1 st vendee. The
filed, 22 years & 26 days had elapsed. Hence this deed w/c itself contains entries showing that it
appeal. was annotated on the back of the OCT was
presented for registration. But for some reason,
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of Nicanora has the deed of sale was not annotated on the OCT
prescribed. No! so said title was not canceled. As a result of
registration, TCT was issued to 1st vendee (but
HELD: The real & ultimate basis of Nicanora’s w/o the OCT being canceled). Subsequently, 1st
action is their ownership of 1/2 of the lot coupled vendee constituted a mortgage on said land &
w/ their possession thereof, w/c entitles them to a made transfers.
conveyance of the property. In Sapto, et. al. vs.
Fabiana, the Court, through J.B.L. Reyes, explained In 1962, TCT was issued to 2nd vendee
that under the circumstances, no enforcement of covering the same parcels of land. 2 nd vendee
the contract is needed, since the delivery of the later mortgaged the land & sold a part of it w/c
possession of the land sold had consummated the the 3rd vendee also mortgaged. When they
sale & transferred title to the purchaser, & that, defaulted, the banks foreclosed the mortgages.
actually, the action for conveyance is one to quiet When 1st vendee learned of the acquisition by 2 nd
title, i.e., to remove the cloud upon Nicanora’s vendee of the land, he registered an adverse
ownership by the refusal of the Josefina to claim over their titles. 1st vendee filed an action
recognize the sale made. We held therein: “The to quiet title against 2nd vendee.
prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have
title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting ISSUE: Who has better title, 1st vendee or 2nd
some adverse claim of lien thereon is not barred vendee? 1st vendee!
while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual
possession of the land, claiming to be owners HELD: 1st vendee was clearly an innocent
thereof. The reason for this rule being that while purchaser for value (IPV). He validly transmitted
the owner in fee continues being liable to an action, to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title
proceeding or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a over the disputed lots. That title could not be
continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to nullified or defeated by the issuance 43 years
ascertain & determine the nature of such claim & its later to other persons of another title over the
effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in same lots due to the failure of the registry of
his favor. He may wait until his possession is deeds to cancel the title preceding the title issued
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to 1st vendee. This must be so considering that
to vindicate his right. But the rule that the Statute 1st vendee & his successors-in-interest remained
of Limitations is not available as a defense to an in possession of the disputed lots & their rival
action to remove a cloud fr. title can only be claimants never possessed the same. Where 2
invoked by a complainant when he is in possession. certificates of title purport to include the same
One who claims property w/c is in possession of land, the earlier in date prevails.
another must, it seems, invoke his remedy w/in the
statutory period.
BAVIERA NOTES: Action to quiet title is
appropriate where two seemingly
BAVIERA NOTES: Even though the Civil Code authentic TCTs are involved.
does not include an action to quiet title as
one of those actions w/c are imprescriptable,
the SC in this case held that such action is JALANDONI V. PNB
imprescriptable. BASIS of SC: Art. 480, CC.
The imprescriptability of an action to quiet FACTS: On March 31, 1959, the CFI of Manila
title is a general principle fr. American rendered judgment ordering Jalandoni to pay
jurisprudence. PNB. Said order became final & executory.

On March 9, 1964, w/in 5 years fr. the entry


GARCIA V.CA of judgment, the sheriff levied upon a lot w/ an
area of 17 hectares, covered by a TCT in the

176
name of Jalandoni. The levy was annotated on the The notice of embargo is no longer
title as a notice of embargo. No effort was made to enforceable & has become a cloud upon his title.
have the land sold at public auction to satisfy the Following the rule in the Ansaldo case, he & his
judgment against Jalandoni. heirs have a good cause of action under Art. 476
of the Civil Code for the removal of any
On April 22, 1974, or more than ten years after encumbrance. Art. 478 provides that “there may
the levy was made, Jalandoni filed w/ the CFI in a also be an action to quiet title or to remove a
land registration proceeding, a petition for the cloud therefr. when the contract, instrument or
cancellation of the levy on the ground of other obligation has been extinguished or has
prescription. The petition was opposed by the terminated or has been barred by extinctive
bank. prescription.” A court of equity will remove a
cloud cast upon a title to property by lien,
The lower court asked Jalandoni to ask the interest or title w/c has become barred by reason
Manila court to quash the writ of execution on the of laches. Liens w/c were acquired by virtue of
ground of prescription & thereafter to refile the judgments or levies of execution & w/c has
petition w/ the lower court. become barred by limitations or delays in
enforcing them have been held removable as
Jalandoni filed an action to quiet title or for the clouds.
cancellation of the notice of embargo on the ground
that more than 10 years have elapsed fr. the time LAYNO V. CA
the levy was made, & no execution sale have been
made. Therefore, levy had become inefficacious & FACTS: In the inventory of the properties of the
was a cloud on his title. deceased, his administrator included a parcel of
land w/ an area of 5,417 square meters. But in
ISSUE: Whether an action to quiet title can be the title, the area denominated was 8,752 sq.
availed of to cancel a notice of embargo on the title. meters. Upon survey of the land, administrator
Yes! found that the northwestern portion of 3,732 sq.
meters was occupied by a 3rd person. As the 3 rd
HELD: An action upon a judgment must be person-occupant refused to vacate, administrator
brought w/in 10 years fr. the time the right of filed action for recovery, while 3 rd person-
action accrues (Art. 1144 CC). As clarified in the occupant sought reconveyance of the property.
Rules of Court, prescriptive period means that a
“judgment may be executed on motion w/in 5 years ISSUE: Who has better title, deceased or the 3rd
fr. the date of its entry or fr. the date it becomes person-occupant? 3rd person-occupant!
final & executory, & after the lapse of such time, &
before it is barred by the Statute of Limitations, a HELD: Evidence discloses that said portion was
judgment may be enforced by action.” In Ansaldo originally possessed openly, continuously &
v. Fidelity & Surety Co., it was held that “properties uninterruptedly in the concept of an owner by 3 rd
levied upon on execution must be sold in public person-occupant’s deceased father. Upon the
auction w/in the period of ten years during w/c the latter’s death, 3rd person-occupant adjudicated
judgment can be enforced by action. The reason said property to herself & paid taxes thereon.
for this rule is that an execution is enforced by levy Tacking the previous possession of his father, 3rd
& sale, not by levy alone. person had been in possession for about 45
years. On the other hand, the deceased, during
The employees of the bank were negligent. his lifetime, never took steps to possess or lay
They did not require the sheriff to sell Jalandoni’s adverse claim to the portion in question.
land at public auction. The bank is bound by its
employees’ negligence. The law helps the vigilant & Prescription cannot be invoked against 3rd
not those who sleep on their rights. This may serve person-occupant for the reason that as lawful
alike as a punishment for those who do not look possessor & owner of said portion, her cause of
after their own interests & as a source of action for reconveyance w/c, in effect, seeks to
reassurance to those who may have rested in the quiet title to the property, falls w/in settled
belief that their creditors have waived their rights & jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to
also to insure economic stability & certainty of property in one’s possession is imprescriptible.
rights. Her undisturbed possession over a period of 52
years gave her a continuing right to seek aid of a
177
court of equity to determine the nature of the the court, at the instance of an interested
adverse claim of a third party & effect on her own party, shall order such measures as it may deem
title. proper, including the appointment of an
administrator.
BAVIERA NOTES: This was originally an action
for reconveyance based on implied trust. In Whenever a part of the thing belongs
this case the deceased & the 3rd person- exclusively to one of the co-owners, & the
occupant were relatives. During the lifetime remainder is owned in common, the preceding
of the deceased, the two had an provisions shall apply only to the part owned in
understanding that the 3rd person-occupant common.
would reconvey the portion belonging to the
deceased upon the latter’s getting title over
the whole property. This action prescribes in TOLENTINO:
10 years fr. issuance of title on ground of
breach of trust. However, in the present “administration & better enjoyment” of the
case, the action did not prescribe bec. no common property contemplates acts or decisions
repudiation was made. The deceased for the common benefit of all the co-owners &
became the registered owner but did not not for the benefit of only one or some of them
disturb possession of the 3rd person-
“acts of administration”:
occupant, who has been in possession since refer to the enjoyment & preservation of the
time immemorial. Even the administrator thing
recognized the possessor’s title. have transitory effects
even alterations w/c do not affect the substance
The SC, however, construed this action as or form of the thing fall under this article
an action to quiet title w/c is imprescriptable
as long as in possession, applying the holding “alterations”
in BUCTON v. GABOR, applying American have a more permanent result &
relate to the substance or form of the
jurisprudence.
thing
But Ma’am says this is wrong bec. the title query: can a mere majority of the co-owners
was quieted a long time ago, the property lease real or immovable property for any length
being covered by an OCT. of time?
answer: special powers are required for leases
IV. CO-OWNERSHIP of real property by an administrator in the
following cases:

when the lease is to be recorded in the


ART. 492. For the: Registry of Property
administration &
better enjoyment
of the thing owned in common, Art. 1648. Every lease of real property may
the resolutions of the majority of the co-owners be recorded in the Registry of Property. Unless a
shall be binding. lease is recorded, it shall not be binding upon 3 rd
persons.
There shall be no majority unless the resolution
is approved by the co-owners who represent the Art. 1647. If a lease is to be recorded in the
controlling interest in the object of the co- Registry of Property, the following persons
ownership. cannot constitute the same w/o proper authority:
. . . the manager w/o special power.
Should there be: (the lease ceases to be an act of administration
no majority, or should the when it is to be recorded in the Registry of
resolution of the majority be seriously Property)
prejudicial to those interested in the property
owned in common,
Art. 1878 provides that a special power of
attorney shall be necessary “to lease any real

178
property to another person for more than one When the resolution, if carried out, would
year.” cause serious injury to the thing
itself, such as an agreement not to
Thus, in these two cases, a mere majority of the co- borrow money under reasonable
owners cannot constitute the lease terms when it is necessary for urgent
repairs for preservation, or for the
Who may manage the property? The management payment of taxes.
of community property lies, in the first place, in the
co-owners themselves. ART. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to
In this management, the majority of interests remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
control, & their decisions are binding upon the demand at any time the partition of the thing
minority. However, in making decisions, the owned in common, insofar as his share is
majority should notify the minority, so that the concerned.
latter can be heard.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the
The majority will be justified in proceeding w/o thing undivided for a certain period of time, not
previous consultation w/ the minority, only when exceeding 10 years, shall be valid. This term
the urgency of the case & the difficulty of the
may be extended by a new agreement.
meeting so require.

The administration may be delegated by the co- A donor or testator may prohibit partition for
owners to one or more persons, whether co-owners a period w/c shall not exceed twenty years.
or not.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is
The powers & duties of such administrators are prohibited by law.
governed by the rules on agency. Thus, the
administrator cannot, w/o the unanimous consent No prescription shall run in favor of a co-
of all the co-owners, compromise on, donate, cede,
owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
alienate, mortgage or encumber in any manner the
common property. heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.
When there is no majority, or when the resolutions
of the latter are seriously prejudicial to the co-
ownership, the court may appoint an administrator, TOLENTINO:
whose powers & duties as are defined in his The mere fact that the partition of the property
appointment may affect the usefulness or value of the
whole is not a valid excuse for a refusal to
Examples of acts seriously prejudicial: have it partitioned among the co-owners.
Such result is a necessary incident of co-
When the resolution calls for a substantial ownership.
change or alteration of the common Action for partition is imprescriptable, as long as
property or of the use to w/c it has the co-ownership is recognized. Gen. Rule:
been dedicated by agreement or by its possession by one co-owner will not be
nature regarded as adverse to the other co-owners,
When the resolution goes beyond the limits but in fact as beneficial to all. Exception: If
of mere administration, or invades the co-owner holds the property in exclusive
proprietary rights of the co-owners, in adverse possession, asserting sole &
violation of Art. 491, w/c states, “None exclusive ownership, for the required
of the co-owners shall, w/o the consent prescriptive period, he can acquire sole title
of the others (unanimous consent), to it as against the co-owners. It must be
make alterations in the thing held in shown by clear & convincing evidence that he
common, even though benefits for all has repudiated the co-ownership, & that the
would result therefr.. However, if the other co-owners have been apprised of his
w/holding of consent by one or more of claim, before the prescriptive period begins
the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to to run.
the common interest, the courts may
afford adequate relief.” Exceptions: Partition can not be asked in the
When the majority authorize leases, loans, following cases:
or other contracts w/o security,
exposing the thing to serous danger to When the co-owners have agreed to continue in
the prejudice of the other co-owners the co-ownership for the period permitted by
179
law (period of indivision cannot be more than The construction of the building is for the
ten years; this period may be extended by the account & benefit of the co-ownership. The
co-owners, provided that each extension does majority co-owner should account to the other
not exceed ten years; where parties stipulate a co-owners for their shares in the rentals of said
definite period of indivision exceeding the
maximum period allowed by law, the stipulation building, deducting the cost of construction.
would be void only as to the period beyond
such maximum) BAVIERA NOTES: The co-owners should
When the co-ownership is imposed as a condition in share in the rentals but w/ the obligation
a donation or a will to pay their share of the costs of the
When the partition will render the thing building.
unserviceable for the use & the purpose for w/c
it is intended, the co-ownership may be
terminated in accordance w/ Art. 498 (sale of
the thing & distribution of its proceeds) V. WATERS

SINGSON V. VELOSO PHILIPPINE WATER CODE, PD 1067

FACTS: The co-heirs, inherited a parcel of land. All waters belong to the State even those
Due to transfers among themselves. One co-owner located in private lands, & cannot be acquired by
became majority owner. She was also prescription. Permit must be obtained for water
administratrix. Later, she built thereon a building & use, except for domestic purposes. Only water
leased it. She credited the co-ownership w/ rentals collected in tanks & pools belonging exclusively to
for the use of the land. The rentals of the building, the owner of the land in w/c water is isolated
however, she appropriated for herself since, she may be placed under the exclusive control &
claims that she alone defrayed the expenses for the disposal of such owner.
building. The other co-heirs claim that majority co-
owner should account for all the rentals including ART. 6. The following waters found on
that of the building. private lands also belong to the State:

ISSUE: Whether or not majority co-owner must a. Continuous or intermittent waters rising
account for all the rentals of the property, on such
irrespective of whether or not she defrayed the land;
costs of constructing the building w/ her own Lakes & lagoons naturally occurring on such
money. Yes! lands;
Rain water falling on such lands;
HELD: Subterranean or ground waters; &
The construction of the building is a definite Waters in swamps & marshes.
alteration & should therefore have the unanimous
consent of all co-owners, otherwise Art 491 would The owner of the land where the water is
be violated . Even assuming that it was a mere act found may use the same for domestic purposes
of administration & that as majority owner her w/o securing a permit, provided that such use
decision prevails, there is a requirement that before shall be registered, when required by the Council
such a decision is made, there should be notice to (National Water Resources Council). The Council,
the minority co-owners so that they can be heard. however, may regulate such use when there is
The majority would be justified in proceeding w/o wastage, or in times of emergency.
consultation only when the urgency of the case &
the difficulty of meeting w/ them render ART. 14. Subject to the provisions of this
impracticable the giving of such notice. In this Code concerning the control, protection,
case, the other co-owners were never given notice. conservation & regulation of the appropriation &
Also, the term “administration & better enjoyment” use of waters, any person may appropriate or use
of property contemplates acts or decisions for the natural bodies of water w/o securing a water
common benefit of all the co-owners & not the permit for any of the following:
benefit of only one or some of them.
Appropriation of water by means of hand-
carried receptacles; &

180
Bathing or washing, watering or dipping of
domestic or farm animals, & navigation of The owner of the thing may, should he so
watercrafts or transportation of logs & other objects desire, give the possessor in good faith the right
by floatation. to finish the cultivation & gathering of the
growing fruits, as an indemnity for his part of the
expenses of cultivation & the net proceeds; the
VI. POSSESSION possessor in good faith who for any reason
whatever should refuse to accept this concession,
A. RIGHT TO FRUITS shall lose the right to be indemnified in any other
manner.

ART. 544. A possessor in good faith is entitled


ART. 549. The possessor in bad faith shall:
to the fruits received before the possession is legally
reimburse the
interrupted.
fruits received &
those w/c the legitimate possessor could
Natural & industrial fruits are considered
have received, &
received fr. the time they are gathered or reserved.
shall have a right only to the
expenses mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article
Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily & belong
546 (necessary expenses) &
to the possessor in good faith in that proportion.
in article 443 (expenses in the production,
TOLENTINO: gathering, & preservation of the fruits, if the
When the owner or a possessor w/ a better right
lawful owner or possessor chooses to appropriate
comes along, & when he hears the grounds in
support of the adverse contention, his good the fruits).
faith ceases.
The legal interruption of possession in good faith, The expenses incurred in improvements for
however, takes place when the action is filed pure luxury or
against him & he is served w/ summons. mere pleasure
Hence, all fruits that the possessor may receive shall not be refunded to the possessor in bad
fr. the time that he is summoned, or when he faith; but he may remove the objects for w/c
answers the complaint, must be delivered or such expenses have been incurred, provided that
paid by him to the owner or lawful possessor.
If the property bears no fruits, the reasonable the:
rents fr. such time should be paid by the thing suffers no injury thereby & that the
possessor, in the concept of civil fruits. lawful possessor does not prefer to retain
Where it is proved, however, that the good faith of them by paying the value they may have at the
the possessor ceased before the legal time he enters into possession.
interruption of the possession, then he must
restore the fruits received fr. the time such
good faith ceased.
TOLENTINO:
A possessor in bad faith has no right to receive
any fruits. Those already gathered & existing
ART. 545. If at the time: will have to be returned; w/ respect to those
the good faith ceases, lost, consumed, or w/c could have been
there should be any received, he must pay the value. The
natural or ungathered fruits will go to the lawful
industrial fruits, possessor or owner.
The amount of the fruits that could have been
the possessor shall have a received is determined by the personal
right to a part of the expenses of cultivation, & circumstances of the lawful possessor –
to better facilities, resources, industry, or skill.
a part of the net harvest, The possessor in bad faith is entitled to
both in proportion to the time of the reimbursement for necessary expenses, but
possession. he has no right of retention. As to useful
expenses, he has no right to reimbursement,
The charges shall be divided on the same basis bec. the law says he is entitled only to
by the two possessors. necessary expenses.

181
PBF bec. he also made repair &
ART. 1123. Civil interruption is produced by improvements in the car. SET-OFF.
judicial summons to the possessor.

ART. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad MARFORI V. VELASCO


faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown w/o right to indemnity. FACTS: Owner of the land filed an action
against the possessors of her land, claiming that
the latter occupied her lands w/o her consent, &
WARD V. DELFIN continue to occupy the lands & to enjoy the fruits
thereof despite her demands for them to vacate.
FACTS: Several days before the occupation,
owner brought his car to a friend for safekeeping. Possessors, on the other hand, contend that
During the occupation, car owner, being an they occupied the lands pursuant to the
American, was interned in UST. In the meantime, information given them by owner’s husband who
one Major Orais, succeeded in pressuring his wife to was then mayor, that they may clear, occupy, &
sign a deed of sale of the car in his favor for P500 cultivate the lands, & that after 10 years of
in Mickey mouse money. After liberation, car owner occupation, titles of ownership would be issued to
brought an action to recover said properly fr. a them.
Bautista to whom the car was sold by Orais.
Bautista contends that assuming arguendo that Maj. ISSUE: Whether or not possessors are PGF.
Orais obtained the car against the wife’s consent & Yes!
that the execution of the Deed of Sale was obtained What are the rights & obligations of such
through improper pressure & compulsion, he is, PGF?
nonetheless a purchaser & consequently, a
possessor in good faith. He may be ordered to HELD: Inasmuch as PGF introduced permanent
return the car to the owner; but he must be improvements on the land in good faith, that is,
reimbursed necessary expenses (for repair & w/o being aware of any flaw in their mode of
improvement) he incurred; & he is entitled to retain acquisition, Art. 448 should apply in the
the car until payment. LC ordered Bautista to pay determination of their rights. Hence, the
P2,200 as value of the car & P300 for damages. expenses they incurred in clearing & improving
Car owner appeals alleging that he is entitled to the the land should be refunded to them.
earnings of the car while in possession of Bautista
who used it in transporting passengers. However, PGF became PBF upon filing of the
complaint herein, for it was then that they
ISSUE: What are the rights & obligations of learned of the owner’s registered title over the
Bautista? lands. From then on, they lost their right to the
fruits & should account for those received by
HELD: Bautista bought the car fr. the wife in them thereafter, according to Arts. 544 & 549,
whose name the car was registered. There was no CC.
evidence that he acted in bad faith. Thus, since he
was a bona fide possessor of said car, he could
therefore lawfully dedicate it to business & reap its BAVIERA NOTES: Fruits harvested during
proceeds pursuant to Art. 544, CC. The car owner possession in bad faith must be accounted
has no right to the earnings of such car while in the for, minus necessary expenses during
good faith possession of Bautista. possession in good faith & possession in
bad faith.

BAVIERA NOTES: Income fr. the car lawfully B. RIGHT TO EXPENSES &
belongs to the possessor in good faith (PGF). IMPROVEMENTS; RISK OF
From the time that PGF was informed of the DETERIORATION
car owner’s adverse claim, he became a PBF.
He was not ordered to account for the
proceeds of the car fr. the time he became a Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be
refunded to every possessor; but only the
182
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he Facts: The lot in question was formerly subject
has been reimbursed therefor. of a homestead application by Martin Dolorico II,
Ortiz’s ward. Upon Martin’s death, Ortiz
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the continued cultivation & possession of said
possessor in good faith w/ the same right of property w/o filing any application to acquire title
retention, the person who has defeated him in the thereon. Martin’s heirs relinquished their rights
possession having the option of refunding the over the property in favor of the defendants. The
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in latter filed their respective sales application, w/c
value w/c the thing may have acquired by reason Ortiz opposed. The Secretary of Agriculture
thereof. dismissed such opposition. On appeal, the CFI
awarded a portion to defendants & the other
Art. 547. If the useful improvements can be portion to be subject of auction sale. And that
removed w/o damage to the principal thing, the should Ortiz not be declared a successful bidder
possessor in good faith may remove them, unless thereof, the defendants be ordered to reimburse
the person who recovers the possession exercises Ortiz for the improvements he introduced therein,
the option under par.2 of the preceding article. Ortiz having the right to retain the property until
after he has been fully paid therefor.
Art. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere
pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in Issue: WON Ortiz is entitled to retain for his
good faith; but he may remove the ornaments w/ own exclusive benefit all the fruits of the
w/c he has embellished the principal thing if it property?
suffers no injury thereby, & if his successor in the
possession does not prefer to refund the amount Held: NO. From the time of the filing of the
expended. action in court, possession in good faith ceases &
all the fruits that the possessor may receive fr.
Art. 552. A possessor in good faith shall not be that time must be delivered & paid to the owner
liable for the deterioration or loss of the thing or lawful possessor. However, even after GF
possessed, except in cases in w/c it is proved that ceases, the possessor in fact can still retain the
he has acted w/ fraudulent intent or negligence, property until he has been fully reimbursed for all
after the judicial summons. the necessary & useful expenses made by him.
This right of retention is accessory to a principal
A possessor in bad faith shall be liable for obligation. Considering that the right of the
deterioration or loss in every case, even if caused possessor to receive the fruits terminates when
by a fortuitous event. his good faith ceases, it is necessary, in order
that this right to retain may be useful, to concede
Art. 450. The owner of the land on w/c to the creditor the right to secure reimbursement
anything has been built, planted or sown in bad fr. the fruits of the property by utilizing its
faith may demand the demolition of the work, or proceeds for the payment of the interest as well
that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to as the principal of the debt while he remains in
replace things in their former condition at the possession.
expense of the person who built, planted or sowed;
or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the This right of retention is considered not a
price of the land, & the sower the proper rent. coercive measure to oblige the debtor to pay,
depriving him temporarily of the enjoyment of
Art. 2121. Pledges created by operation of law, the fruits of his property, but as a means of
such as those referred to in Articles 546, 1731 & obtaining compensation for the debt. The right
1994, are governed by the foregoing articles on the of retention is analogous to a contract of
possession, care & sale of the thing as well as on antichresis & it can be considered as a means of
the termination of the pledge. However, after extinguishing the obligation, inasmuch as the
payment of the debt & expenses, the remainder of right to retain the thing lasts only for the period
the price of the sale shall be delivered to the necessary to enable the creditor to be reimbursed
obligor. fr. the fruits for the necessary & useful expenses.

ORTIZ V. KAYANAN Note: In the contract of antichresis, the creditor


acquires the right to receive the fruits of an
immovable of his debtor w/ the obligation to
183
apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing, useful improvements on the property made in
& thereafter to the principal of his credit. The good faith.
debtor cannot reacquire enjoyment of the
immovable until he has actually paid what he owes Issue: WON the improvements on the land are
the creditor. necessary or useful, thus entitled defendants to
be paid their value? NO.
CASE V. CRUZ
Held: Necessary expenses are those made for
Facts: Petitioner owned a truck w/c disappeared the preservation of the thing & w/o w/c it would
during the Japanese occupation. After liberation, be lost. A useful expense is one w/ w/c the thing
inquiries revealed that the defendant had registered better serves the purpose for w/c it was intended
in his name a truck w/ the same motor number. & thus adds value to the same. The
Petitioner brought an action for replevin. The LC improvements made in the CAB, including the
ruled for petitioner & ordered defendant to return it main road, the cutting of trees & long grasses,
but ordered petitioner to pay defendant, as a removing fallen trees fr. the area, leveling the
possessor in GF, the amount the latter spent in sawmill site, etc., were useful only to a sawmill
rebuilding the engine. operator. The land in question was intended by
the owner to be agricultural land & never as a
Issue(s) WON Cruz was in bad faith? YES. compound for a sawmill. Therefore, the
WON Cruz should be reimbursed for his expenses? improvements were inconsistent w/ the
NO. agricultural nature of the land. Therefore, they
cannot be deemed as useful improvements for
Held: Defendant is a possessor in bad faith. Cruz w/c they can be reimbursed.
was bound to suspect the illegal origins of the
motor & chassis, considering that this was shortly BAQUIRAN V BAQUIRAN
after the Japanese occupation. The fact that the
motor was incomplete w/ several parts missing Facts: 6 parcels of land are held under co-
should have led Cruz to question the certificate of ownership by plaints & defs. One of the son of
registration shown to him by the vendor. Further, the co-owners, Maximo (P), built his house on 2
necessary expenses are those incurred for the of the 6 lots. In the action for partition, the court
preservation of the thing. In CAB, the addition of ordered the lots to be divided bet Ps & Ds exc
parts to complete the engine & place it in working Max & that the Ps are entitled to acquire the
condition were not merely aimed at preserving the house or to compel him to pay them the price of
motor acquired fr. further deterioration but for the 2 lots on q/c the house was built. Should the
improving the same. Ps choose to acquire the house, Max shall have
the rt. to retain the same until the amount of the
The good faith of a possessor consists in house is satisfied. Max is ordered to pay the
the absence of knowledge of a defect that rentals until Ps have acquired his house or until
invalidates his title. It is a belief that the person fr. Max shall have chosen to buy the 2 lots.
whom he received the thing was the owner thereof
& could transmit the title thereto & w/c belief must Issue: WON Max should be made to pay rents.
be well-founded or reasonable.
Held: NO. Max cannot be made to pay the
CALANG V. SANTOS rentals. Max's house falls w/in the scope of the
term useful expenses. Since he built it in GF he
Facts: Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land has the rt. to retain it pending reimbursement.
w/c they sold to defendants w/ right to repurchase This rt. extends to the land itself bec the rt. to
w/in 10 years. Subsequently, the petitioners sought retain the improvements while the indemnity is
to repurchase the land & tendered the amount of not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact
P200 but defendants refused. Petitioners deposited of the land on w/c they are built. Thus, the
the amount in court. The LC ruled in petitioners’ owner of the land has no rt. to demand rents for
favor & ordered defendants to convey the land to the occupation thereof by the builder in GF
the petitioners & to remove all improvements made pending the payment of the indemnity or the sale
at their own expense. Defendants appealed, of the land to the latter, w/cever is the choice of
claiming that the court erred in not holding that the said owner.
they were entitled to the value of the necessary &
184
MARCELINO V MIGUEL the improvements they introduced are governed
by A546 & 547. Under 546(2), the possessor in
Facts: A patent was issued in favor of def Miguel GF can retain the useful improvements unless the
over a lot by the Bureau of Lands. The OCT was person who defeated him in poss refunds the
issued in his name. The plaint Marcelino also has a useful expenses or pays him the increased value
pending applic over a lot adjoining Mig's. This was of the land. Under 547, the possessor in GF also
also approved but no patent has been issued. Both has the rt. to remove the useful improvements if
Mig & Marce entered into possessions of their lots & the removal can be done w/o damage tot he
started cultivating the same. However, it appears land, unless the person w/ the superior rt. elects
that Marce encroached upon the lot covered by to pay for the useful improvements or reimburse
Mig's patent. Marce erroneously believed that the the expenses under 546. These provisions seem
portion belonged to them & cultivated the same. to imply that the possessor in BF has neither the
Marce filed action vs Mig. rt. of retention of useful improvements nor the rt.
to demand refund for useful expenses. But if the
Issue: WON Mig should be made to reimburse lawful possessor can retain the improvements
Marce for the value of improvements (pilapil) introduced by the possessor in BF for pure luxury
or mere pleasure only by paying its value at the
Held: NO Pilapil is not nec & its construction time he enters into possession under 549, as a
depends upon the topographical condition of the matter of equity, EI should be allowed to remove
ground. It is an ordinary improvement w/c does the improvements, altho in BF, unless RC chooses
not affect the value of the land. Art 546 is not to pay for their value at the time they were
applic bec this refers to nec & useful expenses. The introduced. No reimbursement for EI for the
presence of pilapils in a rice field does not enhance current value of the useful improvements bec
nor increase the value of the land itself; it is the they have been enjoying such for 2 decades w/o
production of the mother soil w/c goes to the rents.
benefit of the farmer or possessor.

CARBONELL V CA Baviera: This is wrong!!!

Facts: JP owned a lot w/ improvements. He 1. the 1st sale was made in a private doc.
mortgaged it to RSBank. RC & EI offered to buy so constructive delivery shld not be
the lot. JP offered to sell the lot to RC. RC was to construed. There was tradicion
assume the mortgage. They executed a private constitutum possessorium where owner
doc. w/c states that JP can start living on the lot retains poss in the concept of a lessee. But
w/o rent & if after 1 yr. he cld not find a place the leas was to take place 1 yr. later so
where to move his house, he cld still continue prior this, no delivery is made to the buyer.
occupying the site but w/ rent. Later, RC went to The 2nd sale was in a public doc so there is
JP to execute the formal deed of sale, but JP said constructive delivery.
they cld not continue w/ the sale bec he sold the lot
to EI. JP & EI executed a formal deed of sale. EI 2. The court deemed the adverse claim as
took possession of the lot. RC reg her adverse constructive notice. But the adverse claim
claim. 4 days later EI reg her deed of sale. A TCT is not a reg of title under 1544. Thus,
w/ RC's adverse claim was issued to EI. insofar as 1st vendee is concerned, there is
no reg of title. The recording of the 2nd
Issue: Who has better rt. to the land? sale shld be the one recognized as reg but
the court said he was not in GF. When the
Held: RC. If there is an inscription, prior reg in GF 2nd buyer bought the lot, he is presumed
is a pre-condition to superior title. To merit the to be in GF. So how can the court presume
protection of A1544 (2), it is essential that the BF by the mere fact of being neighbors?
buyer of realty must act in GF in registering his
deed of sale. RC's prior purchase of the land was
made in GF; she was the only buyer at that time.
Her GF did not cease after JP told her of the 2nd
sale to EI. The recording of her adverse claim is
done in GF. EI's BF is emphasized when she reg 1. COMPARE W/
her deed 4 days later. Since EI is in BF, their rts to
185
TOLENTINO:
FLOREZA V EVANGELISTA
Two requisites for ORDINARY REPAIRS
Facts: E was the owner of a lot. E borrowed fr. F
The deteriorations or defects arise fr. the
P100 as a result, E allowed F to occupy the lot &
NATURAL USE of the thing
build a house of light materials w/o rents. E again The repairs are necessary for the PRESERVATION
borrowed fr. F. The loans were in a private doc of the thing
where it was stated that the resid lot stands as
security. F demolished the house & constructed Deteriorations w/c are caused by time or age
one of strong materials. E sold the lot to F w/ rt. to (provided for in Art. 573) & the destruction or
repurchase w/in 6 yrs. 7 mos bef expiry of consumption of the thing by use (provided for in
repurchase period, E paid the full repurchase price. Art. 574) do not fall w/in the concept of ordinary
E sent F a written demand to vacate the lot. F repairs.
refused until reimburse the value of the house. E
Usufructuary is bound to pay only for the repairs
filed a complaint & prayed that she be declared the made during the existence of the usufruct; not
owner of h & l w/o need to pay F indemnity. those made before he enters upon the enjoyment
of the thing w/c are shouldered by the owner.
Issue: WON F as builder is entitled to rts prov in
448, 453 & 1616. If the ordinary repairs are due to defects caused
by the FAULT of the usufructuary, he cannot
Held: NO. 448 453 apply when BPS believes he exempt himself fr. liability by renouncing the
had the rt. to BPS bec he thinks he owns the land or usufruct.
believes himself to have a claim of title. 1616 is But if the defects are occasioned by the ordinary
inapplic. F as vendee a retro is not entitled to the use of the thing, the usufructuary may exempt
rts under this prov. F did not construct his house as himself fr. making the repairs by returning to the
vendee a retro. Remember he built a house of light owner the fruits received during the time that the
materials. F incurred no useful expense after the defects took place.
sale. The house was already there at the tolerance
of E in consideration of several loans extended to The expenses for repairs are a charge upon the
them. Rts of F are more akin to those of a enjoyment of the prop; hence, if the usufructuary
usufructuary who, under A579 may make on the keeps the fruit, s/he must defray those expenses
property useful improvements but w/ no rt. to be
indemnified therefor. He may remove such
improvements if he could do so w/o damage to the Art. 593. Extraordinary repairs shall be at the
property. expense of the owner. The usufructuary is
obliged to notify the owner when the need for
such repairs is urgent.
A. USUFRUCT
Art. 594. If the owner should make the
extraordinary repairs, he shall have a right to
Art. 592. The usufructuary is obliged to make demand of the usufructuary the legal interest on
the ordinary repairs needed by the thing given in the amount expended for the time that the
usufruct. usufruct lasts.
By ordinary repairs are understood such as are
required by the wear & tear due to the natural use Should he not make them when they are
of the thing are indispensable for its preservation. indispensable for the preservation of the thing,
Should the usufructuary fail to make them after the usufructuary may make them; but he shall
demand by the owner the latter may make them at have a right to demand of the owner, at the
the expense of the usufructuary. termination of the usufruct, the increase in value
w/c the immovable may have acquired by reason
of the repairs.

TOLENTINO:

186
Defect or deteriorations requiring extraordinary Annual charges & taxes are considered by
repairs are of two kinds: Manresa as always chargeable against the
usufructuary bec. “they are considered by the
Those caused by EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, law as imposed upon the fruits.”
whether or not they are necessary for the The more logical view, however, seems to be that
preservation of the thing of Sanchez Roman, who believes that such
Those caused by the NATURAL USE of the thing, annual charges & taxes are to be paid by the
but are not necessary for its preservation. usufructuary only when they can be
considered as a lien on the fruits.
GENERAL RULE: The expenses for extraordinary The annual charges & taxes for w/c the
repairs are borne by the owner usufructuary is liable cannot include those
levied upon the tenement itself, but only
Reason for the rule: The law does not impose those levied upon the persons in possession
such repairs as an obli of the owner. or enjoyment thereof.

The usufructuary is not bound to make such repairs


if the owner chooses not to make them.
Art. 597. The taxes w/c, during the usufruct,
If the need for repairs is urgent (those that are may be imposed directly on the capital, shall be
required for preservation), the law requires the at the expense of the owner.
usufructuary to give notice thereof to the owner
If the latter has paid them, the usufructuary
If the owner does not make the extraordinary shall pay him the proper interest on the sums w/c
repairs w/c are necessary for preservation, the may have been paid in the character, &, if the
usufructuary may make them & he shall be entitled said sums have been advanced by the
to indemnity.
usufructuary, he shall recover the amount thereof
Also, the usufructuary is entitled to recover fr. the at the termination of the usufruct.
owner the increase in the value w/c the tenement
acquired by reason of such works. Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the
property held in usufruct such useful
improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as
Art. 595. The owner may construct any works & he may deem proper, provided he does not alter
make any improvements of w/c the immovable in its form or substance; but he shall have no right
usufruct is susceptible, or make new plantings to be indemnified therefor. He may, however,
thereon if it be rural, provided that such acts do not remove such improvements, should it be possible
cause a diminution in the value of the usufruct or to do so w/o damage to the property.
prejudice the right of the usufructuary.

TOLENTINO:
Whenever the usufructuary can remove the
TOLENTINO:
improvements w/o injury to the prop. in
Any advantage or increase in the use of enjoyment
usufruct, he has a right to do so, & the
of the thing due to the improvements or
owner cannot prevent him fr. doing so even
plantings introduced by the owner will inure to
upon payment of their value.
the benefit of the usufructuary.
But the owner cannot compel the usufructuary to
But the usufructuary is not bound to pay interest on
remove the improvements if he does not
the investment of the owner, bec. the
wish to exercise it.
improvements have been made voluntarily by
In the exercise of the right granted by this article,
the latter.
the usufructuary may demolish or destroy
the improvement, such as a building,
provided he leaves the land as it was before
Art. 596. The payment of annual charges & the construction of such improvement.
taxes & of those considered as a lien on the fruits, The right of the usufructuary to remove
shall be at the expense of the usufructuary for all improvements can be enforced only against
the time that the usufruct lasts. the owner, but not against a purchaser in GF
to whom a clean title has been issued.

TOLENTINO:

187
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the Rule if the lessor refuses to reimburse: If the
lessee demands for reimbursement for half
improvements he may have made on the property
the value & the lessor refuses, the lessee
against any damage to the same. CANNOT insist on reimbursement.
BUT the lessee may remove the improvements
even if the leased premises may suffer some
TOLENTINO: damage.
This article refers to compensation of values, & not
of rights & obligations. It is necessary that the
improvements should have increased the value C. COMMODATUM
of the prop. & that the damages are imputable
to the usufructuary.
The increase in value & the amount of damages are
set off against each other; if the damages Art. 1941. The bailee is obliged to pay for the
exceed the increase in value, the difference ordinary expenses for the use & preservation of
should be paid by the usufructuary as the thing loaned.
indemnity.

TOLENTINO: Reason for the law: bec. of the


B. LEASE gratuitous use of the property

Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, Art. 1949.The bailor shall refund the
useful improvements w/c are suitable to the use for extraordinary expenses during the contract for
w/c the lease is intended, w/o altering the form or the preservation of the thing loaned, provided the
substance of the property leased, the lessor upon bailee brings the same to the knowledge of the
the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee bailor before incurring them, except when they
one-half of the value of the improvements at that are so urgent that the reply to the notification
time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said cannot be awaited w/o danger.
amount, the lessee may remove the improvements,
even though the principal thing may suffer damage If the extraordinary expenses arise on the
thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more occasion of the actual use of the thing by the
impairment upon the property leased than is bailee, even though he acted w/o fault, they shall
necessary. be borne equally by both the bailor & the bailee,
unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee
shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he D. MORTGAGE
may remove the ornamental objects, provided no
damage is caused to the principal thing, & the
lessor does not choose to retain them by paying GARDNER VS. COURT OF APPEALS
their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
FACTS: Gardner obtained petty cash advances &
a variety of consumer goods fr. the de Castro
PARAS: spouses worth P7,000. In consideration of said
loans, G executed a “Deed of Sale w/ Rt. of
( 4A, i have no Baviera nor Tolentino notes so I’m Repurchase” in favor of the spouses, wherein he
putting in Peter’s favorite commentator instead) was given 10 years to pay P7,000 as repurchase
The first paragraph of the article is intended to price. G borrowed some more until the total loan
prevent the unjust enrichment of the lessor. amounted to P10,436.75.. When G tendered this
The lessor is bound to pay only 1/2 of the value
of the improvements at the end of the lease amount, the spouses refused to accept it on the
bec. the lessee has already enjoyed the same. ground that the sum is grossly inadequate to
“Good Faith” as used in Art. 1678 is NOT the GF compensate for the improvements introduced by
defined in the law of possession. It refers to a them on the land. G then consigned the sum w/
case where the lessee introduces improvements the court. CFI ruled that the K was actually an
not calculated to harm or destroy the property equitable mortgage & denied the claim of the
leased. spouses for reimbursement of the improvements
introduced by them.
188
faith, & in accordance w/ the custom of the place
HELD: The Pacto de Retro Sale was actually an where the land is situated.
equitable mortgage. As a general rule, the
mortgagee who is in possession of the mortgaged Art. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to
property & introduces improvements therein is not be subrogated, upon the same terms &
entitled to reimbursement for the value thereof conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place
upon the redemption of the mortgage since under of one who acquires a thing by purchase or
Par. 2 of Art. 2125 of the NCC, “the persons in dation in payment, or by any other transaction
whose favor the law establishes a mortgage have whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous
no other right than to demand execution & the title.
recording of the document in w/c the mortgage is
formalized. Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may
exercise the right of redemption in case the
If the mortgagee improves the land, he shares of all the other co-owners or of any of
does so at his risk. To hold otherwise would render them are sold to a third person. If the price of
redemption oppressive & onerous to the owner- the alienation is grossly excessive, the
redemptioner, if not nugatory & inoperative for all redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
that a scheming mortgagee interested in owning
the land would do is to saddle the land w/ so much Should two or more co-owners desire to
improvements that the owner will find himself exercise the right of redemption, they may only
financially incapable of redeeming the mortgage. do so in proportion to the share they may
respectively have in the thing owned in common.

E. VENDEE A RETRO
CALAGAN V. CFI

Art. 1616. The vendor cannot avail himself of FACTS: Calagan sold a portion of their lot to
the right of repurchase w/o returning to the vendee Sandoval w/c was annotated on the title of C. C
the price of the sale, & in addition: offered to repurchase the land sold to w/c S
agreed on the condition that C reimburse the
The expenses of the contract, & other value of the house S constructed on the Land.
legitimate payments made by reason of the sale;
HELD: As the Public Land Act does not provide
The necessary & useful expenses made of the for the terms & conditions of repurchase, resort
thing sold. may be had to Art 1616 of the CC w/c states that
a vendor a retro cannot avail himself of the rt. of
Art. 1617. If at the time of the execution of the repurchase w/o returning to the vendee the price
sale there should be on the land, visible or growing of the sale, the expenses of the contract & other
fruits, there shall be no reimbursement for or legitimate payments & the necessary & useful
prorating of those existing at the time of expenses made on the thing sold. And Art. 1616
redemption, if no indemnity was paid by the should be construed w/ Art. 546 & 547,
purchaser when the sale was executed. considering the purpose of the law on
Should there have been no fruits at the homesteads is to conserve the ownership in the
time of the sale & some exist at the time of hands of the homesteader & his family &
redemption, they shall be prorated between the inasmuch as a vendee a retro is in good faith.
redemptioner & the vendee, giving the latter the Applying said articles, the homesteader desiring
part corresponding to the time he possessed the to repurchase should be given the option to
land in the last year, counted fr. the anniversary of require the vendee a retro to remove the useful
the date of the sale. improvements on the land subject of the sale,
w/c option is not granted the vendor a retro in
Art 1618. The vendor who recovers the thing Art. 1616. To allow a vendee a retro of a
sold shall receive it free fr. all charges or mortgages homestead, however, the rt. of retention until
constituted by the vendee, but he shall respect the payment of useful expenses is made by the
lease w/c the latter may have executed in good redemptioner would be to render nugatory the
right of repurchase granted by law to a

189
homesteader. Since C is not opting to refund the Art.719. Whoever finds a movable, w/c is
expenses incurred by S, S may remove her house, not treasure, must return it to its previous
w/c can be done w/o damaging the land. possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder
shall immediately deposit it w/ the mayor of the
city or municipality where the finding has taken
A. LOST MOVABLE place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by
the mayor for 2 consecutive weeks in the way he
Art. 559. The possession of movable property deems best.
acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. If the movable cannot be kept w/o
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has deterioration, or w/o expenses w/c considerably
been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it fr. diminish its value, it shall be sold at public
the person in possession of the same. auction 8 days after the publication.
Six months fr. publication having elapsed w/o
If the possessor of a movable lost or of w/c the the owner having appeared, the thing found, or
owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it its value, shall be awarded to the finder. The
in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot finder & the owner shall be obliged, as the case
obtain its return w/o reimbursing the price paid may be, to reimburse the expenses.
therefor.
Baviera: The rule in Art. 559 is based on the
Art. 1505. Subject to the provisions of this principle of caveat emptor. Art. 1505 (1) is
Title, where goods are sold by a person who is not not applicable in the Philippines bec. we do
the owner thereof, & who does not sell them under not have a Factors' Act except a provision
authority or w/ the consent of the owner, the buyer in agency relating to property sold on
acquires no better title to the goods than the seller execution by lawful court order w/c must
had unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct belong to the judgment debtor & not to
precluded fr. denying the seller's authority to sell. another person. Otherwise, the authority
is not valid.
Nothing in this Title, however, shall affect:

1. The provisions of any factors' acts, recording


SUN BROTHERS V. VELASCO
laws, or any other provision of law enabling the
apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if
FACTS: (P) SB delivered to Lopez a refrigerator
he were the true owner thereof;
under a conditional sale agreement. It was
stipulated that L shall not sell it w/o consent of P
2. The validity of any contract of sale under
& that ownership remains w/ P until full paymt
statutory power of sale or under the order of a
thereof. W/o P’s knowledge, L sold the ref to V
court of competent jurisdiction; &
who owns JV Trading (merchant store or market
place ???). Co bought the refrigerator in cash
3. Purchase made in a merchant's store, or in
after seeing it in display. In an action by P for
fairs, or markets, in accordance w/ the Code of
replevin, the TC ruled for defs. CA reversed.
Commerce & special laws.
HELD: The applicable rule is Art 1505 (3) & as
such, Co, who was an innocent purchaser for
Baviera: #2 is valid bec, the seller is value (IPV), is the absolute owner of the ref.
authorized by law or by the court. It is valid
if sale was made in accordance w/ law. Although L had no title to the ref & so V,
his transferee, acquired no better title, there is no
Q: What if the thing was merely borrowed? doubt that Co, is an IPV as he purchased the ref
A: The sale is not valid bec. the judgment fr. a merchant store. This is a case of an
presupposes that the thing belongs to you imperfect or voidable title ripening into a valid
( exception surety or guaranty.) one, as a result of some intervening causes.

Not even the remedy granted in Art. 559


to the owner of the movable to obtain its return

190
provided he reimburses the one ;in possession uninterrupted possession in good faith for 4
thereof, is available to P bec neither did he lose the years. Title of the possessor in good faith is not
ref nor was he unlawfully deprived thereof. that of ownership, but is merely a presumptive
title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive
prescription. The possessor is not yet the owner.
Baviera: What is the rationale for the law?
A: One cannot be expected to look into the
identity of the thing & ask who is the owner 1. DISTINGUISHED FR. VOIDABLE TITLE
of each & every product.

Market - one w/c is open for 7 consecutive Art. 1506. Where the seller of goods has
days (sidewalk vendors & garage sales are voidable title thereto, but his title has not been
not included) validated at the time of the sale, the buyer
acquires a good title to the goods, provided he
buys them in good faith, for value, & w/o notice
DE GARCIA V. CA of the seller’s defect of title.

Facts: PR Guevara lost her ring to a thief in 1952.


A year later, she recognized it on the finger of P De Baviera:
Garcia. Upon examination by the jeweler who sold Provision applies to movable property;
the ring to Guevara, it was found to be the one w/c even if the goods were bought in a private
she bought & later lost. De Garcia claims she sale, not necessary that he bought it in a
bought the ring fr. Miranda, who bought it fr. merchant sale.
Hinahon, who, in turn, bought it fr. a certain Aling Where the seller has a voidable title to the
Petring. Guevarra sued for recovery of the ring. CFI goods, but his title has not been avoided at
ruled for De Garcia, but CA reversed. De Garcia the time of the sale, he can transfer valid
contends that being a possessor in good faith, she title to an innocent purchaser for value.
acquired title to the ring. What constitutes voidable title must
necessarily be governed by the general
Issue: WoN Guevara can recover her ring? principles of contract. So long as the goods
are still in the possession of the buyer, they
Held: YES. There is just one ring. The difference in are still recoverable by the vendor in action
weight w/c De Garcia sought to prove in the trial for annulment. But once transfer is made
was due to the fact that she replaced the diamond to an innocent purchaser for value before
stone w/ a heavier one, as testified to by one of the the annulment of the contract, then valid
witnesses. title vests on the buyer. This is so as said
innocent purchaser must not be punished
There is no proof of acquisition in good for entering into a contract w/c he did not
faith. De Garcia’s claim as to the source of the ring think was not valid.
is dubious. And assuming that there is good faith
on her part, she cannot retain the diamond ring.
Following Art. 559, as Guevara was unlawfully Sales Reviewer notes:
deprived of the ring, she is entitled to recover it fr. Requisites for the acquisition of good title by the
De Garcia. The only exception the law allows is buyer if the seller has a voidable title to the
when there is an acquisition in good faith by the goods:
possessor at a public sale, in w/c case, the owner 1. acquisition before title of seller has been
cannot obtain its return w/o reimbursing the price. avoided
the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by 2. in good faith & for value
proof that there was good faith in the acquisition by 3. w/o notice of seller’s defect of title.
the possessor. This is bec. he was dispossessed
w/o his consent.
TAGATAC V. JIMENEZ
Possession in good faith does not amount
to title. Art. 1132 provides for a period of Facts: Tagatac bought a car in the US &
acquisitive prescription for movables thru brought it to Manila. Through misrepresentation,
Feist was able to convince her to sell the car to
191
him for P15,000. She was issued a postdated check
w/c was dishonored for insufficient funds.
Meantime, the car was sold by Feist to Sanchez, Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall
who sold it to Jimenez, who sold it to Masalonga, , prescribe eight years fr. the time the possession
& later to Villanueva, before it was eventually resold thereof is lost, unless the possessor has acquired
to Jimenez. When Tagatac saw the car on display the ownership by prescription for a less period,
for sale, she demanded its return but was refused. according to Art. 1132, & w/o prejudice to the
She filed an action for recovery of possession. TC provisions of Arts. 559, 1505, & 1133.
dismissed case & confirmed ownership & possession
of Jimenez. On appeal, Tagatac claims that Art 1141. Real actions over immovables
Jimenez is a purchaser in bad faith w/in the purview prescribe after thirty years.
of Sec 69 (j), Rule 23, RoC, under w/c a disputable
presumption is created that a person found in This provision is w/o prejudice to what is
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent established for the acquisition of ownership &
wrongful act is the taker & doer of the whole act. other real rights by prescription.

Issue: WoN Jimenez is a purchaser in good faith & VII. USUFRUCT


as such, is entitled to possession of the car?

Held: YES. Tagatac’s contention is untenable as


such provision refers to stolen goods. In this case, Art. 607. If the usufruct is constituted on an
the car was not stolen fr. Tagatac but was obtained immovable property of w/c a building forms part,
by Jimenez by virtue of a sale after the fraud & the latter should be destroyed in any manner
perpetuated by Feist. whatsoever, the usufructuary shall have a right to
make use of the land & the materials.
There was a valid transmission of ownership fr.
Tagatac to Feist, considering that they freely The same rule shall be applied if the usufruct
entered into the contract of sale. The fact that the is constituted on a building only & the same
check was w/o funds may have given rise to a should be destroyed. But in such a case, if the
prosecution for estate, but did not make the owner should wish to construct another building,
consummated sale unlawful. However, the fraud & he shall have a right to occupy the land & to
deceit by Feist renders the sale a voidable contract, make use of the materials, being obliged to pay
making the sale susceptible of either ratification or to the usufructuary, during the continuance of
annulment. And as long as no action is taken by the the usufruct, the interest upon the sum
party entitled (Tagatac) for either annulment or equivalent to the value of the land & of the
ratification, the contract remains valid & binding. materials.
Thus, although Feist’s title was defective & voidable,
at the time he sold the car to Sanchez, his title
thereto had not been avoided, He thus conferred Both land & building Building only
good title to Sanchez, provided the latter acted in -usufruct on land ends -usufruct on bldg.
good faith, & the purchase was for value & w/o usufruct on bldg. ends & may use
notice of defect in Feist’s title. And even assuming continues remaining
that Sanchez was in bad faith, as Jimenez bought materials
the car in good faith, for value & w/o notice of any Usufruct still entitled to Entitled to use of land
defect in Sanchez’s title, then he acquired good title use of land and bec. Although no
to the car. Good title means an indefeasible title to remaining materials usufruct onland, it can’t
the car even as against Tagatac, the original owner. be denied that the user
of the bldg. also uses
Unlawfully deprived? No, Tagatac voluntarily the land
surrendered the property.
Failure to pay the price does not avoid the contract
but gives the vendor the right to resolve it
Naked owner wishes to Landowner’s preference
under Art. 1191.
rebuild but given more weight
usufructuary refuses; w/the right it is to use
usufructuary’s will w/c the land & payment to
2. ACTION TO RECOVER
prevails until end of the usufructuary of
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usufruct interest during use
Interest must be on the materials and land Baviera: when the usufruct is only over the
The person at fault, if any, must indemnify the land, it cannot extend over the building.
ones whose rights were injured

GABOYA V. CUI
GREY V. CARANDANG
Fact: In a deed of sale over 3 parcels of land,
Facts: The testatrix Rosario Fabie devised the Don Mariano retained for himself the usufruct
naked ownership of a lot w/ a building & over said property to last during his lifetime.
improvements to P Rosario Grey while the usufruct however, he granted the buyers, his children
was devised to Josefa Fabie for life. Later, the Mercedes & Antonio, the right to construct &
building was destroyed by fire. Afterwards, a improve a building thereon as long as such will
chinaman offered to lease the property & construct not impair his right to enjoy the fruits & rents. By
a building thereon. Fabie claims that she has the virtue of a loan, the 2 children constructed a
exclusive right to cede the property by lease & to commercial building thereon. Later, a complaint
receive the full rental value of the same by virtue of was filed by Don Mariano’s guardian in his behalf
her right as usufructuary. However, Grey claims that to claim the rentals over the building w/c he
the right of usufruct was extinguished when the claims was unlawfully retained by the children for
building was destroyed, the right of the themselves.
usufructuary being limited to the legal interest on
the value of the lot & the materials. Thus, a Issue: WoN the usufruct of Don Mariano
controversy ensued as to the interpretation of the extended to the rentals of the building
portion of the will w/c devised to Fabie the rentals subsequently constructed on the vacant lots?
over the property.
Held: NO. The terms of the deed state that the
Issue: Whether Fabie’s lifetime usufruct is only reserved usufruct in favor of the vendor, Don
over the rentals of the building, such that when the Mariano, was limited to the rentals of the land
building was destroyed, the usufruct was alone. Had it been intended to include the
extinguished? Or was it over both the building & the rentals over the building, then such would have
land on w/c it was erected? been clearly expressed. That the enjoyment of
the rents over the building subsequently erected
Held: When the testatrix constituted the lifetime passed to the usufructuary inasmuch as the
usufruct over the rentals, she meant to impose the building was an accession to the land as per Art.
encumbrance on both the building & land on w/c it 571 is untenable. Industrial accession by
was erected, for the building cannot exist w/o the edification on the land is limited either to
land. The land, being an indispensable part of the buildings erected on the land of another or
rented premises, cannot be considered as having no buildings constructed by the owner of the land w/
rental value whatsoever. As only the building was materials owned by another. Recourse to the
destroyed, the usufruct subsists. A usufruct is rules of accession are totally unnecessary where
extinguished only by the total loss of the thing the ownership of the land & materials used to
subject to the encumbrance. build thereon are concentrated on one person.

Under Art. 517, if a usufruct is constituted


on an immovable where a building forms part, & PALAD V. GOV. OF QUEZON PROV. 46 S
such building is destroyed, the usufructuary has a 354
right to the use of the land & the materials. This is
calculated to maintain the usufruct alive until the FACTS: Palad, in his will, devised 2 lots to the
very thing that has been destroyed is reconstructed municipality of Tayabas (beneficiary) w/ the
or replaced. Since the usufruct has not been provincial governor as trustee. The proceeds of
extinguished & it is for life, it is only fair that the said lots would be used for the purpose of
usufructuary continues to enjoy the use of the land erecting a high school in said town.
& the materials that may have been left by the fire,
or that of the new building w/c may be constructed The heirs of P are now asking for the
thereon. reversion of said lots on the ground that the

193
purpose of the trust has already been fulfilled. LC Continuous easements are those the use of
held that the trusteeship is permanent & is a w/c is or may be incessant w/o the intervention
perpetual charge upon the land devised. of any act of man.

HELD: Affirmed. Art. 515 of the Spanish CC Discontinuous easements are those w/c are
prohibiting the creation of a usufruct for more than used at intervals & depend upon the acts of man.
30 yrs. in favor of any town, province, etc. does
NOT apply to trust. Apparent easements are those w/c are made
known & are continually kept in view by external
Since the trustee holds the legal title & the signs that reveal the use & enjoyment of the
devise is valid, the heirs have no remaining interest same.
in the land except the right of reversion in case the
DEVISE SHOULD FAIL. (It did not!) Nonapparent easements are those w/c show
no external indication of their existence.
Neither did the devise violate the 20-yr limit
rule on inalienability. The will of the testator does Art. 616. Easements are also positive or
not interdict the alienation of the lots, it merely negative.
provided that the income of the said lots be used
for the establishment, maintenance & operation of A positive easement is one w/c imposes upon
the high school. the owner of the servient estate the obligation of
allowing something to be done or of doing it
himself, & a negative easement, that w/c
BAVIERA: USUFRUCT – the ownership is prohibits the owner of the servient estate fr.
divided between the owner & the doing something w/c he could lawfully do if the
usufructuary. In TRUST, the beneficial easement did not exist.
ownership is vested in one person while legal
title is in the trustee NOT AS OWNER but an
administrator. Note: The kinds of easement were asked in the
1998 bar exam.

CHAPTER VIII
RONQUILLO V. ROCO 103 P 84
EASEMENTS
FACTS: P Ronquillo, etc. have been in
A. KINDS continuous & uninterrupted use of a road or
passage way w/c traversed the land of D Roco,
etc. Ds have respect such use for the past 20
years. In 1953, Ds started constructing a chapel
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an
in the middle of the said way w/c hindered Ps
encumbrance upon an immovable for the benefit of
continued use of the same. Ps filed an action
another immovable belonging to a different owner.
claiming that they acquired said right by
prescription.
The immovable in favor of w/c the
easement is established is called the dominant
HELD: An easement of right of way is a
estate, that w/c is subject thereto, the servient
DISCONTINUOUS one. Under the NCC, it may
estate.
NOT be acquired by prescription.
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established
Reyes, J.B.L.: (concurring) The essence of
for the benefit of a community, or of one or more
the easement of right of way lies in the power of
persons to whom the encumbered estate does not
the dominant owner to cross the servient
belong.
tenement w/o being prevented or disturbed by its
owner. The limitation on the part of the servient
Art. 615. Easements may be continuous or
owner not to prevent the dominant owner exists
discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent.
only when the latter actually crosses over the
servient estate; bec. when he does not, the
servient owner’s right of exclusion is perfect &
194
undisturbed. Hence, this easement is intermittent or Art. 625. Upon the establishment of an
discontinuous. easement, all the rights necessary for its use are
considered granted.

Art. 626. The owner of the dominant estate


cannot use the easement except for the benefit
of the immovable originally contemplated.
Neither can he exercise the easement in any
A. MODES OF ACQUIRING other manner than that previously established.
EASEMENTS

BAVIERA:
Art. 620. Continuous & apparent easements
are acquired either by virtue of a title or by ART. 624. Requirements (for the easement
prescription of ten years. to continuously exist)

Art. 621. In order to acquire by prescription the two estates owned by the same person
apparent sign of easement is established by the
easements referred to in the preceding article, the
owner of the 2 estates
time of possession shall be computed thus: in ownership of 2 estates is divided
positive easements, fr. the day on w/c the owner of
the dominant estate, or the person who may have
made use of the easement, commenced to exercise UNLESS:
it upon the servient estate; & in negative
easements, fr. the day on w/c the owner of the the contrary (that there would no easement) is
dominant estate forbade by an instrument provided in the title of conveyance
acknowledged before a notary public, the owner of apparent sign of easement is removed BEFORE
the execution of the deed of conveyance.
the servient estate, fr. executing an act w/c would
be lawful w/o the easement. Bar Q: Gargantos case

Art. 622. Continuous nonapparent easements, BAR Q: B built a house occupying his entire lot
& discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, (up to the boundary line). What are the
may be acquired only by title. limitations of B’s right to build said house?

Art. 623. The absence of a document or proof A: Since B did not observe the distance imposed
showing the origin of an easement w/c cannot be by Art. 670 (2 meters fr. the adjoining lot), he
can make openings to admit light at the height of
acquired by prescription may be cured by a deed of
the ceiling joists or immediately under the ceiling,
recognition by the owner of the servient estate or & such opening would be limited to 30 sq.
by a final judgment. centimeters. Said opening must have an iron
grating imbedded in the wall & w/ a wire screen.
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of (Art. 669)
easement between the two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both, shall be BAR Q: C, the owner of the adjoining lot, built a
considered, should either of them be alienated, as a house only after 20 years. Assuming that B who
title in order that the easement may continue did not follow the 2-meter rule made opening
larger than 30 sq. cm, can C require B to
actively & passively, unless, at the time the reconstruct said opening in order to make it
ownership of the two estates is divided, the smaller.
contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid A: YES. B, considering that he did not follow the
should be removed before the execution of the 2-meter distance rule, is now limited to openings
deed. This provision shall also apply incase of the the size of w/c should not be greater than 30 sq.
division of a thing owned in common by two or ore cm. The fact that he had been enjoying openings
persons. larger than this does not give rise to prescription.
(Art. 670)

BAR Q: B owns a 3,000 sq. m. land adjoining


C’s 2 hectare lot. Prior to the controversy, C had

195
allowed B to use a narrow portion of C’s lot as a Art. 625. Upon the establishment of an
right of way. B is now asking for a wider right of easement, all the right necessary for its use are
way. Can B do this?
considered granted.
A: YES. Art. 651 provides that the width of the
easement of right of way shall be that w/c is
sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, & Tolentino: Under this article, the owner of the
may accordingly be changed fr. time to time. dominant estate has the right to use accessory
servitudes or those necessary for the use of
BAR Q: B (ang dami niyang lupa) owns a other servitudes regarded as principal ones. (ex.
subdivision lot w/c does not have any access to the Easement of drawing water includes easement of
highway. B bought a rice field to develop as a road. right of way to the place where the water is)
However, said plan did not materialize for reasons
attributable to him. B now wants to establish a
right of way in C’s subdivision. Can B compel C?
Art. 626. The owner of the dominant estate
A: NO. Constabella case. One of the requisites of cannot use the easement except for the benefit
Art. 649 is that the isolation must not be due to of the immovable originally contemplated.
proprietor’s own act. In the CAB, B had another Neither can he exercise the easement is any
opening, the rice field. However, it was for reasons other manner than that previously established.
attributable to him that said lot remained
undeveloped for purposes of using it as a road.
Tolentino: Easement established in a general
way w/o any specific purpose, it can be used for
all the needs of the dominant estate & may be
adopted to any new modification in the tenement
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of itself. (Easement of view for a house generally
easement between the two estates, established or established can still be so used even if the house
was transformed into a commercial
maintained by the owner of both, shall be
establishment.)
considered, should either of them be alienated, as a Easement is established for a particular purpose,
title in order that the easement may continue the general rule is that the easement cannot be
actively & passively, unless, at the time the used for a different purpose. (Easement for water
ownership of the two estates is divided, the for irrigation cannot be used to supply a factory)
contrary should be provided in the title of But if the change of use does not make the
conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid easement more burdensome, such change can be
should be removed before the execution of the allowed.
deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the
division of a thing owned in common by two or GARGANTOS VS. TAN
more persons.
FACTS: Sanz owned a parcel of land w/
improvements. He subdivided the same into 3
portions & sold it to different persons. Tan
Tolentino:
Yanon bought that portion w/ the house w/c has
When does 624 apply? on its northeastern portion doors & windows
Owner alienates one tenement & keeps the other overlooking the third portion owned by
Owner alienates both to two different persons at Gargantos. On the land of Gargantos was a
the same time camarin w/c he demolished in order to build a
When the tenement is owned in common & there is residential structure & a warehouse. Tan opposed
partition. on the ground that his easement of light & view
should remain & that G should construct at a
While the law declares the easement is to continue distance of not less than 3 meters fr. the
(even if the easement is not expressed in the title or
boundary line.
the apparent signs thereof are not made to
disappear) the easement actually arises for the first
time only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch ISSUE: WON Tan’s property had an easement
as before that time there is no easement to speak of light & view? YES
of, there being but one owner of both estates.
HELD: Art. 621 is not applicable in this case.
The two estates were formerly owned by just one

196
person, Sanz. It was Sanz who introduced
improvements on both properties. On that portion
presently belonging to Tan, he constructed a house Art. 631. Easements are extinguished:
in such a way that the NE side thereof extends to By merger in the same person of the
the wall of the camarin on the portion belonging to ownership of the dominant & servient estates;
G. These windows & doors were in existence when By non-user for 10 years; w/ respect to
T bought the house. The deed of sale did not discontinuous easements, this period shall be
provide that the easement of light & view would not computed fr. the day on w/c they ceased to be
be established. The existence of the doors & used; & , w/ respect to continuous easements, fr.
windows on the NE side of the house is equivalent the day on w/c an act contrary to the same took
to a title for the visible & permanent sign of a an place;
easement is the title that characterizes its existence. When either or both of the estates fall into
While the law declares that the easement is to such condition that the easement cannot be
“continue” the easement actually arises for the first used; but it shall revive if the subsequent
time only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch condition of the estates or either of them should
as before that time there is no easement to speak again permit its use, unless when the use
of, there being but one owner of both estates. becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription
has elapsed, in accordance w/ the provisions of
VALISNO VS. ADRIANO the preceding number;
By the expiration of the term or the
FACTS: Valisno is the owner of a parcel of land, fulfillment of the condition, if the easement is
formerly owned by Honorata, Adriano’s sister, temporary or conditional;
adjoining that of Felipe. V’s land was irrigated by a By the renunciation of the owner of the
canal traversing Adriano’s land. A leveled a portion dominant estate;
of the canal depriving V of water & prevented the By the redemption agreed upon between the
latter fr. cultivating the land. owners of the dominant & servient estates.

ISSUE: WON Valisno is entitled to easement of


aqueduct or water? Yes Tolentino:
HELD: The existence of the canal on A’s land for MERGER: In order for merger to extinguish
the passage of water prior to & at the time of the easement, it is not necessary that the merger be
sale by Honorata to Valisno was equivalent to a title w/ respect to the entire tenement, but only w/
for the vendee of the land to continue using it. The respect to the portion that is affected by the
deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the servitude, or the part for the benefit of w/c it was
“conveyance & transfer of the water rights & established.
improvements” appurtenant to Honorata’s property.
Merger/consolidation must be ABSOLUTE,
Such water rights was the primary consideration for
PERFECT, AND DEFINITE & w/ respect to the full
his purchase of the property, since w/o it the ownership.
property would be unproductive.
If dominant estate buys servient estate,
Water rights, such as the right to use a easement is extinguished. But if he sells
drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, w/c are servient estate again, easement is not
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass w/ the reestablished.
conveyance of the land, although not specifically If merger is rescinded or nullified for inherent
mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser’s reasons, the easement is re-established.
easement of necessity in a water ditch running
NON-USER:
across the grantor’s land cannot be defeated even if
the water is supplied by a third person. The fact It is a means of extinguishing servitudes that has
that an easement by grant may also have qualified been in use & later abandoned. It does not
as an easement of necessity does not detract fr. its apply to servitudes w/c have not been in use.
permanency as a property right, w/c survives the It must be due to VOLUNTARY ABSTENTION by
determination of the necessity. the dominant owner, & NOT to fortuitous
event, bec. the basis of this cause is a
PRESUMPTIVE RENUNCIATION.
C. MODES OF EXTINGUISHMENT.
197
If the dominant estate is co-owned, use by one co- all who in the future might succeed them in
owner inures to the benefit of other co-owners dominion, & this is the reason the permanent
& preserves the easement. character of the easement was annotated in each
& all TCT’s.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF USE
The impossibility only suspends the servitude, until
such time when it can be used again. SALAZAR VS. GUTIERREZ
Impossibility arises fr. the condition of the
tenements. FACTS: Salazar is the owner of a parcel of land
bounded by Sapang Tuyo & by Lot 433. Said lot
RENUNCIATION was irrigated by Sapang Tuyo via a canal
It must be EXPRESS. traversing Lot 433. Later, Lot 433 was registered
But Manresa & Sanchez Roman says that it can be & a TCT issued. Gutierrez leased Lot 433 & then
tacit if there are acts w/c clearly reveal it.
demolished the canal. TC ordered the restoration
But remember, renunciation of a real right must be
made in a public instrument (Art. 1358). of the canal. CA ruled that the easement was
Hence, the renunciation must be SPECIFIC, CLEAR voluntary & was extinguished when Lot 433 was
& EXPRESS registered & titled w/o the annotation of said
easement/

BENEDICTO VS. CA ISSUE: WON registration of the servient estate


extinguishes the easement? NO
FACTS: Hendrick sold a portion of her property to
Recto. Said properties included buildings w/c can HELD: The easement here is not voluntary but a
only be reached by means of a vehicular legal easement. The 3 requisites for a legal
passageway. It was stipulated in the Deed of Sale easement of aqueduct are present:
that an easement of was would be constituted
between the properties, w/ each parties Salazar must prove that he can dispose
contributing an equal portion of his property. of the water & it is sufficient for the use for w/c it
Hendrick sold her property to Heras & Recto sold his was intended
to Benedicto. Heras then demolished the building The proposed right of was is the most convenient
on his property. Benedicto, on the other hand, & the least onerous to third persons.
fenced his property, thereby closing the
passageway. Heras sued Benedicto for the re- Salazar must indemnify the owner of the
opening of the passageway. The TC ruled for Heras servient estate.
& found that the passageway was entirely w/in the
property of Benedicto. In the CAB, the registration w/o the
annotation of the aqueduct cannot summarily
ISSUE: WON there was extinguishment by non- terminate the easement 26 years after where the
user? NO original owner allowed it to continue. It can be
said that he either recognized its existence as a
HELD: Benedicto merely assumed that since Hera compulsory servitude or voluntarily agreed to its
demolished his building that the latter would continuance.
already have direct access to a main street, thereby
abandoning the passageway in question. B himself
admitted that he fenced his property in 1946, & Baviera: Registration did not extinguish the
since the action was filed in 1955, the prescriptive aqueduct bec. after such registration, the
period has not yet elapsed. No presumptive owner of the servient estate allowed the
renunciation can be imputed to Heras since he was use of the aqueduct for 26 years more.
constructing an apartment building on his property
w/c would need said passageway. Moreover,
easement in this case is perpetual in character & D. LEGAL EASEMENTS
was annotated in the titles. The fact that an
easement by grant may have also qualified as an
easement of necessity does not detract fr. its Art. 668. The period of prescription for the
permanency as a property right w/c survives the acquisition of an easement of light & view shall
termination of the necessity. Here, the parties be counted:
made provisions for the easement’s observance by
198
between the wall in w/c they are made & such
From the time of the opening of the window, if contiguous property.
it is through a party wall; or
From the time of the formal prohibition upon Neither can side or oblique views upon or
the proprietor of the adjoining land or tenement, if towards such conterminous property be had,
the window is through a wall on the dominant unless there be a distance of 60 centimeters.
estate. The non-observance of these distances
does not give rise to prescription

Tolentino: The first is considered a positive Art. 671. The distances referred to in the
easement while the second is regarded as a preceding article shall be measured in cases of
negative. direct views fr. the outer line of the wall when the
openings do not project, form the outer line of
the latter when they do, & in cases of oblique
Art. 669. When the distances in art. 670 are views fr. the dividing line between the two
not observed, the owner of a wall w/c is not a party properties.
wall, adjoining a tenement or piece of land
belonging to another, can make in it openings to Art. 672. The provisions of Art. 670 are not
admit light at the height of the ceiling joists or applicable to buildings separated by a public way
immediately under the ceiling, & of the size of 30 or alley, w/c is not less than three meters wide,
centimeters square, &, in every case, w/ an iron subject to special regulations & local ordinances.
grating imbedded in the wall & w/ a wire screen.
Art. 673. Whenever by any title a right has
Nevertheless, the owner of the tenement or been acquired to have direct views, balconies or
property adjoining the wall in w/c the openings are belvederes overlooking an adjoining property, the
made can close them should he acquire part- owner of the servient estate cannot build thereon
ownership thereof, if there be no stipulation to the at less than a distance of 3 meters to be
contrary. measured in the same manner provided in art.
671. Any stipulation permitting distances less
He can also obstruct them by constructing a than those prescribed in art. 670 is void.
building on his land or by raising a wall thereon
contiguous to that having such openings, unless an C. LEGAL EASEMENTS
easement of light has been acquired.

ART. 669. When the distances in Article 670


Tolentino: Multi-story building: openings may be are not observed, the owner of a wall w/c is not a
made in every story party wall, adjoining a tenement or piece of land
belonging to another, can make in it openings to
Baviera: admit light at the height of the ceiling joists or
How long before A (opening of 30 sq. cm w/ iron
immediately under the ceiling, & of the size of
grating) can acquire an easement of light &
view? 10 years thirty centimeters square, & in every case, w/ an
If the servient estate in the above question has iron grating imbedded in the wall & w/ a wire
been vacant for 20 years? 10 year prescriptive screen.
period.
Subdivision had no access to the highway. A asked Nevertheless, the owner of the tenement or
B who owned an adjoining lot to provide him w/ property adjoining the wall in w/c the openings
right of way. However, there is a vacant lot are made can close them should he acquire part-
w/c is an alternative route? A cannot have a ownership thereof, if there be no stipulation to
right of way when there is an alternative route
the contrary.

He can also obstruct them by constructing a


Art. 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or building on his land or by raising a wall thereon
other similar projections w/c afford a direct view contiguous to that having such openings, unless
upon or towards an adjoining land or tenement can an easement of light has been acquired.
be made, w/o leaving a distance of 2 meters

199
Side or oblique view – 60 cms. between the
NOTES: boundary lines & nearest edge of the
window.
If the distances for building regular windows are not
observed, owner of a non-party wall can make Permissible to build even up to the boundary line
openings to admit light at the height of ceiling provided no regular windows are opened
joists or immediately under the ceiling & of size (restricted windows allowed).
of 30 cm. Square.
If the distances given in Art. 670 is observed, bigger
or regular windows may be opened. NPC VS. GUTIERREZ, MALIT

Facts: NPC pursuant to the power of eminent


ART. 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or domain invested under CA No. 120 filed eminent
other similar projections w/c afford a direct view domain proceedings against Gutierrez & Malit.
upon or towards an adjoining land or tenement can
be made, w/o leaving a distance of two meters Issue: The reasonableness & adequacy of the
between the wall in w/c they are made & such disturbance of compensation fee of the
contiguous property. expropriated properties.
Neither can side or oblique views upon or
towards such coterminous property be had, unless Held: NPC must pay full compensation even if it
there be a distance of sixty centimeters. is only after a right of way easement bec. it will
The non-observance of these distances perpetually deprive G & M of their proprietary
does not give rise to prescription. rights. NPC imposed upon them that no plant
higher than 3 meters is allowed.
Because of the high-tension current
ART. 671. The distances referred to in the conveyed through the transmission lines, danger
preceding article shall be measured in cases of to life & limbs that may be caused beneath said
direct views fr. the outer line of the wall when the wires cannot altogether be discounted. The
openings do not project, fr. the outer line of the P1.00 easement fee is grossly inadequate
latter when they do, & in cases of oblique views fr. considering that G & M will continually pay the
the dividing line between the two properties. taxes due on said property.

ART. 672. The provisions of Article 670 are not COSTABELLA CORP. VS. CA
applicable to buildings separated by a public way or
alley, w/c is not less than three meters wide, Facts: Private Respondents were used to passing
subject to special regulations & local ordinances. through a passageway w/c traversed Costabella’s
land. However, when Costabella begun to
ART. 673. Whenever by any title a right has construct a resort & hotel on said land, it closed
been acquired to have direct views, balconies or the passageway. PRs filed for injunction.
belvederes overlooking an adjoining property, the
owner of the servient estate cannot build thereon at Held: The owner of the dominant estate may
less than distance of three meters to be measured claim a compulsory right of way only after
in the manner provided in Article 671. Any satisfying the following requisites:
stipulation permitting distances as than those the dominant estate is surrounded by other
prescribed in Article 679 is void. immovables & is w/o adequate outlet to
public highway;
after payment of the proper indemnity;
NOTES: the isolation was not due to the proprietor’s own
acts;
Regular windows can be opened provided proper the right of way claimed is at a point least
distances are followed. prejudicial to the servient estate.
Proper distances:
In the CAB, the PRs failed to prove the
Direct view (face to face) – 2 meter distance existence of the four requisites. To justify the
between the wall having the windows & the imposition of an easement of a right of way,
boundary line. “there must be a real, nor fictitious or artificial

200
necessity for it.” No right of way can be granted to comfort, to use the lots for strictly residential
them. purpose.

C. VOLUNTARY EASEMENTS IX. MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

TRIAS VS. ARANETA Art. 712. Ownership is acquired by


occupation & by intellectual creation.
Facts: Trias filed a petition to cancel fr. her
Torrens Certificate of Title, the annotation Ownership & other real rights over property
appearing on its back w/c states that no factories are acquired & transmitted by law, by donation,
will be permitted in this section. This prohibition by testate & intestate succession, & in
was imposed by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. w/c owned consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.
the subdivision where lot was located.
They may also be acquired by means of
Held: The prohibition is in reality an easement, prescription.
w/c every owner of real estate may validly impose
under Art. 688 of the New Civil Code. The
existence of a zoning ordinance prohibiting factories A. ORIGINAL MODES
in the area is immaterial. The ordinance might be
repealed at any time; & if so repealed, this 1. OCCUPATION
prohibition would not be enforceable against the
new purchasers of the land, who may be ignorant Occupation applies only to things w/o owners
of the prohibition (should the petition for (res nullius) , w/c are subject to hunting.
cancellation be granted). Should the ordinance be Generally applicable only to lost movables as
amended so as to convert the area into an industrial lands cannot be acquired by occupation.
zone impliedly permitting factories, probably the
limitation might still bind the lot owner. But, since it
is not the present issue, we do not now decide it. Art. 718. He who by chance discovers
(Oo nga naman.) hidden treasure in another’s property shall have
the right granted him in Article 438 of this Code.
ORTIGAS VS. FEATI
Art. 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the
Facts: Ortigas & Co. sold two parcels of land. TCTs owner of the land, building or other property on
of the land contain the restrictions that the buyer w/c it is found. Nevertheless, when the discovery
must use them exclusively for residential purpose. is made on the property of another, or of the
Res. No. 27 was passed by the Municipal Council of State or any of its subdivision, & by chance, ½
Mandaluyong providing that that the area along the thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the
western part of EDSA fr. Shaw Blvd. To the Pasig finder is a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to
River is a commercial & industrial zone. The 2 lots any share of the treasure.
subject to this case were acquired by FEATI two
years after the resolution was passed. Ortigas filed If the things found be of interest to science
a complaint to compel FEATI to comply w/ the or the arts, the State may acquire them at their
restriction. just price, w/c shall be divided in conformity w/
the rule stated.
Held: Res. No. 27 is a valid exercise of police
power. Contractual obligation cannot prevail over Art. 439. By treasure, is understood, for
Res. No. 27 since existing laws are deemed to be legal purposes, any hidden & unknown deposit of
read into contracts in order to fix obligations money, jewelry or other precious objects, the
between parties. The building restrictions declaring lawful ownership of w/c does not appear.
lots as residential cannot be enforced. SC ruled that
it is now unprofitable & a hazard to health &
201
Art. 117, FC. The ff. are conjugal partnership they do not constitute a demandable debt, or
properties: x x x when the gift imposes upon the donee a burden
w/c is less than the value of the thing given,
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden there is also a donation.
treasure w/c the law awards to the finder or owner
of the property where the treasure is found; Art. 727. Illegal or impossible conditions in
simple & remuneratory donations shall be
considered as not imposed.

Art. 728. Donations w/c are to take effect


upon the death of the donor partake of the
nature of testamentary provisions, & shall be
governed by the rules established in the Title on
succession.
1. INTELLECTUAL CREATION
Art. 729. When the donor intends that the
2. PRESCRIPTION donation shall take effect during the lifetime of
the donor, though the property shall not be
delivered until after the donor’s death, this shall
Baviera: Law as a means of acquiring be a donation inter vivos. The fruits of the
ownership does not require any act for there property fr. the time of acceptance of the
to be ownership. Ex: in alluvion, one donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the
acquires the property w/o doing any overt donor provides otherwise.
act.
Art. 730. The fixing of an event or the
imposition of a suspensive condition, w/c may
A. DERIVATIVE MODES
take place beyond the natural expectation of life
of the donor, does not destroy the nature of the
1. DONATION
act as a donation inter vivos, unless a contrary
intention appears.

Art. 725. Donation is an act of liberality Art. 731. When a person donates something,
whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing subject to the resolutory condition of the donor’s
or right in favor of another, who accepts it. survival, there is a donation inter vivos.

Q: Is a promise to donate binding? NO.


Q: Enforceable? NO, bec. there must be a
1. REMUNERATIVE
disposition of a thing or right in favor of another,
who accepts it.
Q: When is it an act of liberality if for payment of
services?
A: If it is not demandable as a debt.
Art. 734. The donation is perfected fr. the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance of the
donee. CASTRO V. CA

Art. 746. Acceptance must be made during the Facts: Alejandra Austria (AA) was the widow of
lifetime of the donor & of the donee. the deceased Antonio Ventenilla (AV). An original
application for registration was filed by AA
covering 10 parcels of land. Socorro Castro (SC)
A. KINDS submitted an opposition alleging that the lands
had been donated to her by AA. AA died & SC
became administratrix of the lands. The
Art. 726. When a person gives to another a collateral heirs of AV opposed the registration of
thing or right on account of the latter’s merits or of such lands in favor of SC. TC rejected both
the services rendered by him to the donor, provided claims. Only SC appealed to the CA ---
dismissed.
202
donation is made in contemplation of the donor’s
Issue: Was the donation by AA to SC mortis causa death, that full ownership shall pass to the donee
thus void for not following formalities of a will? only bec. of the donor’s death, then it is at that
time that the donation takes effect, & is mortis
Held: No, donation was inter vivos. It is clear fr. fr. causa w/c should be in a will & testament. But if
the terms of the donation that the donor AA the donation takes effect during the donor’s
intended to & did dispose of her properties lifetime or independently of the donor’s death,
irrevocably in favor of SC as donee, subject to the that full ownership shall pass to the donee during
condition that the latter would have no right to the the donor’s lifetime, not bec. of the death but
products during the AA’s lifetime. This merely bec. of the deed of donation, then it is inter
indicates a reservation in AA of the usufruct over vivos.
said properties & does not convert the donation to In Cab, it is inter vivos bec. it took effect
one of mortis causa, w/c usufruct would be during the lifetime of the donors as shown in #1.
consolidated w/ the naked ownership of SC upon It is also shown by the acceptance in #2 as a
AA’s death. donation mortis causa is never accepted by the
donee during the lifetime of the donor.
A donation is not mortis causa bec. it states Furthermore, #s 3 & 4 granting limited right to
that it is, if it can be gathered fr. the body of the dispose implies that ownership had passed by
instrument that the main consideration is not the donation w/c was already effective during the
death of the donor, but rather services rendered to donors’ lifetime. Finally, #5 refers to beneficial
him by the donee, as in the CAB, or his affection for ownership, not naked title – donors reserved to
the latter, & title is transferred immediately to the themselves the management & fruits of the lots.
donee, even though the gift is conditioned to take
effect after death of the donor insofar as possession 3. MORTIS CAUSA
& enjoyment of property is concerned.

PUIG VS. PENALOSA


2. INTER-VIVOS
FACTS: On Dec. 28, 1949, Dona Carmen Ubalde
executed a deed of donation of a lot in favor of
ALEJANDRO V. GERALDEZ Estela Magbanua Penaflorida. The deed
contained the ff. stipulations:
Facts: The deed of donation of lots contained the The deceased expressly & consistently declared
following – her conveyance to be one of donation mortis
That it was made in consideration of the love & causa & forbade the registration of the deed
affection of the donors (spouses Diaz & Mendoza) until after her death.
for the donees (their children) as well as the The express condition that if at the date of her
services rendered by the donee to the donors in the death, the donor had not transferred, sold, or
past; conveyed 1/2 of lot 58 of the Pototan
That the donees accept the donation; Cadastre to other persons or entities, the
That the donees would answer for sickness & burial donee would be bound to pay to Caridad
of the donors; Ubalde P600.00 & such payment was to be
That the donees may not sell the parcels of land made on the date the donee took possession
while the donors are alive unless proceeds are of lot 58.
made to answer for said expenses; & The donor reserved her right to dispose of the
That while the donors are alive, they continue w/ property during her lifetime.
the administration & ownership of the property. LC
held this was a void donation mortis causa. The donee, Estela alleges that despite
Issue: WON donation was inter vivos the reservation by the donor of the right to
(valid) or mortis causa (invalid)? dispose of the property during the donor’s
Held: It was a valid donation inter vivos. lifetime, the title to the property passed to her on
It is the time of effectivity w/c distinguishes a Dec. 28, 1949 at the time of the donation.
donation inter vivos fr. a donation mortis causa.
And the effectivity is determined by the time when ISSUE: Won the donation was one of inter vivos
the full or naked ownership of the donated or mortis causa
properties is transmitted to the donees. If the
203
HELD: MORTIS CAUSA w/c is invalid bec. it was not
executed w/ the formalities required. That it is a
donation mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that Art. 732. Donations w/c are to take effect
the donor has an unqualified & unrestricted right to inter vivos shall be governed by the general
alienate the property in favor of other persons of provisions on contracts & obligations in all that is
her choice at any time that she should wish to do not determined in this Title.
so; it is so expressed in the deed & it indirectly
recognizes the donor’s power to nullify the Art. 733. Donations w/ an onerous cause
conveyance to the alleged donee whatever the shall be governed by the rules on contracts &
donor wished to do, for any reason or for no remuneratory donations by the provisions of the
particular reason at all. This is a characteristic of present Title as regards that portion w/c exceeds
conveyance post mortem or mortis causa; for the the value of the burden imposed.
right of the transferor to alienate the property to
someone else necessarily imports that the
conveyance to the donee will not become final & VALDES VS. BURAGA
definite until the donor’s death.
FACTS: Spouses Andres are the original owners
Jurisprudence has established the ff. rules: of the land in litigation. During their lifetime, they
executed a so-called “power of attorney” before a
That the donation mortis causa of the Roman Law barrio lieutenant & 2 witnesses that Domingo
has been eliminated as a juridical, entity & after shall inherit the land for the reason that he shall
the enactment of the Spanish CC & NCC, w/c take care of them up until their death. Upon their
admit only gratuitous transfers of title or real death, Domingo took possession & cultivated the
rights to property either by way of donation land. He later sold the same to Ds. In the
inter vivos or else by way of last will & meantime, a grandson of the spouses sold the
testament, executed w/ the requisite land to P. Now, P brought action to be declared
formalities. In a donation inter vivos, the act is the absolute owner of the land. P argues that
immediately operative even if the actual Domingo did not acquire the land bec. the deed
execution may be deferred until the death of purporting to be donation is not in a public
the donor. In the second case, nothing is instrument.
conveyed to the grantee & nothing is acquired
by the latter, until the death of the grantor- ISSUE: WON donation to Domingo was valid
testator, the disposition being until then
ambulatory & not final. HELD: YES. The instrument may be construed as
That in a donation mortis causa, the conveyance or an onerous donation w/c is not necessary to be
alienation should be recoverable ad nutum, i.e. made in a public instrument. It being governed
at the discretion of the donor simply bec. the by the rules on contracts w/c allow the same to
latter changed his mind.
be made in whatever form. Consequently, neither
That, in consequence, the specification in a deed of was its acceptance by Domingo necessary to give
the causes for revocation indicates that it is a it due effect.
donation inter vivos.
That the designation of donation as a donation LAGURA VS. SERVILLAN
mortis causa is not controlling, but must be
construed w/ the rest of the instrument to give FACTS: Ds donated to Ps 12 parcels of land. In
effect to the real intent of the transferor. the deed, the ff. conditions were made: that Ps
That a conveyance for onerous consideration is cultivate the lands for the support & maintenance
governed by the rules of contracts & not those of Ds; that Ps pay for the burial expenses when
of donation testament. Ds die & that the donation shall be revoked
That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be should Ps fail to comply w/ the conditions. Ps
deemed a donation inter vivos rather than a violated the conditions. As a result, Ds in a public
donation mortis causa, in order to avoid document revoked the donation. Ps filed an
uncertainty as to ownership of the property, action vs. Ds contending that being an onerous
subject to the deed. donation, the same may only be revoked either
by the consent of the donees or by a judicial
decree on the ground provided by law for
b. Rules governing each kind.
204
revocation of donations (birth, appearance of a valid & no other requirement is necessary to give
child; non-fulfillment of conditions & ingratitude) & it validity between the parties except that one
that revocation is ineffective until sanctioned by the party may demand the other to execute the
court. proper document in a public instrument pursuant
to Art. 1279.
ISSUE: Can the onerous donation be revoked?

HELD: YES. A donation made in consideration of C. FORM


services to be rendered is one w/ onerous cause &
the revocation of an accepted donation needs
judicial sanction to be effective. But the donation Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be
may not only be revoked for the causes stated made orally or in writing.
above. Onerous donations are governed by the
rules governing contracts, under w/c the parties An oral donation requires the simultaneous
may establish clauses & conditions they may deem delivery of the thing or of the document
advisable provided they are not contrary to law, representing the right donated.
morals & public policy & w/c shall be binding
between them. Thus, they may demand for If the value of the personal property donated
annulment of the contract in case of non- exceeds P5,000.00, the donation & the
compliance by the other party of the conditions. acceptance shall be made in writing. Otherwise,
the donation shall be void.

BAVIERA: How can such donations be revoked


for non-fulfillment of conditions? Inasmuch TOLENTINO :
as this was construed as a contract, then
there must be an axn. for revocation. Donation of personal property > P5000 must
always be made & accepted in writing, else
the donation would be void even if the thing
is simultaneously delivered. However, the
document/s of donation & acceptance need
not be public instruments.
LLENADO VS. HILVANO If the donation is < P5000, it may be made orally
or in writing. If orally, donation is void unless
FACTS: In payment of the services rendered in there is simultaneous delivery of the thing. If
taking care of his sister & mother, Padre Ventura in the donation of < P5,000 is in writing, its
a “Document of Cession of Land” conveyed to PR acceptance may be tacit (ex. if donee accepts
Maria Hilvano 1/3 portion of a lot owned by him. the thing delivered) & need not be in writing.
When Padre V’s mother died, PR administered the
whole property. When Padre V died, PR took
possession of the 1/3 portion. P though demanded Art. 749. In order that the donation of an
rentals fr. PR claiming ownership thereof. It appears immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
that a brother of Padre V sold 1/2 portion to P. LC public document, specifying therein the property
for PR declaring her owner of the 1/3 portion by donated & the value of the charges the donee
virtue of the onerous donation. must satisfy.

ISSUE: WON Maria is the owner of the land? The acceptance may be made in the same
deed of donation or in a separate public
HELD: YES. PR obtained the 1/3 portion as document, but it shall not take effect unless it is
payment for the services she rendered to the done during the lifetime of the donor.
donor’s mother & sister & the services she will
continue to render as administratrix after the If the acceptance is made in a separate
donor’s death. As an onerous donation, rules on instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
contracts will apply. Under Art. 1278, contracts shall an authentic form, & this step shall be noted in
be obligatory in whatever form they may have been both instruments.
entered into provided all the essential requisites for
their validity are present. Thus, the donation here is

205
BAVIERA: Why is there a need for express Prescription - A donation of immovable
acceptance? Why can’t it be presumed? property not made in a public instrument cannot
transfer title, but it may explain the adverse &
Because one cannot be forced to accept exclusive possession of the donee. This
another’s act of liberality. It is a matter of possession can ripen into ownership by
pride. acquisitive prescription.

Note that under Arts. 746 & 1323 NCC, an


acceptance is also ineffective if the donee PAJARILLO ET AL. V. IAC (176 S 340)
dies before the donor receives notice of his
acceptance. Facts: Perfecta Balane died. Her brother,
Felipe, & her sister, Juana, executed an
“Extrajud’l Settlement of the Estate of Perfecta
TOLENTINO : Balane,” a public instrument. In it, they, as the
only heirs of a large tract of land left by Perfecta,
Deed of Donation - The transfer of real property donated said property to Salud de Matias, Juana’s
must be expressed in a public document, otherwise daughter. Salud executed a public instrument
the donation will be an absolute nullity, i.e., Art. accepting the donation. Both instruments were
1357 cannot apply. The donee can’t bring an axn
never registered. Title was never transferred to
to compel the donor to execute a public instrument
of donation bec. Art. 1357 applies only to contracts Salud, but she took possession of the land.
w/c validly exist, not where the form is required to Later, Juana, w/ Salud’s permission, possessed
make it valid. Onerous donations, however, are the land & enjoyed its fruits. In 1956, she
governed by the rules on contracts so in their case executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Claudio,
a public instrument isn’t necessary. Salud’s brother, for P12th. Salud filed a
complaint for reconveyance of the property.
Ratification by Heirs - Where the donor
executed a private instrument of donation w/c his Issue: WON donation was void for being
only heir ratified in a public document, said gift
wasn’t retroactively perfected by the public inst.; it defective in form
cannot prejudice the creditors of the donor’s estate.
However, it can operate as a quitclaim as to the Held: The donation is defective in form (but
heir, i.e., he is estopped fr. asserting any rights to the SC upheld it anyway). There is nothing in
the property. either of the 2 instruments showing that
“authentic notice” of the acceptance was made
Specifying Charges - Manresa, Scaevola & by Salud to Felipe & Juana. A strict interpretation
Castan say that the “charges” here are those in of Art. 633 OCC would lead to the annulment of
onerous / cond’l donations, so the donation’s true
the donation. However, under the
value can be determined. Bonet believes that the
“charges” are those burdens imposed upon the circumstances, a literal adherence might result in
immovable property donated. the distortion of the parties’ intentions. The
purpose of the formal requirement is to ensure
Acceptance & Notification - Title to immovable that the acceptance of the donation is duly
property doesn’t pass to the donee by virtue of the communicated to the donor. It is not even
deed of donation until it has been accepted in a suggested that Juana was unaware of Salud’s
public inst., either in the deed or in another inst., + acceptance. Rather, Juana confirmed it later &
donor is duly notified thereof. The notice of the requested Salud not to register the donated land
donee’s acceptance must be noted in both the deed
during her lifetime. Further, Juana had no right
& in the document of acceptance to perfect the
donation. Absent any of these, the donation is null to sell the land since she was merely holding the
& void. land as a trustee of Salud. The Deed of Sale was
also vitiated by Claudio’s bad faith, since he was
Within Donor’s Lifetime - Acceptance not made presumed to have know of the previous donation
before the donor’s death is w/o effect bec. the to his sister.
donation isn’t considered accepted until the donor is
notified of the acceptance. If the donee accepted
but the donor died before notification, the donation D. LIMITATIONS
won’t bind the latter’s heirs unless they ratify it
(although this doesn’t prejudice donor’s creditors).

Art. 739. The ff. donations shall be void:

206
Priest who heard donor’s confession or minister
who extended spiritual aid to him during his
Those made between persons who were guilty
last illness
of adultery or concubinage at the time of the Relatives of said priest / minister w/in 4th degree,
donation; & the church, order, chapter, community,
Those made bet. persons found guilty of the organization or institution to w/c the priest /
same criminal offense, in consideration thereof; minister belongs
Those made to a public officer or his wife, Guardian w/ respect to Ds made by ward in his
descendants & ascendants, by reason of his office. favor before final accts. of guardianship
were approved, even if donor dies after the
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for approval; but if the guardian is the ward’s
ascendant, descendant, brother, sister or
declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse
spouse, D by ward to guardian is valid
of the donor or donee; & the guilt of the donor & Physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer, druggist
donee may be proved by preponderance of who took care of the donor during his last
evidence in the same action. illness
Individuals, associations, corps. not permitted by
law to receive donations
TOLENTINO
However, Art. 1032 (incapacity to inherit by
D between Paramours - When the D’s purpose reason of unworthiness) doesn’t apply to Ds. If
is to initiate, continue, resume or compensate illicit the D is made before the cause of unworthiness
relations bet. paramours, it is void. It is valid if occurs, it is not revoked by such cause bec. D
intended to indemnify the damage caused to the inter vivos are revoked only by the causes in Arts.
other at the time of separation. 760, 764-5. If made after knowledge of the act
of unworthiness, D is analogous to the
Seducer’s Promise to Pay - The court must look testamentary provision under Art. 1033, w/c
into the facts w/c gave rise to the illicit relation. If it operates as a pardon.
originated fr. a seduction thru deceit by the man,
after w/c the woman resigned herself to the status
of concubine so she could receive some means of Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all
livelihood fr. him, the agreement to pay an amount the present property of the donor, or part
in consideration of the relationship’s cessation is thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or
valid bec. the woman had fr. the start an axn
in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of
against the seducer. But when a woman voluntarily
enters into a union freely, she cannot exact himself, & of all relatives who, at the time of the
indemnity or compensation. However, Ds intended acceptance of the donations, are by law entitled
to maintain or resume a state of concubinage are to be supported by the donor. Without such
void for being based on a cause contrary to morals reservation, the donation shall be reduced on
& good customs. petition of any person affected.

Bribery - Par. 3 of this article must be interpreted


to mean “spouse,” i.e., husbands are included.
TOLENTINO :
Insurance - Art. 2012 NCC forbids persons who This applies to all donations except D mortis
cannot receive donations under Art. 739 fr. being causa, D propter nuptias, & onerous Ds. In
named as beneficiaries in the life insurance policies cond’l or modal Ds, there may be sufficient
of persons who cannot make donations to them. left for the donor’s subsistence.
D of donor’s present property w/o reservation of
an amount sufficient for his subsistence isn’t
void but is susceptible to reduction. It is
Art. 740. Incapacity to succeed by will shall be voidable w/ respect to the amount needed
applicable to donations inter vivos. for the support of the donor or his
dependent relatives.

TOLENTINO :
Art. 751. Donations cannot comprehend
Persons disqualified fr. succeeding by will under Art. future property.
1027 NCC can’t be recipients of D inter vivos : By future property is understood anything
w/c the donor cannot dispose of at the time of
the donation.

207
return it, he will be held liable in damages, but
the damages cannot exceed the value of the
TOLENTINO : property.

Future prop. includes all property that


belongs to others when the D is made, although it THE INSURANCE LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.
may or may not later belong to the donor. It VS. EBRADO (80 S 181)
cannot be donated bec. it isn’t his property &
therefore he can’t dispose of it at the time of the D. Facts: In his life insurance policy, Buenaventura
But 1) properties to w/c the donor has a right, Ebrado designated Carponia Ebrado as the
even if their delivery is fixed at a future date, & 2) revocable beneficiary, referring to her as his wife.
properties w/c will become his upon the happening
of a suspensive cond’n are not future properties. When he died, Carponia filed a claim w/ the
The donor can donate such rights as he has to insurer. She admitted that she & Buenaventura
these properties at the time of the D. Ex. Properties hadn’t really been married. Pascuala Vda. de
of an existing inheritance are not future properties Ebrado, the real wife, also filed a claim for the
of the heirs after the predecessor’s death; heirs proceeds of the policy.
accrued right to the properties at the moment of
death. Issue: WON a common-law wife can be named
as the beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a
married man
Art. 752. The provisions of Art. 750
notw/standing, no person may give or receive, by Held: No. Although the Insurance Code
way of donation, more than he may give or receive doesn’t contain any specific provision on this
by will. matter, the general rules of civil law, i.e., Art.
2012 NCC, provides that: “any person who is
forbidden fr. receiving a donation xxx cannot be
TOLENTINO : named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by
the person who cannot make a donation to him.”
This limitation applies only to persons who Common-law spouses are definitely barred fr.
have compulsory heirs. An inofficious donation is receiving donations fr. each other under Art. 739
not a nullity, but only subject to reduction insofar as NCC. In essence, a life insurance policy is no
it exceeds what the donor could’ve given by will to different fr. a civil donation insofar as the
the donee. This amount is only determinable at the beneficiary concerned. Both are founded on the
time of the donor’s death. same consideration: liberality. As such, the
proscription in Art. 739 NCC should operate
equally in life insurance contracts. Note that only
Art. 759. There being no stipulation regarding preponderance of evidence, & not criminal
the payment of debts, the donee shall be conviction, is required by Art. 739. This was
responsible therefor, only when the donation has satisfied by Carponia’s stipulations in the Pre-Trial
been made in fraud of creditors. Conference.

The donation is always presumed to be in fraud ORACION VS. JUANILLO & PRINCIPE 46
of creditors, when at the time thereof the donor did O.G. 5421
not reserve sufficient property to pay his debts prior
to the donation. Facts: Juanillo spouses who had no children
donated to Principe the lot in question. When the
wife died, husband (H) remarried & had a
daughter Pacita. H later died. In the meantime,
BAVIERA: Before one can be generous, one by virtue of the judgment w/c Oracion obtained
must be just! against H, the property in Q was levied upon &
announced for sale. Principe initially opposed,
but later w/drew when he was given a right to
TOLENTINO : The donee’s liability for the donor’s repurchase. He failed to repurchase so a final
debts in this case is limited to the value of the thing Deed of Sale was issued to Oracion who secured
donated. Creditors may demand the rescission of a Writ of Possession w/c Principe refused on the
the D. If the donee alienated the property to one
who acquired it in good faith so that he is unable to strength of the donation. Pacita intervened

208
contending that upon her birth the donation was In a case when there are 2 donations made
ipso facto revoked & upon her father’s death, she of the same property & the second
inherited it. CA declared sale invalid as the property donation is registered, the first donation is
then belonged to Principe who was not a party to still valid bec. the second donee cannot
the judgment against H, but declared that the land invoke the Land Registration Act w/c
rightfully belongs to Pacita. protects only & innocent purchaser for
value. However, when the conflict is
Held: Principe became the owner of the land by between a donation & a sale, & the vendee
virtue of the donation in 1923. Upon Pacita’s birth registered the sale, he may invoke the
in 1934, the donation was revoked as per Art. 644 Land Registration Act as he is an IPV. In
& the property was to be reverted to the donor, but the latter case, the vendee becomes a
both revocation & return are not self-operative or Preferred Transferee.
self-executory & if donee should refuse to part w/
the property, resort to judicial action shld be taken Take note also of the rules on Double
under Art 646. As Principe did not redeliver the Sales.
property to the donor, reversion to Pacita will only
become effective upon execution of the judgment of
the CA. Pacita’s appearance as intervenor, claiming CRUZ VS. CA NOV. 22, 1985
the property, served the purposes of an action for
revocation under Art. 646. Consequently, levy & Facts: Eduvigis Cruz filed a petition for a change
sale of the property by Oracion has no legal effect of name. Joks lang. Again.. Eduvigis Cruz, a
bec. as the property was then owned by Principe childless widow, donated a residential land w/ 2-
who was not a party to the judgment. door apartment erected thereon to her
grandnieces, the priv. resps. Same was
ORTIZ VS. CA 97 PHIL 46 embodied in a Deed of Donation. EC later
adopted one Cresencia. Cres later tried to revoke
Facts: The land in dispute originally belonged to the donation, but the donees resisted, alleging
the Yupo spouses. In 1940, they donated the lot to that the property was co-owned by their
their grandchildren, petrs. Ortiz, in a public grandfather, & hence they own 1/2 of the
document. The donors were duly notified of the property by inheritance. And that since Cres got
donee’s acceptance. In 1941, donor-spouses the other half, her presumptive legitime was not
executed another deed of donation of the same impaired. TC ordered revocation. CA reversed.
property in favor of priv. resp. Basada, their Issue: WON the donation should be revoked in
nephew, subject to the condition that the donee the case at bar.
would serve & take care of the donors until their
death. The second donee also accepted it. Held: No. Donation subsists.
Issue: Who has a better right to the land? In the case of a subsequent adoption of
a minor by one who has previously donated some
Held: The grandchildren Ortiz. From the time the or all of his property to another, the donor may
public instrument of donation was executed & sue for the annulment or reduction of the
acknowledged by donors & donees, the latter donation w/in 4 years fr. the date of the
acquired not only the ownership but also the adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of
possession of the donated property, since the the adopted, taking into account the whole estate
execution of a public instrument of conveyance is of the donor at the time of the adoption.
one of the recognized ways in w/c delivery of lands
may be made. Petrs. Ortiz having been vested w/ The burden of proof is on the plaintiff-
ownership & attendant possession in 1940, it is donor who must allege & establish the
clear that the subsequent donation in favor of priv. requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of
resp. Basada conferred on the latter no right over w/c annulment or reduction of the donation can
the property against the former donees. be adjudged. Here, complaint does not allege
that the donation impairs the legitime of the
Baviera: Take note that in Donation, there is adopted child Cresencia; there was no indication
no need for delivery to perfect donation. of the total assets of the donor, nor proof of
impairment.

209
1) If the donor, after the donation, should
have legitimate or legitimated or illegitimate
children, even tough they may be posthumous;

DE LUNA VS. ABRIGO 181 SCRA 150 2) If the child of the donor, whom the latter
believed to be dead when he made the donation,
Facts: De Luna donated a lot to the Luzonian should turn out to be living.
Colleges (in Luzon?). The same was embodied in a
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, subject to certain 3) if the donor should subsequently adopt a
conditions, & to automatic reversion to the donor of minor child.
the property in case of non-compliance. Luzon
failed to comply. In April 1971, De Luna executed a
“Revival of Donation Inter Vivos”, subject to the ff.
Baviera: This does not apply to donation
conditions: that the donee shall construct a chapel,
a nursery & kindergarten school named after St.
propter nuptias.
Veronica, all to be completed in 5 years fr. date of
donation. Again, there was a provision for the
automatic reversion in case of non-compliance. Tolentino: If the child is conceived at the time
of the donation but donor is not yet aware of the
conception, then Tole believes that he may still
Heirs of De luna filed a complaint for revoke the donation.
cancellation of the donation & reversion of the land
to them on Sep. 23, 1980. Donee Luzonian claimed Under this article, revocation takes place
that the action has already prescribed. TC for ipso jure, no action is necessary to revoke the
Luzonian. donation. However, resort to court shall be
necessary if donee refuses to return the property
Issue: WON action for cancellation of donation has or denies the right of the donor.
already prescribed.

Held: NO. Donations may be Simple, Art. 761. In the cases referred to in the
Remuneratory or Onerous. Onerous donation is preceding article, the donation shall be revoked
one subject to burdens, charges or future services or reduced in so far as it exceeds the portion that
equal (or more) in value than that of the thing may be freely disposed of by will, taking into
donated. account the whole estate of the donor at the
time of the birth, appearance or adoption of the
The CAB involves an onerous donation. child.
Under Art. 733, NCC, donations w/ an onerous
cause are governed not by the law on donations but
by the Rules on Contracts. And in the matter of Tolentino: Contemplates only partial
prescription of actions for the revocation of an revocation.
onerous donation, the General Rules on Prescription
applies. (Parks vs. Prov. of Tarlac) Said rules
provide for a 10-yr prescriptive period to enforce a Art. 762. Upon the revocation or reduction of
written contract [Art. 1144(1),NCC] the donation by the birth, appearance or
adoption of a child, the property affected shall be
returned, or its value if the donee has sold the
E. Revocation & Reduction same.
If the property is mortgaged, the donor
may redeem the mortgage, by paying the
Art. 760. Every donation inter vivos made by a amount guaranteed, w/ a right to recover the
person having no children, legitimate or legitimated same fr. the donee.
by subsequent marriage, or illegitimate, may be When the property cannot be returned, it
revoked or reduced as provided in the next article shall be estimated at what it was worth at the
by the happening of any of these events. time of the donation.

Art. 763. The action for revocation or


reduction on the grounds set forth in article 760
210
shall prescribe after four years fr. the birth of the
Tolentino: This applies to all donations except
first child, or fr. his legitimation, recognition or
donations mortis causa, donations propter
adoption or fr. the judicial declaration of filiation or nuptias & onerous donations.
fr. the time information was received regarding the This enumeration is restrictive.
existence of the child believed dead.

The action cannot be renounced & is Art. 766. Although the donation is revoked
transmitted upon the death of the donor to his on account of ingratitude, nevertheless, the
legitimate & illegitimate children & descendants. alienations & mortgages effected before the
notation of the complaint for revocation in the
Registry of Property shall subsist.
Tolentino: The prescription shall be counted fr.
the time the earliest cause for revocation occurs.
Later ones shall be void.

Art. 767. In the case referred to in the first


Art. 764. The donation shall be revoked at the
paragraph of the preceding article, the donor
instance of the donor, when the donee fails to
shall have a right to demand fr. the donee the
comply w/ any of the conditions w/c the former
value of the property alienated w/c he cannot
imposed upon the latter.
recover fr. third persons or the sum for w/c the
same has been mortgaged.
In this case, the property donated shall be
returned to the donor, the alienations made by the
The value of said property shall be fixed as of
donee & the mortgages imposed therein by him
the time of the donation.
being void, w/ the limitations established, w/ regard
to third persons, by the Mortgage Law & the Land
Art. 768. When the donation is revoked for
Registration Laws.
any of the causes stated in Art. 760 or by reason
of ingratitude or when it is reduced bec. it is
This action shall prescribe four years fr. the
inofficious, the donee shall not return the fruits
non-compliance w/ the condition, may be
except fr. the filing of the complaint.
transmitted to the heirs of the donor & may be
exercised against the donee’s heirs.
If the revocation is based upon non-
compliance w/ any of the conditions imposed in
Tolentino: Condition referred to in this article the donation, the donee shall return not only the
means the obligations or charges imposed by the property but also the fruits thereof w/c he may
donor upon the donee. have received after having failed to fulfill the
condition.

Art. 765. The donation may be revoked at the Art. 769. The action granted to the donor by
instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in
the following cases: advance. This action prescribes w/in one year, to
be counted fr. the time the donor had knowledge
1) If the donee should commit some offense of the fact & it was possible for him to bring the
against the person, the honor or the property of the action.
donor or of his wife or children under his parental
authority. Art. 770. This action shall not be transmitted
2) if the donee imputes to the donor any to the heirs of the donor, if the latter did not
criminal offense or any act involving moral institute the same although he could have done
turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless so, & even if he should die before the expiration
the crime or the act has been committed against of 1 year.
the donee himself, his wife or children under his
authority. Neither can this action be brought against
3) If he unduly refuses him support when the the heir of the donee unless upon the latter’s
donee is legally or morally bound to give support to death the complaint has been filed.
the donor.

211
Tolentino: When the donor renounced the action,
the heirs cannot bring the action. If the donor dies HELD: No, if the donor reserves the right to
w/o knowing of the fact of ingratitude, the heirs revoke it or reserves the right to dispose of all
may institute the action for revocation. the properties purportedly donated there is no
donation. If the donation shall take effect only
upon the donor’s death, as in the case at bar,
Art. 771. Donations w/c in accordance w/ the then it is a donation mortis causa w/c must follow
provisions of Art. 752, are inofficious, bearing in the form of wills. As the deed is not in
mind the estimated net value of the donor’s conformity w/ the formalities of a will & it is not a
property at the time of his death shall be reduced donation inter vivos, the deed is void & there is
w/ regard to the excess; but this reduction shall not no valid & lawful transmission of properties
prevent the donations fr. taking effect during the between Bautista & Sabiniano.
life of the donor, nor shall it bar the donee fr.
appropriating the fruits.
SUCCESSION
For the reduction of donations the provisions of
this chapter & of articles 911 & 912 of the Code
shall govern.
I. Wills
Art. 772. Only those who at the time of the
donor’s death have a right to the legitime & their A. Law Governing Form
heirs & successor’s in interest may ask for the
reduction of inofficious donations. 1. In general

Those referred to in the preceding paragraph


cannot renounce their right during the lifetime of Art. 795. The validity of a will as to its form
the donor, either by express declaration or by depends upon the observance of the law in force
consenting to the donation. at the time it is made.

Art. 773. If, there being two or more


donations, the disposable portion is not sufficient to Balane:
cover all of them, those of the more recent dates
shall be suppressed or reduced w/ regard to the Formal Validity
excess.
Time criterion.-- law at the time of execution;
subsequent laws cannot apply retroactively.
Place criterion.-- Under Art 815-817, five (5)
Tolentino: There must be a proportional reduction choices are available to the testator:
of simultaneous donations but the donor may Citizenship
express a preference but such must be expressly Residence
stated in the donation itself. Domicile
Execution
Philippines
BAUTISTA V. SABINIANO
2. Intrinsic Validity
Facts: Bautista executed a deed of conditional Time.-- time of death bec. of Art. 777
donation in favor of the Sabinianos w/ the following Place.-- Law of citizenship of decedent.
conditions:
donor retains ownership & control over the
properties during his lifetime Art. 17. The forms & solemnities of
he can dispose of the properties during his lifetime contracts, wills, & other public instruments shall
to support him be governed by the laws of the country in w/c
if the donor dies , the donee shall pay all his debts they are executed.
& pay for his funeral expenses. When the acts referred to are executed
before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
ISSUE: WON the deed executed by Bautista is a Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country,
donation inter vivos?

212
the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall estate among his heirs & among the legatees is
be observed in their execution. given solemn expression at the time the will is
executed, & in reality, the legacy or bequest then
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts becomes a completed act.
or property, & those w/c have for their object public
order, public policy & good customs shall not be However, fr. the day of the death of the
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions legatees & devisees under it becomes a vested
agreed upon in a foreign country. right, protected under the due process clause of
the Consti. against subsequent change in the
Art. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign statute adding new legal requirements of
country, he is authorized to make a will in any of execution of wills w/c would invalidate such will.
the forms established by the law of the country in
w/c he may be. Such will may be probated in the By parity of reasoning, when one
Philippines. executes a will w/c is invalid for failure to observe
& follow the legal requirements at the time of its
execution then upon his death he should be
regarded & declared as having died intestate, &
IN RE WILL OF REVEREND ABADIA
his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession
& no subsequent law w/ more liberal
FACTS: In 1923, Father Abadia executed a
requirements or w/c dispenses w/ such
document purporting to be his Last Will &
requirements as to execution should be allowed
Testament. He died in 1943 & 1946, the will was
to validate a defective will & thereby divest the
submitted for probate by Enriquez for probate.
heirs of their vested right in the estate by
Enrique was one of the legatees in the will. If the
intestate succession. The general rule is that the
will was not allowed, Abadia’s cousins & nephews
Leg cannot validate void wills.
will inherit.

There were 3 witnesses to the execution of


the will but only 1 survived to testify. He said that Baviera: The reason for the law governing
Sancho wrote in longhand (meaning handwritten) form is that one cannot foresee what the
the will in Spanish & that Abadia signed on the left law will be in the future. The law cannot
hand margin of the front page of each of the 3 invalidate what was valid when executed &
sheets. Finally, the testator signed at the last page. vice- versa.
The 3 witnesses signed their names on the last
page after the attestation clause & nowhere else. 2. Exceptions

Note that in 1923, holographic wills were a. Wills made by aliens abroad
not permitted. Certain requirements were imposed
by the law at that time like numbering correlatively Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad
each page & not each sheet & the signing on the produces effect in the Philippines if made w/ the
left hand margin by the testator & 3 attesting formalities prescribed by the law of the place in
witnesses. w/c he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity w/ those
ISSUE: Is the will valid? NO, under 1923 laws w/c this Code prescribes.

HELD: The will was not allowed. The validity of


the will is not to be judged by the law in force at b. Wills made by diplomatic &
the time of the testator’s death or at the time the consular officers of the Philippines
supposed will is presented in court for probate or
when the petition is decided by the court BUT AT
THE TIME THE INSTRUMENT WAS EXECUTED. In
Art. 17 (2) xxx When the acts referred to are
the CAB, this was the law prevailing in 1923. One
executed before the diplomatic or consular
reason to support this rule is that although the will
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
operates upon & after the death of the testator, the
foreign country, the solemnities established by
wishes of the testator about the disposition of his

213
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. it is the will of 2 or more persons.
xxx
Why prohibited? Because it encourages undue
influence, murder, or attempt to kill the other
bec. generally, joint wills benefit each other.
c. Wills made by aliens in It runs counter to the idea that wills are
the Phils. revocable. It makes revocation more
difficult. (E.g., tearing it up-- destroys the
will of another) It undermines the personal
element of a will. (It becomes a multiple
Art. 817. A will made in the Philippines by a will.)
citizen or subject of another country, w/c is
executed in accordance w/ the law of the country of In the same light, joint wills make revocation
w/c he is a citizen or subject, & w/c might be difficult as the provisions therein depend on each
proved & allowed by the law of his own country, other (Baviera)
shall have the same effect as if executed according
to the laws of the Philippines. One sheet of paper. On each side is a will of one
person. Is it valid? Yes, bec. there are 2
documents.

Balane: One sheet of paper. On the front page, on the


upper half is a will of A. On the bottom half
Four combinations as to situation: is the will of B. Is it valid? Yes. This is not a
a. Filipino makes a will here joint will bec. there are still 2 documents.
b. Filipino makes a will abroad.
c. Foreigner makes a will here. The presumption is that wills are valid. The fault
d. Foreigner makes a will abroad. probably is in the wording of the law. Joint will--
one instrument. What the law prohibits is not 2
What law governs the validity of will? wills on the same sheet of paper but joint wills.
Intrinsic.-- the national law of the
testator
Time.-- At the time of death.
Art. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding
Place.-- the same for Filipinos & aliens. The same
rule wherever you make your will. You have article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country
five (5) choices-- the law of shall not be valid in the Philippines, even though
1. The testator's citizenship authorized by the laws of the country where they
2. Testator's domicile may have been executed.
3. Place of execution
4. Testator's residence Balane:
5. Philippines.
This provision is an exception to the rule
c. Joint Wills enunciated in Articles 815 to 817 that for
Filipinos, as long as the will is valid in the place of
execution, then it is valid in the Phils.
Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a
Filipinos, whether here or abroad, cannot execute
will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for
joint wills. It is against public policy.
their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third
person. Can aliens execute joint will?
If executed in the country where it is allowed,
YES, it may be probated here.
Balane: If made here & their country allows them to do
this? There are 2 views on this:
A joint will is one document w/c serves as the will of (i) Yes, follow the personal law.
2 persons; this is prohibited; (ii)No bec. it is against public
policy.
A reciprocal will involves 2 instruments reciprocally
making each other heir; this is not prohibited. Baviera: Art 819 affects the intrinsic validity
of a will hence, it applies only to Filipinos.
Elements of a Joint Will:
one single instrument;

214
DE LA CERNA VS. POTOT estate w/c he claimed as personal funds. He said
that he w/drew these funds fr. the savings
FACTS: The spouses Bernabe & Gervasia de la account w/ Bank of America. The executrix of
Cerna executed a joint will in their dialect the wife’s estate opposed saying the account was
bequeathing their 2 parcels of land to their niece, part of the conjugal partnership, thus there was
Manuela Potot. The Bernabe died first. The no need for reimbursement.
Gervasia & Manuela submitted the joint will for
probate & the same was approved. Upon the death Mr. Vitug countered by saying that said
of the wife, another petition for probate of the same funds are his exclusive property by virtue of a
will was filed insofar as Gervasia was concerned. SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENT signed by the
This time the TC ruled against the allowance of the spouses. (The agreement says something like if
will for being prohibited under the NCC. one of us will die ahead of the other, the funds
shall be collectible on w/drawal by the survivor)
ISSUE: Is the joint will valid? As to Bernabe, yes.
But as to Gervasia, no. ISSUE: Is reimbursement proper? Yes
Is the survivorship agreement valid? Yes
HELD: The allowance of the joint will insofar as
Bernabe is concerned stands, despite the fact that HELD: The agreement is not a conveyance
even when it was submitted for probate, joint wills mortis causa. A will has been defined as a
were already prohibited. personal, solemn, revocable & free act by w/c a
capacitated person disposes of his property &
The error committed by the probate court rights & declares or complies w/ the duties to
in admitting the joint will was an error of law that take effect after his death. In other words, the
should have been corrected by appeal, but w/c did bequest or devise must pertain to the testator
not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor (that he must own the property devised) . In
the conclusive effect of its final decision, however CAB, the monies in the bank were in the nature
erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition of conjugal funds.
for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole
world & public policy & sound practice demand that Neither is the agreement a donation inter
at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of courts vivos bec. it was to take effect after the death of
should become final at some definite date fixed by one party. Furthermore, it is not a donation
law. between the spouses bec. it involved no
conveyance of a spouse’s own properties to the
The probate decree concerning Bernabe other.
could only affect his share. It could not affect the
disposition of the share of the wife, who was then When the spouses Vitug opened the
still alive & over whose interest in the conjugal account, they merely put what rightfully belonged
properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction to them in a money-making venture. They did
precisely bec. her estate could not then be in issue. not dispose of it in favor of the other, w/c would
have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited
It follows that the validity of the joint will, donation.
insofar as the estate of the wife was concerned,
must be, on her death, re-examined & adjudicated The validity of the agreement seems
de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate debatable by reason of its “survivor take all”
will of each testator. Thus, the undivided interest of feature, but in reality that contract imposed a
the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate mere obligation w/ a term. The term being
heirs, & not exclusively to the testamentary heir, death.
unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to
exist or unless she be the intestate heir of Gervasia. The agreement may also be considered
an aleatory contract. An aleatory K is one whose
VITUG VS. CA fulfillment depends on either the happening of an
event w/c is (1) uncertain or (2) w/c is to occur
FACTS: Mr. Vitug filed a motion for authority fr. at an indeterminate time. In either case, an
the probate court of his wife’s estate to sell certain element of risk is present. In CAB, the risk was
shares of stock & real properties belonging to his the death of one party & the survivorship of the
wife’s estate to cover allegedly his advances to the other.
215
General rule: Day, month & year must be
While a survivorship agreement is per se indicated.
not contrary to law, its operation or effect may be
Exception: When there is no appearance of
violative of the law. It is illegal if it be shown that
fraud, bad faith, undue influence, & pressure &
such agreement is a mere cloak to hide an the authenticity of the will is established, & the
inofficious donation, or transfer of property in fraud only issue is whether or not "Feb./61" is valid,
of creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a forced then it should be allowed under the principle of
heir. Under these cases, the agreement may be substantial compliance.
annulled.
(2) Labrador v. CA (Balane case) -- In this
Baviera: The aleatory agreement was done by case , the date was indicated in the body of the
will as part of the narration. Is this valid? Yes.
the bank. Joint accounts usually made by It is not necessary that the will be separate fr.
people who want to leave something to the body. In fact, it can be anywhere in the will
another w/o going through the courts as long as the date appears in the will.

If the date is proven wrong, then its validity


e. Holographic Wills depends on whether the error is deliberate or
not. If deliberate, the will is considered not dated
& the will is void. If not deliberate, the date will
be considered as the true date.
Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic
will w/c must be entirely written, dated, & signed by Date is usually written by putting the day, month,
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no & year. However, other ways may be adopted
other form, & may be made in or out of the such as "Christmas day of 1995."
Philippines, & need not be witnessed.
Signature
Commentators have said that the signature must
consist of the testator's writing his name down.
Baviera: The problem w/ holographic wills is The reason for this is since he is able to write his
that they must be proved by the genuineness will, then he is literate enough to write his name.
of the handwriting of the testator. By the
time the probate of the will is filed, those
familiar w/ the testator’s handwriting may Are holographic wills in letters allowed? Yes,
provided there is an intent on the part of the
no longer be alive.
testator to dispose of the property in the
letters & the 3 requisites are present.

Balane: "I give you 1/2 of my estate as provided for in


the document I kept in the safe." This is a
Real Requirements (MANDATORY): must be by the holographic will bec. the letter does not in itself
hand of the testator himself. dispose of the property.

I. Written entirely by the testator 2. Can a blind testator make a holographic will?
Yes. There is no form required. What is
If partly by the testator & partly by another person, important is the presence of the 3 requisites.
VOID
If another person wrote an additional part w/o
knowledge of the testator, the will is VALID but
the addition is VOID.
If another person wrote an additional part w/ the
knowledge of the testator, VOID.

II. Dated B. Law Governing Contents

(1) Roxas v. de Jesus. (Balane case) -- On the will,


Art. 16(2).xxx However, intestate &
the date was written as "Feb./ 61." Is it valid? Yes.
testamentary successions, both w/ respect to the
order of succession & to the intrinsic validity of

216
the testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by Each state of the union has its own private law
the national law of the person whose succession is applicable to its citizens only & in force only w/in
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the state. The California Probate Code provides
the property & regardless of the country wherein that the testator may dispose of his property by
said property may be found. xxx will in the form & manner he desires (internal
law) BUT Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California
Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by provides that the law of the testator’s domicile
the law of the nation of the decedent. governs (conflicts rule) Applying the principle of
renvoi, Art. 16 will apply. The reason being that
California internal law should be applied to its
citizens residing therein, & enforce the conflict
Bar Question
rule for citizens domiciled abroad. Hence, Helen
Q: A Filipino went abroad & acquired US has the right to demand completion of her
citizenship. She then made a will giving all her legitime.
properties to her paramour.
A: US laws will govern ESTATE OF AMOS BELLIS (A.K.A. BELLIS
VS. BELLIS)
Q: What if she was a Filipino citizen when she
executed the will but died a US citizen? FACTS: The decedent Amos Bellis was born in
A: US laws will govern.
Texas & was a citizen & resident thereof at the
time of his death. Under Texas law, there are no
forced heirs or legitimes. He executed a will in
ESTATE OF CHRISTENSEN (A.K.A. AZNAR VS. the Phils in w/c he directed that after all taxes,
GARCIA) obligations & expenses his estate shall be divided
thus: (1) $240,000 to his 1st wife; (2) P120,000
FACTS: In accordance w/ the will executed by the to his 3 illegit children, divided equally; & (3) the
decedent Edward Christensen (a US citizen but Phil remainder goes to his surviving legitimate
domiciliary) , the executor in his final account & children. The 3 illegit children filed their
project of partition, ratified the payment of P3,600 opposition to the project of partition on the
to Helen, for such amount that was bequeathed & ground that they were deprived of their legitime
devised by the testator to her. The executor then under Phil law (By the way, the illegit children are
proposed that the residue of the estate be all in the Phils)
transferred to the decedent’s daughter Lucy. Helen
opposed saying that she was deprived of her ISSUE: Texas law or Phil. law? TEXAS
legitime as the acknowledged natural child of the
decedent. The legal ground of her opposition was HELD: Texas law will apply since the decedent
that the distribution should be governed by the laws is both a citizen & a domiciliary of said state.
of the Phils. Unless there is a Texas conflicts rule applying lex
rei sitae (law of the place where the properties
ISSUE: Phil or California law? Philippine law are situated), renvoi will not apply in this case.
although the decedent is a California citizen. Read
on. Art. 16 & Art 1039 render applicable the
national law of the decedent in intestate &
HELD: As Edward was a citizen of the US & of the testamentary succession w/ regard to:
State of California at the time of his death, the order of succession
successional rights & intrinsic validity of the amount of successional rights
provisions in his will are to be governed by the laws intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will
of California. According to California law, a capacity to succeed
testator has the right to dispose of his property in
the way he desires, bec. the right of absolute In the case of Miciano vs. Brimo, the SC held
dominion over his property is sacred & inviolable. that a provision in a foreigner’s will to apply Phil
law & not the national law of the decedent is
But as provided in Art. 16 (supra), the illegal & void.
national law of the decedent applies. And so, what
is the national law? There is no single American law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions.

217
PCIB VS. ESCOLIN laws being questions of fact, & it being the
position now of PCIB that the estate of Linnie
FACTS: Charles Hodges & his wife Linnie Jane pursuant to the laws of Texas, should only be 1/2
provided mutually in their respective wills that : “I of the conjugal estate, such contention
give, devise, bequeath all … of my estate to my constitutes an admission of fact, & consequently,
beloved spouse … during his/her natural lifetime, it would be in estoppel in any further proceedings
subject to the condition that upon the death of in these cases to claim that said estate could be
whoever of them survived the other, the remainder less, irrespective of what might be proved later to
of what he or she would inherit fr. the other is be actually the provisions of the applicable laws
given, devised, & bequeathed to the brothers & of Texas.
sisters of the latter.”
AJERO VS. CA
Linnie died first & Charles became the
Executor of her estate. However, he made no FACTS: The holographic will of Annie Sand was
liquidation of Linnie’s estate. When Charles died, submitted for probate. Ajero opposed on the
Magno was appointed Administratrix of Linnie’s ground that one of the dispositions in the will
estate. PCIB was declared spl. Administrator of (house & lot) was invalid bec. the decedent was
Charles’ estate. not the sole owner thereof.

PCIB claims that the Hodges spouses were ISSUE: Can court pass upon substantial validity
both residents of the Phils & that the estate left by of a will in a probate proceeding? Yes, in certain
Linnie could not have been more than 1/2 of her cases.
share of the conjugal partnership, the other half
being the legitime of Mr. Hodges (1/4 of the HELD: In a petition to admit a holographic will,
conjugal partnership) notw/standing that she is a the only issues to be resolved are:
Texas national. WON the instrument submitted is, indeed, the
decedent’s last will & testament
Magno claims that Art. 16 of the NCC, the WON said will was executed w/ the formalities
applicable law is Texas law under w/c there is no prescribed by law
system of legitime, hence, the estate of Linnie WON the decedent had the necessary
cannot be less than her share or 1/2 of the conjugal testamentary capacity at the time the will
partnership) was executed
WON the execution of the will & its signing were
ISSUE: Philippine law or Texas law? Texas, the voluntary acts of the decedent.
although SC was not categorical
The general rule is that the probate court
HELD: The Court regrets, however, that it cannot is limited to passing upon the extrinsic validity of
decide as neither the evidence submitted by the the will. An exception : Courts are not powerless
parties nor their discussion provide a clear & to do what the situation constrains them to do, &
reliable proof of what in fact is the possibly pass upon certain provisions of the will. In the
applicable law of Texas. Elementary is the rule that CAB, the property in question is in the name of
foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of & the decedent’s father. Thus, she cannot validly
have to be proven like any other fact in dispute dispose of it since she shares it w/ her father’s
between the parties in any proceeding, w/ the rare other heirs.
exception in instances when the said laws are
already w/in the actual knowledge of the court, A reading of Art. 813 shows that its
such as when they are well & generally known or requirement affects the validity of the dispositions
they have been actually ruled upon in other cases contained in the holographic will, but not its
before it & none of the parties concerned do not probate. If the testator fails to sign & date some
claim otherwise. Case remanded to lower court to of the dispositions, the result is that these
determine Texas law. dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament
BUT NO! Whatever be the provisions void.
actually of the laws of Texas applicable hereto, the
estate of Linnie is at least 1/2 of the conjugal estate
of the spouses. The existence & effects of foreign
218
sufficient. E.g., a person w/ a college
C. Kinds degree does a will in English.

1. Holographic
Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic
Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
will w/c must be entirely written, dated, & signed by who knows the handwriting & signature of the
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no testator explicitly declare that the will & the
other form, & may be made in or out of the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If
Philippines, & need not be witnessed. the will is contested, at least three of such
witnesses shall be required.

Baviera: In the absence of any competent witness


Why should holographic wills be dated? To referred to in the preceding paragraph, & if the
know whether the testator is of disposing court deem it necessary, expert testimony may
mind at the time of the execution thereof. be resorted to.
Without the date, the will is void.
But in one case, the SC said that the date
stated in the body of the will is valid. Balane:

Requirements in the Probate of Holographic Wills:


Art. 804. Every will must be in writing &
1. Documentary Requirement
executed in a language or dialect known to the
testator. a. GENERAL RULE: The will itself
must be presented (Gan vs. Yap)

Balane: Requirements:
EXCEPTION: If there is an existing copy or
1. In writing but no specific form is required. It duplicate photostatic xerox. (Rodelas case)
could be in a marble glass or on a wall, so long as
there was testamentary capacity. b. Lost holographic wills can not be
2. Written in a language or dialect known to the probated even by the testimonies of the
testator. witnesses. The reason is that the will itself is the
only proof of its authenticity.
Suroza v. Honrado (Balane case) -- The issue here
is whether the will, w/c was written in English is 2. Testimonial Requirement
valid. The SC ruled that it is not. The testatrix
does not know English, being an Igorot & an a. Uncontested will.-- only one witness to
illiterate. Obviously, the will is void, bec. of non- identify the signature & handwriting of the
testator.
compliance w/ Art. 804. In a will, can you
conclude that it is void where in the attestation b. Contested will.-- three witnesses to identify
clause, it was stated that the will was read & the signature & handwriting of the testator.
translated to Filipino? The law does not require
translation nor interpretation of the language to the
testator but that he himself personally understands AZAOLA V. SINGSON (BALANE CASE) --
the said language.
In the case, the oppositors of the will contested
the will on the ground that it was executed
Is it necessary for a will to state that the through fraud. They, however, admitted its due
testator knew the language? No. Extrinsic/ execution. During the case, the proponent
presented only one witness to identify the
testimonial evidence may prove this.
signature & handwriting of the testator. Is one
witness sufficient considering there is an
Is direct evidence always necessary to prove oppositor to the will?
that the testator knew the language? No. Yes. The SC held that one witness is
Sometimes, circumstantial evidence is sufficient. What the law envisions is that the

219
genuineness of the handwriting & signature be HELD: Due execution & the contents of a lost or
contested. Contested holographic will refers to the destroyed holographic will cannot be proved by
challenge by the oppositors that the will is not in the the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen &
handwriting of the deceased. The oppositors in this read such will. As compared to notarial wills, HW
case did not challenge the handwriting of the
deceased. Their ground for opposing probate is no witnesses are needed provided however that
that the will was executed through fraud & the will is entirely written, dated & signed by the
improper & undue influence. Hence, the probate hand of the testator. In HW, the witnesses so
required only one witness. presented do not need to have seen the
The authenticity of the will is not execution of the HW. The loss of the HW will
contested. Therefore, the will itself, not being entail the loss of the only medium of proof. If a
contested was that of the testator. The oppositors notarial will was lost, the subscribing witnesses
here precisely admit that authenticity of the will but are available to authenticate. Moreover, in the
oppose on the ground that there is fraud or undue
case of a lost HW the witnesses would testify as
influence initiated upon her in the execution of the
will. Hence, it is uncontested. to their opinion of the handwriting w/c they
Obiter dictum: The three witness provision allegedly saw, an opinion w/c cannot be tested in
for contested holographic will is merely directory. court nor directly contradicted by the oppositors
The court upon satisfying itself of the authenticity of bec. the handwriting itself is not at hand.
the will can require one or ten witnesses. The
judge knows best. The second paragraph of Art. RODELAS VS. ARANZA
811 gives the court discretion, hence the directory
effect of the Art.-- (a) it is a matter of quality & FACTS: Marcela Rodelas sought the probate of
not quantity; (b) to require 3 witnesses, makes it
the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla. Aranza
worse than treason, w/c requires only 2 witnesses.
opposed by saying that the petitioner should
Bar Questions: have presented the holographic will itself & not a
copy thereof.
Q: Wife executes a HW w/c the husband
forged. The will was admitted in probate. Is the ISSUE: Can HW be proved w/ a copy thereof?
admission a bar to criminal liability? Yes
A: NO
HELD: If the HW has been lost or destroyed &
Q: How does one prove the existence of a lost no other copy is available, the will cannot be
will (HW)?
A: Witnesses who will testify that they saw the probated bec. the best & only evidence is the
will after the testator’s death. After w/c, present handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
secondary evidence (copy of the HW) necessary that there be a comparison between
sample handwritten statements of the testator &
Q: J executed a notarial will instituting A as his the will. BUT a photostatic copy or xerox copy of
sole heir. After a fight, J executed a HW instituting the HW may be allowed bec. comparison can be
B instead of A as his sole heir. J accidentally made w/ the standard writings of the testator.
destroyed the HW. (This was based on a footnote in Gan vs. Yap,
A: Can no longer probate the HW. You only
supra. “Perhaps it may be proved by a
have the testimony of witnesses w/c is not allowed.
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a
mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of
ESTATE OF ESGUERRA (A.K.A. GAN VS. YAP)
the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited & tested before the probate court.)
FACTS: When decedent Felicidad Yap died, Fausto
Gan initiated probate proceedings alleging that
there was a holographic will executed by the
decedent. The surviving spouse asserted that his Baviera: But first prove the existence of the
wife did not leave any will. Fausto tried to establish HW at the time of death of the testator.
the due execution & contents of the will by the Otherwise, the presumption is that the will
testimonies of witnesses. was destroyed.

ISSUE: Can HW be proved w/ witnesses only? No


KALAW VS. RELOVA

220
FACTS: Gregorio Kalaw sought the admission of the Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic
holographic will of his sister Natividad Kalaw. The will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
HW, as first written, named Rosa as her sole heir. testator himself or by the testator's name written
However, it appears that the testatrix crossed out by some other person in his presence, & by his
Rosa’s name & inserted Gregorio’s name. This express direction, & attested & subscribed by
change was initialed by Natividad. Rosa opposed three or more credible witnesses in the presence
the probate on the ground that there were of the testator & of one another.
erasures, insertion, cancellation or alterations w/c
were not authenticated by the testatrix by her full The testator or the person requested by him
signature. to write his name & the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each &
ISSUE: Will valid? NO every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, & all the pages shall be numbered
HELD: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, correlatively in letters placed on the upper part
corrections, & interlineations made by the testator of each page.
in a HW have not been noted under his signature,
the will is not invalidated as a whole, but at most The attestation shall state the number of
only w/ respect to the particular words erased, pages used upon w/c the will is written, & the
corrected or interlined. fact that the testator signed the will & every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his
However, when as in this case, the HW had name, under his express direction, in the
only one substantial provision, w/c was altered by presence of the instrumental witnesses, & that
substituting the original heir w/ another, but w/c the latter witnessed & signed the will & all the
alteration did not carry the requisite of full pages thereof in the presence of the testator & of
authentication by the full signature of the testator, one another.
the effect must be that the entire will is voided or
revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains If the attestation clause is in a language not
in the will after that w/c could remain valid. To known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
state that the will as first written should be given them.
efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind
of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither
be given effect bec. she failed to authenticate it in Balane:
the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature. Fourth Paragraph.-- Know the language

1. Body of the will.-- testator


Baviera: 2. Attestation clause
Could this not be taken as a dangerous precedent a. Testator.-- No.
whereby those who want to have the HW b. witnesses.-- No. Only required to
voided may do so in the manner provided for in know the contents thereof.
this case? YES
Distinguish Ajero & Kalaw cases: In Ajero, the HW Discrepancies
was allowed even w/ the alterations. But the
alterations in the Ajero case probably involved Par. 1.-- No mention that the testator signs in
several dispositions. (I think -chip) In Kalaw, the presence of witnesses & yet par. 3 states
the alteration involved the only single this.
substantial provision, & so the entire will was Par. 2.-- No statement that the testator & the
rendered void. Furthermore, in the Ajero case, witnesses must sign every page in one
the SC held that in probate proceedings, courts another's presence & yet that is required to
are limited to issues regarding extrinsic validity be stated in the attestation clause.
only. Par. 3.-- In case of agent, all it requires is that
the agent signed by his direction & not in his
presence, but that is required in par. 1.
2. NOTARIAL WILL
Requisites for an ordinary attested will
(notarized will.).-- Purpose of requisites:
judgment call of Code Commission; balancing of
2 policies.-- (1) to encourage a person to make a

221
will; (2) to make sure that the will is testament of testator's presence & of one
the testator to minimize fraud. another.

Signed by the testator or his agent in Q: Can the testator sign first not in the witness'
his presence & by his express presence, then let the witnesses sign? No.
direction at the end thereof & in Art. 805 requires that the testator should sign
the presence of the witnesses. at their presence (Vda. de Ramos case.)
There is some inconsistency here but we
Subscribe.-- literally means "to write one's name." have to follow Art. 805.
Sign means "to put a distinctive mark" (this is
the better term to use.) Q: Can the validity be affected if the witness
signed ahead of the testator?
Signing.-- by writing his own name; a person may A: No. Provided it is made in one occasion or
sign in other ways transaction. However, in strict theory, it can not
be done bec. before the testator signed there is
Purpose.-- to authenticate the will no will at all w/c the witnesses can sign & attest
to. If there is more than one transaction, then
Where should the testator sign? At the end of the the testator must always sign ahead of the
will. There are 2 kinds of ends: witnesses.

Physical end.-- where the writing ends Attestation --visual act; witness
Logical end.-- that where testamentary disposition Subscribing -- manual act; sign
ends.
The three witnesses must do
Usually, they are the same. But if different, both attesting & subscribing.
t hen either will do. What if after the signature,
some clauses follow? What is the effect of the said Where must witnesses sign? This is not clear.
clauses to the will? If annuls or makes the whole
void bec. of the non-compliance w/ Art. 805. Can witnesses sign w/ thumb mark? (1) Some
say Yes bec. it is only an act of
e. Testator directs another to sign his name. authentication; (2) some say no bec. one
Four cases: requirement is that witnesses must know
Testator- A; Agent- B how to read & write w/c implies that the
"B" is not valid witness write his name.
"A" handwritten "by B" typewritten is valid
"A" typewritten "by B" handwritten is not The testator or agent must sign
valid. every page except the last on
"A" is valid the left margin.

The agent must sign where the testator's Purpose.-- to prevent the disappearance of the
signature should be. pages.
Purpose of the rules: to test the "Every page except the last." Why not the last?
authenticity of the agency. It is an Bec. it will already be signed at the bottom.
added safeguard to minimize fraud. Left hand margin.-- requirement was made
when right hand was not justified when
f. Testator must sign in the presence of witnesses typed.
Four cases: Testator.-- A; Witnesses.-- B, C, D Now, testator can sign anywhere in the page.
each page is signed &
A signs w/ B breathing on her face. Is it signing in authenticated.-- mandatory
the presence of the testator? YES. left margin.-- directory.
A signs while B is talking to C. B can see A through
peripheral vision. Is A signing in B' s presence? Witnesses must sign each & every
YES page, except the last, on the left
A signs while B is talking to C w/ B's back to A. Is it margin.
signing in B's presence? YES.
B goes out & stands behind the wall. He cannot see This is the same as number 3.
A. B is also talking to F. Is a signing in B's Witnesses may sign anywhere as long as they
presence? NO. sign.

Attested & subscribed by at least 5. All pages must be numbered in


three credible witnesses in the letters on the upper part of the page.

222
Mandatory.-- there must be a method by w/c the Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged
sequence of the pages can be known; to before a notary public by the testator & the wit-
prevent an insertion or taking out of a page.
nesses. The notary public shall not be required to
b. Directory retain a copy of the will, or file another w/ the
Manner it is numbered- letters, numbers, Arabic, office of the Clerk of Court.
roman numerals, etc.; any conventional
sequence of symbols is allowed Balane:
Upper part
General rule: The notary public cannot be a
6. Attestation Clause. witness.
Exception: When there are more than 3
Three things that must be stated: witnesses. In such a case, the requisite of 3
the number of pages in the will witnesses is achieved.
the fact that the testator or his agent signed the will
in every page thereof in the presence of the Questions.
instrumental witnesses
that the instrumental witnesses witnessed & signed Q1: Can a witness be an agent who will sign for
the will & all the pages thereof in the presence the testator?
of the testator & one another. A1: (a) Yes. There is no prohibition.
No. The testator must sign before 3 witnesses.
Attestation clause is not a part of the will proper He cannot sign before himself.
bec. it contains no dispositions. It is merely To be safe, do not let this happen. As
essential for the formal requirements of a valid the lawyer, be sure you have at least
will. It is a statement of the witnesses. 3 witnesses.
Where must witnesses sign? At the bottom in order Q2: Is there any particular order of signing?
to prevent additions. A2: No. As long as the signing is done on one
occasion or one continuing transaction.
Must the language of the will be understood or Yes. If the signing is not done on one occasion
known by the witnesses? No. After all, or transaction. In such a case, there is
witnesses need not know the contents of the nothing that the witness is attesting to.
will.

Q: Is it required that the witnesses knew the


language of the attestation clause: Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery,
A: No. So long as it has been interpreted to them. or fraud, or undue & improper pressure &
influence, defects & imperfections in the form of
Q: Must the testator know the language of the attestation or in the language used therein shall
attestation clause? not render the will invalid if it is proved that the
A: No. What is required of the testator is to know
will was in fact executed & attested in substantial
the language of the will. An express requirement of
Art. 804. compliance w/ all the requirements of article 805.

Reason for the above rules: In order to


minimize fraud. The very purpose of Art. 804 & Balane:
805. The law encourages not discourages will
making. Precisely bec. it wanted to encourage wills. This is a liberalization rule, an attempt to
It sets up safeguards to protect the will. liberalize Articles 804 to 808. Substantial
compliance w/ Articles 805 & 806 will validate the
Must the testator sign the attestation clause? No. will despite some defects in the attestation
clause.
Q: Must an attested will be dated?
A: No. Lack of date does not annul an attested Looking at Art. 809, you get the
will. But a holographic will must be dated. (Art. impression of utmost liberalization. We can not
810.) determine how liberal we can be or can we go.
This article does not give a clear rule. JBL Reyes
Notarization.-- A will is a public instrument that is & Tolentino suggest that you make a distinction.
why it must notarized.

223
Guide: If the defect is something that can be deceased inside her room & later brought out by
remedied by the visual examination of the will itself, the husband of Velenzona to be signed in the
liberalize. If not, then you have to be strict. presence of witnesses.
Illustration: If in an attestation clause, the number
of pages used was not stated, then you can Held: The will is null & void. The attestation
liberalize bec. by examining the will itself, you can clause failed to state that the testatrix signed the
detect the defect. This is bec. the pagination of will & every page thereof or caused her name to
statement in the attestation clause is merely a be signed thereon in her presence, in the
double check. presence of witnesses & that the witnesses
signed the will & every page thereof in the
If the attestation clause failed to state that presence of the testatrix & of each & every one
"the testator signed in the presence of witnesses," of them. These omissions are substantial
& this can not be remedied by visual examination of
sufficient to invalidate the will.
the will, then you need to be strict.

Suggested amendment of the law: "If such CAGRO VS. CAGRO


defect & imperfections can be supplied by
examination of the will itself & it is proved." Facts. In the case, the page where the
attestation clause appears was signed by the
: witnesses on the side & not after the attestation
CRUZ VS. VILLASOR clause.

Facts: A last will & testament of Valente Cruz was Held: This was a fatal defect. The logic is that if
submitted for probate w/ the CFI of Cebu. Agapita there had been no signature at the bottom but
Cruz, the surviving spouse opposed the allowance on the sides, there will be ample room for fraud,
of the will on several grounds including, that of the that is, to add in the attestation clause upon the
3 instrumental witness to the will, one of them, is at death of the decedent an essential matter w/c
the same time the Notary Public before whom the was not there in the first place to validate it.
will was supposed to have been acknowledged.
RODRIGUEZ VS. YAP
Held: The last will & testament was not executed
in accordance w/ law. The notary public before Facts: The will of the deceased Ylanan has an
whom the will was acknowledged cannot be attestation clause w/c states that:
considered as the 3rd instrumental witness since he this is the last will of the deceased
cannot acknowledge before himself his having that said will is composed of two pages
signed the will. inasmuch as the deceased does not know how to
write, upon her direction, her name was
Consequently, if the 3rd witness were the signed by another in her presence & of her
notary public himself, he would have to avow, witnesses
assent, or admit his having signed the will in front that the name of the deceased was signed in all
of himself. This cannot be done bec. he cannot split the pages
his personality into two so that one will appear that the witnesses signed this will in the presence
before the other to acknowledge his participation in of the testatrix & in the presence of each &
the making of the will. To permit such situation to every one in Cebu on 27 Jan. ’26
obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
Held: Will is valid for it substantially complied w/
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF the formal requirements. The attestation clause
FILOMENA BERMOY states ( c ) that, as the testatrix did not know
how to writer, her name was written by another
Facts: The will sought for probate here was under her direction & in her presence & that of
written in Visayan dialect, composed of three pages, her witnesses. While not so stated, this can only
dated in 1942 & thumbmarked by Bermoy & signed refer to the foot of the will, & not to the margin
by her 3 witnesses. The attestation clause was of the pages bec. there is added in ( b ) that the
signed by another set of 3 witnesses. name of the testatrix was written in all pages.

The notary public who prepared the will The AC also states that the witnesses
testified that the thumbmarks were affixed by the signed the will in the presence of the testatrix &
224
of each other. While it is also stated that these GUEVARA VS. GUEVARA
signatures were written on the left margin of the
pages of the will, it should be understood in view of Facts (relevant to the case): On Sept. 27, 1933,
the fact that these witnesses only signed on the left Vic Guevara died but his will was not filed for
margin of the pages of the will, for otherwise it probate. Four months later, a certain Rose
would not be a fact that they signed the will. claiming to be his recognized natural child
brought suit against Ernie (one of Vic’s children)
IN RE: ESTATE OF SAGUINSIN claiming a portion of the lot w/c was sold to the
latter by the deceased prior to his death. The SC
Facts: This involves the will of Saguinsin. ruled in favor of Ernie & ordered the parties to
present the will for proper probate. Rose
Held: The court declared the will to be invalid. commenced an action for the probate of the will
The AC did not state the number of pages upon w/c on 5 October 1945.
the will was written Neither was the signature w/c
guarantees the genuineness of the testament Held: The petition for probate of the will was
placed on the left hand margin of each page nor not barred by the statute of limitations. Reason
was each page numbered by letter in the upper & precedent reject the applicability of the statute
part. The witnesses who must sign all pages of the of limitations to probate proceedings bec. the
document did not sign the 2nd page. same are established not exclusively in the
interest of the heirs, but primarily for the
ESTATE OF BARRIOSO VS. JAVELLANA protection of the testator’s expressed wishes, w/c
are entitled to respect as a consequence of his
Facts: A purported will & codicil of the deceased ownership & right of disposition. Inasmuch as
were allowed probate. This was vigorously the probate of wills is required by public policy,
contested by the executrix stating several grounds the state could not have intended to defeat the
including, that the AC failed to state that the same by applying there to the statute of
witnesses signed each & every one of the three limitations of action.
pages of the testament.

Held: The will & the codicil were valid. Several SC ii. PRETERITION
decisions were imbued w/ a more liberal spirit
upheld the doctrine that literal conformity w/ the
language of the AC, as prescribed by the statute, is Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one,
not required, It is sufficient that fr. the language some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
employed, it can be reasonably deduced that the AC line, whether living at the time of the execution
fulfils what the law expects of it. of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the
In the CAB, the attestation clause recites devisees & legacies shall be valid insofar as they
that the testatrix signed on the left hand margin of are not inofficious.
pages 1 & 2 & at the foot of the 3 rd page in the
presence of the witnesses, When later on the If the omitted compulsory heirs should die
clause says that the witnesses “signed as before the testator, the institution shall be
instrumental witnesses” it means that the witness effectual, w/o prejudice to the right to
signed on the pages & at the places where the representation.
testatrix signed, bec. when a person signs as a
witness his signature must be in the same place &
on the same page where the testatrix stamped her Balane:
signature, i.e. on the left hand margin. So it
appears fr. the codicil that the witnesses also signed A. Clarification:
on the left hand margin of pages 1 & 2 & at the foot
of page 3. The defect lies in the failure of the "Whether living at the time of the execution of
drafter of the codicil to follow the language of the the will or born after the death of the
statute, his failure to expressly point out a fact, w/c testator." This does not cover all the
however, may be reasonably inferred fr. the AC as a possibilities. What about those born after the
whole. execution of the will but before the death of

225
the testator? Art. 854 also covers them, just an
oversight. Effect of preterition.-- "Annul the
institution of heir but devises & legacies
Extends protection only to "compulsory heirs in the shall be valid insofar as they are not
direct line." Is this redundant? Aren't inofficious." -- Abrogate, set aside,
compulsory heirs in the direct line? No. eliminate, cancel.
Spouses are compulsory heirs not in the direct
line. Effect of preterition (of parents) when there are
So what is the remedy of the wife who has been no devises or legacies (Nuguid case)-- whole
omitted? Demand her legitime. will is considered inexistent.
Compulsory heirs in the direct line cover only
ascendants & descendants. If there are devises or legacies.-- Set aside only
the institution of heirs but not the institution
Preterition.-- "praeter" means "to go of devisees & legatees. If the devise &
beyond" -- not enough to know the legacy exceed the free portion, decrease the
meaning. devise & legacy.

Who is a person preterited? Manresa.-- "Complete E.g., Testator has son, A. His will states
omission fr. the will" -- Wrong! Why? It "I give 1/2 of my estate to A & P300,000 to N."
presupposes that if mentioned in the will, then The estate is worth P600,000. How much will
the heir is not preterited. However, whether each get? N gets 300,000. A gets the other
you are mentioned in the will or not has no 300,000. M gets nothing.
effect on the preterition.
E. Criticism
Illustrations:
1. Why not extend the application to the wife?
I have a son, A. The will states "I give 1/2 to B." A 2. Why distinguish between heir & devisee &
is not preterited bec. he gets the other half. legatee?
I have a son, A. The will states "I give 1/3 to B &
1/3 to C." A is not preterited bec. he gets the NOTE: This is the only case where it is important
other 1/3. His legitime, however, is impaired. to know the distinction between heir, on the one
I have a son, A. The will states "I give 1/2 to B, 1/2 hand, & devisee & legatee on the other.
to B, & to A, all my love." A, even if mentioned
in the will, was preterited. Balane: This is not a case of preterition. This is
a case of completion of legitime.
Preterition occurs if the heir receives
nothing fr. the inheritance by way of testamentary
disposition, devise, legacy, intestacy, or donation ESCUIN VS ESCUIN
inter vivos.
Facts: Emilio Antonio Escuin executed a will
Situations
stating that he has no lawful descendants but in
Heir is mentioned but nothing is left to him-- Heir is case he has a duly successor, his child will be his
preterited if he receives nothing by intestacy. sole & universal heir. But, if there should be no
Heir is instituted in the will but the part she is such heir, then his father & his wife would be his
instituted in is less than her legitime.-- There is universal heirs. The trial court partitioned the
no preterition. properties among the wife, the father, & the
natural child, Emilio Escuin y Batac. But, alas,
Definition of preterition.-- Preterition happens the natural child wants all, hence, this case.
when the compulsory heirs in the direct line are
totally omitted fr. the inheritance, that is the
Held: The share of the recognized natural child
heir got nothing by way of testamentary
disposition, donation, legacy, devise or is only 1/3 of the estate. While the natural child
intestacy. was ignored by his father in his will, the
designation of the heirs was annulled by force of
Who can be preterited? law. However, it is clear & unquestionable that it
was the wish of the testator to favor his natural
Legitimate children-- Yes. father & his wife w/ certain portions of his
Illegitimate children-- Yes. The law makes no property w/c, under the law, he had the right to
distinction. dispose of by will,, as he has done provided the
Parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate.-- Yes.
legal portion of the general heir was not

226
impaired, the two others (wife & husband) being Facts: Rosario Nuguid died. Her sister,
considered as LEGATEES under the will. Remedios, filed in court a purported holographic
will of Rosario executed 11 years before her
The testamentary provisions impairing the demise & leaving all her properties to Remedios.
legal portion of a general heir shall be reduced in so Naturally, the parents of the deceased opposed.
far as they are illegal or excessive.
Held: There was preterition for the will
completely omits the parents of Rosario. Entire
ELEAZAR VS. ELEAZAR will & not just the institution of the heir was void.
Reduction of the inheritance of the universal heir
Facts: The deceased omitted in his last will & & not the annulment of the entire bequest will
testament his legitimate father, the appellant, result in complete abrogation of Arts. 814 & 815
expressly disinherited his lawful wife, & instituted of the New Civil Code. Considering in this case
the appellee, Miguela Eleazar, as his universal heir. that the will before us solely provides for the
The trial court gave dad ½ & Miguela the other institution of petitioner as universal heir, &
half. nothing more, the result is the same. The entire
will is null.
Held: There was preterition. The will, in so far as
it deprives the legitimate father of his legal portion BALANAY VS. MARTINEZ
is null & void, but is valid w/ respect to the other
half w/c the testator could freely dispose of & w/c Facts: Felix Balanay Jr. filed a petition for the
should be considered as a legacy. probate of his mother’s notarial will. Felix Sr. &
Avelina (kapatid ni Felix Jr.) opposed the
NERI VS. ESCUTIN probate. Later, Felix Sr. w/drew his opposition &
signed an instrument where he manifested that
Facts: The testator left all his property by universal out of respect for his wife’s will, he waived &
title to the children by his second marriage. Without renounced his hereditary rights in her estate in
expressly disinheriting his children by his first favor of their 6 children. He likewise signified his
marriage, he left nothing to them. In the said will, conformity to the partition scheme.
however, he stated that the children by his first
marriage already received their shares in his Held: The will therefore may be probated. The
property excluding what he had given them as aid renunciation of Felix Sr.’s hereditary rights in
during their financial troubles & the money they had favor of their 6 children does not have the effect
borrowed fr. him w/c he condoned in his will. of preteriting him. It is the preterition of
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
Held: The findings of the CA showed that the at the time of the execution of the will or born
properties of the deceased has remained intact & so after the death of the testator, w/c shall annul
no portion thereof has been given to the children of the institution of the heir. In the CAB, preterited
the first marriage. In w/c case, there is preterition heir is the surviving spouse who even signified his
resulting to the annulment of the institution of heirs conformity to the will’s provisions & renounced
& declare total intestacy according to Art. 814. his hereditary rights. While he can renounce his
testamentary share, his legitime must be
The annulment of the institution of heirs in respected.
cases of preterition does not always carry w/ it the
ineffectiveness of the whole will. If, aside fr. the SOLANO VS. CA
institution of heirs, there ate in the will provisions
leaving to the heirs so instituted or to other persons Facts: This case made a wrong decision. It
some specific properties in the form of legacies or made the effect of preterition the reduction of the
mejoras, such testamentary provisions shall be share of the instituted heir rather than annulling
effective & the legacies or mejoras shall be the whole institution of heir.
respected in so far as they are not inofficious or (Pwedeng magtanong? Asan yong ruling 
excessive. Obiter Master)

NUGUID VS. NUGUID ACAIN VS. IAC

227
Facts: The case is petition for the probate of DEATH OF INSTITUTED HEIR BEFORE
Anemesio Acain’s will. The will provided that TESTATOR
Nemesio’s shares in his conjugal property shall be
given to his brother & should the latter predecease
him, to Segundo’s children. Art. 856. A voluntary heir who dies before
Held: In the CAB, only the adopted daughter has the testator transmits nothing to his heirs.
been preterited & not the widow. Preterition
consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the A compulsory heir who dies before the
forced heirs or anyone of them either bec. they are testator, a person incapacitated to succeed, &
not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, are one who renounces the inheritance, shall transmit
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly no right to his own heirs except in cases ex-
disinherited. Since the widow is not an heir in the pressly provided for in this Code.
ascending or descending line, she is not subject to
preterition.
Balane:
Distinguished fr. Disinheritance Without
Cause. Kind of Pre Incapacit Renunciati
Heir deceas y on
Art. 918. Disinheritance w/o a specification of e
the cause, or for a cause the truth of w/c, if Compul- TN TN TN
contradicted, is not proved, or w/c is not one of sory Rep Rep No Rep
those set forth in this Code, shall annul the Voluntary TN TN TN
institution of heirs in so far as it may prejudice the No Rep No Rep No Rep
person disinherited; but the devises & legacies & Intestate TN TN TN
Rep Rep No Rep
other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to
such extent as will not impair the legitime.
Legend: TN-- Transmits Nothing
Rep.-- There is Representation
Distinguished fr. Art. 906. No rep.-- There is no representation.

Art. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the Observations:


testator has left by any title less than the legitime
There is no transmission of any right fr. an heir to
belonging to him may demand that the same be his own heirs for any of the three cases (P, I
fully satisfied. & R.) There is no exception.

For voluntary, there is no representation, no


IN RE ESTATE OF CHRISTENSEN matter what the reason for disqualification is

For renunciation, there is no representation, no


Facts: When Edward died, he left a will wherein he matter what kind of heir.
gave bequeathed P3,600 to Maria Helen & the
remainder of his estate to Lucy. Later, it was
judicially declared the Maria Helen was Edward’s
III. FIDEICOMMISARY SUBSTITUTION
daughter.

Held: There was no preterition. Preterition is the


omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming Art. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by
him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, virtue of w/c the fiduciary or first heir instituted is
etc., by not instituting him as heir w/o disinheriting entrusted w/ the obligation to preserve & to
him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the
the properties. In the CAB, Art. 815 applied, & the inheritance, shall be valid & shall take effect,
heir could not ask that the institution of the heir be provided such substitution does not go beyond
annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be one degree fr. the heir originally instituted, &
completed. provided, further, that the fiduciary or first heir &
the second heir are living at the time of the death
of the testator.

228
Balane: Balane disagrees w/ Tolentino that there
can be no successive fideicommissaries or several
Four Elements of a Fideicommissary transmissions. If this is allowed, chaos will result
Substitution: if the fideicommissaries die. You will not know
who will get the property & that the property may
There must be a first heir or fiduciary. be tied up for centuries..

For the substitution to operate, the first heir


receives property, either upon the death of the Art. 864. A fideicommissary substitution can
testator or upon the fulfillment of any suspensive never burden the legitime.
condition imposed by the will. As distinguished fr. a
simple substitution where the second heir receives
property only upon default of the first heir. First
heir does not receive the property. Balane: In fact, no testamentary disposition can
burden the legitime bec. legitime is transmitted
An absolute obligation is imposed upon the fiduciary by operation of law upon the death of the
to preserve & to transmit to a second heir the testator.
property at a given time.

Essence of a fideicommissary substitution-- dual Art. 865. Every fideicommissary substitution


obligation. must be expressly made in order that it may be
"Given time."-- Provided by the testator; if not,
valid.
then it is understood that the period is the
lifetime of the fiduciary.
Scaevola.-- Characterized the situation as a legacy The fiduciary shall be obliged to deliver the
or devise of the residue. inheritance to the second heir, w/o other
deductions than those w/c arise fr. legitimate
There is a second heir who must be one degree fr. expenses, credits & improvements, save in the
the first heir. case where the testator has provided otherwise.
"One generation." Does it refer to the degree of
relationship or number of substitution? It refers
to the degree of relationship. See Palacios v. Balane:
Ramirez.
There are 2 ways of making a fideicommissary
However, fideicommissary substitutions are substitution:
also limited to one transmission. Upon the lapse of By naming it.-- "I institute A to 1/2 of my estate,
time for the first heir, he transmits the property to & by way of fideicommissary substitution, I
the second heir. They cannot be any more institute B as his substitute."
fideicommissary substitution coming fr. the same By imposing upon the fiduciary the obligation to
testator. In other words, there can only be one preserve & transmit.-- "I institute A to 1/2 of
fideicommissary transmission such that after the my estate & impose upon him the obligation
first, there can be no second fideicommissary to preserve & to transmit the same to B upon
substitution. his return."

The first & second heir must both be living &


qualified at the time of the death of the Art. 866. The second heir shall acquire a right
testator. to the succession fr. the time of the testator's
From the moment of the death of the testator, the death, even though he should die before the
rights of the first & second heir are vested. fiduciary. The right of the second heir shall pass
(look at Art. 866.) to his heirs.
Nature of right of first heir.-- Similar to usufruct.--
Possessory & enjoyment rights w/o right to
alienate. Balane: This relates to the fourth requisite of
fideicommissary.
If fiduciary is able to register the property At the time of the testator's death, right
in his name, fideicommissary should annotate his of the first & second heir become vested.
claim on the land on the title to protect himself
against any alienations in favor of innocent third
parties.
229
Art. 867. The following shall not take effect: be w/in one degree. But it cannot extend beyond
the second recipient.
(1) Fideicommissary substitutions w/c are not Dummy provision. This is usually used as a
made in an express manner, either by giving them means to circumvent some prohibition of law.
this name, or imposing upon the fiduciary the
absolute obligation to deliver the property to a Example, Prohibition of giving to
second heir; paramour
(2) Provisions w/c contain a perpetual
prohibition to alienate, & even a temporary one, A has a paramour X. A gets B as a
beyond the limit fixed in article 863; dummy. Because of the prohibition of giving to a
paramour, they agree between themselves that A
(3) Those w/c impose upon the heir the charge
will leave to B a devise & fr. its profits B will give
of paying to various persons successively, beyond X. So A pretends to name B as heir. But in
the limit prescribed in article 863, a certain income reality, such institution is for the benefit of X.
or pension;
(4) Those w/c leave to a person the whole or In such a case, the institution will not benefit X.
part of the hereditary property in order that he may Even if X shows a written agreement bet. A & B,
apply or invest the same according to secret it cannot be enforced bec. it is contrary to law.
instructions communicated to him by the testator. As regards B, he can keep the inheritance even if
he double-crosses A. A instituted B at his own
risk that he may be double-crossed by B. Too
bad for X.
Balane:

Reasons why they will not take effect:


Art. 868. The nullity of the fideicommissary
Relate to Art. 865, par. 1. It will not take effect as substitution does not prejudice the validity of the
a fideicommissary substitution but may take institutions of the heirs first designated; the
effect as something else. fideicommissary clause shall simply be considered
as not written.
This is not a fideicommissary but a prohibited
institution.
Perpetual prohibition will freeze the property w/c is
against public policy. Balane:
Temporary prohibition is allowed but cannot go
beyond the limit in Art. 863-- limit is the death The nullity of the fideicommissary substitution will
of the fiduciary. Cannot prohibit alienation not affect validity of institution of the first heir.
beyond the death of the fiduciary. When the
property goes to the second heir, there is no E.g., "I hereby institute A to 1/3 of my
more prohibition. estate under obligation to preserve & to transmit
the same to B upon his death."
Commentators say that it refers to Art. 870
rather than Art. 863. They contend that the limit is If institution of B is invalid, what will happen to
20 yrs. In such a case, the contention is valid if you the institution of A? Valid. Institution of A is
do not make it applicable to substitutions. valid w/o substitution.
If the institution of A is invalid, what will happen
Q: If you prohibit for 30 yrs., what will happen? to the institution of B? The law does not
A: There are 2 answers. provide. Think about it.
The whole period is void.
Only the first 20 years is valid. (Balane agrees w/
this.) Art. 869. A provision whereby the testator
leaves to a person the whole or part of the
Attempt to circumvent one degree limitation of
inheritance, & to another the usufruct, shall be
fideicommissary substitution.
valid. If he gives the usufruct to various persons,
E.g., "I give 1/3 of my estate to X & impose not simultaneously, but successively, the
upon him the obligation to give a P5,000 pension to provisions of article 863 shall apply.
A & in A's death, to A's son." This is allowed. But if Balane:
this is extended to the son of the son of A, then it
won't be allowed. The first & second recipient must This is similar to Art. 867, par. 3

230
Example, "I give to A naked ownership, & to B the that should the latter die, whether this occurs
usufruct & upon B's death, to his son C." This is before or after that of the testatrix, the property
valid. W/in the limit of Art. 863. If it goes to the bequeathed to her shall be delivered in equal
son of the son of B, then it is invalid. parts to the testatrix’s three brothers, & or to
their forced heirs should anyone one of them die
Note: Just as there can be a substitution w/ regard
to the usufruct, there can also be a substitution w/ ahead of Consolacion.
regard to the naked ownership.
Held: The substitution here is a substitucion
vulgar. The substitution provided is not expressly
Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator
made to be of the fideicommissary kind. Nor
declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for
does it contain a clear statement to the effect
more than twenty years are void.
that Consolacion, during her lifetime, shall only
enjoy the usufructuary rights over the property
Balane: This has nothing to do w/ substitution. It
bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof
refers to simple institution of heir, devisee or
legatee. being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. It
merely provides that upon C’s death –whether
Q: Can it go beyond 20 yrs.? this happens before or after that of the testatrix –
A: There are 2 answers. her share shall belong to the brothers of the
No. The whole period is void. testatrix.
No. But valid only for the first 20 years.

Distinguished fr. resolutory


PEREZ VS. GARCHITORENA conditional substitution

Facts: Ana Maria Alcantara died. She left a certain


sum of money to her niece, Carmen. A certain
Art. 867 (1), Art. 866 par. 1, 863, supra
Garchitorena obtained judgment of a sum of money
against Carmen’s husband. The sheriff levied an
attachment on the money given by Ana Maria w/c
was deposited w/ La Urbana. PCIB VS. ESCOLIN

Held: The will instituted Carmen’s children as Facts: In the case, the spouses executed
fideicommissary heirs of the testatrix Ana Maria. reciprocal wills. It provided that the share in the
Thus, said deposit, w/c was part of the inheritance conjugal assets will pass to the surviving spouse
does not belong to Carmen, not can the same be & that the surviving spouse can do whatever he
the subject of execution of the judgment against or she wants w/ the inheritance, even sell it, & if
Carmen’s husband who is not one of the there is any residue fr. the inheritance fr. the
fideicommissary heirs. other spouse upon the death of the surviving
spouse, it shall pass to the brothers & sisters of
Distinguished fr. Simple Substitution the spouse who first died. The wife died first.
The husband did not liquidate the conjugal assets
bec. he was the sole heir of his wife. Upon the
Art. 857. Substitution is the appointment of
husband's death, it is now questioned whether
another heir so that he may enter into the
there is any residue fr. the wife's estate that
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted.
could pass to her brothers & sisters. PCIB, (&
the) administratrix of the husband claims that:
Art. 858 Substitution of heir may be:
(1) There was no fideicommissary substitution
Simple or common;
bec. there was no obligation upon the husband to
Brief or compendious;
preserve & transmit the prop. to the brothers &
Reciprocal; or
sisters of the wife as seen in his authority to sell
Fideicommissary.
the property, & (2) since there was an invalid
attempt to make a substitution, then the
testamentary disposition is void & there can be
CRISOLOGO VS. SINGSON no transmission of rights to the brothers &
sisters.
Facts: Dna. Singson died single. She gave her
property to Consolacion Florentino w/ the condition
231
Held: The SC agreed w/ contention no. 1 on the
same ground. The second requisite was absent & Only the legitime is reserved. The free portion
there could be no fideicommissary substitution. may be disposed of by will.
With regard to the second contention, the SC
E.g., A is married to B. They had a child C. A
disagreed. The SC said there was a simultaneous
owns lot worth P5M.
substitution. The institution of the husband was
subject to a resolutory condition while the institution A sells the lot to D for P5M. This is valid. The
of the brothers & sisters was subject to a prohibition does not cover an onerous
suspensive condition. Both conditions are one & disposition bec. this involves an exchange of
the same. It is the existence in the husband's values.
estate of assets he received fr. his wife at the time A donates to D. This is not valid if it impairs the
of his death. If there is, the husband's right to the legitime of B & C.
residue is extinguished upon his death while the
right of the brothers & sisters vests at the same
time. Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

RAMIREZ VS. RAMIREZ (1) Legitimate children & descendants, w/


respect to their legitimate parents & ascendants;
Facts: In the case, 2/3 of the usufruct of the free (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate
portion was given to Wanda, w/ 2 other persons not parents & ascendants, w/ respect to their
related to her as her substitutes by way of simple & legitimate children & descendants;
fideicommissary substitution. Her grandnephews (3) The widow or widower;
object on the ground that there could be no (4) Acknowledged natural children, & natural
fideicommissary substitution bec. the substitutes children by legal fiction;
were not w/in one degree of each other. (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in
article 287.
Held: The SC agreed w/ the nephews. It said,
quoting Tolentino, that one degree refers to one Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 & 5
generation. As such, the fideicommissary can only are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 & 2; neither
be either a parent or child of the fiduciary. do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their


v. LEGITIME filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children


Art. 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit fr.
property w/c he cannot dispose of bec. the law has them in the manner & to the extent established
reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, by this Code.
called compulsory heirs.

Balane:
Balane:
There are Five (5) kinds of Compulsory
There is compulsion on the part of the testator to heirs:
reserve that part of the estate w/c corresponds Legitimate children & descendants
to the legitime. Legitimate parents & ascendants
The law sets a fractional portion of the estate aside Widow or widower
for the compulsory heirs. Acknowledged natural children, & natural children
The law does not specify w/c prop. to reserve but by legal fiction
only sets aside a fractional portion of the estate. Other illegitimate children
There is no obligation on the compulsory heirs to
accept. Under the Family Code, there is no more
distinction between acknowledged natural
The prohibition imposed on the testator is that he is children & illegitimate children. They are all
prohibited fr. making gratuitous disposition: (a) considered as illegitimate.
testamentary disposition mortis causa; (b)
donation inter vivos
232
Three Kinds of Relationship Among Illegitimate children -- 4/5 of the share
Compulsory Heirs: of a
natural child. (Art. 895, par. 2.)
Primary.-- Legitimate children, & in their absence, Surviving spouse -- 1/4 (Art. 892, par.
legitimate descendants. 1.)
They are primary bec. they are absolutely preferred,
& they exclude the secondary. NOTE: All concurring heirs get their share fr. the
free portion. The surviving spouse will be
Secondary.-- Legitimate parents, & in their preferred over the natural & illegitimate children,
absence, legitimate ascendants whose share may suffer reduction pro rata. (Art.
They inherit only in the absence of default of the 895, last par.)
primary.
Legitimate children -- 1/2, in equal portions.
Concurring.-- Surviving spouse & illegitimate (Art. 888.)
children. They get their legitime together w/ Natural children -- 1/2 of the share of a
the primary or secondary heirs. legitimate child. (Art. 895, par. 1.)
Neither exclude primary or secondary heirs
nor each other. Illegitimate children -- 4/5 of the share
of a
Except: Illegitimate children exclude illegitimate natural child. (Art. 895, par. 2.)
parents. Surviving spouse -- share equal to that
of a
legitimate child. (Art. 892, par.
Articles 888 to 903. Different Combinations 2, 897, 898.)

I. According to Tolentino (all shares are w/ respect Legitimate parents -- 1/2, whether they survive
to the whole estate unless otherwise provided.) alone or w/ concurring compulsory heirs.
(Art. 889.)
Legitimate children 1/2, in equal portions, whether
they survive alone or w/ concurring compulsory Legitimate parents -- 1/2 (Art. 889.)
heirs. (Art. 888.) Natural children -- 1/4, in equal shares.
(Art.
One legitimate child -- 1/2 (Art. 888.) Surviving 896.)
spouse -- 1/4 (Art. 892, par. 1.)
Legitimate parents -- 1/2 (Art. 889.)
Legitimate children -- 1/2, in equal portions (Art. Illegitimate children -- 1/4, in equal shares
888.) (Art.
Surviving spouse -- share equal to that of 896.)
each child (Art. 892, par. 2.)
Legitimate parents -- 1/2 (Art. 889.)
Legitimate children -- 1/2, in equal portions. (Art. Natural children -- 1/4 (Art. 896) but
888.) each illegitimate child gets 4/5 of the share of
Natural children -- 1/2 the share of each each natural child (Art. 895 par. 2)
legitimate child (Art. 895, par. 1.) Illegitimate children

Legitimate children -- 1/2, in equal portions. (Art. Legitimate parents -- 1/2 (Art 889.)
888.) Surviving spouse -- 1/4 (Art. 893.)
Illegitimate children -- 2/5 the share of each
legitimate child (Art. 895, par. Legitimate parents -- 1/2 (Art. 889.)
2.) Natural children -- 1/4 (Art. 896) but each
illegitimate child gets 4/5 of the share of
Legitimate children -- 1/2, in equal portions. each natural child. (Art. 895, par. 2)
Natural children -- 1/2 of the share of a Illegitimate children
legitimate child. (Art. 895, par. 1.) Surviving spouse -- 1/8 (Art. 899.)
Illegitimate children -- 4/5 of the share of
each Natural &/ or illegitimate children -- all together
natural child. (Art. 895, par. 2.) get 1/2 (Art. 901.) If all natural or all
illegitimate, dived the portion equally.
One legitimate child -- 1/2 (Art. 888.)
Natural children -- 1/2 of the share of a If some are natural & others illegitimate,
legitimate child. (Art. 895, par. 1.) each of the illegitimate child gets only 4/5 of the
share of each natural child. (Art. 895, par. 2.)

233
Natural &/ or illegitimate children -- 1/3 (Art. 894.), SS -- 1/4
dividing it as in number 15. 4 illeg. children -- 1/2 of the share of a leg. child
Surviving spouse -- 1/3 (Art. 894.) =
1/8 each
Surviving spouse alone -- 1/2 or 1/3 if the 2 leg. children -- 1/2 shared equally = 1/4
marriage is in articulo mortis & the deceased each
dies w/in 3 months after the marriage. (Art. If it exceeds the estate, ratably diminish the
900.) legitime of the illeg. children = 1/16

Illegitimate parents (natural or otherwise) alone -- 2 illeg. parents -- 1/4 shared equally
1/2 (Art. 903.) SS -- 1/4

Illegitimate parents -- none. (Art. 903.) 2 leg. children -- 1/2 shared equally
Children or any class -- same as in nos. 1, 4, 6 SS -- share equal to 1 leg. child = 1/4
& leg. parents -- none
15, as the case may be.
1 adopted child -- \ 1/2 shared
Illegitimate parents -- 1/4 1 leg. child ------- / equally
Surviving spouse -- 1/4 (Art. 903.) SS -- 1/4

SS -- 1/4
II. According to Balane (all shares are w/ Illeg. parents -- none
respect to the whole estate unless otherwise 1 adopted child -- 1/2
provided.)
SS alone -- 1/2 except if the marriage is in
2 legitimate children -- 1/2 shared equally = 1/4 articulo mortis, in w/c case the share is 1/3
each a. Marriage is in articulo mortis
Surviving spouse (hereinafter SS) -- 1/4 b. Dies w/in 3 months
c. Not lived together for 5 years
5 Legitimate children -- 1/2 shared equally = d. Person who dies is the sick spouse
1/10
SS -- same share as in legitimate child = 1 adopted child -- 1/2
1/10 illeg. child -- 1/2 of the share of an adopted child
= 1/4
OBSERVE: There is an inverse proportion between
number of children & the share of the SS. 8 leg. children -- 1/2 shared equally = 1/16

1 leg. child -- 1/2 1 illeg. child -- 1/2 of the share of a leg. child =
SS -- 1/4 1/32
SS -- same as the share of 1 leg. child = 1/16
General rule: SS gets share equal to 1 leg. child.
Exception: If only 1 leg. child, SS gets 1/4 8 leg. children --\ 1/2 shared
equally
2 leg. parents -- 1/2 shared equally 1 adopted child - / = 1/18 each
SS -- 1/4 1 illeg. child -- 1/2 of the share of a leg. child =
1/36
2 leg. parents -- 1/2 shared equally SS -- same share as 1 leg. child = 1/18
SS -- 1/8
1 illeg. child -- 1/4 1 leg. parent -- 1/2
SS -- 1/8
2 leg. parents -- 1/2 shared equally 1 illeg. child -- 1/4
3 illeg. children -- 1/4 shared equally
1 leg. parent -- 1/2
2 illeg. parents -- none SS -- 1/4
3 illeg. children -- 1/2 shared equally
1 leg. parent -- 1/2
1 adopted child -- 1/2 1 illeg. child -- 1/4
2 leg. parents -- none.
1 adopted child -- \ 1/2 shared equally
SS -- 1/3 1 leg. child ------- / = 1/4
4 illeg. children -- 1/3 shared equally SS -- same share as a leg. child = 1/4

234
1 illeg. child -- 1/2 share of leg. child = 1/8 change to make a will. If given a chance, he
2 leg. or illeg. parents -- none could have named other people.

1 adopted child -- 1/2


SS -- 1/4
1 illeg. child -- 1/4
Art. 888. The legitime of legitimate children &
2 leg. or illeg. parents -- none
descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
Under the Family Code: estate of the father & of the mother.

If the decedent died before the Family Code took The latter may freely dispose of the
effect -- leg. : natural : illeg. = 10 : 5 : 4 remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate
children & of the surviving spouse as hereinafter
If the decedent died after the FC took effect -- leg. provided.
: illeg. = 2 : 1. Do not distinguish between natural
& spurious.

(conc)urring fraction -- 1/2 -- called basic Balane:


legitime
If there are legitimate children, they will get
In most cases, there will be a group or single heir collective legitime of 1/2 of the estate. It does
who will get 1/2 of the estate. not say how they will divide the legitime.
Commentators agree that they will divide the 1/2
Exceptions: equally regardless of age, sex, marriage of origin
(whether 1st, 2nd, etc.)
Art. 894. -- Illeg. children (1/3) & SS (1/3)
Art. 903. -- Illeg. parents (1/4) & SS (1/4) Why descendants? Rule: Nearer excludes more
Articles 900 -- SS alone in case of marriage in remote.
articulo mortis w/ the following requisites: If there are children, they will exclude
the more remote descendants, e.g.,
a. Marriage in articulo mortis grandchildren
b. The spouse dies w/in 3 months
c. They have not lived together for 5 years When descendants?
d. Spouse who dies is the sick spouse
Right of representation exists
Example, A, in the ICU, is rich & dying of All children renounce. Since all renounce, the
AIDS. B, who has not lived w/ A, accepts A's next in line will inherit equally not by virtue of
proposal of marriage. They get married in the representation but bec. they are the nearest
hospital. After getting married, A lapses into a relatives in the descending line.
coma. The doctor sends B to buy the medicine. As
B is crossing the street, she is run over by a bus & If A, B & C renounce, grandchildren will inherit
dies. A is the only compulsory heir of B. Is this the If only B renounces, legitime will be divided into 2
marriage in articulo mortis contemplated by the 3rd only, B's children cannot represent him.
exception? No. The one who should die w/in 3
months should be A for the exception to apply. Other half of the estate -- free portion. Subject
to the free disposal of the testator. If not
Rationale for the exception in number disposed of by the testator, then it will go by
3 -- It is the law's way of showing its distaste to intestacy.
marriages for convenience or for interest or gain.

Exception to exception: If they have Art. 889. The legitime of legitimate parents or
lived together for at least 5 years before the ascendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
marriage. This shows that it was not only for
estates of their children & descendants.
interest. Now that one is dying, to reward the other
spouse.
The children or descendants may freely
Exception to number 3 -- Applies only dispose of the other half, subject to the rights of
if the wife is (the) only compulsory heir. Why? illegitimate children & of the surviving spouse as
Bec. in other cases, she will always get less than hereinafter provided.
1/2. Does not also apply to intestacy if the wife is
the only intestate heir. She will get the whole
estate. In such a case, the testator was not given a

235
Art. 890. The legitime reserved for the NOTE: If one of the parents, either A or
B, is alive, division by line will not apply. Rule 1
legitimate parents shall be divided between them
would apply where the nearer would exclude the
equally; if one of the parents should have died, the more remote. The parent would exclude the
whole shall pass to the survivor. grandparent.

If the testator leaves neither father nor mother, 3. Equal division w/in the line.
but is survived by ascendants of equal degree of the
paternal & maternal lines, the legitime shall be B. How far up do you go? As far as possible as
divided equally between both lines. If the long as all lower ascendants are dead. The law
ascendants should be of different degrees, it shall does not limit but nature does.
pertain entirely to the ones nearest in degree of
either line. Art. 892. If only one legitimate child or
descendant of the deceased survives, the widow
or widower shall be entitled to one- fourth of the
Balane: hereditary estate. In case of a legal separation,
the surviving spouse may inherit if it was the
Articles 889 & 890 -- Legitimate parents or deceased who had given cause for the same.
ascendants alone -- 1/2 of the estate. If there are two or more legitimate
children or descendants, the surviving spouse
shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime
A. Three rules: of each of the legitimate children or descendants.
In both cases, the legitime of the
1. Nearer excludes the more remote. No surviving spouse shall be taken fr. the portion
representation in the ascending line.
that can be freely disposed of by the testator.
Illustration:
Balane:
A1 A2 B1 B2 A. Legitime of Surviving spouse:
\ / \ / 1. If valid or voidable marriage --
A B Qualified. Spouse may inherit.
\ /
\ / 2. If legally separated, it depends:
X a. If innocent spouse -- not
disqualified to inherit fr. the guilty spouse
If X dies, the legitime will be shared by the parents b. If guilty spouse --
A & B bec. the nearer excludes the more remote. disqualified to inherit fr. the innocent spouse.
If A predeceases X, B gets all. A1 & A2 will get
nothing bec. there is no right of representation in B. Rules as to legitime of the surviving spouse if
the ascending line. concurring w/ legitimate children.
1. 1 leg. child -- 1/2 of estate
2. Division by (between the) lines -- 1/2 SS -- 1/4 of estate
of legitime each to maternal & paternal (assuming
that the nearest relatives in both sides are of the 2. 2 or more leg. children -- 1/2 of
same degree.) estate shared equally
SS -- share equal to that of a
Illustration (see illustration above.) leg. child.

a. If both parents predecease X, the C. "Or descendant" (all portions are in relation to
nearest ascendants would be the grandparents. the whole estate unless otherwise provided.)
Division by line will apply. The estate will be divided
equally bet. the maternal & paternal lines (1/4 of Illustration:
estate each.) Legitimes: A1 = 1/8, A2 = 1/8, B1 = X ----------- Y (spouse)
1/8, B2 = 1/8 / | \
A B C
b. If A1 predeceases X, there will still be /| /|\ |\
equal division by lines. Both lines get 1/4 of the 1234567
estate each. Legitimes: A2 = 1/4, B1 = 1/8, B2 =
1/8. 1. If B predeceases X
A = 1/6
B's children = 1/18 per child
236
C = 1/6 Illeg. children -- 1/3 collectively =
Y = 1/6 divided depending if the decedent died before
(5 : 4) or after (equal) the Family Code.
2. If B renounces
A = 1/4 Surviving spouse -- 1/3
C = 1/4 Free portion -- 1/3
Y = 1/4
Art. 895. The legitime of each of the
3. If A, B & C predecease
acknowledged natural children & each of the
1 & 2 = 1/12 each --- representation
1 & 2 = 1/12 each natural children by legal fiction shall consist of
3, 4 & 5 = 1/18 each one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate
6 & 7 = 1/12 each children or descendants.
Y = 1/6 The legitime of an illegitimate child who
is neither an acknowledged natural child , nor a
According to commentaries: Y's share is natural child by legal fiction, shall be equal in
based on what the children would have received if every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an
they were alive. acknowledged natural child.
The legitime of the illegitimate children
If A, B & C renounce
shall be taken fr. the portion of the estate at the
--- no representation
legitime of 1/2 is divided equally free disposal of the testator, provided that in no
between the 9 grandchildren case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate
Y children exceed that free portion, & that the
= ? legitime of the surviving spouse must first be fully
satisfied.
According to Tolentino, Y gets 1/6. Y's
share is based on the number of children. To allow Art. 176. (Family Code) Illegitimate children
Y's share to be equal to a grandchild would give the shall use the surname & shall be under the
children the opportunity to reduce the legitime of Y,
parental authority of their mother, & shall be
especially if Y is only a stepmother. The problem in
this case is when "or descendants" will apply. This entitled to support in conformity w/ this code.
issue is undecided. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist
of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Art. 893. If the testator leaves no legitimate
descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants, the
surviving spouse shall have a right to one-fourth of Balane:
the hereditary estate. 1. Legitime of illeg. children affected by the
Family Code.
This fourth shall be taken fr. the free
a. If before -- 10 : 5 : 4
portion of the estate. b. If after -- 2 : 1

Balane: 2. Combination:
Combination: Legitimate parents or ascendants -- Leg. children -- 1/2 collectively
1/2 (divide according to Art. 889 & 890.) Illeg. children -- 1/2 of the share of a leg. child
Spouse -- 1/4 each
Free portion -- 1/4 SS -- share is equal to that of 1 leg. child.

Art. 894. If the testator leaves illegitimate 3. Illustration:


X---------Y
children, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to
/ |
one-third of the hereditary estate of the deceased & A B C D
the illegitimate children to another third. The After the Family Code:
remaining third shall be at the free disposal of the a. A= ¼
testator. B= ¼
Y= ¼
Balane: C= 1/8
This is one of the exceptions to the basic rule of D= 1/8
1/2.
b. If there is a third illegitimate child, E
A=1/4

237
B=1/4 Legitime exceeds estate disposable portion. The testator may freely
Y=1/4
dispose of the remaining one-eighth of the
C=1/8 reduced proportionately
D=1/8 reduced proportionately estate.
E=1/8 reduced proportionately

C=1/12 Balane: This shows how arbitrary legitime


D=1/12 scheme is w/ regard to the surviving spouse.
E=1/12
Leg. parents -- 1/2 divided according to Articles
Art. 896. Illegitimate children who may survive 889 & 890
w/ legitimate parents or ascendants of the Illeg. children -- 1/4 divided depending on when
deceased shall be entitled to one-fourth of the the decedent died
hereditary estate to be taken fr. the portion at the SS -- 1/8
Free portion -- 1/8
free disposal of the testator.

Art. 900. If the only survivor is the widow or


Balane:
Leg. parents -- 1/2 divided according to Art. 889 & widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of
890 the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, &
Illeg. children -- 1/4 collectively divided according the testator may freely dispose of the other half.
to whether decedent died before or after the Family If the marriage between the
Code. surviving spouse & the testator was solemnized
in articulo mortis, & the testator died w/in three
months fr. the time of the marriage, the legitime
Art. 897. When the widow or widower survives of the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be
w/ legitimate children or descendants, & one-third of the hereditary estate, except when
acknowledged natural children, or natural children they have been living as husband & wife for more
by legal fiction, such surviving spouse shall be than five years. In the latter case, the legitime of
entitled a portion equal to the legitime of each of the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the
the legitimate children w/c must be taken fr. that preceding paragraph.
part of the estate w/c the testator can freely
dispose of.

Balane: Legitime of surviving spouse when he/


Balane: This is a repetition of Art. 895. she survives alone:
General rule : SS --1/2; Free portion -- 1/2
Exception : Marriage in articulo mortis;
Art. 898. If the widow or widower survives w/ SS-- 1/3; Free portion -- 2/3
legitimate children or descendants, & w/ illegitimate
children other than acknowledged natural, or
natural children by legal fiction, the share of the Art. 901. When the testator dies leaving
surviving spouse shall be the same as that provided illegitimate children & no other compulsory heirs,
in the preceding article. such illegitimate children shall have a right to
one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased.
Balane: This is the same as Art. 895. The FC has The other half shall be at the free
simplified this. disposal of the testator.

Balane:
Art. 899. When the widow or widower survives lleg. children -- 1/2 divided either equally
(decedent died after the FC) or 5 : 4 (decedent
w/ legitimate parents or ascendants & w/
died before the FC.)
illegitimate children, such surviving spouse shall be
entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate of the
deceased w/c must be taken fr. the free portion, &
the illegitimate children shall be entitled to one- Art. 902. The rights of illegitimate children
fourth of the estate w/c shall be taken also fr. the set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted

238
upon their death to their descendants, whether VI. RESERVA TRONCAL (RT)
legitimate or illegitimate.
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits fr. his
Balane: descendant any property w/c the latter may have
Illustration: acquired by gratuitous title fr. another ascendant,
X or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
/ property as he may have acquired by operation
A B of law for the benefit of relatives who are w/in
/\ / the third degree & who belong to the line fr. w/c
a1 a2 b1 b2
said property came.
1. A is legitimate while B is illeg. Both A &
B predeceased X. A left a1, a leg. child & a2, an Nature of Right of Reservor
illeg. child. B left b1, a leg. child & b2, an illeg.
child. Who will inherit & not inherit when X dies? SIENES V. ESPARCIA

A1 can inherit fr. X by representation. Facts: Saturnino Yaeso was twice married.
A2 cannot inherit fr. X in either intestate or
With his 1st wife he begot 4 children including
compulsory succession bec. of Art. 992 w/c provides
that an illegitimate cannot inherit ab intestado fr. Cipriana & Paulina. With his 2 nd wife he had a
the legitimate relatives of the father or mother & son, Francisco. When Saturnino died he left Lot
vice-versa 3368 to Francisco. But Cipriana & Paulina sold
Lot 3368 to Esparcia. Then Francisco died & his
This results in inconsistency & unfairness. mother, as his sole heir, sold the same lot to
(Art. 902) read w/ Art. 992 puts a premium on Sienes. When the 2nd wife died Cipriana was the
bastardness. Preference is given to bastard children only one surviving.
of bastard children as compared to bastard children Sienes commenced action for declaration of the
of legitimate children.
sale by Cipriana & Paulina to Esparcia as null &
2. If both A & B are dead. Who can X void & for reconveyance. TC declared both sales
inherit fr.? as void bec. Lot 3368 was reservable. It further
a1 dies -- X can inherit. held that upon 2nd wife’s death the lot passed to
a2 dies -- X cannot inherit bec. of Art. 992 Cipriana as the only surviving relative w/in 3rd
b2 dies -- X cannot inherit. In illegitimacy, degree belonging to the line fr. w/c the property
you cannot go beyond the parent in representation. came fr.. Hence, this petition.
b1 dies -- Unknown. The law is silent on
this. Issue: WON Lot 3368 is reservable
property?
Art. 903. The legitime of the parents who have
an illegitimate child, when such child leaves neither Held: YES. Lot 3368 reverted to estate of
legitimate descendants, nor a surviving spouse, nor Cipriana.
illegitimate children, is one- half of the hereditary RT creates 2 resolutory conditions:
estate of such illegitimate child. If only legitimate or The death of the ascendant obliged to reserve; &
illegitimate children are left, the parents are not The survival, at the time of such death, of
entitled to any legitime whatsoever. If only the relatives w/in the 3rd degree belonging to the line
widow or widower survives w/ parents of the fr. w/c the property came fr..
illegitimate child, the legitime of the parents is one- The reservista has the legal title & dominion to
fourth of the hereditary estate of the child, & that of the reservable property BUT subject a resolutory
the surviving spouse also one-fourth of the estate. condition : that he is like a life usufructuary of the
reservable property; that he may alienate the
Balane: There are 2 combinations: same but subject to reservation, said alienation
1. Illeg. parents -- 1/2 does not go beyond illeg. transmitting only the revocable & conditional
parents unlike Articles 899 & 890. ownership of the reservista, the rights acquired
by the transferee being revoked or resolved by
2. Illeg. parents -- none
Leg. or illeg. children -- depending on who is the survival of the reservatarios at the time of the
left death of the reservista.
In CAB, the sale by the 2 nd wife was
subject to the condition that Sienes would acquire

239
ownership only if the vendor died w/o being The property is inherited by another ascendant
survived by any person entitled to the reservable by operation of law.
property. But since Cipriana survived the 2nd wife, There are relatives w/in the third degree
the sale became of no legal effect & Lot 3368 was belonging to the line fr. w/c said property came.
placed in the exclusive ownership of Cipriana. In CAB, children by Jose’s first marriage
On the other hand the sale to Esparcia was (who fall under requisite #4) are entitled to 1/2
subject to the suspensive condition that Cipriana & portion of the lot originally belonging to Juanito.
Paulina should survive the reservista (2nd wife).
Cipriana did survive & became the absolute owner
of Lot 3368 but Esparcia did not appeal fr. the GONZALES V. CFI
decision of the TC. This decision however, is w/o
prejudice to the right of Esparcia against estate of Facts: Benito Legarda died leaving money,
Cipriana for reconveyance of Lot 3368. stocks & 7 properties. The real properties were
partitioned 1/3 to the wife & 6 children; 1/3 to
Distinguished fr. Fideicommissary Benito II’s family (bec. Benito II dies before
Substitution (FS) partition). Daughter Filomena died intestate thus
her mother, Mrs. Legarda, as sole heir
In FS the usufruct & the naked title of the property extrajudicially adjudicated to herself the interests
in Q belong to separate owners. of her daughter in the 7 properties inherited fr.
Benito I. The mother then executed documents
Reservees disposing of the properties inherited fr. Filomena
in favor of her 16 grandchildren, including Benito
II’s kids. The mother & her 6 children partitioned
FRIAS CHUA V. CFI their 1/3 interest. Mrs. Legarda then died w/ her
holographic will admitted to probate.
Facts: Jose Frias Chua had 3 children by his first Beatriz Gonzales, daughter of Benito I &
marriage. After his first wife died he contracted a sister to Filomena & Benito II, filed a motion to
2nd marriage w/ Consolacion w/ whom he had a exclude fr. her mother’s estate the properties
son, Juanito. Jose died granting 1/2 of a lot to inherited fr. Filomena as these are reservable &
Consolacion & the other 1/2 to Juanito. But in the thus should be inherited by Filomena’s bros. &
testate proceeding of Jose his Consolacion & Juanito sisses, not the grandchildren.
were ordered by the court to pay Standard Oil
amounts due based on a separate civil case Issues:
involving that corporation & Jose. Juanito dies Were the subject properties reservable? Yes.
intestate & his mother succeeded to his 1/2 share of Could Mrs. Legarda, the mother, dispose of the
the lot. Consolacion dies intestate w/o heirs except properties by will to her 16 grandchildren to
her brother & sisters. the exclusion of her children? No.

Issues: Held: The share of the mother in the 1/3


WON property was acquired gratuitously? Yes. portion is reservable as all the requisites of
WON reserva troncal applies? Yes. reserva troncal are present. Filomena is the
prepositus; the mother the reservor/ reservista; &
Held: As long as the transmission to the heir is the 6 children, including petitioner Beatriz G., are
free fr. any condition imposed by the deceased the reservees/ reservatarios. Mrs. Legarda as the
himself & the property is given out of pure reservor could not convey the properties to her
generosity, it is gratuitous. Even if the Court grandchildren through her will bec. these
ordered the heirs to pay Standard Oil, it is still properties were inherited fr. her daughter & as
gratuitous. If the expense or charge is just reservable properties do not form part of Mrs.
incidental, it is still considered gratuitous. Besides it Legarda’s estate. The reservor cannot make a
is the court, NOT the deceased Jose that imposed disposition mortis causa of the reservable
the payment. property as long as the reservees survive her.
The requisites of reserva troncal are : The reserva creates 2 resolutory conditions:
The property was acquired by a person fr. an Death of the ascendant obliged to reserve (in
ascendant of fr. a brother or sister by gratuitous CAB, Mrs. Legarda, the mother); &
title.
Said person died w/o legitimate issue.

240
Survival at the time of such death, of relatives w/in relatives in the line of origin. Art. 1891 no longer
the 3rd degree belonging to the line fr. w/c the applies.
property came. Upon Benita’s death the property should
Art. 1891 clearly indicates that the property pass not to the reservatarios as a class, but only
shall be inherited by the nearest relatives w/in the to those nearest in the line of degree to the
3rd degree fr. the prepositus– in CAB, the 6 children descendant prepositus, in this case Fortunato,
(the nearest exclude the more remote). The excluding those reservatarios of the more
reservor, Mrs. Legarda cannot choose to whom the remote. The rule that full-blood brothers &
properties will be given & deprive the reservees of nephews are entitled to a share twice that of
their share. To allow such would be a glaring brothers & nephews of the half-blood applies.
violation of Art. 1891.
The reservor has legal title & dominion over Q: Why was the rule applied in CAB?
the reservable property w/c is extinguished should A: Because the 2nd heir inherits fr. the prepositus.
he die & reservees survive him---thus reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. It must be Baviera: This is wrong!
noted, however, that the reservor may alienate the The court should not have
reservable property, but subject to the reservation. distinguished between the 2 sets of
The transferee acquires the reservor’s revocable & reservatarios. The law speaks only of the
conditional ownership – but that such rights are line, it is irrelevant whether the people of
revoked upon the survival of reservees survive the the same line were of full or half blood.
reservor. Court treated it as if the reservatarios
inherited fr. the prepositus, Fortunato,
Baviera: the 16 grandchildren cannot inherit when they are in fact inheriting fr. the
by right of representation in CAB, as their reservor, Agustin. The reservatarios are
respective parents are still alive. inheriting by operation of law as they
belong to same line fr. w/c the property
PADURA V. BALDOVINO came.

Facts: Agustin Padura had two sets of families. By DE PAPA V. CAMACHO


his first marriage he had a son, Manuel. His second
marriage to Benita produced two children – Facts: Romana Tioco donated 4 parcels of land
Fortunato & Candelaria. Agustin died & his estate to her niece Toribia. Toribia dies intestate
was divided among his heirs – his widow & 3 kids. leaving the 4 parcels to her 2 children Faustino &
Fortunato received 4 parcels of land. Fortunato Trinidad.
died & said lands were inherited by his mother, Balbino, Toribia’s father & Romana’s
Benita. When Benita died the 4 parcels of land brother, died intestate survived by –
were fought over by the Paduras (the 7 children of Children Francisca, Manual & Nicolas (plaintiffs),
Manuel) & the Baldovinos (the 4 children of &
Candelaria). Grandchildren Faustino & Trinidad.
Faustino & Trinidad inherited 3 parcels of land fr.
Issue: How should the reservable property be their lolo as representatives of their mother.
divided between the Baldovinos & the Pduras? They now share 7 lots w/c they did not partition.
Faustino died w/o issue, thus his father
Held: The Paduras, as nephews of Fortunato of Eustacio inherited his 1/2 share in the 7 lots,
the 1/2 blood, should get a share of only 1/2 of the subject to reserva troncal.
share of the nephews of the full-blood who are Trinidad died intestate, her 1/2 share
Baldovinos. was inherited by her only child, Dalisay
Reserva Troncal merely determines the (defendant). Eustacio also died intestate, w/
group of relatives (reservatarios/reservees) to Dalisay his only legitimate descendant & thus she
whom the property should be returned, BUT w/in inherited his interests.
the group the individual’s share should be decided There is no dispute that Dalisay is the
by the rules of ordinary Intestate Succession. The owner of 1/2 of the 7 lots as her inheritance fr.
purpose of reserva troncal is accomplished once the her mother. However the dispute is over the
property has devolved upon the specified class of other 1/2 w/c Dalisay claims likewise belong to
her by virtue of reserva troncal & intestate
succession. On the other hand her granduncles
241
& grandaunt claim that of the 1/2 interest inherited Rafael & Ruperto Nequia. Rafael died before CQ
by Eustacio fr. Faustino, 1/2 should go to them as but left a son Fernando & a wife, Margarita.
they are also relatives of the 3rd degree of Faustino. When CQ dies she left as her heirs Ruperto &
TC ruled in favor of plaintiff granduncles & Fernando (by intestate succession in
grandaunt. representation of Rafael). The land went to
Fernando. Upon his death, the land went to his
Issues: mother, Margarita who sold the same to Nono
Do all relatives of the prepositus w/in the 3rd of the evidenced by a deed of sale duly registered.
same line degree succeed w/o distinction? No. When she died the issue of ownership arose
Are the rights of id relative subject to the rules on between Nono & Ruperto. TC ruled in favor of
intestate succession? Yes. Ruperto & ordered recission of the deed of sale.
Is Dalisay entitled to whole of the 7 lots? Yes.
Issue: Who has a right to the land?
Held: Citing Padura v. Baldovino once the purpose
of reserva troncal is accomplished Art. 1891 no Held: Ruperto. Under Art. 891, Margarita was
longer applies, the shares of each should be obligated to reserve the land. the reserva troncal
governed by the rules of intestate succession. Upon is a resolutory condition over the right of the
the death of the reservor, the reservable property ascendant who inherits. If upon the ascendant’s
should pass not all reservees as a class but only to death the descendant has relatives w/in the 3rd
those nearest in degree to the prepositus, excluding degree in the troncal line, these relatives are the
the reservees more remote. ones who acquire the property by virtue of
There is a right of representation on the reservation. As a consequence the successors of
part of reservees who are w/in the 3rd degree, as in the ascendant lose the property.
the case of nephews of the deceased fr. whom the In CAB, Ruperto was still living at the
property came. Proximity of degree & right of time of Margarita’s death. Thus, at that time, he
representation are basic principles of ordinary became the owner of the land & the resolutory
intestate succession. Thus, whole brothers & condition of the reservation dissolves the sale to
nephews are entitled to a double share of brothers Nono.
& nephews of the half-blood. The land in Q is not registered. Thus,
Being governed by intestate succession, the Margarita’s acquisition in the concept of owner fr.
plaintiffs in CAB must be held to be w/o any right to her son cannot be inscribed unless she applies for
the 1/2 interest over the 7 lots. As aunt & uncles of the same in a certificate for registration. Neither
Faustino (prepositus) they are excluded fr. can Ruperto apply for it as his right to the land
succession by his niece Dalisay even though they was contingent. Ruperto may not be prejudiced
are related to him w/in the same degree as the or deprived of the right tot he reserva troncal by
niece. Abellana v. Ferraris – in case of intestacy, the sale or registration of the deed of sale.
nephews & nieces exclude all other collaterals Otherwise he would be deprived of his right to
(aunts, uncles, cousins, etc.). property w/o due process of law.

Baviera: Another wrong case for the same Baviera: In cases of reserva troncal, where
reason as Padura, that SC treated 2nd heir as the reservable property is registered land
inheriting fr. the prepositus when in fact & it is purchased fr. the Reservor by an
inheriting fr. the reservor. innocent purchaser for value, the reservees
Also there is no use determining can NO longer acquire the property, on the
whether there is reserva troncal in CAB bec. condition that no lien was recorded on the
Dalisay (reservee) would still inherit fr. the title. This is bec. the innocent purchaser is
reservor as a sole heir. protected by the land registration. (Ma’am
says in later decisions the SC has held that
Effect of Alienation by Reservor although an innocent purchaser has a right
to rely on the TCT, he must also have
NONO V. NEQUIA investigated title.)
However, a different rule applies if
Facts: The land in Q was Originally owned by the land w/c the reservable property is
Nicolas Quilantang. He died & left as heir his wife unregistered. In such a case even if it was
Catalina Quilantang (CQ) who had two sons – bought by an innocent purchaser for value,

242
the land would still belong to the reservee(s) property during the lifetime of the reservor, only
as in the above mentioned case. when reservor should die. The prescriptive
period is 30 yrs. under Art. 1141. In CAB the
SUMAYA V. IAC action was brought in March 4,1970 or 2 years fr.
the death of the reservor – well w/in the period.
Facts: Raul Balantakbo (prepositus) inherited 2 sets
of properties fr. 2 different ascendant – Balane:
History of Reserva Troncal:
1/3 interest in a parcel of land fr. his father, Jose,
In the old law, there were 2 reservations:
Sr.; & 1. Viudal -- "ordinaria", Art. 968, OCC
1/7 interest in 10 parcels of land fr. his maternal 2. Troncal -- "lineal," "familial,"
grandmama, Luisa Bautista. "extraordinaria," Art. 811 of the OCC
Raul died intestate w/o issue, his sole heir being his
mother Consuelo (reservista). She sold the first set In addition: Reversiones
of properties to Sumaya who sold it to Villa Honorio 1. Legal -- Art. 812
Dev’t Corp. (VHDC) who transferred its rights to 2. Adoption -- Rules of Court
Agro-Indus’l Coconut Coop., Inc. (ACCI).
Documents evidencing this was registered & the Reservations.-- Property set aside for a
group of people who are limited to persons
corresponding TCTs were issued.
related fr. whom it came
Consuelo sold the 2nd set of properties to
VHDC w/c transferred the same to ACCI w/c is Reversiones.-- Property goes back to the
presently in possession. TCTs do not contain any person fr. whom it came.
annotation of the properties’ reservable character.
Consuelo died. The brothers in full blood of The Code Commission abolished all 4. In
Raul & his nephews & nieces (by his brother Jose, the floor of Congress, there was a last minute
Jr.) claimed the properties as theirs since the same amendment to include reserva troncal. In 1963,
are reservable. PD 613 revived reversion adoptiva. But this was
eliminated by the Family Code. Now, only
reserva troncal remains.
Issues:
Is Sumaya an innocent purchaser for value? No. 1MS 3R
Is annotation necessary? Yes. \ / \
Has the COA of brothers, nephews & nieces \ / \
prescribed? No. \ / \
2P 4R
Held: Upon Raul’s death, Consuelo caused the
registration of an affidavit of self adjudication of the 1MS (Mediate Source) ---- gratuitous title ---- 2P
(Prepositus) --- by operation of law --- 3R
estate, it was clearly stated that the properties were
(Reservista/ reserver) --- 4R (Reservatorios/
inherited by Raul fr. his father & grandmother; & reservees)
that Consuelo was the lone ascendant/ heir to Raul.
Although the TCTs showed the properties to be free PURPOSE OF RESERVA TRONCAL
fr. lien, the affidavit is sufficient notice to the whole
world. Thus failure to annotate reservable Gonzales v. CFI.-- The purpose of
character cannot be attributed to Consuelo. reserva troncal is to return the property to where
Furthermore, Sumaya had actual knowledge of the it originated & fr. where it strayed due to the
reservable character of the properties before buying accident of marriage. "Accident" here means
them fr. Consuelo as is shown/ contained in the unforeseen development.
deed of sale.
The reservable character of property may 1. Feudal
be lost to innocent purchasers for value, thus, there a. Underlying concept.--
is a need for annotation. In CAB, there was notice Property should stay w/ the family bec. it has
(affidavit) to Sumaya even if there was no stayed w/ them for so long & marriage should
annotation. not be allowed to cause that property to leave
COA did not commence upon Raul’s that family.
death , but upon the death of the reservor,
b. To prevent the property fr.
Consuelo on June 3,1968. Relatives have no title of leaving the family through the accident of
ownership of or fee simple over the reserved marriage.

243
E.g., X ---------- Y ordered the heirs to pay Standard Oil, it is still
| gratuitous. If the expense or charge is just
A incidental, it is still considered gratuitous.
E.g., "I give you my house provided you
Property fr. X's family. X dies,
property goes to A. A dies, property goes to Y. pay the mortgage." This is still gratuitous but
The property may end up w/ Y's family. you subtract the value of what you paid.

2. This is not good 2. B = 2P -- 3R


a. It impairs the free circulation of property Operation of law:
b. Underlying philosophy is bad-- (a) compulsory succession
outdated, aristocratic. (b) intestate succession

REQUISITES Cannot be by:


Chua v. CFI -- (a) testate succession
(b) donation
The property was acquired by a person fr. an
ascendant of fr. a brother or sister by gratuitous Reserva troncal commences at this point.
title.
Said person died w/o legitimate issue. 3. C = 3R -- 4R
The property is inherited by another ascendant by This is a consequence of reserva troncal
operation of law. This occurs when the reservista dies
There are relatives w/in the third degree belonging Reserva troncal ends here.
to the line fr. w/c said property came.
NATURE
Comments:
1. "descendant" -- applies only if one got it fr. an 1. Of right of the reservista over the
ascendant; but what if one got it fr. a brother; it reserved property.
should have been "by a person or individual"
Edroso v. Sablan.--
2. Individual died w/o legitimate issue. Reservista's right over the property is that
"Issue" here means children or descendants. of ownership
If w/ legitimate issue, this will not apply but
Reservista's right is subject to a resolutory
will go to legitimate descendants.
If w/ legitimate issue but they all renounce, condition w/c is that the reservatorios
the individual dies as if there was no legitimate exist at the time of the reservista's
issue death. If there are, the reservista's
right terminates & the property will
3. "Operation of law" means legal or compulsory pass to the reservatorios.
succession. Reservista's ownership is alienable but
subject to the same resolutory
PROCESS. condition. The buyer's ownership is
1MS 3R subject to the same resolutory
\ / \
condition.
A \ / \ C
\ / \ Reservista's right of ownership is
2P 4R registrable.

1. A = 1MS -- 2P
MS -- either only an: ["Uncle German: -- "germanus" --
(1) ascendant \ coming fr. the same seed; later came to mean
-- of 2P "brother."]
(2) brother or sister /
Error in the case: The case said
MS to P -- by gratuitous title -- either: "reservatorios cannot dispose of the expectancy."
(1) donation According to the Sienes case, supra., w/c is
(2) succession correct, the expectancy can be alienated.
Chua vs. CFI.-- As long as the transmission
to the heir is free fr. any condition imposed by the
deceased himself & the property is given out of 2. Of right of the reservatorios over the
pure generosity, it is gratuitous. Even if the Court reserved property.

244
Sienes v. Esparcia.-- Y to X. A is dead. X dies, so the
a. Reservatarios right over the property property goes to B. B remarries. The property is
during the life of the reservista is a mere lost.
expectancy.
Manresa's view is the accepted
b. The expectancy is subject to a
view.
suspensive condition w/c is that the reservatorio is
alive at the time the reservista dies 2. Prepositus.-- Either a descendant, or brother
c. The right of expectancy can be alienated or sister of the mediate source.
but it will be subject to the same suspensive
condition He is the central figure in the reserva
d. The right of expectancy is registrable. It troncal bec.:
must be annotated at the back of the title to protect
the reservatorios fr. innocent purchasers for value. a. At the time he receives the property,
he becomes the absolute owner. He can prevent
Errors in the case: reserva troncal fr. happening. How? By
1. The case said the "right of reservista is preventing it fr. going to an ascendant by
subject to a double resolutory condition." -- (a) operation of law. How?
death of the reservista; & (b) survival or
reservatorio 1. By selling it. Dispose of a potentially
However, the death of the reservista is a free portion property (even by pacto de retro.)
term. It should be the "right of (the) reservatorio is 2. Give it to an ascendant by donation,
subject to a suspensive condition." devise, legacy or testamentary succession.

2. The case said that "alienation by (the) b. He is the basis or point of reference
reservatorios is subject to a resolutory condition." for the third degree relationship.
It should read "suspensive condition."
Note: There is no reserva troncal yet
while the property is in the hands of the
prepositus.
PARTIES.
A. Four Parties.
3. Reservista-- called "ascendant
1. Mediate Source.-- Either an ascendant or a
reservista." He must be another ascendant other
brother or sister of the prepositus.
than the mediate source if the mediate source is
a. If ascendant, there is no problem. You
an ascendant.
know fr. what line the property came fr..
b. If brother or sister & full or half blood.
(i) If half blood, no problem. You Reserva troncal begins once the
know what line the property came fr.. reservista inherits the property. He is bound by
(ii) If full blood, there is a the obligations.
problem. How will you what line it came
fr.? Q: Must the ascendant-reservista belong
to a line similar to the mediate source or should
JBL Reyes.-- Reserva troncal applies only he be fr. a different line?
to half blood brothers & sisters. You cannot
determine the line if it is of full blood. E.g., X----------Y
|
A----------B
Manresa.-- It should apply regardless of
|
whether it is of full or half blood. The law does not
C
distinguish.
X donates to C. C dies & it goes to A.
What line do you apply it to? You cannot
Is there reserva troncal?
apply it to either line as long as it is w/in the third
1. No. The property never left the line.
degree. Why? The purpose of the law is not only
2. Yes. There is no requirement in Art
to bring back the property to the line (curative) but
891 that the 1MS & 3R must belong to different
also to prevent it fr. leaving the family.
lines. This is the view accepted by the majority
of commentators.
E.g. A----------B
/ \
X Y
4. Reservatorios -- class or group

a. Requirements:
245
1. Must be w/in the third degree fr. the Prepositus -- w/in the 3rd degree
prepositus.
2. Must be fr. the line fr. w/c the property All relationships must be legitimate.
came In effect, this requirement punishes
3. Must be related by blood to the mediate legitimate relations bec. if the relation
source. is illegitimate, there is no obligation to
(According to commentators.) reserve.
E.g., A----------A1
|
B----------B1 (Reservista) VII. LEGACY
|
C (Prepositus)
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be w/o
B died. Upon A's death, C inherits fr. A. effect:
Upon C's death, the property is transmitted to B1. (1) If the testator transforms the thing
Is A1 a reservatorio? bequeathed in such a manner that it does not
retain either the form or the denomination it had;
Following the 3 requisites: (2) If the testator by any title or for any
1. Yes.
cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part
2. Yes.
3. No. A1 is not related by blood to the thereof, it being understood that in the latter
mediate source. case the legacy or devise shall be w/o effect only
w/ respect to the part thus alienated. If after the
b. Reservation.-- in favor of a class. It is alienation the thing should again belong to the
not required that reservatorios be living at the time testator, even if it be by reason of the nullity of
of the prepositus' death but required to be alive at the contract, the legacy or devise shall not
the time of the death of the reservista. Why? Bec. thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall
reservation is in favor of a class. As long as you have been effected by virtue of the exercise of
belong to the class when the reservista dies, then
the right of repurchase;
you are a reservatorio.
(3) If the thing bequeathed is totally lost
during the lifetime of the testator, or after his
c. How do they inherit w/in the death w/o the heir's fault. Nevertheless, the
class? person obliged to pay the legacy or devise shall
be liable for eviction if the thing bequeathed
Padura v. Baldovino.-- Apply the rules in intestate should not have been determinate as to its kind,
succession: in accordance w/ the provisions of article 928.
a. Nearer excludes the more remote.
b. Representation in favor or nieces for
predeceased brother Balane: Grounds for the revocation of legacy or
c. Proportion of 2 : 1 between full & half blood devise (takes effect by operation of law.)
nephews & brothers. However, there is no
representation in the case bec. there are no other 1. Transformation of the thing.
brothers. However, the ratio of 2 : 1 is maintained. E.g. a. "I bequeath my ring to B." After
making the will, the ring is melted & turned into a
Florentino v. Florentino.-- Representation pendant.
b. When a coconut plantation is
only in favor of nephews & nieces of deceased
transformed into a fishpond.
brothers & sisters of the prepositus. The case is 2. This manifests the intent to revoke.
wrong, however, when it did not distinguish Exception: If pacto de retro & reacquired during
between full & half blood nephews & nieces. the testator's lifetime.
Annulment depends on the basis:
B. Three relationships a. Vitiated consent.-- Not revoked bec.
1. Mediate Source.-- Prepositus-- ascendant or there was no intention to revoke
brother or sister b. All other reasons.-- Revoked.
3. Totally lost.
2. Prepositus.-- Reservista -- descendant -
ascendant relationship
Art. 928. The heir who is bound to deliver
3. Reservatorio -- Reservista the legacy or devise shall be liable in case of
Mediate Source -- blood relation

246
eviction, if the thing is intermediate & is indicated bequest. Therefore, administration of the
only by its kind. ricelands by PPV was likewise inoperative.
CAB is governed by Art. 960(2) w/c
Art. 959. A disposition made in general terms provides that legal succession takes place when
in favor of the testator's relatives shall be the will does not dispose of all that belongs to the
understood to be in favor of those nearest in testator. There being no substitution nor
degree. accretion s to the said ricelands, the same should
be distributed among the testator’s legal heirs.
Effect is as if testator , as to the ricelands, made
Balane:
This does not refer to legacies & devises no disposition at all.
This article is misplaced. This should be in the
Chapter on Institution of Heirs
This applies only in favor of the testator's own VIII. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
relatives.
Art. 968. If there are several relatives of the
same degree, & one or some of them are
PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA V. RIGOR unwilling or incapacitated to succeed, his portion
shall accrue to the others of the same degree,
Facts: In his will Father Rigor bequeathed certain save the right of representation when it should
ricelands to anyone of his nearest relatives who take place. Art. 969. If the inheritance
would pursue an ecclesiastical career until should be repudiated by the nearest relatives,
ordination as a priest. He also provided that during should there be one only, or by all the nearest
the time when there is no qualified devisee, the relatives called by law to succeed, should there
administration of the ricelands would be under the be several, those of the following degree shall
responsibility of the parish priest of Victoria (PPV). inherit in their own right & cannot represent the
13 years later the PPV filed petition for the person or persons repudiating the inheritance.
delivery of the ricelands & the accounting of the
fruits to the church as trustee, since a grandnephew Art. 978. Succession pertains, in the first
of the testator was a seminarian pursuing a study of place, to the descending direct line.
priesthood.
Rigor, et al., brothers & sisters of Father Art. 979. Legitimate children & their
Rigor, countered & asked that the bequest be descendants succeed the parents & other
declared inoperative & that they be adjudged ascendants, w/o distinction as to sex or age, &
entitled to the lands as the condition in the will was even if they should come fr. different marriages.
not fulfilled. TC for PPV. CA reversed. An adopted child succeeds to the
property of the adopting parents in the same
Issues: manner as a legitimate child.
Who did the testator contemplate as his nearest
male relative? Fr. Rigor referred to the Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall
nearest male relative already living at the always inherit fr. him in their own right, dividing
time of his death. the inheritance in equal shares.
Is the devise of ricelands efficacious or
enforceable? No. Ineffectual & Art. 981. Should children of the deceased &
Unenforceable. descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own right,
Held: The said bequest referred to nearest male & the latter by right of representation.
relative living at the time of his death & not to any
indefinite time thereafter. Otherwise, it would Art. 982. The grandchildren & other
render the provision difficult to apply & create descendants shall inherit by right of
uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. As representation, & if any one of them should have
no nearest male relative of the deceased has ever died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining
studied for the priesthood, the conclusion is that the to him shall be divided among the latter in equal
bequest in question was ineffectual & inoperative. portions.
The grandnephew referred to was born after the
death of the testator thus not covered by the

247
Baviera: Only legitimate descendants Subsection 3.-- Illegitimate Children.
General rule: Art. 982
Exception: Art. 992.-- An illegitimate child Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate
has no right to inherit ab intestato fr. the descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate
legitimate children & relatives of his father or children shall succeed to the entire estate of the
mother; nor shall such children or relatives deceased.
inherit in the same manner fr. the illegitimate
child. Art. 989. If, together w/ illegitimate children,
This applies only to child, not there should survive descendants of another
descendant illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall
This is called the "iron curtain rule." succeed in their own right & the latter by right of
representation.

Art. 983. If illegitimate children survive w/ Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the
legitimate children, the shares of the former shall be two preceding articles to illegitimate children shall
in the proportions prescribed by article 895. be transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, who shall inherit by right of repre-
sentation fr. their deceased grandparent.
Baviera: Article 895 - note article 176 FC -
Illegitimate child is entitled to 1/2 of share of Art. 991. If legitimate ascendants are left, the
a legitimate child. The legitime of the illegitimate children shall divide the inheritance w/
illegitimate child shall be taken fr. the free them, taking one-half of the estate, whatever be
portion, provided in no case shall the total the number of the ascendants or of the
legitime of illegitimate child exceed the free illegitimate children.
portion, & the legitime of surviving spouse
must first be fully satisfied. Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato fr. the legitimate children &
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
Art. 984. In case of death of an adopted child, children or relatives inherit in the same manner
leaving no children or descendants, his parents & fr. the illegitimate child.
relatives by consanguinity & not by adoption, shall
be his legal heirs. Baviera: This applies only to child, not
descendants. This is called the iron curtain
Subsection2.-- Ascending Direct Line. rule
Art. 985. In default of legitimate children &
descendants of the deceased, his parents &
ascendants shall inherit fr. him, to the exclusion of Art. 993. If an illegitimate child should die
collateral relatives. w/o issue, either legitimate or illegitimate, his
father or mother shall succeed to his entire
Art. 986. The father & mother, if living, shall estate; & if the child's filiation is duly proved as to
inherit in equal shares. both parents, who are both living, they shall
Should one only of the survive, he or she inherit fr. him share & share alike.
shall succeed to the entire estate of the child.
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother,
Art. 987. In default of the father & mother, the an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or
ascendants nearest in degree shall inherit. her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the
Should there by more than one of equal entire estate.
degree belonging to the same line they shall divide If the widow or widower should
the inheritance per capita; should they be of survive w/ brothers & sisters, nephews & nieces,
different lines but of equal degree, one-half shall go she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, &
to the paternal & the other half to the maternal the latter the other half.
ascendants. In each line the division shall be made
per capita. Subsection 4.-- Surviving Spouse.

248
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
descendants & ascendants, & illegitimate children & the entire estate of the deceased in accordance
their descendants, whether legitimate or w/ the following articles.
illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the
entire estate, w/o prejudice to the rights of brothers Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be
& sister, nephews & nieces, should there by any brothers & sisters of the full blood, they shall
under article 1001. inherit in equal shares.

Art. 996. If a widow or widower & legitimate Art. 1005. Should brothers & sisters survive
children or descendants are left, the surviving together w/ nephews & nieces, who are the
spouse has in the succession the same share as children of the decedent's brothers & sisters of
that of each of the children. the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita,
& the latter per stirpes.
Art. 997. When the widow or widower survives
w/ legitimate parents or ascendants, the surviving Baviera: Per capita means equally
spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the estate, & per stirpes means by representation
the legitimate parents or ascendants to the other
half.

Art. 998. If a widow or widower survives w/ Art. 1006. Should brothers & sisters of the
illegitimate children, such widow or widower shall full blood survive together w/ brother & sisters of
be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, & the the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether share double that of the latter.
legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half.
Art. 1007. In case brothers & sisters of the
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives half blood, some on the father's & some on the
w/ legitimate children or their descendants & mother's side, are the only survivors, all shall
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether inherit in equal shares w/o distinction as to the
legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower origin of the property.
shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child. Art. 1008. Children of brothers & sisters of
the half blood shall succeed per capita or per
Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the stirpes, in accordance w/ the rules laid down for
surviving spouse, & illegitimate children are left, the brothers & sisters of the full blood.
ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance, & the other half shall be divided Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers
between the surviving spouse & the illegitimate nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the
children so that such widow or widower shall have other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
one-fourth of the estate, & the illegitimate children estate.
the other fourth. The latter shall succeed w/o distinction of
lines or preference among them by reason of
Art. 1001. Should brothers & sisters or their relationship by the whole blood.
children survive w/ the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance & the Art. 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato
brothers & sisters or their children to the other half. shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of
relationship in the collateral line.
Art. 1002. In case of a legal separation, if the
surviving spouse gave cause for the separation, he
or she shall not have any of the rights granted in Summary:
the preceding article. LC – whole
LP – excluded
Subsection 5.-- Collateral Relatives
LC –
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ILC – ½ of each LC
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
LC –
249
S – same as each LC half-brothers on the Corpus side who were
legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate
LC – under the rules of intestacy. There is no
ILC – ½ of each LC reciprocal succession between legitimate &
S – same as each LC illegitimate relatives as per Art. 992, CC. The rule
is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is
LP – ½ disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family
S–½ & vice-versa. The law does not recognize the
blood tie & seeks to avoid further grounds for
LP – ½ resentment.
ILC – ¼
S–¼
ESTATE OF SANTILLON
ILC – ½
S–½ Facts: Pedro Santillon died w/o testament. He
was survived by his wife, Perfecta Miranda & his
S–½ son Claro Santillon. Widow was appointed
B, S, N – ½ administratrix of the estate. Claro filed a Motion
to Declare Share of Heir & to resolve the
Collaterals – whole conflicting claims regarding the estate. 1/2 of the
estate is the widow’s share in the conjugal
State – whole partnership, it is the remaining 1/2 that is in
dispute.

CORPUS V. ADMIN Claro claims that as an only child he is


entitled to 3/4 & the 1/4 of the disputed portion,
Facts: Teodoro Yangco was the acknowledged pursuant to Art. 892, NCC.
natural son of Rafael & Ramona Arguelles, who was
the widow of Tomas Corpus (Tomas I). Teodoro Widow claims 1/2 should go to Claro &
died leaving a will. He had no forced heirs, & his 1/2 to her, invoking Art. 996, NCC. TC ruled 1/2-
nearest relatives were 1/2 or equal sharing.
A half-brother;
A half-sister; Issue: How should the intestate estate be
The children of half-brother, Pablo; & divided between the spouse & the one legitimate
Juanita, daughter of half-brother, Jose. child? ½ each.
Petitioner in this case is Tomas Corpus (Tomas II),
son of Juanita. Held: Claro claims that Art. 996 is unjust &
The heirs of Teodoro entered into a inequitable bec. it grants the widow the same
compromise agreement & the estate was share as that of children in intestate succession,
partitioned accordingly. 2 years later, Tomas II as whereas in testate succession the surviving
the sole heir of Juanita filed an action to recover her spouse is given only 1/2 while the only child gets
supposed share in the intestate estate of Teodoro 1/2.
Yangco. TC dismissed.
Art. 892 falls under Testamentary
Issues: Succession; Art. 996 under Legal or Intestate
Is Juanita a legal heir of Teodoro Yangco? No. Succession. Such being the case it is obvious
Does Tomas II have COA? No. that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 bec. it merely
fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse. While
Held: Teodoro Yangco & Juanita’s father, Jose, it may indicate the intent of the law w/ respect to
had different fathers but the same mother. ideal shares, it does not fix the amount of shares
Testator was an illegitimate child while Jose was a that a child & a surviving spouse are entitled to
legitimate child. Thus, Tomas II as grandson of when intestacy occurs. Incases of intestacy, Art.
Jose, had no cause of action for the recovery of the 996 applies.
supposed hereditary share of his mother Juanita as
legal heir to Yangco’s estate for the simple reason BICOMONG V. ALMANZA
that Juanita was not such an heir. In fact, Yangco’s
250
Facts: Simeon Bagsic in his first marriage had 3 In CAB, the existence of a niece of the
children – Perpetua, Igmedia & Ignacio. All three full-blood does not exclude the 10 nephews &
are dead & the present action was filed by their nieces of the half-blood fr. inheriting. Maura
respective children (nephews & nieces of the half- could not have been succeeded by Felipa such as
blood). to exclude the 10 half-blood collaterals, for the
simple reason that Felipa predeceased Maura.
When his first wife died, Simeon remarried
to Silvestra & they had 2 children – Felipa & Maura.
Felipa died leaving & was survived by her husband Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to
Geronimo, her daughter Cristeta & her husband inherit ab intestato fr. the legitimate children &
Engracio. relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner
The subject matter in CAB is 1/2 share of fr. the illegitimate child.
Maura in 5 parcels of land w/c she inherited fr. her
mother Silvestra. When Maura died the propertied
passed to her full-blood niece Cristeta who took DIAZ V. IAC
charge of administration of the same. Several years
after Maura’s death the 1/2 blood nephews & Facts: Simona Pamuti died & her niece Felisa
nieces requested Cristeta for a partition of Maura’s Pamuti Jardin was declared by the CFI to be sole
estate. Cristeta agreed but died w/o dividing, thus heir. Felisa was likewise allowed to intervene in
leaving possession & administration to Geronimo & the intestate estates of Pascual (Simona’s
Engracio. TC declared nephews & nieces of the husband) & Pablo (Simona’s son) Santero, both
half-blood are entitled to 10/24 share of the 5 predeceased Simona. However, Pablo had 6
parcels of land. illegitimate children; 4 w/ Diaz & 2 w/ Pacursa.
Diaz & Pacursa moved to exclude Felisa fr. taking
Issue: Who are the intestate heirs of Maura? Her part in the settlement of the said estates. The
nephews & nieces of the full & half-blood. CFI reversed its decision & held instead that
Felisa is not an heir of Simona. IAC reversed this
Held: Articles 975, 1006 & 1008 are applicable in & declared Felisa sole heir of Simona.
CAB.
Issues: Can Pablo’s illegitimate children inherit
In the absence of descendants, ascendants, fr. Simona by right of representation of their
illegitimate children or surviving spouse, Art. 1003 father her legitimate son? No. Who are
provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the Simona’s legal heirs? Felisa is the sole heir.
entire estate. In CAB, Maura died intestate w/o
issue & her husband & descendants have died Held: Art. 992 absolutely prohibits a succession
ahead of her, she is succeeded by her surviving ab intestado between illegitimate child & the
collateral relatives namely, her full-blood niece (the legitimate children & relatives of the father or
daughter of her full-blood sister) & her half-blood mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
nephews & nieces (the 10 children of her half- natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by
brother & 2 half-sisters). In accordance w/ Art. the law for the purpose of Art. 992. Between the
975. legitimate & illegitimate family there is a
presumed antagonism, thus the law seeks to
Nephews & nieces are entitled to inherit in avoid further grounds for resentment. In CAB,
their own right. Nephews & nieces alone do not the illegitimate children of Pablo cannot represent
inherit by right of representation unless concurring their father in the succession of the latter to the
w/ brothers & sisters of the deceased. Under Art. intestate estate of his legitimate mother, Simona
975, there is no qualification as to whether the bec. of the barrier of Art. 992.
nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal
side; & there is no preference as to whether Note however, that while 992 prevents
relation ship is full or half –blood. The only the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child fr.
difference in their right of succession is provided in representing him in intestate succession of the
Art. 1008 in relation to Art. 1006 w/c entitles those grandparent, the illegitimate issues of illegitimate
of full-blood to a share double that of those of the children can now do so. Art. 982 is the general
half-blood. rule while Art 992 is the exception. The

251
determining factor being the illegitimacy or Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be
legitimacy of the person to be represented. brothers & sisters of the full blood, they shall
inherit in equal shares.
If illegitimate – descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate may represent him. Art. 1005. Should brothers & sisters survive
If legitimate – only his legitimate descendants may together w/ nephews & nieces, who are the
exercise right of representation. children of the decedent’s brothers & sisters of
the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita,
& the latter per stirpes.
a. Estate of an Illegitimate Child

Baviera: Per capita means equally; per


Art. 903. The legitime of the parents who have stirpes means by representation
an illegitimate child, when such child leaves neither
legitimate descendants, nor a surviving spouse, nor
illegitimate children, is ½ of the hereditary estate
of such illegitimate child. If only legitimate or Art. 1006. Should brothers & sisters of the
illegitimate children are left the parents are not full blood survive together w/ brother & sisters of
entitled to any legitime whatsoever. If only the the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a
widow or the widower survives w/ the parents of share double that of the latter.
the illegitimate child, the legitime of the parents is
¼ of the hereditary estate of the child, & that of the Art. 1007. In case brothers & sisters of the
surviving spouse also ¼ of the estate. half blood, some on the father’s & some on the
mother’s side, are the only survivors, all shall
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit in equal shares w/o distinction as to the
inherit ab intestato fr. the legitimate children & origin of the property.
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner fr. Art. 1008. Children of brothers & sisters of
the illegitimate child. the half blood shall succeed per capita or per
stirpes, in accordance w/ the rules laid down for
Art. 993. If an illegitimate child should die w/o brothers & sisters of the full blood.
issue, either legitimate or illegitimate, his father or
mother shall succeed to his entire estate; & if the Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers
child’s filiation is duly proved as to both parents, nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the
who are both living, they shall inherit fr. him share other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
& share alike. estate.
The latter shall succeed w/o distinction of
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an lines or preference among them by reason of
illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her relationship by the whole blood.
surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire
estate. Art. 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato
shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of
If the widow or widower should survive w/ relationship in the collateral line.
brothers & sisters, nephews & nieces, she or he
shall inherit one-half of the estate, & the latter the
other half. b. Estate of the Adopted Child

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants,


ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving Art. 190, FC. Repealed.
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased in accordance w/ the
following articles. DELA PUERTA V. CA

Facts: Dominga Revuelta died & in her will she


left her properties to her 3 children – Alfredo,

252
Vicente & Isabel. Isabel was given the free portion lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any
in addition to her legitime & was appointed other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
executrix. Probate was opposed by the brothers on computed in the determination of the legitime of
the ground that some of the properties listed in the each heir, & in the account of the partition.
inventory of their mother’s estate actually belonged
to them exclusively. Alfredo died leaving Vicente as
the lone oppositor to the probate. Balane: First sense, computation. This is the
same as the third step in Art. 908.
Vicente filed petition to adopt Carmelita –
granted but appealed by Isabel. Pending the same Inaccuracy in the provision.-- "collation done by
Vicente died; Isabel moved for dismissal. compulsory heirs."-- All donations are collated
Carmelita was allowed to intervene, she filed a provided there is at least one compulsory heir
motion for payment of a monthly allowance as the bec. there will be a legitime.
acknowledged natural child of Vicente. She
presented evidence to prove the same – probate
court granted her motion. CA affirmed. Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place
among compulsory heirs if the donor should have
Issue: Can Carmelita claim support & successional so expressly provided, or if the donee should
rights to the estate of Dominga? No. repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation
should be reduced as inofficious.
Held: Vicente did not predecease his mother,
Dominga. Representation can take place only in the
ff.: When… Balane: Second sense, imputation. (Articles
the person represented dies ahead of the testator; 909, 910.)
person represented is incapable of succeeding the
testator; & General rule: Donation to a compulsory heir
person represented is disinherited by the testator. shall be collated (imputed) to his legitime.
Exceptions:
Donor provides otherwise. In such a case, it will
In all these cases there is a vacancy in the be imputed to the free portion.
inheritance and the law call the Donee repudiates the inheritance.
descendants/children of the person represented to
succeed by right of representation. There is
representation only when relatives of a deceased
Art. 1063. Property left by will is not deemed
person try to succeed him in his rights w/c he
subject to collation, if the testator has not
would have had if he were still living. Not having
otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any
predeceased Dominga, Vicente had the right to
case remain unimpaired.
inherit directly, no representation.

Carmelita is a spurious child. As a spurious


Balane: Second sense, imputation.
child she is barred fr. inheriting fr. Dominga bec. of
Art. 992 w/c is a barrier between legitimate & Testamentary Disposition. This is imputed
illegitimate families. Even as an adopted child she against the free portion & not against the
is still barred as there is no natural kindred ties legitime. The heir gets legitime + testamentary
between Carmelita & Dominga. Carmelita had disposition. Why? If not, what is the use? He
successional rights to the intestate estate of will get it anyway. Unless, of course, if it impairs
Vicente, but not to the estate of Dominga. the legitime of others.

IX. Collation

Art. 1064. When grandchildren, who survive


Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who w/ their uncles, aunts, or cousins, inherit fr. their
succeeds w/ other compulsory heirs, must bring into grandparents in representation of their father or
the mass of the estate any property or right w/c he mother, they shall bring to collation all that their
may have received fr. the decedent, during the parents, if alive, would have been obliged to

253
bring, even though such grandchildren have not In 1995, X donated to a1. In 2001, X dies while
A is still alive. Will A impute the donation to a1?
inherited the property.
No. a1 is considered a stranger bec. he is not a
compulsory heir. Impute vs. the free portion.
They shall also bring to collation all that they
may have received fr. the decedent during his
lifetime, unless the testator has provided otherwise,
Art. 1066. Neither shall donations to the
in w/c case his wishes must be respected, if the
spouse of the child be brought to collation; but if
legitime of the co-heirs is not prejudiced.
they have been given by the parent to the
spouses jointly, the child shall be obliged to bring
to collation one-half of the thing donated.
Balane:

Second sense, imputation.


Balane:
"Grandchildren" refer to all descendants who inherit
by representation. Second sense, imputation.

Illustration: Illustration:

X X
/ \ |
A B A' ----A
/ \
b1 b2 Two cases:

B predeceased X. X donates to A' only, imputed to the free portion.


X donates to both A & A', impute 1/2 to legitime
1. In 1988, X donated to B P70,000. of A & 1/2 to the free portion.
2. In 2001, X donated to b1 & b2 P50,000
Rule: Donation given to the spouse will not be
What will b1 & b2 impute when X dies? imputed to the legitime of the descendant spouse
bec. the spouse is considered a stranger.
Par. 1.-- 1988 donation.-- Yes bec. B would have
imputed it (if he) were he alive.
Par. 2.-- 2001 donation.-- Yes. This is not logical Art. 1067. Expenses for support, education,
bec. b1 & b2 inherit by representation. The general medical, attendance, even in extraordinary
rule is that only persons who receive the donation illness, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or
are bound to impute it.
customary gifts are not subject to collation.

Art. 1065. Parents are not obliged to bring to Balane:


collation in the inheritance of the ascendants any
property w/c may have been donated by the latter First sense, computation.
to their children.
Overlap between support in the NCC & in the
FC.-- Support in the FC already includes medical
attendance.
Balane: All expenses in Art. 1067 are not imputed to the
legitime.-- Including 6 things in support in the
Second sense, imputation. FC.
Illustration:
X
/ \ Art. 1068. Expenses incurred by the parents
A B in giving their children a professional, vocational
| / \ or other career shall not be brought into collation
a1 b1 b2 unless the parents so provide, or unless they
impair the legitime; but when their collation is
required, the sum w/c the child would have spent

254
if he had lived in the house & company of his E.g., Estate is worth 600. There are 3 children.
Legitimes = 300. When A got married, he was
parents shall be deducted therefr..
given a gift of 40. This is more than 1/10 of the
free portion.

Balane: 1. Literal = 30, impute to the legitime


10, return
Second sense, imputation.
2. Liberal = 30, impute to the free
This qualifies Art. 1067. portion
10, impute to the legitime.
General rule: Imputed versus the free portion.
Exceptions:
When parents provide otherwise Art. 1071. The same things donated are not
When it impairs the legitimes of other compulsory to be brought to collation & partition, but only
heirs.
their value at the time of the donation, even
But if you lived away fr. home, deduct the living though their just value may not then have been
expenses fr. what would be imputed against your assessed. Their subsequent increase or
legitime. deterioration & even their total loss or
destruction, be it accidental or culpable, shall be
This is inconsistent bec. this is included in support for the benefit or account & risk of the donee.
under the Family Code.

Balane:
Art. 1069. Any sums paid by a parent in
satisfaction of the debts of his children, election Par. 1.-- First & second senses, computation &
expenses, fines, & similar expenses shall be brought imputation.
to collation.
What do you compute? The value at the time of
the donation.
Balane: Second sense, imputation.
Par. 2.-- Any change in the value is for the
account of the donee. Why? Bec. the donee is
the owner of the thing donated. (Res perit
Art. 1070. Wedding gifts by parents & domino.)
ascendants consisting of jewelry, clothing, & outfit,
shall not be reduced as inofficious except insofar as
they may exceed one-tenth of the sum w/c is Art. 1072. In the collation of a donation
disposable by will. made by both parents, one-half shall be brought
to the inheritance of the father, & the other half,
to that of the mother. That given by one alone
Balane: shall be brought to collation in his or her
inheritance.
Second sense, imputation.

Wedding gifts.-- Two views: Balane:


Literal.-- Cannot be beyond 1/10 of the free
First & second senses, computation & imputation.
portion. If it exceeds, return the excess.
Liberal.--
This provision contemplates joint donation by
below 1/10 of the free portion, impute to the free parents fr. their common property.
portion
1/2 computed for determination of the estate of
above 1/10 of the free portion, impute to the the husband.
1/2 computed for determination of the estate of
legitime.
the wife.

255
Same rule for imputation w/ respect to the donee.
Impute 1/2 to father & 1/2 to mother. Donee may return: (a) property; (b) cash value

Obligation to return arises at the time of death.


The fruits are also returned fr. that time. The
Art. 1073. The donee's share of the estate shall amount depends on how much of the property
be reduced by an amount equal to that already has to be returned.
received by him; & his co- heirs shall receive &
equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the
same nature, class & quality. E.g., A donated to X a mango plantation.

If X has to return all, return all the fruits fr. the


time of the death of A.
Balane: Second sense, imputation. In partition,
If X has to return 1/2, return 1/2 of the fruits fr.
there should be among heirs of the same class, as
the time of the death of A.
much as possible, equality not only as to value but
also as to kind & nature. This is subject, of course,
to a contrary agreement of the heirs concerned.
Baviera: At the moment of death of donor,
donee's right over the property is modified
Art. 1074. Should the provisions of the
preceding article be impracticable, if the property
donated was immovable, the co-heirs shall be Art. 1076. The co-heirs are bound to
entitled to receive its equivalent in cash or reimburse to the donee the necessary expenses
securities, at the rate of quotation; & should there w/c he has incurred for the preservation of the
be neither cash nor marketable securities in the property donated to him, though they may not
estate, so much of the other property as may be have augmented its value.
necessary shall be sold at public auction.
The donee who collates in kind an
If the property donated was movable, the co- immovable, w/c has been given to him, must be
heirs shall only have a right to select an equivalent reimbursed by his co-heirs for the improvements
of other personal property of the inheritance at its w/c have increased the value of the property, &
just price. w/c exists at the time the partition is effected.

As to works made on the estate for the mere


Balane: Second sense, imputation. pleasure of the donee, no reimbursement is due
Applies if Art. 1073 is not possible. him for them; he has, however, the right to
1. Immovables-- cash or securities remove them, if he can do so w/o injuring the es-
2. Movables-- similarly valued movable tate.

Art. 1075. The fruits & interest of the property Balane:


subject to collation shall not pertain to the estate
except fr. the day on w/c the succession is opened. Third sense, return, on the assumption that the
donation is totally inofficious.
For the purpose of ascertaining their amount,
the fruits & interest of the property of the estate of Par. 1.-- The donee, being the rightful owner,
the same kind & quality as that subject to collation has to be reimbursed the necessary expenses.
shall be made the standard of assessment. How much? It depends on how much is collated.
(same as Art. 1075.)
Par. 2.-- Useful expenses.-- Apply the same
rules as in necessary expenses.
Balane: Par. 3.-- Ornamental expenses.-- No right to
reimbursement but has the right to remove.
Third sense, return.
These are incidental obligations arising
Assume that the property donated has to be fr. collation in the third sense.
returned bec. the legitime has been impaired. The
return may be total or partial.

256
Art. 1077. Should any question arise among Held: Art. 1041, OCC states that allowances for
the co-heirs upon the obligation to bring to collation support, education, attendance for illness are not
or as to the things w/c are subject to collation, the subject to collation. But, Art. 1042 provides that
distribution of the estate shall not be interrupted for expenses incurred by parents giving their children
this reason, provided adequate security is given. a profession or artistic career are NOT subject to
collation, unless:
Art. 51. xxx The delivery of the presumptive parent so orders, or
legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the same encroaches upon the legitime of other
the ultimate successional rights of the children heirs.
accruing upon the death of either or both of the
parents; but the value of the properties already It is also provided that in cases where it is
received under the decree of annulment or absolute proper to collate, the money w/c the child would
nullity shall be considered as advances on their have spent if he had lived in the house &
legitime. (Family Code, par. 3 thereof.) company of his parents shall be deducted fr.
therefrom.
Art. 227. If the parents entrust the
management or administration of any of their In the CAB, Felix studied surveyorship w/c is
properties to an unemancipated child, the net a 2-year course & it is shown that he received an
proceeds of such property shall belong to the average of P500 per year fr. his mother.
owner. The child shall be given a reasonable Surveyorship is a professional course & since the
monthly allowance in an amount not less than that expenses incurred in giving him that career
w/c the owner would have paid if the administrator encroached upon the legitime of Victoria, it is
were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proper to collate 1/2 of said amount. The other
proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds 1/2 is deemed the amount he would have spent if
thus given in whole or in part shall not be charged he lived in the house & company of his mother.
to the child's legitime. (Family Code.)
SC further held that the cash, cavans of palay
& carabaos received by Felix fr. the mother are
likewise collationable. Since the value of all that
ADAN V. CASILI
Felix received is greater than the value of the 4
parcels, the parties are to be left as they are.
Facts: Felix Adan commenced an action against
his sister Victoria & her husband to secure judicial
partition of the estate left by their deceased mother
VDA. DE TUPAS V. PTC
consisting of 6 lots, 2 of w/c were discarded, thus
there are only 4 remaining amounting to P2,783.55.
Facts: Epifanio Tupas died w/o issue his sole
heir being his widow Partenza. his will was
The spouse claimed that the 4 lots were
admitted to probate. Among the properties listed
donated to Victoria as her share in the inheritance.
therein were 3 lots w/c formed part of deceased’s
They also claimed that Felix had already received
private capital. However, at the time of his death
more than his share in the form of money, livestock,
these lots were no longer owned by him as he
palay & real property. TC found that the alleged
had donated them to the Tupas Foundation the
donation of the 4 parcels to Victoria was not duly
year before. Tupas Foundation obtained title to
proven, thus they should be brought to collation.
these lots.
TC also found that Felix had received sums fr. their
mother for studying in Manila & that 1/2 of the
The widow claimed that she was
amount received ought to be brought to collation.
practically destitute & thus brought suit against
As the amount received by Felix was more than the
Tupas Foundation. She claimed that the
total value of the 4 lots the court absolved Victoria
donation was inofficious & prejudiced her
& her husband.
legitime. CFI dismissed the same.
Issue: Which amounts received by Felix should be
brought to collation? Parties should be left as Issue: WON a donation inter vivos by a donor
now deceased is inofficious & should be reduced
they are.
at the instance of the donor’s widow? Yes.

257
Held: A person’s prerogative to make donations is as imputation is not in question. Sole issue is
limited in that he cannot give by donation more whether or not there is express prohibition.
than what he can give by will. Whatever is donated
that is in excess of what he can give by will is
deemed inofficious & thus the donation is reducible. X. PARTITION OF THE ESTATE
Moreover, such donation is collationable. value is
imputable to the estate of the deceased in order to
determine the value of the legitime of the Art. 1079. Partition, in general, is the
compulsory heirs. Collationable gifts include those separation, division & assignment of a thing held
made in favor of forced heirs as well as those given in common among those to whom it may belong.
to strangers. The thing itself may be divided, or its value.

The fat therefore that the donated property


is no longer part of the deceased’s estate cannot be Balane:
asserted to prevent the collation. The fact that the
properties form private capital of the deceased is of Definition.-- "Separate, divide & assign."
no moment.
1. Ways to go about partition.
To determine whether or not donation is
inofficious, a step by step process should be Extrajudicially.-- Decedent dies intestate & there
followed: are no debts.
determine value of the property w/c remains at the All the heirs agree among themselves.-- Upon
agreement, partition is already valid.
time of the testator’s death;
If registered property is included, publish the
determine the obligations, debts & charges to be partition in a public document
paid out of the value of the property thus left; Go to the Register of Deeds to have titles
determination of the difference between the assets transferred
& liabilities , giving rise to the hereditary estate;
add the value of donations (at the time they were Judicial
made) subject to collation; &
determination of the amounts of legitimes. Settlement proceeding
Ordinary action on co-ownership

2. General Procedure
DE ROMA V. CA
If w/ a will, it must first be probated. After
Facts: Candelaria de Roma had 2 legally adopted probate, the heirs can choose between:
daughters -- Buhay & Rosalinda. She died
intestate. Admin proceedings were instituted by the
guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed Extrajudicial
administratrix & filed an inventory. Rosalinda Judicial.-- Judge will divide but will first give the
opposed bec. certain properties earlier donated by heirs a chance to submit their own partition.
Candelaria to Buhay were not included, including 7
If the heirs do not agree on the partition , the
parcels of land & its fruits. Buhay claimed that the
judge will appoint a commissioner.
donor prohibited collation of the said parcels in the
deed of donation. TC ruled in favor of Buhay. CA Commissioner will submit a project of partition to
reversed. the judge. This project of partition, however,
is not binding on the judge.
Issue: Are donated properties subject to collation?
Yes. The judge will issue an order of partition.
Property will be adjudicated among the heirs
Held: Nothing in the provisions of the deed of sale accordingly.
expressly prohibits the collation of the donated
properties. It merely described the donations as
irrevocable. Anything less than express prohibition Art. 1080. Should a person make a partition
will NOT suffice under the clear language of Art. of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such
1062. Implied prohibition merits little consideration partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

258
In the case, Manuela assigned or distributed her
A parent who, in the interest of his or her estate equally among her six (6) children. Three
family, desires to keep any agricultural, industrial, or of those sold their share to a sister, Concepcion,
manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself w/ the consent of Manuela. Manuela then sold
of the right granted him in this article, by ordering the entire property to Ferrer. Was the partition
that the legitime of the other children to whom the by an act inter vivos valid? Yes. Art. 1080 allows
property is not assigned, be paid in cash. the person to make a partition. If the partition is
by will, it must be w/ the formalities on wills. If
the partition is by an act inter vivos, the partition
Balane: may be oral or written, & need not be in the form
of a will, provided the partition does not prejudice
Par. 1.-- Person can make partition. How? the legitime of the compulsory heirs. The deeds
1. By will-- making two things: of sale between Concepcion & her sisters are
Testamentary disposition.-- State what value the valid bec. they are not contracts w/ respect to
person will get. future inheritance but rather a contract perfected
Partition.-- State specific property the heir will get
& consummated during the lifetime of Manuela,
or what comprises the value.
E.g., X has no compulsory heirs. He states who signed & gave her consent.
in his will "I give to A 1/3 of my estate. To
comprise A's share, I would like her to get my
house in Alabang." 1. Right of Redemption

The testator is allowed to do so even if he


has compulsory heirs. The partition is valid as long
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his
as the items given do not impair the legitime.
hereditary rights to a stranger before the
Act inter vivos, e.g., private writing not a will. partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
Rule under the OCC -- to do this, there has to be a reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
prior existing will. Why? If no prior existing will, provided they do so w/in the period of one month
you are giving the person power to make fr. the time they were notified in writing of the
dispositions not in the form of a will. This is seen in sale by the vendor.
the use of the word "testator" in the article.
Art. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to
Rules under the NCC, is it valid?
be subrogated, upon the same terms &
conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place
(i) Yes, as long as (it is) strictly confine(d) to rules
of intestate succession since there is no will. (You) of one who acquires a thing by purchase or
can only state what properties they are to receive & dation in payment, or by any other transaction
not make testamentary dispositions. whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous
title.
(ii) Otherwise, he will have to make a supporting
will. This is seen in the use of the word "person" in
the article.
Balane:
Note: (This) can still be done in (the) manner done
in the OCC. The right of redemption given to the co-heir
provided the co-heir/ vendor sold his undivided
Example: Estate of A consists of RTW factory & share or a portion thereof in the estate.
cash. A has 3 compulsory heirs X, Y & Z. A wants
the factory to go to X. A makes a partition "Factory Article 1620 on legal redemption & Art. 1088 are
to X. Y & Z are to get their legitime in cash." the same. The only difference is in the
application.
This is valid. Bec. legitimes are only values & not
specific properties. Also, the legitimes are not 1. Art. 1620 applies to specific property
impaired. 2. Art. 1088 applies to hereditary mass

B. How will the right of redemption be


exercised?
CHAVEZ V. IAC.-- If only one will redeem, he will pay the purchase
price.
259
If more than one will redeem, they will pay As P30,000 was the price stipulated in
purchase price proportionally to their share in the the deed of sale it is also the amount to paid for
property. redemption.
Note: Share must have been sold to a
stranger. If sold to a co-heir, the right of
redemption does not exist. Why? The purpose is to Effects of Partition
keep the proprietary mass w/in the co-owners.
.
GULLAS V. JUDGE
DOROMAL V. CA
Facts: Jacinta Lopez was married to Alejandro &
Facts: Horilleno siblings – Luis, Soledad, Fe, they had no children. Jacinta executed a will w/
Rosita, Carlos, Antonio & Esperanza co-owned Lot her husband as the sole heir. However, after the
3504. Esperanza died & is survived by her daughter execution of the will they legally adopted Juanita.
Filomena. All the owners except Filomena decided Jacinta did not amend her will nor execute a
to sell their 6/7 portion over the lot in favor of the codicil.
Doromal spouses. The co-owners executed a
power of attorney in favor of their niece Mary, Upon the death of Jacinta judicial
except Filomena. A draft of the power of attorney partition was made granting Juanita 2 parcels of
was sent to Filomena stating that the selling price land w/ the remainder of the estate going to the
was P4.00 per sq. meter. Filomena was not Alejandro. Court archived the case.
agreeable & refused to sign. However, Carlos had
already accepted fr. the Doromal spouses P5,000. Juanita filed an action to set aside the
The remaining co-owners went ahead w/ the sale of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition &
their 6/7 portion for P30,000. A TCT was issued w/ fraud. She was also seeking the delivery of the 2
6/7 in the name of the Doromals & 1/7 in the name parcels of land. Alejandro opposed claiming the
of Filomena. approval of the project of partition by the court &
the order archiving the same closed &
Filomena offered P30,000 to the Doromals terminated the proceeding.
to redeem the portion of the lot sold, but they
refused. Hence they filed an action. TC dismissed. Issue: WON TC’s approval of the partition
CA reversed. terminated the testate proceeding? No.

Issue: Can Filomena can redeem the property? Held: the probate court loses jurisdiction of an
Yes. estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts & when the remaining of
Held: the letters of Carlos to Filomena were not the estate is delivered to the heirs entitled. The
evidence of a consummated sales they contained finality of the approval of the project of partition
mere offer of P4.00 per sq. meter. & later P5.00 per alone does not terminate the probate proceeding.
sq. meter. Art. 1623 requires a notice of a
perfected sale, as well as actual execution & As long as an order of the distribution of
delivery of the deed of sale. the estate has not been complied w/, probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed.
There is nothing to show that the P5,ooo
paid to Carlos was in the concept of earnest money,
rather it was a guarantee that the buyer would not DELOS SANTOS V. DELA CRUZ
back out.
Facts: the owner of the estate is Pelagia dela
Art. 1619 bestows to a co-owner the right Cruz who died intestate. The parties in this case
to redeem under the same terms & conditions are the grandniece Delos Santos (plaintiff) & the
stipulated in the contract & to avoid any nephew Dela Cruz (defendant). There was a
controversy, it is best that the period therefore project of partition among the heirs of Pelagia
shall not commence unless the notice of the wherein Dela Cruz was granted 3 lots in addition
dispositions is made after the formal deed of to his share, on the condition that he would
disposal has been duly executed. supervise the development & subdivision of the

260
estate. Expenses to be defrayed fr. proceeds of the Art. 1107. Persons who are capable of
sale. He failed to comply w/ the condition. acquiring property or rights by the other legal
modes may acquire the same by means of
Thus Delos Santos filed for specific prescription.
performance. Dela Cruz countered that the
partition was void as to Delos Santos as she was Minors & other incapacitated persons may
not a legal heir of Pelagia. acquire property or rights by prescription, either
personally or through their parents, guardians, or
Issues: legal representatives.
Is Delos Santos a legal heir entitling her to inclusion
in the partition? No. Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive &
If not, will this render the partition void w/ respect extinctive runs against:
to her? Yes.
Is Dela Cruz estopped fr. questioning Delos Santos’ (1) Minors & other incapacitated persons
right to enforce the agreement? No. who have parents, guardians or other legal
What is the effect of Dela Cruz’ counterclaim? representatives;
Restoration to legal heirs of property. (2) Absentees who have administrators,
either appointed by them before their
Held: Art. 972 provides that in the collateral line disappearance, or appointed by the courts.;
representation takes place only in favor of the (3) Persons living abroad who have
children of brothers & sisters, whether half or full managers or administrators;
blood. Delos Santos is a grandniece & thus beyond (4) Juridical persons, except the State &
the degree where representation is allowed (limited its subdivisions.;
to nephews & nieces. Neither can she inherit in her Persons who are disqualified fr.
own right as Art. 962 provides that those of the administering their property have a right to claim
nearer degree exclude the farther. damages fr. their legal representatives whose
negligence has been the cause of prescription.
Art. 1105 provides that a partition w/c
includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is Art. 1109. Prescription does not run between
not, shall be void only w/ respect to that person. husband & wife, even though there be a
separation of property agreed upon in the
Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void marriage settlements or by juridical decree.
contract or on acts w/c are prohibited by law or are
against public policy. No estoppel arises where the Neither does prescription run between
representation or conduct of the party sought to be parents & children during the minority or insanity
estopped is due to ignorance founded upon a of the latter, & between guardian & ward during
mistake. the continuance of the guardianship.

Art. 1110. Prescription, acquisitive &


PRESCRIPTION extinctive runs in favor of, or against a married
woman.

I. In General Art. 1111. Prescription obtained by a co-


proprietor or co-owner shall benefit the others.
Chapter One
GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1112. Persons w/ capacity to alienate
property may renounce prescription already
obtained but not the right to prescribe in the
Art. 1106. By prescription, one acquires future.
ownership & other real rights through the lapse of
time in the manner & under the conditions laid Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly
down by law. renounced when the renunciation results fr. acts
In the same way, rights & actions are lost w/c imply the abandonment of the right acquired.
by prescription.

261
Art. 1113. All things w/c are w/in the commerce Art. 1122. If the natural interruption is for
of men are susceptible of prescription, unless only one year or less, the time elapsed shall be
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of counted in favor of the prescription.
its subdivision not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription. Art. 1123. Civil interruption is produced by
judicial summons to the possessor.
Art. 1114. Creditors & all other persons
interested in making the prescription effective may Art. 1124. Judicial summons shall be deemed
avail themselves thereof notw/standing the express not to have been issued & shall not give rise to
or tacit renunciation by the debtor or proprietor. interruption.

Art. 1115. The provisions of the present Title (1) If it should be void for lack of legal
are understood to be w/o prejudice to what in this solemnities;
Code or special laws is established w/ respect to (2) If the plaintiff should desist fr. the
specific cases of prescription. complaint or should allow the proceedings to
elapse.
Art. 1116. Prescription already running before (3) If the possessor should be absolved fr.
the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the complaint.
laws previously in force; but if, since the time this
Code took effect, the entire period herein acquired In all these cases, the period of interruption
for prescription should elapse, the present Code shall be counted for the prescription.
shall be applicable, even though by the former
laws a longer period may be required. Art. 1125. Any express or tacit recognition
w/c the possessor may make of the owner’s
rights also interrupts possession.
Chapter Two
PRESCRIPTION OF OWNERSHIP AND OTHER Art. 1126. Against a title recorded in the
REAL RIGHTS registry of Property, ordinary prescription of
ownership or real rights shall not take place to
the prejudice of a third person, except in virtue of
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion &
another title also recorded; & the time shall begin
other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
to run fr. the recording of the latter.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession of things in good faith & w/o just title
As to land registered under the Land
for the time fixed by law.
Registration Act, the provisions of that special law
shall govern.
Art. 1118. Possession has to be in the concept
of an owner, public, peaceful & uninterrupted.
Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the person
Art. 1119. Acts of possessory character
fr. whom he received the thing was the owner
executed in virtue of license or by mere tolerance of
thereof & could transmit his ownership.
the owner shall not be available for the purpose of
possession.
Art. 1128. The conditions of good faith
required for possession in articles 526, 527, 528
Art. 1120. Possession is uninterrupted for the
& 529 of this Code are likewise necessary for the
purposes of prescription, naturally or civilly.
determination of good faith in the prescription of
ownership & other real rights.
Art. 1121. Possession is naturally interrupted
when through any cause it should cease for more
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good
than one year.
faith who is not aware that there exists in his title
or mode of acquisition any flaw w/c invalidates it.
The old possession is not revived if a new
possession should be exercised by the same
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who
adverse claimant.
possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.

262
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of Art. 1505. Subject to the provisions of this
law may be the basis of good faith. Title, where goods are sold by a person who is
not the owner thereof, & who does not sell them
Art. 527. Good faith is always presumed, & under authority or w/ the consent of the owner.
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a the buyer acquires no better title to the goods
possessor rests the burden of proof. than the seller had, unless the owner of the
goods is by his conduct precluded fr.
Art. 528. Possession acquired in goof faith does denying the seller’s authority to sell.
not lose this character except in the case &
fr. the moment facts exist w/c show that the Nothing in this Title , however, shall affect:
possessor is not unaware that he possesses the (1) The provisions of any factor’s act,
thing improperly or wrongfully. recording laws, or any other provision of law
enabling the apparent owner of goods to dispose
Art. 529. It is presumed that possession of them as if he were the true owner thereof;
continues to be enjoyed in the same character in (2) The validity of any contract of sale under
w/c it was acquired, until the contrary is proved. statutory power of sale or under the order of a
court of competent jurisdiction
Art. 1129. For the purpose of prescription, (3) Purchases made in a merchant’s store, or
there is just title when the adverse claimant came in fair, or markets, in accordance w/ the Code of
into possession of the property though one of the Commerce & special laws;
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights but the grantor was Art. 1133. Movables possessed through a
not the owner or could not transmit. crime can never be acquired through prescription
by the offender.
Art. 1130. The title for prescription must be
true & valid. Art. 1134. Ownership & other real rights over
immovable property are acquired by ordinary
Art. 1131. For the purpose of prescription, just prescription through possession of ten years.
title must be proved, it is never presumed.
Art. 1135. In case the adverse claimant
Art. 1132. The ownership of movable prescribes possesses by mistake an area greater or less than
through uninterrupted possession for fours years in that expressed in his title, prescription shall be
good faith. based on the possession.

The owner ship of personal property also Art. 1136. Possession in wartime, when the
prescribed through uninterrupted possession for civil courts are not open shall not be counted in
eight years w/o need of any other condition. favor of the adverse claimant.

With regard to the right of the owner to recover Art. 1137. Ownership & other real rights over
personal property lost or of w/c he has been illegally immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
deprived, as well as w/ respect to movables adverse possession thereof for thirty years w/o
acquired in a public sale, fair or market or fr. a need of title or of good faith.
merchant’s store, the provisions of articles 559 &
1505 of this Code shall be observed. Art. 1138. In the computation of time
necessary for prescription, the following rules
Art. 559. The possession of movable property shall be observed:
acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has (1) The present possessor may complete the
been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it fr. period necessary for prescription by tacking his
the person in possession of the same. If the possession to that of his grantor or predecessor
possessor of a movable lost or of w/c the owner has in interest.
been unlawfully deprived, had acquired it in food (2) It is presumed that the present
faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its possessor who was also the possessor at a
return w/o reimbursing the price paid therefor. previous time, has continued to be in possession

263
during the intervening time, unless there is proof to The provisions of any factor’s act, recording
the contrary. laws, or any other provision of law
(3) The first day shall be excluded & the last enabling the apparent owner of goods to
day, included. dispose of them as if he were the true owner
thereof;

Chapter Three (2) The validity of any contract of sale under


PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS statutory power of sale or under the order of a
court of competent jurisdiction

(3) Purchases made in a merchant’s store, or


Art. 1139. Actions prescribe by the mere lapse
in fair, or markets, in accordance w/ the Code of
of time fixed by law.
Commerce & special laws;
Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall
Art. 1133. Movables possessed through a
prescribe eight years fr. the time the possession
crime can never be acquired through prescription
thereof is lost, unless the possessor has acquired
by the offender.
the ownership by prescription for a less period,
according to article 1132, & w/o prejudice to the
provisions of articles 559, 1505 & 1133.
Art. 1141. Real action over immovables
prescribe after thirty years.
Art. 1132. The ownership of movables
prescribed through uninterrupted possession for
This provision is w/o prejudice to what is
our years in good faith.
established for the acquisition of ownership &
other real rights by prescription.
The ownership of movables prescribe through
uninterrupted possession for eight years w/o need
Art. 1142. A mortgage action prescribes after
of any other condition.
ten years.
With regard to the right of the owner to recover
Art. 1143. The following rights, among others
personal property lost or of w/c he has been illegally
specified elsewhere in this Code are not
deprived, as well as w/ respect to movables
extinguished by prescription;
acquired in a public sale, fair, or market, or fr. a
merchants store, the provisions of articles 559 &
(1) To demand a right of way, regulated in
1505 of this Code shall be observed.
article 649
Art 559. The possession of movable property
Art. 649. (Easement of right of way) The
acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has
may cultivate or use any immovable, w/c is
been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it fr.
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to
the person in possession of the same. If the
other persons & w/o adequate outlet to a public
possessor of a movable lost or of w/c the owner has
highway, is entitled to demand a right of way
been unlawfully deprived, had acquired it in food
through the neighboring estates, after payment
faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its
of the proper indemnity.
return w/o reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Should this easement be established in such
Art 1505. Subject to the provisions of this Title,
a manner that its use may be continuous for all
where goods are sold by a person who is not the
the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a
owner thereof, & who does not sell them under
permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist
authority or w/ the consent of the owner. the buyer
of the value of the land occupied & the amount of
acquires no better title to the goods than the seller
the damage caused to the servient estate.
had, unless the owner of the goods is by his
conduct precluded fr. denying the seller’s authority
In case the right of way is limited to the
to sell.
necessary passage for the cultivation of the
estate surrounded by others & for the gathering
Nothing in this Title , however, shall affect:

264
of its crops through the servient estate w/o a Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all
permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the kinds of actions when there is no special
payment of the damage cause by such provision w/c ordains, otherwise shall be counted
encumbrance. fr. the day they may be brought.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation Art. 1151. The time for the prescription of
of the immovable is due to the proprietor’s own actions w/c have for their object the enforcement
acts. of obligations to pay principal w/ interest or
annuity runs fr. the last payment of the annuity
(2) To bring an action to abate a public or or of the interests.
private nuisance.
Art. 1152. The period for prescription of
Art. 1144. The following actions must be actions to demand the fulfillment of obligation
brought w/in ten years fr. the time the right of declared by a judgment commences fr. the time
action accrues: the judgment becomes final.
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2)Upon an obligation created by Art. 1153. The period for prescription of
law actions to demand accounting runs fr. the day
(3) Upon a judgment the persons who would render the same cease in
their functions.
Art. 1145. The following actions must be
commenced w/in six years: The period for the action arising fr. the
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the result of the accounting runs fr. the date when
plaintiffs said result was recognized by agreement of the
(2) Upon a quasi contract interested parties.

Art. 1146. The following actions must be Art. 1154. The period during w/c the obligee
instituted w/in four years was prevented by a fortuitous event fr. enforcing
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the his right is not reckoned against him.
plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi delict; Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is
interrupted when they are filed before the court,
However, when the action arises fr. or out of when there is a written extrajudicial demand by
any act, activity, or conduct of any public officer the creditors, & when there is any written
involving the exercise of powers or authority arising acknowledgment of the debt by the debtors.
fr. Martial law including the arrest, detention &/ or
trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought w/in
one year. (As amended by PD 1755, Sec. 24, 1980) BAVIERA NOTES:

Art. 1147. The following actions must be filed 1. Acquisitive Prescription:


w/in one year: a. Tacit recognition interrupts prescriptive period.
(1.) For forcible entry & detainer; b. This need not be specifically alleged.
(2.) For defamation
2. Extinctive Prescription: Written
Art. 1148. The limitations of actions in articles acknowledgment of debtor interrupts the
prescriptive period.
1140 to 1142 & 1144 to 1147 are w/o prejudice to
those specified in other parts of this Code, in the
Code of Commerce, & in special laws.
Sec. 42. Code of Civil Procedure
Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are
not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be Sec. 45 Code of Civil Procedure
brought w/in five years fr. the time the right of
action accrues.
SOLIS V. CA 176 S 678, 685-7

265
FACTS: Ps are the owners of a residential ISSUE: WON Meralco acquired the perpetual
land w/c they inherited fr. their father. In 1939, easement by prescription
they allowed Ds to construct a house thereon but
when PS demanded that Ds vacate the same in HELD: No. IAC decision AFFIRMED . There being
1965, the latter refused to do so. Ps thus filed this no evidence that the original use of the property
action. Ds claim that they had acquired the land by in question by P was based upon any express
donation propter nuptias & they have been in grant of a fee to the said property, or of an
continuous, open, & adverse possession of the easement of right of way nor that it had began
same. Trial court for Ps. CA reversed. Hence this under an assertion of a right on its part, the
appeal. presumption must be that the origin of the use
was the mere tolerance or license of Nazario
ISSUE: Who has a better title between the Ps & Crisostomo. It is a fundamental principle of law
Ds? that possession is not affected by acts of a
possessory character w/c are “merely tolerated”
HELD: CA decision AFFIRMED. Ds are lawful by the possessor, or w/c are due to his license.
owners. Evidence shows that there was indeed a Possession, to constitute the foundation of a
DPN executed by Ps father in favor of Ds’ father. prescriptive right, must be POSSESSION UNDER
And even granting that the DPN was void, suffice it A CLAIM OF TITLE (en concepto de dueno). It
to say that a void donation may be the basis of must be ADVERSE. Acts of a possessory
claim of ownership w/c may ripen into title by character performed by one who holds by mere
prescription. It is the essence of the status of tolerance of the owner are clearly not ën
limitations that whether the party had a right to the concepto de dueno” & such possessory acts, no
possession or not, if he entered under the claim of matter how long so continued, do not start the
such right & remained in possession ....for 10 years, running of the period of prescription..
the right of action of the Ps father who had the
better title is barred by that adverse possession.
The right given by the statute of limitations doe not BAVIERA: Estoppel by laches does not vest
depend upon, & has no necessary connection ( w/ ) title. It merely bars the owner fr.
the validity of the claim under w/c the possession is recovering the property.
held. The “ just title” required for acquisitive
prescription to set in is not “titulo verdadero y A land was possessed by another & the
valido”.... or such title by itself is sufficient to owner cannot recover possession thereof
transfer ownership w/o necessity of letting the as he was guilty of laches. Then the land is
prescriptive period to elapse but only “titulo transferred to a third period. Is he an
colorado”--- or such title where, although there was innocent purchaser? NO, as the land was
a mode of transferring ownership, still something is in possession of another & he should have
wrong bec. the grantor is not the owner. Acquisitive therefore inquired as to the state of affairs.
prescription has set in under the CCP.
What if the property was taken possession
BAVIERA: Donation is void as to form. Can the of by another while the owner thereof
same ripen into acquisitive prescription (AP) was abroad. The owner returned after
w/in 10 years? NO, as the donation is void. many years & seeks to recover his
Thirty years is needed for AP as the donee property. LACHES ? NO. He is not guilty of
cannot invoke good faith. AP still requires conduct amounting to laches.
that the title is valid & true.
Remember that in laches, the property
remains the property of the owner, only
MERALCO VS. IAC 174, S313, 320-2 that he cannot recover possession fr. the
possessor as such action is barred by law.
FACTS: P MERALCO built transmission towers on Thus, the creditor of the rightful owner
the land owned by Prs. The same had been may still attach the rightful owner’s
standing thereon for 43 years. But it was only in interest in the same.
1973 that PR’s sued MERALCO for damages. For PR.
IAC affirmed. Hence, this appeal .

266
KIAMKO V. CA, 211 S 156, 161-2 money , she referred Galicia to her D- son
Gregorio. D bought the land & immediately took
FACTS: Faustino sold the property here in question possession. But when the Japanese came, his
to the Villamor spouses under a pacto de retro. house was looted so he lost the document of
When the latter later on needed money, Faustino’s sale. Pfs now bring action for partition.. For Ds.
father in law Jose Daguilmo bought the same fr. the Hence this appeal.
Villamors & immediately took possession of the
land. Then Faustino abandoned his family only to ISSUE: WON Gregorio owns the lot
return 20 years later to repossess the land in
dispute fr. Jose. He failed but he sold the same to HELD: YES. Contention of D as to ownership,
P- Kiamko. P, unable to get possession of the land, WITH MERIT. D never did hold the land in
filed an action for quieting the title. For P. CA common w/ the Ps.
reversed, hence this.
As to the court’s consideration of the
HELD: AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Art. 1116 of the defense of prescription even though the same
NCC, the law to be applied in determining whether was not raised by Gregorio, it must be noted that
prescription had already set in is the CCP. Under the there is a distinction between acquisitive
same, only 10 years is needed for acquiring land by prescription (AP) & extinctive prescription (EP).
prescription, whether there is good or bad faith. EP or prescription of action should be
More than 10 years had passed since Joe first took affirmatively pleaded & proved in order to bar the
possession of the land. He has thus acquired the action or claim of the adverse party whereas AP
land by acquisitive prescription. can be proven under the general issue w/o its
being affirmatively pleaded. The latter applies in
BAVIERA: EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION is also this case so D’s failure to allege the same
known as the STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. constitutes no waiver.

Prescription has a substantive & a BAVIERA: Why can AP not be affirmatively


procedural aspect. alleged? Because it is a MATTER OF
EVIDENCE. Only ultimate facts need be
A partner & a co-owner cannot recover alleged.
property of the partnership or under co-
ownership unless he first repudiates the PS
or the co-ownership. SUNGA VS. GUZMAN, JUNE 17, 1979.

Extraordinary prescription only requires that FACTS: The spouses Guzman left to their 9
possession be peaceful & not taken by force. children a fishpond as part of their in inheritance.
5 of the children sold their shares in the fishpond
Under the CCP, a uniform period of 10 years to Sibug for P700 via a private contract of sale. In
is the maximum for AP, depending on the 1948, Sunga, to whom the shares of the 5
nature of the action. brothers were sold took physical possession of
the fishpond. However, the tax declaration of the
fishpond remained in the name of its original
owners, spouses Guzman. Rs (3 of the 9
II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACQUISITIVE children), since 1955 have demanded for the
AND EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION delivery of their respective share. Later, Rs
brought action to recover their share in the same.
Granted & Rs were declared pro-indiviso owners
MONTANEZ VS. MONTANEZ 51 OG NO. 8 , P. of the 3/9 portion of the fishpond. The CA
4119 affirmed. Hence this appeal.

FACTS: In question is the ownership of a lot ISSUE: WON Sunga, et. al. acquired ownership
originally owned by one Galicia. On the land was of the land through prescription.
constructed the house of Juan Montanez &
Gregorio Montanez’ mother. Galicia asked the HELD: NO. CA decision AFFIRMED. Rs were not
parties mother to buy the land but as she had no definitely aware since 1948 contrary to Ps

267
contention that Ps’ possession over the same BAVIERA: Dapat alisin na ang ground na
extended over the whole fishpond. Thus, possession iyan. Baka demand ka nga ng demand,
of Ps since 1948 cannot be said to be adverse & hindi ka naman nag-pa file ng action. What
open as to give rise to title by prescription in favor if meanwhile, the evidence has been lost.
of Ps. The only way that a fishpond may be said to The case of a written acknowledgment of
have been held in adverse possession by some of the debt is different.
its co-owners is when they harvest all the fish in the
fishpond, leaving nothing for the other co-owners to
harvest. BUENAVENTE VS. MELCHOR MARCH 30,
1979
Besides, the property in question has
remained in the name of the father. Thus, Facts: Ps have their houses erected on land
possession of Ps cannot be completely adverse or owned by NDC. They filed this action to prevent
open, & nor was it in the concept of an owner, w/c Rs fr. demolishing their houses & relocating them
are indispensable elements for prescription. in Cavite. They also ask that they be declared
first priority applicants of the tenement housing
Also, the Ps have promised one of the Rs unit built near their place pursuant to RA 3469.
that they will pay his share in the land. This fact
shows the Ps continuing recognition of the rights of ISSUE: WON Ps have a right to be protected
Rs over their corresponding share in the fishpond under RA 3469

BAVIERA: THIS INTERRUPTED THE RUNNING HELD: NO. DISMISSED. Ps are mere squatters
OF PRESCRIPTION. Art. 1155 w/c is invoked on the lot & w/o any legal right to be protected
by Ps is not applicable as it refers to by declaratory relief or by a writ of prohibition.
prescription by action, not acquisitive Their occupation of the land by mere tolerance
prescription. can by no means give rise to a right that the law
should protect in their favor as against the true
local owners.
OVERSEAS BANK VS. GERALDEZ DEC.28,
1979
LEDESMA VS. CA, 224 S 175
Facts: Rs owed P Bank money. As Rs defaulted in
their payment, P made several extra-judicial FACTS: In 1980, action was brought by PR bank
demands, the last being in August 1976. Later, it against P to enforce the terms of a 1974 trust
commenced this action for recovery of the debt. agreement. Dismissed for failure to serve
Barred on the ground of prescription (allegedly Ps summons. In 1988, PR filed another action based
COA accrued February 1965 & action was brought on the same c/a. P filed MTD on the ground of
only in October 1975) Lower court held that the 6 prescription. Denied & for PR. CA AFFIRMED. SC
extra judicial demands merely tolled the running of AFFIRMED. Hence, this MFR.
the prescriptive period for a total of 6 days ( 1 day
per demand ). ISSUE: WON the second civil case filed by RCBC
is barred by prescription
ISSUE: What is the effect of the written demands
made by the Bank upon the debtors on the running HELD: NO. AFFIRMED. Upon filing of an axn. in
of the prescriptive period? court, the full period of prescription commences
to run anew. Art. 1153 provides that the filing of
HELD: REVERSED. The letters of demand an action interrupts the running of the 10 year
interrupted the running of the period. Action has prescriptive period. This means that when an
not yet prescribed. The interruption of the action is filed, the prescriptive period is
prescriptive period by the written extra judicial suspended & upon the cessation of the action,
demands means that the prescriptive period the period commences to run anew. (10 years
commenced anew fr.-- the receipt of the demand. ulit)
And as action upon a written contract prescribes in
10 years, P’s action would prescribe only in 1986. BAVIERA: The article says while the case is
pending, the period is interrupted. When

268
does the period run or commence anew ? having had knowledge or notice of the D’s
WHEN THE ACTION IS DISMISSED WITHOUT conduct & having been afforded an opportunity
THERE BEING A DECISION ON THE MERITS. to institute a suit; 3.) lack of knowledge or notice
on the part of the D that the complainant would
From the service of summons, the D assert the right on w/c he bases his suit; & 4.)
becomes aware of the flaw in his title so injury or prejudice to the D in the event relief is
becomes in bad faith. In such a case, when accorded to the complainant or the suit is not
he was initially in GF, then later became in held barred.
BF, how do you apply E prescription. THE
PERIOD WHEN HE WAS IN GOOD FAITH, Prescription is different fr. laches. The 2
ACCORDING TO MANRESA IS COUNTED . SO defenses are independent.
IF HE WAS IN GF FOR 5 YEARS, THEN HE
WAS ABLE TO COMPLETE 1/2 OF THE PERIOD Prescription is concerned w/ the fact of delay.,
FOR ORDINARY PRESCRIPTION. 1/2 NA whereas laches is concerned w/ the effect of
LANG NUNG PERIOD FOR EX delay.
.PRESCRIPTION. ANG KAILANGAN, MEANING Prescription is a matter of time; laches is
15 YEARS. principally a question of inequity of permitting a
claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded
on some change in the condition of the property
III. DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXTINCTIVE or the relation of the parties.
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES Prescription is statutory, laces is not. Laches
applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at
law.
MIGUEL VS. CATALINO, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 Prescription is based on fixed time,. laches is not.

FACTS: Bacquiao sold his land in 1928 to D’s father BAVIERA: Under the CC, an action to declare
but no formal deed was executed. D & his father, the contract valid is imprescriptible. But
however, took possession of the land & have still, in this case, the SC applied the
continued doing so for more than 30 years. In principle of laches.
1949, P, (a daughter of Bacquiao) again sold the
land to D. In 1969, D’s father sold the land to D. In
1962, Pfs. brought action in the CF against D for LOLA VS. CA, 145 S 439, 449
recovery of the land. Dismissed.
FACTS: Zabala owned 2 adjoining lots, one in
ISSUE: WON the 1928 sale was null & void ab front of the Sto Nino Street, & the other behind
initio (YES ) WON Pfs. can still recover possession said lot. She sold the back lot to Fr. Lola. The
of the land (NO) bec. of laches. latter, however, believed that what was sold to
him included the front lot. So he occupied the
HELD: AFFIRMED. Although the sale in 1928 was same & Zabala now brings this action. Fr. Lola
void for lack of the required executive approval, D asserts that more than 30 years have elapsed
still has the right over the land on the ground of since the execution of the sale & thus, PR is now
acquisitive prescription. And even granting that no estopped fr. asserting any rights, having slept on
prescription lies against P’s father’s recorded title, them for 30 years. LC for P. CA REVERSED.
still their passivity & inaction for than 34 years
justifies D in setting up the defense of laches. Ps ISSUE: WON Zabala is barred by laches
are thus barred by laches fr. recovering the
property. HELD: YES. CA decision REVERSED. For P.
Although the defense of prescription is unavailing
All the 4 elements of laches ( A FAVORITE to Lola bec. admittedly, the title to the lot in
BAR QUESTION , ACCORDING TO MAM) are question is still registered in he name of PR, still
present in the case at bar: 1.) conduct on the part he has acquired title to it by virtue of the
of the D or of one under whom he claims, giving equitable principle of laches due to PR’s failure to
rise to the situation of w/c complaint is made & for assert her claim & ownership for 32 years. The
w/c complainant seeks a remedy; 2.) delay in long inaction & delay of the title holder in
asserting the complainant’s rights. the complainant

269
asserting his right over the disputed land bars him action for recovery of the jewelry’s value. Javier
fr. recovering the same. alleges that the action has prescribed. Javier was
acquitted in the criminal case. However, he was
Courts cannot look w/ favor at parties who, adjudged liable in the civil case.
by their silence, delay , & inaction, knowingly induce
another to spend time, effort & expense in ISSUE: WON Garrido’s COA has
cultivating the land, paying taxes & making prescribed. NO.
improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to
spring fr. ambush & claim title when the possessor’s HELD: Rule 111, Sec.1 of the ROC provides:
efforts & the rise of land values offer an Section 1. When a criminal action is instituted,
opportunity to make easy profit at his expense. the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
fr. the offense charged is impliedly instituted w/
VICTORIANO VS. CA, 194 S 18 the criminal action, unless the offended party
expressly waives the civil action or reserves his
FACTS: Masigla was in possession of Lot 897. In right to institute it separately.
1987, his son entered the adjoining lot owned by P
& prohibited her fr. cultivating the land. P thus filed Thus, when the criminal action was filed
a criminal action against the son. In the process, against Javier on Dec. 16, 1947, the civil action
she discovered that Lot 897 was registered in the for recovery of her civil liability was deemed
name of her grandfather. She secured partition fr. instituted w/ it. Garrido did not then reserve his
all the heirs & was able to register the land in her right to institute the civil action separately; he did
name. The heirs of Arcilla, represented by Masigla, so on Feb. 18, 1959. In the meantime, the civil
thus filed an action for reconveyance alleging that aspect of the case was kept alive by its pendency
their father bought the lot fr. P’s grandfather & they in the criminal action, fr. the time it was revived
had been in possession of the same since 1927. For on Jan. 12, 1950, up to the time the reservation
P. CA reversed. was made. The aggregate duration of the
periods available for prescription is less than the
ISSUE: Who owns Lot 897? prescriptive period:
Oct. 1, 1947 when the COA accrued, up to Dec.
HELD: CA decision AFFIRMED. Masigla & her co- 16, 1947 when the criminal action for estafa was
heirs own the lot. P’s action to recover the lot is filed;
barred by laches. Laches is “such neglect or fr. Mar. 22, 1948 when the said action was
omission to assert a right taken in conjunction w/ provisionally dismissed, up to Jan. 12, 1950
the lapse of time & other circumstances causing when it was revived by the Court; &
prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a fr. Feb. 18, 1959 when Garrido expressly
bar in equity. True, titled lands cannot be acquired reserved his right to institute a separate civil
by prescription. However, as stated, P’s inaction for action, to Feb. 20, 1959, when the complaint in
more than 50 years now bars her fr. acquiring said action was filed.
possession of the land on the ground of laches.

ESPIRITU V. CFI
III. Special Cases
FACTS: Espiritu in her complaint alleged
that defendant Topacio verbally sold to her 2
GARRIDO V. ENRIQUEZ parcels of land & that delivery was made to her
but no deed of sale was executed. Espiritu
FACTS: Javier received fr. Garrido two claimed that despite repeated demands,
pieces of jewelry. Javier failed to return these defendant sellers failed w/o just cause to comply
jewelry or to pay the agreed value in spite of w/ the execution of the deed of sale. Defendant
repeated demands. She charged w/ estafa. Javier denied that it was a contract of sale & alleged it
wrote to Garrido, requesting him to allow her to pay was only an antichresis & that the action has
in installments. Garrido agreed & the case was prescribed. Espiritu claims her action is
provisionally dismissed. Javier failed to pay the imprescriptible since it is an action to compel
installments. Garrido moved to set aside the order compliance to a promise to execute the
of provisional dismissal. to revive the case. CFI necessary public document of sale of real estate.
granted the motion. Garrido filed a separate civil
270
ISSUE: WON the action has prescribed. this kind of action is entirely independent of the
YES. criminal responsibility of the offender.

HELD: Art. 1357 of the NCC provides: However, the original MTD did not allege
If the law requires a document or other special prescription. Under the ROC, defenses &
form, as in the acts & contracts enumerated in the objections not pleaded either in an MTD or in the
following article, the contracting parties may answer are deemed waived.
compel each other to observe that form, once the
contract has been perfected. This right may be
exercised simultaneously w/ the action upon the SOLIDARIOS V. ALAMPAY
contract.
FACTS: The Solidario spouses filed on
Said article does not contemplate that the Nov. 29, 1972 a complaint against Ong for
time to commence an action to compel the reformation of a deed of absolute sale (executed
execution of a formal agreement can be longer than on Dec. 24, 1964) into a contract of mortgage &
that for filing of the suit for specific performance of for the return of the land to them upon payment
the perfected K itself. The NCC does not consider of the loan.
the action to compel the execution of a formal
agreement imprescriptible. Under Art. 1143, only HELD: The action has not yet prescribed. The
the following rights are imprescriptible: applicable period is that relating to actions based
to demand a right of way upon a written contract & for reformation thereof,
to bring an action to abate a public nuisance w/c is 10 years. Only less than 8 years has
elapsed fr. the execution of the deed of sale up
The nature of Espiritu’s action may be said to the filing of this action.
to be one founded on an oral K. Under Art. 1145, it
must be commenced w/in 6 years (also an action
upon a quasi-contract). Special cases

The COA accrued in 1948 ( re: the verbal


sale) while the present suit was instituted in 1964. JALANDONI V. PNB

Facts: CFI rendered judgement ordering


TORREDA V. BONCAROS Jalandoni to pay PNB. The Sheriff levied upon a
property owned by Jalandoni. No effort was
FACTS: Defendants Visayan Sawmill & Ang Tay are made to sell the land at a public auction to satisfy
the proprietors & operator of a cargo truck. It was the judgment. Jalandoni filed an action to quiet
being driven by Tionson when its protruding lumber title or for the cancellation of the notice of
cargo struck & killed Torreda, a passenger in embargo on the ground that 10 years had
another truck. A criminal complaint was filed elapsed fr. the time the sale was made.
against the driver of both trucks. The criminal case
has been pending for 9 years bec. Tionson went Issue: May the judgement debtor’s land w/c was
abroad to hide. The widow of Torreda filed a notice levied upon w/in 5 years fr. entry of judgment,
manifesting her reservation of her right to file a be sold at an execution sale after the expiration
separate civil action against the driver & employer of the 10 year period for enforcing judgment?
(defendants in this case).
Ratio: No. Employees of the bank were
Defendants filed a MTD on the ground of negligent. Thus, laches & neglect bar the
lack of cause of action, & later a Supplemental MTD creditors fr. enforcing the debt. The notice of
on the ground that the action based on culpa embargo is no longer enforceable & has become
aquiliana had prescribed. a cloud upon his title.

HELD: Suit by the widow not barred.


BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS V. ZULUETA
Regardless of the criminal case, the case of
quasi-delict could have been filed separately, since Facts: In 1955, a decision was rendered
ordering Zulueta to pay the Land Settlement &
271
Development Corporation. In 1965, the Board of Luzon Surety. In 1982, Luzon filed a claim against
Liquidators as trustee for LSDC filed a complaint the estate of Puyat. Heirs said Luzon is barred by
against Zulueta to revive the judgment, w/c had not laches.
been enforced bec. summons was not served on
Zulueta. The Court dismissed the case foe lack of Issue: Whether the ten year prescriptive period
interest to prosecute. The Board filed another to file an action to enforce a judgment pursuant
complaint in 1966. Zulueta averred that the cause to Art. 1144 commences to run fr. the finality of
of action had prescribed ( 10 years) the original judgment or fr. the revived
judgment?
Issue: Whether or not the Board’s cause of action
in the new case has prescribed? No. Held: Count fr. the finality of judgment. After the
expiration of 5 years w/in w/c execution can be
Held: Art. 144 provide that an action based upon a the manner therein provide so long as the period
judgment must be brought w/in 10 years fr. the of 10 years does not expire fr. the date of such
time the right of action accrues. The prescriptive judgment. The right of the winning party to
period starts fr. the time the judgment becomes enforce the judgment begins to exist the moment
final & executory. In the CAB, the first decision then judgment becomes final. In reconciling the
sought to be enforced became final & executory on Rules of Court provision (now irrelevant) & the
the date of its rendition in 1955. Civil Code , what the law intends is that after the
expiration of the first 5 years, there remain to the
Article 1155 expressly provides that the winning party 10 years after the expiration of the
prescription of action is interrupted when they are first 5 years, there remain to the winning party
filed before the court. Such interruption lasts during only another 5 years to revive it.
the pendency of the action.
In the CAB, the first action for revival was dismissed ATOK BIG WEDGE V. CA
not by reason of abandonment but bec. of the
inability to serve summons on Zulueta. The Facts: AI Reynolds located Fredia Mineral claim.
dismissal of the action filed w/in the prescriptive Reynolds executed a Declaration of Location. And
period does not necessarily result in the non- recorded it in the Office of the Mining Recorder in
interruption of the period of limitation. an action 1931. Reynolds sold the claim to Atok in a deed
based upon a judgment. of sale in 1931. Since then it has been in
continuous & exclusive ownership & possession
REPUBLIC V. CFI of the claim.

Facts: In 1943, Infante obtained loans fr. the Bank Consi has a lot located in the area. In
of Taiwan. In 1961, the Republic of the Philippines 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry &
as successor in interest filed a complaint to collect detainer against Consi.
the amount. Infante moved to dismiss on the
ground of prescription. Issue: Whether or not an individual’s long term
occupation of a land of public domain vests him
Issue: Whether or not the action has prescribed? w/ such rights over the same to defeat the rights
of the owner of that claim?
Held: No. Prescription does not run against the
State. Moratorium laws also interrupted the running Held: No. Atok now owns the property. The
of the prescriptive period. perfection of the mining claim converted the
property to mineral land & removed it fr. the
LUZON SURETY V. IAC public domain. In CAB, the records show that the
lot was acquired through a Deed of Sale. The
(This is no longer relevant. Check the New Rules of land was not & could not have been transferred
Civil Procedure & ask someone who has taken to Consi by virtue of acquisitive prescription bec.
Remedial Law to explain it to you) at the time, Consi occupied the property it is still
part of the public domain. His possession did not
Facts: Judgement was rendered against Gil Puyat confer him possessory rights over the same.
& company on April 13, 1967. Another civil case
was instituted to revive the judgment. In 1974,
judgment was rendered ordering Puyat etc. to pay
272
OBLIGATIONS
Both parties are determined at the time of the
execution of the obligation.
An obligation wherein one party is determined at
Balane: the constitution of the obligation & the other to
be determined subsequently in accordance w/ a
Book IV starts w/ an inaccuracy. It gives the criteria that is previously established.
impression that obligations & contracts are of the An obligation in w/c the subject is determined in
same status, w/c they are not. A contract is only accordance w/ his relation to a thing & therefor it
one of the sources of obligations. Book IV should changes where the thing passes fr. one person to
have been simply titled "Obligations." another. This is a property-linked obligation.

Etymology.-- The word obligation comes fr. two Object of the obligation.-- This refers to the
Latin words, ligare, meaning "to bind" & ob w/c is a conduct or activity that must be observed by the
proposition used to intensify a verb. Literally debtor. The object of the obligation is always an
obligare means "to bind securely." activity or conduct, the prestation.

Requisites of an object:
Art. 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity It must be licit.
to give, to do or not to do. It must be possible.
It must be determinate or determinable.
It must have pecuniary value so that if not
performed it is converted into damages.
Balane:
Vinculum juris (legal tie).-- Upon default or
Definition. A better definition would be, refusal of the debtor to perform, the creditor can
go to court. When a person says "I promise to
An obligation is a juridical relation (bec. pay you when I like to," there is no obligation
there are 2 parties) whereby a person should here bec. there is no vinculum juris
engage or refrain fr. engaging in a certain activity
for the satisfaction of the private interests of All these first three four elements are agreed
another, who in case of non-fulfillment of such duty upon by commentators as essential elements.
may obtain fr. the patrimony of the former through The following two are being debated.
proper judicial proceedings the very prestation due
or in default thereof, the economic equivalent Causa debendi/ obligationes (Castan).-- This is
(damages) that it represents. (Diaz Piero.) what makes the obligation demandable. This is
the proximate why of an obligation.

Characteristics of an Obligation: Form.-- This is controversial. This is acceptable


only if form means some manifestation of the
It represents an exclusively private interest intent of the parties.
It creates ties that are by nature transitory
It involves the power to make the juridical tie
effective in case of non-fulfillment through an I. Sources of Obligations
economic equivalent obtained fr. the debtor's
patrimony.

Essential Elements of an Obligation: Art. 1157. Obligations arise fr.:


(1) Law;
Active Subject.-- This refers to the creditor or the (2) Contracts;
obligee. Strictly speaking the two are not the same. (3) Quasi-contracts;
A creditor generally used in an obligation to give (4) Acts or omissions punished by
while obligee is used in an obligation to do. law; &
(5) Quasi-delicts
Passive Subject.-- This refers to the debtor or the
obligor. If you want to be a civilist, debtor is used
in an obligation to give while obligor is used in an
obligation to do. Balane:

On the first two elements: They must be Law as a source of obligation.-- I am under
determinate or determinable. The following are the impression that all obligations are derived fr.
possible combinations: law. It is my opinion that there is an overlap in
273
the enumeration bec. all obligations arise fr. law.
So, what is the idea of enumerating law as only one Is the enumeration in Art. 1157 exclusive
of the sources of an obligation as if it is only one of or merely illustrative? The sense that the case of
them when the four find their sources in law? Is it Sagrada Orden tells us is that the enumeration is
true that law is the only source of obligation? Yes & exclusive. In resolving the issue of whether the
No. Yes, law is the only source of obligation if you def. should be liable to pay rentals, the SC used
talk of it in the ultimate sense. No, if you are the process of exclusion. For there to be an
talking of law as a proximate source. In this case, obligation to pay rentals, that obligation must
there are five sources of obligations. Law is both arise fr. either of the five (5) sources of
the ultimate & a proximate source of obligations. obligations. If it does not, then there is no
obligation. The clear implication of this ruling is
Sources of Obligations according to Sanchez that, these five (5) are the only sources of
Roman.-- Law & Acts. The latter are further obligations.
classified, as follows: (1) licit acts created by
concurrence of wills (contracts); (2) licit acts either The problem w/ Art. 1157 is that it might
voluntary or involuntary w/o concurrence of wills not cover all situations. For example: Carale
(quasi-contract); (3) illicit acts of civil character w/c uses Dove as his soap. He then hears an
are not punishable, voluntary or involuntary (torts & advertisement fr. Proctor & Gamble that it is
all damages arising fr. delay); (4) illicit acts w/c are offering a nice tumbler for those who can collect
voluntary & are punishable by law (crimes.) 30 wrappers of Tide before Feb. 29, 1996. So,
Carale stopped using Dove & started using Tide.
He was able to consume all 30 wrappers on Feb.
SAGRADA ORDEN VS. NACOCO [91 P 503] 29, 1996. He then went to Proctor & Gamble (P
& G) to exchange the 30 Tide wrappers for a
tumbler. But P & G told Carale that their
If def.-appellant (NaCoCo) is liable at all, its
tumblers run out of stock. Carale contracted a
obligations must arise fr. any of the 4 sources of skin allergy as a result of using Tide in taking a
obligations, namely, law, contract or quasi contract, bath. The question is: Does P & G have any
crime, or negligence. (Art. 1089, OCC.) Def.- obligation to Carale. If we look at Art. 1157, this
appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, bec. it situation does not fall in any of the five sources.
entered into the premises & occupied it w/ the So, we know have a problem. The German Civil
permission of the entity w/c had the legal control & Code (BGB) covers this situation. The BGB has a
admin. thereof, the Alien Prop. Admin. (APA) sixth source of obligation, the Auslobung, w/c
Neither was there any negligence on its part. There means a unilateral offer. Art. 657 of the BGB
provides:
was also no privity (of contract or obligation) bet.
the APA & Taiwan Tekkosho, w/c had secured the
possession of the prop. fr. the pltff-appellee by the
use of duress, such that the Alien Prop. Custodian Art. 657. Binding promise. A person who, by
or its permittee (def.-appellant) may be held public notice, announces a reward for the
responsible for the supposed illegality of the performance of an act, in particular for the
occupation of the prop. by said Tekkosho. The APA production of a result, is bound to pay a reward
had the control & admin. of the prop. not as to any person who has performed the act, even if
successor to the interests of the enemy holder of he did not act w/ a view to the reward.
the title, the T. Tekkosho, but by express provision
of law. Neither is it a trustee of the former owner,
the pltff-appellee herein, but a trustee of the US Note: We now have a DTI regulation covering
Govt., in its own right, to the exclusion of, & against this situation. This is an administrative regulation
the claim or title of, the enemy owner. From Aug. w/c has the force of law. But it would have been
better to have placed this rule in a law rather
1946, when def.-appellant took possession, to the
than in a mere administrative regulation.
date of the judgment on 2/28/48, the APA had the
absolute control of the prop. as trustee of the US Articles 1158 - 1162 specify the general
Govt., w/ power to dispose of it by sale or principles regarding the sources of obligation
otherwise, as though it were the absolute owner. enumerated in Art. 1157.
Therefore, even if def. were liable to the APA for
rentals, these would not accrue to the benefit of the
pltff., the old owner, but the US Govt. Art. 1158. Obligations derived fr. law are not
presumed. Only those expressly determined in
this Code or in special laws are demandable, &
Balane:
274
shall be regulated by the precepts of the law w/c Balane:
established them; & as to what has not been
foreseen, by the provisions of this Book. The Code Commission did not choose to use tort.
This is bec. tort does not exactly have the same
meaning as quasi-delict. Tort covers intentional
torts w/c in quasi-delict is considered as civil
Art. 1159. Obligations arising fr. contracts have liability arising fr. acts or omissions punishable by
the force of law between the contracting parties & law. There are some quasi-delicts w/c are not
should be complied w/ in good faith. covered by tort. Dean Bocobo suggested the
ancient term culpa aquiliana. But this did not
merit the approval of the Code Commission.
Balane: There are two parts in Art. 1159. The
first part is that obligations derived fr. contract has Question: If there is a contract bet. the parties,
the force of law bet. the contracting parties (jus can there be a quasi-delict committed by one
civili.) The second part is that there must be against the other regarding the area covered by
compliance in good faith (jus gentium.) the contract. If you look at Art. 2176, you get
the impression that if there is a contract bet. the
parties, the parties cannot be liable for quasi-
delict on an area covered by the contract. The
PEOPLE'S CAR VS. COMMANDO SECURITY case of Cangco has not really resolve this
[51 SCRA 40] controversy.

Pltff. (People's Car) was in law liable to its


customers for the damages caused the customer's CANGCO VS. MANILA RAILROAD CO. [38 P
car, w/c had been entrusted into its custody. Pltff. 768] -
therefore was in law justified in making good such
damages & relying in turn on def.(Commando Balane: There are two important principles that
Security) to honor its contract & indemnify it for we learn fr. this case:
such undisputed damages, w/c had been caused
directly by the unlawful & wrongful acts of def.'s The difference in concept bet. contract & quasi-
security guard in breach of their contract. delict is that in a contract, there is a pre-
existing juridical tie bet. the parties.
Violation of the contract gives rise to
liability but not to the juridical tie. Juridical
Art. 1160. Obligations derived fr. quasi- tie is not borne by a violation. In quasi-
contracts shall be subject to the provisions of delict, it is precisely the wrongful act w/c
Chapter 1, Title XVIII of this Book. gives rise to the juridical tie. Liability &
juridical tie are simultaneous.

Contracts & quasi-delicts create two concentric


Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising fr. criminal circles w/ quasi-delict as the bigger circle.
offenses shall be governed by the penal laws,
subject to the provisions of article 2177, & of the [Note: There is a little mistake in Cangco. The
pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, SC said that the driver can be sued under culpa
on Human Relations, & of Title XVIII of this Book, contractual. This is wrong. The driver cannot be
regulating damages. sued as he has no privity of contract w/ the
passenger.]
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate &
So, the question now is: Is it possible
distinct fr. the civil liability arising fr. negligence
that even if there is a contract bet. the parties, a
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot quasi-delict can still be committed by one against
recover damages twice for the same act or omission the other regarding the area covered by the
of the defendant. contract? Yes, according to the case of Araneta
v. de Joya, 57 SCRA 59. The same act can give
Art. 1162. Obligations derived fr. quasi-delicts rise to obligations arising fr. different sources.
shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2,
Title XVII of this Book, & by special laws. For example, Alinea is the owner of a bus
co., the Alinea Bus Co., Molina is a driver of one
of the buses of Alinea Bus Co. Lagdameo rode
the bus being driven by Molina. As a result of the

275
reckless driving of Molina, Lagdameo suffered contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly
injuries. In this case, Lagdameo has a choice-- he enriched or benefited at the expense of another.
can sue on either contract, quasi-delict or on crime.
If he decided to sue on the breach of the contract
of carriage, all he has to prove is the (existence of Art. 2175. Any person who is constrained to
the contract) & that it was not performed. In this pay the taxes of another shall be entitled to
case, he can sue the common carrier but not the reimbursement fr. the latter.
driver bec. he has no contract w/ the driver. If he
sues on quasi-delict, he can sue both the common Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
carrier & the driver. The defense of the driver performance by another, or any other means,
would be diligence in driving (or fortuitous event.) acquires or comes into possession of something
The defense of the common carrier would be
at the expense of the latter w/o just or legal
diligence in the selection & supervision of
employees. If he sues under crime, he has to sue ground shall return the same to him.
the driver. In case the driver is convicted & has
been sentenced to pay civil liability, the employer Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing
(Alinea Bus Co.) is subsidiarily liable. If Molina is damage to another's property was not due to the
insolvent, Alinea Bus Co. will pay. fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter
shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or
Notice that the choice of cause of action will event he was benefited.
determine three things: the theory of the plaintiff,
the defense of the def. & the question of whom to
sue.
Benefits Conferred
Again, remember that in this case, the Voluntarily
victim has a choice. Provided that he is consistent
w/ his theory & provided, further, that he cannot Preservation of Property
recover damages twice for the same injury. or Business
Note: There is still a brewing controversy among
civilists w/ regard to this question. This is only my (1) Negotiorum Gestio
opinion.

Art. 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge


GUTIERREZ VS. GUTIERREZ [56 P 177] of the agency or management of the business or
property of another, w/o any power fr. the latter,
One G, a passenger in a truck, recovers is obliged to continue the same until the
damages in the amount of P5,000 fr. the owner of a termination of the affair & its incidents, or to
pvt. automobile not in the car, the machine being require the person concerned to substitute him, if
operated by a son 18 yrs. of age, w/ other the owner is in a position to do so. This juridical
members of the family accommodated therein, & fr.
relation does not arise in either of these
the chauffeur & owner of the truck w/c collided w/
the pvt. automobile on a bridge, causing physical instances:
injuries to G as a result of the automobile accident.
(1) When the property or business is not
The head of a house, the owner of an neglected or abandoned;
automobile, who maintains it for the general use of (2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly
his family, is liable for its negligent operation by one authorized by the owner;
of his children, whom he designates or permits to
run it, where the car is occupied & being used at In the first case, the provisions of articles
the time of the injury for the pleasure of other
1317, 1403, No. 1, & 1404 regarding
members of the owner's family than the child
driving it. unauthorized contracts shall govern.

In the second case, the rules on agency in


A. Quasi-Contracts Title X of this Book shall be applicable.

Art. 1317. No one may contract in the name


Art. 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary & unilateral
of another w/o being authorized by the latter, or
acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-
unless he has by law a right to represent him.

276
A contract entered into in the name of another (1) If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the
by one who has no authority or legal management;
representation, or who has acted beyond his (2) If by his intervention he prevented a
powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, more competent person fr. taking up the
expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose management.
behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by
the other contracting party. Art. 2149. The ratification of the
management by the owner of the business
Art. 1403. The following contracts are produces the effects of an express agency, even
unenforceable, unless they are ratified: if the business may not have been successful.
(1) Those entered into in the name of
another person by one who has been given no Art. 2150. Although the officious
authority or legal representation, or who has acted management may not have been expressly
beyond his powers; ratified, the owner of the property or business
who enjoys the advantages of the same shall be
Art. 1404. Unauthorized contracts are liable for obligations incurred in his interest, &
governed by article 1317 & the principles of agency shall reimburse the officious manager for the
in Title X of this Book. necessary & useful expenses & for the damages
w/c the latter may have suffered in the
Art. 2145. The officious manager shall perform performance of his duties.
his duties w/ all the diligence of a good father of a
family, & pay the damages w/c through his fault or The same obligation shall be incumbent upon
negligence may be suffered by the owner of the him when the management had for its purpose
property or business under management. the prevention of an imminent & manifest loss,
The courts may, however, increase or although no benefit may have been derived.
moderate the indemnity according to the
circumstances of each case. Art. 2151. Even though the owner did not
derive any benefit & there has been no imminent
Art. 2146. If the officious manager delegates to & manifest danger to the property or business,
another person all or some of his duties, he shall be the owner is liable as under the first paragraph of
liable for the acts of the delegate, w/o prejudice to the preceding article, provided:
the direct obligation of the latter toward the owner (1) The officious manager has acted in good
of the business. faith;
(2) The property or business is intact, ready
The responsibility of two or more officious to be returned to the owner.
managers shall be solidary, unless the management
was assumed to save the thing or business fr. Art. 2152. The officious manager is
imminent danger. personally liable for contracts w/c he has entered
into w/ third persons, even though he acted in
Art. 2147. The officious manager shall be liable the name of the owner & third persons. These
for any fortuitous event: provisions shall not apply:
(1) If the owner has expressly or tacitly
(1) If he undertakes risky operations w/c the ratified the management, or
owner was not accustomed to embark upon; (2) When the contract refers to things
(2) If he has preferred his own interest to that pertaining to the owner of the business.
of the owner;
(3) If he fails to return the property or business Art. 2153. The management is extinguished:
after demand by the owner; (1) When the owner repudiates it or puts an
(4) If he assumed the management in bad end thereto;
faith. (2) When the officious manager w/draws fr.
the management subject to the provisions of
Art. 2148. Except when the management was article 2144;
assumed to save the property or business fr.
imminent danger, the officious manager shall be Art. 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge
liable for fortuitous events: of the agency or management of the business or

277
property of another, w/o any power fr. the latter, is value w/c the thing may have acquired by reason
obliged to continue the same until the termination thereof.
of the affair & its incidents, or to require the person
concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a
position to do so. xxx (b) Payments by 3rd Persons

(3) By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or


insolvency of the owner or the officious manager. Art. 2173. When a third person, w/o the
knowledge of the debtor, pays the debt, the
rights of the former are governed by articles 1236
(2) Finder of Lost Property & 1237.
Art. 2171. The rights & obligations of the finder
of lost personal property shall be governed by arti- Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to
cles 719 & 720. accept payment or performance by a third person
who has no interest in the fulfillment of the
Art. 719. Whoever finds a movable, w/c is not obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the
treasure, must return it to its previous possessor. If contrary.
the latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately Whoever pays for another may demand
deposit it w/ the mayor of the city or municipality fr. the debtor what he has paid, except that if he
where the finding has taken place. paid w/o the knowledge or against the will of the
The finding shall be publicly announced by debtor, he can recover only insofar as the
the mayor for two consecutive weeks in the way he payment has been beneficial to the debtor.
deems best.
Art. 1237. Whoever pays on behalf of the
If the movable cannot be kept w/o debtor w/o the knowledge or against the will of
deterioration, or w/o the expenses w/c considerably the latter, cannot compel the creditor to
diminish its value, it shall be sold at public auction subrogate him in his rights such as those arising
eight days after the publication. fr. a mortgage, guaranty, or penalty.
Six months fr. the publication having elapsed
w/o the owner having appeared, the thing found, or
its value, shall be awarded to the finder. The finder 2. Benefits Involuntarily Conferred
& the owner shall be obliged, as the case may be,
to reimburse the expenses. (a) Solutio Indebiti

Art. 720. If the owner should appear in time,


he shall be obliged to pay, as a reward to the Art. 2154. If something was received when
finder, one-tenth of the sum or of the price of the there is no right to demand it, & it was unduly
thing found. delivered through mistake, the obligation to
return it arises.
Art. 2172. The right of every possessor in good
faith to reimbursement for necessary & useful Art. 2155. Payment by reason of a mistake
expenses is governed by article 546. in the construction or application of a doubtful or
difficult question of law may come w/in the scope
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded of the preceding article.
to every possessor; but only the possessor in good
faith may retain the thing until he has been Art. 2156. If the payer was in doubt whether
reimbursed therefor. the debt was due, he may recover if he proves
that it was not due.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the
possessor in good faith w/ the same right of reten- Art. 2157. The responsibility of two or more
tion, the person who has defeated him in the payees, when there has been payment of what is
possession having the option of refunding the not due, is solidary.
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in

278
Art. 2158. When the property delivered or Art. 2163. It is presumed that there was a
money paid belongs to a third person, the payee mistake in the payment if something w/c had
shall comply w/ the provisions of article 1984. never been due or had already been paid was
delivered; but he fr. whom the return is claimed
Art. 1984. The depositary cannot demand that may prove that the delivery was made out of
the depositor prove his ownership of the thing liberality or for any other just cause.
deposited.

Nevertheless, should he discover that the thing (1)Distinguished fr. Natural


has been stolen & who its true owner is, he must Obligations
advise the latter of the deposit.

If the owner, in spite of such information, does Art. 1423. Obligations are civil or natural.
not claim it w/in the period of one month, the Civil obligations give a right of action to compel
depositary shall be relieved of all responsibility by their performance. Natural obligations, not being
returning the thing deposited to the depositor. based on positive law but on equity & natural
law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their
If the depositary has reasonable grounds to performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by
believe that the thing has not been lawfully the obligor, they authorize the retention of what
acquired by the depositor, the former may return has been delivered or rendered by reason
the same. thereof. Some natural obligations are set forth in
the following articles.
Art. 2159. Whoever in bad faith accepts an
undue payment, shall pay legal interest if a sum of Art. 1424. When a right to sue upon a civil
money is involved, or shall be liable for fruits obligation has lapsed by extinctive prescription,
received or w/c should have been received if the the obligor who voluntarily performs the contract
thing produces fruits. cannot recover what he has delivered or the
He shall furthermore be answerable for any value of the service he has rendered.
loss or impairment of the thing fr. any cause, & for
damages to the person who delivered the thing, Art. 1425. When w/o the knowledge or
until it is recovered. against the will of the debtor, a third person pays
a debt w/c the obligor is not legally bound to pay
Art. 2160. He who in good faith accepts an bec. the action thereon has prescribed, but the
undue payment of thing certain & determinate shall debtor later voluntarily reimburses the third
only be responsible for the impairment or loss of the person, the obligor cannot recover what he has
same or its accessories & accessions insofar as he paid.
has thereby been benefited. If he has alienated it,
he shall return the price or assign the action to Art. 1428. When, after an action to enforce a
collect the sum. civil obligation has failed, the defendant
voluntarily performs the obligation, he cannot
Art. 2161. As regards the reimbursement for demand the return of what he has delivered or
improvements & expenses incurred by him who the payment of the value of the service he has
unduly received the thing, the provisions of Title V rendered.
of Book II shall govern.
Art. 1429. When a testate or intestate heir
Art. 2162. He shall be exempt fr. the obligation voluntarily pays a debt of the decedent exceeding
to restore who, believing in good faith that the the value of the property w/c he received by will
payment was being made of a legitimate & or by the law of intestacy fr. the estate of the
subsisting claim, destroyed the document, or deceased, the payment is valid & cannot be
allowed the action to prescribe, or gave up the rescinded by the payer.
pledges, or canceled the guaranties for his right. He
who paid unduly may proceed only against the true Art. 1430. When a will is declared void bec.
debtor or the guarantors w/ regard to whom the it has not been executed in accordance w/ the
action is still effective. formalities required by law, but one of the
intestate heirs, after the settlement of the debts

279
of the deceased, pays a legacy in compliance w/ a
clause in the defective will, the payment is effective Art. 207. When the person obliged to
& irrevocable. support another unjustly refuses or fails to give
support when urgently needed by the latter, any
Art. 1960. If the borrower pays interest when third person may furnish support to the needy
there has been no stipulation therefor, the individual, w/ right of reimbursement fr. the
provisions of this Code concerning solutio indebiti, person obliged to give support. This Article shall
or natural obligations, shall be applied, as the case apply particularly when the father or mother of a
may be. child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to
support or fails to give support to the child when
Art. 1956. No interest shall be due unless it has urgently needed. (Id.)
been expressly stipulated in writing.

DEL RIO V. TANGUILAY


Performance of
Obligations imposed by law in the Facts: Cuartero filed an action for support in
interest of the public behalf of her 5 minor children against their
father, Tanguilay. The CFI approved the
(1) Support agreement entered into bet. the parties wherein
it was provided that Tanguilay will give support in
the amount of 1,500/month. It appears,
Art. 2164. When, w/o the knowledge of the however, that a certain Del Rio furnished the
person obliged to give support, it is given by a children w/ additional money for their support.
stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the He now filed this action to recover the sum fr.
same fr. the former, unless it appears that he gave Tanguilay based on Art. 1894 of the CC ( now
it out of piety & w/o intent of being repaid. Art. 2164 NCC)

Art. 2165. When funeral expenses are borne by Issue; WON Tanguilay is liable to Del Rio for the
a third person, w/o the knowledge of those relatives sum furnished by the former to his children?
who were obliged to give support to the deceased,
said relatives shall reimburse the third person, Held: No, Tanguilay is not liable. In order for
should the latter claim reimbursement. one to be liable under Art. 1894, the ff. must be
present:
Art. 2166. When the person obliged to support support has been furnished a dependent of one
an orphan, or an insane or other indigent person bound to give support but who fails to do so;
unjustly refuses to give support to the latter, any support was supplied by a stranger
third person may furnish support to the needy support was given w/o the knowledge of the
individual, w/ right of reimbursement fr. the person person charged w/ the duty
obliged to give support. The provisions of this article
apply when the father or mother of a child under In this case, Del Rio made the advances
eighteen years of age unjustly refuses to support not only w/o the knowledge of Tanguilay but in
him. fact, against his wishes. Therefore, Del Rio was
not justified in continuing the supply of money to
Tanguilay’s children nor could he expect to be
reimbursed by Tanguilay.
(2) Unjust refusal to support an orphan,
insane or other indigent
(3) Funeral expenses
Art. 206. When, w/o the knowledge of the
person obliged to give support, it is given by a
Art. 2165. When funeral expenses are borne
stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the
by a third person, w/o the knowledge of those
same fr. the former, unless it appears that he gave
relatives who were obliged to give support to the
it w/o intention of being reimbursed. (Family
deceased, said relatives shall reimburse the third
Code.)
person, should the latter claim reimbursement.

280
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict & is governed by the provisions of this
(4) Health or safety regulation Chapter.
re: property
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is entirely
Art. 2169. When the government, upon the separate & distinct fr. the civil liability arising fr.
failure of any person to comply w/ health or safety negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
regulations concerning property, undertakes to do cannot recover damages twice for the same act
the necessary work, even over his objection, he or omission of the defendant.
shall be liable to pay the expenses.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
(5) Constraint of life or property on or omissions, but also for those of persons for
occasion of & accident or calamity whom one is responsible.

The father &, in case of his death or


incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
Art. 2167. When through an accident or other
damages caused by the minor children who live
cause a person is injured or becomes seriously ill, &
in their company.
he is treated or helped while he is not in a condition
Guardians are liable for damages caused
to give consent to a contract, he shall be liable to
by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
pay for the services of the physician or other person
under their authority & live in their company.
aiding him, unless the services has been rendered
out of pure generosity.
The owners & managers of an establishment
or enterprise are likewise responsible for
Art. 2168. When during a fire, flood, storm, or
damages caused by their employees in the
other calamity, property is saved fr. destruction by
service of the branches in w/c the latter are
another person w/o the knowledge of the owner,
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
the latter is bound to pay the former just
compensation.
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees & household helpers
Art. 2174. When in a small community a
acting w/in the scope of their assigned tasks,
majority of the inhabitants of age decide upon a
even though the former are not engaged in any
measure for protection against lawlessness, fire,
business or industry.
flood, storm or other calamity, any one who objects
to the plan & refuses to contribute to the expenses
The State is responsible in like manner when
but is benefited by the project as executed shall be
it acts through a special agent; but not when the
liable to pay his share of said expenses.
damage has been caused by the official to whom
the task done properly pertains, in w/c case what
Art. 2170. When by accident or other fortuitous
is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
event, movables separately pertaining to two or
more persons are commingled or confused, the
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of
rules on co-ownership shall be applicable.
arts & trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils & students or apprentices, so long
as they remain in their custody.
B. Quasi-delicts The responsibility treated of in this article
shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes good father of a family to prevent damage.
damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual causing damage has no parents or guardian, the
minor or insane person shall be answerable w/

281
his own property in an action against him where a return of the lot to him. He also inhibited Lasala
guardian ad litem shall be appointed. fr. entering his property & ordered the removal of
the flying wheel. Lasala filed an action for
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more damages against Velez contending that as a
persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. result of Velez’ act of removing the wheel, he was
forced to find other sources of water.
Art. 1728. The contractor is liable for all the
claims of laborers & others employed by him, & of Issue: WON Velez is liable for damages/ tort?
third persons for death or physical injuries during
the construction. Held: No. For an action for tort or damages to
prosper, it is necessary that the act complained of
Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for be illicit or unlawful. In the CAB, the lease
injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the contract entered into by Lasala does not include
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of the use of the wheel. The wheel was constructed
strangers, if the common carrier's employees to supply water to the Velez residence & not to
through the exercise of the diligence of a good his ice plant. Lasala used the wheel w/o
father of a family could have prevented or stopped obtaining the proper authority, thus Velez is not
the act or omission. guilty of tort in removing the wheel.

Art. 218. The school, its administrators &


teachers, or the individual, entity or institutions Baviera: There was no legal or contractual
engaged in child care shall have special parental obligation on the part of Velez to supply
authority & responsibility over the minor child while water to Lasala fr. the well.
under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority & responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside the TACTACQUIN V. PALILEO
premises of the school entity or institution. (Family
Code.) Facts: Tactaquin died when he was run over by
a car driven by Palileo. A criminal case for
Art. 219. Those given the authority & reckless imprudence was filed against Palileo.
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be During the arraignment, Palileo pleaded guilty &
principally & solidarily liable for damages caused by he was sentenced forthw/ to suffer imprisonment
the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. & to pay 4,000 as damages. The private
The parents, judicial guardians or the persons prosecutor made an oral reservation to file a
exercising parental authority over said minor shall separate civil action for damages. Consequently,
be subsidiarily liable. the civil case was filed. Palileo filed a MtD on the
ground that the civil action is barred by the final
The respective liabilities of those referred to in judgment in the criminal case.
the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is
proved that they exercised the proper diligence Issue: WON the civil action is barred?
required under the particular circumstances.
Held: No. There was a timely reservation made
All other cases not covered by this & the by the private prosecutor on behalf of the
preceding articles shall be governed by the complainant. As a result thereof, the civil liability
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (Id.) was automatically taken out of the crim. case &
was not before the court. The decision of the
lower court sentencing Palileo to pay damages is
LASALA V. VELEZ therefore a nullity.

Facts: Velez owns a lot. When the Japanese The reservation to file a separate civil
forces invaded the Philippines, he was forced to action may be made at any time before rendition
turn it over to the Japs. When the US forces took of the final judgment. Upon such reservation,
over, the lot was leased to Lasala. The latter then the private complainant loses the right to
operated an ice plant on said lot. When Velez intervene in the crim. action.
learned of the lease to Lasala, he then asked for the

282
PADUA V. ROBLES SINGSON V. BPI

Facts: Normandy, son of the pet. Padua died Facts: Singson, Lobregat & Villa-Abrille were
when he was run over by a taxi cab driven by adjudged liable to pay Phil. Milling Corp the sum
Punzalan & owned by Robles. Both civil & criminal of 105, 539. Singson & Lobregat appealed the
cases were filed against Punzalan. Punzalan was judgment, Villa Abrille did not. As a
adjudged criminally liable but no award for damages consequence, a writ of garnishment was served
was given in view of the filing of the sep. civil upon BPI in w/c the Singson’s had a current
action. However, in the civil action, the writ of account insofar as Villa-Abrille’s account was
execution against Punzalan was returned unsatisfied concerned. However, there was a
prompting the Paduas to enforce the subsidiary misunderstanding & Singson’s account was also
liability of Robles under Art. 103 of the RPC. garnished. As a result thereof, checks issued by
Singson bounced. The bank officials, upon
Issue: WON the Paduas are barred fr. enforcing realizing their error made efforts to rectify the
the civil liability of the employer under the RPC? situation. Singson, however filed an action based
on QD against BPI. the CFI dismissed the action
Held; No. Civil liability coexists w/ the criminal on the ground that Singson cannot recover
responsibility & the offended party has the option to damages based on QD as the rel. between him &
file a civil action based on culpa criminal ( RPC) & the bank is contractual in nature.
action for damages based on culpa aquiliana ( CC).
The former is deemed simultaneously instituted w/ Issue: WON a n action based on QD will
the crim. action unless expressly waived or prosper against BPI?
reserved. What Art. 2177 of the CC precludes
recovery of damages twice for the same negligent Held: Yes. The existence of a contract
act or omission. Allowance of the action of Paduas between the parties does not bar the commission
against the employer’s subsidiary liability involves of a tort by one against the other & the
no violation of the proscription against double consequent recovery of damages therefor. The
recovery. Art. 2177 forbids actual double recovery act that breaks the contract may also constitute a
of damages. tort.

Baviera: Requisites of enforcing the Baviera: The damages in this case was
subsidiary obligation of the employer under awarded based on QD bec. the act
the RPC: complained of did not relate to the
criminal case was filed against the employee performance of BPI’s contractual
the act or negligence arose during or in obligation w/ Singson.
connection w/ the performance of the
latter’s employment Q: When is the wrongful dishonoring of a
the employee is found guilty of criminal check a contractual negligence?
negligence A: In case of mistake in the recording of
a writ of execution has been returned funds, for example. In such a case, there
unsatisfied, i.e., employee has been found to would not be available the defense of
be insolvent. diligence of GFF as the action is not based
on QD.
There is no res judicata as regards the
ER as there is a difference in the COA. Quasi-
delict differs fr. an action based on delict on MALIPOL V. TAN
the following grounds:
QD: ER’s liability is primary in RPC, its Facts: Malipol died when he was hit by tanker
subsidiary driven by Labsan & owned by Tan. An action for
QD: diligence of good father of the family damages was field against Labsan. The TC
may be set up by the ER, in RPC, such ordered Labsan to pay damages to Malipol’s heirs
defense is not available. & made Tan subsidiarily liable.

Issue: WON an action based on QD makes the


ER only subs. liable?

283
issues, to wit, WON there was negligence
Held: NO. The allegation in the complaint against on the part of the driver.
Labsan reveals that it is an action based on Art.
2180 of the CC, QD. The liability therefor of the ER
is not merely subsidiary but primary & direct giving FERNANDO V. CA
him only a right to reimbursement form the
employee. Facts: 5 men died when they suffocated while
cleaning a septic tank of a Public Market in
Davao. The heirs sued the City Government
Baviera: If there is contractual negligence, basing their claim on the alleged negligence of
there is no more need to sue the employee. the city for neglecting the cleaning of the tank for
To determine what kind of action is 19 years & for not putting up signs near &
brought against the employer, look at the around the area. It appears, however, that the
allegations in the complaint. deceased cleaned the tank w/o authority fr. the
government.

MARCIA V. CA Issue: WON the city government is liable for


damages?
Facts: VLI Liner bus driven by Paje collided w/ a
jeep driven by Marcia resulting in the death of the Held: No. The city is not guilty of negligence,
latter. Both civil & criminal cases were filed against they cannot not be held liable for damages. The
VLI & Paje. However, Paje was eventually putting up of signs in the area is not one of the
acquitted by the CA in the criminal case stating req’ts for construction of public utilities, septic
that: criminal negligence is wanting, that Paje was tanks not being nuisances per se. The deaths of
not even guilty of civil negligence.” Paje & VLI the 5 men occurred through their own
then moved to dismiss the civil case invoking the negligence. They were engaged in the business
CA decision in the crim. case. of cleaning septic tanks, they are charged w/ the
knowledge of knowing the risks attendant to such
Issue: WON the CA decision bars the sep. civil axn business.
for damages? To be entitled to damages for an injury
resulting fr. the negligence of another, a claimant
Held: YES. An acquittal based on the finding that must establish the relation between the omission
the facts upon w/c civil liability did not exist bars the & the damage. It must be proved that the
filling of an independent civil action if it is based on negligence was the immediate & proximate cause
crime. of his injury.

No sep. civil axn. may be field by Marcia MMTC V. CA


under Art. 33 as it is not one of the 3 crimes
enumerated thereunder. In the action field by Facts: Custodia died when the passenger jeep,
Marcia, the allegation was that the act was (driven by Calebag) she was riding collided w/ an
committed as a result of negligence, not that they MMTC bus driven by Leonardo. An action for
were inflicted w/ malice. No civil action may damages was field by Custodia’s heirs & the TC
therefore be filed under Art.33 found the drivers concurrently negligent. The
TC, however, absolved MMTC on the ground that
The essence of the quasi-offense of the latter has sufficiently proven that it had
criminal negligence under Art. 365 RPC lies in the exercised the diligence of GFF.
execution of an imprudent or negligent act, that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. Issue: WON MMTC should be absolved fr.
The law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not liability?
the result thereof. the gravity of the consequence
is only taken into acct. to det. the penalty. Held: MMTC has not proven that it exercised
due diligence in the supervision of its employees.
It should be made liable. Under the Civil Code,
Baviera: Although the criminal & civil cases the employer has the burden of proving it has
had diff. COA, they basically had the same been diligent. Negligence is imputed to them by

284
law unless they prove the contrary. Under the NCC, provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors,
it is not the representation nor interest nor even the in this case, the father & the minor. Further, the
necessity of having somebody else answer for the primary liability of the parents may be seen on
damages caused by the persons devoid of the last par. of Art. 2180 w/c makes available the
personality w/c is the basis of the action but the defense of GFF.
non-performance of certain duties of precaution &
prudence imposed upon the persons who become Under the RPC, the SC also believe that
responsible by civil bond uniting the actor to them, the liability of the parents is primary ref. to Art.
w/c forms the foundation of such responsibility. 101 of the RPC.
The presentation of hiring procedures & supervision
policies are not suff. to prove exercise of diligence Thus, in both delicts & quasi-delicts, the
as the ER must show actual supervision of the EE’s parents are primarily liable for such damages by
work. their minor children & the minor is made to
answer only in the absence of or in case of
insolvency of the parents.
Baviera: What is the liability of the school if an
EE is negligent in driving a car when such EE Baviera: Art. 2180 applies only for acts or
was not assigned to drive the vehicle? omissions committed through fault or
negligence. In this case, the parents were
A: No liability. The EE was not acting w/in held liable bec. they themselves were
the scope of his assigned task at the time of negligent.
the accident.

LIBI V. IAC C. Law

Facts: Julie Gotiong ( 18 yrs. old ) & Wendell Libi


(18 yrs. old) were sweethearts. When they broke Art. 1158. Obligations derived fr. law are not
up, Wendell apparently did not take news lightly, he presumed. Only those expressly determined in
threatened Julie. Finally, the couple was found this Code or in special laws are demandable, &
dead. Wendell shot Julie, then himself using a gun shall be regulated by the precepts of the law w/c
owned by his father. Julie’s Parents filed an action establishes them; & as to what has not been
for damages against Wendell’s parents ( Libi) under foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper
Issue: WON the parents of Wendell are liable & two or more persons are obliged to give it,
under Art. 2180? If so, WON such liability is shall be made in the following order:
vicarious or primary? (1) From the spouse;
(2) From the descendants of the nearest
Held: Yes, they are liable. The parents are & degree;
should be held primarily liable for the civil liability (3) From the ascendants, also of the nearest
arising fr. criminal offenses committed by their degree;
minor children under their legal authority & control (4) From the brothers & sisters.
or who live in their company, UNLESS it is proven
that the former acted w/ the diligence of a good Among descendants & ascendants the order
father of the family to prevent such damages. in w/c they are called to the intestate succession
of the person who has a right to claim support
Libi’s parents did not exercise due diligence. shall be observed.
The father kept the gun in a safety box but left the
key lying around. the liability is primary & not
vicarious under Art. 2180 of the Civil code. If the NOTES: Under the NCC, follow the order of
liability of the parents fr. crimes or quasi-delicts of intestate succession.
their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents
cannot invoke the defense of the GFF. This primary
liability is supported by Art. 2194 of the NCC w/c

285
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are law does not prohibit it or no injury is suffered by
obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve a third person.
upon the following persons in the order herein
provided: Art. 2014. No action can be maintained by
(1) The spouse; the winner for the collection of what he has won
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree; in a game of chance. But any loser in a game of
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; chance may recover his loss fr. the winner, w/
(4) The brothers & sisters. (Family Code.) legal interest fr. the time he paid the amount lost,
& subsidiarily fr. the operator or manager of the
Art. 448. The owner of the land on w/c gambling house.
anything has been built, sown, or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the Baviera: When the source of the obligation
indemnity provided for in articles 546 & 548, or to is Law, there is no need for an act or
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price omission for the obligation to arise.
of the land, & the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged
to buy the land if its value is considerably more than
D. Contracts
that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does
not choose to appropriate the building or trees after Baviera: The terms of the contract cannot
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the be against mandatory & prohibitive laws.
terms of the lease & in case of disagreement, the And if the contract is valid, it shall have the
court shall fix the terms thereof. force of law between the contracting
parties.
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded
to every possessor; but only the possessor in good
faith may retain the thing until he has been Art. 1159. Obligations arising fr. contracts
reimbursed therefor. have the force of law between the contracting
parties & should be complied w/ in good faith.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the
possessor in good faith w/ the same right of reten- Art. 1306. The contracting parties may
tion, the person who has defeated him in the establish such stipulations, clauses, terms &
possession having the option of refunding the conditions as they may deem convenient,
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
value w/c the thing may have acquired by reason good customs, public order, or public policy.
thereof.

Art. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere E. Delict


pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in
good faith; but he may remove the ornaments w/
w/c he has embellished the principal thing if it PEOPLE VS. SENDAYDIEGO JANUARY 20,
suffers no injury thereby, & if his successor in the 1978
possession does not prefer to refund the amount
expended. Facts: Defendant Sendaydiego, the provincial
treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy w/ co-
Art. 636. Easements established by law in the defs. Samson (EE of a lumber & hardware store)
interest of private persons or for private use shall be & Quirimit (provincial auditor), were charged w/
governed by the provisions of this Title, w/o several counts of malversation through
prejudice to the provisions of general or local laws & falsification. It seems that 6 provincial vouchers
ordinances for the general welfare. were forged to embezzle P57,000 fr. the road &
bridge fund. The LC acquitted Quirimit, but
These easements may be modified by convicted Sendaydiego & Samson. Both
agreement of the interested parties, whenever the appealed to this court. PENDING APPEAL,
Sendaydiego died. This appeal as to his criminal

286
liability was dismissed, death having extinguished
the same. But his civil liability remained. The SC held in the case of Pajarito vs.
Seneris that a criminal court should hear & decide
Issue: WON the case on appeal when in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of
Sendaydiego died survived the latter wrt to civil the alleged owner & operator of the vehicle.
liability. The proceeding for the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability may be considered as part of
Held: YES. Lower Court affirmed. the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment. Besides, a judgment of conviction
If the defendant dies after a money sentencing a defendant-ER to pay an indemnity
judgment had been rendered against him by the in the absence of collusion between the
CFI, the action survives him. It may be continued defendant & the offended party, is conclusive
on appeal. The accountable officer may still be upon the employer in an action for the
civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed enforcement of the latter’s subsidiary liability not
although he has no criminal liability. In such a case, only w/ regard to civil liability, but also w/ regard
the heirs or the administrator will be substituted for to its amount. A separate & independent action
the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil is, therefore, unnecessary & would only prolong
liability is concerned. The title of this case should the agony of the heirs of the victim.
be amended to show its civil aspect.

VDA. DE PAMAN VS. SENERIS 115 SCRA 709 Baviera: This is a novel case as the decision
is sought to be enforced against a person
Facts: De los Santos, while driving a truck owned NOT a party to the action.
by Western Mindanao, through negligence caused
Paman to fall off fr. the truck & die consequently. A
case for reckless imprudence was filed. De los Balane Provisions:
Santos pleaded guilty & was ordered to pay
P12,000 as indemnity. As De los Santos was
insolvent, petr. Vda. de Paman filed a Motion for
Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising fr. criminal
Execution on Subsidiary liability of ER Western
offenses shall be governed by the penal laws,
Mindanao in the same criminal action. Resp. Judge
subject to the provisions of article 2177, & of the
Seneris denied on the ground that a separate action
pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary
must be filed therefore.
Title, on Human Relations, & of Title XVIII of this
Book, regulating damages.
Issue: WON subsidiary liability of the ER may be
enforced in the criminal case where EE was held
correlate this w/ Art. 100, RPC
liable.
Art. 100. Civil Liability of a person guilty of
Held: YES. The alleged drawback in the
felony.-- Every person criminally liable for a
enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same
felony is also civilly liable.
criminal proceeding is the lack of due process to the
ER, that it should be shown that (1) ER is engaged
in any kind of industry; (2) EE committed the
offense in the discharge of his duties; & (3) he is Back to Ma’am Baviera:
insolvent. This is untenable.

Under Sec. 1, Rule 111 of ROC, “when a RPC, Art. 108. Obligation to make
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the restoration, reparation for damages,
recovery of civil liability arising fr. the offense indemnification for consequential damages &
charged is impliedly instituted w/ the criminal action to demand the same - Upon whom it
action, unless the offended party expressly waives devolves. - The obligation to make restoration or
the civil action or reserves his right to institute reparation for damages & indemnification for
separately.” This mean that the 2 actions are consequential damages devolves upon the heirs
joined in one as twins, each one complete w/ the of the person liable.
same completeness as any of the 2 normal persons The action to demand restoration,
composing twins. reparation, & indemnification likewise descends
287
to the heirs of the person injured. (Revised Penal judgment. In the case at bar, Petralba died
Code.) pending appeal & before any final judgment
therein. Hence the death of P extinguished his
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally personal & pecuniary liabilities (e.g. Fine).
extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally Howevah, his civil liability survives. Extinction of
extinguished: criminal liability does not necessarily mean that
the civil liability is also extinguished. No separate
1. By the death of the convict, as to the civil action need be instituted. (People vs.
personal penalties; & as to pecuniary penalties, Sendaydiego)
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment. VILLEGAS VS. CA 271 SCRA 148
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, w/c completely extinguishes Facts: Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas publicly
the penalty & all its effects; imputed acts constituting violations of Anti-Graft
4. By absolute pardon; & Corrupt Practices Act against Assemblyman
5. By prescription of the crime; Raquiza. A Senate Committee cleared Raquiza of
6. By prescription of the penalty; all charges. Raquiza filed a case for Libel vs.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as Villegas. During the pendency of the case,
provided in Article 344 of this Code. (Id.) Villegas went to the US where he died. The
lower court issued an order dismissing the
Art. 344, RPC. xxx In cases of seduction, criminal aspect of the case, but reserving the
abduction, acts of lasciviousness & rape, the right to resolve its civil aspect. Later, LC ordered
marriage of the offender w/ the offended party shall the estate of Villegas to pay Raquiza P200M in
extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty Damages.
already imposed upon him. The provisions of this
paragraph shall also be applicable to the co- Issue: WON death of Villegas extinguished his
principals, accomplices & accessories after the fact civil liability.
of the above-mentioned crimes. (Id.)
Held: NO. The SC ruled in People vs Bayotas:
”The survival of the civil liability depends on
whether the same can be predicated on sources
PETRALBA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 200
of obligation other than delict. Stated differently,
SCRA644
the claim for civil liability is also extinguished
together w/ the criminal action if it were solely
Facts: Petralba was charged w/ Malversation of
based thereon.
Public Funds before the Sandiganbayan as when his
cash & accounts for December 1980 to March 1981
In recovering damages for injury to
were audited, he was found short of P29,000. He
persons through an independent civil action
was convicted. While case was pending before the
based on Art. 33, NCC, the same must be filed
SC, Petralba died.
against the executor or administrator of the
estate of deceased accused (under Sec.1 Rule 87
Issue: WON Petralba’s civil liability survives his
ROC) & not against the estate (under Sec. 5,
death.
Rule 86) bec the latter rule explicitly limits the
claim to those of funeral expenses, for last
Held: YES. Petralba’s death during the pendency
sickness, etc. In CAB: the source of Villegas’ civil
of the appeal extinguished his criminal liability, but
liability is the felonious act of libel. It could be
not his civil liability. The govt. should be
deemed a quasi-delict under Art. 33 in rel to Art.
indemnified for P6,900.
1157, NCC. And since both proceedings, crim &
civil, were terminated w/o final adjudication, the
Under Art. 89, RPC, death of a convict
civil action of the offended party under Art. 33
extinguished his criminal liability. But his criminal
may yet be enforced separately.
liability does not only mean the obligation to serve
the personal or imprisonment penalties, but it also
HEIRS OF TEODORO GUARING VS. CA
includes the liability to pay the fines or pecuniary
269 SCRA 283 (1997)
penalties. Pecuniary liability is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final

288
Facts: A 3-way vehicular accident involving Guaring
(driver of a car), Cuevas (driver, Phil Rabbit Bus), &
Enriquez (driver, Toyota car), occurred along North (not in Baviera’s outline)
Expressway. Guaring & Enriquez died. Heirs of
Guaring filed an Action for Damages based on
Quasi-Delict vs. Cuevas & his ER. RTC found bus
co. & driver Cuevas at fault, & held them liable CHAPTER 2.-- NATURE AND EFFECT OF
solidarily. CA reversed & dismissed the complaint OBLIGATIONS
on the strength of the decision by the RTC in crim
case acquitting the bus driver of reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to prop & double Articles 1163 - 1168 in relation to Art.
homicide. That since the basis of the petitioner’s 1156.
action was the negligence of the driver, the latter’s
acquittal in the crim case rendered the civil case on
Qdelict untenable. Balane:

Issue: WON acquittal of the accused carried w/ it Three types of obligations.-- (1) obligation
the extinction of the civil liability based on Quasi- to give; (2) obligation to do; & (3) obligation not
Delict. to do.

I. Obligation to give
Held: NO. As held in Tayag vs. Alcantara, “ a A. Specific thing
separate civil action lies against the offender in a B. Generic thing
criminal act, WON he is criminally prosecuted &
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the II. To do
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on III. Not to do (this includes all negative
both, & w/d be entitled in such eventuality only to obligations like obligation not to give.)
the bigger award of the 2. In other words, the
Kinds of performance.-- (1) specific
extinction referred to in the ROC R111 S2(b) refers
performance (performance by the debtor
to civil liability founded on A100 of RPC, whereas himself); (2) substitute performance
the civil liability for the same act considered as a QD (performance at the expense of the debtor); (3)
only is not extinguished even by a declaration that equivalent performance (grant of damages.)
the crim act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. Articles 1163 - 1166 cover obligation to give.

It was error for CA to skip review of the Three Accessory Obligations:


evidence in this case & instead based its on the 1. Art. 1163.-- To take care of the thing w/ the
diligence of a good father of a family until actual
findings of the TC in the crim case. This case must
delivery.
be decided on the basis of the evid in the civil case; 2. Art. 1164.-- To deliver the fruits to the
this involves a different set of witnesses. In the creditor (fruits produced after obligation to
crim case, bus driver was acquitted based on deliver arises.)
reasonable doubt. (Such quantum of evid not 3. Art. 1166.-- To deliver accessions &
applicable to CAB w/c merely requires accessories.
preponderance of evidence.)

Art. 1163. Every person obliged to give


Balane: Crime as a source of obligation.-- something is also obliged to take care of it w/ the
There are many crimes fr. w/c, civil liability arises in proper diligence of a good father of a family,
their commission, in addition to the criminal penalty unless the law or the stipulation of the parties
attached to them. This underlines the two aspects
in a crime: one, as an offense against the state, & requires another standard of care.
two as an offense against the victim. It is in the
latter case that civil liability is recoverable. Art. 1164. The creditor has a right to the
fruits of the thing fr. the time the obligation to
As far as crime is concerned, civil law is not deliver arises. However, he shall have no real
concerned w/ the penal liability but only w/ the civil
liab.
289
right over it until the same has been delivered to If the thing is indeterminate or generic, he
him. may ask that the obligation be complied w/ at the
expense of the debtor.

Balane: From the time the obligation arises, the If the obligor delays, or has promised to
creditor has a personal right against the debtor as deliver the same thing to two or more persons
to the fruits. But he has no real right over them who do not have the same interest, he shall be
until actual delivery. Real right is a right w/c is responsible for any fortuitous event until he has
enforceable against the whole world. He has only effected the delivery.
the personal right against the debtor w/ regard to
the undelivered fruits. This is bec. of the principle
Non nudis pactis, sed traditione, dominia rerum Art. 1166. The obligation to give a
transferentur." (It is not by mere agreement, but determinate thing includes that of delivering its
by delivery, is ownership transferred.) Personal accessions & accessories, even though they may
right arises fr. the time the obligation to deliver not have been mentioned.
arises whereas the real right does not arise until
actual delivery. Art. 1167. If a person obliged to do
something fails to do it, the same shall be
executed at his cost.
Articles 1165 - 1167.-- Remedies Available to
the Creditor (specific performance, substitute This same rule shall be observed if he does it
performance, equivalent performance.)
in contravention of the tenor of the obligation.
A. In obligations to give Furthermore, it may be decreed that what has
1. A determinate thing been poorly done be undone.
a. Specific performance
b. Equivalent performance Art. 1168. When the obligation consists in
not doing & the obligor does what has been
2. A generic thing, all remedies are forbidden him, it shall also be undone at his
available expense.
B. In an obligation to do, make a distinction:
Obligation to do w/c is purely personal, only
equivalent performance is available Articles 1169 - 1174.-- Irregularity of
Obligation to do w/c is not personal Performance.
a. substitute performance
b. equivalent performance Balane:
Note that in obligations to do, specific Two Classes of Irregularity of Performance:
performance is not available. The reason for this is
that specific performance will give rise to I. Attributable to the debtor
involuntary servitude. A. Fraud
B. Negligence
C. Obligation not to do C. Delay
1. substitute performance II. Not attributable to the debtor
2. equivalent performance. A. Fortuitous event.
In all these cases, the creditor has the option of
resolution or rescission under Art. 1191. In
addition, he can also claim damages. Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do
something incur in delay fr. the time the obligee
judicially or extrajudicially demands fr. them the
Art. 1165. When what is to be delivered is a fulfillment of their obligation.
determinate thing, the creditor, in addition to the
right granted him by article 1170, may compel the However, the demand by the creditor shall
debtor to make the delivery. not be necessary in order that delay may exist:

(1) When the obligation or the law expressly


so declare;

290
to make Ella's (the bride) wedding gown. Feb.
14 comes , no gown was delivered. Ella gets
(2) When fr. the nature & the circumstances of
married in blue jeans & T-shirt. Finally, on Feb.
the obligation it appears that the designation of the 15, Inno delivers the gown. xxx Ella sues Inno
time when the thing is to be delivered or the service for breach. Inno says there was no demand. In
is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the this case, demand is not necessary in order that
establishment of the contract; delay may exist.

(3) When demand would be useless, as when When demand would be useless, as when the
the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to obligor has rendered it beyond his power to
perform. perform.-- Example is the case of Chavez v.
Gonzales, infra.
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in
delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to
BALANE CASES:
comply in a proper manner w/ what is incumbent
upon him. From the moment one of the parties
fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins.
AGCAOILI VS. GSIS [165 S 1]

There was then a perfected contract of sale bet.


Balane: the parties; there had been a meeting of the
minds upon the purchase by Agcaoili of a
When does delay set in?-- Delay sets in the determinate house & lot in the GSIS Housing
following manner: Project at Nangka, Marikina, Rizal, at a definite
price payable in amortizations at P31.56 per mo.,
1. For Reciprocal simultaneous obligations.-- by & fr. the moment the parties acquired the right to
the readiness of one of the parties to perform & his reciprocally demand performance. It was, to be
letting the other party know; & the other party is sure, the duty of the GSIS, as seller, to deliver
not ready to comply in a proper manner w/ what is the thing sold in a condition suitable for its
incumbent upon him. enjoyment by the buyer for the purpose
contemplated, in other words, to deliver the
2. For Reciprocal obligations w/c are not house subject of the contract in a reasonably
simultaneous.-- Gen. Rule: Demand is necessary livable state. This it failed to do.
(Art. 1169, par. 1.) This is called mora solvendi ex xxx
persona.
Exception: When demand is not necessary Since GSIS did not fulfill that obligation,
(the exceptions are found in Art. 11 69, par. 2.) & was not willing to put the house in habitable
This is called mora solvendi ex re state, it cannot invoke Agcaoili's suspension of
payment of amortization as cause to cancel the
contract bet. them. It is axiomatic that "(i)n
What kind of demand is necessary?-- Judicial reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in
or extra-judicial delay if the other does not comply or is not ready
to comply in a proper manner w/ what is
Exceptions: incumbent upon him.

When the obligation or the law expressly so SSS VS. MOONWALK [221 S 119]
declare.-- when the contract says that w/o the
necessity of demand, default sets in upon the Requisites in order that debtor may be in default;
failure of the obligor to perform on due date. Necessity of demand.-- To be in default "xxx is
There must be something in the contract w/c different fr. mere delay in the grammatical sense,
explicitly states that the demand is not bec. it involves the beginning of a special
necessary in order that delay may set in. condition or status w/c has its own peculiar
effects or results." In order that the debtor may
When fr. the nature & the circumstances of the be in default it is necessary that the following
obligation it appears that the designation of the requisites be present: (1) that the obligation be
time when the thing is to be delivered or the demandable & already liquidated; (2) that the
service is to be rendered was a controlling debtor delays performance; & (3) that the
motive for the establishment of the contract. creditor requires the performance judicially or
extrajudicially. Default generally begins fr. the
Illustration: Bong Baylon is getting moment the creditor demands the performance
married in Valentines '96. Inno Sotto was supposed of the obligation. Nowhere in this case did it

291
appear that SSS demanded fr. Moonwalk the TELEFAST VS. CASTRO [158 s 445] - In the
payment of its monthly amortization. Neither did it case at bar, petitioner & private respondent Sofia
show that petitioner demanded the payment of the C. Crouch entered into a contract whereby, for a
stipulated penalty upon the failure of Moonwalk to fee, petitioner undertook to send said private
meet its monthly amortization. What the complaint respondent's message overseas by telegram.
itself showed was that SSS tried to enforce the This, petitioner did not do, despite performance
obligation sometime in Sept, 1977 by foreclosing by said pvt. resp. of her obligation by paying the
the real estate mortgages executed by Moonwalk in required charges. Petitioner was therefore guilty
favor of SSS. But this foreclosure did not push of contravening its obligation to said private
through upon Moonwalk's requests & promises to respondent & is thus liable for damages.
pay in full. The next demand for payment
happened on Oct. 1, 1979 when SSS issued a
Statement of Account to Moonwalk. And in NPC VS. CA [161 S 334] - NPC cannot escape
accordance w/ said statement, Moonwalk paid its liability bec. its negligence was the proximate
loan in full. What is clear, therefore, is that cause of the loss & damage even though the
Moonwalk was never in default bec. SSS never typhoon was an act of God.-- It is clear fr. the
compelled performance. appellate court's decision that based on its
findings of fact & that of the trial court's,
petitioner NPC was undoubtedly negligent bec. it
opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of at the height of typhoon "Welming" when it knew
their obligation are guilty of fraud, negligence or very well that it was safer to have opened the
delay, & those who in any manner contravene the same gradually & earlier, as it was also
tenor thereof, are liable for damages. undeniable that NPC knew of the coming of the
typhoon at least 4 days bef. it actually struck.
And even though the typhoon was an act of God
or what we may call force majeure, NPC cannot
BALANE CASES:
escape liability bec. its negligence was the
proximate cause of the loss & damage. As we
have said in Juan Nakpil & Sons vs. CA, 144
ARRIETA VS. NARIC [10 S 79] SCRA 596,

One who assumes a contractual obligation & fails to Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event
perform the same on account of his inability to or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding
meet certain bank requirements w/c inability he fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
knew & was aware of when he entered into the contravention in any manner of the tenor of the
contract, should be held liable in damages for obligation as provided for in Art. 1170, w/c
breach of contract. results in a loss or damage, the obligor cannot
escape liability. The principle embodied in the act
Under Art. 1170, not only debtors guilty of fraud, of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must
negligence or default but also every debtor, in be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of
general, who fails the performance of his obligation nature & human agencies are to be excluded fr.
is bound to indemnify for the losses & damages creating or entering into the cause of the
caused thereby. mischief. When the effect, the cause of w/c is to
be considered, is found to be in part the result of
Meaning of phrase "in any manner contravene the the participation of man, whether it be fr. active
tenor" of the obligation.-- The phrase includes any intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the
illicit task w/c impairs the strict & faithful fulfillment whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it
of the obligation, or every kind of defective was, & removed fr. the rules applicable to the
performance. acts of God. Thus, it has been held that when
the negligence of a person concurs w/ an act of
God in producing a loss, such person is not
Balane: This phrase is a catch-all provision. At exempt fr. liability by showing that the immediate
worst, it is a superfluity. At best, there is a safety cause of the damage was the act of God. To be
net just in case there is a culpable irregularity of exempt fr. liability for loss bec. of an act of God,
performance w/c is not covered by fraud, he must be free fr. any previous negligence or
negligence or delay. In this case, the SC was misconduct by w/c the loss or damage may have
apparently not sure as to what category the breach been occasioned.
fell. This phrase is not really an independent
ground.
RCPI VS. RODRIGUEZ [182 S 889] - Resp.
Rodriguez & RCPI entered into a contract

292
whereby for a fee RCPI undertook to send the
respondent's message overseas. When, therefore,
resp. Rodriguez paid RCPI to deliver his message
overseas by telegram, RCPI obligated itself to Art. 1171. Responsibility arising fr. fraud is
transmit the messages to the addressee. Clearly, demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an
RCPI reneged on its obligation when it failed to action for future fraud is void.
deliver the messages or to inform the sender about
the non-delivery, thus making it liable for damages. Art. 1172. Responsibility arising fr.
negligence in the performance of every kind of
obligation is also demandable, but such liability
Fraud shall may be regulated by the courts, according
to the circumstances.
Balane: Is it correct to say that fraud in Art. 1170
means deceit or insidious machinations? No.

BALANE CASE:
LEGASPI OIL VS. CA [224 S 213] - Definition of
Fraud.-- In general, fraud may be defined as the
voluntary execution of a wrongful act, or willful METROBANK VS. CA [237 S 761] - As borne
omission, knowing & intending the effects w/c out by the records, the dishonoring of the resp.'s
naturally & necessarily arise fr. such act or checks committed through negligence by the
omission; the fraud referred to in Art. 1170 is the petitioner bank on 4/6/82 was rectified only on
deliberate & intentional evasion of the normal 4/15/82 or nine days after receipt of the credit
fulfillment of obligation; it is distinguished fr. memo. Clearly, petitioner bank was remiss in its
negligence by the presence of deliberate intent, w/c duty & obligation to treat pvt. resp's account w/
is lacking in the latter. the highest degree of care, considering the
fiduciary nature of the relationship. The bank is
under obligation to treat the accounts of its
Balane: depositors w/ meticulous care, whether such
account consists only of a few hundred pesos or
Fraud as used in Art. 1170 is different fr. fraud as a of millions. It must bear the blame for failing to
cause for vitiation of consent in contracts (more discover the mistake of its employee despite the
properly called deceit w/c prevents the contract fr. established procedure requiring bank papers to
arising; this is found in Art. 1380, et seq.) pass through bank personnel whose duty it is to
check & countercheck them for possible errors.
Q: What is a synonym for fraud as used in Art. Responsibility arising fr. negligence in the
1170? performance of every kind of obligation is
A: Malice. demandable.

Effects of Fraud:
Creditor may insist on performance, specific or BACK TO MA’AM BAVIERA:
substitute (Art. 1233.)
2. Creditor may resolve/ rescind (Art. 1191.)
3. Damages in either case (Art. 1170.) II. Diligence required
Negligence
Negligence is the absence of something that
should be there-- due diligence. Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
w/c is required by the nature of the obligation &
Delay corresponds w/ the circumstances of the persons,
Delay is the non-fulfillment of the obligation w/ of the time & of the place. When negligence
respect to time.
shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 &
2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
Kinds of Delay:
Art. 1171. Responsibility arising fr. fraud is
1. Mora Solvendi -- delay in the performance (on demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an
the part of the debtor); action for future fraud is void.
2. Mora Accipiendi -- delay in the acceptance (on Art. 2201. xxx
the part of the creditor);
3. Compensation Morae -- mutual delay
293
(2) In contracts & quasi-contracts, the dangers to life & limb under those difficult
circumstances. For instance, the drainage hole
damages for w/c the obligor who acted in good
could have been placed under the stalls instead
faith is liable shall be those that are the natural & of on the passage ways. Even more important is
probable consequences of the breach of the the fact, that the City should have seen to it that
obligation, & w/c the parties have foreseen or could the openings were covered. Sadly, the evidence
have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation indicates that long before petitioner fell into the
was constituted. opening, it was already uncovered, & 5 mos.
after the incident happened, the opening was still
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton uncovered. Moreover, while there are findings
attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all that during floods the vendors remove the iron
grills to hasten the flow of water, there is no
damages w/c may be reasonably attributed to the
showing that such practice has ever been
non-performance of the obligation. prohibited, much less penalized by the City of
Mla. Neither was it shown that any sign had
been placed thereabouts to warn passers-by of
Balane: the impending danger.

Negligence is the absence of something that


should be there-- diligence. Extraordinary diligence required
Negligence is covered by Articles 1170, 1172 &
1173 A. Innkeeper
Measure of Due Diligence.-- There are two
guides:
Art. 2000. The responsibility referred to in
Diligence demanded by circumstances of person, the two preceding articles shall include the loss
place & time of, or injury to the personal property of the
Care required of a good father of a family (fictional guests caused by the servants or employees of
bonus pater familias who was the embodiment the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by
of care, caution & protection in Roman law.) strangers; but not that w/c may proceed fr. any
force majeure. The fact that travelers are
In common law, the degree of care required is the
constrained to rely on the vigilance of the keeper
diligence of a prudent businessman. This is actually
the same as the diligence of a good father of a of the hotels or inns shall be considered in
family. determining the degree of care required of him.

Effects of Negligence:
Creditor may insist on performance, specific or NOTES:
substitute (Art. 1233.)
Creditor may resolve/ rescind (Art. 1191.) Q: Why are the innkeepers held liable under Art.
Damages in either case (Art. 1170.) 2000?
A: Because travelers are constrained to rely on
their VIGILANCE.
BALANE CASE:

Art. 2001. The act of a thief or robber, who


JIMENEZ VS. CITY OF MANILA [150 S 510] - has entered the hotel is not deemed force
City of Mla. failed to exercise the diligence of a majeure, unless it is done w/ the use of arms or
good father of a family w/c is a defense in quasi-
delict.-- As a defense against liability on the basis through an irresistible force.
of quasi-delict, one must have exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family. There is no
argument that it is the duty of the City of Mla. to B. Common Carriers
exercise reasonable care to keep the public market
reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for
their marketing needs. While it may be conceded
that the fulfillment of such duties is extremely Art. 1733. Common carriers, fr. the nature of
difficult during storms & floods, it must, however, their business & for reasons of public policy, are
be admitted that ordinary precautions could have bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
been taken during good weather to minimize the vigilance over the goods & for the safety of the

294
passengers transported by them, according to all for those events w/c could not be foreseen, or
the circumstances of each case. w/c ,though foreseen, were inevitable.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance


over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, AUSTRIA VS. ABAD JUNE 10, 1971
1735, & 1745, Nos. 5, 6, & 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of passengers Facts: While walking home one night, Maria
is further set forth in articles 1755 & 1756. Abad was accosted by 2 men who hit her in the
face & snatched her purse. Inside her purse was
a pendant w/ diamond w/c she received fr.
Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for plaintiff Austria to be sold on commission basis.
the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, Austria filed a civil case for recovery of the
unless the same is due to any of the following pendant or its value vs. Abad.
causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other Issue: WON Abad can be held liable for the
natural disaster or calamity; pendant or its value.
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether
international or civil; Held: NO. To constitute a caso fortuito that w/d
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of exempt a person fr. responsibility, it is necessary
the goods; that
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the the event must be independent of human will;
packing or in the containers; the occurrence must render it impossible for the
(5) Order or act of competent public authority. debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal
manner;
that the obligor must be free of participation in,
C. Lessee of Agricultural land or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.

To avail of the exemption granted by the


Art. 1680. The lessee shall have no right to a law, it is not necessary that the persons
reduction of the rent on account of the sterility of responsible for the occurrence should be found or
the land leased, or by reason of the loss of fruits punished; it shld only be sufficient to establish
due to ordinary fortuitous events; but he shall have that the unforeseeable event, the robbery in CAB,
such right in case of loss of more than one-half of did take place w/o any concurrent fault on the
the fruits through extraordinary & unforeseen debtor’s part, & this can be done through
fortuitous events, save always when there is a preponderance of evidence. To require prior
specific stipulation to the contrary. conviction of the culprits in order to establish the
robbery as a fact w/d be to demand proof
Extraordinary fortuitous events are understood beyond reasonable doubt to prove a fact in a civil
to be: fire, war, pestilence, unusual flood, locusts, case.
earthquake, or others w/c are uncommon, & w/c I is undeniable that in order to
the contracting parties could not have reasonably completely exonerate the debtor for reason of
foreseen. fortuitous event, such debtor must, in addition to
the casus itself, be free fr. any concurrent or
contributory fault or negligence. It is clear that
Q: Bandits stole fish in a leased fishpond. Lessee under the circumstances prevailing at present in
entitled to reduction of lease? the City of Manila, the conduct of Abad in
returning alone to her house in the evening
carrying jewelry of considerable value, w/d be
III. Loss due to Fortuitous Events negligence per se, & w/d not exempt her fr.
responsibility in case of robbery. However, the
same rule w/d not be applicable ten years
previously, or in 1961, for at that time, criminality
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified
had not by far reached the levels attained in the
by law, or when it otherwise declared by stipulation,
present day.
or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible
295
force majeure nature of the armed robbery." The
Balane: Court quite agrees, too, w/ the Appellate
Tribunal's wry observation that PAL's failure to
General Rule: The happening of a fortuitous event take certain steps that a passenger in hindsight
exonerates the debtor fr. liability. believes should have been taken is not the
negligence or misconduct w/c mingles w/ force
Exceptions: majeure as an active & cooperative cause."
When the law so specifies.-- e.g., if the debtor is
already in delay (Art. 1165, par. 3.) BACHELOR EXPRESS VS. CA [188 S 216] -
When the parties so agree The running amuck of the passenger was the
When the nature of the obligation requires the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off
assumption of risk, e.g., an insurance contract. a commotion & panic among the passengers such
that the passengers started running to the sole
exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off
the bus by passengers Beter & Rautraut causing
BALANE CASES: them fatal injuries w/c killed them. The sudden
act of the passenger who stabbed another
NAKPIL & SONS VS. CA [144 S 596] - passenger in the bus is w/in the context of force
Requisites for exemption fr. liability due to an "act majeure.
of God."-- To exempt the obligor fr. liability under
Art. 1174, for a breach of an obligation due to an However, in order that a common carrier may be
"act of God," the following must concur: absolved fr. liability in case of force majeure, it is
the cause of the breach of the obligation must be not enough that the accident was caused by
independent of the will of the debtor; force majeure. The common carrier must still
the event must be either unforeseeable or prove that it was not negligent in causing the
unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to injuries resulting fr. such accident.
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; & Considering the factual findings of the CA-- the
the debtor must be fee fr. any participation in, or bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at
aggravation of the injury to the creditor. the height of the commotion; the bus was
speeding fr. a full stop; the victims fell fr. the bus
door when it was opened or gave way while the
Balane: Some of the elements were present in this bus was still running; the conductor panicked &
case. What was absent was the last element. blew his whistle after people had already fallen
off the bus; & the bus was not properly equipped
w/ doors in accordance w/ law-- it is clear that
NAKPIL & SONS VS. CA [160 S 334] - "One petitioners have failed to overcome the
who negligently creates a dangerous condition presumption of fault & negligence found in the
cannot escape liability for the natural & probable law governing common carriers.
consequences thereof, although the act of a third
person, or an act of God for w/c he is not The petitioner's argument that the petitioners
responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss." "are not insurers of their passengers" deserves
(citing Tucker v. Milan, 49 OG 4379, 4380.) no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to
prove that the deaths of the 2 passengers were
QUISUMBING VS. CA [189 S 605] - PAL's exclusively due to force majeure & not to the
failure to take certain steps that a certain passenger failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary
in hindsight believes should have been taken is not diligence in transporting safely the passengers to
the negligence or misconduct w/c mingles w/ force their destination as warranted by law.
majeure as an active & cooperative cause.-- A
careful analysis of the record in relation to the NPC VS. CA [222 S 415] - Petitioners cannot
memoranda & other pleadings of the parties, be heard to invoke the act of God or force
convinces this Court of the correctness of the majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage
essential conclusion of both the trial & appellate sustained by the pvt. respondents since they, the
courts that the evidence does indeed fail to prove petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event
any want of diligence on the part of PAL, or that, then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of
more specifically, it had failed to comply w/ God or force majeure; a human factor--
applicable regulations, or universally accepted & negligence or imprudence-- had intervened. The
observed procedures to preclude hijacking; & that effect then of the force majeure in question may
the particular acts singled out by the petitioners as be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted
supposedly demonstrative of negligence were, in fr. the participation of man. Thus, the whole
the light of the circumstances of the case, not in occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, &
truth negligent acts "sufficient to overcome the removed fr. the rules applicable to acts of God.

296
Art. 1979 provides for instances wherein
SIA VS. CA [222 S 24] - SBTC's negligence depositary is still liable even in cases of fortuitous
aggravated the injury or damage to the petitioner event.
w/c resulted fr. the loss or injury or damage to the
petitioner w/c resulted fr. the loss or destruction of Q: What kind of diligence is required of a
the stamp collection. SBTC was aware of the floods depositary?
of 1985 & 1986; it also knew that the floodwaters A: Ordinary Diligence.
inundated the room where Safe Deposit Box No. 54
was located. In view thereof, it should have lost no *Safety Deposit Box: If the jewelry inside a SDB
time in notifying the petitioner in order that the box was stolen, rules on deposit will not apply bec.
could have been opted to retrieve the stamps, thus the contract governing the transaction is LEASE
saving the same fr. further deterioration & loss. In of safety deposit box.
this respect, it failed to exercise the reasonable care
& prudence expected of a good father of a family,
thereby becoming a party to the aggravation of the Bailee in commodatum
injury or loss. Accordingly, the aforementioned
fourth characteristic (the debtor must be fee fr. any
participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the
creditor) of a fortuitous event is absent. xxx Art. 1942. The bailee is liable for the loss of
the thing, even if it should be through a
NPC VS. CA [223 S 649] - Petitioners have raised fortuitous event:
the same issues & defenses as in the 2 other
decided cases therein mentioned. Predictably (1) If he devotes the thing to any purpose
therefore, this petition must perforce be dismissed
different fr. that for w/c it has been loaned;
bec. the losses & damages sustained by the private
resp.'s had been proximately caused by the (2) If he keeps it longer than the period
negligence of the petitioners, although the typhoon stipulated, or after the accomplishment of the use
w/c preceded the flooding could be considered as a for w/c the commodatum has been constituted;
force majeure. If the thing loaned has been delivered w/
appraisal of its value, unless there is a stipulation
exempting the bailee fr. responsibility in case of a
A. Exceptions fortuitous event;
If he lends or leases the thing to a third
Express Provision of person, who is not a member of his household;
Law (5) If, being able to save either the thing
borrowed or his own thing, he chooses to save
Depositary the latter.

Art. 1979. The depositary is liable for the loss Negotiorum Gestio
of the thing through a fortuitous event:

(1) If it is so stipulated; Art. 2147. The officious manager shall be


(2) If he uses the thing w/o the depositor's liable for any fortuitous event:
permission;
(3) If he delays its return; (1) If he undertakes risky operations w/c the
(4) If he allows others to use it, even though he owner was not accustomed to embark upon;
himself may have been authorized to use the same. (2) If he has preferred his own interest to
that of the owner;
(3) If he fails to return the property or
NOTES: business after demand by the owner;
(4) If he assumed the management in bad
Q: What if a depositor was in the premises of the faith.
bank & was robbed of his money w/c he was about
to deposit? Art. 2148. Except when the management
A: Bank cannot be held liable for fortuitous event was assumed to save the property or business fr.
(robbery) esp in CAB where the money has not yet
imminent danger, the officious manager shall be
been actually deposited.
liable for fortuitous events:

297
(1) If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the
management; Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible
(2) If by his intervention he prevented a more for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
competent person fr. taking up the management. the willful acts or negligence of other passengers
or of strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the diligence
Payee in Solutio Indebiti of a good father of a family could have prevented
or stopped the act or omission.

Art. 2159. Whoever in bad faith accepts an


undue payment, shall pay legal interest if a sum of 2. Mora or default
money is involved, or shall be liable for fruits
received or w/c should have been received if the a. Mora solvendi
thing produces fruits.
- delay on the part of debtor to fulfill his
obligation to give or to do.
He shall furthermore be answerable for any loss
or impairment of the thing fr. any cause, & for dam-
ages to the person who delivered the thing, until it
is recovered. Art. 1165. xxx. If the obligor delays, or has
promised to deliver the same thing to two or
more persons who do not have the same interest,
he shall be responsible for any fortuitous event
Lessee
until he has effected the delivery.

Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do


Art. 1648. Every lease of real estate may be something incur in delay fr. the time the obligee
recorded in the Registry of Property. Unless a lease judicially or extrajudicially demands fr. them the
is recorded, it shall not be binding upon third fulfillment of their obligation.
persons.
However, the demand by the creditor shall
Art. 1671. If the lessee continues enjoying the not be necessary in order that delay may exist:
thing after the expiration of the contract, over the
lessor's objection, the former shall be subject to the (1) When the obligation or the law expressly
responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith. so declare;
(2) When fr. the nature & the circumstances
Art. 552. xxx. of the obligation it appears that the designation
A possessor in bad faith shall be liable for of the time when the thing is to be delivered or
deterioration or loss in every case, even if caused the service is to be rendered was a controlling
by a fortuitous event. motive for the establishment of the contract;
(3) When demand would be useless, as when
the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to
Independent Contractor perform.

In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs


Art. 1727. The contractor is responsible for the in delay if the other does not comply or is not
work done by persons employed by him. ready to comply in a proper manner w/ what is
incumbent upon him. From the moment one of
Art. 1728. The contractor is liable for all the the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the
claims of laborers & others employed by him, & of other begins. (Compensatio Morae)
third persons for death or physical injuries during
the construction. Art. 552. Xxx A possessor in bad faith shall
be liable for deterioration or loss in every case,
even if caused by a fortuitous event.
Common Carrier

298
b. Mora accipiendi WON MMC was in default in payment of rent, &
therefore liable for destruction of the bldgs.
- delay on the part of the creditor to accept (NO.)
performance of the obligation.
Held: Under the first par. of A1560, lessor does
not answer for a mere act of trespass as disting.
Art. 1718. The contractor who has undertaken fr. trespass under color of title in w/c lessor bears
to put only his work or skill, cannot claim any liability. In CAB, ouster of the Jap forces belongs
compensation if the work should be destroyed to the 2nd class of disturbances--under color of
before its delivery, unless there has been delay in title, & thus, the lessor-pltffs. bear the burden.
receiving it, or if the destruction was caused by the For under the generally accepted prin of IL, a
poor quality of the material, provided this fact was belligerent occupant may legitimately billet or qtr.
communicated in due time to the owner. If the its troops in privately owned land or bldgs. for the
material is lost through a fortuitous event, the duration of the occupation.
contract is extinguished.
The lessor’s insistence upon collecting
Art. 1504. Unless otherwise agreed, the goods Jap occupation rentals was unwarranted in law.
remain at the seller's risk until the ownership Hence, their refusal to accept the current rental
therein is transferred to the buyer, but when the w/o qualification placed them in default (mora
ownership therein is transferred to the buyer the accipiendi) w/ the result that thereafter, they had
goods are at the buyer's risk whether actual delivery to bear all supervening risks of accidental injury
has been made or not, except that: or destruction of the leased premises. While not
expressly stated by the Code of 1889, this result
(1) Where delivery of the goods has been made is clearly inferable fr. the nature & effects of
to the buyer or to a bailee for the buyer, in mora & Arts. 1185, 1452(3) & 1589. That the
pursuance of the contract & the ownership in the lessee did not consign rentals in court did not
goods has been retained by the seller merely to render debtor liable for default nor answerable
secure performance by the buyer of his obligations for fortuitous event.
under the contract, the goods are at the buyer's risk
fr. the time of such delivery;
(2) Where actual delivery has been delayed 3. Express agreement
through the fault of either the buyer or seller the
goods are at the risk of the party in fault.
Art. 1306. The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms &
VILLARUEL VS. MANILA MOTOR CO. 56 O.G. conditions as they may deem convenient,
NO. 18 provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.
Facts: Pltf. Villaruel & def. Manila Motor entered
into a contract whereby Villaruel w/d lease real prop
to MMC for 5 years. The Japanese came & 4. Aleatory Contract
occupied the real prop as part of their quarters.
The Japs paid no rent. Upon liberation, Americans
occupied the bldgs. on the prop & paid rent. When Art. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of
the G.I. Joes left, MMC exercised its option to renew the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves
lease for another 5 years. MMC sublet the prop to to give or to do something in consideration of
one Colmenares. Consequently, Villaruel sought what the other shall give or do upon the
rescission of the K of Lease, & demanded payment happening of an event w/c is uncertain, or w/c is
by MMC of rentals during the time same was held to occur at an indeterminate time.
by the Japs (1942-1945). V refused to accept
MMC’s monthly payments. During pendency of case
filed by V, fire razed the properties.
(not in Baviera's outline)
Issues:
WON MMC liable for rent during Jap pd. (NO.)

299
Art. 1175. Usurious transactions shall be Art. 1178. Subject to the laws, all rights
governed by special laws. acquired in virtue of an obligation are
transmissible, if there has been no stipulation to
the contrary.
Tolentino:

Usury.-- Usury is the contracting for or receiving CHAPTER 3.-- DIFFERENT KINDS OF
something in excess of the amount allowed by law OBLIGATIONS
for the loan or forbearance or money, goods or
chattels. Section 1.-- Pure & Conditional Obligations
Special law on usury.-- The Usury Law was Act
No. 2655. This law was repealed during the period
of martial law, leaving parties free to stipulate Balane:
higher rates.
Articles 1179 - 1230.-- The trouble w/ the
classification is that there is no system.
Art. 1176. The receipt of the principal by the Classification of Obligations:
creditor w/o reservation w/ respect to the interest
shall give rise to the presumption that said interest 1.. According to criteria of demandability:
has been paid. a. Pure
b. Conditional
The receipt of a later installment of a debt w/o c. W/ a term
reservation as to prior installments, shall likewise
raise the presumption that such installments have
2. According to plurality of objects:
a. Single
been paid. b. Alternative
c. Facultative
Art. 1177. The creditors, after having pursued
the property in possession of the debtor to satisfy 3. According to Plurality of subjects:
their claims, may exercise all the rights & bring all a. Joint
the actions of the latter for the same purpose, save b. Solidary
those w/c are inherent in his person; they may also
impugn the acts w/c the debtor may have done to 4. According to Performance:
a. Divisible
defraud them.
b. Indivisible

5. According to Sanctions for Breach:


Balane: a. Simple
b. W/ a penal clause
Against what can the obligee demand performance?

Against non-exempt properties of the debtor.-- The


debtor is liable w/ all his property, present & Different Types of Civil
future, for the fulfillment of his obligations, Obligations
subject to the exemptions provided by law.
(Art. 2236.) As to Criteria of
Demandability
If number one is not enough, the creditor goes to
any claims w/c the debtor may have against
third persons. This is called accion 1. Pure Obligation.--
subrogatoria, wherein the creditor is subrogated
in the rights of the debtor. A pure obligation is one w/c is not subject to a
condition or a term.
Accion pauliana (Articles 1387-89).-- This is the
right of creditors to set aside fraudulent
transfers w/c the debtor made so much of it as Art. 1179. Every obligation whose
is necessary to pay the debts. performance does not depend upon a future or

300
uncertain event, or upon a past event unknown to
Condition compared to a term.-- As
the parties, is demandable at once.
to element of futurity, condition & element are
the same. They differ in the aspect of certainty--
Every obligation w/c contains a resolutory a condition is uncertain whereas a term is certain.
condition shall also be demandable, w/o prejudice
to the effects of the happening of the event. Conditions can either be:
Suspensive condition (condition precedent)
wherein the happening of the event gives
birth to an obligation
BALANE CASE:
Resolutory condition (condition subsequent)
wherein the happening of the event will
extinguish the obligation.
PAY V. PALANCA [57 SCRA 618] - From the
manner in w/c the P/N was executed, it would
appear that petitioner was hopeful that the
satisfaction of his credit could be realized either 1. Distinguished fr. term or
through the debtor sued receiving cash payment fr. period
the estate of the late Carlos Palanca presumptively
as one of the heirs, or, as expressed therein, "upon
demand." There is nothing in the record that would Art. 1193. Obligations for whose fulfillment a
indicate whether or not the first alternative was day certain has been fixed, shall be demandable
fulfilled. What is undeniable is that on 8/26/67,
only when that day comes.
more than 15 yrs. after the execution of the P/N on
1/30/52, this petition was filed. The defense
interposed was prescription. Its merit is rather Obligations w/ a resolutory period take effect
obvious. Art. 1179, par. 1 says so. xxx at once, but terminate upon arrival of the day
certain.
The obligation being due & demandable, it would
appear that the filing of the suit after 15 yrs. was A day certain is understood to be that w/c
much too late. must necessarily come, although it may not be
known when.

B. Conditional Obligations If the uncertainty consists in whether the day


will come or not, the obligation is conditional, & it
shall be regulated by the rules of the preceding
Art. 1181. In conditional obligations, the Section.
acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment
or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon
the happening of the event w/c constitutes the Balane: A term is a future and certain event
condition. upon w/c the demandability (or extinguishment)
of an obligation depends.

Balane: A condition is a future & uncertain event A term or period is an interval of time,
upon w/c an obligation or provision is made to w/c, exerting an influence on an obligation as a
depend. xxx Futurity & uncertainty must concur as consequence of a juridical act, either suspends its
characteristics of the event. (IV Tolentino.) demandability or produces its extinguishment.
(Manresa.)
A past thing can never be a condition. A
condition is always future & uncertain. A term can either be:
1. suspensive condition (ex die -- fr. the day) or
Past event unknown to the parties.-- one the arrival of w/c will make the obligation
It is really the knowledge of the event w/c demandable
constitutes the future. It is the knowledge w/c is 2. resolutory condition (in die -- into the day) or
future & uncertain. For example, when I say " I one the arrival of w/c will extinguish the
will treat you for lunch if you get the highest score obligation.
in the Civil Law Final Exams (on the assumption that
Prof. Balane has already finished checking the
papers.)" Here, the event (getting the highest 2. Kinds of Conditional
score) is already a past event, yet the knowledge is Obligations
future & uncertain.
301
shall be observed as regards the effect of the
a. Condition precedent extinguishment of the obligation.
(Suspensive Condition)
Art. 1187. Xxx In obligations to do & not to
do, the courts shall determine, in each case, the
Art. 1187. The effects of a conditional retroactive effect of the condition that has been
obligation to give, once the condition has been complied w/.
fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution
of the obligation. Nevertheless, when the obligation
imposes reciprocal prestations upon the parties, the Balane: Art. 1190 refers to resolutory
fruits & interests during the pendency of the conditions. This is just the opposite of Art. 1189.
condition shall be deemed to have been mutually
compensated. If the obligation is unilateral, the
debtor shall appropriate the fruits & interests 3. Kinds of conditions
received, unless fr. the nature & circumstances of
the obligation it should be inferred that the intention
of the person constituting the same was different. Art. 1182. When the fulfillment of the
condition depends upon the sole will of the
In obligations to do & not to do, the courts shall debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void. If
determine, in each case, the retroactive effect of it depends upon chance or upon the will of a third
the condition that has been complied w/. person, the obligation shall take effect in
conformity w/ the provisions of this Code.

Balane:
TIBLE VS. AQUINO 65 SCRA 207 (1975)
This article refers to suspensive condition. This
article sets forth the rule of retroactivity in an Facts: Petr. Amelia Tible was appointed
obligation to give. This rule is logical but
impractical. Many modern Civil Codes have administratrix of the estate of Cong. Emilio Tible.
discarded it. Notice to creditors of the settlement of estate
was made. PR Jose Aquino filed a claim for P30T
No Retroactivity as to the Fruits.-- w/c was opposed by Petr. Tible.
Notice that there is no retroactivity w/ respect to
the fruits. The fruits are deemed to cancel out each Accdg to Aquino, Cong. T borrowed P50T
other. If only one of the thing produces fruits, fr. him w/c money T used to buy A’s timber
there is no obligation to deliver the fruits. concession. Total price of concession was P107T.
At time of T’s death, latter still owed A P30T as
evid by PNs.
(ii) Condition subsequent
(Resolutory Condition) Accdg to Tible: Timberland of A was
ceded for P50T w/c Tible had already paid. Then
A convinced T to increase price to P80T, to w/c
Art. 1190. When the conditions have for their Tible agreed, & issued PN for, on the condition
purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, that payment of the balance (P30T) would
the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, depend upon the operation of the timberland.
shall return to each other what they have received. Moreover, A cont to borrow money fr. T w/c at
the end amounted to P54T.
In case of the loss, deterioration or
improvement of the thing, the provisions w/c, w/ TC ruled for Amelia Tible. CA for Aquino.
respect to the debtor, are laid down in the
preceding article shall be applied to the party who is Issue: WON condition imposed by Tible valid?
bound to return.
Held: NO. The condition that payment of the
As for obligations to do & not to do, the amount embodied in the PNs issued by Tible shall
provisions of the second paragraph of article 1187 be dependent upon the operation by Tible of the
forest concession acquired fr. Aquino is a VOID

302
conditional obligation since its fulfillment is made to
depend upon the exclusive will of the debtor. SC BALANE CASE:
gave more credence to Aquino’s version on the
basis of factual evidence. SMITH BELL V. SOTELO MATTI [44 P 874] -
Where the fulfillment of the condition does not
There was no novation in CAB. Mere depend on the will of the obligor, but on that of a
3rd person who can, in no way be compelled to
extension of payment & addition of another obli not
carry it out, the obligor's part of the contract is
incompatible w/ the old one is not a novation complied w/, if he does all that is in his power, &
thereof. it then becomes incumbent upon the other
contracting party to comply w/ the terms of the
contract.
NOTES:

Q: Debtor: I’ll give you a horse when I feel like it. (not in Baviera's outline)
A: Void. Dependent upon will of debtor.

Q: I’ll pay the P500 I owe you when I feel like it.
A: Void time of performance (when I feel like it) of Art. 1183. Impossible conditions, those
the obli. But obli to pay still valid as a pre-existing contrary to good customs or public policy & those
obligation. prohibited by law shall annul the obligation w/c
depends upon them. If the obligation is divisible,
that part thereof w/c is not affected by the
Balane: We are talking here of a suspensive impossible or unlawful condition shall be valid.
condition.

First sentence of Art. 1182.-- The condition The condition not to do an impossible thing
must be suspensive, potestative & depends on the shall be considered as not having been agreed
sole will of the debtor. E.g., "I promise to sell you upon.
my car for P1.00 whenever I like."

Q: Why does it make the obligation void? Balane:


A: Bec. such an obligation lacks one of the
essential elements of an obligation, the vinculum
This refers to a suspensive condition.
juris, the binding force-- the means by w/c it is
enforceable in court. In this case, there is no
There are 2 classes of impossible conditions:
binding force. There is no obligation. It is a joke.
Impossible in fact, e.g., "I promise to sell my car
Potestative Condition is one w/c to Mr. M for P2 if he can swim across the
depends solely on the will of either one party. E.g., Pacific Ocean for 2 hours."
" I will give you my plantation in Davao provided Impossible in law or one w/c attaches an illegal
you reside in Davao permanently." condition, e.g., "I promise to sell my car to
Mr. M for P2 on condition that he burns the
Casual Condition is one where the College of Law."
condition is made to depend upon a third person or
upon chance. E.g., "I will give you my land in Effect of Impossible Condition.-- It annuls
Floridablanca if Mt. Pinatubo erupts this year." the obligation w/c depends upon them. The
entire juridical tie is tainted by the impossible
Mixed Condition is one w/c depends condition. Correlate this w/ Articles 727 & 873.
partly upon the will of one of the parties & partly on
either chance or the will of a third person.
Art. 727. Illegal or impossible conditions in
Q: What if the condition is suspensive, potestative simple & remuneratory donations shall be
& depends solely on the will of the creditor, is the considered as not imposed.
conditional obligation valid?

A: Yes. In fact, the obligation is not even a Art. 873. Impossible conditions & those
condition obligation. It is a pure obligation, binding contrary to law or good customs shall be
at once. considered as not imposed & shall in no manner

303
prejudice the heir, even if the testator should Balane: This article refers to suspensive
conditions. If the condition is resolutory, the
otherwise provide.
effect is the opposite.

According to Tolentino: In contracts, an


impossible condition annuls the contract. In Art. 1185. The condition that some even will
gratuitous dispositions, the impossible condition is not happen at a determinate time shall render
simply disregarded. the obligation effective fr. the moment the time
indicated has elapsed, or if it has become evident
The first statement is inaccurate bec. that the event cannot occur.
donation is a contract & in a donation, the
impossible condition does not annul the contract. It If no time has been fixed, the condition shall
is simply disregarded. The proper way to say it is be deemed fulfilled at such time as may have
that: In an onerous transaction, an impossible probably been contemplated, bearing in mind the
condition annuls the condition obligation. In a
gratuitous disposition, as in a donation or nature of the obligation.
testamentary disposition, an impossible condition
attached to the disposition is simply considered as
not imposed. Balane: This article refers to a suspensive
condition.
Q: Why is there a difference?

A: Bec. in a donation as well as in a


testamentary disposition, the causa or consideration Art. 1186. The condition shall be deemed
is the liberality of the donor or testator, as the case fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its
may be. Even if you take away the impossible fulfillment.
condition, there is still a reason for the disposition to
exist-- liberality. They (donation & testamentary
disposition) have both their underpinnings, Balane: This article refers to a suspensive
liberality. condition.
But in an onerous transaction, since an
onerous prestation w/c is reciprocal requires Doctrine of Constructive Compliance.--
concomitant performances, that impossible There are three requisites in order that this article
condition becomes part of the causa. Therefore, if may apply:
the condition is impossible, there is failure of causa.
In no causa, there is also no contract.
Intent on the part of the obligor to prevent
fulfillment of the condition. The intent does
Paras' outline on impossible conditions:
not have to be malicious.
Actual prevention of compliance (by the obligor)
Positive suspensive condition to do an impossible/
illegal thing-- The obligation is void (Art. 1183,
Constructive compliance can have application
par. 1.)
A negative condition (not to do an impossible only if the condition is potestative. It can also
apply to Mixed condition as to that part w/c the
thing)-- Just disregard the condition (Art. 1183,
obligor should perform.
par. 2.)
A condition not to do an illegal thing (negative)--
This is not expressly provided for in the
provision but is implied. The obligation is valid. BALANE CASES:
E.g. "I will sell you a piece of land provided you
do not plant marijuana on it."
TAYAG V. CA [219 SCRA 480] - Insofar as the
3rd item of the contract is concerned, xxx resp.
court applied Art. 1186, NCC on constructive
Art. 1184. The condition that some event will
fulfillment w/c petitioners claim should not have
not happen at a determinate time shall extinguish been appreciated bec. they are the obligees while
the obligation as soon as the time expires or if it has the proviso in point speaks of the obligor. But,
become indubitable that the event will not take petitioners must concede that in a reciprocal
place. obligation like a contract of purchase, both
parties are mutually obligors & also obligees, &
any of the contracting parties may, upon non-
304
fulfillment by the other privy of his part of the Obligations w/ a resolutory period take
prestation, rescind the contract or seek fulfillment. effect at once, but terminate upon arrival of the
In short, it is puerile for petitioners to say that they
are the only obligees under the contract since they day certain.
are also bound as obligors to respect the stipulation A day certain is understood to be that
in permitting pvt. resp. to assume the loan w/ the w/c must necessarily come, although it may not
Phi. Veterans Bank w/c petitioners impeded when be known when.
they paid the balance of said loan. As vendors, If the uncertainty consists in whether the
they are supposed to execute the final deed of sale day will come or not, the obligation is conditional,
upon full payment of the balance as determined & it shall be regulated by the rules of the
hereafter. preceding Section.

Art. 1188. The creditor may, before the Tolentino:


fulfillment of the condition, bring the appropriate
actions for the preservation of his right.
Concept of Term.-- A term or period is a space
The debtor may recover what during the same of time w/c, exerting an influence on obligations
time he has paid by mistake in case of a suspensive as a consequence of a juridical act, suspends
condition. their demandability or determines their
extinguishment. (Manresa.)

Distinguished fr. Condition:


Balane: This article refers to suspensive
conditions. As to fulfillment.-- A condition is an uncertain
event, while a term is an event that must
Bring the appropriate actions ...-- According to
necessarily come, whether on a date known
Mr. Justice JBL Reyes, the phrase "may xxx bring before hand or at a time w/c cannot be
the appropriate actions" is inaccurate. To bring predetermined.
action is to file a suit. But the creditor is not
restricted to filing a suit. The proper verb is not As to influence on the obligation.-- While a
"bring" but "take." For example, in a sale of land condition gives rise to an obligation or
subject to suspensive condition, the creditor should extinguishes one already existing, a period
have the suspensive condition annotated on the title has no effect upon the existence of
of the land. This is not bringing an appropriate obligations, but only their demandability or
action but taking an appropriate action. performance. Bec. of this difference, a
period does not carry w/ it, except when
The principle in this article is: Vigilantibus
there is a special agreement, any retroactive
et non dormientibus jura subveniunt w/c means effect.
that the laws aid those who are vigilant, not those
who sleep upon their rights. As to time.-- A period always refer to the future,
while a condition may refer to a past event
Q: Why does Art. 1188 give the creditor a recourse
unknown to the parties.
although technically the creditor still have no right?
As to will of debtor.-- A condition w/c depends
A: Bec. as a matter of fact, although technically the
exclusively on the will of the debtor annuls
creditor still have no right, he is already expecting a the obligation, but a period left to the
right. You cannot let the creditor sit & fold his arms debtor's will merely empowers the court to
& wait for his right of expectancy to be rendered fix such period.
illusory.

Balane: In a (suspensive) term, the obligation


C. Obligations w/ a period has already arisen except that it is not yet
demandable.
1. Kinds

Art. 1194. In case of loss, deterioration or


Art. 1193. Obligations for whose fulfillment a improvement of the thing before the arrival of the
day certain has been fixed, shall be demandable day certain, the rules in article 1189 shall be
only when that day comes. observed.

305
such improvements, should it be possible to do
Art. 1189. When the conditions have been so w/o damage to the property.
imposed w/ the intention of suspending the efficacy
of an obligation to give, the following rules shall be
observed in case of the improvement, loss or (not in Baviera’s outline)
deterioration of the thing during the pendency of
the condition.
Art. 1195. Anything paid or delivered before
(1) If the thing is lost w/o the fault of the the arrival of the period, the obligor being
debtor, the obligation shall be extinguished; unaware of the period or believing that the
obligation has become due & demandable, may
(2) If the thing is lost through the fault of the be recovered, w/ the fruits & interests.
debtor, he shall be obliged to pay damages; it is
understood that the thing is lost when it perishes,
or goes out of commerce, or disappears in such a
way that its existence is unknown or it cannot be Balane:
recovered;
Mistaken Premature Delivery.-- This article
assumes 2 things: (1) the delivery was by
(3) When the thing deteriorates w/o the fault mistake; (2) the mistake was discovered bef. the
of the debtor, the impairment is to be borne by the term arrives.
creditor;
Both the things & the fruits can be recovered.
(4) If it deteriorates through the fault of the
debtor, the creditor may choose between the If the term has already arrived, the
rescission of the obligation & its fulfillment, w/ question is moot & academic. But can he recover
the fruits produced during the meantime? It
indemnity for damages in either case:
depends on what school of thought you follow:
(5) If the thing is improved by its nature, or by According to one school of thought, the debtor is
time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of entitled to the fruits produced in the
the creditor; meantime (Tolentino.)

(6) If it is improved at the expense of the According to another school of thought, all the
debtor, he shall have no other right than that fruits received during the pendency of the
granted to the usufructuary. term belong to the creditor (Caguioa.)

When fruits & interests cannot be


recovered notw/standing premature
Balane: delivery:

There are three requisites in order for Art. 1189 to When the obligation is reciprocal & there has
apply-- been premature performance (by both
There is loss, deterioration or delay parties);
There is an obligation to deliver a determinate thing When the obligation is a loan in w/c the debtor is
(on the part of the debtor) bound to pay interest;
There is loss, deterioration or improvement before When the period is for the creditor's exclusive
the happening of the condition. benefit;
The condition happens. When the debtor is aware of the period & pays
anyway.

Rights of a usufructuary
2. Presumed for whose
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the benefit
property held in usufruct such useful improvements
or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem
proper, provided he does not alter its form or Art. 1196. Whenever in an obligation a
substance; but he shall have no right to be period is designated, it is presumed to have been
indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove established for the benefit of both the creditor &

306
the debtor, unless fr. the tenor of the same or other Art. 1197. If the obligation does not fix a
circumstances it should appear that the period has period, but fr. its nature & the circumstances it
been established in favor of one or of the other. can be inferred that a period was intended, the
courts may fix the duration thereof.

Balane:
Exceptions: (a) Art. 1682
General rule: If a period is attached in an
obligation, the presumption is that it is for the
benefit of both parties. The consequence is that
the creditor cannot compel the performance before Article 1682. The lease of a piece of rural
the arrival of the term; the debtor cannot compel land, when its duration has not been fixed, is
acceptance bef. the arrival of the term. understood to have been made for all the time
necessary for the gathering of the fruits w/c the
If the term is for the benefit of the creditor.-- whole estate leased may yield in one year, or w/c
The creditor can demand performance anytime; but it may yield once, although two or more years
the debtor cannot insist on payment bef. the period. may have to elapse for the purpose.
If the term is for the benefit of the debtor.--
Article 1687. If the period for the lease has
The creditor cannot demand performance anytime;
but the debtor can insist on performance anytime. not been fixed, it is understood to be fr. year to
year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; fr. month
Illustrations: "I promise to pay w/in 60 to month, if it is monthly; fr. week to week, if the
days." This is a term for the benefit of the debtor. rent is weekly; & fr. day to day, if the rent is to
be paid daily. xxx
"I promise to pay Clara the sum of
P100,000 on or before Oct. 31, 1996." This is a
term for the benefit of the debtor.
Art. 1606 in pacto de retro sale where the
period is not specified by the parties
3. When no period is fixed
Art. 1606. The right referred to in article
1601 (the right of conventional redemption on
the part of the vendor a retro), in the absence of
an express agreement, shall last four years fr. the
Art. 1197. If the obligation does not fix a
date of the contract. xxx
period, but fr. its nature & the circumstances it can
be inferred that a period was intended, the courts
may fix the duration thereof.

The courts shall also fix the duration of the contract of services for an indefinite term
period when it depends upon the will of the debtor. (bec. fixing of a period by the courts may
amount to involuntary servitude)
In every case, the courts shall determine such
period as may under the circumstances have been
probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by Art. 1197. Xxx The courts shall also fix the
the courts, the period cannot be changed by them. duration of the period when it depends upon the
will of the debtor.

Balane: Art. 1191. Xxx he court shall decree the


rescission claimed, unless there be just cause
authorizing the fixing of a period.
Cases where the Courts may fix a period.-- xxx

1. Art. 1197, par. 1 Art. 1687. xxx However, even though a


monthly rent is paid, & no period for the lease
has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for
the lease after the lessee has occupied the

307
premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, PHILBANKING V. LUI SHE [21 SCRA 53] - A
lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid.
the courts may likewise determine a longer period
after the lessee has been in possession for over six
months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also LIM V. PEOPLE [133 SCRA 333] - It is clear in
fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the the agreement that the proceeds of the sale of
place for over one month. the tobacco should be turned over to the
complainant as soon as the same was sold, or,
Art. 1180. When the debtor binds himself to that the obligation was immediately demandable
pay when his means permit him to do so, the as soon as the tobacco was disposed of. Hence,
obligation shall be deemed to be one w/ a period, Art. 1197 of the NCC, w/c provides that the
courts may fix the duration of the obligation if it
subject to the provisions of article 1197.
does not fix a period, does not apply.

MILLARE V. HERNANDO [151 SCRA 484] -


BALANE CASES: Par. 1 of Art. 1197 is clearly inapplicable, since
the Contract of Lease did in fact fix an original
period of 5 yrs., w/c had expired. It is also clear
CHAVEZ V. GONZALES [32 SCRA 547] - Where fr. par. 13 of the contract that the parties
obligation does not fix a period; When fixing a reserved to themselves the faculty of agreeing
period is mere formality.-- Where the def. virtually upon the period of the renewal contract. The
admitted non-performance by returning the 2nd par. of Art. 1197 is equally inapplicable since
typewriter he was obliged to repair in a non- the duration of the renewal period was not left to
working condition, w/ essential parts, missing, he the will of the lessee alone, but rather to the will
cannot invoke Art. 1197 of the NCC. The time for of both the lessor & the lessee. Most
compliance having evidently expired, & there being importantly, Art. 1197 applies only where a
a breach of contract by non-performance, it was contract of lease clearly exists. Here, the
academic for the pltff. to have first petitioned the contract was not renewed at all, there was in fact
court to fix a period for the performance of the no contract at all the period of w/c could have
contract before filing his complaint in this case. The been fixed.
fixing of a period would thus be a mere formality &
would serve no purpose than to delay.
Art. 1180. When the debtor binds himself to
pay when his means permit him to do so, the
ENCARNACION V. BALDOMAR [77 P 470] - obligation shall be deemed to be one w/ a period,
The continuance & fulfillment of the contract of subject to the provisions of article 1197.
lease cannot be made to depend solely &
exclusively upon the free & uncontrolled choice of
the lessees bet. continuing paying the rentals or
not, completely depriving the owner of all say in the Baviera Cases:
matter. For if this were allowed, so long as defs.
elected to continue the lease by continuing the CPU V. CA
payment of the rentals the owner would never be
able to discontinue it; conversely, although the Facts: Lopez executed a deed of donation of a
owner should desire the lease to continue, the
parcel of land in favor of Central Phil. Univ. A
lessees could effectively thwart his purpose if they
should prefer to terminate the contract by the TCT was issued in CPU’s name w/ the annotation
simple expedient of stopping payment of the that the land shall be utilized by CPU exclusively
rentals. This, of course, is prohibited by art. 1256, for the establishment & use of a medical college .
NCC. The heirs of Lopez filed an action for the
annulment of the donation & reconveyance
alleging that CPU did not comply w/ the
ELEIZEUI V. LAWN TENNIS CLUB [2 P309] - conditions. CPU alleged that the action had
The term of a lease whose termination is expressly prescribed.
left to the will of the lessee must be fixed by the
courts according to the character & conditions of Held: The SC allowed the revocation of the
the mutual undertakings, in an action brought for
that purpose xxx. donation. It held that the donation was onerous.
The action has not prescribed. The condition
imposed upon the donor depended upon the
exclusive will of the donee as to when this

308
condition shall be fulfilled. The absolute acceptance
& acknowledgment of the obligation to build the The K shows that the parties were fully
buildings were sufficient to prevent the statute of aware that the land described was occupied by
limitations fr. barring the action of the heirs. squatters. The conclusion is thus forced that the
parties must have intended to defer the
The starting point in counting the performance of the obligations until the squatters
prescriptive period begins w/ the expiration of a have been duly evicted, i.e. the performance is
reasonable period & opportunity for petitioner to fixed at the date that all the squatters on the
fulfill what has been charged upon it by the donor. affected areas have been evicted.
In this case, more than 50 years has elapsed.
There is no more need to fix the duration of the
term when such would be a mere technicality & 4. When debtor loses the
formality. benefit of period

Notes:
Art. 1198. The debtor shall lose every right
Q: Why has the action not prescribed?
to make use of the period:
A: Because before an action to revoke the donation
can be filed, there must first be an action to fix the
period. Since it is moot to fix the period in the CPU (1) When after the obligation has been
case due to the lapse of 50 years (w/c is more than contracted, he becomes insolvent, unless he
a reasonable period) the donation should be gives a guaranty or security for the debt;
revoked. (2) When he does not furnish to the creditor
the guaranties or securities w/c he has promised;
(3) When by his own acts he has impaired
ARANETA INC. V. PSED CO. said guaranties or securities after their
establishment, & when through a fortuitous event
Facts: JMT & Co. is the owner if Sta. Mesa Hts. they disappear, unless he immediately gives new
Subdivision. Through GAI, it sold a portion thereof ones equally satisfactory;
to PSED. The buyers stipulated in the contract that (4) When the debtor violates any
the buyer will build on the said land the Sto. undertaking, in consideration of w/c the creditor
Domingo Church & Convent while the seller will agreed to the period;
construct the streets on the NE, NW, & SW sides of (5) When the debtor attempts to abscond.
the land.
(6) Art. 2109 - If the creditor is deceived on
PSED finished the construction of the the substance or quality of the thing pledged, he
church. JMT was not able to finish construction of may either claim another thing in its stead, or
the streets bec. squatters were occupying a part demand immediate payment of the principal
thereof & refused to vacate. obligation. (The sixth ground was added by Prof.
PSED filed a complaint against JMT to Balane.)
compel the latter to comply w/ their agreement.

Held: Art. 1197 prescribes that “the court shall 7. Acceleration clause
determine such period as may under the
circumstances been probably contemplated by the
parties. It involves a two-step process: Balane: In number one, factual insolvency is
the court must first determine whether fr. the enough. A judicial declaration of insolvency is
nature & circumstances it can be inferred that a not required.
period has been intended but that the
obligation does not fix the period
decide what period was probably contemplated by DAGUHOY ENTERPRISES V. PONCE
the parties
Facts: Domingo was Chairman & Manager of
Therefore, the court cannot fix the period Daguhoy Enterprises. His wife borrowed P5T fr.
merely bec. in its opinion it is reasonable but it must Daguhoy payable w/in 6 years. As security, she
set the time that the parties are shown to have executed two deeds of mortgage over a parcel of
intended. land. Domingo & his wife presented the mortgage
309
deeds for registration, but the Register of Deeds
refused due to defects therein. Without curing the Balane:
defects, the spouses mortgaged the same parcel to
RFC to secure another loan. To whom does the right of choice belong?

A stockholder of Daguhoy sued Domingo General rule: To the debtor (Art. 1200.)
Exception: When expressly granted to the
for an accounting & collection of the debt. Domingo
creditor
claims that the loan was not yet due.
There is a third possibility where the
Held: Under Article 1198, the debtor loses the choice may be made by a third person upon
benefit of the period by reason of her failure to give agreement of the parties.
the security in the form of the two deeds of
mortgage & register them. The obligation then Q: What is the technical term of the act of
became pure & w/o any condition. Consequently, making a choice in alternative obligations?
the loan became due & immediately demandable.
A: Concentration.

Obligations according to plurality of objects:


Art. 1201. The choice shall produce no effect
A. Simple except fr. the time it has been communicated.

B. Multiple

Conjunctive where the debtor must perform more Balane:


than one prestation
Alternative Obligations where the debtor must
perform any of the prestations Requirement of Communication of choice.--
Facultative where only one thing is due but the If the choice belongs to the creditor, of course,
debtor has reserved the right to substitute it w/ he has to communicate his choice to the debtor.
another (IV Tolentino) (Art. 1206.) The debtor is not a prophet.

Q: If the choice belongs to the debtor, why


require communication before performance if the
D. Alternative Obligations choice belongs to him anyway?
A: To give the creditor an opportunity to consent
to the choice or impugn it. (Ong v. Sempio-Dy,
Art. 1199. A person alternatively bound by 46 P 592.)
different prestations shall completely perform one of
them. BUT how can the creditor impugn it if the
choice belongs to the debtor. The better reason
would be to give the creditor a chance to prepare
The creditor cannot be compelled to receive for the performance.
part of one & part of the other undertaking.

Articles 1202 to 1205 talk of the loss of some


Tolentino: The characteristic of alternative of the prestations before performance.
obligations is that, several objects being due, the
fulfillment of one is sufficient xxx. 1. If the choice is debtor's

a. When only one prestation is left


(whether or not the rest of the prestations have
Art. 1200. The right of choice belongs to the been lost through fortuitous event or through the
debtor, unless it has been expressly granted to the fault of the debtor), the debtor may perform the
creditor. one that is left.-- Art. 1202.

The debtor shall have no right to choose those


prestations w/c are impossible, unlawful or w/c Art. 1202. The debtor shall lose the right of
could not have been the object of the obligation. choice when among the prestations whereby he
is alternatively bound, only one is practicable.

310
Until then the responsibility of the debtor
b. If the choice is limited through the shall be governed by the following rules:
creditor's own acts, the debtor can ask for
resolution plus damages.-- Art. 1203
(1) If one of the things is lost through a
fortuitous event, he shall perform the obligation
by delivering that w/c the creditor should choose
Art. 1203. If through the creditor's acts the fr. among the remainder, or that w/c remains if
debtor cannot make a choice according to the terms only one subsists;
of the obligation, the latter may rescind the contract (2) If the loss of one of the things occurs
w/ damages. through the fault of the debtor, the creditor may
claim any of those subsisting, or the price of that
w/c, through the fault of the former, has
c. If everything is lost through the debtor's disappeared, w/ a right to damages;
fault, the latter is liable to indemnify the creditor for (3) If all the things are lost through the fault
damages.-- Art. 1204. of the debtor, the choice by the creditor shall fall
upon the price of any one of them, also w/
indemnity for damages.
Art. 1204. The creditor shall have a right to
indemnity for damages when, through the fault of The same rules shall be applied to obligations
the debtor, all the things w/c are alternatively the to do or not to do in case one, some or all of the
object of the obligation have been lost, or the prestations should become impossible.
compliance of the obligation has become
impossible.
a. If one or some are lost through
The indemnity shall be fixed taking as a basis fortuitous event, the creditor may choose fr.
the value of the last thing w/c disappeared, or that those remaining.-- Art. 1205 (1), supra.
of the service w/c last became impossible.
b. If one or some are lost through the
Damages other than the value of the last thing debtor's fault, the creditor has choice fr. the
or service may also be awarded. remainder or the value of the things lost plus
damages.-- Art. 1205 (2), supra.

c. If all are lost through the debtor's


d. If some things are lost through the fault, the choice of the creditor shall fall upon the
debtor's fault, the debtor can still choose fr. those price of any of them, w/ indemnity for
remaining. damages.-- Art. 1205 (3), supra.
e. If all are lost through fortuitous event, d. If some are lost through the creditor's
the obligation is extinguished. fault, the creditor may choose fr. the remainder.
f. If all prestations but one are lost through e. If all are lost through fortuitous event,
fortuitous event, & the remaining prestation was the obligation is extinguished.
lost through the debtor's fault, the latter is liable to
indemnify the creditor for damages. f. If all are lost through the creditor's
fault, the obligation is extinguished.
g. If all but one are lost through the fault
of the debtor & the last one was lost through
fortuitous event, the obligation is extinguished.
Distinguished fr. Facultative obligations

2. Choice is the creditor's


Art. 1206. When only one prestation has
been agreed upon, but the obligor may render
Art. 1205. When the choice has been expressly another in substitution, the obligation is called
given to the creditor, the obligation shall cease to facultative.
be alternative fr. the day when the selection has
been communicated to the debtor.
311
The loss or deterioration of the thing intended part of the debt or each creditor is entitled only
to a proportionate part of the credit.
as a substitute, through the negligence of the
obligor, does not render him liable. But once the In joint obligations, there are as many
substitution has been made, the obligor is liable for obligations as there are debtors multiplied by the
the loss of the substitute on account of his delay, number of creditors.
negligence or fraud.
There are three kinds of joint obligations:
(1) Active joint where the obligation is joint on
the creditor's side; (2) Passive joint where the
Tolentino:
obligation is joint on the debtor's side; & (3)
Multiple Joint where there are multiple parties on
Distinguished fr. Alternative.-- each side of a joint obligation.
As to contents of the obligation: In the alternative,
there are various prestations all of w/c
constitute parts of the obligation; while in Tolentino:
facultative, only the principal prestation
constitutes the obligation, the accessory being The joint obligation has been variously termed
only a means to facilitate payment. mancomunada or mancomunada simple or pro
rata. The phrase "We promise to pay," used by 2
As to nullity: In alternative obligations, the nullity or more signers, creates a pro rata liability.
of one prestation does not invalidate the
obligation, w/c is still in force w/ respect to Effects of Joint Liability:
those w/c have no vice; while in facultative, the
nullity of the principal prestation invalidates the The demand by one creditor upon one debtor,
obligation & the creditor cannot demand the produces the effects of default only w/
substitute even when this is valid. respect to the creditor who demanded & the
debtor on whom the demand was made, but
As to choice: In alternative, the right to choose not w/ respect to the others;
may be given to the creditor; while in The interruption of prescription by the judicial
facultative, only the debtor can choose the demand of one creditor upon a debtor, does
substitute prestation. not benefit the other creditors nor interrupt
the prescription as to other debtors. On the
As to effect of loss: In alternative, only the same principle, a partial payment or
impossibility of all the prestations due w/o fault acknowledgement made by one of several
of the debtor extinguishes the obligation; while joint debtors does not stop the running of the
in facultative, the impossibility of the principal statute of limitations as to the others;
prestation is sufficient to extinguish the The vices of each obligation arising fr. the
obligation, even if the substitute is possible. personal defect of a particular debtor or
creditor does not affect the obligation or
rights of the others;
Balane: Facultative obligations always involve The insolvency of a debtor does not increase the
choice by the debtor. responsibility of his co-debtors, nor does it
authorize a creditor to demand anything fr.
In theory, it is easy to distinguish a his co-creditors;
facultative obligation fr. an alternative one. But in In the joint divisible obligation, the defense of res
practice, it is difficult to distinguish the two. You judicata is not extended fr. one debtor to
just have to find out what the parties really another. (Manresa.)
intended.

Art. 1208. If fr. the law, or the nature or the


E. Joint & Solidary Obligations wording of the obligations to w/c the preceding
article refers the contrary does not appear, the
1. Joint Obligations credit or debt shall be presumed to be divided
into as many equal shares as there are creditors
or debtors, the credits or debts being considered
Balane: distinct fr. one another, subject to the Rules of
Court governing the multiplicity of suits.
Joint Obligation.-- A joint obligation is one in w/c
each of the debtors is liable only for a proportionate

312
2. Indivisible Obligations "individually & collectively" also create a solidary
liability. So does an agreement to be "individually
liable" or "individually & jointly liable."
Art. 1209. If the division is impossible, the right
of the creditors may be prejudiced only by their
a. Active Solidarity
collective acts, & the debt can be enforced only by
proceeding against all the debtors. If one of the
latter should be insolvent, the other shall not be
liable for his share. Art. 1211. Solidarity may exist although the
creditors & the debtors may not be bound in the
Art. 1210. The indivisibility of an obligation same manner & by the same periods &
does not necessarily give rise to solidarity. Nor does conditions.
solidarity of itself imply indivisibility.
Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more
creditors or of two or more debtors in one & the
Distinguished fr. Solidary Obligations same obligation does not imply that each one of
the former has a right to demand, or that each
Art. 1224. A joint indivisible obligation gives one of the latter is bound to render, entire
rise to indemnity for damages fr. the time anyone of compliance w/ the prestation. There is solidary
the debtors does not comply w/ his undertaking. liability only when the obligation expressly so
The debtors who may have been ready to fulfill states, or when the law or the nature of the
their promises shall not contribute to the indemnity obligation requires solidarity.
beyond the corresponding portion of the price of
the thing or of the value of the service in w/c the
obligation consists. Balane:

When is an obligation w/ several parties on either


side Joint or Solidary? The presumption is that
3. Solidary obligations an obligation is joint bec. a joint obligation is less
onerous that a solidary one.

Balane: There is solidary obligation only in three


cases: (1) when the obligation expressly so
Solidary Obligations.-- A solidary obligation is states; or (2) when the law or the (3) nature of
one in w/c the debtor is liable for the entire the obligation requires solidarity.
obligation or each creditor is entitled to demand the
whole obligation. There is only one obligation is a Characteristics of Active Solidarity:
solidary obligation.
Since it is a reciprocal agency, the death of a
There are three kinds of solidarity: (1) solidary creditor does not transmit the
Active solidary where there are several creditors w/ solidarity to each of his heirs but to all of
one debtor in a solidary obligation; (2) Passive them taken together. (IV Tolentino);
solidarity where there is one creditor w/ several
debtors solidary bound; (3) Mixed Solidarity where Each creditor represents others in the act of
there are several creditors & several debtors in a requiring payment, & in all other acts w/c
solidary obligation. tend to secure the credit or make it more
advantageous. Hence, if he receives only a
partial payment, he must divide it among the
Tolentino: other creditors. He can interrupt the period
of prescription or render the debtor in
Solidary obligations may also be referred to default, for the benefit of all other creditors;
as mancomunada solidaria or joint & several or in
solidum. It has also been held that the terms A credit once paid is shared equally among the
"juntos o separadamente" in a promissory note creditors unless a different intention appears;
creates a solidary responsibility; that where there
are no words used to indicate the character of a Debtor may pay any of the creditors but if any
liability, the phrase "I promise to pay," followed by demand, judicial or extrajudicial is made on
the signatures of 2 or more persons, gives rise to an him, he must pay only to one demanding
individual or solidary responsibility. The words payment (Art. 1214);

313
Solidarity fr. Nature of Obligations.--
One creditor does not represent the others in such Liability may arise fr. the provisions of articles 19
acts as novation (even if the credit becomes to 22 of the NCC. If 2 or more persons acting
more advantageous), compensation & jointly become liable under these provisions, their
remission. In these cases, even if the debtor is liability should be solidary bec. of the nature of
released, the other creditors can still enforce the obligation. xxx The acts giving rise to
their rights against the creditor who made the liability under these articles have a common
novation, compensation or remission; element-- they are morally wrong. A moral
wrong cannot be divided into parts; hence, the
Each creditor may renounce his right even against liability for it must be solidary.
the will of the debtor, & the latter need not
thereafter pay the obligation to the former.
BALANE CASES:
(Parts in italics were taken fr. IV Tolentino.)
RONQUILLO V. CA [132 S 274] - Clearly
then, by the express term of the compromise
Characteristics of Passive Solidarity:
agreement & the decision based upon it, the
defs. obligated themselves to pay their obligation
Each debtor may be required to pay the entire
"individually & jointly." The term "individually"
obligation but after payment, he can recover fr.
has the same meaning as "collectively,"
the co-debtors their respective shares (this is "separately," "distinctively," "respectively" or
something similar to subrogation); "severally." An agreement to be " individually
liable" undoubtedly creates a several obligation,
Interruption of prescription as to one debtor affects
& a "several obligation" is one by w/c one
all the others; but the renunciation by one individual binds himself to perform the whole
debtor of prescription already had does not obligation.
prejudice the others, bec. the extinguishment
of the obligation by prescription extinguishes xxx [T]he phrase juntos or separadamente used
also the mutual representation among the in the P/N is an express statement making each
solidary debtors. of the persons who signed it individually liable for
the payment of the full amount of the obligation
The debtor who is required to pay may set up by contained therein. xxx In the absence of a
way of compensation his own claim against the finding of facts that the defs. made themselves
creditor, in this case, the effect is the same as individually liable for the debts incurred they are
that of payment; each liable only for 1/2 of said amount. The
obligation in the case at bar being described as
The total remission of the debt in favor of a debtor "individually & jointly," the same is therefore
releases all the debtors; but when this enforceable against one of the numerous
remission affects only the share of one debtor, obligors.
the other debtors are still liable for the balance
of the obligation. MALAYAN INSURANCE V. CA [165 S 536] -
The direct liability of the insurer under indemnity
All the debtors are liable for the loss of the thing contracts against third-party liability does not
due, even if such loss is caused by the fault of mean that the insurer can be held solidarily liable
only one of them, or by fortuitous event after w/ the insured &/ or the other parties found at
one of the debtors has incurred in delay; fault.-- While it is true that where the insurance
contract provide for indemnity against liability to
The interests due by reason of the delay of one of 3rd persons, such 3rd persons can directly sue
the debtors are borne by all of them. the insurer, however, the direct liability of the
insurer under the indemnity contracts against
(Words in italics were taken fr. IV Tolentino.)
third party liab. does not mean that the insurer
can be held solidarily liable w/ the insured &/ or
IV Tolentino: When the law requires
the other parties found at fault. The liab. of the
solidarity.-- The liability of joint tortfeasors, w/c insurer is based on contract; that of the insured is
include all persons who command, instigate, based on tort.
promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, In the case at bar, petitioner as insurer of Sio
or who approve of it, after it is done, if done for Choy, is liable to respondent Vallejos, but it
their benefit. cannot, as incorrectly held by the trial court, be
made "solidarily" liable w/ the 2 principal
tortfeasors, namely respondents Sio Choy & San
314
Leon Rice Mill, Inc. For if petitioner-insurer were bound by the contract of loan. Nowhere did it
solidarily liable w/ said 2 respondents by reason of appear in the P/N that petitioner was a co-debtor.
the indemnity contract, against 3rd party liability-- The law is clear that "(c)ontracts take effect only
under w/c an insurer can be directly sued by a 3rd between the parties xxx" But by some stretch of
party-- this will result in a violation of the principles the imagination, petitioner was held solidarily
underlying solidary obligations & insurance liable for the debt allegedly bec. he was a co-
contracts. mortgagor of the principal debtor, Delgado. This
ignores the basic precept that "(t)here is solidary
RCBC V. CA [178 S 739] - Where an obligation liability only when the obligation expressly so
expressly states a solidary liability the concurrence states, or when the law or the nature of the
of 2 or more creditors or 2 or more debtors in one & obligation requires solidarity.
the same obligation implies that each of the former
has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter
is bound to render, entire compliance w/ the
prestation (Art. 1207.) The creditor may proceed Art. 1212. Each one of the solidary creditors
against any one of the solidary debtors or some or may do whatever may be useful to the others,
all of them simultaneously. but not anything w/c may be prejudicial to the
latter.
QUISIMBING V. CA [189 S 325] - Joint
obligation distinguished fr. solidary obligations;
Concept of active solidarity-- Distinguishing it fr.
Balane:
the joint obligation, Tolentino makes the ff.
observation: A joint obligation is one in w/c each of
the debtors is liable only for a proportionate part of There is an apparent conflict bet. Art. 1212 &
the debt, & each creditor is entitled only to a 1215. Art. 1212 states that the agency extends
proportionate part of the credit. A solidary only to things w/c will benefit all co-creditors.
obligation is one in w/c each debtor is liable for the But not anything w/c is prejudicial to the latter.
entire obligation, & each creditor is entitled to In Art. 1215, he can do an acts prejudicial to the
demand the whole obligation. Hence, in the former, other creditors, like remission for instance.
each creditor can recover only his share of the
obligation, & each debtor can be made to pay only
his part; whereas, in the latter, each creditor may Art. 1213. A solidary creditor cannot assign
enforce the entire obligation, & each debtor may be his rights w/o the consent of the others.
obliged to pay it in full.

The same work describes the concept of active Art. 1214. The debtor may pay any one of
solidarity thus: The essence of active solidarity the solidary creditors; but if any demand, judicial
consists in the authority of each creditor to claim & or extrajudicial, has been made by one of them,
enforce the rights of all, w/ the resulting obligation payment should be made to him.
of paying every one what belongs to him; there is
no merger, much less a renunciation of rights, but
only mutual restitution. Balane:
REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK [216 S 738] - An
instrument w/c begins w/ "I," "WE" or "Either of us" General Rule.-- A debtor may pay any of the
promise to pay, when signed by two or more solidary creditors.
persons, makes them solidarily liable. The fact that
the singular pronoun is used indicates that the Exception.-- If demand is made by one creditor
promise is individual as to each other; meaning that upon the debtor, in w/c case the latter must pay
each of the co-signers is deemed to have made an the demanding creditor only.
independent singular promise to pay the notes in
full. Cases:

In the case at bar, the solidary liability of private Debtor upon whom demand was made pays to a
resp. F. Canlas is made clearer & certain, w/o creditor other than the one who made the
reason for ambiguity, by the presence of the phrase demand in violation of Art. 1214.-- This is
"joint & several" as describing the unconditional considered payment to a third person (Art.
promise to pay to the order of Republic Planters 1241, par. 2) & the debtor can still be made
Bank. xxx to pay the debt. The only concession given
to the debtor is that he is allowed to deduct
CERNA V. CA [220 SCRA 517] - Only Delgado the share of the receiving creditor fr. the
singed the P/N & accordingly, he was the only one total amount due even if he paid the entire
amount due to that creditor.
315
PNB V. INDEPENDENT PLANTERS [122
Creditor A makes demand on debtor Y. Does it SCRA 113] - If one of the alleged solidary
mean that he cannot pay the share pertaining debtor dies during the pendency of the collection
to creditor B? According to commentators he case, the court where said case is pending retains
can. But this is dangerous bec. there may jurisdiction to continue hearing the charge as
already be an agreement on the part of the against the surviving defendants.-- It is crystal
creditors. clear that Art. 1216 is the applicable provision in
this matter. Said provision gives the creditor the
There are three creditors -- A, B & C & there are right to proceed against anyone of the solidary
three debtors -- X, Y & Z. A makes a demand debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.
on Y. X pays B. This is not covered by Art. The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary
1214. creditor to determine against whom he will
enforce collection. In case of the death of the
solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so
Art. 1215. Novation, compensation, confusion chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary
debtors w/o necessity of filing a claim in the
or remission of the debt, made by any of the
estate of the deceased debtors. It is not
solidary creditors or w/ any of the solidary debtors, mandatory for him to have the case dismissed
shall extinguish the obligation, w/o prejudice to the against the surviving debtors & file its claim in the
provisions of article 1219. estate of the deceased solidary debtor.

The creditor who may have executed any of Rules of Procedure cannot prevail over
these acts, as well as he who collects the debt, shall substantive law.-- If Sec. 6, Rule 86, ROC were
be liable to the others for the share in the obligation applied literally, Art. 1216 would, in effect, be
corresponding to them. repealed since under the ROC, petitioner has no
choice but to proceed against the estate of
Manuel Barredo only. Obviously, this provision
Art. 1219. The remission made by the creditor
diminishes the Bank's right under the NCC to
of the share w/c affects one of the solidary debtors proceed against any one, some or all of the
does not release the latter fr. his responsibility solidary debtors. Such a construction is not
towards the co-debtors, in case the debt had been sanctioned by the principle xxx that a substantive
totally paid by anyone of them before the remission law cannot be amended by a procedural law.
was effected. Otherwise stated, Sec. 6 of Rule 86 cannot be
made to prevail over Art. 1216, the former being
Art. 1915. If two or more persons have merely procedural, while the latter, substantive.
appointed an agent for a common transaction or
OUANO V. ALEONAR [202 SCRA 619] - The
undertaking, they shall be solidarily liable to the
creditor may proceed against any one of the
agent for all the consequences of the agency. solidary debtor or some or all of them
simultaneously.-- If that were to happen,
petitioner has only itself to blame. It allowed the
Baviera: Principals are always liable solidarily; period for appeal to lapse w/o appealing. Art.
Agents are not liable solidarily unless expressly 1216 provides that "[T]he creditor may proceed
stipulated against any one of the solidary debtor or some or
all of them simultaneously." Thus IPI, as solidary
creditor, has the right to enforce the trial court's
decision against petitioner OASI.
b. Passive Solidarity

Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the


Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against
solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If
any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of
two or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the
them simultaneously. The demand made against
creditor may choose w/c offer to accept.
one of them shall not be an obstacle to those w/c
may subsequently be directed against the others, so
He who made the payment may claim fr. his
long as the debt has not been fully collected.
co-debtors only the share w/c corresponds to
each, w/ the interest for the payment already
made. If the payment is made before the debt is
BALANE CASES: due, no interest for the intervening period may
be demanded.

316
If through a fortuitous event, the thing is lost
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, bec. or the performance has become impossible after
of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor one of the solidary debtors has incurred in delay
paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by through the judicial or extrajudicial demand upon
all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each. him by the creditor, the provisions of the
preceding paragraph shall apply.
Art. 1218. Payment by a solidary debtor shall
not entitle him to reimbursement fr. his co-debtors Art. 1895. If solidarity has been agreed
if such payment is made after the obligation has upon, each of the agents is responsible for the
prescribed or become illegal. non-fulfillment of the agency, & for the fault or
negligence of his fellow agents, except in the
Art. 1219. The remission made by the creditor latter case when the fellow agents acted beyond
of the share w/c affects one of the solidary debtors the scope of their authority.
does not release the latter fr. his responsibility
towards the co-debtors, in case the debt has been Art. 1222. A solidary debtor may, in actions
totally paid by anyone of them before the remission filed by the creditor, avail himself of all defenses
was effected. w/c are derived fr. the nature of the obligation &
of those w/c are personal to him, or pertain to his
own share. With respect to those w/c personally
Balane: belong to the others, he may avail himself
thereof only as regards that part of the debt for
w/c the latter are responsible.
Effect of Remission.-- Problem: Solidary debtors
W, X, Y & Z are indebted to A for P12,000. A remits
the share of Y (P3,000.) Balane:
Q: Can Y be sued? Three Defenses in Passive Solidarity:
A: Yes, for the P9,000 (P12,000 less P3,000 share
of Y.) Those derived fr. the nature of the obligation is a
total defense, e.g., prescription, illegality of
Q: Supposing X is insolvent? obligation.
A: Y can still be made to contribute. Remission will Those defenses personal to the debtor-
benefit Y only in so far as his share is concerned. defendant, e.g., insanity. If it involves
His liability in case of insolvency of one co-creditor vitiation of consent, total defense. If it
is not affected. involves a special term or a condition, a
partial defense.
Q: Can A demand the P9,000 fr. Y. Those defenses personal to other debtors, e.g.,
A: Yes. But he can recover the same fr. W, X & Z. partial defense, is a defense as to the share
corresponding to other debtors.)

Art. 1220. The remission of the whole


obligation, obtained by one of the solidary debtors, BALANE CASE:
does not entitle him to reimbursement fr. his co-
debtors.
UNIVERSAL MOTORS V. CA [205 S 448] -
Art. 1221. If the thing has been lost or if the
prestation has become impossible w/o the fault of When the obligation of the other solidary debtors
is so dependent on that of their co-solidary
the solidary debtors, the obligation shall be
debtor, the release of the one who appealed,
extinguished. provided it be not on grounds personal to such
appealing private resp. operates as well as to the
If there was fault on the part of any one of others who did not appeal. It is for this reason,
them, all shall be responsible to the creditor, for the that a decision or judgment in favor of the private
price & the payment of damages & interest, w/o resp. who appealed can be invoked as res
prejudice to their action against the guilty or negli- judicata by the other private respondents.
gent debtor.
xxx It is obvious that the resp. court committed
no error in ruling that its decision inures to the

317
benefit of all the private resps. regardless of the fact Art. 1216 of the NCC gives the creditor
that only one appealed. It is erroneous to rule that the right to proceed against anyone of the
the decision of the trial court could be reversed as solidary debtors or some or all of them
to the appealing private resp. & continue in force simultaneously. The creditor, may, if he so
against the other pvt. resps. The latter could not
remain bound after the former had been released; chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary
although the other pvt. resps had not joined in the debtors w/o necessity of filing a claim in the
appeal, the decision rendered by the resp. court estate of the deceased debtor/s. For to require
inured to their benefit. the creditor to proceed against the estate,
making it a condition precedent for any collection
action against the surviving debtors to prosper (if
Art. 1215. Novation, compensation, confusion the Rules of Court were applied literally), would
or remission of the debt, made by any of the deprive him of his substantive rights under Art.
solidary creditors or w/ any of the solidary debtors, 1216.
shall extinguish the obligation, w/o prejudice to the
provisions of article 1219.
Defenses Available
The creditor who may have executed any of
these acts, as well as he who collects the debt, shall
be liable to the others for the share in the obligation Art. 1222. A solidary debtor may, in actions
corresponding to them. filed by the creditor, avail himself of all defenses
w/c are derived fr. the nature of the obligation &
Art. 1219. The remission made by the creditor of those w/c are personal to him, or pertain to his
of the share w/c affects one of the solidary debtors own share. With respect to those w/c personally
does not release the latter fr. his responsibility belong to the others, he may avail himself
towards the co-debtors, in case the debt had been thereof only as regards that part of the debt for
totally paid by anyone of them before the remission w/c the latter are responsible.
was effected.
Art. 1215. Novation, compensation,
confusion or remission of the debt, made by any
of the solidary creditors or w/ any of the solidary
PNB V. DE LA ASUNCION debtors, shall extinguish the obligation, w/o
prejudice to the provisions of article 1219.
Facts: PNB granted in favor of respondent Fabar
Inc. various credit accommodations & advances. The creditor who may have executed any of
These are secured by the joint & several signatures these acts, as well as he who collects the debt,
of Jose Barredo, Carmen Borromeo, Tomas shall be liable to the others for the share in the
Borromeo & Manuel Barredo. For failure of obligation corresponding to them.
respondents to pay their obligations despite
demands, PNB instituted a case for collection
against all private respondents. Manuel Barredo INCHAUSTI V. YULO
died. Respondent Court dismissed the entire case
reasoning that the suit was for a money claim w/c FACTS: Teodoro Yulo borrowed money
does not survive the death of defendant. fr. Inchausti. Teodoro died. His child Gregorio,
in representation of the latter’s 4 brothers & 1
Held: The dismissal should only be against the sister executed a document admitting their
deceased defendant Manuel Barredo. The lower solidarily indebtedness amounting to P 253,
court erred in dismissing the case against all the 445.42. However, one of his brothers did not
defendants. A creditor in a solidary obligation has ratify the agreement. Two brothers & the sister
the option whether to file or not to file a claim of Gregorio executed another instrument w/
against the estate of the solidary debtor. The NCC Inchausti providing that the debt is reduced for
expressly allows the creditor to proceed against any them to P 225,000 (plus extension of the term of
one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them payment). Inchausti sued Gregorio alone for the
simultaneously. debt.

318
HELD: The debtors having obligated themselves in
solidum, the creditor can bring the action in toto Divisibility of Obligation distinguished fr.
against any one of them. divisibility of object.-- Divisibility of obligation
or prestation does not necessarily mean a
divisible obligation. Divisibility of object is not the
Even thought the creditor may have same as divisibility of obligation. But the reverse
stipulated w/ some of the solidary debtors, this does is not the same. Indivisibility of object means an
not lead to the conclusion that the solidarity is indivisibile obligation.
broken. Solidarity may exist even though the
debtors are not bound in the same manner & for
the same periods & under the same conditions. Art. 1223. The divisibility or indivisibility of
the things that are the object of obligations in
There was no novation for there was no w/c there is only one debtor & only one creditor
incompatibility between the old & new obligations. does not alter or modify the provisions of Chapter
2 of this Title (Nature & Effect of Obligations).
The obligation being solidary, the remission
of any part of the debt made by a creditor in favor Art. 1224. A joint indivisible obligation gives
of one or more of the solidary debtors necessarily rise to indemnity for damages fr. the time anyone
benefits the others. of the debtors does not comply w/ his
undertaking. The debtors who may have been
The personal defense of Gregorio’s two ready to fulfill their promises shall not contribute
brothers & a sister as to the part of the debt for w/c to the indemnity beyond the corresponding
they are responsible made in their favor can be set portion of the piece of the thing or of the value of
up by him as a partial defense. The part of the the service in w/c the obligation consists.
debt w/c these are responsible is 3/6 of P 225,000
or P 112,500 so that Gregorio may claim that that Art. 1225. For the purposes of the preceding
part w/c pertained to his co-debtors is not yet due. articles, obligations to give definite things & those
Thus, the action by Inchausti will be only as to the w/c are not susceptible of partial performance
P112,500. shall be deemed to be indivisible.

When the obligation has for its object the


F. Indivisible & Divisible execution of a certain number of days of work,
Obligations the accomplishment of work by metrical units, or
analogous things w/c by their nature are
susceptible of partial performance, it shall be
Balane: divisible.
This kind of obligations has something to do w/ the
However, even though the object or service
prestation, not to the thing.
may be physically divisible, an obligation is
Divisible obligation is one susceptible of indivisible if so provided by law or intended by
partial performance. An indivisible obligation is one the parties.
that must be performed in one act. In obligations not to do, divisibility or
indivisibility shall be determined by the character
General rule: Obligation is indivisible w/c of the prestation in each particular case.
means that it has to be performed in one act singly.
Why? Bec. the law provides so: Unless there is an
express stipulation to that effect, the creditor
cannot be compelled partially to receive the Indivisible Obligations
prestations in w/c the obligation consists. Neither
may the debtor be required to make partial
payments. xxx (Art. 1248, par. 1.) Art. 1209. If the division is impossible, the
right of the creditors may be prejudiced only by
Three Exceptions to the Rule on Indivisibility:
their collective acts, & the debt can be enforced
When the parties so provide. (Art. 1248, par. 1.) only by proceeding against all the debtors. If one
When the nature of the obligation necessarily of the latter should be insolvent, the others shall
entails performance in parts. not be liable for his share.
Where the law provides otherwise.

319
Art. 1210. The indivisibility of an obligation Art. 1612. If several persons, jointly & in the
does not necessarily give rise to solidarity. Nor does same contract, should sell an undivided
solidarity of itself imply indivisibility. immovable w/ a right of repurchase, none of
them may exercise this right for more than his
Examples of Indivisible Obligations respective share.

(1) By virtue of its object The same rule shall apply if the person who
sold an immovable alone has left several heirs, in
w/c case each of the latter may only redeem the
part w/c he may have acquired.
Art. 618. Easements are indivisible. If the
servient estate is divided between two or more
Art. 1613. In the case of the preceding
persons, the easement is not modified, & each of
article, the vendee may demand of all the
them must bear it on the part w/c corresponds to
vendors or co-heirs that they come to an
him.
agreement upon the repurchase of the whole
thing sold; and should they fail to do so, the
If it is the dominant estate that is divided
vendee cannot be compelled to consent to a
between two or more persons, each of them may
partial redemption.
use the easement in its entirety, w/o changing the
place of its use, or making it more burdensome in
Art. 1248. Unless there is an express
any other way.
stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be
compelled partially to receive the prestations in
w/c the obligation consists. Neither may the
(2) Express provision of law debtor be required to make partial payments.

However, when the debt is in part liquidated


Art. 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, & in part unliquidated, the creditor may demand
even though the debt may be divided among the & the debtor may effect the payment of the
successors in interest of the debtor or of the former w/o waiting for the liquidation of the
creditor. latter.

Therefore, the debtor's heir who has paid a part Art. 1583. Unless otherwise agreed, the
of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate buyer of goods is not bound to accept delivery
extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as long thereof by installments.
as the debt is not completely satisfied.
Where there is a contract of sale of goods to
Neither can the creditor's heir who received his be delivered by stated installments, w/c are to be
share of the debt return the pledge or cancel the separately paid for, & the seller makes defective
mortgage, to the prejudice of the other heirs who deliveries in respect of one or more installments,
have not been paid. or the buyer neglects or refuses w/o just cause to
take delivery of or pay for one or more
From these provisions, it is expected the case in installments, it depends in each case on the
w/c, there being several things given in mortgage terms of the contract & the circumstances of the
or pledge, each one of them guarantees only a case, whether the breach of contract is so
determinate portion of the credit. material as to justify the injured party in refusing
to proceed further & suing for damages for
The debtor, in this case, shall have a right to breach of the entire contract, or whether the
the extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as breach is severable, giving rise to a claim for
the portion of the debt for w/c each thing is compensation but not to a right to treat the
specially answerable is satisfied. whole contract as broken.

Art. 2090. The indivisibility of a pledge or


mortgage is not affected by the fact that the (3) Express agreement
debtors are not solidarily liable.

320
Art. 1714. If the contractor agrees to produce refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in
the work fr. material furnished by him, he shall the fulfillment of the obligation.
deliver the thing produced to the employer &
transfer dominion over the thing. This contract shall The penalty may be enforced only when it is
be governed by the following articles as well as by demandable in accordance w/ the provisions of
the pertinent provisions on warranty of title & this Code.
against hidden defects & the payment of price in a
contract of sale.
BALANE CASES:

G. Obligations w/ a Penal Clause


BACHRACH V. ESPIRITU [52 P 346] - Art.
1152 of the OCC permits the agreement upon a
Balane: penalty apart fr. the interest. Should there be
such an agreement, the penalty xxx does not
include the interest, & as such the two are
different & distinct things w/c may be demanded
Articles 1226 to 1230 on obligation w/ a penal separately. The penalty is not to be added to the
clause is the same as liquidated damages found in interest for the determination of whether the
Articles 2226 to 2228 by authority of Lambert v. interest exceeds the rate fixed by law, since said
Fox, 26 Phil. 588. rate was fixed only for the interest.
Penal Clause.-- A penal clause is an accessory ROBES-FRANCISCO V. CFI [86 S 59] -
undertaking to assume greater liability in case of Petitioner contends that the deed of absolute sale
breach. The purpose is to strengthen the coercive executed bet. the parties stipulates that should
force of the obligation. When a penal clause is the vendor fail to issue the transfer cert. of title
present, damages do not have to be proved. w/in 6 mos. fr. the date of full payment, it shall
refund to the vendee the total amount paid for
Characteristics of Penal Clause: w/ interest at the rate of 4% p.a., hence, the
vendee is bound by the terms of the provision &
1. Subsidiary (also called alternative) w/c means cannot recover more than what is agreed upon.
that upon non-performance, only the penalty may xxx
be demanded.
HELD: The foregoing argument of petitioner is
Exception: Where penalty is joint (cumulative) - totally devoid of merit. We would agree w/
where both the principal undertaking & penalty may petitioner if the clause in question were to be
be demanded -- Art. 1227, second sentence: "xxx considered as a penal clause. Nevertheless, for
unless this right has been clearly granted him." very obvious reasons, said clause does not
Notice the word clearly (not explicitly) w/c means convey any penalty, for even w/o it, pursuant to
that the right can be clearly granted by implication. Art. 2209 of the NCC, the vendee would be
entitled to recover the amount paid by her w/
2. Exclusive w/c means that a penal clause is for legal rate of interest w/c is even more than the
reparation. It takes the place of damages. 4% provided for in the clause.
Exception: When it is for the punishment in w/c
case both penalty & damages may be demanded, Balane: The SC considered the 4% interest as
namely-- not a penal clause bec. it does not strengthen the
coercive force of the obligation.
If there is a stipulation that both penalty & damages
are recoverable in case of breach
If the obligor refuses to pay the penalty PAMINTUAN V. CA [94 S 556] - We hold that
If the obligor is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of appellant's contention cannot be sustained bec.
his obligation. the second sentence of art. 1226 itself provides
that "nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the
obligor xxx is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of
Art. 1226. In obligations w/ a penal clause, the the obligation." xxx The trial court & the CA
penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages found that Pamintuan was guilty of fraud bec. he
did not make a complete delivery of the plastic
& the payment of interests in case of non-
sheeting & he overpriced the same. xxx
compliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary.
Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor
321
Penalty & Liquidated damages.-- There is the event of breach. From the foregoing, it is
no justification for the NCC to make an apparent clear that a penal clause is intended to prevent
distinction bet. penalty & liquidated damages bec. the obligor fr. defaulting in the performance of
the settled rule is that there is no difference bet. his obligation. Thus, if there should be default,
penalty & liquidated damages insofar as legal the penalty may be enforced.
results are concerned & either may be recovered
w/o the necessity of proving actual damages & both
may be reduced when proper. Xxx Art. 1227. The debtor cannot exempt himself
We further hold that justice would be adequately fr. the performance of the obligation by paying
done in this case by allowing Yu Ping Kun Co., Inc. the penalty, save in the case where this right has
to recover only the actual damages proven, & not to been expressly reserved for him. Neither can the
award to it the stipulated liquidated damages of creditor demand the fulfillment of the obligation
P10,000 for any breach of the contract. The proven & the satisfaction of the penalty at the same
damages supersede the stipulated liquidated time, unless this right has been clearly granted
damages. him. However, if after the creditor has decided to
require the fulfillment of the obligation, the
This view finds support in the opinion of Manresa
performance thereof should become impossible
that in cases of fraud the difference bet. the proven
damages & the stipulated penalty may be w/o his fault, the penalty may be enforced.
recovered.
Art. 1228. Proof of actual damages suffered
COUNTRY BANKERS V. CA [201 S 458] - A by the creditor is not necessary in order that the
provision w/c calls for the forfeiture of the penalty may be demanded.
remaining deposit still in the possession of the
lessor, w/o prejudice to any other obligation still
owing, in the event of the termination or
cancellation of the agreement by reason of the Baviera: Courts enforce contracts according
lessee's violation of any of the terms & conditions of to their terms
the agreement is a penal clause that may be validly
entered into. A penal clause is an accessory
obligation w/c the parties attach to a principal
obligation for the purpose of insuring the Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce
performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a the penalty when the principal obligation has
special prestation (generally consisting in the been partly or irregularly complied w/ by the
payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation debtor. Even if there has been no performance,
is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if
fulfilled. As a general rule, in obligations w/ a penal it is iniquitous or unconscionable.
clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for
damages & the payment of interests in case of non-
Art. 1230. The nullity of the penal clause
compliance. This is specifically provided for in Art.
1226, par. 1. In such case, proof of actual does not carry w/ it that of the principal
damages suffered by the creditor is not necessary in obligation.
order that the penalty may be demanded. xxx
The nullity of the principal obligation carrier
But there are cases when both the penalty & the w/ it that of the penal clause.
actual damages may be recovered, such as when
there is a stipulation to the contrary or when the
obligor is guilty of fraud.
1. Distinguished fr.
Balane: Country Bankers case is better than alternative obligations
Pamintuan v. CA. Both the penalty & damages are
recoverable in exceptional circumstances. You do
not merge the two. Art. 1227. The debtor cannot exempt himself
fr. the performance of the obligation by paying
SSS V. MOONWALK [221 S 119] - A penal the penalty, save in the case where his right has
clause is an accessory undertaking to assume been expressly reserved for him. Neither can the
greater liability in case of breach. It has a double creditor demand the fulfillment of the obligation
function: (1) to provide for liquidated damages; & & the satisfaction of the penalty at the same
(2) to strengthen the coercive force of the time, unless this right has been clearly granted
obligation by the threat of greater responsibility in him. However, if after the creditor has decided to

322
require the fulfillment of the obligation, the
performance thereof should become impossible w/o Other causes of extinguishment of
his fault, the penalty may be enforced. obligations, such as annulment, rescission,
fulfillment of a resolutory condition, &
Art. 1200. The right of choice belongs to the prescription are governed elsewhere in this Code.
debtor, unless it has been expressly granted to the
creditor.
Balane:
The debtor shall have no right to choose those
prestations w/c are impossible, unlawful or w/c Art. 1231 gives us ten modes of
could not have been the object of the obligation. extinguishing an obligation. One of the modes
mentioned is rescission. But it does not tell us
whether this is rescission under Art. 1191
(resolution) or rescission under Art. 1380, et. seq.
2. Distinguished fr. If it means both, then we have eleven modes of
facultative obligations extinguishing an obligation under Art. 1231.
(Similar to Tolentino’s)

Art. 1206. When only one prestation has been This enumeration is not exclusive. Other
agreed upon, but the obligor may render another in modes of extinguishing an obligation are the
following:
substitution, the obligation is called facultative.
The loss or deterioration of the thing Death, particularly where the obligation is purely
intended as a substitute, through the negligence of personal, e.g., death of one partner dissolves
the obligor does not render him liable. But once the the partnership.
substitution has been made, the obligor is liable for Renunciation by the creditor
the loss of the substitute on account of his delay, Compromise
negligence or fraud. Arrival of resolutory term
Mutual desistance or mutuo disenso (Saura v.
Art. 1227. The debtor cannot exempt himself DBP.)
In some cases, unilateral w/drawal, e.g., in
fr. the performance of the obligation by paying the
partnership, any partner can w/draw any
penalty, save in the case where this right has been time fr. the partnership.
expressly reserved for him. Neither can the creditor In some cases, change of civil status, e.g., if
demand the fulfillment of the obligation & the marriage is annulled, it extinguishes
satisfaction of the penalty at the same time, unless obligations like the obligation to give support,
this right has been clearly granted him. However, if among others.
after the creditor has decided to require the Unforeseen events (rebus sic stantibus) (Art.
fulfillment of the obligation, the performance 1267.)
Want of interest
thereof should become impossible w/o his fault, the
penalty may be enforced. Illustration: Carale owns a restaurant. He
hires Molina as a chef. In the contract of
employment, there was a stipulation that if
Molina resigns fr. Carale's restaurant, he cannot
V. Extinguishment of Obligations seek employment fr. another restaurant for a
period of five years. Subsequently, Molina
resigns fr. Carale's restaurant & wants to apply to
Mildo's House of Chicken. In this case, Molina
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished: cannot work w/ Mildo's bec. of the stipulation in
the contract he signed w/ Carale. Suppose,
(1) By payment or performance; however, Carale, closes down his restaurant &
(2) By the loss of the thing due; engages in a totally different business, a
(3) By the condonation or remission of the construction business, for example, Molina can
debt; apply for work at Mildo's even before the lapse of
the five year prohibitive period.
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights
of the creditor & debtor; In this case, Molina can make out a case
(5) By compensation; of extinguishment of obligation on the ground of
(6) By novation. want of interest. The obvious purpose of the
stipulation is to prevent unfair competition.
323
valid but the obligation to pay in foreign currency
is void. Payment will be made in Phil. currency.
10. Judicial insolvency
How do you convert? In case of an
obligation w/c is not a loan in foreign currency, if
incurred bef. RA 529, conversion must be as of
BALANE CASE: the time the obligation was incurred. If incurred
after RA 529 became effective, the conversion
must be as of the time the obligation was
SAURA IMPORT & EXPORT BANK VS. DBP [44 S incurred (Kalalo v. Luz.) If the loan is in foreign
445] - Where after approval of his loan, the currency, the conversion is as of the time of
borrower, instead of insisting for its release, asked payment. (RA 529.)
that the mortgage given as security be cancelled &
the creditor acceded thereto, the action taken by Payment in negotiable paper-- This may be
both parties was in the nature of mutual desistance refused by the creditor. Payment in
- what Manresa terms "mutuo disenso" - w/c is a manager's check or certified check is not
mode of extinguishing obligations. It is a concept payment in legal tender. The ruling in
that derives fr. the principle that since mutual Seneris has been reversed in the case of
agreement can create a contract, mutual Bishop of Malolos. The Malolos ruling is
disagreement by the parties can cause its better. I found it hard to accept that
extinguishment. manager's check or certified check is good as
legal tender. There are always risks to w/c
cashier's checks are subject. What if after
A. Payment or Performance having issued a cashier's check, the drawee-
bank closes, what happens to your cashier's
Balane’s Outline of the Articles on Payment: check?

Requisites of Payment or Performance: In any event, payment by check can be


refused by the creditor. And even if payment by
I. Re: The prestation check is accepted by the creditor, the acceptance
is only a provisional payment until the check is
1. Identity (a) encashed or (b) when through the fault of
2. Integrity the creditor they have been impaired. The case
3. Indivisibility of Namarco v. Federation, 49 SCRA 238,
interprets the phrase "when through the fault of
II. Re: The parties the creditor, they have been impaired" as to
apply only to a check used in payment if issued
1. Payor/ obligor/ debtor by a person other than the debtor. Why? Bec. if
2. Payee/ obligee/ creditor the check was issued by the debtor himself, all
that the debtor have to do is to issue another
III. Re: Time & place check.

I. With respect to prestation: Revaluation in case of extraordinary inflation or


deflation (Art. 1250.)-- This rule has never
1. Identity been used. It was only during the Japanese
occupation that there was a recognition of
If specific prestation, this requisite means that the extraordinary inflation in this country.
very thing or service must be delivered. (Art.
1244.) Exceptions to the requirement of identity
If generic, the requisite requires the delivery of
something of neither inferior or superior quality (i) Dacion en pago (Art. 1245.)
(Art. 1246). It must be something in the (ii) Novation
middle. In case of money, there are special
rules: In both cases, there is a voluntary change in the
object.
Governing rule: RA 529 as amended by RA
4100-- In case of money debts, you will have
to pay in legal tender in the Philippines. This 2. Integrity.--
law supersedes Art. 1249.
There must be delivery of the entire prestation
If the parties stipulate that payment will be due. (Art. 1233.) The exceptions to the
made in foreign currency, the obligation to pay is requirement of integrity are:
324
If payment was w/o the debtor's consent, the
In case of substantial performance in good faith third person may demand repayment to the
(Art. 1234.) This is an equity rule. extent that the debtor has been benefited.
In case of waiver of obligee/ creditor (Art. 1235.) (Art. 1236, par. 2.)
In case of application of payments if several debts
are equally onerous (Art. 1254, par. 2.)
2. Who may be the payee?

3. Indivisibility.-- The obligee proper (Articles 1240, 1626.)


His successor or transferee (Art. 1240.)
This means that the obligor must perform the His agent (ibid.)
prestation in one act & not in parts. (Art. 1248.) Any third person subject to the following
There are several exceptions to this requirement: qualifications:

In case or express stipulation. (Art. 1248.) provided it redounded to the obligee's benefit &
In case of prestations w/c necessarily entail partial only to the extent of such benefit. (Art.
performance. (Art. 1225, par. 2) 1241, par. 2.)
If the debt is liquidated in part & unliquidated in If it falls under Art. 1241, par. 2 nos. 1, 2 & 3,
part. (Art. 1248.) benefit is deemed to be total.
In case of joint divisible obligations (Art. 1208.)
In solidary obligations when the debtors are bound Anyone in possession of the credit. (Art. 1242.)
under different terms & conditions. (Art. 1211.)
In compensation when a balance is left. (Art. In all these five (5) cases, it is required
1290.) that the debt should not have been garnished.
If the work is to be delivered partially, the price or (Art. 1243.)
compensation for each part having been fixed.
(Art. 1720.)
In case of several guarantors who demand the right III. With respect to the time & place of payment
of division. (Art. 2065.)
In case of impossibility or extreme difficulty of 1. When payment to be made: When
single performance. due
2. Place (Art. 1251.)
II. With respect to the parties
There are two parties involved: Primary rule: As stipulated
1. Payor/ obligor/ debtor Secondary rule: Place where the thing was at the
2. Payee/ obligee/ creditor time the obligation was constituted if the
obligation is to deliver a determinate thing.
Requirements: Tertiary rule: At the debtor's domicile

1. Art. 1226 - 1238. Who should the payor be:

a. Without need of the creditor's consent Art. 1232. Payment means not only the
The debtor himself delivery of money but also the performance, in
His heirs or assigns any other manner, of an obligation.
His agent
Anyone interested in the fulfillment of the
obligation, e.g., a guarantor Balane:
b. With the creditor's consent -- Anyone.
Payment or Performance are used
This is a departure fr. the rule in the Old
interchangeably. But technically, payment is
Civil Code w/c did not require consent
used in obligations to give whereas performance
on the part of the creditor.
is used in obligations to do. Payment/
performance is the paradigmatic mode of
c. Effect of payment by a third person:
extinguishment of an obligation. It is the only
normal way of extinguishing an obligation.
If the payment was w/ the debtor's consent, he
becomes the agent of the debtor. The effect is
subrogation (Articles 1236-1237.) Exception:
If the person paying intended it to be a Art. 1233. A debt shall not be understood to
donation. (Art. 1238.) have been paid unless the thing or service in w/c
the obligation consists has been completely
delivered or rendered, as the case may be.
325
Art. 1234. If the obligation has been
substantially performed in good faith, the obligor AZCONA V. JAMANDRE [151 S 317] - xxx If
the petitioner is fussy enough to invoke it now, it
may recover as though there had been a strict &
stands to reason that he would have fussed it too
complete fulfillment, less damages suffered by the in the receipt he willingly signed after accepting,
obligee. w/o reservation & apparently w/o protest only
P7,000. Art. 1235 is applicable.

BALANE CASES: Petitioner says that he could not demand


payment of the balance of P200 on 10/26/60,
date of receipt bec. the rental for the crop year
1961-1962 was due on or before 1/30/61. But
LEGARDA HERMANOS V. SALDANA [55 S 324]
this would not have prevented him fr. reserving
- The Court's doctrine in J.M. Tuason v. Javier is
in the receipt his right to collect the balance
fully applicable to the present case.
when it fell due. Moreover, there is evidence in
the record that when the due date arrived, he
J.M. TUASON V. JAVIER [31 S 829] - In the
made any demand, written or verbal, for the
interest of justice & equity, court may grant the
payment of that amount.
vendee a new term where he substantially
performed in good faith according to Art. 1234,
regardless of Art. 1592 of the same Code.
PAGSIBIGAN V. CA [221 S 202] - We hold
that the payment amounting to P8,500 for the
PRESBITERO V. CA [217 S 372] - Under Art.
balance of P3,558.20 as of 8/26/78 plus the
1234, if the obligation has been substantially
P1,000 it was asked to pay on 4/24/84 would at
performed in GF, the obligor (private resp. Leonardo
the very least constitute substantial performance.
Canoso) may recover as though there had been a
xxx Petitioner in this case has the right to move
strict & complete fulfillment, less damages suffered
for the cancellation of the mortgage & the release
by the obligee (Presbitero.) Moreover, when the
of the mortgaged prop., upon payment of the
obligee accepts the performance as what happened
balance of the loan. xxx
in this case, knowing its incompleteness or
irregularity, & w/o expressing any protest or
Thus, aside fr. the fact that the resp. bank was
objection, the obligation is deemed fully complied
estopped fr. enforcing its right to foreclose by
w/.
virtue of its acceptance of the delayed payments
for a period of more than six years, the
TAYAG V. CA [219 S 480] - Both the trial court &
application of such payment to the interest & the
the appellate courts were correct in sustaining the
principal during the first three payments
claim of pvt resps. anchored on estoppel or waiver
constitutes a virtual waiver of the acceleration
by acceptance of delayed payments under Art. 1235
clause provided in the contract. We cannot
considering that the heirs of Juan Galicia, Sr.
sustain the legality of the foreclosure under the
accommodated pvt. resp. by accepting the latter's
peculiar facts of this case, bec. there is
delayed payments not only beyond the grace
substantial performance of the obligation on the
periods but also during the pendency of the case for
part of petitioner. xxx
specific performance. Indeed, the right to rescind is
not absolute & will not be granted where there has
been substantial compliance by partial payments.
By & large, petitioners' actuation is susceptible of 1. To whom payment should be
but one construction-- that they are now estopped made
fr. reneging fr. their commitment on account of
acceptance of benefits arising fr. overdue accounts
of pvt. resps.
Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the
person in whose favor the obligation has been
constituted, or his successor in interest, or any
Art. 1235. When the obligee accepts the person authorized to receive it.
performance, knowing its incompleteness or
irregularity, & w/o expressing any protest or
objection, the obligation is deemed fully complied
BALANE CASES:
w/.
ARANAS V. TUTAAN [127 S 828] - Payment
by judgment debtor to the wrong party does not
BALANE CASES: extinguish judgment debt.-- The burden of
326
recovering the supposed payments of the cash Cr, or thru error induced by fraud of 3P,
dividends made by UTEX to the wrong parties EXCEPT AS PROV. IN ART. 1241
Castaneda & Manuel squarely falls upon itself by its Deposit by Dr in bank, in the name of & to the
own action & cannot be passed by it to petitioners credit of Cr, w/o latter’s autho. Does NOT
as innocent parties. It is elementary that payment constitute paymt; but when the Cr cannot be
made by a judgment debtor to a wrong party found in the place of payment, such deposit
cannot extinguish the judgment obligation of such may be a valid excuse for not holding the Dr
debtor to its creditor. xxx in default
GR: Consignation in ct. of thing or amt. Due,
PAL V. CA [181 S 557] - A payment in order to when properly made will ext. oblig.
be effective to discharge an obligation must be
made to the proper parties.-- In general, a
payment, in order to be effective to discharge an
obligation, must be made to the proper person. Art. 1241. Payment to a person who is
Thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself incapacitated to administer his property shall be
or to an agent having authority, express or implied, valid if he has kept the thing delivered, or insofar
to receive the particular payment. Payment made as the payment has been beneficial to him.
to one having apparent authority to receive the
money will, as a rule, be treated as though actual Payment made to a third person shall also be
authority had been given for its receipt. Likewise, if valid insofar as it has redounded to the benefit of
payment is made to one who by law is authorized to the creditor. Such benefit to the creditor need not
act for the creditor, it will work a discharge. The
be proved in the following cases:
receipt of money due on a judgment by an officer
authorized by law to accept it will, therefore satisfy
the debt. (1) If after the payment, the third persons
acquires the creditor's rights;
xxx The theory is where a payment is made to a
person authorized & recognized by the creditor, the (2) If the creditor ratifies the payment to the
payment to such a person so authorized is deemed third person;
payment to the creditor. xxx
(3) If by the creditor's conduct, the debtor
Unless authorized by law or by consent of the
has been led to believe that the third person had
obligee, a public officer has no authority to accept
anything other than money in payment of an authority to receive the payment.
obligation under a judgment being executed.-- In
the absence of an agreement, either express or
implied, payment means the discharge of a debt or Baviera: Number three is Estoppel in Pais
obligation in money & unless the parties so agree, a
debtor has no rights, except at his own peril, to
substitute something in lieu of cash as medium of
payment of his debt. Consequently, Unless Tolentino:
authorized by law or by consent of the obligee, a
public officer has no authority to accept anything When Cr is incapacitated, payment must be
other than money in payment of an obligation made to his legal rep. Or deliver
under a judgment being executed. Strictly the thing to ct. for consignation ff.
speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of the Art. 1256
petitioner's checks, in the case at bar, does not, per Paymt. To Inc. Cr shall be valid only insofar
se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt. as it accrued to his benefit.
Absence of benefit, Dr may be
made to pay again by Cr when he
Tolentino: attains capacity, or his legal rep
during the inc.
Same principles are applicable to paymt
made to 3P, but person who paid
Authority to receive: LEGAL or CONVENTIONAL
has right to recover fr. 3P
Legal: conferred by law, such as autho. Of guardian
In ff. Cases, paymt. To 3P releases Dr: (1)
to inc. creditor (Cr), or the adm’r of estate
when w/o notice to assngmt. Of
Conventional: autho. Fr. Cr himself, as when agent
credit he pays to original Cr [Art.
is appted. To collect fr. Debtor (Dr)
1626] & (2) when in GF he pays
Paymt. To wrong party does NOT extinguish oblig
to one in poss’n of credit [Art.
to Cr, if there is no fault or negligence w/c can
1242]
be imputed to the latter, even when Dr acted in
utmost GF & by mistake as to the person of his
327
If mistake of Dr due to fault of Cr, then Cr voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers a
cannot demand anew fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation,
there shall be no right to recover the same fr. the
obligee who has spent or consumed it in good
Art. 1242. Payment made in good faith to any faith.
person in possession of the credit shall release the
debtor.
NOTE: age of majority is now 18.
(Assignment of Credits & Other Incorporeal
Rights)
Tolentino:
Art. 1626. The debtor who, before having
knowledge of the assignment, pays his creditor shall Where the person paying has no capacity to
be released fr. the obligation. make the pmt, the Cr cannot be compelled to
accept it. Consign’n will not be proper.
2. Who shall make payment In case Cr accepts, the pmt will not be valid,
except in the case provided in A 1427.
Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to accept
payment or performance by a third person who has
no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless RFC V. CA
there is a stipulation to the contrary.
Facts: Anduiza & Cano made a PN solidarily
Whoever pays for another may demand fr. the promising to pay AIB, predecessor of RFC, a sum
debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid w/o of money in 10 equal installments. They failed to
the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he pay in ’42 &’43. Madrid offered, & subsequently
can recover only insofar as the payment has been paid such debt to AIB. Despite demands, Anduiza
beneficial to the debtor. failed to pay Madrid. AIB refused to cancel the
mortgage made by A & C. Thus, Madrid filed a
Art. 1237. Whoever pays on behalf of the complaint praying that the indebtedness be
debtor w/o the knowledge or against the will of the declared paid, that the mortgage be canceled &
latter, cannot compel the creditor to subrogate him that A&C pay the amount he paid to AIB.
in his rights, such as those arising fr. a mortgage,
guaranty, or penalty. Issue: WON payment by M valid

Held: Yes. A&C did not protest when M paid AIB.


Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person Thus M entitled to payment. Under 1158,
who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor payment made by any person, WON interested in
is deemed to be a donation, w/c requires the the obligation & WON payment is known &
debtor's consent. But the payment is in any case approved by Dr or WON he is aware of it. If
valid as to the creditor who has accepted it. made v. Dr’s will, the payor will only recover
insofar as the payment has been beneficial to
(Other Quasi-Contracts) him. The Bank cannot invoke the provision that
the payor may only recover fr. the Dr only insofar
Art. 2173. When a third person, w/o the as the payment has been beneficial to him. This
knowledge of the debtor, pays the debt, the rights defense may only be availed of by the Dr, not the
of the former are governed by articles 1236 & 1237. bank. Besides, in order that the rights of the
payor may be subject to such limitation, the Dr
Art. 1239. In obligations to give, payment must oppose the pmts b4 or at the time the same
made by one who does not have the free disposal were made, not subsequently thereto.
of the thing due & capacity to alienate it shall not
be valid, w/o prejudice to the provisions of article
1427 under the Title on "Natural Obligations." Art. 1243. Payment made to the creditor by
the debtor after the latter has been judicially
Art. 1427. When a minor between eighteen & ordered to retain the debt shall not be valid.
twenty-one years of age, who has entered into a
contract w/o the consent of the parent or guardian,
328
nature of sale, that is, the creditor is really buying
Tolentino: the thing or property of the debtor, payment for
w/c is to be charged against the debtor's debt.
Pmt to Cr after the credit has been attached ir As such, the essential elements of a contract of
garnished is void as to the party who obtained sale, namely, consent, object certain, & cause or
the attachmt or garnishmt, to the extent of the consideration must be present.
amt of jmt in his favor
Dr can therefor be made to pay again to the party Dacion en pago in its modern concept.-- In its
who secured the attachtmt or garnishmt, but he modern concept, what actually takes place in
can recover the same to the extent what he has dacion en pago is an objective novation of the
pd to his Cr obligation where the thing offered as an accepted
equivalent of the performance of an obligation is
considered as the object of the contract of sale,
while the debt is considered as the purchase
Art. 1244. The debtor of a thing cannot compel price. In any case, common consent is an
the creditor to receive a different one, although the essential prerequisite, be it sale or novation, to
latter may be of the same value as, or more have the effect of totally extinguishing the debt
valuable than that w/c is due. or obligation.

In obligations to do or not to do, an act or


CITIZENS SURETY V. CA [162 S 738] -
forbearance cannot be substituted by another act or There is no dation in payment when there is no
forbearance against the obligee's will. obligation to be extinguished.-- The transaction
could not be dation in payment. xxx [W]hen the
deed of assignment was executed on 12/4/59,
Tolentino: the obligation of the assignor to refund the
assignee h ad not yet arisen. In other words,
Defects of the thing delivered may be waived by the there was no obligation yet on the part of the
Cr, if he expressly so declares, or if, w/ knowledge petitioner, Citizens' to pay Singer Sewing Machine
thereof, he accepts the thing w/o protest or Co. There was nothing to be extinguished on
disposes of it or consumes it that date, hence, there could not have been a
dation in payment.

Art. 1245. Dation in payment, whereby Art. 1246. When the obligation consists in
property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of the delivery of an indeterminate or generic thing,
a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of whose quality & circumstances have not been
sales. stated, the creditor cannot demand a thing of
superior quality. Neither can the debtor deliver a
thing of inferior quality. The purpose of the
BALANE CASES: obligation & other circumstances shall be taken
into consideration.
FILINVEST V. PHIL. ACETYLENE [111 S 421] -
We find appellant's contention devoid of persuasive
force. The mere return of the mortgaged motor
vehicle by the mortgagor, the herein appellant, to Tolentino:
the mortgagee, the herein appellee, does not
constitute dation in payment in the absence, Cr or Dr may waive the benefit of this Art.
express or implied of the true intention of the Cr may require a thing of inferior qlty & Dr may
parties. deliver a thing of superior qlty, unless the
price to be pd in the latter case is dependent
Dacion en pago, according to Manresa, is the upon the qlty
transmission of the ownership of a thing by the
debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of
the performance of an obligation . In dacion en Art. 1247. Unless it is otherwise stipulated,
pago, as a special mode of payment, the debtor
the extrajudicial expenses required by the
offers another thing to the creditor who accepts it
as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. payment shall be for the account of the debtor.
With regard to judicial costs, the Rules of Court
Dacion en pago in the nature of sale.-- The shall govern.
undertaking really partakes in one sense of the

329
Art. 1248. Unless there is an express garnished funds deposited w/ RTC in connxn w/
stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be another case, the Tibajas delivered to the sheriff
compelled partially to receive the prestations in w/c the total money jmt partly in cash & a greater
the obligation consists. Neither may the debtor be part in a Cashier’s Check, w/c Tan refused to
required to make partial payments. accept.

However, when the debt is in part liquidated & Issue: WON there is valid tender of pmt
in part unliquidated, the creditor may demand & the
debtor may effect the payment of the former w/o Held: Under Sec. 63 of RA 265, checks
waiting for the liquidation of the latter. representing deposit money do not have legal
tender power & their acceptance in the pmt of
debts, public or private, is at the option of the Cr,
provided that a check w/c has been cleared &
BALANE CASE:
credited to the account of the Cr shall be equiv to
a delivery to Cr of cash. In PAL v. CA & RC Bishop
NASSER V. CUEVAS [188 S 812] - There is of Mla v. IAC, a check, WON Mgr’s or ord, is not
nothing in the cited proviso to justify the reading legal tender & an offer of a check in pmt of a
that the petitioner would give to it. The par. in w/c debt is not a valid tender of pmt & may be
it is found does no more than establish "on all the refused receipt by the Cr.
properties of the Estate, real & personal, herein
adjudicated & other properties not yet adjudicated,
a charging lien xxx to secure the payment of BALANE CASES:
(Canlas') attorney's fees;" this, w/ the express
agreement of all the signatories. The proviso that
"upon full payment of the corresponding liability of
a party the lien on his/her share is extinguished," KALALO V. LUZ [34 S 337] - Under RA 529, if
evidently contemplates the probability that the heirs the obligation was incurred prior to the
obliged to pay Canlas' fees would pay at different enactment in a particular kind of coin or currency
times, & denotes nothing more than that if one of other than the Phil. currency the same shall be
the obligors separately pays his share in Canlas' discharged in Phil. currency measured at the
fees, the lien on his share of the estate is thereby prevailing rate of exchange at the time the
extinguished-- a quite obvious proposition, to be obligation was incurred. RA 529 does not provide
sure. The clause cannot be construed as granting for the rate of exchange for the payment of the
to any of the obligors, by implication, the option to obligation incurred after the enactment of said
pay in installments, or as impliedly binding on the Act. The logical conclusion is that the rate of
obligee to accept payment by parts. xxx exchange should be that prevailing at the time of
payment for such contracts.

PONCE V. CA [90 S 533] - It is to be noted


Art. 1249. The payment of debts in money that while an agreement to pay in dollars is
shall be made in the currency stipulated, & if it is declared as null & void & of no effect, what the
not possible to deliver such currency, then in the law specifically prohibits is payment in currency
currency w/c is legal tender in the Philippines. other than legal tender. It does not defeat a
creditor's claim for payment, as it specifically
provides that "every other domestic obligation
The delivery of promissory notes payable to xxx whether or not any such provision as to
order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile payment is contained therein or made w/ respect
documents shall produce the effect of payment only thereto, shall be discharged upon payment in any
when they have been cashed, or when through the coin or currency w/c at the time of payment is
fault of the creditor they have been impaired. legal tender for public & pvt. use." A contrary
rule would allow a person to profit or enrich
In the meantime, the action derived fr. the himself inequitably at another's expense.
original obligation shall be held in abeyance.
NEW PACIFIC TIMBER V. SENERIS [101 S
686] - It is to be emphasized that the check
deposited by the petitioner in the amount of
TIBAJA V. CA P50,000 is not an ordinary check but a Cashier's
check of the Equitable Banking Corp., a bank of
Facts: Tan obtained a jmt v. the Tibaja spouses good standing & reputation. It was even a
for pmt of sum of money. To prevent exec’n of certified crossed check. It is well known &

330
accepted practice in the business sector that a "monetary fluctuation" contemplated by them as
Cashier's check is deemed as cash. would justify the adjustment. Under this
scenario, it is an idle task to determine whether
Moreover, since the said check has been certified by the contract has been visited by an
the drawee bank, by the certification, the funds "extraordinary inflation" as to trigger the
represented by the check are transferred fr. the operation of Art. 1250. While the contract may
credit of the maker to that of the payee or holder, & contain an "escalator clause" providing that in the
for all intents & purposes, the latter becomes the occurrence of certain events, the contract price
depositor of the drawee bank, w/ rights & duties of shall be increased to a fixed percentage of the
one in such situation. Where a check is certified by base price, still the autonomy of the parties to
the bank on w/c it is drawn, the certification is provide such escalator clauses may be limited by
equivalent to acceptance. Said certification "implies law. The petition should be dismissed on the
that the check is drawn upon sufficient funds in the ground that the stipulation of the parties is in
hands of the drawee, that they have been set apart violation of RA 529, as amended.
fort its satisfaction, & that they shall be so applied
whenever the check is presented for payment. It is We cannot grant the petition but not on the
an understanding that the check is good then, & grounds relied upon by the trial court & the CA
shall continue good, & this agreement is as binding that there should be an "extraordinary inflation"
on the bank as its notes in circulation, a certificate before a stipulation for an upward adjustment of
of deposit payable to the order of the depositor, or the purchase price can be enforced.
any other obligation it can assume. The object of
certifying a check, as regards both parties, is to 1. xxx The petition should be dismissed on the
enable the holder to use it as money ." When the ground that the stipulation of the parties is in
holder procures the check to be certified, "the check violation of RA 529, aka, Cuenco Law.
operates as an assignment of a part of the funds to
the creditors." Hence, the exception to the rule The Court cited Sec. 1 of the said law.
enunciated under Sec. 63 of the CB Act to the effect
that "a check w/c has been cleared & credited to xxx [T]he said law prohibits two things in all
the account of the creditor shall be equivalent to a domestic contracts: (1) giving the obligee the
delivery to the creditor in cash in an amount equal right to require payment in a specified currency
to the amount credited to his account" shall apply in other than Phil. currency; & (2) giving the
this case. obligee the right to require payment "in an
amount of money of the Philippines measured
BISHOP OF MALOLOS V. IAC [191 S 411] - thereby."
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute
for money & not money, the delivery of such an When the parties stipulated that in the event of
instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. monetary fluctuation, the unpaid balance account
A check, whether a manager's check or ordinary of the herein vendee on the aforesaid subdivision
check, is not legal tender, & an offer of a check in lot shall be increased proportionately on the basis
payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment of the present value of peso to the US dollar, the
& may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. obligee was given the right to demand payment
of the bal. of the purchase price "in an amount of
DBP V. SIMA WEI [219 S 736] - Notw/standing money of the Phils. measured" by a foreign coin
the above, it does not necessarily follow that the or currency.
drawer Sima Wei is freed fr. liability to petitioner
bank under the loan evidenced by the p/n agreed to xxx Congress passed RA 529, having in mind the
by her. Her allegation that she has paid the balance preservation of the value of the Phil. peso. A
of her loan w/ the 2 checks payable to petitioner currency has value bec. people are willing to
Bank has no merit for xxx these checks were never accept it in exchange for goods & services & in
delivered to petitioner Bank. And even granting, payment for debts. xxx If instead of the Phil.
w/o admitting, that there was delivery too petitioner currency, the people would use a foreign
Bank, the delivery of checks in payment of an currency as the mode of payment or as basis for
obligation does not constitute payment unless they measuring the amount of money to be paid in
are cashed or their value is impaired through the Phil. currency, such usage would adversely affect
fault of the creditor. None of these exceptions were the confidence of the public on the Phil. monetary
alleged by resp. Sima Wei. system.

PALANCA V. CA [238 S 593] - In the case at 2. The liberalization of the foreign exchange
bar, the clear understanding of the parties is that regulations on receipts & disbursements of
there should be an upward adjustment of the residents arising fr. both non-trade & trade
purchase price the moment there is a deterioration transactions did not repeal or in any way amend
of the Phil. vis-a-vis the US dollar. This is the RA 529. In essence, said CB Circulars merely

331
allowed the free sale & purchase of foreign purchasing pwr of the currency cannot be
exchange outside the banking system & other considered extraord. It was due to oil embargo
transactions involving foreign currency previously crisis the effect of w/c was worldwide.
subject to CB control.

BALANE CASES:
Tolentino:
VELASCO V. MERALCO [42 S 556] - From
Legal tender: such currency w/c in a given the employment of the words "extraordinary
jurisdiction can be used for the pmts of debts, inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated" in
public & private, & w/c cannot be refused by Art. 1250, it can be seen that the same envisages
the Cr contractual obligations where a specific currency
Since pmt must be in money that is legal tender, is selected by the parties as the medium of
pmt in check even when good may be validly payment; hence it is inapplicable to obligations
refused by Cr arising fr. tort & not fr. contract. Besides, there
Pmt by Check: WON MgrC or ordinary is NOT a is no showing that the factual assumption of said
valid tender of pmt article has come into existence.

COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS V.


Art. 1250. In case an extraordinary inflation or BURGOS [96 S 831] - Art. 1250 does applies
deflation of the currency stipulated should only to cases where a contract or agreement is
involved. It does not apply where the obligation
supervene, the value of the currency at the time of
to pay arises fr. law, independent of contracts.
the establishment of the obligation shall be the The taking of private property by the govt in the
basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to exercise of its power of eminent domain does not
the contrary. give rise to a contractual obligation.

DEL ROSARIO V. SHELL [164 S 556] - In the


case at bar, while no express reference has been
Baviera: This article applies to contracts only. made to metallic content, there nonetheless is a
EXTRAORDINARY means unusual or beyond reduction in par value or in the purchasing power
the common fluctuation, not foreseen of Phil. currency. Even assuming there has been
no official devaluation as the term is technically
understood, the fact is that there has been a
Tolentino: Does NOT apply where oblig to pay diminution or lessening in the purchasing power
arises fr law, independent of Ks, like the taking of of the peso, thus there has been a "depreciation"
private prop by the govt in the exercise of its pwr of (opposite of "appreciation.") Moreover, when
emt domain laymen unskilled in the semantics of economics
use the terms "devaluation" or "depreciation"
they certainly mean them in their ordinary
FIL. PIPE & FOUNDRY CORP. V. NAWASA signification-- decrease in value. Hence, as
contemplated by the parties herein in their lease
agreement, the term "devaluation" may be
Facts: In ’67, CFI ordered NAWASA to pay FPFC regarded as synonymous w/ "depreciation," for
the balance of the purchase price of cast iron certainly both refer to a decrease in the value of
pressure pipes. N failed to pay. In ’71, FPFC filed the currency. The rentals should therefore, by
another complaint seeking an adjustment of the their agreement, be proportionately increased.
unpaid balance. TC dismissed the complaint holding
that the inflation was a worldwide occurrence & that SANGRADOR V. VALDERAMA [168 S 215] -
there was no proof of extraord inflation in the sense Since petitioners failed to prove the supervening
contemplated by Art. 1250. of extraordinary inflation bet. 4/6/84 & 12/7/84--
no proofs were presented on how much, for
instance, the price index of goods & services had
Issue: WON there was extraord inflation risen during the intervening period-- an
extraordinary inflation cannot be assumed;
Held: None. Extraord inflation exists when there is consequently, there is no reason or basis, legal or
a decrease or increase in the purchasing pwr of the factual, for adjusting the value of the Phil. peso in
Phil currency w/c is unusual & w/c cld not have the settlement of respondents' obligation.
been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond
the contemplation of the parties at the time of the
est of the obligation. In CAB, the decline of the (not in Baviera's outline)

332
Classical way where dacion en pago is treated as
a sale.
Modern concept w/c treats dacion en pago as a
Art. 1251. Payment shall be made in the place novation.
designated in the obligation.
Castan has another view-- Both are
There being no express stipulation & if the wrong. A dacion en pago is not a sale bec. there
undertaking is to deliver a determinate thing, the is no intention to enter into a contract of sale. It
payment shall be made wherever the thing might is not also a novation bec. in novation, the old
be at the moment the obligation was constituted. obligation is extinguished & a new obligation
takes its place. But here, the old obligation is
extinguished. What takes its place? Nothing.
In any other case the place of payment shall be
So what is it? It is a special form of payment w/c
the domicile of the debtor. resembles a sale.

If the debtor changes his domicile in bad faith There are two more things to remember
or after he has incurred in delay, the additional in the cases of Filinvest v. Phil. Acetylene, supra.
expenses shall be borne by him. & Lopez v. CA, 114 SCRA 671:

These provisions are w/o prejudice to venue Dacion en pago can take place only if both
under the Rules of Court. parties consent.
To what extent is the obligation extinguished?
Up to the value of the thing given (the thing
must be appraised) unless the parties agree
Four Special Kinds of Payments: on a total extinguishment. (Lopez. v. CA,
supra.)
1. Dacion en pago (Art. 1245.)
2. Application of payments (Subsection 1.)
3. Payment by cession (Subsection 2.) 2. Application of Payment
4. Consignation (Subsection 3.)

Balane Discussion: Balane:


1. Dacion en pago Application of payment (Imputacion in
Spanish) is the designation of a debt w/c is being
paid by the debtor who has several obligations of
Art. 1245. Dation in payment, whereby the same kind in favor of the creditor to whom
property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of the payment is made (quoting Tolentino.)
a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of Rules where the amount sent by the debtor to
sales. the creditor is less than all that is due.

First rule: Apply in accordance w/ the


Balane: agreement.

Dacion en pago (In Roman law, called "datio in Second rule: Debtor may apply the amount (an
solutum", in French, "dation en paiement," in obvious limitation bec. of the principles of
Spanish, "dacion en pago.") Dation in payment is indivisibility & integrity) where there would be
possible only if there is a debt in money. Instead of partial payment.
money, a thing is delivered in satisfaction of the
debt in money. Third rule: Creditor can make the application.

Dation in payment is governed by the law on sales Fourth rule: Apply to the most onerous debt.
bec. it is as if the creditor is now the vendee, & the (Art. 1252, par. 1.)
debtor becomes now the vendor.

Dation en pago is explained in the case of Filinvest What are the rules to determine w/c is the most
v. Phil Acetylene, supra. onerous debt?

There are two ways at looking at dacion en pago: If one is interest paying & the other is not, the
debt w/c is interest paying is more onerous.

333
If one is a secured debt & the other is not, the If the Dr did not choose, the Cr may
secured debt is more onerous choose, w/c he will manifest in a receipt.
If both are interest free, one is older than the first,
the newer one is more onerous bec.
If neither specified the applic’n, pmt shall
prescription will take longer w/ respect to the be made to the most onerous debt.
newer debt.

Fifth rule: Proportional application if the debts are


equally onerous. TRADERS V. DY ENG GIOK

Facts: As of Aug ’51, Dy (Ee of Destileria Lim


Art. 1252. He who has various debts of the Tuaco) had an outstanding running acct of P12,
same kind in favor of one & the same creditor, may 848.61. That same mo & yr, a surety bond was
declare at the time of making the payment, to w/c issued in favor of the Co. for P10,000 w/ Dy as
of them the same must be applied. Unless the principal & Traders as surety to guarantee the full
parties so stipulate, or when the application of pmt of Dy’s oblig w/c was not to exceed the
payment is made by the party for whose benefit the above sum, effective Aug’51 to Aug ’52. Then Dy
term has been constituted, application shall not be as principal w/ Lopez & Dy-Liaco as
made as to debts w/c are not yet due. counterbondsmen, issued an indemnity agreemt
in favor of Traders. From Aug ’51 to Aug ’52 , Dy
If the debtor accepts fr. the creditor a receipt in K’ed obligs in favor of the Co. amting to
w/c an application of the payment is made, the P41,864+ for w/c Dy made remittances.
former cannot complain of the same, unless there is However the Co. applied such to Dy’s outstanding
a cause for invalidating the contract. balance prior to Aug ’51. The Co. then sought
reimbursement. From Traders for the remaining
balance of P12,464. Traders paid P10,000 & in
Tolentino: turn sought reimb fr. Dy, et. al.

Nec that obligs must all be due Issue: WON Dy, et. al. has any liability
Only in case of mutual agreement, or upon consent
of the party in whose favor the term was est, Held: The remittance by Dy shld have been
that pmts may be applied to obligs w/c have
applied to his oblig K’ed fr. Aug ’51 & Aug ’52,
not yet matured
when the surety + bond was issued. Hence,
Traders & Dy, et. al. did not incur any liab in
favor of the Co. The 1 st reason is that, in the
Art. 1253. If the debt produces interest, absence of express stip, a guaranty or suretyship
payment of the principal shall not be deemed to operates prospectively & not retro; that is to say,
have been made until the interests have been it secures only debts K’ed after the guaranty
covered. takes effect. The 2nd reason is that any partial
pmts made by the Dr shld be imputed or applied
Art. 1254. When the payment cannot be to debts that were guaranteed, since they are
applied in accordance w/ the preceding rules, or if regarded as more onerous debts, fr. Dr’s standpt.
application can not be inferred fr. other (A 1254). Debts covered by a guaranty are
circumstances, the debt w/c is most onerous to the deemed more onerous to the Dr than the simple
debtor, among those due, shall be deemed to have obligs ‘coz in their case, the Dr may be subjected
been satisfied. to axn not only by the Cr, but also by the
guarantor, & this even b4 the guaranteed debt is
If the debts due are of the same nature & pd by the guarantor (A 2071); hence pmt of the
burden, the payment shall be applied to all of them guaranteed debt relieves the Dr fr. liab to the Cr,
proportionately. as well as to the guarantor, while pmt of the
unsecured debt only discharges him fr. possible
axn by only one party, the unsecured Cr.
Baviera: The ff. Are the rules for applic’n of
pmts: REPARATIONS COMM. V. UNIV. DEEP
The first choice belongs to the Dr.

334
Facts: Univ. Deep (UD) was awarded 6 trawl boats pro tanto. This is to be distinguished fr. Legal
by Rep. Comm.(RC). The boats were delivered in cession where the extinguishment of the
twos. For all deliveries, UD & Mla Surety (MS), to obligation is total. Legal cession is governed by
the Insolvency Law.
guarantee faithful compliance, executed a
performance bond of P53,643 in favor of RC. When
UD failed to pay, RC filed a suit v. UD & MS. TC
ordered UD & MS to pay jointly & severally. MS Art. 1255. The debtor may cede or assign
now claims that the TC erred in not applying the his property to his creditors in payment of his
amt of P10,000 pd as downpmt by UD to RC to the debts. This cession, unless there is stipulation to
guaranteed indebtedness, so that the oblig of MS the contrary, shall only release the debtor fr.
will only be P43,643. ( Full purchase price was responsibility for the net proceeds of the thing
P53,643) assigned. The agreements w/c, on the effect of
the cession, are made between the debtor & his
Issue: WON downpmt as application to MS’ oblig creditors shall be governed by special laws.
is proper

Held: No. The rules contained in A 1252-54 apply B. Tender of Payment &
to a person owing several debts of the same kind to Consignation
a single Cr. They cannot be made applicable to a
person whose oblig as a mere surety is both
contingent & singular, w/c in this case is the full & Subsection 3.-- Tender of Payment &
faithful compliance w/ the terms of the K of cond’l Consignation
purchase & sale of reparations goods. The oblig
included the pmt not only of the 1 st installment but
also of the 10 installments. It is liable for the debt Balane:
or more, but cld be less; still, its liab does not cease
until there is pmt of whole debt. The title of the subsection is wrong. It should
have been Consignation only bec. that is the
special mode of payment & not the tender of
payment. It is a special mode of payment bec.
(not in Baviera's outline)
payment is made not to the creditor but to the
court.
Subsection 2.-- Payment by Cession
Consignation is an option on the part of the
debtor bec. consignation assumes that the
Balane: creditor was in mora accipiendi (when the
creditor w/o just cause, refuses to accept
Concept of payment by cession.-- Property is payment.)
turned over by the debtor to the creditor who
acquires the right to sell it & divide the net proceeds Consequence when the creditor w/o just cause,
among themselves. refuses to accept payment-- The debtor may just
delay payment. But something still hangs above
Why is payment by cession a special form of his head. He is therefore, given the option to
payment?-- Bec. there is no completeness of consign. Distinguish this fr. BGB (German Civil
performance (re: integrity.) In most cases, there Code) w/c states that mora accipiendi
will be a balance due. extinguishes the obligation.

Difference between dacion en pago & payment by


cession.-- In dacion en pago, there is a transfer of
Art. 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of
ownership fr. the debtor to the creditor. In
payment by cession, there is no transfer of payment has been made refuses w/o just cause
ownership. The creditors simply acquire the right to to accept it, the debtor shall be released fr.
sell the properties of the debtor & apply the responsibility by the consignation of the thing or
proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of their sum due.
credit.
Consignation alone shall produce the same
Does payment by cession terminate all debts due?-- effect in the following cases:
Generally, no. But only to the extent of the net
proceeds. The extinguishment of the obligation is

335
(1) When the creditor is absent or unknown, or rentals as they fall due in order to abort any
ejectment proceedings against him.. If the lessor
does not appear at the place of payment;
refuses to accept the payment, as in the case at
(2) When he is incapacitated to receive the bar, def. had a remedy provided for by law,
payment at the time it is due; namely consignation in court or deposit in a bank
(3) When, w/o just cause, he refuses to give a in the lessor’s name w/ due notice to the lessor.
receipt; Unfortunately, it is of record that def. did not
(4) When two or more persons claim the same avail of such remedy so that when plaintiffs filed
right to collect; the ejectment proceedings against him, the
(5) When the title of the obligation has been rentals corresponding the mo. of April to July
lost. 1984 had not yet been paid by def. Tender of
payment is not enough-- consignation must
follow in order to extinguish the debt. Otherwise,
failure to comply w/ the requirements provided
Tolentino: for under Sec. 5, par. (b), PB 25 is a ground for
ejectment. Delayed consignation or deposit will
Tender of pmt b4 consig’n is required by the not do.
present Art only in case where the Cr refuses to
accept it w/o just cause
Effect on INTEREST: When tender made in form TAYAG V. CA [219 S 480] - xxx [P]etitioners
that Cr cld have immdtly realized pmt, followed argue that there was no valid tender of payment
by a prompt attempt of Dr to make consign’n., nor consignation of the sum of P18,520 w/c they
the accrual of interest will be suspended fr. the acknowledge to have been deposited in court on
date of such tender. But when tender is not 1/22/81 five years after the amount of P27,000
accompanied by means of pmt, & the Dr did had to be paid. xxx Against this suggestion
not take any immdte step to consign, then ignores the fact that consignation alone produced
interest is not suspended fr. the time of such the effect of payment in the case at bar bec. it
tender was established that 2 or more heirs of Juan
For requiremts of consign’n : SEE SOCO V. Galicia, Sr. claimed the same right to collect.
MILITANTE CASE BELOW !

MANILA REMANANT V. CA [231 S 272] -


BALANE CASES: xxx [U]pon consignation by the Ventanillas of the
sum due, the trial court may enter judgment
canceling the title of the petitioner over the
property & transferring the same to the
SOCO V. MILITANTE [123 S 160] - respondents. This judgments shall have the
Consignation Defined.-- Consignation is the act of same force & effect as a conveyance duly
depositing the thing due w/ the court or judicial executed in accordance w/ the requirements of
authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or the law.
refuses to accept payment & it generally requires a
prior tender of payment.

Requisites of a Valid Consignation.-- The debtor Art. 1257. In order that the consignation of
must show (1) that there was a debt due; (2) that the thing due may release the obligor, it must
the consignation of the obligation had been made first be announced to the persons interested in
bec. the creditor to whom tender of payment was the fulfillment of the obligation.
made refused to accept it, or bec. he was absent or
incapacitated, or bec. several persons claimed to be
The consignation shall be ineffectual if it is
entitled to receive the amount due; (3) that
previous notice of the consignation had been given not made strictly in consonance w/ the provisions
to the person interested in the performance of the w/c regulate payment.
obligation (Art. 1257); (4) that the amount due
was placed at the disposal of the court
(consignation proper); (5) that after the Art. 1258. Consignation shall be made by
consignation had been made the person interested depositing the things due at the disposal of
was notified thereof (second notice.) Failure of any judicial authority, before whom the tender of
of these requirements is enough ground to render a payment shall be proved, in a proper case, & the
consignation ineffective.
announcement of the consignation in other cases.
ALFONSO V. CA [168 S 545] - Such rejection
rendered the proposal of free rental w/o force &
effect. Def. therefore was duty bound to pay the
336
The consignation having been made, the Baviera:
interested parties shall also be notified thereof.
Q: When is there a need to tender pmt?
A: (a) upon demand & (b) when due
Tolentino: Q: There are 2 or more claims. What will Cr do
Notice: The reqmt is fulfilled by the service of after consignation?
summons upon the Def together w/ copy of A: File INTERPLEADER.
complaint
Q: Why tender first?
A: ‘Coz no need to consign if Cr accept pmt. We
Art. 1259. The expenses of consignation, when can only know this through tender.
properly made, shall be charged against the
Q: B4 & after consign’n, there is a need to notify
creditor. the Cr. Why?
A: So that the Cr can get the money fr. the Clerk
of ct & avoid costs of litigation.
Tolentino: Proper when (1) Cr accepts consign’n
after deposit w/o protest though Dr failed to comply Q: D consigns. Hearing. B4 the ct cld approve,
w/ reqs. Or (2) Ct. declares cons as validly made the City Hall burned + money. Shld D pay again?
A: No. When money is consigned, it is no longer
generic. It becomes specific. Cr bears the loss
bec. although it was due to a fortuitous event,
Art. 1260. Once the consignation has been duly there was delay on his part when he refused to
made, the debtor may ask the judge to order the accept pmt.
cancellation of the obligation.
Special Kinds of Pmt:
Before the creditor has accepted the Consignation
consignation, or before a judicial declaration that Dacion en pago
the consignation has been properly made, the Cession by pmt ( Assignmt of all assets of Dr to
debtor may w/draw the thing or the sum deposited, Cr; an act of insolvency)
allowing the obligation to remain in force. Q: K of Sale w/ pacto de retro. The vendor
tendered pmt w/in the 3-yr pd by vendee refused
to accept. Axn for spec perf by Vr. Accdg to Ve,
Tolentino: since money was not consigned, Vr cannot claim
rt of repurchase. Tenable argument?
Effects of Consignation:
A: No. As long as the was tender, no need to
Dr is released in the same manner as if he had consign.
performed the oblig But in one case of a co-owner wanting to redeem
Accrual of INTEREST is suspended at reasonable price (was exorbitant), the court
Deterioration or loss of thing or amt consigned w/o held that reasonable price is det accdg to the
fault of Dr must be borne by Cr circs. So if you want to redeem, consign the full
Any increment ir increase in value of thing inures to amt in ct & ask it to fix the reasonable
the benefit of Cr compensation.

SC: When money is deposited in ct under the provs


of the law on cons, it is in custodia legis & therefore C. Loss or Impossibility of
exempt fr. Attachmt & execution (Manejero v. Performance
Lampa)

Balane:
Art. 1261. If, the consignation having been
Applicable provisions.-- In an obligation to give a
made, the creditor should authorize the debtor to determinate thing (Art. 1262); in an obligation to
w/draw the same, he shall lose every preference give a generic thing (Art. 1263); in an obligation
w/c he may have over the thing. The co-debtors, to do (Art. 1266.)
guarantors & sureties shall be released.
There are two kinds of impossibility of
performance: (1) an original impossibility & (2)
supervening impossibility. The kind of
337
impossibility talked about here is supervening the loss was due to his fault, unless there is proof
impossibility. An original impossibility makes the to the contrary, & w/o prejudice to the provisions
obligation void. It will be case of an obligation w/o
a cause (see Art. 1409, no. 2 "those where the of article 1165. This presumption does not apply
cause or object did not exist at the time of the in case of earthquake, flood, storm, or other
transaction"-- the phrase "did not exist at the time natural calamity.
of the transaction" is inaccurate; it is possible to
enter into contracts where the object did not exist Art. 1165. When what is to be delivered is a
at the time of the transaction, e.g., contract over a determinate thing, the creditor, in addition to the
future thing; the phrase should have been "could right granted him by article 1170, may compel
not exist") A contract whose prestation is the debtor to make the delivery.
impossible at the beginning is not the concern of
loss of thing due/ impossibility of performance.
If the thing is indeterminate or generic, he
may ask that the obligation be complied w/ at the
expense of the debtor.
Art. 1262. An obligation w/c consists in the
delivery of a determinate thing shall be extinguished If the obligor delays, or has promised to
if it should be lost or destroyed w/o the fault of the deliver the same thing to two or more persons
debtor, & before he has incurred in delay. who do not have the same interest, he shall be
responsible for any fortuitous event until he has
When by law or stipulation, the obligor is liable effected the delivery.
even for fortuitous events, the loss of the thing
does not extinguish the obligation, & he shall be Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of
responsible for damages. The same rule applies their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence,
when the nature of the obligation requires the or delay, & those who in any manner contravene
assumption of risk. the tenor thereof are liable for damages.

Art. 1266. The debtor in obligations to do


Balane: shall also be released when the prestation
becomes legally or physically impossible w/o the
Art. 1262 is the same as fortuitous event in Art. fault of the obligor.
1174. The effect is the same: The obligation is
extinguished if the obligation is to deliver a
determinate thing. If the obligation is t deliver a
generic thing, the obligation is not extinguished. Balane:
Genus nunquam perit ("Genus never perishes."
This is the general rule. But what is not covered by Objective & Subjective Impossibility.-- In
this rule is an obligation to deliver a limited generic objective impossibility, the act cannot be done by
(something in bet. specific & generic thing), e.g., anyone. The effect of objective impossibility is to
"For P3,000, I promise to deliver to you one of my extinguish the obligation. In subjective
watches." This obligation does not really fall under impossibility, the obligation becomes impossible
either Art. 1262 or Art. 1263. But this obligation only w/ respect to the obligor. There are 3 views
really falls under Art. 1262. In this case, the as to the effect of a subjective impossibility: (1)
obligation may be extinguished by the loss of all the One view holds that the obligation is not
things through fortuitous event. extinguished. The obligor should ask another to
do the obligation. (2) Another view holds that
the obligation is extinguished. (3) A third view
distinguishes one prestation w/c is very personal
Art. 1263. In an obligation to deliver a generic & one w/c are not personal such that subjective
thing, the loss or destruction of anything of the impossibility is a cause for extinguishes a very
same kind does not extinguish the obligation. personal obligation but not an obligation w/c is
not very personal.
Art. 1264. The courts shall determine, whether,
under the circumstances, the partial loss of the
object of the obligation is so important as to BALANE CASES:
extinguish the obligation.

Art. 1265. Whenever the thing is lost in the PEOPLE V. FRANKLIN [39 S 363] - Appellant
possession of the debtor, it shall be presumed that now contends that the lower court should have

338
released it fr. all liability under the bail bond posted be beyond the contemplation of the parties
by it bec. its failure to produce & surrender the due to the oil crisis? Released.
accused was due to the negligence of the Phil. Govt
itself in issuing a passport to said accused, thereby
enabling her to leave the country. In support of
this contention, the provisions of Art. 1266 are Balane:
invoked.

HELD: Art. 1266, NCC does not apply to a surety Rebus sic stantibus.-- Literally means "things
upon a bail bond.-- Art. 1266 does not apply to a as they stand." It is short for clausula rebus sic
surety upon a bail bond, as said Art. speaks of a stantibus ("agreement of things as they stand.")
relation bet. a debtor & creditor, w/c does not exist This is a principle of international law w/c holds
in the case of a surety upon a bail bond, on one that when 2 countries enter into a treaty, they
hand, & the State, on the other. For while sureties enter taking into account the circumstances at
upon a bail bond (or recognizance) can discharge the time it was entered into & should the
themselves fr. liability by surrendering their circumstances change as to make the fulfillment
principal, sureties on ordinary bonds or commercial of the treaty very difficult, one may ask for a
contracts, as a general rule, can only be released by termination of the treaty. This principle of
payment of the debt or performance of the act international law has spilled over into Civil law.
stipulated. This doctrine is also called the doctrine of
extreme difficulty & frustration of commercial
IMMACULATA V. NAVARRO [160 S 211] - We object.
hereby grant said alternative cause of action or It has four (4) requisites:
prayer. While the sale was originally executed 1. The event or change could not have
something in Dec. 1969, it was only on Feb. 3, 1974 been foreseen at the time of the execution of the
when, as prayed for by prvt. res, & as ordered by contract.
the court a quo, a deed of conveyance was formally 2. The event or change makes the
executed. Since the offer to redeem was made on performance extremely difficult but not
3/24/75, this was clearly w/in the 5-yr. period of impossible.
legal redemption allowed by the Public Land Act. 3. The event must not be due to an act
of either party.
PNCC V. NLRC [193 S 401] - An obligor shall be 4. The contract is for a future prestation.
released fr. his obligation when the prestation has If the contract is of immediate fulfillment, the
become legally or physically impossible w/o fault on gross inequality of the reciprocal prestation may
his part..-- Petitioner cannot be held liable for involve lesion or want of cause.
breach of contract for three reasons. xxx The
second reason is found in the rule that an obligor In the case of Naga, the court did not
shall be released fr. his obligation when the consider the 4th element as an element.
prestation has become legally or physically
impossible w/o fault on his part. The supervening The attitude of the courts on this
impossibility of performance, based upon some doctrine is very strict. This principle has always
factor independent of the will of the obligor, been strictly applied. To give it a liberal
releases the obligor fr. his obligation after restitution application is to undermine the binding force of
of what he may have received, if any, in advance fr. an obligation. Every obligation is difficult. The
the other contracting party; the obligor incurs no performance must be extremely difficult in order
liability for damages for his inability to perform. for rebus sic stantibus to apply.

Art. 1267. When the service has become so BALANE CASES:


difficult as to be manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also
be released therefr., in whole or in part. LAGUNA V. MANABAT [59 S 650] - Art.
1680, it will be observed is a special provision for
leases of rural lands. No other legal provision
makes it applicable to ordinary leases. xxx
Baviera: Ordinarily, on a K for a piece of work,
an increase in prices will nor relieve the K’or Even if the cited article were a general rule on
bec. such circ was already considered by the lease, its provisions nevertheless do not extend to
parties when they entered into the K. But petitioners. One of the requisites is that the
Bar Q: What if the prices rose so high as to cause of the loss of the fruits of the leased prop.
must be an "extraordinary & unforeseen

339
fortuitous event." The circumstances of the case stantibus in public international law; under this
fail to satisfy such requisite. xxx [T]he alleged theory, the parties stipulate in the light of certain
causes for the suspension of operations on the lines prevailing conditions, & once these conditions
leased, namely, the high prices of spare parts & cease to exist the contract also ceases to exist.
gasoline & the reduction of the dollar allocations, Considering practical needs & the demands of
"already existed when the contract of lease was equity & good faith, the disappearance of the
executed." The cause of petitioners' inability to basis of a contract gives rise to a right to relief in
operate on the lines cannot, therefore, be ascribed favor of the party prejudiced.
to fortuitous events or circumstances beyond their
control, but to their own voluntary desistance.
Balane: The Court went too far in this case. It
xxx Performance is not excused by subsequent even went to the extent of stipulating for the
inability to perform, by unforeseen difficulties, by parties in the name of equity.
unusual or unexpected expenses, by danger, by
inevitable accident, by the breaking of machinery,
by strikes, by sickness, by failure of a party to avail
himself of the benefits to be had under the Art. 1268. When the debt of a thing certain
contract, by weather conditions, by financial & determinate proceeds fr. a criminal offense, the
stringency, or by stagnation of business. Neither is debtor shall not be exempted fr. the payment of
performance excused by the fact that the contract its price, whatever may be the cause for the loss,
turns out to be hard & improvident, unprofitable or unless the thing having been offered by him to
impracticable, ill-advised or even foolish, or less the person who should receive it, the latter
profitable, or unexpectedly burdensome.
refused w/o justification to accept it.
OCCENA V. JABSON [73 S 637] -
Respondent's complaint seeks not release fr. the Art. 1269. The obligation having been
subdivision contract but that the court "render extinguished by the loss of the thing, the creditor
judgement modifying the terms & conditions of the shall have all the rights of action w/c the debtor
contract... by fixing the proper shares that should may have against third persons by reason of the
pertain to the herein parties out of the gross loss.
proceeds fr. the sales of subdivided lots of subject
subdivision." Art. 1267 does not grant the courts
this authority to remake, modify, or revise the
contract or to fix the division of shares bet. the Tolentino: When Dr tenders pmt & Cr refuses to
parties as contractually stipulated w/ the force of accept w/o just cause, Dr W/ 2 alternatives: (1)
law bet. the parties, so as to substitute its own to consign or (2) to just keep the thing in his
terms for those covenanted by the parties poss’n, w/ the oblig to use due diligence, subj to
themselves. the gen rules of obligs, but no longer to the spec
liab under Article 1268
Balane: In this case the interpretation of the court
is too literal. According to the court, it can release a D. Condonation or
debtor fr. the obligation but it cannot make the Remission
obligation lighter. But if you look at Art. 1267,
partial release is permitted.
Balane:

NAGA TELEPHONE V. CA [230 S 351] - The Condonation or remission is an act of liberality by


term "service" should be understood as referring to virtue of w/c, w/o receiving any equivalent, the
the "performance" of the obligation.-- Art. 1267 creditor renounces enforcement of an obligation
speaks of "service" w/c has become so difficult. w/c is extinguished in whole or in part.
Taking into consideration the rationale behind this
provision, the term "service" should be understood This has four (4) requisites:
as referring to the "performance" of the obligation.
In the present case, the obligation of prvt. resp. Debt that is existing. You can remit a debt
consists in allowing petitioners to use its posts in even before it is due.
Naga City, w/c is the service contemplated in said Renunciation must be gratuitous. If
article. Furthermore, a bare reading of this article renunciation is for a consideration, the
reveals that it is not a requirement thereunder that mode of extinguishment may be
the contract be for future service w/ future unusual something else. It may be novation,
change. Accdg. to Tolentino, Art. 1267 states in our compromise of dacion en pago.
law the doctrine of unforeseen events. This is said Acceptance by the debtor
to be based on the discredited theory of rebus sic Capacity of the parties.
340
the obligor. It may be made expressly or
The form of donation must be observed. If
impliedly.
the condonation involves movables, apply Art. 748.
If it involves immovables, apply Art. 749. But note One & the other kind shall be subject to
that the creditor may just refuse to collect (w/o the rules w/c govern inofficious donations.
observing any form.) In this case, the obligation Express condonation shall, furthermore, comply
will be extinguished not by virtue of condonation w/ the forms of donation.
but by waiver under Art. 6.
Art. 746. Acceptance must be made during
the lifetime of the donor & of the donee.
Art. 1270. Condonation or remission is
essentially gratuitous, & requires the acceptance by Art. 752. The provision of article 750
the obligor. It may be made expressly or impliedly. notw/standing, no person may give or receive, by
way of donation, more than he may give or
One & the other kind shall be subject to the receive by will.
rules w/c govern inofficious donations. Express
condonation shall, furthermore, comply w/ the The donation shall be inofficious in all that it
forms of donation. may exceed this limitation.

Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all


1. Modes of Condonation the present property of the donor, or part
thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or
a. By Will in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of
himself, & of all relatives who, at the time of the
acceptance of the donation are by law entitled to
be supported by the donor. Without such
Art. 935. The legacy of a credit against a third reservation, the donation shall be reduced on
person or of the remission or release of a debt of petition of any person affected.
the legatee shall be effective only as regards that
part of the credit or debt existing at the time of the Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be
death of the testator. made orally or in writing.
In the first case, the estate shall comply w/ An oral donation requires the
the legacy by assigning to the legatee all rights of simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the
action it may have against the debtor. In the document representing the right donated.
second case, by giving the legatee an acquittance, If the value of the personal property
should he request one. donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the
In both cases, the legacy shall comprise all donation & the acceptance shall be made in
interests on the credit or debt w/c may be due the writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void.
testator at the time of his death.
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an
immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
Art. 936. The legacy referred to in the public document, specifying therein the property
preceding article shall lapse if the testator, after donated & the value of the charges w/c the
having made it, should bring an action against the donee must satisfy.
debtor for payment of his debt, even if such
payment should not have been effected at the time The acceptance may be made in the same
of his death. deed of donation or in a separate public
The legacy to the debtor of the thing document, but it shall not take effect unless it is
pledged by him is understood to discharge only the done during the lifetime of the donor.
right of pledge.
If the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
b. By Agreement an authentic form, & this step shall be noted in
both instruments.

Art. 1270. Condonation or remission is


essentially gratuitous, & requires the acceptance by
341
2. Presumption of delivered it voluntarily, unless the contrary is
Condonation proved.

Balane: Articles 1271 & 1272 refer to a kind of Rule 131, Sec. 5 (b), (j), (k), Rules of Court.
implied renunciation when the creditor divests
himself of the proof credit. According to De Diego,
this provision is absurd & immoral in that it Rule 131, Sec. 5. Disputable
authorizes the debtor & his heirs to prove that they presumptions.-- The following presumptions are
paid the debt, when the provision itself assumes satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
that there has been a remission, w/c is gratuitous. contradicted & overcome by other evidence:
(Tolentino.) xxx
(b) That an unlawful act was done w/ an
unlawful intent;
Art. 1271. The delivery of a private document, xxx
evidencing a credit, made voluntarily by the creditor (j) That a person found in possession of a
to the debtor, implies the renunciation of the action thing taken in the doing of a wrongful act is the
w/c the former had against the latter. taker & doer of the whole act; otherwise, that
If in order to nullify this waiver it should be things w/c a person possesses, or exercises acts
claimed to be inofficious, the debtor & his heirs may of ownership over, are owned by him;
uphold it by providing that the delivery of the (k) That a person in possession of an order
document was made in virtue of payment of the on himself for the payment of money, or the
debt. delivery of anything, has paid the money or
delivered the thing accordingly;
xxx
Limited to Private Document.-- Art. 1271 has no
application to public documents bec. there is always Under the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended
a copy in the archives w/c can be used to prove the
credit. Rule 131, Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.--
Private document refers to the original in The following presumptions are satisfactory if
order for Art. 1271 to apply. (Trans-Pacific. v. CA, uncontradicted, but may be contradicted &
supra.) overcome by other evidence:
xxx
(c) That a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act;
BALANE CASE:
xxx
(f) That money paid by one to another was
due to the latter;
TRANS-PACIFIC V. CA [234 S 494] - It may not
be amiss to add that Art. 1271 raises a (g) That a thing delivered by one to another
presumption, not of payment, but of the belonged to the latter;
renunciation of the credit where more convincing (h) That an obligation delivered up to the
evidence would be required than what normally debtor has been paid;
would be called for to prove payment. The (i) That prior rents or installments had been
rationale for allowing the presumption of paid when a receipt for the later ones is
renunciation in the delivery of a private instrument produced;
is that, unlike that of a public instrument, there (k) That a person in possession of an order
could be just one copy of the evidence of credit.
on himself for the payment of they money, or the
Where several originals are made out of a private
document, the intendment of the law would thus be delivery of anything, has paid the money or
to refer to the delivery only of the original rather delivered the thing accordingly;
than to the original duplicate of w/c the debtor xxx
would normally retain a copy. It would thus be
absurd if Art. 1271 were to be applied differently.
VELASCO V. MASA

Facts: Velasco filed a complaint for the recovery


Art. 1272. Whenever the private document in of a sum of money he gave to Masa as a loan,
w/c the debt appears is found in the possession of as contained in a private doc. V claims that while
the debtor, it shall be presumed that the creditor
342
he was imprisoned during the Jap occupation, M thing pledged, after its delivery to the creditor, is
coerced & tricked V’s wife into surrendering the doc found in the possession of the debtor, or of a
to M. V filed a crim case b4 v. M w/c was dismissed third person who owns the thing.
for lack of juris. M contends that doc was
voluntarily delivered to him through Osmena. TC
dismissed the axn. Balane: The accesory obligation of pledged is
extinguished bec. pledge is a possessory lien.
Issue: WON there was condonation The presumption in this case is that the pledgee
has surrendered the thing pledged to the
Held: Yes. No satisfactory proof as to allegation of pledgor. This is not a conclusive presumption
coercion & trickery on V’s wife. It is an according to Art. 2110, par. 2.
unquestionable fact that the instru proving the debt
now claimed passed to the possession of the Dr.
For this reason, unless the contrary is proven, it Art. 2093. In addition to the requisites
must be presumed that in accdance w/ the prescribed in article 2085, it is necessary, in order
provisions of the law, that delivery was voluntarily to constitute the contract of pledge, that the
made. This fact implies a renunciation of the axn thing pledged be placed in the possession of the
w/c Cr had for the recovery of his credit. It shld be creditor, or of a third person by common
noted that the doc is of a private nature, the only agreement.
case subj to the provs of Articles 1187 to 1189
OCC, so that a tacit renunciation of the debt may Art. 2105. The debtor cannot ask for the
be presumed, in the absence of proof that the doc return of the thing pledged against the will of the
was delivered for some other reason than the creditor, unless & until he has paid the debt & its
gratuitous waiver of the debt & the complete interest, w/ expenses in a proper case.
extinction of the oblig to pay.

E. Confusion or Merger of
3. Effect of Partial Remission Rights

Art. 1273. The renunciation of the principal Art. 1275. The obligation is extinguished fr.
debt shall extinguish the accessory obligations; but the time the characters of creditor & debtor are
the waiver of the latter shall leave the former in merged in the same person.
force.

Art. 2076. The obligation of the guarantor is Balane:


extinguished at the same time as that of the debtor,
& for the same causes as all other obligations. Confusion is the meeting in one person of the
qualities of the creditor & debtor w/ respect to
Art. 2080. The guarantors, even though they the same obligation.
be solidary, are released fr. their obligation
whenever by some act of the creditor they cannot There are two (2) requisites:
be subrogated to the rights, mortgages, & It must take place between the creditor & the
preferences of the latter. principle debtor (Art. 1276.)
The very same obligation must be involved.
(Provisions Common to Pledge & Mortgage) Rationale.-- You become your own creditor or
you become your own debtor. So how can you
Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential sue yourself.
to the contracts of pledge & mortgage: What may cause a merger or confusion?-- (1)
(1) That they be constituted to secure the Succession, whether compulsory, testamentary or
fulfillment of a principal obligation; intestate; (2) Donation; (3) Negotiation of a
xxx negotiable instrument.

Because of its nature, confusion/ merger


Art. 1274. It is presumed that the accessory
may overlap w/ other causes of extinguishment.
obligation of pledge has been remitted when the For example, I owe Ms. Olores P100,000. She

343
bequeath to me that credit. And then she died. In 4. Solidary Obligations
this case, there is extinguishment both by merger.
But in this case, merger could overlap w/ payment.
Art. 1215. Novation, compensation,
Balane: Art. 1276 ( below) is perfectly in confusion or remission of the debt, made by any
consonance w/ Art. 1275. of the solidary creditors or w/ any of the solidary
debtors, shall extinguish the obligation, w/o
1. Principal Parties prejudice to the provisions of article 1219.

The creditor who may have executed any of


Art. 1276. Merger w/c takes place in the these acts, as well as he who collects the debt,
person of the principal debtor or creditor benefits shall be liable to the others for the share in the
the guarantors. Confusion w/c takes place in the obligation corresponding to them.
person of any of the latter does not extinguish the
obligation. Article 1219. The remission made by the
creditor of the share w/c affects one of the
solidary debtors does not release the latter fr. his
Tolentino: responsibility towards the co-debtors, in case the
debt had been totally paid by anyone of them
Extinguishment of the principal oblig through before the remission was effected.
confusion releases the guarantors, whose oblig
is merely accessory Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against
When merger takes place in the person of the any of one of the solidary debtors or some or all
guarantor, oblig is NOT extinguished. of them simultaneously. The demand made
against one of them shall not be an obstacle to
those w/c may subsequently be directed against
2. Among guarantors the others, so long as the debt has not been fully
collected.
(Effects of Guaranty as Between Co-
Guarantors) Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the
solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If
two or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the
Art. 2073. When there are two or more creditor may choose w/c offer to accept.
guarantors of the same debtor & for the same debt,
the one among them who has paid may demand of He who made the payment may claim fr. his
each of the others the share w/c is proportionally co-debtors only the share w/c corresponds to
owing fr. him. each, w/ the interest for the payment already
made. If the payment is made before the debt is
If any of the guarantors should be insolvent, his due, no interest for the intervening period may
share shall be borne by the others, including the be demanded.
payer, in the same proportion.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot,
The provisions of this article shall not be bec. of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the
applicable, unless the payment has been made in debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be
virtue of a judicial demand or unless the principal borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the
debtor is insolvent. debt of each.

3. Joint Obligations 5. Indivisible Obligations

Art. 1277. Confusion does not extinguish a Art. 1209. If the division is impossible, the
joint obligation except as regards the share right of the creditors may be prejudiced only by
corresponding to the creditor or debtor in whom the their collective acts, & the debt can be enforced
two characters concur. only by proceeding against all the debtors. If one
of the latter should be insolvent, the others shall
not be liable for his share.

344
FRANCIA V. IAC [162 S 753] - [T]here can be
no off-setting of taxes against the claims that the
Art. 1224. A joint indivisible gives rise to
taxpayer may have against the govt. A person
indemnity for damages fr. the time anyone of the cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the
debtors does no comply w/ his undertaking. The govt owes him an amount equal to or greater
debtors who may have been ready to fulfill their than the tax being collected. The collection of a
promises shall not contribute to the indemnity tax cannot await the results of a lawsuit against
beyond the corresponding portion of the price of the govt.
the thing or of the value of the service in w/c the
obligation consists. A claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand,
contract or judgment as is allowed to be set-off
xxx The general rule based on grounds of public
policy is well-settled that no set-off admissible
F. Compensation against demands for taxes levied for general or
local governmental purposes. The reason on w/c
the gen. rule is based, is that taxes are not in the
Balane: nature of contracts bet. the party & party but
grow out of duty to, & are the positive acts of the
Definition of Compensation.-- Compensation is govt to the making & enforcing of w/c, the
a mode of extinguishing, to the concurrent amount, personal consent of individual taxpayers is not
the obligations of those persons who in their own required. xxx (Republic v. Mambulao Lumber.)
right are reciprocally debtors & creditors of each
other. (Castan.) In Cordero v. Gonda, we held that: "xxx internal
revenue taxes can not be the subject of
Perhaps, next to payment, compensation is compensation: Reason: govt & taxpayer 'are not
the most common mode of extinguishing an mutually creditors & debtors of each other under
obligation. Art. 1278 & a "claim for taxes is not such a debt,
demand, contract or judgment as is allowed to be
Distinguished fr. Confusion.-- In set-off.
compensation, there are 2 parties & 2 debts,
whereas in confusion, there are 2 debts & only 1
party. Art. 1286. Compensation takes place by
operation of law, even though the debts may be
payable at different places, but there shall be an
Art. 1278. Compensation shall take place when indemnity for expenses of exchange or
two persons, in their own right, are creditors & transportation to the place of payment.
debtors of each other.

1. Different Kinds of
BALANE CASES: Compensation:

(NOTE: THIS SECTION IS ACCDG TO BALANE


PNB V. ONG ACERO [148 S 166] - There is no OUTLINE W/C IS EASIER TO FOLLOW. IN
compensation where the parties are not creditors & BAVIERA OL: F: COMP 1. KINDS)
debtors of each other.-- The insuperable obstacle
to the success of PNB's cause is the factual finding Legal Compensation (Articles 1279, 1290) w/c
of the IAC that it has not proven by competent takes place automatically by operation of law
evidence that it is a creditor of ISABEL. The only once all the requisites are present. (Baviera
evidence presented by PNB towards this end OL: F.Comp 1.Kinds c. Legal Comp)
consists of 2 documents marked in its behalf. But
as the IAC has cogently observed, these documents
do not prove any indebtedness of ISABELA to PNB.
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may
All they do prove is that a letter of credit might have
been opened for ISABELA by PNB, but not that the be proper, it is necessary:
credit was ever availed of [by ISABELA's foreign
correspondent (MAN)], or that the goods thereby (1) That each one of the obligors be bound
covered were in fact shipped, & received by principally, & that he be at the same time a
ISABELA. principal creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of
money, or if the things due are consumable, they
345
be of the same kind, & also of the same quality if Art. 1287. Compensation shall not be proper
the latter has been stated; when one of the debts arises fr. a depositum or
(3) That the two debts be due; fr. the obligations of a depositary or of a bailee in
(4) That they be liquidated & demandable; commodatum.
(5) That over neither of them there by any
retention or controversy, commenced by third Neither can compensation be set up against
persons & communicated in due time to the debtor. a creditor who has a claim for support due by
gratuitous title, w/o prejudice to the provisions of
paragraph 2 of article 301.
Balane:
Art. 1288. Neither shall there be
Requisites under Art. 1279: compensation if one of the debts consists in civil
liability arising fr. a penal offense.
Mutual Debtors & Creditors.-- The parties must be
mutually debtors & creditors (1) in their own right, Art. 1794. Every partner is responsible to the
& (2) as principals. There can be no compensation partnership for damages suffered by it through
if 1 party occupies only a representative capacity. his fault, & he cannot compensate them w/ the
Likewise, there can be no compensation if in one
obligation, a party is a principal obligor & in another profits & benefits w/c he may have earned for
obligation, he is a guarantor. the partnership by his industry. However, the
courts may equitably lessen this responsibility if
Fungible Things Due.-- The word consumable is through the partner's extraordinary efforts in
wrong. Under Art. 418, consumable things are other activities of the partnership, unusual profits
those w/c cannot be used in a manner appropriate have been realized.
to their nature w/o their being consumed. In a
reciprocal obligation to deliver horses, the things
due are not consumable; yet there can be
compensation. (Tolentino.) The proper BALANE CASES:
terminology is "fungible" w/c refers to things of the
same kind w/c in payment can be substituted for
another. REPUBLIC V. DE LOS ANGELES [98 S 103] -
Compensation of debts arising even w/o proof of
Maturity of Debts.-- Both debts must be due to liquidation of claim, where the claim is
permit compensation. undisputed.-- Proof of the liquidation of a claim,
in order that there be compensation of debts, is
Demandable & Liquidated Debts.-- Tolentino: proper if such claim is disputed. But, if the claim
Demandable means that the debts are enforceable is undisputed, as in the case at bar, the
in court, there being no apparent defenses inherent statement is sufficient & no other proof may be
in them. The obligations must be civil obligations, required. xxx
excluding those that are purely natural. xxx Before
a judicial decree of rescission or annulment, a
rescissible or voidable debt is valid & demandable; SOLINAP V. DEL ROSARIO [123 S 640] -
hence, it can be compensated. Petitioner contends that respondent judge
gravely abused her discretion in not declaring the
A debt is liquidated when its existence & mutual obligations of the parties extinguished to
amount are determined. xxx And a debt is the extent of their respective amounts. He relies
considered liquidated, not only when it is expressed on Art. 1278 to the effect that compensation shall
already in definite figures w/c do not require take place when 2 persons, in their own right, are
verification, but also when the determination of the creditors & debtors of each other. The argument
exact amount depends only on a simple arithmetical fails to consider Art. 1279 w/c provides that
operation. xxx compensation can take place only if both
obligations are liquidated. In the case at bar, the
Debt must not be garnished. petitioner's claim against the resp. Luteros is still
pending determination by the court. While it is
(additional requirement) not for Us to pass upon the merits of the pltff's
cause of action in that case, it appears that the
Compensation is not prohibited by any provision of claim asserted therein is disputed by the Luteros
law like Articles 1287, 1288 & 1794. on both factual & legal grounds. More, the
counterclaim interposed by them, if ultimately
found to be meritorious, can defeat petitioner's
demand. Upon this premise, his claim in that
346
case cannot be categorized as liquidated credit w/c The argument is w/o merit. Compensation shall
may properly be set-off against his obligation. take place when two persons, in their own right
Compensation cannot take place where one's claim are creditors & debtors of each other. When all
against the other is still the subject of court the requisites mentioned in Art. 1279 are present,
litigation. It is a requirement, for compensation to compensation takes effect by operation of law,
take place, that the amount involved be certain & even w/o the consent or knowledge of the
liquidated. debtors. (Art. 1290.) Art. 1279 requires among
others, that in order that legal compensation shall
take place, 'the two debts be due' & 'they be
SYCIP V . CA [134 S 317] - Compensation liquidated & demandable.' Compensation is not
cannot take place where, w/ respect to the money proper where the claim of the person asserting
involved in the estafa case, the complainant was the set-off against the other is not clear nor
merely acting as agent of another. In set-off the liquidated; compensation cannot extend to
two persons must in their own right be creditor & unliquidated, disputed claim arising fr. breach of
debtor of each other.-- Petitioner contends that contract. There can be no doubt that petitioner
resp. CA erred in not applying the provisions on is indebted to prvt resp. in the amount of
compensation or setting-off debts under Art. 1278 & P1,062,063.83 representing the proceeds of her
1279, despite evidence showing that Jose Lapuz still money market investment. This is admitted. But
owed him an amount of more than P5,000 & in not whether prvt. resp is indebted to petitioner in the
dismissing the appeal considering that the latter is amount of P6.81 million representing the
not legally the aggrieved party. This contention is deficiency balance after the foreclosure of the
untenable. Compensation cannot take place in this mortgage executed to secure the loan extended
case since the evidence shows that Jose Lapuz is to her, is vigorously disputed. This circumstance
only an agent of Albert Smith &/ or Dr. Dwight Dill. prevents legal compensation fr. taking place.
Compensation takes place only when two persons in
their own right are creditors & debtors of each
other, & that each one of the obligors is bound ONG V. CA [177 S 402] - Requisites of
principally & is at the same time a principal creditor Compensation.-- Fermin obviously cannot take
of the other. Moreover, xxx Lapuz did not consent refuge in Art. 1279. As the resp. Court correctly
to the off-setting of his obligation w/ petitioner's observed in holding that the above provision was
obligation to pay for the 500 shares. not applicable: The instant case does not
certainly satisfy the above bec. (1) appellant is
not a debtor of appellee, it is only the latter who
CIA. MARITIMA V. CA [135 S 593] - is indebted to appellant; (2) the debts, even
Compensation cannot take place where one of the admitting, that the delivery of the zippers to pltff.
debts is not liquidated as when there is a running is a debt, do not both consist in a sum of money
interest still to be paid thereon.-- More, the legal nor are they of the same quality & kind. xxx
interest payable fr. 2/3/51 on the sum of
P40,797.54, representing useful expenses incurred
by PAN-ORIENTAL, is also still unliquidated since PIONEER INSURANCE V. CA [180 S 126] -
interest does not stop accruing "until the expenses Compensation shall take place when 2 persons, in
are fully paid." Thus, we find w/o basis REPUBLIC's their own right, are creditors & debtors of each
allegation that PAN-ORIENTAL'S claim in the other. When all the requisites mentioned in Art.
amount of P40,797.54 was extinguished by 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by
compensation since the rentals payable by PAN- operation of law, even w/o the consent or
ORIENTAL amount to P59,500 while the expenses knowledge of the debtors. (Art. 1290.) Art. 1279
reach only P40,797.54. Deducting the latter requires among others, that in order that legal
amount fr. the former, REPUBLIC claims that compensation shall take place, the 2 debts be
P18,702.46 would still be owing by PAN-ORIENTAL due & they be liquidated & demandable.
to REPUBLIC. That argument loses sight of the fact Compensation is not proper where the claim of
that to the sum of P40,797.54 will still have to be the person asserting the set-off against the other
added the legal rate of interest "fr. Feb. 3, 1951 is not clear nor liquidated; compensation cannot
until fully paid." extend to unliquidated, disputed claim arising fr.
breach of contract.

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK V. IAC


[163 S 296] - Requisite of legal compensation SILAHIS MARKETING V. IAC [180 S 21] -
under Art. 1279.-- Petitioner contends that after Compensation is not proper where the claim of
foreclosing the mortgage, there is still due fr. prvt. the person asserting the set-off against the other
resps as deficiency the amount of P6.81 million is not clear nor liquidated; compensation cannot
against w/c it has the right to apply or set off prvt. extend to unliquidated, disputed claim existing fr.
respondent's money market claim of P1,062,063.83. breach of contract. xxx

347
MINDANAO PORTLAND CEMENT V. CA [120
Undoubtedly, petitioner admits the validity of its S 930] - Automatic compensation, requisites of,
outstanding accounts w/ prvt. resp. in the amount present; Extinguishment of two debts arising fr.
of P22,213.75 as contained in its answer. But final & executory judgments due to compensation
whether prvt. resp. is liable to pay the petitioner a by operation of law.-- It is clear fr. the record
20% margin or compensation on the subject sale to that both corporations, petitioner Mindanao
Dole Phils., Inc. is vigorously disputed. This Portland Cement Corp. (appellant) & resp.
circumstance prevents legal compensation fr. taking Pacweld Steel Corp. (appellee), were creditors &
place. debtors of each other, their debts to each other
consisting in final & executory judgements of the
CFI in 2 separate cases, ordering the payment to
each other of the sum of P10T by way of
Art. 1280. Notw/standing the provisions of the attorney's fees. The 2 obligations, therefore,
preceding article, the guarantor may set up respectively offset each other, compensation
compensation as regards what the creditor may having taken effect by operation of law &
owe the principal debtor. extinguished both debts to the concurrent
amount of P10T, pursuant to the provisions of
Art. 1283. If one of the parties to a suit over Art. 1278, 1279 & 1290, since all the requisites
an obligation has a claim for damages against the provided in Art. 1279 for automatic compensation
other, the former may set it off by proving his right "even though the creditors & debtors are not
aware of the compensation" were duly present.
to said damages & the amount thereof.

Facultative Compensation w/c takes place when


Effect of Legal Compensation (Baviera OL: F. compensation is claimable by only one of the
Comp 3. Effect of L Comp) parties but not of the other, e.g., Articles
1287, 1288. (Baviera OL: F. Comp 2. Obligs
W/c cannot be compensated)
Art. 1289. If a person should have against him
several debts w/c are susceptible of compensation,
the rules on the application of payments shall apply Art. 1287. Compensation shall not be proper
to the order of the compensation. when one of the debts arises fr. a depositum or
fr. the obligations of a depositary or of a bailee in
Art. 1290. When all the requisites mentioned in commodatum.
article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect
by operation of law, & extinguishes both debts to Neither can compensation be set up against
the concurrent amount, even though the creditors & a creditor who has a claim for support due by
debtors are not aware of the compensation. gratuitous title, w/o prejudice to the provisions of
paragraph 2 of article 301.
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be
proper, it is necessary: Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound be renounced; nor can it be transmitted to a third
principally, & that he be at the same time a principal person. Neither can it be compensated w/ what
creditor of the other; the recipient owes the obligor.
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money,
or if the things due are consumable, they be of the However, support in arrears may be
same kind, & also of the same quality if the latter compensated & renounced, & the right to
has been stated; demand the same may be transmitted by
(3) That the two debts be due; onerous or gratuitous title.
(4) That they be liquidated & demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there by any
retention or controversy, commenced by third Baviera: Note that Art. 301 of the NCC is
persons & communicated in due time to the debtor. not found in FC. Future support cannot be
compensated. Thus, a father who paid
damages for son’s q-delict cannot claim
BALANE CASE: comp by not giving support to his son.
However under 301, support IN ARREARS
may be compensated & renounced & the rt
348
to demand the same may be transmitted by maturity but applied the amt to the deficiency in
onerous or gratuitous title. the proceeds of the auction sale.

Issue: WON there can be legal comp


Balane: The depositary cannot set up
compensation w/ respect to the things deposited to Held: No. Art 1279 requires among others that “
him. But the depositor can set up the the debts be due & that they be liquidated &
compensation. demandable”. Comp is not proper when the claim
of the person asserting the set-off v. the other is
not clear nor liquidated; comp cannot extend to
Art. 1288. Neither shall there be compensation unliquidated, disputed claim arising fr. Breach of
if one of the debts consists in civil liability arising fr. K. There can be no doubt that the ICB is
a penal offense. indebted to F in the amt of P1 M representing the
proceeds of the money market investment. But
whether F is indebted to ICB in the amt of P6.8 M
representing deficiency balance after the
Baviera : The oblig of the depositary to return
foreclosure of the mort is vigorously disputed.
a spec thing cannot be compensated or
Case for annulment of foreclosure sale is still
substituted by delivery of a thing of the same
pending. This circ prevents legal comp fr. taking
kind.
place.

Contractual/ Conventional compensation w/c


Q: If there is an oblig of the depositary to the takes place when parties agree to set-off
depositor for damages(already liquidated & even if the requisites of legal compensation
demandable) in case of negligence & if the are not present, e.g., Art. 1282. ( Baviera OL:
depositor owes the depositary a sum of money, can F. Comp 1. Kinds a. Voluntary)
there be set-off?

A: No since it arose out of a deposit. Not allowed by


law. Cld be a way of Cr to collect a bad debt. Art. 1282. The parties may agree upon the
compensation of debts w/c are not yet due.

Art. 1794. Every partner is responsible to the


partnership for damaged suffered by it through his Tolentino: Voluntary Compensation is not
limited to obligations w/c are not yet due. The
fault, & he cannot compensate them w/ the profits
parties may compensate by agreement any
& benefits w/c he may have earned for the obligations, in w/c the objective requisites
partnership by his industry. However, the courts provided for legal compensation are not present.
may equitably lessen this responsibility if through xx
the partner’s extraordinary efforts in other activities
of the partnership, unusual profits have been
realized. Judicial Compensation when decreed by the court
in a case where there is a counterclaim, such
as that provided in Art. 1283. (Baviera OL: F.
Comp 1. Kinds b. Judicial)
ICB V. IAC

Facts: Fajardo secured fr. ICB a P50 M loan &


Art. 1283. If one of the parties to a suit over
made a REM (Real Est Mort) over her prop as
an obligation has a claim for damages against the
security. Of this loan, only P20 M was released.
other, the former may set it off by proving his
Subseq, F made a money market placement w/ ICB
right to said damages & the amount thereof.
in the amt of P1 M at 17% p.a. When F failed to
pay her mortgaged indebtedness, ICB foreclosed
the REM. After the foreclosure sale, ICB claims that
after deducting the purchase price of P20 M, there GAN V. CA
remained a balance of P6.81 M. ICB refused to pay
the proceeds of the money market placement on Facts: In a ’61 civil case between P & PR (Lessor
& Tenant, resp), PR was awarded P500 atty’s
fees. In ’63, P notified PR that he was increasing
349
the rents & at the same time demanded that PR pay
all his back rentals amting to P4, 320. In the PEREZ V. CA
meantime, PR was able to obtain a WOE on the jmt
for atty’s fees. P pleaded comp. CA held that atty’s Facts: Congeneric (CG) issued 2 PNs to Mojica
fees cannot be subj to legal comp, it being a trust (M), to mature on Aug 6 & 13, ’74 resp. Mever
fund for the benefit of the lawyer. Films (MF) borrowed fr. CG P500 T & issued a PN
for such to mature on Aug 5, ’74. CG received fr.
Issue: WON there can be comp Perez (P) P200 T, so the Co. issued to her a
confirmation sale, & assigned to her all its
Held: No. CA erred. Accdg to CA, the reqs of legal interests in the PN made by MF. On Aug 5 MF
comp, namely that the parties must be Crs & Drs of paid the Co. w/c the Co. in turn paid to P.
each other in their own rt & that each one of them Meanwhile, when the 2 PNs issued to M
must be bound principally & at the same time be a matured, instead of paying M the whole oblig, the
principal Cr of the other , are not present in the Co., paid only the interest therein & the principal
instant case since the real Cr w/ respect to the P500 oblig were rolled over to mature on Oct. 4 & 11.
was PR’s lawyer. Wrong! The award for atty’s fees M assigned these 2 PNs to MF. Thus, MF
is made in favor of the litigant, not his counsel, & is surrendered these 2 PNs to CG in pmt of his
justified by way of indemnity for damages remaining loan & asked the Co. to compute the
recoverable by the former in cases enumerated in A remaining balance. On Oct 7, MF was served w/
2208 CC. It is the litigant, not his counsel, who is garnishment by the Sheriff in 2 collxn cases filed
the jmt Cr & who may properly enforce the jmt by by CG’s Crs. MF, believing that his debt was only
exec’n. Such credit therefore may properly be the P79 T, tendered the same amt to the Sheriff. P.
subj of legal comp. Quite obviously it wld be unjust on the basis of the assignment made in her favor
to compel P to pay his debt of P500 when by CG, sued MF for the recovery of P100 T. TC
admittedly his Cr (PR) is indebted to him for more ruled for P. CA reversed.
than P4,000.
Issue: WON MF can claim comp

Baviera: What is the idea behind legal comp? Held: No. Perez can collect the portion of the PN
To facilitate collxn of money. For expediency. assigned to her by CG. No comp bec the PNs
assigned to MF by M were not yet due &
demandable since the maturity dates were rolled
Effect of Assignment of Credit (Baviera OL: F. over to Oct 4 & 11. The inevitable result of such
Comp 4. Effect of Assign of Cr) was that the 2 PNs were not yet due &
demandable as of the date of their assignment by
M to NF on Sept 9 nor on Oct 9 when MF
surrendered both to CG. As a legal conseq, no
Art. 1285. The debtor who has consented to
legal comp cld have taken place the 2 debts were
the assignment of rights made by a creditor in favor
not yet due & demandable. There is another
of a third person, cannot set up against the
aspect to this case. What is involved herein is a
assignee the compensation w/c would pertain to
money market transxn. The impersonal char of
him against the assignor, unless the assignor was
the money mkt device overlooks the indivs & the
notified by the debtor at the time he gave his
entities concerned. The issuer of a comm’l paper
consent, that he reserved his right to the
in the mkt necessarily knows in advance that it
compensation.
wld be expeditiously transacted & transferred to
any investor/lender w/o need of notice to issuer.
If the creditor communicated the cession to him
In practice, no such notification. Accdgly, there is
but the debtor did not consent thereto, the latter
no applicability of A 1285 3 rd par. Rather, it is the
may set up the compensation of debts previous to
1st par w/c is applicable w/c provides that, “ The
the cession, but not of subsequent ones.
Dr who has consented to the assignment of rts
made by the Cr in favor of a 3P cannot set up as
If the assignment is made w/o the knowledge
against the assignee the comp w/c wld pertain to
of the debtor, he may set up the compensation of
him as v. the assignor, unless the assignor was
all credits prior to the same & also later ones until
notified by the Dr at the time he gave his
he had knowledge of the assignment.
consent, that he reserved his rt to the comp.”

350
against each other before they are judicially
Balane: rescinded or avoided.
There are 3 situations covered in this article:

Assignment w/ the debtor's consent;


Assignment w/ the debtor's knowledge but w/o his G. Novation
consent; &
Assignment w/o the debtor's knowledge (&
obviously w/o his consent.) TOLENTINO’s NOTES:
Rules: Concept of Novation.-- Novation is the
extinguishment of an obligation by the
Assignment w/ the debtor's consent.-- Debtor substitution or change of the obligation by a
cannot set up compensation at all unless subsequent one w/c extinguishes or modifies the
the right is reserved. first, either by changing the object of principal
conditions, or by substituting the person of the
Assignment w/ the debtor's knowledge but debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the
w/o his consent.-- The debtor can set up rights of the creditor. (Manresa.)
compensation w/ a credit already existing
at the time of the assignment. Novation is the most unusual mode of
extinguishing an obligation. It is the only mode
Assignment w/o the debtor's knowledge.-- whereby an obligation is extinguished & a new
Debtor can set up as compensation any obligation is created to take its place. The other
credit existing at the time he acquired modes of extinguishing an obligation are absolute
knowledge even if it arose after the actual in the sense that the extinguishment of the
assignment. obligation is total (w/ the exception of
compromise.) Novation, on the other hand, is a
relative mode of extinguishing an obligation.
BALANE CASE:

SESBRENO V. CA [222 S 466] - Compensation Classification of Novation:


may defeat assignee's rights before notice of the
assignment is given to the debtor.-- In other Subjective (Personal) or novation by a change of
words, petitioner notified Delta of his rights as subject
assignee after compensation had taken place by
operation of law bec. the offsetting instruments had Active subjective or a change of creditor; also
both reached maturity. It is a firmly settled doctrine known as subrogation.
that the rights of an assignee are not any greater Passive subjective or a change of debtor
than the rights of the assignor, since the assignee is
merely substituted in the place of the assignor & Objective (Real) or novation by change in the
that the assignee acquires his rights subject to the object or in the principal conditions.
equities-- i.e., the defenses-- w/c the debtor could Novation by a change in the principal
have set up against the original assignor before conditions is the most problematic kind of
notice of the assignment was given to the debtor. novation bec. you have to determine whether
At the time that Delta was first put to notice of the or not the change in the conditions is
assignment in petitioner's favor on 7/14/81, DMC principal or merely incidental. For example, a
PN NO. 2731 had already been discharged by change fr. straight terms to installment terms
compensation. Since the assignor Philfinance could & a change fr. non-interest bearing obligation
not have then compelled payment anew by Delta of to an interest bearing one are changes in the
DMC PN No. 2731, petitioner, as assignee of principal conditions.
Philfinance, is similarly disabled fr. collecting fr.
Delta the portion of the Note assigned to him. Mixed novation w/c is a combination of both
subjective & objective novation.

(not in Baviera’s outline) Requisites of Novation:

There must be a previous valid obligation;


Agreement of the parties to create the new
Art. 1284. When one or both debts are obligation;
rescissible or voidable, they may be compensated

351
Extinguishment of the old obligation. (I would be expressed or clearly apparent fr. the
consider this an effect, rather than a requisite incompatibility of the old & the new obli.
of novation-- Balane);
Validity of the new obligation.
Moreover, an extension of time,
(Tiu Siuco v. Habana, 45 P 707.)
generally, does not constitute novation as can be
There must be CONSENT of all the parties to the seen fr. the fact that extension had to be made a
substitution, resulting in the extinction of the old special ground for the extinguishment of the K of
obligation & the creation of a valid one. guaranty in Art. 1831 (now Art. 2079 of the
NCC), notw/standing that Art. 1847 (now 2076)
applies to guaranty the same grounds that
Art. 1292. In order that an obligation may be extinguish all other oblig, naturally including
extinguished by another w/c substitute the same, it novation.
is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal
terms, or that the old & the new obligations be on MAGDALENA ESTATES VS. RODRIGUEZ
every point incompatible w/ each other.
FACTS: Rodriguez spouses executed a
promissory note in favor of Magdalena Esyayes
for P5,000 w/ 9% interest p.a. R & Luzon Surety
TOLENTINO:
at the same time executed a BOND in favor of
Novation is NEVER presumed. Magda, promising to pay the purchase price of a
parcel of land. The obli became due so Luzon
It must be established that the old & the new Surety paid to Magda. Magda then demanded
contracts are reimbursement fr. the R spouses alleged
incompatible in all points, accumulated interests. R spouses refused to pay
or that the will to novate appear by express on the ground that there has been a novation of
agreement of the parties the obli of the R spouses in favor of Magda bec.
or in acts of equivalent import.
the latter accepted w/o reservation the surety
IMPLIED NOVATION. There is no specific form bond.
required for an implied novation. All that is required
is INCOMPATIBILITY between the original & the HELD: Novation by presumption has never been
subsequent contracts. favored. The mere fact that the creditor receives
a guaranty or accepts payment fr. a 3rd person
A mere extension of the term of payment does not does not constitute novation in the absence of
result in novation, for the period affects only the any agreement that the first debtor shall be
performance, not the creation of the obligation released fr. responsibility. In the CAB, the surety
bond was not a new & separate contract but an
accessory of the PN.
BAVIERA CASES:
MILLAR VS. COURT OF APPEALS
LA TONDENA VS. ALTO SURETY FACTS: Millar obtained a judgment against
Gabriel. A writ of execution was issued, on the
FACTS: Ferrer constituted a second mortgage over basis of w/c G’s Willy’s Ford Jeep was seized.
his parcel of land in favor of La Tondens (LT). LT Subsequently, G pleaded w/ M to release the jeep
filed foreclosure proceedings. Sheriff levied on the under an agreement whereby G would mortgage
mortgaged prop. but it was released when Ferrer the jeep in favor of M to secure the payment of
promised that he would satisfy the judgment w/in the judgment debt. The chattel mortgage
3 mos. Alto Surety later attached the same prop. reduced the amount to be paid by G. Issue here
w/c was sold & bought by it. LT filed an action is WON the mortgage K novated the judgment
against Alto but CFI dismissed on the ground that debt. The TC said there was no novation bec. the
the judgment of foreclosure in the LT case was mortgage was executed only to secure the
novated & extinguished by the extension of time & judgment.
release of execution levy.
HELD: Where the new obligation merely
HELD: In order to extinguish an obli through reiterates or ratifies the old obligation, although
novation, the intent to do so (animus novandi) must the former effects but minor alterations or slight
352
modifications w/ respect to the cause or object or achieved-- an obligation is extinguished & a new
conditions of the latter, such changes do not one is created in lieu thereof.
effectuate any substantial incompatibility bet. the 2
obligations. Only those essential & principal Novation is never presumed.-- If
changes introduced by the new obligation producing objective novation is to take place, it is
an alteration or modification of the essence of the imperative that the new obligation expressly
old obligation result in implied novation. In the declare that the old obligation is thereby
case at bar, the mere reduction of the amount due extinguished, or that the new obligation be on
in no sense constitutes a sufficient indicium of every point incompatible w/ the old one.
incompatibility, especially in the light of (a) the Novation is never presumed; it must be
explanation by the petitioner that the reduced established either by the discharge of the old
indebtedness was the result of the partial payments debt by the express terms of the new agreement,
made by the resp. before the execution of the or by the acts of the parties whose intention to
chattel mortgage agreement, & (b) the latter's dissolve the old obligation as a consideration of
admissions bearing thereon. the emergence of the new one must be clearly
discernible.
COCHINGYAN VS. R & B SURETY [151 S
339] If old debtor is not released, no novation
occurs & the third person who assumed the
FACTS: PAGRICO (P) submitted a surety bond obligation becomes a co-debtor or surety or a co-
issued by R & B surety in favor of PNB. Under the surety.-- Again, if subjective novation by a
bond, PNB had the right to proceed directly against change in the person of the debtor is to occur, it
R&B w/o going after P. In turn, 2 indemnity is not enough that the juridical relation bet. the
agreements were entered into w/ R&B by CCM & parties to the original contract is extended to a
Joseph Cochingyan in his capacity as CCM prexy & third person. It is essential that the old debtor be
in his personal capacity; & by P, PACOCO, Jose released fr. the obligation, & the third person or
Villanueva as P’s manager & in his personal new debtor take the place in the new relation. IF
capacity, Liu Tua Beth, as PACOCO prexy, & in his the old debtor is not released, no novation occurs
personal capacity. 2 years after the execution of & the third person who has assumed the
these documents, a TRUST AGREEMENT was obligation of the debtor becomes merely a co-
entered into bet. Jose & Susana Cochingyan, Tomas debtor or surety or a co-surety.
Besa, a PNB officer, as trustee; & PNB was the
beneficiary. The trust agreement expressly provided Novation is not implied when the parties
that it shall not, in any manner release R&B fr. their to the new obligation expressly negated the
respective liabilities under the bond. When P failed lapsing of the old obligation. -- Neither can the
to pay, PNB demanded payment fr. R%B. R&B in petitioners anchor their defense on implied
turn demanded reimbursement fr. Joseph novation. Absent an unequivocal declaration of
Cochingyan & Jose V. who refused to pay on the extinguishment of a pre-existing obligation, a
ground that the trust agreement had extinguished showing of complete incompatibility bet. the old
their oblig under the Indemnity Agreements. & the new obligation (& nothing else) would
sustain a finding of novation by implication. But
HELD: Novation defined.-- Novation is the where, as in this case, the parties to the new
extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution obligation expressly recognize the continuing
or change of the obligation by a subsequent one existence & validity of the old one, where, in
w/c terminates it, either by changing its object or other words, the parties expressly negated the
principal conditions, or by substituting a new debtor lapsing of the old obligation, there can be no
in place of the old one, or by subrogating a third novation. The issue of implied n ovation is not
person to the rights of the creditor. Novation reached at all.
through a change of the object or principal
conditions of an existing obligation is referred to as
objective (or real) novation. Novation by the BALANE CASES:
change of either the person of the debtor or of the
creditor is described as subjective (or personal) FUA VS. YAP [74 P 287]
novation. Novation may also be both objective &
subjective (mixed) at the same time. In both HELD: Although the mortgage did not expressly
objective & subjective novation, a dual purpose is cancel the old obligation, this was impliedly
353
novated by reason of incompatibility resulting fr. the recon. of the order of the trial court dated
fact that, whereas the judgment was for P1,538.04 4/26/83, during the pendency of the petition for
payable at one time, did not provide for attorney's certiorari before the IAC & after the filing of the
fees, & was not secured, the new obligation is for petition bef. Us. This answers the claim of the
P1200 payable in installments, stipulates for resps. on the failure of the petitioners to present
attorney's fees & is secured by a mortgage. The evidences or proofs of payment in the lower court
later agreement did not merely extend the time to & the appellate court.
pay the judgment, bec. it was therein recited that
appellants promised to pay P1,200 to appellee as a
settlement of the said judgment. Said judgment PEOPLE'S BANK VS. SYVEL'S [164 S 247]
cannot be said to have been settled, unless it was
extinguished. HELD: When does novation take place; Novation
is never presumed.-- Novation takes place when
SANDICO VS. PIGUING [42 S 322] the object or principal condition of an obligation
is changed or altered. It is elementary that
HELD: Novation results in 2 stipulations-- one to novation is never presumed; it must be explicitly
extinguish an existing obligation, the other to stated or there must be manifest incompatibility
substitute a new one in its place. Fundamental it is bet. the old & the new obligations in every
that novation effects a substitution or modification aspect.
of an obligation by another or an extinguishment of
one obligation by the creation of another. In the Absence of existence of an explicit novation nor
case at hand, we fail to see what new or modified incompatibility between the old & the new
obligation arose out of the payment by the resp. of agreements.-- In the case at bar, there is
the reduced amount of P4,000 & substituted the nothing in the REM w/c supports appellants'
monetary liability for P6,000 of the said resp. under submission. The contract on its face does not
the appellate court's judgment. Additionally, to show the existence of an explicit novation nor
sustain novation necessitates that the same be so incompatibility on every point bet. the old & the
declared in unequivocal terms-- clearly & new agreements as the second contract evidently
unmistakably shown by the express agreement of indicates that the same was executed as new
the parties or by acts of equivalent import-- or that additional security to the CM previously entered
there is complete & substantial incompatibility bet. into by the parties.
the 2 obligations.
Novation was not intended in the case at bar as
NPC VS. DAYRIT [125 S 849] the REM was taken as additional security for the
performance of the contract.
HELD: Novation is never presumed but must be
explicitly stated; No novation in the absence of
explicit novation or incompatibility on every point BROADWAY CENTRUM VS. TROPICAL HUT
between the old & the new agreements of the 224 S 302]
parties.-- In the case at bar, there is nothing in the
May 14, 1982 agreement w/c supports the HELD: We start w/ the basic conception that
petitioner's contention. There is neither explicit novation is the extinguishment of an obligation
novation nor incompatibility on every point bet. the by the substitution of that obligation w/ a
"old" & the "new" agreements. subsequent one, w/c terminates it, either by
changing its object or principal conditions or by
BALILA V. IAC [155 S 262] substituting a new debtor in place of the old one,
or by subrogating a 3rd person to the rights of
HELD: Subsequent mutual agreements & actions of the creditor. xxx
petitioners & private respondents allowing the
former extension of time to pay their obligations & If objective novation is to take place, it is
in installments novated & amended the period of essential that the new obligation expressly
payment decreed by the trial court in its judgement declare that the old obligation is to be
by compromise.-- The fact therefore remains that extinguished or that the new obligation be on
the amount of P84,000 payable on or before May every point incompatible w/ the old one. xxx
15, 1981 decreed by the trial court in its judgment
by compromise was novated & amended by the
subsequent mutual agreements & actions of 2. Modes
petitioners & prvt. resps. Petitioners paid the
aforestated amount on an installment basis & they
were given by prvt. resps no less than 8 extensions Art. 1281. Compensation may be total or
of time to pay their obligation. These transactions partial. When the two debts are of the same
took place during the pendency of the motion for amount, there is a total compensation.
354
(Classmates, I think there was a typo error in def on the same obligation. The LC dismissed the
Ma’am Bubbles’ outline. I think this should have comp on the ground that there was novation
been Art. 1291, reproduced below) brought about by the alteration of the principal
conditions of the original obli & the substitution of
Art. 1291. Obligations may be modified by: a news debtor.
(1) Changing their object or principal
conditions; HELD: The acceptance of PNB of the offer of G
(2) Substituting the person of the debtor; to pay under the terms specified by him
(3) Subrogating a third person in the rights of constituted not only a substitution of the debtor
the creditor. but an alteration or modification of the terms &
conditions of the original K.

a. Substitution of debtor--
(1) Effect of insolvency of
new debtor--
Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to accept
payment or performance by a third person who has
Article 1294. If the substitution is w/o the
no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless
knowledge or against the will of the debtor, the
there is a stipulation to the contrary.
debtor’s insolvency or non-fulfillment of the
obligation shall not give rise to any liability on the
Whoever pays for another may demand fr. the
part of the original debtor.
debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid w/o
the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he
Art. l295. The insolvency of the new debtor,
can recover only insofar as the payment has been
who has been proposed by the original debtor &
beneficial to the debtor.
accepted by the creditor, shall not revive the
action of the latter against the original obligor,
Art. 1237. Whoever pays on behalf of the
except when said insolvency was already existing
debtor w/o the knowledge or against the will of the
& of public knowledge, or known to the debtor,
latter, cannot compel the creditor to subrogate him
when he delegated his debt.
in his rights, such as those arising fr. a mortgage,
guaranty, or penalty.

Art. 1835 second paragraph


BALANE CASE:
A partner is discharged fr. any existing liability
upon dissolution of the partnership by an LAND BANK V. CA [181 S 610]
agreement to that effect between himself, the
partnership creditor & the person or partnership HELD: None of the requirements of novation
continuing the business; & such agreement may be either of the subject matter of the bond
inferred fr. the course of dealing between the agreement or of subrogation of the creditor
creditor having knowledge of the dissolution & the thereunder, is visible in the instant case.--
person or partnership continuing the business. Finally, it is not easy to understand the thrust of
respondent's argument that novation had taken
place in respect of their bonds when they had
their registered bonds converted into bearer
BAVIERA CASE:
bonds. If respondents mean to suggest that the
printed terms of the new bearer bonds were
PNB VS. MALLARI
somehow novated by the notation they had
inserted in the LBP Forms 64 so as to obligate the
FACTS: Def borrowed fr. PNB & this loan was
Land Bank to pay a portion of the Nov. 21, 1974-
secured by a chattel mortgage on his standing crop.
May 20, 1975 interest not to the holder or bearer
Mallari defaulted so the sacks of rice deposited in a
of such bonds (as required by the terms thereof)
warehouse were attached. Guanzon, defendant’s Er,
but rather to the respondents, such suggestion
offered to pay the obli of the latter. This was
must be firmly rejected. None of the
accepted by PNB so the attachment was later lifted.
requirements of novation either of the subject
Guanzon defaulted in his payment so PNB sued the
355
matter of the bond agreement or of (partial) expressly mentioned in this Code; the latter must
subrogation of the creditor (obligee) thereunder, is be clearly established in or order that it may take
visible in the instant case. Of equal importance is effect.
the fact that the unilateral notation of the
respondents was not inserted in the new bearer
bond certificates. The mischief implicit in the Legal (Art. 1302)-- In all cases of Art. 1302,
(assumed) suggestion of the respondents is plain to subrogation takes place by operation of law.
see.
Art. 1302. It is presumed that there is legal
subrogation:
b. Change of Principal
Condition or Object (1) When a creditor pays another creditor
who is preferred, even w/o the debtor's
knowledge;
COJUANGCO VS. GONZALES (2) When a third person, not interested in the
obligation, pays w/ the express or tacit approval
FACTS: G sold his land to Jose Cojuangco (C) w/ a of the debtor;
rt. to repurchase the same w/in 2 years for (3) When, even w/o the knowledge of the
P20,000. Simultaneously, a K of lease was also debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment of
entered into between G & C. G neglected to pay the the obligation pays, w/o prejudice to the effects
rent & the taxes so the land was declared forfeited of confusion as to the latter's share;
in favor of the gov’t. Heirs of C paid such taxes &
consolidated their ownership over the land. Title to Conventional/ Contractual (Art. 1301)-- Consent
said prop. was issued to the heirs of C. of the 3 parties (old creditor, debtor & new
Subsequently, two new contracts of lease over the creditor) are required.
same parcel of land were entered into between G &
the heirs of C w/ an option to repurchase the same Art. 1301. Conventional subrogation of a
at P60,000 provided that G would regularly pay the third person requires the consent of the original
rental. parties & of the third person.

HELD: There has been a novation of the first


contract. In two respects, there is incompatibility Q: Is it possible for a creditor to transfer his
between the original K & the subsequent ones, credit w/o consent of the debtor?
namely: a) in the purchase price (w/c was increased
fr. P20 thou to P60 thou); & b) in the holder of the A: Yes. But this is not novation but an
title (in the orig. K, the holder of the title was G assignment of rights under Art. 1624.
while in the subsequent Ks, the title of the heirs of
Assignment is also a novation but much
C is established when they consolidated their simpler. But is not subrogation.
ownership over the land & a title was issued in their
name). No specific form is required of a novation.
All that is required is incompatibility of between the 1 Kinds
original & the subsequent Ks.
a Legal
c. Subrogation/Subjective
Novation
Art. 1302. It is presumed that there is legal
subrogation:
a. In case of active
(1) When a creditor pays another creditor
subjective novation
who is preferred, even w/o the debtor's
knowledge;
Art. 1300. Subrogation of a third person in the (2) When a third person, not interested in the
rights of the creditor is either legal or conventional. obligation, pays w/ the express or tacit approval
The former is not presumed, except in cases of the debtor;

356
the insurance company shall be subrogated to
(3) When, even w/o the knowledge of the the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer
debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment of the or the person who has violated the contract. If
obligation pays, w/o prejudice to the effects of the amount paid by the insurance company does
confusion as to the latter's share; not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved
party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency fr.
Art. 1177. The creditors, after having pursued the person causing the loss or injury.
the property in possession of the debtor to satisfy
their claims, may exercise all the rights & bring all
the actions of the latter for the same purpose, save 2 Effect
those w/c are inherent in his person; they may also
impugn the acts w/c the debtor may have done to Art. 1304. A creditor, to whom partial
defraud them. payment has been made, may exercise his right
for the remainder, & he shall be preferred to the
(Conventional Redemption) person who has been subrogated in his place in
virtue of the partial payment of the same credit.
Art. 1610. The creditors of the vendor cannot
make use of the right of redemption against the Art. 1303. Subrogation transfers to the
vendee, until after they have exhausted the person subrogated the credit w/ all the rights
property of the vendor. thereto appertaining, either against the debtor or
against third persons, be they guarantors or
Art. 1729. Those who put their labor upon or possessors of mortgages, subject to stipulation in
furnish materials for a piece of work undertaken by a conventional subrogation.
the contractor have an action against the owner up
to the amount owing fr. the latter to the contractor
at the time the claim is made. However, the
following shall not prejudice the laborers, b. Passive Subjective Novation
employees & furnishers of materials: (Substitution of the debtor)

(1) Payments made by the owner to the Art. 1293. Novation w/c consists in
contractor before they are due; substituting a new debtor in the place of the
(2) Renunciation by the contractor of any original one, may be made even w/o the
amount due him fr. the owner. knowledge or against the will of the latter, but
not w/o the consent of the creditor. Payment by
This article is subject to the provisions of special the new debtor gives him the rights mentioned in
laws. articles 1236 & 1237.

(Assignment of Credits & Other Incorporeal Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to
Rights) accept payment or performance by a third person
who has no interest in the fulfillment of the
Art. 1629. In case the assignor in good faith obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the
should have made himself responsible for the contrary.
solvency of the debtor, & the contracting parties
should not have agreed upon the duration of the Whoever pays for another may demand fr.
liability, it shall last for one year only, fr. the time of the debtor what he has paid, except that if he
the assignment if the period had already expired. paid w/o the knowledge or against the will of the
debtor, he can recover only insofar as the
If the credit should be payable w/in a term or payment has been beneficial to the debtor.
period w/c has not yet expired, the liability shall
cease one year after the maturity. Art. 1237. Whoever pays on behalf of the
debtor w/o the knowledge or against the will of
Art. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been the latter, cannot compel the creditor to
insured, & he has received indemnity fr. the subrogate him in his rights, such as those arising
insurance company for the injury or loss arising out fr. a mortgage, guaranty or penalty.
of the wrong or breach of contract complained of,

357
In expromission, the release of the old debtor is
BALANE CASE: absolute (even if it turns out that the new
debtor is insolvent.)

In delegacion, the release of the old debtor is not


RODRIGUEZ V. REYES absolute. He may be held liable (1) if the
new debtor was already insolvent at the time
HELD: By buying the property covered by TCT No. of the delegacion; & (2) such insolvency was
48979 w/ notice that it was mortgaged, resp. either known to the old debtor or of public
Dualan only undertook either to pay or else allow knowledge.
the land's being sold if the mortgage creditor could
not or did not obtain payment fr. the principal Cases of expromission are quite rare.
debtor when the debt matured. Nothing else.
Certainly, the buyer did not obligated himself to
replace the debtor in the principal obligation, & he
could not do so in law w/o the creditor's consent. Effect of Novation
(Art. 1293)

The obligation to discharge the mortgage Art. 1296. When the principal obligation is
indebtedness therefore, remained on the shoulders extinguished in consequence of a novation,
of the original debtors & their heirs, petitioners
herein, since the record is devoid of any evidence of accessory obligations may subsist only insofar as
contrary intent. xxx they may benefit third persons who did not give
their consent.
Art. 1835. xxx

A partnership is discharged fr. any existing Balane:


liability upon dissolution of the partnership by an
agreement to that effect between himself, the Effect of novation as to accessory
obligations.-- Accessory obligations may
partnership creditor & the person or partnership subsist only insofar as they may benefit third
continuing the business; & such agreement may be persons who did not give their consent, e.g.,
inferred fr. the course of dealing between the stipulation pour atrui
creditor having knowledge of the dissolution & the
person or partnership continuing the business. General rule: In a novation, the accesory
obligation is extinguished.
Exception: In an active subjective novation, the
guarantors, pledgors, mortgagors are not
Balane: released.
Passive Subjective Novation-- Articles 1293 & 1295 Look at Art. 1303, accessory obligations
are not extinguished. So there is a conflict. How
Art. 1293 talks of expromission (not upon do you resolve? According to commentators, Art.
the old debtor's initiative. It could be upon the 1303 is an exception to Art. 1296.
initiative of the creditor or of the new debtor.)

Art. 1295 talks of delegacion (change at the


old debtor's initiative.) Art. 1297. If the new obligation is void, the
original one shall subsist, unless the parties
In expromission, the change in the person intended that the former relation should be
of the debtor is not upon the initiative of the old extinguished in any event.
debtor, whether or not he gave his consent. As
soon as a new debtor & creditor agree, novation Art. 1298. The novation is void if the original
takes place. obligation was void, except when annulment may
be claimed only by the debtor, or when
In both cases, the intent of the parties must
be to release the old debtor. ratification validates acts w/c are voidable.

What is the difference in effect between Art. 1299. If the original obligation was
expromission & delegacion? subject to a suspensive or resolutory condition,
the new obligation shall be under the same
condition, unless it is otherwise stipulated.

358
CARANTE VS. CA

CONTRACTS FACTS: The Gov’t. wanted to expropriate part of


a land originally owned by the deceased Mateo
for the construction of the Loakan airport. The
I. Form of Contracts heirs of Mateo executed a contract, denominated
as “Assignment of Right to Inheritance” in favor
A. General Rule of petitioner, one of the children of Mateo. P then
sold the lot to the gov’t. & he was able to secure
a TCT in his name for the remaining portions of
the land. Eighteen years later, the other heirs
Art. 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in
brought this action, alleging that they were made
whatever form they may have been entered into,
to believe that the document merely authorized P
provided all the essential requisites for their validity
to convey a portion of the lot to the Gov’t. in their
are present. However, when the law requires that a
behalf to facilitate the transaction. The lower
contract be in some form in order that it may be
court dismissed the complaint on the ground of
valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in
prescription.
a certain way, that requirement is absolute &
indispensable.
HELD: SC upheld the TC. It is the total absence
of consideration w/c renders a K absolutely void
& inexistent. In the CAB, the action of the private
Tolentino respondents (the other heirs) is not to declare
the inexistence of a K for lack of consideration.
Art. 1356 provides for TWO CASES where form is
Here, the consideration was not absent. The
absolute & indispensable, namely:
sum of P1.00 appears in the document as one of
When the form is essential to the validity of the K the considerations for the assignment of
When the K is unenforceable unless it is in a certain inheritance. In addition, the document recites
form, such as those under the Statute of Frauds that private resps. acknowledge that the lot
(SOF) rightly & exclusively belonged to petitioner bec.
Mateo considered him to be the real owner.
GENERAL RULE: A K having the essential requisites
of Art. 1318 will be valid as between the parties Even if we consider the K here as
whatever the form it may have been entered into
voidable on the ground that consent was
Requisites under Art. 1318 procured thru fraud, such action prescribes in
FOUR YEARS fr. the discovery of the fraud. Since
1. Consent of the contracting parties the registration of the lot is constructive notice to
2. Object certain w/c is the subject matter of the whole world, the same is barred bec. it is
litigation filed 18 years after such registration. Even if we
3. Cause of the obligation w/c is established consider that an implied trust was created
between petitioner & private resps., an action
The formalities required by law are classified into based on implied trust prescribes in 10 years.
three groups:
Thus, it is also barred.
those w/c are required for the validity of the K ad
esentia, ad solemnitatem
those required to make the K effective as against DBP VS. ADIL
3rd parties, such as those mentioned in Arts.
1357 & 1358 FACTS: Spouses Confesor & Villafuerte borrowed
those required for the purpose of proving the fr. DBP for w/c they executed a PN, promising to
existence of a K, or formalities ad probationem, pay in 10 equal yearly installments. The debt
such as those provided in the SOF
remained unpaid even after 10 years. Later, C
executed a 2nd PN, expressly acknowledging the
debt & promising to pay or before June 15, ‘61.
BAVIERA CASES:
Spouses again failed to pay so DBP filed a comp
for payment of the loan. The LC ruled for DBP
but it was reversed by the CA on the ground that
the action has already prescribed.
359
donated & the value of the charges w/c the
HELD: It is true that prescription has set in w/ donee must satisfy.
regards to the 1st PN. However, when C executed a
2nd PN whereby he promised to pay the loan, C The acceptance may be made in the same
effectively renounced & waived his right to the deed of donation or in a separate public
prescription of the action covering the 1st PN. This document, but it shall not take effect unless it is
is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt done during the lifetime of the donor.
that has prescribed by a new promise to pay the
debt. If the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
A new express promise to pay a debt an authentic form, & this step shall be noted in
barred will take it out of the operation of the statute both instruments.
of limitations. Since a statutory limitation merely
bars the remedy & does not discharge the debt,
there is something more than a mere moral obli to Tolentino:
support a promise, & this is the pre-existing debt If the donation of an immov was not made in a
w/c is a sufficient consideration for the new public instrument, the donee cannot bring an
promise. The new promise to pay constitutes a new action to compel the donor to execute a
cause of action. public instrument of donation under Art.
1357.
Art. 1357 applies only to Ks w/c validly exist, &
BAGNAS VS. CA cannot be held applicable to a case where
the form is required in order to make it valid
A public instrument is not necessary in cases of
FACTS: Mateum died w/ no descendants or onerous donations bec. they are governed by
ascendants but he left a considerable estate. Part of the rules on contracts.
such estate is the subject of the present case. It
appears that a deed was executed wherein Title to immov prop. does not pass fr. the donor
petitioners allegedly sold to private resps. TEN to the donee until & unless:
parcels of land for P1.00 & in consideration of past,
present & future services rendered by the private it has been accepted in a public instrument---
respondents. Ps seek to annul the said deed on the whether in the deed of donation itself or on
a separate public instrument. Solemn words
ground that it is fictitious, fraudulent & falsified.
of acceptance are not necessary.
HELD: The K is absolutely void. The stipulated price The donor was duly notified thereof---
of P1.00 is grossly disproportionate to the valuable Necessary that formal notice is given to the donor
real estate. Moreover, PRs failed to prove the & the fact that due notice has been given must
services constituting the principal consideration of be noted in the instruments containing the offer
the K. Hence, bec. there was total absence of to donate & that showing the acceptance. Then &
consideration, the K is void ab initio. Therefore, the only then is the donation perfected
props. subject thereof remained part of the estate
The acceptance must be made during the life of
of Mateum w/c is recoverable by his heirs.
the donor; if not made before the donor’s death,
it is w/o effect.
Neither can it be said that the K is one of
donation bec. the same involved real properties & In so far as the donor is concerned, the donation
was not executed in or accepted in a public is not accepted unless he/she is notified of such
document. acceptance.

B. Form essential to its Art. 748. x x x


validity If the value of the personal property
donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the
donation & the acceptance shall be made in
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void.
immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
public document, specifying therein the property

360
Tolentino:
Art. 1403 . The following contracts are
A donation of personal prop. exceeding P5 thou in unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
value must ALWAYS be made in writing, &
accepted also in writing.
The document of donation & the acceptance need NOTES:
not be public instruments but may simply be ***This list is EXCLUSIVE
private documents.
When the value does not exceed P5 thou, a (1) x x x
donation may be mare orally or in writing.
If donation is made orally, there must be (2) Those that do not comply w/ the Statute
simultaneous delivery.
of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the
If there is no simultaneous delivery, the donation is
void unless made in writing. BUT in this case, following cases an agreement hereafter made
the law does not require that that when the shall be unenforceable by action, unless the
donation is made in writing, the acceptance same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be
should also be in writing. in writing, & subscribed by the party charged, or
by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the
agreement cannot be received w/o the writing, or
Art. 1773. A contract of partnership is void, a secondary evidence of its contents:
whenever immovable property is contributed
thereto, if an inventory of said property is not
made, signed by the parties, & attached to the BAVIERA:
public instrument. *** When the law states “in writing,” this
need not be a public document.
Art. 1984. The depositary cannot demand that ***It is sufficient that it was SIGNED by
the depositor proves his ownership of the thing the party sought to be charged
deposited.

Nevertheless, should he discover that the thing


has been stolen & who its true owner is, he must (a) An agreement that by its terms is not to
advise the latter of the deposit. be performed w/in a year fr. the making thereof;

If the owner, in spite of such information, does


not claim it w/in the period of one month, the BAVIERA:
depositary shall be relieved of all responsibility by *** rationale of this: bec. of memory lapse
returning the thing deposited to the depositor.

If the depositary has reasonable grounds to Tolentino:


believe that the thing has not been lawfully The time begins fr. the day the K is entered into,
acquired by the depositor, the former may return & not fr. the time that performance of it is
the same. entered upon
It must appear that the parties intended when
Art. 2134. The amount of the principal & of the they made the K that it should not be
performed w/in a year.
interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise, the Where no time is fixed by the parties for
contract of antichresis shall be void. performance, & there is nothing in the
agreement itself to show that it cannot be
Art. 83---Family Code performed w/in a year according to its terms
& the understanding of the parties, the
These donations are governed by the rules on agreement is NOT w/in the SOF.
ordinary donations established in Title III of Book
III of the Civil Code, insofar as they are not
modified by the following articles. (b) A special promise to answer for the debt,
default, miscarriage of another;

C. Form essential to its


enforceability BAVIERA:
361
***Examples of this are guaranty & surety hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept & receive
contracts part of such goods & chattels, or the evidences,
or some of them, of such things in action, or pay
Tolentino: at the time some part of the purchase money;
This has been defined as an undertaking by a but when a sake is made by auction & entry is
person, not before liable, for the purpose of made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the
securing or performing the same duty for w/c time of the sale, of the amount & kind of
the original debtor continues to be liable. property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the
The test as to whether a promise is w/in the statute purchasers & person on whose account the sale
has been said to lie in the answer to the
question whether the promise is an original or is made, is a sufficient memorandum;
a collateral one:

BAVIERA: ***Choses in action refer to


PROMISE IS PROMISE IS incorporeal property
ORIGINAL OR COLLATERAL
INDEPENDENT
If the promisor If the promise is Tolentino:
becomes primarily collateral to the The requirement of a written instrument or a
liable for the payment agreement of another memo for sales of personal prop. for a price
of a debt, the promise & the promisor not less than P500, covers both TANGIBLE &
is not w/in the statute becomes thereby INTANGIBLE personal prop.
merely a surety, the To bring a sales transaction w/in the operation of
promise falls w/in the the SOF, the price of the prop. sold must be
SOF & hence, it should at least P500.
A K for the sale of goods, chattels or things in
be in writing action is removed fr. the operation of the
SOF where the buyer ACCEPTS & RECEIVES
part of such goods & chattels.
(c) An agreement made in consideration of Neither will the SOF apply where there has been
marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry; part payment of the purchase price.
Evidence to prove an oral K of sale of real estate
must be disregarded if timely objections are
made to its introduction.
BAVIERA: A consummated sale of real prop. is not covered
*** Examples of this would be a marriage by the SOF (OO na...OO na...)
settlement, donation propter nuptias
***A mutual promise to marry, whether or
not in writing, is unenforceable bec. it is a (e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer
personal act. period than one year, or for the sale of real
property or of an interest therein;

Tolentino: (f) A representation as to the credit of a third


person.

When the marriage is a mere incident, & not the


end to be attained by the agreement, the Tolentino:
contract is not in consideration of marriage, & The representations are limited to those w/c
oral evidence can prove the agreement operate to induce the person to whom they are
Even when marriage is a consideration, but in made to enter into contractual relations w/ the
addition thereto, there is some other third person, but not to those representations
consideration sufficient to support the oral tending to induce action for the benefit of the
agreement, this may be proved by w/o a person making them.
writing.
BAVIERA:

(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels Q: What is the ratio for the SOF?
or things in action, at a price not less than five

362
A: To prevent fraud. The problem w/ oral contracts upon the parties as if it had been reduced to
is that they are easy to fabricate & perjure the writing.
witnesses.
In order that a NOTE/MEMORANDUM shall meet
Q: An oral contract for the lease of property for 2 the requirements of the SOF, it must contain:
years. What is the status of the K? the names of the parties
A: Enforceable for the 1st year, unenforceable for the terms & conditions of the agreement
the 2nd year a description of the subject matter sufficient to
render it capable of identification
Q: An oral K for the sale of land. The buyer suffered the date & place of the making of the agreement
damages when the seller refused to comply w/ his signature of the party assuming the obligation
promise even if the buyer offered to pay. B
consigned the payment. So what’s up?

A: Acceptance of benefits (even if it was just an Art. 1443. No express trusts concerning an
earnest money) takes it away w/in the ambit of the immovable or any interest therein may be proved
Statute of Frauds. To allow a K w/c has been by parol evidence.
partially performed to become unenforceable would
be to allow a party to perpetrate fraud.

Q: When is there a waiver of the SOF? BAVIERA:


A: In the ff. instances: ***This provision is not very clear as to the
When there has been acceptance of benefits meaning of “parol.” Strictly, parol evidence
When there is failure to object to the introduction of rule presupposes a written agreement. It is
oral evidence much better to make it unenforceable.

Q: Seller has advertised a specific object for sale. A


buyer comes to buy (sus...eh ano pa nga bang
ginagawa ng buyer?). Seller says “Bukas ka na lang Family Code Provisions
bumalik, alas 7:00 na eh!” To show good faith,
buyer deposits P500.00 as earnest money. Is the Art. 77. The marriage settlements & any
sale enforceable even if there’s no compliance w/ modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by
the SOF? the parties & executed before the celebration of
A: OO naman. the marriage. They shall not prejudice third
persons unless they are registered in the local
Tolentino
civil registry where the marriage contract is
Ration of the SOF: Oral contracts lead to fraud in recorded as well as in the proper registries of
the fulfillment of obligations, or to false testimony. property.

SOF applies only to EXECUTORY & not to completed Art. 83. These donations are governed by the
or executed Ks. rules on ordinary donations established in Title III
of Book III of the Civil Code, insofar as they are
A K falling under the SOF cannot be proved w/o the not modified by the following articles.
writing or a memorandum thereof.

SOF simply provides for the manner in w/c Ks under


it shall be proved. It does not make such Ks invalid CRUZ VS. TUAZON & CO.
if not executed in writing, but only makes ineffective
the action for specific performance. FACTS: Tuazon availed of the services of Cruz to
act as an intermediary w/ the Deudors in
Where one party has entirely performed his obli achieving an amicable settlement in a civil case
under an oral K, equity would agree that all
evidence be admitted to prove the alleged between Tuazon & the Deudors. In consideration
agreement. Performance takes it out of the for C’s services, T promised to convey 3,000 sq.
operation of the statute. ms. of land to C. C performed his services as a
result of w/c a compromise agreement was
During trial, if the parties to the action make no reached. C then asked for the payment but T
objection to the admissibility of oral evid to support refused. C then filed this comp w/c was dismissed
the K covered by the statute, & thereby permits by the TC on the ground that it involves an
such K to be proved orally, it will be just as binding interest in real prop. & therefore, under Art.

363
1403, such agreement is unenforceable unless in ART. 1358. The ff. must appear in a public
writing. instrument:

HELD: Reversed. The SOF refers to specific kinds of Acts & contracts w/c have for their object the
transactions & it cannot apply to any K that is not creation, transmission, modification or
enumerated therein. In the CAB, the K cannot be extinguishment of real rights over immovable
considered a sale of real prop. or any interest property; sales of real property or of an interest
therein since what C is trying to enforce is the therein are governed by Articles 1403, No. 2 &
delivery to him of a parcel of land w/c T promised 1405;
to him as consideration for his services as mediator
or intermediary. Not all dealings involving interest in The cession, repudiation or renunciation of
real prop. come under the SOF. hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal
partnership of gains;
Moreover, the agreement in question has
already been partially executed. It is a fundamental The power to administer property, or any
principle governing the application of the SOF that other power w/c has for its object an act
the contract in dispute must be purely executory on appearing or w/c should appear in a public
the part of both parties to a K. instrument, or should prejudice a third person;

The cession of actions or rights proceeding fr.


WESTERN MINDANAO LUMBER CO. VS. an act appearing in a public document.
MEDELLA
All other contracts where the amount
FACTS: WM entered into a right-of-way agreement involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear
w/ Hernandez over Lot 2136. By virtue of this in writing, even a private one. But sales of goods,
agreement, WM constructed & maintained a road chattels, or things in action are governed by
through Lot 2136. Later, this lot was purchased by articles 1403, No. 2 & 1405.
the Medalles, who did not oppose but instead
allowed the continued use & maintenance of the
road by WM & the public. Later, the Ms sent WM a NOTES: Purpose of form in A1358 is to
notice of their intention to close said road. WM filed prejudice or to affect third persons.
a comp, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain the Ms fr. closing the road & to recognize ART. 1772. Every contract of partnership
& respect the right-of-way agreement. The Medalles having a capital of three thousand pesos or
filed a MTD on the ground that the claim on w/c more; in money or property shall appear in a
the action is founded is unenforceable under the public instrument w/c must be recorded in the
provisions of the SOF. Office of the SEC.

HELD: An agreement creating an easement of Failure to comply w/ the requirements of the


right-of-way is not one of those contracts covered preceding paragraph shall not affect the liability
by the SOF since it is not a sale of real prop. or of of the partnership & the members thereof to third
an interest therein. The trial court, therefore, erred persons.
in dismissing the case upon the claim of the Ms that
the right-of-way agreement is unenforceable under NOTES: Purpose of form in A1772; for
the SOF. Also, the claim may be viewed as a licensing
demand for the establishment of an easement of
right-of-way, if none exists, in view of WM’s offer to ART. 2125. In addition to the requisites
pay reasonable compensation for the use of the stated in article 2085, it is indispensable, in order
land. that a mortgage may be validly constituted, that
the document in w/c it appears be recorded in
the Registry of Property. If the instrument is not
D. WHEN FORM NOT ESSENTIAL TO recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding
VALIDITY OR ENFORCEABILITY between the parties.

The persons in whose favor the law


establishes a mortgage have no other right than
364
to demand the execution & the recording of the “In consideration of the scholarship granted to
document in w/c the mortgage is formalized. me by the University. I hereby waive my right to
transfer to another school w/o having refunded
NOTES: Purpose is to prejudice third persons to the university the equivalent of my scholarship
in cash.”
ART. 1051 The repudiation of an inheritance
shall be made in a public or authentic instrument or HELD: The contract stipulation is contrary to
by petition presented to the court having jurisdiction public policy, hence, NULL & VOID. In order to
over the testamentary or intestate proceedings. declare a contract void as against public policy,
the court must find that the K’s consideration
ART. 2096. A pledge shall not take effect contravenes some established interest of society,
against third persons if a description of the thing or inconsistent w/ sound public policy & good
pledged & the date of the pledge do not appear in a morals or tends clearly to undermine the security
public instrument. of individual rights. Scholarships are awarded in
recognition of merit & NOT to keep students in
NOTES: What is the requirement as to form, in school to bolster prestige. As for the Def.,
pledge? A2096; purpose is to affect 3rd persons & to scholarship award is a business scheme designed
protect creditors; otherwise, it would be easy to to increase the business potential of an
defraud creditors. educational institution.

FILIPINAS CIA. DE SEGUROS V.


1. Effect of non-compliance MANDANAS 17 SCRA 391 (1966)
w/ formality
Facts: Pet’r-Philippine Rating Bureau, is a group
of 39 non-life insurance companies. Respondent
ART. 1357. If the law requires a document or is the Insurance Commissioner. The subject of
other special form, as in the acts & contracts this petition is Art.22 of P’s constitution, w/c
enumerated in the ff. article, the contracting parties accdg. to R is a void stipulation specifically
may compel each other to observe that form once “unlawful machination or a combination in
the contract has been perfected. This right may be restraint of trade”. Art. 22 provides that:
exercised simultaneously w/ the action upon the “members of the Bureau agree not to represent
contract. nor to effect reinsurance w/, nor to accept
reinsurance fr., any company, body or
underwriter licensed to do business in the
II. STIPULATIONS CONTRARY TO LAW Philippines…not a member in good standing of
the Bureau.” R threatened to suspend the
certificate of authority of the companies to do
business in the Phils.
ART. 1306. The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms & Held: Art. 22 is VALID. A test as to whether a
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided given agreement constitutes unlawful
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, machination or a combination in restraint of trade
public order or public policy. is whether under the particular circumstances of
the case & the nature of the particular contract
involved in it, the contract is, or is not,
CUI V. ARELLANO [112 PHIL 135 (1961)] unreasonable. Restrictions upon trade may be
upheld when not contrary to the public welfare &
Facts: Plaintiff was a scholar at the Arellano law not greater than what is necessary to afford a fair
School. When he was in his 4th year he transferred & reasonable protection to the party in whose
to Abad Santos Law School. When he was about to favor it is imposed. The question to be
take the Bar, Def-Arellano refused to release his determined is whether the restraint imposed as
transcript unless he paid back the P1,033 given to such may suppress or destroy the competition.
him as scholarship grants. D bases its claim for
reimbursement fr. the ff. stipulation in their In CAB, there is nothing unlawful,
agreement: immoral or unreasonable or contrary to public
policy either in the objectives sought to be
365
attained by the Bureau, or in the means availed of (SPA) Acceptance by 3P: no particular form.
to achieve said objectives, or in the consequences Before acceptance, the K’ing parties, by mutual
of the accomplishment thereof. The purpose of agreement, may modify the K or revoke it.
Art.22 is not to eliminate competition but to
(SPA) Since 3P’s rt. is based directly on the K, it is
promote ethical practices among non-life insurance also subj. to all defenses available v. the K, such
companies. as those affecting its validity.

III Binding Effect Baviera: A consignee, though not strictly a


party in the K of transpo, can sue, on the K,
the common carrier. Reason: There is a
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between stip. in his favor.
the parties, their assigns & heirs except in case
where the rights & obligations arising fr. the Art. 1314. Any 3P who induces another to violate
contracts are not transmissible by their nature, or his K shall be liable to the other contracting party.
by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not
liable beyond the value of the property he received
fr. the decedent. Tolentino:

If a contract should contain some stipulation in Reqs. of axn under this article:
favor of a third person, he may demand its existence of a valid K
fulfillment provided he communicated his knowledge by 3P of K’s existence
interference by 3P in the K’al relation w/o legal
acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A
justification
mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not
sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly Whatever may be the char. of the liability w/c a
& deliberately conferred a favor upon a third stranger to a K may incur by advising or
person. assisting one of the parties to evade perf.,
such stranger can’t become more extensively
liable in damages for non-perf or the K than
the party in whose behalf he intermeddles.
Tolentino:
To hold the stranger liable for damages in excess
Gen. Rule: rts. & obs. under a K are transmitted of those that could. be recovered v. the
to the heirs of the parties. Heirs can’t be immediate. party would. lead to results
considered as 3P, bec. there is privity of interest grotesque & unjust.
bet. them & their predecessor.
3P’s liability. is solidary w/ non-pref. party, bec.
Intransmissible Ks: those w/c are purely he commits a tortuous act or a q-delict.
personal, either by provision of law, such as in
cases of partnership & agency, or by the very
nature of the obs. arising therefr., such as those
requiring special personal qualifications of the FLORENTINO V. ENCARNACION
obligor.
Facts: The nephews & nieces of Doña
2nd par. permits a 3P to avail himself of a benefit Encarnacion Florentino filed an application for the
extended to him by its terms. Doctrine of registration of a parcel of land in Ilocos Sur, such
stipulations pour autrui (SPA). land adjudicated to them by virtue of a 1947
deed of extra-judicial partition. A stipulation in
Requisites of SPA:
the deed provided that the products of the land,
stip. in favor of 3P
stip. shld. be a part, not the whole, of the K since time immemorial & after the Doña’s death,
clearly & deliberately conferred by K’ing parties had been used in answering for the payment of
not be conditioned or compensated by any kind of expenses for religious functions. Miguel
ob. whatever (nephew) asked that such be an encumbrance on
3P must have communicated his acceptance to the land sought to be registered. This was
obligor before revocation opposed by other relatives.
neither of the K’ing parties bears the legal
representation or authorization of the 3P Issue: WON stip. Be encumbrance on title

366
Held: Yes. The stipulation is part of an extra-judicial Rsn. is a subsidiary axn, w/c presupposes that
partition duly agreed upon & signed by the the Cr has exhausted the prop. of the Dr.
parties, hence the same must bind the King parties Fraudulent conveyance must be shown.
& its validity or compliance cannot be left to the well
Test: WON conveyance by dr a bona fide transxn
of one of them. The stipulation is a stipulation pour
autrui (SPA), bec. it satisfies the necessary Badges/ Signs of Fraud:
requisites (see Tolentino enumeration). The
evidence on record shows that the true intent of the consideration of conveyance is inadequate
parties is to confer a direct & material benefit upon transfer made by Dr after suit has begun & while
the Church. The enjoyment of the Church of pending v. him
benefits flowing therefr. acceptance by the Church a sale upon credit by insolvent Dr
of the SPA before its revocation. The SPA is to be evidence of large indebtedness or complete
insolvency
annotated an encumbrance on the title.
transfer of all or nearly all of prop of Dr who is
insolvent or greatly embarrassed financially
transfer is made between father & son
iv. Rescissible Contracts failure of vendee to take exclusive poss’n of prop
If alienation is gratuitous, GF of transferee does
NOT protect him O.W. Unjust enrichment
Tolentino: If alienation is by onerous title, transferee must
be a party to the fraud, to have Rsn
Rescission (Rsn) in reciprocal observation (Art.
1191) is not identical to Rsn of Ks (Art. 1380+). As a rule, Rsn benefits only Cr who obtained Rsn.
And the extent of revocation is only to the
Requisites of Rsn of a K: amount of prejudice suffered by Cr. As to the
excess, the alienation is maintained
a rescissible K, ex. under Art. 1381 & 1382
no other legal means to obtain reparation for Axn for Rsn may be brought by: (1) the person
damages (Art. 1383) injured by the Rescue K, (2) heirs of this person,
person demanding Rsn must be able to return & (3) their Crs by virtue of it granted under Art.
whatever he may be obliged to restore if Rsn 1177.
granted (Art. 1385)
objects of K must not have passed legally to poss’n Rt. Of transferee to retain prop. depends upon
of 3P in GF (Art. 1385) the nature of the transfer & upon the complicity
Axn for Rsn brought w/in 4 years (Art. 1389) of the former in the fraud.

Rescindable Ks are valid until voided & can’t be When K can’t be rescinded bec. 3P in GF, the
attacked collaterally as in a land registration party who caused the loss liable for the damages
proceeding. Direct proceeding necessary.
Badges of fraud, & Art. 1387: Presumptions.
Rsn only for legal cause, as those in Art. 1381 & May be rebutted by satisfactory & convincing
1382 evidence.
“Lesion” under Art. 1381 par. 1 & 2, to give rise to
Rsn, must be known or could have been known at Art. 1388: Cr. With axn only v. subsequence
the time of making the K, & not due to circs subseq transferees only when an axn lies v. 1 st
thereto or unknown to the parties. transferee. If 1st Tfee in GF, no liability. If 1 st
Tfee in BF, the rescissible char. Of 2nd alienation
Accion Pauliana: Axn to set aside Ks in fraud of Crs. depends upon how 2nd Tfee acquired the thing.
(Art. 1381 par. 3)
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obs. Is
Requisites for Accion Pauliana: implied in reciprocal ones, in case on of the
obligors should not comply w/ what is incumbent
Pff. Asking for Rsn has a credit prior to alienation,
upon him.
though demandable later
Dr has made a subsequent K conveying a The injured party may choose between the
patrimonial benefit to 3P fulfillment & the rescission of the ds., w/ the
Cr/Pff has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim payment of damages in either case. He may also
Act being impugned is fraudulent seek rescission, even after he has chosen
3P who received prop., if by onerous title, is fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
accomplice in the fraud

367
The ct. shall decree the rescission claimed, W/N Tolentino can compel specific performance.
unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a W/N Tolentino’s liability to pay the P17,000
period. covered by the promissory note subsists.
This is understood to be w/o prejudice to the
rts of third persons who have acquired the thing, in Held: NO. The agreement is a loan agreement,
accordance w/ Arts. 1385 & 1388 & the Mortgage w/c is a reciprocal obligation. In reciprocal
Law. obligations, the obligation or promise of each
party is the consideration for that of the other; &
Art. 1192. In case both parties have committed when one party has performed or is ready &
a breach of the obligation, the liability of the 1 st willing to perform his part of the contract, the
infractor shall be equally tempered bye the cts. If it other party who has not performed or is not
cannot be det. Which of the parties 1st violated the ready & willing to perform incurs in delay. The
K, the same shall be deemed extinguished, & each promise of Tolentino to pay was the
shall bear his own damages. consideration for the obligation of the Bank to
furnish the P80,000. When Tolentino executed a
real estate mortgage, he signified his willingness
to pay the loan. From such date, the obligation of
Tolentino:
the Bank to furnish the P80,000 accrued. The
Similarities between Rsn under Art. 1191 & Art. Bank’s delay started in 1965, lasted for 3 years or
1380+: (1) both presuppose Ks validly entered into when the Monetary Board issued Resolution No.
& existing, & (2) both require mutual restitution 967 in 1968, w/c prohibited the Bank fr. doing
when declared proper. further business. Resolution No. 1049 cannot
interrupt the default of the Bank in releasing the
Differences: (1) Rsn under 1191 may be demanded P63,000 bec. said resolution merely prohibited
only by party to the K, under 1380+ by 3P the Bank fr. making new loans. Since the Bank
prejudiced by the K; (2) Rsn under 1191 may be
denied when there is sufficient reason to justify was in default in fulfilling its reciprocal obligation
extension of time to perform, under 1380+ such under the loan agreement, Tolentino may choose
reason does NOT affect rt. To ask for Rsn; (3) Non- between specific performance or rescission w/
perf. is the only grd. For Rsn under 1191, while damages in either case. But since the Bank is
there are various reasons of equity as grds. under now prohibited fr. doing further business, the
1191 applies only to recip. ds. where one party has Court cannot grant specific performance.
not performed, while under 1380(+) ob. May be Rescission is the only alternative remedy left.
unilateral or reciprocal & even when K has been However, rescission is only for the P63,000
fulfilled.
balance, bec. the bank is in default only insofar
as such amount is concerned.
CENTRAL BANK VS. CA (1985)
The promissory note gave rise to
Tolentino’s reciprocal obligation to pay the
Facts: Islands Savings Bank approved the loan
P17,000 loan when it falls due. Art. 1192 provides
application of Tolentino for P80,000. To secure the
that in case both parties have committed a
loan, Tolentino executed a real estate mortgage on
breach of their reciprocal obligations, the liability
his 100-hectare land. Only P17,000 was released by
of the first infractor shall be equitably tempered
the Bank, for w/c Tolentino executed a promissory
by the Court. The liability of the Bank for
note payable w/in 3 years. The balance was not
damages in not furnishing the entire loan is offset
released. In 1965, the Monetary Board of the
by the liability of Tolentino for damages, in the
Central Bank issued Resolution No. 1049 prohibiting
form of penalties & surcharges for not paying his
the Bank fr. doing business in the Philippines. The
overdue P17,000 debt.
Bank filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage of Tolentino for non-
SIMON VS. ADAMOS
payment of the promissory note for P17,000. In
turn, Tolentino filed an action for injunction, specific
Facts: Porciuncula sold 2 parcels of land to
performance or rescission, alleging that the Bank
Adamos & Feria. Porciuncula’s successors-in-
failed to fulfill its obligation to lend the balance of
interest later sought & obtained the annulment of
P63,000.
the sale & the cancellation of the TCT issued in
favor of Adamos & Feria. However, while this
Issues:
case was pending, Adamos & Feria sold the
368
property to Simon. Because of the failure of Adamos transaction to defraud Arellano who obtained a
& Feria to deliver the titles & possession of the land money judgment against the Dilag children’s
to him, Simon sued them for specific performance & parents. The supposed sellers, Dilag spouses,
won. The execution of this decision was rendered who sold the lot to their children for an
impossible by the previous annulment of the sale. insufficient consideration continued exercising
Hence, Simon filed an action for rescission of sale acts of ownership over Lot 288. Also, in securing
w/ damages. Adamos & Feria claim the fulfillment & the cancellation of the TCT covering Lot 288 in
the rescission of the obligation in reciprocal ones the names of the Dilag spouses, the Dilag
are alternative remedies, & Simon having chosen children had to rely on another deed of absolute
fulfillment in the earlier civil case, she cannot now sale supposedly executed by their parents in
seek rescission. 1981, instead of relying on the first deed of sale
in 1974, an indication that they do not really
Issue: W/N Simon can still rescind the consider the 1974 deed of sale valid & legal.
sale.

Held: Yes. The rule that the injured party can v. Unenforceable Contracts - Arts. 1403-8,
only choose between fulfillment & rescission of the 1317
obligation, & cannot have both, applies when the
obligation is possible of fulfillment. If, as in this
case, the fulfillment has become impossible, Article ART. 1403. The following contracts are
1192 allows the injured party to seek rescission unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
even after he has chosen fulfillment. Therefore, Those entered into in the name of another
Simon can have the contract rescinded. person by one who has been given no authority
or legal representation, or who has acted beyond
DILAG VS. IAC (1987) his powers;
Those that do not comply w/ the Statute of
Facts: Arellano’s son died in a vehicular accident Frauds as set forth in this number. In the
involving a truck owned by the Dilag spouses. In an following cases an agreement hereafter made
action for quasi-delict, Arellano obtained judgment shall be unenforceable by action, unless the
against the spouses. A writ of execution was issued same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be
& a levy was made on Lot 288 registered in the in writing, & subscribed by the party charged, or
name of the spouses. Annotated on the title was an by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the
adverse claim by the Dilag children who allegedly agreement cannot be received w/o the writing, or
bought the same fr. their parents in 1974. a secondary evidence of its contents:
Subsequently, the lot was sold to Arellano. An agreement that by its terms is not to be
However, before the corresponding certificate of performed w/in a year fr. the making thereof;
sale could be issued, the Dilag spouses again sold A special promise to answer for the debt,
the same Lot 288 to their children, who filed an default, or miscarriage of another;
action for the annulment of the decision in the An agreement made in consideration of
quasi-delict case, alleging that the levy on execution marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;
on Lot 288 was illegal since it was made on An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels,
property no longer owned by the Dilag spouses as or things in action, at a price not less than five
judgment debtors. hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept & receive
part of such goods & chattels, or the evidences,
Issue: W/N the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in or some of them, of such things in action, or pay
1974 by the Dilag spouses in favor of their children at the time some part of the purchase money;
is a simulated or fictitious sale. but when a sale is made by auction & entry is
made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the
Held: Yes. At the time the levy on execution was time of the sale, of the amount & kind of
made, the Dilag spouses were still the registered property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the
owners of Lot 288. On the other hand, the title in purchasers & person on whose account the sale
the name of the Dilag children was issued several is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;
days ahead of the deed of sale dated August 26, An agreement for the leasing for a longer
1981. Clearly, the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of period than one year, or for the sale of real
the Dilag children executed in 1974 (after the filing property or of an interest therein;
of the civil case) was a simulated & fictitious
369
A representation as to the credit of a third Q: Why should loan be in writing for antichresis
to be in writing?
person.
A: Antichresis takes a long time. Loan is valid if
Those where both parties are incapable of not in writing but antichresis not
giving consent to a contract.
 Donation propter nuptias: rules on ordinary
ART. 1404. Unauthorized contracts are donations would apply.
governed by Article 1317 & the principles of agency
in Title X of this Book. Q: Buyer & seller orally agreed for Seller to sell
land. Buyer sold palay & w/ the money fr. this
ART. 1405. Contracts infringing the Statute of sale Buyer gave to Seller. Seller refused.
A: Seller can refuse. He did not receive any
Frauds, referred to in No. 2, of Article 1403, are
benefit yet.
ratified by the failure to object to the presentation
of oral evidence to prove the same, or by the Q: X saw an advertisement for the sale of a car
acceptance of benefits under them. for P200T. X phoned Y & the latter noted the
order. Y failed to deliver the car. Can X enforce
ART. 1406. When a contract is enforceable the obligation?
under the Statute of Frauds, & a public document is A: Sale of movable > P500 should be in writing
necessary for its registration in the Registry of under the Statute of Frauds or else
Deeds, the parties may avail themselves of the right unenforceable.
under Article 1357. BUBBLES  If person promises to lend money to
another, then refuses to lend, no cause of action.
ART. 1407. In a contract where both parties are If a bank does it, enforceable.
incapable of giving consent, express or implied
ratification by the parent, or guardian, as the case Dilag vs. IAC Badges of fraud:
may be, of one of the contracting parties shall give whether sale to children was paid
the contract the same effect as if only one of them not registered until after decision in the quasi-
were incapacitated. delict case
parents continued to exercise acts of ownership
over land
If ratification is made by the parents or relationship between vendor & vendee.
guardians, as the case may be, of both contracting
parties, the contract shall be validated fr. the BUBBLES  This does not fall squarely under the
inception. presumption of fraud bec. there was a sale
before judgment in 1974. If sale was after,
ART. 1408. Unenforceable contracts cannot be presumed to be fraudulent.
assailed by third persons.
Q: X proposed to buy Y’s house & lot. X paid the
P100T then constituted a chattel mortgage on Y’s
ART. 1317 No one may contract in the name of
house & lot for the unpaid balance. Art. 1484 CC:
another w/o being authorized by the latter, or law gives seller the choice of remedies.
unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of A: Y cannot choose to rescind bec. alternative
another by one who has no authority or legal remedy of foreclosure is available.
representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified,
expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose TOLENTINO NOTES:
behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by
the other contracting party.
Purpose of the Statute of Frauds: To
prevent fraud & perjury in the enforcement of
obligations depending for their evidence upon the
BAVIERA NOTES: unassisted memory of witnesses by requiring
certain enumerated contracts & transactions to
Q: Authority to sell oral but sale is in writing be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to
A: Void. be charged.

Q: Authority to sell in writing but sale of land is not Statute Of Frauds


A: Unenforceable under Statute of Frauds.

370
simply provides for the manner in w/c contracts
under it shall be proved
such contracts are valid but effect of noncompliance
w/ the SOF is simply that no action can be proved VI. VOID OR INEXISTENT CONTRACTS
unless the requirement is complied w/
not applicable to contracts either totally or partially
performed but only to executory contracts
neither applicable to actions w/c are neither for Art. 1409 The following contracts are
specific performance of the contract nor for the inexistent or void fr. the beginning:
violation thereof
partial performance must be duly proved Those whose cause, object or purpose is
contract under SOF cannot be proved w/o the contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
writing or a memorandum thereof
order or public policy;
“note or memorandum” Those w/c are absolutely simulated or
fictitious;
evidence of the agreement used to show the Those whose cause or object did not exist at
intention of the parties the time of the transaction;
may consist of any kind of writing, fr. a solemn Those whose object is outside the commerce
deed to a mere hasty note or memorandum in of man;
books & papers, may be in ink or in pencil, typed or Those w/c contemplate an impossible
printed service;
meets requirements of Statute of Frauds if it
Those where the intention of the parties
contains:
names of the parties relative to the principal object of the contract
terms & conditions of the agreement cannot be ascertained;
a description of the subject matter sufficient to Those expressly prohibited or declared void
render it capable of identification by law.
date & place of the making of the agreement These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither
signature of the party assuming the obligation can the right to set up the defense of illegality be
waived.
 Where there is a sale of a number of articles w/c
separately do not have a price of P500 each but w/c
in their aggregate have a total price exceeding Art. 1410. The action or defense for the
P500, the operation of the SOF depends upon declaration of the inexistence of a contract does
whether there is a single inseparable contract or a not prescribe.
several one. If the contract is entire or inseparable,
SOF applies. If separable, then each article is taken Art. 1411. When the nullity proceeds fr. the
separately, & the application of the SOF depends illegality of the cause or object of the contract, &
upon its price. the act constitutes a criminal offense, both
parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
 oral evidence to prove a consummated sale of
action against each other, & both shall be
real property - allowed by the Statute of Frauds
prosecuted. Moreover the provisions of the Penal
 “representation as to credit of a third person” - Code relative to the disposal of the effects or
limited to those w/c operate to induce the person to instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the
whom they are made to enter into contractual things or the price of the contract.
relations w/ the 3rd person, but NOT to those This rule shall be applicable only
representations tending to induce action for the when one of the parties are guilty; but the
benefit of the person making them. innocent one may claim what he has given, &
shall not be bound to comply w/ his promise.
 An oral contract for a supplemental lease of
property for a period longer than 1 year - also w/in
SOF. An agreement to enter into an agreement is Art. 1412. If the act in w/c the unlawful or
also w/in the SOF & the promise is not enforceable forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
unless the statute is satisfied. criminal offense, the following rules shall be
observed:
Defense of the Statute of Frauds 
personal to the party to the agreement When the fault is on the part of both
like minority, fraud, mistake, & similar defenses w/c contracting parties, neither may recover what he
may be asserted or waived by the party affected
cannot be set up by strangers to the agreement

371
has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the Art. 1420. In case of divisible contract, if the
performance of the other’s undertaking; illegal terms can be separated fr. the legal ones,
When only one of them is at fault, he cannot the latter may be enforced.
recover what he has given by reason of the
contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been Art. 1421. The defense of illegality of
promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may contracts is not available to third persons whose
demand the return of what he has given w/o any interests are not directly affected.
obligation to comply w/ his promise.
Art. 1422. A contract w/c is the direct result
Art. 1413. Interest paid in excess of the of a previous illegal contract, is also void &
interest allowed by the usury laws may be inexistent.
recovered by the debtor, w/ interest thereon fr. the
date of payment.
RODRIGUEZ VS. RODRIGUEZ JULY 31,
Art. 1414. When money is paid or property 1967
delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may be
repudiated by one of the parties before the purpose Facts: Plaintiff was a widow who owned a
has been accomplished, or before any damage has fishpond. Subsequently, she married Domingo
been caused to a third person. In such case, the Rodriguez, a widower, whose children fr. the first
courts may, if the public interest will thus be marriage are defendants in this case. During the
subserved, allow the party repudiating the contract marriage, she transferred title to the above
to recover the money or property. property to her daughter, fr. her first marriage,
who in turn sold the same to the couple. Both
Art. 1415. Where one of the parties to an transfers were evidenced by a deed of sale.
illegal contract is incapable of giving consent, the Apparently, it was a scheme devised to go
courts may, if the interest of justice so demands, around the prohibition on marital donations.
allow recovery of money or property delivered by Plaintiff’s husband then died intestate. As a
the incapacitated person. result of an extrajudicial settlement of his estate,
the fishpond’s ownership was divided into two:
Art. 1416. When the agreement is not illegal 1/2 in favor of the wife as her conjugal share, &
per se but is merely prohibited & the prohibition by 1/2 to the defendants. The heirs then granted a
the law is designed for the protection of the lifetime usufruct to the plaintiff over their 1/2
plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby share, w/c in effect made her in charge of the
enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered. entire property once again. After a few years,
relations became strained so the heirs decided to
Art. 1417. When the price of any article or terminate the lifetime usufruct. Plaintiff brings
commodity is determined by statute or by authority this action alleging that the deed of transfer of
of law, any person paying any amount in excess of conjugal partnership was null & void bec. the
the maximum price allowed may recover such deceased husband had employed duress & the
excess. two transfers as abovestated were w/o
consideration & simulated.
Art. 1418. When the law fixes, or authorizes
the fixing of the maximum number of hours of Issue: WON transfers were void
labor, & a contract is entered into whereby a
laborer undertakes to work longer than the Held: Duress is merely a vice or defect of
maximum thus fixed, he may demand additional consent & action based upon it must be brought
compensation for service rendered beyond the time w/in 4 years fr. cessation. Present action was
limit. brought 21 years after intimidation & 9 years
after the death of the perpetrator of the alleged
Art. 1419. When the law sets or authorizes the duress. Contract is not simulated. A simulated
setting of minimum wage for laborers, & a contract contract is a fictitious one, where said contract is
is agreed upon by w/c a laborer accepts a lower not intended or desired to produce any legal
wage, he shall be entitled to recover the deficiency. effect, e.g. where a debtor wishes to place his
properties beyond his creditors reach, transfers it
to his mother yet in actuality he maintains

372
ownership. In CAB, it is clear that the plaintiff by Garan in favor of Menil, but this time it was
intended to transfer the title of said fishpond to the made & registered beyond the 5-year prohibitive
conjugal partnership & said contracts or deeds of period. A new TCT was then issued in favor of
sale were the means to achieve said desired result. Menil. A few years later, a dispute arose as to
Fact that said contracts were used to circumvent a who the actual owner of the land was. The
specific legal prohibition (donations between conflict mainly centered on whether the two
spouses) does not make the contract simulated. deeds above were valid & binding.
Pltff is also barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto,
since she herself became part of a contract whose Issue: WON subsequent registration of the deed
cause was illegal. She cannot now bring an action of sale
to recover the same. beyond the 5-year prohibitive period made the
sale valid.
BASIC BOOKS VS. LOPEZ & KINTANAR FEB.
28, 1966 Held: No. Sale was void & illegal having been
made w/in the said 5-year prohibitive period. The
Facts: For failure to account for books received on law does not make any distinction as between
consignment fr. BBI, Lopez was charged w/ estafa. executory sales & consummated sales. To allow
Subsequently, an agreement was made between such a distinction is to put asunder the purpose
BBI, Lopez & a certain Kintanar whereby it was of the prohibition : to preserve its ownership for 5
stipulated that Lopez would pay the debt in 15 years w/ the beneficiary an his family. To give
monthly installments, that Kintanar would be jointly validity to petitioner’s (Menil) contention
& severally liable w/ Lopez for the full amount of contract of sale was a valid executory contract is
the debt, that default in payment for two months to open the door wide open to fraudulent
would result in the debt becoming due & subterfuge & schemes that would effectively
demandable, & that BBI would petition the court to render useless the entire homestead concept.
dismiss the criminal case once Lopez & Kintanar put Neither may it be claimed that there are two
up a surety bond. No payment was made. BBI contracts: the first one void & the second one
brought action to recover amount fr. L & K. K valid since such was made beyond the prohibitive
denies liability on the ground that contract was void period. There is only one contract , the second
bec. it was based on an illegal consideration, w/c one merely a confirmatory deed of sale of the
was to stifle Lopez’ prosecution for estafa. first one, Since the first one was clearly
prohibited by law, it cannot be confirmed nor
Issue: WON contract was void for being contrary ratified.
to public policy
BAVIERA: Doctrine of Pari Delictu was not
Held: NO. Kintanar’s obligation under the applied in this case for to do so would be
agreement was not based on an illegal nugatory to the declared public policy of
consideration. Cause is “ the essential reason w/c the law of giving land to the landless.
moves the contracting parties to enter into it”. It is
the immediate, direct & proximate reason w/c
justifies the creation of an obligation through the UNITED GENERAL INDUSTRIES V. PALER
will of the contracting parties. The cause of the 112 SCRA 404
agreement in the CAB would be the existing
account of Lopez w/ BBI. For Kintanar, it was mere Facts: Paler bought a TV set fr. Plaintiff United
liberality or gratuitousness on his part that moved General Industries securing the same w/ a chattel
him to oblige severally w/ Lopez. Though it may be mortgage over the TV. Paler violated the terms of
inferred that Kintanar’s motive was to help save the CM., thus United filed a criminal action for
Lopez fr. the criminal case, motives are different fr. estafa. The same case was however settled
the cause thereof. extrajudicially, when Paler & De la Rama
executed a promissory note in favor of United.
MENIL V. CABRAL, 84 SCRA 413 Notw/standing, the defendants failed to pay the
same. In a suit filed by United based on the PN,
Facts: Garan, a holder of a homestead patent, sold defendants denied their liability by raising as a
the same w/in the 5-year prohibitive period, to defense the illegality of the cause (of the PN )
Menil. It was evidenced by a deed of sale w/c they w/c was the abatement of criminal prosecution.
didn’t register. Another deed of sale was executed
373
the exchange void or inexistent. ( Art. 1378. 2 nd
Issue: WON the agreement to settle the criminal par, Art. 1409, 6th par.)
case is valid.
Several paragraphs in the agreement are
Held: No. However, Paler alone is still liable to pay irreconcilable. One par, contemplates that the
United. properties are still to be awarded while another
stipulation presumes that the parties already
An agreement to stifle the prosecution of a have control of the same properties referred to in
crime is manifestly contrary to public policy & the first one. Also, the court decide that this
administration of justice & may never be enforced in rescissory action may be treated as an action to
a court of law. There can be no recovery on the PN declare void the deed of exchange, hence
for such is vitiated by the illegality of the cause. defense of prescription does not lie.

There can be no recovery against Jose de la NOTES: Intention of parties relative to principal
Rama who incidentally appears to be an object of contract cannot be ascertained.
accommodation signer only of the PN w/c is vitiated
by the illegality of the cause.
CABRAL V. CA, 130 SCRA, 498
Paler, on the other hand, is still liable since his
obligation is independent of the assailed PN. To Facts: The San Diegos sold a parcel of land
deny his liability would be tantamount to unjust (1/6) to the Cabrals on Aug. 14, 1948. However,
enrichment at the expense of another. the SD's claim that the deed of sale was
fabricated. A criminal action for \falsification was
filed in court. It was dismissed on the ground of
BAVIERA: prescription bec. the information was filed only
United is different fr. Basic Books. In Basic Books, on Sept, 24, 1974.
the cause was not the dismissal of the crim.
Complaint, but rather was merely a particular On May 2, 1974, or 25 years later, SD spouses
motive. Here, the cause was exactly that, the filed an action to nullify the title of the Cabrals on
dismissal of a criminal complaint. Basis? In Basic the theory that the sale was falsified. This case
Books, the case was not extrajudicially settled; it was dismissed by TC on the ground of res
was not dismissed despite agreement. In United,
the case was dismissed in view of the agreement. judicata bec. the order of dismissal in the criminal
case bars the present civil case. On appeal, the
CA reversed. Cabrals appeal to the SC, raising the
MARIN V. ADIL, 130 SCRA 406 defenses of prescription & res judicata.

Facts: There were two sets of cousins, one residing Issue: WON the cause of action of the SD’ is
in Gen,. Santos & the other in Iloilo. In anticipation imprescriptible.
of their hereditary rights over certain properties,
they executed a deed of exchange w/ quitclaim. In Held: Yes. The action of the SD’s being one to
said agreement, the group residing in Gen. Santos declare the inexistence of a contract (deed of
would transfer any property located in Iloilo, w/c sale), the same does not prescribe.
they would eventually inherit, in favor of their
cousins in Iloilo & vice versa. A number of disputes The order of dismissal in the crim. complaint
arose between & among the cousins w/c eventually cannot be considered as res judicata as to bar
led to the filing of this rescissory action on the said the civil action of PR against the Cabrals.
deed of exchange.

Issue: WON the deed of exchange is void or YANAS V. ACAYLAR


inexistent.
FACTS: Yanas had been occupying a piece of
Held: Deed is void or inexistent. land since 1926. It was subsequently awarded to
him by a judicial decree in June 1954. On Dec
The DoE was invalid. The intention of the parties 1954, Acaylar was able to have the land
relative to the lots to be exchanged cannot transferred in his name. Such a transfer was
definitely be ascertained. This circumstance renders premised on an alleged deed of sale executed in
374
1950, w/c Yanas had supposedly thumbmarked, lots, paying realty taxes thereon, & appropriating
being illiterate. all the fruits produced & other income of said
lots.
Yanas seeks the declaration of inexistence of the
deed of sale alleging that the document he Less than a year later, Dizon offered to
thumbmarked for Acaylar was a deed of reimburse Gaborro of what he paid to the banks
acknowledgment of his debt. & demanded an accounting of the income of the
property, contending that the transaction they
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract is void & entered into was one of antichresis. Dizon
inexistent. Yes! contended that their real agreement was not an
absolute sale but merely an equitable mortgage
HELD: or conveyance by way of security for the
Several badges of fraud & fictitiousness were reimbursement by Dizon to Gaborro of what the
present: latter may have paid on account of the mortgage
Deed of Sale was in English when the vendor is debts.
illiterate;
Wife of vendor did not join in the sale; ISSUE: Whether or not the contract entered
Inadequacy of the price; into by Dizon & Gaborro is an absolute sale. NO!
Notarization was made the following day, & not on
the same moment when the sale was Held: The “Deed of Sale w/ Assumption of
consummated; Mortgage” cannot be legally considered a real &
Failure to state boundaries; unconditional sale of the parcels of land. Firstly,
Governor approved the sale 2 years later; there was absolutely no money consideration
Sale was registered 3 years after. therefor. The stipulated sum of P131,831.91
mentioned in the document as the consideration
Defense of prescription w/o merit, since an was not actually paid. Secondly, the properties
action to declare void & inexistent a contract does had already been previously sold by the sheriff to
not prescribe under Art. 1410. DBP at the foreclosure sale, thereby divesting
Dizon of his full right as owner thereof to dispose
& sell the lands.
ART. 1307. Innominate contracts shall be
regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the The true intention of the parties is that
provisions of Titles I & II of this Book (Obligations & Gaborro would assume & pay the indebtedness of
Contracts), by the rules governing the most Dizon to DBP & PNB, & in consideration therefor,
analogous nominate contracts, & by the customs of Gaborro was given the possession, enjoyment &
the place. use of the lands until Dizon can reimburse fully
Gaborro for the amount paid by the latter to DBP
& PNB.
DIZON V. GABORRO
Agreement between the 2 is one of those
innominate contracts under Art. 1307, whereby
FACTS: Dizon is the owner of 3 parcels of land,
Dizon & Gaborro agreed “to give & to do” certain
w/c were subject to a 1st mortgage lien in favor of
rights & obligations respecting the lands & the
DBP & a 2nd mortgage lien in favor of PNB. Having
mortgage debts of Dizon, but partaking of the
defaulted in the payment of his debt, DBP
nature of antichresis insofar as the principal
foreclosed the mortgage. A corresponding
parties, Dizon & Gaborro, are concerned.
“Certificate of Sale” was executed in favor of the
said bank.
The instrument must, therefore, be reformed
in accordance w/ the intention & legal rights &
Subsequently, Dizon & Gaborro executed a
obligations of the parties – Dizon, Gaborro & the
“Deed of Sale w/ Assumption of Mortgage” covering
banks.
Dizon’s. As stated in the Deed, Gaborro assumed
the entire mortgage indebtedness of Dizon, in
return for the transfer of such lots in his name.
Gaborro then has been in actual possession of the 3 BAVIERA: This does not come squarely
parcels of land. He has been actually cultivating the under an innominate contract that is

375
analogous to a contract of antichresis. It to Pf, leaving only the right of usufruct to his
simply is a usufruct in return for the children.
assumption of the mortgage.
As it appears that while Ds refuse to deliver
the land, they also acknowledge that they hold
the property not as their own but in trust for the
Pf. Given the fiduciary relation w/c according to
TRUSTS
the complaint is recognized by Ds, the latter may
not invoke the statute of limitations as a bar to
Pf's action.
I. EXPRESS TRUSTS

II. RESULTING OR IMPLIED trust.


Art.1444. No particular words are required for
the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient
that a trust is clearly intended.
Art.1447. The enumeration of the following
cases of implied trust does not exclude others
Art.1445. No trust shall fail bec. the trustee
established by the general law of trust, but the
appointed declines the designation, unless the
limitation laid down in article 1442 shall be
contrary should appear in the instrument
applicable.
constituting the trust.
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when
Art.1446. Acceptance by the beneficiary is
property is sold, & the legal estate is granted to
necessary. Nevertheless, if the trust imposes no
one party but the price is paid by another for the
onerous condition upon the beneficiary, his
purpose of having the beneficial interest of the
acceptance shall be presumed, if there is no proof
property. The former is the trustee while the
to the contrary.
latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to
whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate
or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the
JULIO V. DALANDAN sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably
presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
Facts: Victoriana had a daughter, herein Pf. It
appeared that Victoriana owned a parcel of riceland Art.1449. There is also an implied trust
w/c was posted as security by Clemente for an when donation is made to a person but it appears
obligation. Since Clemente failed to fulfill said that although the legal estate is transmitted to
obligation, the riceland was foreclosed. Because of the dense, he nevertheless is either to have no
this, Clemente executed a document wherein he beneficial interest or only a part thereof.
promised Pf that he would replace the land
foreclosed w/ another w/c consists of 4 hectares. Art.1450. If the price of a property is
But he expressed that Pf should not evict his loaned or paid by one person for the benefit of
children fr. the land & neither may she force them another & the conveyance is made to the lender
to give up the harvests. or payor to secure the payment of the debt, trust
After Clemente's death, Pf failed this action for arises by operation of the law in favor of the
reconveyance against his children herein Ds. The person to whom the money is loaned or for
lower court dismissed the case on the ground that it whom it is paid. The latter may redeem the
has prescribed. property & compel conveyance thereof to him.

Issue: Whether or not a trust was constituted? Art.1451. When the land passes by
succession of any person & he causes the legal
HELD :Yes. A reading of the document would show title to be put in the name of the other, a trust is
that the Ds are merely usufructuaries for an established by implication of law for the benefit of
undetermined length of time. For so long as that the true owner.
period has not been fixed & has not elapsed, they
hold the property in trust for Pf. It is clear that by Art. 1452. If two or more persons agree to
the deed. Clemente has divested himself of the purchase property & by common consent the
ownership of the land & transferred said ownership legal title is taken in the name of one of them for
376
the benefit of all, a trust is crested by force of law matters indicative of such intent, then the trust is
in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of implied. In the case at bar H has expressed such
each. intent to create a trust.

Art. 1453. When property is conveyed to a


person in reliance upon his declared intention to DE BUENCAMINO V. MATIAS
hold if for, or transfer it to another or the grantor,
there is an implied trust in favor of the person Facts: Hilaria & Fulgencio had a son , Luis, who
whose benefit is contemplated. was married to Maria. But he kept a mistress w/
whom he begot five children. H & F believing that
Art. 1454. If an absolute conveyance of should their properties pass to L, that he would
property is made in order to secure the give them to his illegitimate children, disposed
performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the properties to one of L's legitimate children,
the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. Teodora & her husband. But after the death of H
If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the & F, Teodora excluded her own mother &
grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the brothers & sisters fr. said land. They thus filed an
reconveyance of the property to him. action to recover said properties. The lower court
ruled for them so Teodora filed this appeal
Art. 1457. An implied trust may be proved by contending that the action is barred by extinctive
oral evidence. prescription.

Issue: Whether or not there was an implied


trust?
CUAYCONG V. CUAYCONG

Facts: Hacienda Bacayan was owned by the HELD: The contention that the action for
reconveyance, w/c was brought 17 years after
CPG of Eduardo & his wife. E's desire was to divide
the execution of the disputed document, was
said hacienda among his bros. & sisters. He asked
barred by prescription, cannot be sustained. The
them to pay his wife's share but they were unable
execution of the deed & the consequent
to do so through stealth & strategy, herein Ds were
registration of the lands in the name of Teodora
able to buy the hacienda. So what H did was to tell
& her husband created an implied trust in favor
the Ds to hold in the trust what might belong to his
of Teodora's brothers & sisters. And while implied
bros. & sisters as a result of the arrangement &
or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years,
deliver to them said shares when the time comes.
the rule does not apply where a fiduciary relation
When H died, his bros. & sisters (Pfs) filed an action
exists & the trustee recognizes the trust.
to recover their shares against Ds.
Continuous recognition of a resulting trust
Issue: Whether the trust is express or implied?
precludes any defense of laches in a suit to
declare & enforce the trust. As it does not appear
HELD: The trust created herein is an express one,
when Teodora repudiated the existence of the
& since it involves real properties, it may not be
fiduciary relations between her & her brothers &
proved by parole evidence.
sisters, the same shall be taken to have been
made only upon the filing of her answer to the
The Civil Code defines an express trust as
complaint. The action, therefore, has not yet
one created by the intention of the trustor or of the
prescribed.
parties, & an implied trust as one that comes into
being by operation of law. Express trusts are those
created by the direct & positive acts of the parties,
ESCAY V. COURT OF APPEALS
by some writing or deed or will or by words
evidencing an intention to create the trust. On the
other hand, implied trusts are those w/c, w/o being Facts: Emilio & Jose Escay are brothers. During
his lifetime, Emilio procured a loan fr. PNB for w/c
express, are deducible fr. the nature of the
he mortgaged his properties. He died w/o paying
transaction by operation of laws as matters of
his debt so PNB moved to foreclose said
equity, independently of the particular intention of
mortgaged. Pending such suit, Jose agreed to
the parties. Thus, if the intention to establish a trust
assume Emilio's indebtedness in consideration of
is clear, the trust is express; if the intent to so
the said properties, but gave the widow of Emilio
establish is to be taken fr. circumstances or other
the right to repurchase the same w/in five years.
377
However, later widow filed an action to recover the
ownership & possession of the said land on the
theory that an implied trust was created between MIGUEL V. COURT OF APPEALS
her & Jose. Later, on MFR, she changed her theory,
stating that the trust was an express one. Facts: Elloy has been in possession of the land
subject of the controversy since 1894. His lawyer
Issue: Whether or not there was an express trust? was able to secure a homestead patent over the
parcel of land & registered the same in the name
HELD: Settled is the rule that is partly may not of his wife. Eloy filed an action for reconveyance.
change his theory on appeal. It is very clear that the
contract executed was one of assumption of Issue: Whether or not there is a constructive
mortgage indebtedness, the consideration being the trust?
transfer of ownership of subject properties in favor
of Jose Escay. The widow, therefore, cannot recover HELD: Ps have proven by preponderance of
said properties. evidence the fraud perpetrated by PR & her
husband. This makes the action clearly for the
Assuming that said trust exists, such trust enforcement of a constructive trust, the ultimate
was not an express one. Since an implied trust object is for the reconveyance of property lost
prescribes in ten years, the present action has through breach of fiduciary relations &/or fraud.
already prescribed having been filed long after the Therefore, it can be filed w/in the four years fr.
execution of the contract. the discovery of the fraud. The fraud was
discovered in 1950, & this action was
In any case, even if it were an express trust, commenced in 1953, hence, not time-barred.
since it involves immovable properties, it cannot be
proved by parole evidence, & actions based on
express trust also prescribe & the property held in DIAZ V. GORRICHO
trust may be acquired by adverse possession fr. the
moment the trust is repudiated by the trustee. Facts: Francisco died leaving his wife & 3
Therefore, the defense of extinctive & acquisitive children. He left two parcels of land. Now, a
prescription is available to Jose. judgment was rendered against W & a WoE was
issued & her share in these two lots were levied
upon. The judgment creditor was the successful
III. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS bidder & a final deed of sale was executed in her
favor for, the whole parcels of land, instead of
W's share only. Fifteen years later, W's children
Art. 1455. When a trustee, guardian or other filed this action to compel the creditor to execute
person holding a fiduciary relationship uses trust a deed of conveyance over the half-interest
funds for the purchase of property & causes the belonging to them on the ground that a
conveyance to be made to him or to a third person, constructive trust arose when she took advantage
a trust is established by operation of law in favor of of the mistake of sheriff. The lower court
the person to whom the funds belong. dismissed the case on the ground that it has
prescribed.
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force Issue: Whether cause of action is barred?
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the person fr. whom the property HELD: Affirmed. Constructive trust may be
comes. barred by laches unlike an express one thus, they
can no longer lay claim on the half of the land.
Art. 1807. Every partner must account to the
partnership for any benefit, & hold as trustee for it There is a distinction between express
any profits derived by him w/o the consent of the trusts created by the intention of the parties, &
other partners fr. any transaction connected w/ the the implied or constructive trusts that are
formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership exclusively created by law, the latter not being
or fr. any use by him of its property.(n) trusts in their technical sense. The express trusts
disable the trustee fr. acquiring for his own
benefit the property committed to his
378
management or custody, at least while he does not reconveyance against C on the ground that prior
openly repudiate the trust, & makes known his to J's death, J requested C to purchase Pulong
repudiation to the beneficiary or cestui que trust. Maulap & to register the same in his (C's) name.
But in constructive trusts, the rule is that laches After J's death, C suppressed all information on
constitutes a bar to actions to enforce the trust, & this trust agreement.
repudiation is not required, unless there is a
concealment of the facts giving rise to the trust. Issue: Whether there was an implied trust?

Time runs fr. the moment that the law HELD: A constructive trust under Art. 1450
creates the trust, w/c is the time when the cause of exists between J & C. Art 1450 presupposes a
action arises. situation where a person, using his own funds,
The reason for the difference in treatment is purchases a certain piece of land in behalf of
obvious. In express trust, the delay of the another who, in the meantime, may not have
beneficiary is directly attributable to the trustee who sufficient funds to purchase the land. The
undertakes to hold the property for the former, or property is then transferred in the name of the
who is linked to the beneficiary by confidential or trustee, the person who paid for the land, until
fiduciary relations. The trustee's possession is, he is reimbursed by the beneficiary, the person
therefore, not adverse to the beneficiary, until & for whom the land is purchased. It is only after
unless the latter is made aware of a repudiation. the beneficiary reimburses the trustee of the
But in constructive trusts, there in neither a promise purchase price that the former can compel
nor a fiduciary relation, the so-called trustee does conveyance of the purchased property fr. the
not recognize any trust & has no intent to hold for latter.
the beneficiary. Therefore, the latter is not justified
in delaying the action to recover his property. It is Based on the evidence before the trial
his fault if he delays, hence, he may be estopped by court. C purchased the property in behalf of J.
his owned laches. Consequently, C is estopped fr. claiming that he
bought Pulong Maulap for himself. Not merely in
ASUNCION V. PINEDA trust for the late J. However, J's widow cannot
as yet redeem & compel conveyance of the
Facts: Filemonowned 3.5 hectares of land. To property for C must first be reimbursed for the
expedite Macario's application for a homestead advances he made on the disputed property,
patent, Filemon agreed to consolidate the such reimbursement being a condition sine qua
possession & cultivation of their respective lands in non for compelling conveyance under Art. 1450.
the name of Macario. The heirs of Filemon filed this
action for reconveyance against the heirs of The period w/in w/c to compel
Macario, alleging that an implied trust was created conveyance is not imprescriptible. The rule is well
between the two. settled that an action for reconveyance based on
the implied trust prescribes in ten years. But in
Issue: Whether or not action for reconveyance for the case at bar, since C did not repudiate the
enforcement of the trust is subject to prescription? trust, the prescriptive period is not deemed to
have commenced until after C excluded Pulong
HELD: An action for reconveyance for the Maulap fr. the inventory of J's properties since it
enforcement of an implied trust is subject to is fr. that time that C is deemed to have
prescription under Art. 496. In the case at bar, the repudiated the trust.
OCT was issued in the name of Macario in 1917, or
almost 60 years before the filing of this complaint.
Even if the case here is one of express trust, since it SPECIAL CONTRACTS
involves real property it cannot be proved by parole
evidence.
SALES
NAKPIL V. IAC

Facts: Jose & Charlie were best friends. C


Art. 1505. Subject to the provisions of this
became the lawyer, accountant & auditor & financial
Title, where goods are sold by a person who is
consultant of J. However, J died & since then things
not the owner thereof, & who does not sell them
have changed. J's widow filed an action for
379
under authority or w/ the consent of the owner, the Should there be no inscription, the ownership
buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his first in the possession; &, in the absence thereof,
conduct precluded fr. denying the seller’s authority to the person who presents the oldest title,
to sell. provided there is good faith.

Nothing in this Title, however, shall affect:


The provisions of any factors’ act, recording Notes:
laws, or any other provision of law enabling the According to the SC, the 2nd & 3rd paragraphs of
apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if Art. 1544 do not apply to unregistered land.
he were the true owner thereof; The “title” referred to in the 3rd paragraph does
The validity of any contract of sale under not refer to ownership bec. ownership only
statutory power of sale or under the order of a passes upon delivery; this refers to the oldest
document.
court of competent jurisdiction;
Purchases made in a merchant’s store, or in
fairs, or markets, in accordance w/ the Code of
CARBONELL VS. CA
Commerce & special laws.
Facts: Carbonell, Poncio, & Infante were
Notes: neighbors in San Juan. Both Carbonell & Infante
Art. 1505, 1st par. states the general rule. The
offered to buy Poncio’s lot. Poncio offered it to
exceptions are:
Estoppel by conduct of vendor Carbonell & the latter accepted. However, when
Art. 1505, number 1. the day of the signing of the deed of sale arrived,
Art. 1505, number 2. Poncio informed Carbonell that he is no longer
Art. 1505, number 3. selling the land to her since Infante gave a better
Land Registration Act – protects buyers of offer. Carbonell registered her adverse claim, so
immovable property by requiring them to buy it fr. that when a TCT was issued to Infante,
registered owners only. Carbonell’s adverse claim was annotated thereon.
Art. 559 embodies the rule on caveat emptor – the
Carbonell then filed this case for the annulment
owner of lost or unlawfully deprived movable
property can recover them even against innocent of the sale to Infante.
purchasers for value
Issue: Who has better right to the land?

Held: Carbonell has the better right. To merit


Art. 1506. Where the seller of goods has a
the protection of Art. 1544, it is essential that the
voidable title thereto, but his title has not been
buyer of the realty must act in good faith in
avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a
registering his deed of sale. Here, when
good title to the goods, provided he buys them in
Carbonell bought the lot fr. Poncio, she was in
good faith, for value, & w/o notice of the seller’s
good faith, & this good faith subsisted when she
defect of title.
recorded her adverse claim prior to Infante’s
registration.
: Munoz-Palma, dissenting: When Carbonell
Baviera sez that Arts. 1505(3) & 1506 refer to registered her adverse claim, she had already
innocent purchasers for value. been told about the sale to Infante & had seen
the wall that Infante built, & she had no
registerable document of sale at the time.
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been
sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be Note: Baviera disagreed w/ the majority
transferred to the person who may have first taken decision in this case.
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
BERICO VS. CA
Should it be immovable property, the ownership
shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good Facts: In 1961, delos Santos sold a parcel of
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. land to PRs Flores & Bareja. In 1963, delos
Santos sold the same parcel of land to petitioner
380
Berico, who was aware of the prior sale to PRs. were sold at public auction but there remained a
Despite such knowledge, Berico caused the balance of P10T for w/c SM obtained an alias
registration of the deeds of sale in his favor in 1968. WoE. The sheriff levied on T's certain real prop.
It was only in 1978 that PRs tried to register their To prevent such sale, T brought this suit.
deeds of sale. They then filed an action for
annulment of title. The LC ruled in PR’s favor. Issue: WON SM is precluded fr. levying on the
real prop of T to recover the deficiency.
Held: Affirmed. The rights conferred by Art. 1544,
NCC upon one of the two purchases of the same Held: NO. T's contention that 1484(3) is
real property who has registered his title in the untenable bec there has been no foreclosure of
registry of deeds do not come into being if the the CM nor a foreclosure sale. The prohibition vs.
registration is not made in good faith. Otherwise further collection does not apply. It is true that
stated, in order that a purchaser of realty may merit there was CM on the goods sold. But SM elected
the protection of Art. 1544(2), the said purchaser to sue on the PN exclusively. It had the rt. to
must act in good faith in registering his deed of select among the 3 remedies established in 1484.
sale. Good faith is the fundamental premise of the In choosing to sue on the PN, it was not thereby
preferential rights established in the said article. limited to the proceeds of the sale on execution
Hence, mere registration is not enough; good faith of the mortgaged goods.
must concur w/ it.
Baviera: Will the ruling in this case not
Since Berico was in bad faith when he circumvent the prohibition vs. recovery of
registered the land, the registration of the deed of deficiency in case of sale of mortgaged
sale was ineffectual & vested upon him no property?
preferential rights to the property in derogation of NO bec if the creditor files a personal
the rights of the PRs. Accordingly, since it has been action, he waives the lien on the CM.
proven that the PRs were the anterior possessors in Debtor can then dispose the property
good faith, ownership of the questioned land vested pending the litigation.
in them in accordance of Art. 1544(3).

CRUZ V FILIPINAS INVESTMENT


Art. 1484. In a contract of sale of personal
property the price of w/c is payable in installments, Facts: C purchased on installments fr. FEMC one
the vendor may exercise any of the following unit of bus. C delivered a PN & a CM in favor of
remedies: the seller over the vehicle. C also gave an
additional security of a REM executed by a 3rd
Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the person in favor of FEMC. FEMC assigned its rts to
vendee fail to pay; Filinvest. C defaulted. F foreclosed the bus. The
Cancel the sale, should the vendee’s failure to proceeds of the foreclosure sale of the bus were
pay cover two or more installments; not enough to cover the debt so F requested the
Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing Prov Sheriff to take possession & sell the land
sold, if one has been constituted, should the subj to REM. C & 3rd person filed an axn for
vendee’s failure to pay cover two or more cancellation of the REM.
installments. In this case, he shall have no further
action against the purchaser to recover any unpaid Issue: WON def may extrajudicially foreclose
balance of the price. Any agreement to the the REM constituted by the 3rd person as
contrary shall be void. additional security after it has extrajud foreclosed
the CM.

TAJANLAJIT V SOUTHERN MOTORS Held: NO. Remedies under 1484 have been
recognized as alternative, that the exercise of one
Facts: T bought fr. SM 2 tractors & executed a PN wld bar the exercise of the other. The
as a security for the balance of the purchase price. foreclosure & actual sale of CM bars further
They also executed a chattel mortgage on the recovery by the vendor of any balance on the
tractors. When T failed to pay, SM sued on the PN vendee's outstanding oblig not satisfied by the
& obtained judgment in its favor. The properties sale. The principal object of this is to remedy

381
the abuses committed in connection w/ the HELD: Judgment for F. Under the law, the
foreclosure sale for a low price & then bringing suit delivery of possession of the mortgaged prop. to
vs. the mortgagor for a deficiency judgment. The the mortgagee can only operate to extinguish
result of this was that the mortgagor found himself PAC’s liability if F had actually caused the
minus the prop & still owing practically the full foreclosure sale of the mortgaged prop.
amount of his orig debt.
It is the fact of foreclosure & actual sale
of the mortgaged chattel that bar the recovery by
INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORP. V TOBIAS the vendor of any balance of the purchaser’s
outstanding obligation not satisfied by the sale.
Facts: P filed a complaint vs. Alcoba denominated
as replevin w/ damages bec Alcoba failed to pay the If the vendor desisted, on his own
purchase price of the car he bought fr. P & w/c was initiative, fr. consummating the auction sale,
secured by a CM on the car. LC issued a writ of such desistance was a timely disavowal of the
replevin but the sheriff was not able to seize the remedy of foreclosure, & the vendor can still sue
mortgaged car. Thereafter, judgment was rendered for specific performance. This is exactly what
vs. Alcoba to pay P a sum of money. WoE was happened in the instant case.
issued but was returned unsatisfied. A second alias
WoE was issued, & the car was levied upon & sold UNIVERSAL MOTORS VS. VELASCO
at public auction. After the sale, there remained a
balance of P250. P asked for 3rd alias WoE w/c LC FACTS: Velasco bought on installment basis a
denied. Mercedes-Benz truck fr. Universal Motors (UM).
He executed a PN for the balance as well as a
Issue: WON Alcoba can recover the deficiency. chattel mortgage over the truck. He defaulted in
his payments so UM asked him to surrender the
Held: YES. It is clear that there was no truck but he failed/refused to do so. UM instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in this case. an action to recover the truck preparatory to
Under 1484, it is only when there has been a foreclosure of the CM. A writ of replevin was
foreclosure that the mortgagor is not liable for any issued so UM repossessed the truck. TC held that
deficiency. UM is entitled to the possession & V was ordered
to pay UM the costs of suit plus atty.’s fees.
P's action is for specific performance or However, it held that all these sums may be
fulfillment of the oblig & not for judicial foreclosure. enforced only against the proceeds of the sale of
It levied upon the car by virtue of an execution & the truck on the ground that, in proceedings for
not as an incident of a foreclosure proceeding. The foreclosure of mortgages executed on chattels
rule is that in installment sales, if the action w/c have been sold on installment, the
instituted is for specific performance & the mortgagee is limited to the property included in
mortgaged property is subsequently attached & the mortgage. Hence, this appeal by UM.
sold, the sale thereof does not amount to a
foreclosure of mortgage. Hence, the seller creditor HELD: Velasco should be made to pay the costs
is entitled to deficiency judgment & consequently to of suit & atty.’s fees independently of the
an alias WoE for the portion of the judgment that proceeds of the auction sale of truck. Art. 1484 is
has not been satisfied. inapplicable in the CAB for two reasons:
The action instituted in the court a quo was not
FILINVEST VS. PHIL. ACETYLENE foreclosure of the chattel mortgage, but for
replevin
FACTS: Phil. Acetylene Corp. (PAC) bought on Amounts adjudged in favor of Universal were not
installment basis a car fr. Filinvest (F). PAC part of the unpaid balance of the price, or in the
executed a promissory note & a chattel mortgage concept of a deficiency judgment, but were for
over the car. PAC defaulted so F wrote a demand expenses of the suit.
letter, asking the latter to either pay or return the
car. PAC opted to return the car, but F told PAC that This case is for delivery of personal prop.
it cannot sell the car due to unpaid taxes. When under Rule 60 of the ROC. The mere fact that
PAC failed to pay, F filed an action for collection of a appellee has secured possession of the truck
sum of money against it.. does not necessarily mean that it will foreclose
the mortgage. Indeed, there is no showing at all
382
that appellee is causing the sale thereof at public agreed upon by the parties. F sought to return
auction or in even preparing to do so. the P50,000 to R, w/c the latter refused. F then
filed an action to rescind the contract, contending
As held in the Tajanlajit & Manila Motors that the Deed of Conditional Sale is null & void
case, it is the actual sale of the mortgaged chattel for her failure to evict the squatters & she has
that would bar the creditor fr. recovering any decided to retain the prop.
unpaid balance.
HELD: The K is already a perfected contract of
DE LA CRUZ VS. ASIAN CONSUMER sale. The ejectment of the squatters is a
condition the operative act of w/c sets into
FACTS: Spouses de la Cruz purchased on motion the period of compliance by R to pay the
installment basis one unit Hino truck fr. Benter balance of the purchase price.
Motor Sales. They executed a CM over the vehicle &
a PN payable in 30 mo. installments. Benter then F’s failure to comply w/ this condition
assigned its rights & interest over the vehicle in gives to R the right to either refuse to proceed
favor of Asian Consumer. The spouses defaulted on w/ the agreement or waive the condition. This
more than 2 installments. Asian then filed a petition option belongs to R, & not to F. In the CAB, R
for extrajudicial foreclosure of the CM. The sheriff chose to waive the condition.
attempted to repossess the vehicle but the
spouses’ son refused to surrender the same. De la Moreover, F’s action for rescission is not
Cruz then brought the vehicle to the Asian office for warranted as she is not the injured party. She is
inventory & inspection. Asian did not sell the prop. the one who failed in her obli.
at a public auction. Asian then filed an ordinary
action for collection of the balance of the purchase
price. TC ruled in favor of Asian. CA affirmed. BAVIERA:

HELD: While Asian eventually succeeded in taking Q: When you foreclose the CM & there is
possession of the mortgaged vehicle, it did not deficiency, can you still ask for a deficiency
pursue the foreclosure of the mortgage as shown judgment?
A: Nope.
by the fact that no auction sale of the vehicle was
ever conducted. Q: If a real estate mortgage is constituted over
a 3rd person’s land as security for the
It is the fact of foreclosure & actual sale of performance of an obli, what is the nature of this
the mortgaged prop. that bar recovery by the K?
vendor of any balance of the purchaser’s A: A contract of guaranty
outstanding obli. not satisfied by the sale. If the
vendor desisted on his own initiative fr. Q: In the case of Cruz, if, instead of foreclosing
consummating the auction sale, such desistance the chattel mortgage, they chose to foreclose the
real estate mortgage over a parcel of land, can
was a timely disavowal of the remedy of
he still go after the buyer for a deficiency
foreclosure, & the vendor can still sue for specific judgment?
performance. A: Yes.

The three remedies provided for in the Q: Why?


Recto Law , namely, Art. 1484 of the CC, are A: Bec. it was NOT the chattel mortgage that was
alternative & not cumulative. The exercise of one foreclosed. The extrajudicial foreclosure of the
would preclude the other. REM is equivalent to a specific performance &
therefore, what you will do is to file an action for
specific performance.
ROMERO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Romero needed a lot on w/c to build a


warehouse in MM. Flores offered a parcel of land. R Art. 1479. A promise to buy & sell a
& F then agreed that should R pay P50,000 to eject determinate thing for a price certain is
the existing squatters on the lot, the prop. would be reciprocally demandable.
sold to him. Flores then filed an ejectment suit
against the squatters & won. However, the writ of An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to
execution was issued beyond the 60-day period sell a determinate thing for a price certain is

383
binding upon the promissor if the promise is acceptance is made before a w/drawal, it
supported by a consideration distinct fr. the price. constitutes a binding K of sale, even though the
option was not supported by a sufficient
consideration.
SANCHEZ VS. RIGOS
BAVIERA:
caveat: Ma’am Bubbles said that there is a very
recent SC decision w/c reverted to the ruling in the
Q: Distinguish between Art. 1479 & 1324?
Southwestern Molasses case, w/o however,
expressly declaring that this case has been
abandoned. 1479 1324
Applies if K has NOT This is the GENERAL
FACTS: Rigos (R) promised to sell to Sanchez (S) a been ACCEPTED RULE on CONTRACTS:
parcel of land for P1,500. This was embodied in a A consideration other If ACCEPTED, the
document called an “Option to Purchase.” In than the purchase price agreement becomes
pursuant to the agreement, S made several tenders is required to make the BINDING (WON there
of payment but these were all rejected by R. S then unilateral promise is a consideration other
deposited the money w/ the CFI & commenced the binding than the purchase
present action for specific performance & damages. price)
In defense, R said that the K was a unilateral
promise to sell, w/c, being unsupported by any
consideration, was null & void, pursuant to Art.
1479 of the NCC. LC ruled in favor of S. Hence this CRONICO VS. TUAZON
appeal by R.
FACTS: J.M. Tuazon & Co. (JM) owns a parcel
HELD: Affirmed. Although a unilateral promise to of land. Cronico (C) & a certain Claudio Ramirez
sell is not binding as a K in itself for lack of a (R) offered to buy the lot so JM notified both
separate consideration, it nevertheless generated a parties of the terms & conditions of the sale. C
bilateral contract of purchase & sale upon then offered a check as downpayment to JM. This
acceptance. check was issued by one Venturanza. Her check
was refused & she was told that the decision on
Since plaintiff accepted the offer before the whose offer will be accepted will be made by JM
w/drawal of the offer, a bilateral K to buy & to sell after the registry return cards have been received
ensued. by it. R sent a reply letter on Mar. 23 while C sent
a letter to JM only on Mar. 27. The lot was then
In the case of Atkins vs. Chua Hian Tek, the sold to R.
SC saw no distinction between Arts. 1324 & 1479 of
the CC. Art. 1324 applies to a unilateral promise to C now alleges that she has a preferential
sell similar to the one in the CAB. As Justice right to buy the lot bec. she is the successor-in-
Bengzon explained, “an option is unilateral: a interest of one Deusor (D) who executed a
promise to sell at the price fixed whenever the compromise agreement w/ JM wherein the latter
offeree should decide to exercise his option w/in the bound itself to sell the lot to the successor-in-
specified time. After accepting the promise & before interest of D. C seeks to annul the sale on the
he exercises his option, the holder of the option Is ground that she was the first to accept the terms
not bound to buy. He is free either to buy or not to of the sale & that the promise to sell is supported
buy later...however, upon accepting herein by a consideration aside fr. the selling price, w/c
petitioner’s offer, a bilateral promise to sell & to buy is the compromise agreement between D & JM.
ensued, & the resp. ipso facto assumed the
obligation of a purchaser. He did not just get the HELD: The offer is not binding on JM. The offer
right subsequently to buy or not to buy. It was not by JM is not supported by a consideration distinct
a mere option then; it was a bilateral K of sale.” fr. the price. The compromise agreement relied
upon by C has already been rescinded & set aside
If the option is given is given w/o a in a prior case. Hence, the promise to sell by the
consideration, it is a mere offer of a contract of sale, corp. has no other consideration separate fr. the
w/c is not binding until accepted. If however, selling price of the lot.

384
In order that a unilateral promise may be
binding upon the promissor, Art. 1479 requires the HELD: Affirmed. The option did not impose
concurrence of the condition that the promise be upon P the obligation to purchase D's prop. It
“supported by a consideration distinct fr. the price.” merely granted P an option to buy. There is
Accordingly, the promisee cannot compel the nothing in the contract to indicate that the agmt
promisor to comply w/ the promise, unless the is supported by a consideration "distinct fr. the
former establishes the existence of said distinct price" stipulated for the sale of the land.
consideration. The promisee has the burden of It should be noted that:
proving such consideration. C has not established
the existence of a consideration distinct fr. the price 1. Art. 1324 applies to Ks in general,
of the lot in question. whereas the 2nd par of Art. 1479 refers to "sales"
in particular, &, more specifically, to an "accepted
unilateral promise to buy or to sell." Art. 1479 is
RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL controlling in the case at bar.

2. In order that said unilateral promise


PARANAQUE KINGS ENTERPRISES VS. CA may be binding upon the promisor, Art. 1479
requires the concurrence of a condition, namely,
FACTS: Santos is the owner of 8 parcels of land that the promise be "supported by a
w/c were originally being leased to Chua then to consideration distinct fr. the price. In other
Bing. B assigned his rights & interest in the prop. to words, the promise, even is accepted, may be
Paranaque King (PK). Par. 9 of the lease K provides w/drawn if there is no consideration distinct fr.
that in case the prop. are sold, the lessee shall have the price. (SW Sugar case)
the FIRST OPTION or PRIORITY to buy the prop. S,
in violation of the terms of the K of lease, sold the HOWEVER, IN THE CAB, CITING ATKINS
prop. to Raymundo for P5 M. Realizing her error, S V. CUA HIN LEK, the cts .saw no distinction bet.
had the prop. reconveyed to her & then she offered the 2 arts (harmonizing them) & applied the
it to PK for P15 M. PK counter-offered for P5 M. S, former where a unilateral promise to sell similar
w/o answering the counter offer of PK, executed to the one sued upon here was involved, treating
another deed of sale in favor of R for P9 M. S then such promise as an option w/c, although not
informed PK that the new owner of the prop. is R. binding as a contract in itself for lack of a
HELD: We hold that, in order to have full separate consideration, NEVERTHELESS
compliance w/ the contractual right granting PK the GENERATED A BILATERAL CONTRACT OF
first option to purchase, the sale of the properties PURCHASE AND SALE UPON ACCEPTANCE.
for P9 M, the price for w/c they were finally sold to
R, should have likewise been first offered to PK. Since P accepted the offer before the
w/drawal of the offer, a bilateral contract to buy
The basis of the right of first refusal must & to sell ensued.
be the current offer to sell of the seller or offer to
purchase of any prospective buyer. Only after the NOTE: MA'M BAVIERA SAID THAT IN A LATER
optionee fails to exercise its right of first priority CASE, THIS RULING WAS ABANDONED,
under the SAME terms & w/in the period MEANING THE COURT REVERTED TO THE
OLD RULING (SW SUGAR CASE) THAT A
contemplated, could the owner validly offer to sell
UNILATERAL PROMISE, EVEN IF ACCEPTED, IS
the property to a 3rd person, again, under the same NOT BINDING AS LONG AS THERE WAS NO
terms as offered to the optionee. CONSIDERATION DISTINCT FROM THE PRICE.

SANCHEZ V. RIGOS
Art. 1482. Whenever earnest money is given
FACTS: On April 3, 1961, Sanchez & Rigos (P & D,
in a K of sale, it shall be considered as part of the
respectively), executed an "Option to Purchase"
price & as proof of the perfection of the K.
whereby D promised to sell to P for P1,500 a parcel
of land w/in 2 yrs. fr. date. P made several tenders
of payment w/in such period but as these were
rejected by D, P deposited the amt w/ the CFI & CIFRA V. CA
commenced the present action for specific
performance. LC ruled for P.
385
FACTS: P (Cifra) entered into an agmt w/ PR
(Chua), for the sale of a real prop for 1.1 M. It is Art. 1616. The vendor cannot avail himself
stipulated in the ADDENDUM that in case the buyer of the right of repurchase w/o returning to the
fails to purchase the prop after the seller formally vend the price of the sale , & in addition:
notifies him of the surrender of the premises by the (1) The expenses of the contract, & any
tenant, in addition to the forfeiture of the earnest other legitimate payments made by reason of the
money, the buyer must pay the seller 20T plus sale;
atty.’s. fees & cost. On the other hand, if the sellers (2) The necessary & useful expenses made
do not make good their promise to sell the prop, on the thing sold.
the seller binds himself to return the earnest money
& in addition, to pay the buyer 20T, plus atty.'s fees
& cost. Baviera:
The Chuas were not able to free the prop In an equitable mortgage, the property must still
fr. its tenants so they did not want to push through first be foreclosed before ownership passes to the
w/ the sale. P filed an action for specific seller. Distinguished fr. a pacto de retro sale,
performance. where ownership already passes to the buyer
upon perfection of the contract, but if the right to
HELD: The K is clear & should be applied as it is. redeem is exercised, then ownership reverts to
Under the addendum to the K, both parties are the seller.
given the freedom to back out of the transaction
Pacto de retro, or conventional redemption, is
provided that, in the case of the seller, he must favored by creditors, bec. it does away w/ the
return the earnest money in addition to being liable necessity of a foreclosure, in case the debtor fails
to the buyer for P20T; & in case of the buyer, the to pay the loan. All that the creditor has to do is
earnest money is forfeited, & he is liable to pay the to execute an affidavit consolidating ownership in
seller P20T in damages. This right is afforded to himself & register the same in the Register of
both parties & may be availed of by them, Deeds. the price in a pacto de retro sale is
irrespective of WON the occupant of the premises naturally lesser than that in an absolute sale, bec.
had vacated the same. Consequently, the action for the sale is subject to a resolutory condition, &
also to facilitate redemption. Thus, the mere fact
specific performance must fail. For the rescission of
that the price is not the true value of the property
the K, Ps must return the P5T earnest money & pay does not justify the conclusion that the contract is
P20T to PR. However they are not liable for attys one of mortgage.
fees, for it was PR who brought the case to the ct
as a result of w/c P’s unnecessarily incurred If the seller wants to redeem, he must give the
expenses of litigation. buyer:
the price
the expenses of the contract
Baviera: The parties could stipulate
any other legitimate payments made by reason of
otherwise & that the earnest money will be the sale
forfeited, as in the CAB the necessary expenses made on thing sold.

When there is a right of first refusal, at the time the Equitable mortgage
offer is made, the owner still has not yet decided to
sell, but in case he does, the holder of the right has
the priority to accept it. Distinguished fr. an option Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to
to sell, where there is a continuing offer to sell on be an equitable mortgage in any of the following
the part of the owner. cases:
(1) When the price of the sale w/ right to
repurchase is unusually inadequate;
Conventional redemption (2) When the vendor remains in possession
as lessee or otherwise;
Art. 1601. Conventional redemption shall take (3) When upon or after the expiration of the
place when the vendor reserves the right to right to repurchase another instrument extending
repurchase the thing sold, w/ the obligation to the period of redemption or granting a new
comply w/ the provisions of Art. 1616 & other period is executed;
stipulations w/c may have been agreed upon.
386
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a
part of the purchase price; Reason for the 10-year limitation: A pacto
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the de retro is a suspension of title, & it is against
taxes on the thing sold; public interest to permit such uncertainty to
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly continue for a long time.
inferred that the real intention of the parties is that
the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt Counting of 4-year period: From the
or the performance of any other obligation. execution of the contract. But if the right is
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, suspended by agreement that it shall be
fruits, or other benefit to be received by the vendee exercised only after a certain time or condition
as rent or otherwise shall be considered as interest arises, then the period shall be counted only fr.
w/c shall be subject to usury laws. the time such right could be exercised, but not
exceeding 10 years fr. execution.
Art. 1603. In case of doubt, a contract
purporting to be a sale w/ right to repurchase shall Not sufficient that a vendor a retro manifests his
be construed as an equitable mortgage. desire to redeem. This must be accompanied by
an actual or simultaneous tender of payment of
the redemption price. But if vendee refuses, then
vendor may file a suit against him & consign the
Paras:
An equitable mortgage is one w/c, though lacking in amount in court.
some formality or other requisites demanded by
law, reveal an intention of the parties to charge
a real property as security for a debt & ARCHES V. DIAZ
constrains nothing impossible or contrary to
law. Facts: Maria vda. de Diaz executed in favor of
Jose Arches a deed of sale w/ pacto de retro over
a parcel of land in consideration of P12,500. A
Art 1606. The right referred to in Art. 1601, in filed a petition for consolidation of ownership
the absence of an express agreement, shall last four over the property; D opposed, saying their
years fr. date of the contract. contract was merely a loan w/ a mortgage. TC
denied A’s petition on the ground that the
Should there be an agreement, the period contract was an equitable mortgage & not an
cannot exceed ten years. absolute sale. CA & SC affirmed.
However, in addition to the P12,500, A
However, the vendor may still exercise the right also spent during his lifetime P1,543.70 in
to repurchase w/in thirty days fr. the time final connection w/ the reconstitution of the title in the
judgment was rendered in a civil action on the basis name of the vendor & in paying real estate taxes.
that the contract was a true sale w/ right to Owing to D’s refusal to reimburse the said
repurchase. amounts, A’s heirs filed an action for collection of
the same. TC dismissed, saying that when A filed
the petition to consolidate title, he had two
Baviera: remedies: 1)to consolidate title & ownership, &
2)to foreclose in the event the deed of sale a
An agreement to repurchase becomes an retro be declared one of equitable mortgage.
option to buy when entered into after the time to When he opted to consolidate title, he was
redeem stipulated in a pacto de retro sale had thereby barred fr. pursuing the other alternative.
already expired, bec. then the vendee a retro
became absolute owner of the thing sold, & the Issue: WoN the heir of A can still file an action
subsequent grant of the right to repurchase is a to foreclose what the court ruled was an
new agreement. But where the period to equitable mortgage or collect the indebtedness of
repurchase has not expired, & another agreement is the mortgagor?
entered into granting the vendor a retro the right to
repurchase the object of the contract at any time, Held: YES. The decision of the court holding
the subsequent agreement is not a promise to sell that the sale w/ pacto de retro was an equitable
but is an extension of the period to redeem, w/c mortgage, & consequently dismissing the petition
cannot exceed 10 years. to consolidate title did not constitute an
387
adjudication of the right to foreclose the mortgage object of any litigation in w/c they may take part
or collect the indebtedness. by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.
The law abhors injustice. It would be
unjust to allow D to escape payment of her debt, &
to rationalize such result by claiming that she is a
debtor & not a vendor of the property in favor of A. Baviera:
Where the petition of the vendee in a pacto de retro Nos. 1-3 are voidable contracts; nos. 4-6 are void
sale is for a judicial order pursuant to Art 1607, CC, contracts.
so that consolidation of ownership by virtue of the The reason why those enumerated under Art.
failure of the vendor to redeem may be recorded in 1491 have relative incapacity to enter into a
the Registry of Property, the right of action to contract of sale is that they possess a
foreclose the mortgage or to collect the fiduciary relationship w/ the owner of the
indebtedness arises fr. the judgment of the court properties mentioned, such that the law
prevents them fr. being tempted to take
declaring the contract as an equitable mortgage.
advantage of their positions. the prohibition
Although an alternative prayer to that effect may be rests on the fact that greed might get the
made in the petition, the same cannot be better of loyalty. The law does not trust
conditional, that is, only in the event such a human nature to resist the temptations likely
declaration is made, contrary to petitioner’s claim & to arise out of the antagonism between the
the relief sought. Petitioner’s failure to make the interest of the seller & the buyer.
alternative prayer & the failure of the court to grant An agent who has renounced the agency & is a
it in the judgment dismissing the petition should not judgment creditor of his principal may
be construed as a bar to collecting the indebtedness acquire the latter’s property in a public sale.
The prohibition against lawyers is intended to
in a proper action for that purpose.
curtail any undue influence the lawyer may
have over his client on account of their
confidential association. Such sales are void
Capacity to contract & cannot be ratified. Public interest & public
policy remain paramount & do not permit
compromise & ratification.
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot When is a thing deemed to be the subject of
litigation?
acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial Not only if there is some contest or litigation in
auction, either in person or through the mediation court, but also fr. the moment it becomes
of another: subject to judicial action.
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or Contingent fee- not contrary to law as it will
persons who may be under his guardianship; encourage the lawyer to work harder to win
(2) Agents, the property whose administration the case in order to earn the said fee. thus,
or sale may have been entrusted to them, unless it is to the client’s advantage. But the court
the consent of the principal has been given; may reduce the fee is found to be
(3) Executors & administrators, the property of unconscionable.
the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers & employees, the property of
the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. ABABA
government owned or controlled corporation, or
institution, the administration of w/c has been Facts: Atty. Fernandez represented Abarquez in
entrusted to them; this provision shall apply to a civil case filed by the latter against his sister w/
judges & government experts who, in any manner regards ownership of a parcel of land. They
whatsoever, take part in the sale; agreed that in case A wins, he will give to F 1/2
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, of what he may recover in the action. A WoN,
clerks of superior & inferior courts, & other officers but he refused to comply w/ his obligation under
& employees connected w/ the administration of the agreement. When F learned of A’s plans to
justice, the property & rights in litigation or levied sell the property to Larrazabal, he filed an
upon an execution before the court w/in whose affidavit of adverse claim w/ the Register of
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective Deeds, such that when the property was sold, &
functions; this prohibition includes the act of a TCT issued to L, there appeared an annotation
acquiring by assignment & shall apply to lawyers, of F’s attorney’s lien. L filed a petition for the
w/ respect to the property & rights w/c may be the
388
cancellation of the annotation in the TCT. F Held: NO. It was valid & not in violation of Art.
opposed. LC ruled for F. 1491 (5). The prohibition applies only to a sale
or assignment to the lawyer by his client of the
Issue: WoN the contract for a contingent fee is property w/c is the subject of litigation. For the
prohibited under Art. 1491, NCC, & Canon 13 of the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of
Canons of Professional Ethics? the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property.
Held: NO. Art. 1491 prohibits only the sale or
assignment between the lawyer & his client or CAB: The sale was made when the decision in
property w/c is the subject of litigation. Here, the the civil case was already final & executory &
transfer of the property as payment for attorney’s thus, the property was no longer the subject of
fees was to take place only after a favorable litigation. With respect to the other half of the
judgment is rendered by the court. Hence, the property given to L as contingent fees, the SC
property is no longer the subject of litigation. finds nothing wrong w/ it. Contingent fees are
recognized in our jurisdiction under Canon 13,
A contract for a contingent fee is not Canon of Professional Ethics, w/c state that
covered by Art. 1491 bec. the transfer or contingent fees may be a portion of the property
assignment of the property takes effect only after in litigation.
the finality of a favorable judgment. this is also not
violative of the Canons. Contracts of this nature are
allowed bec. they redound to the benefit of both the Art. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to
poor client & the lawyer. Oftentimes, contingent be subrogated, upon the same terms &
fees are the only means by w/c the poor can seek conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place
redress for injustices. A contingent fee contract is of one who acquires a thing by purchase or
also subject to the supervision of the courts w/ dation in payment, or by any other transaction
respect tot he stipulated amount & may be reduced whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous
or nullified if found to be unconscionable. title.

F has a better right over the land than L.


The latter bought the same w/ the knowledge of TOLENTS:
the adverse claim of F. Thus, he is not a purchaser
in good faith. Scope of legal redemption. – LR is a right
created & regulated by law by reason of public
LAIG V. CA interest, w/c is not opposed to, but rather is in
harmony w/ the interest of private parties.
Facts: Atty. Laig represented Galero in a civil case
involving ownership of a lot. Their agreement was It is applicable to all transactions w/c result in the
that the fees of L would be paid on a contingent transmission of ownership, whose special nature
does not bar subrogation, w/c is the essence of
basis. G WoN. Thereafter, 1/2 of the property was
legal redemption, but not to barter or acquisition
conveyed to G as his contingent fees, while the by hereditary title.
other half was also sold to him for P1,500. TCT
issued in name of L. A person cannot exercise the right of legal
redemption if he is not in a condition to take the
Subsequently, G was able to procure place of the vendee. The vendee may have
another OCT over the property through fraudulent assumed some purely personal obligations w/c
means. he then sold the lot to Verzo for P600. the redemptioner cannot perform; hence,
heirs of L filed a complaint for annulment of the subrogation cannot take place. In such cases,
however, the court should carefully determine
second sale or, in the alternative, for reconveyance
whether such obligations are merely a subterfuge
of the property in their favor. V opposed, claiming to avoid redemption.
there was no double sale as the first sale to L was
void under Art 1491(5), NCC. Distinguished fr. Pre-emption. – Pre-emption
is the power to acquire a thing for the same price
Issue: Was the conveyance to L a prohibited in preference over any other buyer. It is
transfer? exercised before the stipulated sale is
consummated by the vendor, who must
communicate the proposed sale to possible

389
redemptioners so that they can exercise the right of The co-owners’ right of redemption exists
pre-emption if they so desire. Redemption is the only where there has been a sale or alienation,
right to rescind the sale, subrogate oneself in the NOT in the event of a mere lease.
place & to the exclusion of the buyer, & acquire the
thing at the price stipulated, so long as this is done
w/in the time & under the circumstances provided
by law. On the other hand, redemption is exercised Art. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands
after the sale is perfected & consummated; hence, shall also have the right of redemption when a
it must be brought vs. the vendor AND the vendee, piece of rural land, the area of w/c does not
& even vs. succeeding vendees. exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless the
grantee does not own any rural land.
Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise
the right of redemption in case the shares of all the This right is not applicable to adjacent lands
other co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third w/c are separated by brooks, drains, ravines,
person. If the price of the alienation is grossly roads & other apparent servitudes for the benefit
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a of other estates.
reasonable one.
If two or more adjoining owners desire to
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption at the same
exercise the right of redemption, they may only do time, the owner of the adjoining land of smaller
so in proportion to the share they may respectively area shall be preferred; & should both lands have
have in the thing owned in common. the same area, the one who first requested the
redemption.

TOLENTS:
TOLENTS:
Compared w/ Art. 1088. Art. 1088 applies
where a co-heir sells his share to a stranger before The intention of the law is to protect agriculture,
partition or distribution or before the determination by the union of small agricultural lands &
of the portion to w/c each heir is entitled. Once the those adjoining under one single owner for
portion corresponding to each heir has been fixed, their better exploitation.
the co-heirs turn into co-owners & their right of
legal redemption is governed by this art. & Art. Redemption can be exercised only if the land sold
1624. is one hectare or less in area. Where several
distinct & separate pieces of land are sold to
Object of redemption – the word “thing” is used a stranger, the fact that their total area is
in its generic sense, therefore, it includes not only greater than one hectare will not prevent
objects, whether movable or immovable, but also all redemption, if each piece sought to be
rights w/c are susceptible of appropriation. redeemed does not exceed one hectare in
area.
Who may Redeem. The right of LR given in this
art. is applicable to all who subsequently acquire LR can only be enforced vs. a stranger who buys
their respective shares while the community the property sought to be redeemed, & not
subsists. The purpose of the law in establishing the vs. another adjacent owner who has the
right of LR bet. the co-owners is to reduce the no. same interest.
of participants until the community is done away
w/, being a hindrance to the dev’t. & better Transfer by Vendee. – If after a co-owner has
administration of the property, & this reason exists instituted an action to compel redemption,
while the community subsists & the participants another co-owner voluntarily buys the land,
continue to be so whether they be the orig co- this will not bar the action w/c can be
owners or their successors. exercised vs. the subsequent transferee.
One co-owner cannot exercise the right of The repurchase of the land by the orig vendor
redemption alone, bec. the right belongs to all the cannot defeat the right of LR, & any
other co-owners in common. subsequent act of the buyer & seller cannot
prejudice the prospective redemptioner.
The privilege granted by this art. can only
be exercised when the purchaser is a STRANGER to Burden of Proving Existence of Brooks,
the co-ownership. Ravines, Roads, etc. – The grantee or
purchaser of the tenement who wants to

390
defeat the right of LR sought to be exercised by allowed to lapse before the right is made use
the adjoining owner, & NOT the person seeking of, then the action to enforce the redemption
to exercise the right of LR, has the duty to will not prosper, even if brought w/in the
prove that the lands involved are separated by ordinary prescriptive period. The period is
brooks, etc. extinctive, so that if the claim is not made
w/in the pd. provided, the rt. can no longer
be exercised.
Art. 1622. Whenever a piece of urban land w/c This pd. is preemptory, bec. the policy of the law
is so small & so situated that a major portion is not to leave the purchaser’s title in
thereof cannot be used for any practical purpose uncertainty beyond the 30-day pd.
w/in a reasonable time, having been bought merely
for speculation, is about to be re-sold, the owner of This pd. runs vs. minors, even if they have no
any adjoining land shall have a right of redemption, legal guardians, & more especially so, if they
also at a reasonable price. have a legal guardian. Minority for the
prospective redemptioners does not suspend
the period for redemption.
When two or more owners of adjoining lands
wish to exercise the right of pre-emption or The pd. must be counted fr. the date the vendor
redemption, the owner whose intended use of the or prospective vendor notified in writing the
land in question appears best justified shall be prospective redemptioner or the person w/
preferred. the right of pre-emption, of the sale or
intended sale. But the law does not require
any specific form of the written notice.
TOLENTS: The inability of a prospective redemptioner to
accept an offer of sale of the property
Requisites: subject to redemption before the actual sale
The piece of urban land is so small that it cannot be to a 3rd person took place, bec. the offer
used for any practical purpose w/in a reasonable appeared expensive or for lack of funds, does
time; not extinguish his right to redeem the same
Such small urban land was bought merely for w/in the period fixed by law.
speculation.
The law does not require any previous notice to
the new owner, nor a meeting between him
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or & the redemptioner, much less a previous
redemption shall not be exercised except w/in thirty formal tender, before any action is began in
court to enforce the right. The important
days fr. the notice in writing by the prospective
thing is to assert it in due time & in proper
vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The form.
deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by the affidavit of the
vendor that he has given written notice thereof to LEGASPI V. CA
all possible redemptioners.
Facts: Legaspi is the owner of Lot #267, w/c
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes abuts Lot #268 owned by the Pestejos. A portion
that of adjoining owners. of Legaspi’s ancestral house was erected on a
portion of Lot 268 bec. it was believed that the
same belonged to L’s parents. Upon agreement,
TOLENTS: the Pestejos allowed such portion of her house to
remain on Lot 268. In 1963, L made
This art. does not provide a period of prescription. representation w/ the Pestejos for her to exercise
It creates a right, & fixes the period for the
the right of pre-emption by offering to buy LOT
exercise of that right. The pd. is not
prescriptive, but is more a requisite or condition 268 in the event that they would sell it. The
precedent to the exercise of the right of LR. projected sale didn’t push through bec. the
consideration asked for was the staggering sum
If such person has offered to redeem the property of P9,000 for an area of 59 sq. m only.
w/in the period fixed, he has complied w/ the
condition fixed by law & may bring an action to L later found out that Lot 268 was sold to
enforce the redemption. If the period is de Aguilar for only P1,500. L demanded that she
391
be subrogated to the rights of de Aguilar by the sale & to indicate the date of such notice as
reimbursing the consideration paid by the latter, but the starting time of the 30-day period of
they dishonored her demand. L instituted a civil redemption. SC was satisfied that the other co-
suit vs. the Pestejos & de Aguilar for legal heirs were actually informed, although not in
redemption & damages. writing, of the sales, & such notice was
sufficient. Between 1964 & 1976 (when the 1 st
Issue: Who has the better right over Lot 268? comp. for redemption was filed), the other co-
heirs were actually informed of the sale &
Held: Legaspi has the preferential right of pre- thereafter, the 30-day pd. started running &
emption &/or redemption. ultimately expired. None of the heirs made a
move to redeem the properties for 13 years. The
Ratio: The 3rd par. of Art. 1622 applies. Court SC is not abandoning the doctrines in the Butte
took judicial notice of Pestejos’ toleration of L’s case (applying the letter of the law). However, it
possession & the fact that when L made adopted an exception in view of the peculiar
improvements on the said house they allowed her circumstances of this case.
to do so unconditionally. Further proven that L
offered to buy for P3,000 but the Pestejos BUTTE V. UY
deliberately refused. Therefore, the heirs of de
Aguilar shall deliver TCT over Lot 268 to the CFI Facts: Jose v. Ramirez (JVR) was a co-owner of
Clerk of Court who shall execute the corresponding a house & lot issued in the name of the ff.: Marie
deed of redemption for the lot in favor of L after Garnier Vda. De Ramirez, 1/6; JVR, 1/6; Jose E.
depositing P1,500. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita de Ramirez, 1/6; & Jose Ma.
Ramirez, 1/6. JVR died. In his last will &
ALONZO V. IAC testament, he bequeathed 1/3 of the free portion
to plaintiff Butte. Estate proceedings were still
Facts: 5 bros. & sisters inherited in equal pro pending at the time the SC rendered this
indiviso shares a parcel of land. On 3/15/63, one of decision. BPI was appointed judicial
them, Celestino Padua, sold his share to pets. administrator.
Carlos & Casimira Alonzo for P550. On 4/22/64,
Eustaquia Padua sold her share to pets. for P440. ON 12/9/58, Marie Garnier, one of the
Pets. then occupied 2/5 of said lot, enclosing it w/ a co-owners, sold her undivided 1/6 share to
fence. In 1975, pets.’ son Eduardo built a house defendant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. for P500,000.
w/in said area. Formal notices of the sale were sent to all
possible redemptioners. The def. sent a letter to
On 2/25/76, Mariano Padua, one of the the BPI informing it of the sale. BPI sent this to
heirs, sought to redeem the land but was dismissed Mrs. Butte who received it 12/11 & 12/12. On
by the TC due to his American citizenship. On 1/15/59, Mrs. Butte sent a letter & a check for
5/27/77, Tecla (whattaname!) Padua filed her own P500 T to the defs. Offering to redeem the 1/6
complaint to redeem the lot. TC dismissed also on share. This tender was refused to Butte on the
the ground that the right had lapsed, not having same day consigned the amt. in court & filed the
been exercised w/in 30 days fr. notice of the sales corresponding action for legal redemption.
in 1963 & 1964. Although there was no written
notice, it held that actual knowledge of the sales by Held: Butte can exercise the right of LR despite
the co-heirs satisfied the req’t. of the law. TC found the presence of the judicial administrator &
that pets. & co-heirs were close friends & neighbors pending the final distribution of her share in the
whose children went to school together. testate proceedings. She exercised the right of
LR w/in the period prescribed by the law. Arts.
IAC reversed & declared that actual notice 1620 (1) & 1623 are applicable. The right of
would not suffice as a substitute for a written redemption of co-owners excludes that of
notice. adjoining owners.

Held: Actual notice is sufficient to satisfy the Butte’s right of LR is clear. As


req’ts. of Arts. 1088 & 1623. The law should never testamentary heir of JVR, she & her co-heirs
be interpreted in a such a way as to cause injustice. acquired an interest in the undivided 1/6 share
In requiring written notice, Art. 1088 seeks to owned by her predecessor, fr. the moment of
ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of JVR’s death. The right of succession includes all
392
the property rights & obligations that survive the 28,000. Paz was unaware of such sale until one
decedent. year later when Enrique showed Paz’ husband a
copy of the deed of sale. Paz offered to buy back
From JVR's death, his heirs became co- said interest fr. the Raffmans for P 34,000 but
owners in the property, together w/ the original was refused. TC ruled in Paz’ favor but was
surviving co-owners. A co-owner of an undivided reversed by CA on the ground that there was no
share is necessarily a co-owner of the whole. valid offer to redeem since Paz merely offered
Wherefore, any one of JVR’s heirs became entitled only a P 10,000 check w/ w/c to redeem the
to exercise the right of LR (retracto de comuneros) property, w/ a promise to pay the balance
as soon as another co-owner has sold her undivided afterwards. CA held that it was not in pursuance
share to a stranger. of a legal & effective exercise of the right of
redemption as contemplated by law.
The situation is in no wise altered by the
existence of a judicial administrator of the estate of Issue: WON a written notice of the sale is
JVR. The jud admin’s rights of possession & necessary before the 30-day period for
administration under the ROC do not include the redemption will start running
right of LR of the undivided share. The reason is WON there was a valid tender of
obvious: this right only came into existence when payment
the sale to Uy was perfected, 8 yrs. after JVR’s
death & formed no part of his estate. The Held: YES. A written notice is indispensable &,
redemption right vested on the heirs originally, in applying A1623, mere knowledge of the sale,
their individual capacity, they did not derivatively acquired in some other manner by the
acquire it fr. their decedent, for when JVR died, redemptioner, does not satisfy the statute. The
none of the other co-owners of the property had yet purpose of the written notice was to remove all
sold his undivided share to a stranger. uncertainty as to the sale, its terms & its validity
& to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not
The period of 30 days fr. notice be it noted, definitive. The statute not having provided for
is peremptory, bec. the policy of the law is not to any alternative, the method of notification
leave the purchaser’s title in uncertainty beyond the prescribed remains exclusive. No form is
30-day period. In considering WON the offer to required, so long as it is in writing. Hence, the
redeem was timely, we think that the notice given showing of a copy of the deed of sale was
by the vendee should not be taken into account. equivalent to the giving of a written notice. It
The text of Art. 1623 clearly & expressly prescribes came fr. the vendor & made available in writing
that 30 days for making the redemption are to be the details & finality of the sale.
counted fr. notice in writing by the vendor.
NO. Bona fide redemption necessarily
Ratio for requiring that the notice should be imports a seasonable & valid tender of the entire
given by the seller, & not by the buyer: the seller of purchase price, & this was not done. There is no
an undivided interest is in the best position to know reason for requiring the vendee to accept
who are his co-owners that under the law must be payment by installments as it would result in an
notified of the sale. Also, the notice by the seller indefinite extension of the redemption period.
removes all doubts as to the fact of the sale, its Purpose of the law for the period was to avoid
perfection; & its validity, the notice being a prolonged & anti-economic uncertainty as to the
reaffirmation thereof, so that the party need not ownership of the thing sold. The redemption
entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the price should either be fully offered in legal tender
alienation. This assurance would not exist if the of validly consigned in court bec. it is only by
notice should be given by the buyer. such means that the buyer can become certain
that the offer to redeem is one made seriously &
CONEJERO VS. CA APRIL 29, 1966 in good faith.

Facts: Enrique Torres sold his 1/2 interest over a


property co-owned w/ his sister Paz to the Raffman RA 6552 REALTY INSTALLMENT BUYER
spouses for P 13,000 w/ a right to repurchase w/in PROTECTION ACT
one year. Seven months later, Enrique obtained
more money fr. the Raffmans by executing a deed
of absolute sale over the same 1/2 interest for P
393
Sec.2 Public Policy: to protect buyers on the back of the certificate of title over the
of real estate on installment payments against property.
onerous & oppressive conditions

Sec.3 Rights of Buyers who default in Notes:


payment of succeeding installments
gives a grace period for every year of default
Requirements: refers only to contracts to sell immovables except
for all transactions or contracts involving the commercial lots
does not allow stipulations w/c provide for ipso
sale or financing of real estate on installment
facto cancellation
payments remedy of seller is to foreclose mortgage & not to
includes residential condominium apartments cancel the sale
except industrial lots, commercial buildings & sales
to tenants under RA 3843, as amended by RA 6389
buyer has paid at least two years of
Art. 1592 In the sale of immovable
installments
property, even though it may have been
stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the
Rights:
time agreed upon the rescission of the contract
to pay w/o additional interests the unpaid
shall of right take place, the vendee may pay
installments due w/in the grace period of one
even after the expiration of the period, as long as
month for every year of installment payments
no demand for rescission of the contract has
made, w/c right could be exercised only once in
been made upon him either judicially or by a
every five years of the life of the contract & its
notarial act. After the demand, the court may
extensions
not grant him a new term.
if contract is canceled, the seller shall return to
the buyer the value of the payments to the property
equivalent to fifty percent of the total payments
made &, after five years of installments, an Notes:
additional five percent every year but not to exceed
applies only to contracts of absolute sale where
90% of the total payments made ownership has already transferred
cancellation of contract must be made thirty mere default leads to uncertainty as to
days after buyer receives notice of cancellation or ownership, thus there is a need either for
demand for rescission of the contract by notarial act rescission of the contract or specific performance
& full payment of the cash surrender value there must be an action to rescind or a notarial
includes downpayments, deposits or options on instrument that the contract is rescinded; else,
the contract the buyer may still pay even after the expiration
period
if contract to sell, covered by the Maceda Law or
Sec. 4 Where payment is less than two
RA 6552
years. Seller shall give the buyer a grace period of
not less than sixty days fr. the date the installment
became due. Failure to pay after such grace period
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations
gives the seller the right to cancel the contract after
is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
receipt of notice by the buyer.
obligors should not comply w/ what is incumbent
upon him.
Sec. 5 Buyer has a right to sell or assign
his rights under Secs. 3 & 4 to another or to
The injured party may choose between the
reinstate the contract by updating the account
fulfillment & the rescission of the obligation, w/
during the grace period & before cancellation. The
the payment of damages in either case. He may
deed of sale or assignment should be done by
also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
notarial act.
fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
Sec. 6 Buyer has a right to pay in advance
The court shall decree the rescission claimed,
any installment or the full unpaid balance any time
unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing
w/o interest & to have such full payment annotated
of a period.

394
This is understood to be w/o prejudice to the Art. 1624. An assignment of credits & other
rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, incorporeal rights shall be perfected in
in accordance w/ articles 1385 & 1388 & the accordance w/ the provisions of article 1475.
Mortgage Law.
Art. 1625. An assignment of a credit, right or
action shall produce no effect as against third
Notes: two remedies are alternative & not persons, unless it appear in a public instrument,
cumulative, subject to the exception in par. 2 or the instrument is recorded in the Registry of
where he may also seek rescission even after Property in case the assignment involves real
he has chosen fulfillment if the latter should property.
become impossible
Art. 1626. The debtor who, before having
knowledge of the assignment, pay his creditor
shall be released fr. the obligation.
JISON VS. CA AUGUST 15, 1988
Art. 1627. The assignment of a credit
includes all the accessory rights, such as
Facts: Jison entered into a contract to sell w/
guaranty, mortgage, pledge or preference.
ROPSI where the latter agreed to sell to Jison an
Antipolo lot for P55T w/ 8% interest per year. He
Art. 1628. The vendor in good faith shall be
paid ROSPI P 11T as downpayment & fr. Oct. 1961
responsible for the existence & legality of the
to May 1965, he will pay P 533.85 monthly. Jison
credit at the time of the sale, unless it should
defaulted in some installments. After several
have been sold as doubtful; but not for the
demand letters, ROPSI returned their checks &
solvency of the debtor, unless it has been so
informed them of the rescission of the contract.
expressly stipulated or unless the insolvency was
Tender for payments were refused.
prior to the sale & of common knowledge.
Even in these cases he shall only be
Issue: WON rescission of the contract & the
liable for the price received & for the expenses
forfeiture of the payments were already paid by
specified in No. 1 of Article 1616.
pets were valid
The vendor in bad faith shall always be
Held: YES but forfeiture limited to 50% of the
answerable for the payment of all expenses, &
contract price. Judicial action for the rescission of a
for damages.
contract is not necessary where the contract
provides that it may be cancelled (This was before
Art. 1629. In case the assignor in good faith
the enactment of RA 6552). Petitioners were also
should have made himself responsible for the
informed by PR that the contract was cancelled in a
solvency of the debtor, & the contracting parties
letter. As RA 6552 was not yet effective, the notice
should not have agreed upon the duration of the
of cancellation need not be by notarial act, the
liability, it shall last for one year only, fr. the time
letter being a sufficient compliance w/ the legal
of the assignment if the period had already
requirement. In obligations w/ a penal clause, the
expired.
judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the
principal obligation has been partly or irregularly
If the credit should be payable w/in a term or
complied w/ by the debtor. In CAB, forfeiture of
period w/c has not yet expired, the liability shall
the amount was unconscionable, giving weigh to
cease one year after the maturity.
the fact that although pets have been delinquent in
paying their amortizations, w/ the cancellation of
Art. 1630. One who sells an inheritance w/o
the contract, possession reverts to ROSPI who is
enumerating the things of w/c it is composed
free to resell it to another.
shall only be answerable for his character as an
heir.

Assignment of Credits Art. 1631. One who sells for a lump sum the
whole of certain rights, rents or products, shall
comply by answering for the legitimacy of the
whole in general; but he shall not be obliged to

395
warrant each of the various parts of w/c it may be Art. 1649. The lessee cannot assign the
composed, except in the case of eviction fr. the lease w/o the consent of the lessor, unless there
whole or the part of greater value. is a stipulation to the contrary.

Art. 1632 Should the vendor have profited by Art. 1650. When in the contract of lease of
some of the fruits or received anything fr. the things there is no express prohibition, the lessee
inheritance sold, he shall pay the vendee thereof, if may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part,
the contrary has not been stipulated. w/o prejudice to his responsibility for the
performance of the contract toward the lessor.
Art. 1633 The vendee shall, on his part,
reimburse the vendor for all that the latter may Art. 1651. Without prejudice to his obligation
have paid for the debts of & charges on the estate toward the sub-lessor the sub-lessee is bound to
& satisfy the credits he may have against the same, the lessor for all acts w/c refer to the use &
unless there is an agreement to the contrary. preservation of the thing leased in the manner
stipulated between the lessor & the lessee.
Art. 1634 When a credit or other incorporeal
right in litigation is sold, the debtor shall have a Art. 1652. The sub-lessee is subsidiarily liable
right to extinguish it by reimbursing the assignee for to the lessor for any rent due fr. the lessee.
the price the latter paid therefor, the judicial costs However, the sub-lessee shall not be responsible
incurred by him, & the interest on the price fr. the beyond the amount of rent due fr. him, in
day on w/c the same was paid. accordance w/ the terms of the sub-lessee, at the
time of the extra-judicial demand by the lessor.
A credit or other incorporeal right shall be
considered in litigation fr. the time the complaint Payments of rent in advance by the sub-
concerning the same is answered. lessee shall be deemed not to have been made,
so far as the lessor’s claim is concerned, unless
The debtor may exercise his right w/in thirty said payments were effected in virtue of the
days fr. the date the assignee demands payment fr. custom of the place.
him.
Art. 1653. The provisions governing
warranty, contained in the Title on Sales, shall be
Notes: applicable to the contract of lease.
at a discount
if before litigation, can recover full amount In the cases where the return of the price is
if case is pending, may be terminated by required, reduction shall be made in proportion to
debtor by paying to assignee only the the time during w/c the lessee enjoyed the thing.
amount he paid for in the assignment of
credit PURPOSE: to prevent speculation
in litigation

Art. 1635 From the provisions of the BAVIERA NOTES:


preceding article shall be excepted the assignments Rent Control Law prohibits sublease
or sales made: NCC - unless prohibited, sublease is
to a co-heir or co-owner of the right assigned; allowed.
to a creditor in payment of his credit;
to the possessor of a tenement or piece of land
w/c is subject to the right in litigation assigned. MANLAPAZ VS. SALAZAR

Facts: A fishpond belonged to 3 co-owners who


had taken turns in leasing it to the same person,
LEASE Enriquez. The last lease was signed in 1931 to
last until June 1, 1967. After the death of
Enriquez, his widow subleased the fishpond to
Cruz & then to Salazar, the sublease to the latter
to commence fr. May 31, 1947 to last until May
31, 1967. In 1952, the sole heir of the other co-

396
owners, Manlapaz, brought action against the sub- upon the lessee, the same must be contained
lessee Salazar to recover possession of the expressly in the contract of lease, w/c in the
fishpond, alleging that the sublease to Salazar as instant case, did not appear; & if it did, was
well as the leases executed by his predecessor in waived by the owner of the premises in question
interest was null & void. when he allowed the sub-lessee to stay in the
premises & accepted rentals fr. him. Whether the
Issue: W/N the contract is a sublease w/c is valid lessee had the right to sublease the property or
even though entered into w/o consent of the lessors assign his leasehold right to another is not a
since there was no prohibition against it in the proper defense for the sub-lessee, not only bec.
contract of lease OR an assignment of lease w/c is the sub-lessee is a stranger to the lease contract
void for want of consideration. between the lessee & the owner of the house
who alone can enforce or waive it, but also bec.
Held: The contract is valid sublease. To the sub-lessee, being a privy of the lessee,
determine whether a contract constitutes an cannot attack the lease collaterally for the simple
assignment & not a mere sublease, the test is reason that a tenant is not permitted to deny the
whether the lessee has by said contract made an title of his landlord.
absolute transfer of his interest as such lessee, thus
disassociating himself fr. the original contract of
lease, so that his personality disappears & there BAVIERA NOTES:
remain only in the juridical relation two persons, the
lessor & the assignee, who is converted into a
lessee. In the case at bar, the original lease is to Q: Distinguish the right of first refusal fr. an
last until June 1, 1957. On the other hand, the option to buy.
sublease is to last only until May 31 of that year.
Right of First Refusal  lessor should first offer
The sublease is thus for a shorter period than the
to sell to the lessee before offering to a third
original lease. A reservation of even so short a person
period as the last day of the term is enough to owner has not yet decided to sell & no offer yet
make the transfer a sublease. Moreover, the terms made
of the sublease shows that the lessee, now the sub-
lessor, has not disassociated herself fr. the original Option to buy  a continuing offer to sell
lease.
Q: Seller of car made a contract in the form of
NAVA VS. YAPTINCHAY lease to the buyer w/ right to buy.

Q: it is actually a sale by installments. In case


Facts: Quillen owned a house w/c he leased to the contract is canceled, the seller cannot
Nava in April 1945, for w/c an advance rent was recover the unpaid balance.
paid for May 15 to Aug. 14, 1945. It was
understood that the lease was for 1 year. At about 3 kinds of leases w/ option to buy:
the end of April, 1945, Nava subleased the same
premises to Yaptinchay for P3,000, payable in 1. lease w/ option buy at any time where
installments. Later, Quillen objected to the sublease payments are rents
& as a consequence took control thereof & entered but are not credited to purchase price
= still bound to pay arrears
into a separate agreement w/ Yaptinchay wherein
the latter can rent the premises in his own right. 2. lease w/ option buy at any time where
Thus, Nava filed an action against Yaptinchay. rents paid are credited to purchase price
= not bound to pay arrears
Issue: W/N the contract entered into between the
parties was a sublease or an assignment of the right 3. lease w/ option to buy w/ the condition that at
to occupy the premises. the end of the period, lessee pays all rents
and the lessor would execute the deed of
sale = considered sale on installments
Held: The contract is a sublease. In the case of
cession, the lessee transmits absolutely his rights &
PACTO DE RETRO EQUITABLE
his personality disappears, there only remains in the MORTGAGE
juridical relation two persons, the lessor & the ownership is already lot should first be
assignee who is converted into a lessee. In order transferred to the foreclosed before
that prohibition to sublease may be held binding buyer subject to seller’ ownership transferred
397
right of redemption excess in the LEASE COMMODATUM
foreclosure sale is onerous gratuitous
returned to borrower involve usage of also involve usage of
property property
Q: A sold lot to B for P5M. C, lessee of A’s lot
offered to buy the same for P4.5 M. aliens may lease real property - by implication, as
A: A already offered C but C could only give they are only prohibited fr. buying the same
P4.5M. The right of first refusal was not violated.
leases w/ option to buy - where rentals constitute
TOLENTINO NOTES: payment of price in installments, actually sales,
leases in name only
General characteristics of lease:
temporary duration anyone w/ capacity may become lessees
onerous
price is fixed according to contract duration persons disqualified to buy under Arts. 1490 &
1491 cannot become lessees of the same
Kinds of leases
of things - movable or immovables GENERAL RULE. A lease is only a personal right.
of work or contract of labor
of services EXCEPTION: A lease becomes a real right only by
household services (Arts 1689-1699) exception; i.e., when it is registered.
contract for a piece of work (Arts. 1713-1731)
lease of service of common carriers (Arts. 1732- Registration necessary when:
1763) the lease is longer than one year
it is a lease of an immovable
 consumable things - cannot be the subject of a
lease UNLESS: only for display or advertising & if it Effect of non-registration of lease when required
is merely an accessory to a leased industrial  lease not binding on 3rd persons.
establishment (e.g., coal in factory)
Period of lease:
Special characteristics of lease of things: cannot be perpetual
essential purpose is to transmit the use & definite - set time/ not more than 99 years,
enjoyment of the thing excess is void
consensual - perfected by mere consent if lease is for a determinate time, it ceases upon
onerous day fixed, w/o need for a demand
price fixed in relation to period of use or enjoyment indefinite period - exact time not known but
temporary certainly to terminated upon arrival of a day
certain (e.g., lease until you get a new place ,
Distinctions: etc.)

LEASE SALE Obligations of a SUBLESSEE to the lessor:


only use & enjoyment ownership transferred subsidiarily liable to lessor for rent due fr. lessee
of thing are transferred permanently BUT not liable for amount in excess of that due of
only for a determinate price generally only him (as sub-lessee)
period money or equivalent liable to lessor (& lessee/sub-lessor) for all act
price may not only that refer to the use & preservation of the thing
consist of money
Obligations of the LESSOR:
deliver thing in condition fit for use intended
LEASE USUFRUCT during the lease, make necessary repairs to keep
generally a personal always a real right it suitable for use intended UNLESS there’s
right (real right only by constituted only by the stipulation to contrary
exception) owner maintain lessee in peaceful & adequate
may be constituted by includes all possible enjoyment of the lease for contract duration
person not the owner ways of using & cannot alter form of thing contrary so as to
may be limited to enjoying the property impair intended use
particular uses in the may be for an sales warranties - against hidden defects,
contract indeterminate period of eviction, applicable to leases also; the lessor also
must be for a time warrants these
determinate period
Rights & Obligations of the LESSEE:
pay rent according to terms
398
use thing according to stipulated use, like a good That the common carrier shall not be
father of a family; if use not specified, inferred fr. responsible for the acts or commissions of his
nature of thing, according to customs of the place
pay expenses for deed of lease employees;
tolerate urgent repairs That the common carrier’s liability for acts
bring to knowledge of lessor ASAP usurpations or committed by thieves or robbers who do not act
untoward acts of 3rd persons w/ grave or irresistible threat, violence or force is
advise owner of repairs needed dispensed w/ or diminished;
be liable for damages suffered by lessor through his That the common carrier is not responsible
negligence for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of goods
return thing leased at termination as he received it o account of the defective condition of the car,
responsible for deterioration of thing leased
vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment used in
liable for deterioration caused by members of his
household, guests, & visitors the contract of carriage;
to suspend rentals’ payment if lessor fails to make
necessary repairs or maintain lessee in peaceful & Art. 1749. A stipulation that the common
adequate possession of the property leased carrier’s liability is limited to the value of the
goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the
Grounds for judicial ejectment of lessee by lessor: shipper or owner declares a higher value, is
expiration of lease duration - as stipulated or by law binding.
lack of payment of price stipulated
violations of conditions agreed upon
Art. 1750. A contract fixing the sum of that
lessee did not use thing for intended purpose,
causing its deterioration may be recovered by the owner or shipper for
the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
Where there is an implied extension of the lease: is valid, if it is reasonable & just under the
(TACITA RECONDUCCION - tacit renewal of lease) circumstances & has been fairly & freely agreed
upon.
Requisites:
Art. 1753. The law of the country to w/c the
contract of lease has ended goods are to be transported shall govern the
lessee has continued enjoying the thing leased for
15 days liability of the common carrier for their loss,
such continued enjoyment was w/ the acquiescence destruction & deterioration.
of lessor
notice to contrary by either party not previously Art. 1754. The provisions of articles 1733 to
given 1753 shall apply to the passenger’s baggage w/c
no express contract entered into by parties after old is not in his personal custody or that of his
contract ended employees. As to other baggage, the rules in
articles 1998 to 2000 to 2003 concerning the
responsibility of hotel-keepers shall be
COMMON CARRIERS applicable.

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to


Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar carry passengers safely as far as human care &
provisions shall be considered unreasonable, unjust foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
& contrary to public policy: of very cautious persons, w/ due regard for all
That the goods are transported at the risk of circumstances.
the owner or shipper;
That the common carrier shall not be liable for Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to
any loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods; passengers, common carriers are presumed to
That the common carrier need not observe any have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
diligence in the custody of the goods; unless they proved that they have observed
That the common carrier shall exercise a .extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles
degree of diligence less than that of a good father 1733 to 1755.
of a family, or of a man of ordinary prudence in the
vigilance over the movables transported; Art. 1757. The responsibility of a common
carrier for the safety of passengers as required
in articles 1733 to 1755 cannot be dispensed w/

399
or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, Art. 1765. The Public Service Commission
by statements on tickets or otherwise. may, on its own motion or on petition of any
interested party, after due hearing, cancel the
Art. 1758. When a passenger is carried certificate of public convenience granted to any
gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the common common carrier that repeatedly fails to comply w/
carrier’s liability for negligence is valid; but not for his duty to observe extraordinary diligence as
willful acts or gross negligence. prescribed in this section.

The reduction of fare does not justify any Art. 1766. In all matters not regulated by
limitation of the common carrier’s liability. this Code, the rights & obligations of common
carriers shall be governed by the Code of
Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the Commerce & special laws.
death of or injuries tom passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond PHOENIX ASSOCIATION V. MACONDRAY
the scope o their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers. Facts: SS Fernbank received a shipment fr.
California, consigned to the order of Commercial
The liability of the common carriers doe not Bank, a Manila Bank w/ arrival notice to Floro
cease upon proof that they exercised all the Mills. The shipment was insured for $5,450 w/
diligence of a good father of a family in the Phoenix Co. of New York against all risks. This
selection & supervision of their employees. shipment was covered by a bill of lading. Printed
in the smallest type on the back of the BOL is a
Art. 1760. The common carrier’s responsibility stipulation limiting the carrier’s liability for loss or
prescribed in the preceding article cannot be damage to $500 per package unless the shipper
eliminated or limited by stipulation, or by the in writing declares the nature of the goods & a
posting of notices, by statements on the tickets or higher valuation & pays additional freightage on
otherwise. the basis of said higher valuation. It also
provides, that in accepting the BOL, the shipper,
Art. 1761. The passenger must observe the owner & consignee of the goods & the holder of
diligence of a good father of family to avoid injury the BOL agree to be bound by all its stipulations,
to himself. exceptions & conditions whether written,
stamped or printed as fully as if they were all
Art. 1762. The contributory negligence of the signed by such shipper, consignee or holder.
passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his
death or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is The ship arrived in Manila & a carton
the negligence of the common carrier, but the included in the shipment was in bad order & was
amount of damages shall be equitably reduced. almost empty. Because of this, Floro Mills filed a
claim w/ Macondray & Co., the agent of the
Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for vessel & agent of the insurance company in the
injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the amount of $1,512.78 w/c is the value of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or cargo .Macondray posted as a defense clause 17
strangers if the common carrier’s employees of the BOL to limit its liability to $500.
through the exercise of the diligence of a good Issue: WON clause 17 is valid;
father of a family could have prevented or stopped WON Macondray should be liable to pay
the act or omission. beyond $500.

Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Held: Clause 17 is valid. Hence, Macondray
section shall be awarded in accordance w/ Title cannot be made to pay beyond $500.
XVIII of this book, concerning damages. Article
2208 shall also apply to the death of a passenger Clause 17 of the BOL is sanctioned by Sec. 4
caused by the breach of contract by a common of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The
carrier. provisions on limited liability are as much a part
of the BOL as though physically in it & as much a
part thereof as though placed therein by

400
agreement. The court has previously upheld in small letters at the back of the plane ticket
stipulations limiting liability of a carrier unlike (P100).
unqualified limitations & total exemptions.
HELD. NO. PAL’s liability should be P373 based
AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCOSO SEPT. 28, 1966 on evidence. Following Art. 1750, a common
carrier’s liability may be limited to a fixed amount.
FACTS: Air France, through its authorized agent However, the contract must be reasonable & just
PAL, issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip under the circumstances & has been fairly &
ticket fr. Mla. to Rome. The trip involved 3 freely entered upon by the parties.
connecting flights.
In the CAB, it could not be said that S
In Bangkok, the manager of the airline was aware of said conditions w/c are printed at
forced C to vacate the first class seat claiming that a the back of the ticket in letters so small. PAL has
white man had a better right thereto. A commotion admitted that the passengers do not sign the
ensued as a result of the manager’s insistence. C ticket.
was transferred to a tourist class seat. Hence this
suit for damages. Further, in the case of Ysmael v. Barreto,
the court held that the carrier cannot limit its
HELD: SC could not understand how a reputable liability for injury to or loss of goods shipped
firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to where such injury or loss was caused by its own
give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It negligence. REASON: The natural effect of a
received the corresponding amount in payment of limitation of liability against negligence is to
first class ticket & yet it allowed the passenger to be induce want of care on the part of the carrier in
at the mercy of its Ees. More so in this case since C the performance of its duty.
was a confirmed passenger.
MARANAN V. PEREZ
There was a contract to furnish C a first
class passage. Said contract was breached when FACTS: Corrachea, a passenger of a taxicab
the common carrier failed to furnish first class owned & operated by Perez, was stabbed to
transportation to Bangkok. As to the airline’s death by the driver Valenzuela. The latter was
culpability based on culpa aquiliana, a common convicted of homicide. Maranan, the mother of
carrier can be guilty of culpa aquiliana the deceased filed an action for damages against
independently of its contract of carriage if the P. P contended that it should be absolved fr.
breach of contract of carriage was attended by (1) liability based on the doctrine laid down in Gillaco
negligence, (2) malice & (3) bad faith. v. MRR -- that the Er is under no absolute
liability for assaults of its Ees upon passengers.
For this, C is entitled to both exemplary &
moral damages. The NCC gives the court ample HELD: P liable. Gillaco case different. In the
power to grant exemplary damages in contracts & Gillaco case, the guard who killed the passenger
quasi contracts. The only condition is that the was not in his supposed duty post. Furthermore,
airline should have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, the incident happened at least 2 hours before the
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. The EE was to start his duty.
manner of ejecting C fr. his first class seat fits into
this legal precept. In the CAB, the killing was perpetrated
by the very driver of the cab transporting the
passenger in whose hands the carrier had
SHEWARAM V. PAL entrusted the duty to execute the contract of
carriage. It took place in the course of duty of
FACTS: Shewaram, a paying passenger of PAL the Ee. Furthermore, the Gillaco case was
filed a complaint for damages against the latter decided under the OCC. The NCC, unlike the
claiming that PAL’s Ees mistagged his luggage former, expressly makes the common carrier
resulting to its non-arrival in Manila. Later, it was liable for intentional assaults committed by its Ees
found that it ended in Iligan City. against passengers. It is no defense that the act
was done in excess of authority or in
ISSUE: WON PAL’s liability should be limited to the disobedience to the carrier’s orders.
amount stated in the conditions of carriage printed
401
JUNTILLA V. FONTANAR the common carrier’s liability. Since the box
looked innocuous, it would be clearly in violation
FACTS: Juntilla was a passenger in a public utility of the constitutional right of the passenger to
jeepney. In the course of its journey, the rear tire search his baggage.
exploded & caused J to be thrown off. J suffered
injuries. Hence, J filed a suit for breach of contract MANILA RAILROAD CO. VS. BALLESTEROS
of carriage against the driver, the franchise holder &
registered owner. Facts: Ballesteros, et. al. were passengers on
MRR’s bus. The auditor assigned to the company
ISSUE: WON said incident should be characterized by the General Auditing Office, took the wheel &
as caso fortuito, therefore, absolving the defendants told the driver to sit somewhere else. The driver
fr. liability. tried to take the wheel to no avail. At some
point, the bus collided w/ a freight truck, w/c
HELD: NOT CASO FORTUITO. In the case of caused injuries to passengers.
Lasam v. Smith, the elements of caso fortuito are:
the cause of the unforeseen or unexpected event Held: MRR is liable for the injuries Article 1763
must be independent of the human will; of the Civil Code & Section 48 (b) of the Motor
it must be impossible to foresee or if it can be Vehicle Law, respectively provide that: ‘”a
foreseen, it was impossible to avoid; common carrier is responsible for injuries
the occurrence must be as such to render it suffered by a passenger on account of the willful
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a acts or negligence of other passengers or
normal manner. strangers, if the common carrier’s Ees through
The obligor must be free fr. any participation in the the exercise of the diligence of a good father of
aggravation of the resulting injury to the obligee. the family could have prevented or stopped the
act or omission.
In the CAB, req. no. 1 is not present. The “No professional chauffeur shall permit
driver was speeding at the time of the incident. any unlicensed person to drive the motor vehicle
The jeepney was also overloaded & that there were under his control, or permit a person, sitting
three passengers in the front seat. beside him or in any other part of the car, to
interfere w/ him in the operation of the motor
As to mechanical defects, the vehicle, by allowing said person to take hold of
preponderance of authority is that the passenger is the steering wheel, or in any other manner take
entitled to recover damages fr. a carrier for an part in the manipulation or control of the car.”
injury resulting fr. a defect in the appliance. The
rationale for the carrier’s liability is the fact that the ONG YIU VS. CA
passenger has neither the choice nor control over
the carrier in the selection & use by the carrier. Facts: Ong, a practicing lawyer & a
Having no privity whatsoever w/ the manufacturer businessman, took the PAL fr. Cebu to Iligan,
of the defective equipment, the passenger had no where he was to attend a trial of a civil case.
remedy against the manufacturer while the carrier Upon arriving at Butuan City, he claimed his
has. luggage but it could not be found. It turned out
that the luggage was carried over to Manila.
NOCUM VS. NOCUM Inside the luggage were documents needed for
the trial.
Facts: Nocum was a passenger in LTB’s Bus No.
120 who was injured of the explosion of firecrackers Ong wired PAL-Cebu demanding the
contained in a box, loaded in said bus & declared to delivery of the luggage. When his baggage
its conductor as containing clothes & miscellaneous arrived, one of the airport drivers opened it in
items by a co-passenger. the presence of a PAL employee who looked at
the contents only. He handed the luggage to
Held: LTB not liable bec. there is need for Ong & informed him that the lock was open.
evidence of circumstances indicating cause or Ong discovered that the documents pertinent to
causes for apprehension that the passenger’s the trial were missing as well as his gifts for his
baggage is dangerous & that it is failure of the parents-in-law.
common carrier’s employee to act in the face of
such evidence that constitutes the cornerstone of
402
Held: PAL is to pay only P100.00 as baggage exception to the GR that negligence must be
liability. No bad faith on the part of PAL who proved.
exerted diligent effort to locate Ong’s baggage.
PAL’s liability is limited to the amount stipulated at PAL VS. CA
the back of the plane ticket. The stipulation was
printed in reasonably & fairly big letters, easily FACTS: Samson, a licensed aviator was
readable. Furthermore, Ong as a frequent flyer & a employed by PAL as a regular co-pilot of Capt.
lawyer, should have been fully aware of the Bustamante. On several occasions, Samson
conditions. complained to PAL about the slow reaction &
poor judgment of Bustamante in manning their
Ong may not have signed the ticket regular flights. Notw/standing the complaints,
nevertheless, he is bound by such stipulation the PAL allowed B to man its flights.
same being part of the contract of carriage, valid &
binding upon the passenger regardless of lack of In one flight, due to the slow reaction &
knowledge or assent. poor judgment of B, they overshot the airfield.
Because of the impact, Samson suffered fr.
It is a contract of adhesion wherein one concussions & wounds on the forehead. He was
party imposes a ready made contract for the other not accorded the proper medical attention
party, the place ticket in CAB. Such contracts are required under the circumstances. PAL ignored
not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the Samson’s plea for expert medical assistance.
contract is free to reject it entirely, if he adheres he Suffering fr. periodic spells & general debility,
give consent. Samson always complained to PAL. He was
dismissed. PAL denied liability on the ground
ABETO VS. PAL that the accident was due to aviational
disturbance & not Bustamante’s negligence.
Facts: Judge Abeto boarded PAL’s plane at Iloilo
City for Manila. The plane crashed at Mindoro ISSUE: Is PAL liable? Yes
killing all passengers. The widow of Judge Abeto
filed a case against PAL for breach of contract of HELD: There was gross negligence on the part
carriage. of PAL in allowing B to fly on the day of the
accident. It has been a known fact to PAL that B
Held: Common Carriers are bound to observe had always been complaining to PAL of pain in
extra-ordinary diligence. In case of death or the face particularly in the nose. This pain is the
injuries to passengers, common carriers are result of a tumor. Thus, for allowing B to man its
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted flight, PAL is guilty of gross negligence & should
negligently, unless they prove that they observed be made liable for the resulting accident.
extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed.
PAL is a common carrier, it is bound to
It is clear that the pilot did not follow the exercise extraordinary diligence. This duty on the
designated route for his flight between Romblon & part of the common carrier is for the safety of the
Manila. The weather was clear & he was supposed passengers as well as the crew members or its
to cross airway “Amber 1” over Romblon. Instead complement operating the common carrier.
he made a straight flight to Manila in violation of air
traffic rules. ZALAMEA VS. CA

The court need not make an express FACTS: Papa Zalamea bought tickets fr.
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the TransWorld Airlines (TWA) for Mama Zalamea &
carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the Baby Zalamea. The ticket was for a flight for NY
damages sought for by the passenger. By the to LA. The tickets of Papa & Mama were bought
contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the at a 75% discount while that of Baby was a full
express obligation to transport the passenger to his fare ticket. The Zalameas reconfirmed their flight
destination safely & to observe to observe in NY. When they checked in for their flight,
extraordinary diligence w/ a due regard for all the they were placed in the waiting list bec. the flight
circumstances, & any injury that might be suffered was overbooked. Only Papa was able to board
by the passenger is right way attributable to the the plane bec. he was mistakenly holding Baby’s
fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an ticket. Baby & Mama were left in NY. Mama was
403
constrained to buy 2 more tickets. Upon arrival at ISSUE: Which law should govern - COGSA or
Manila, the Zalameas sued TWA & was awarded NCC? NCC. The law of the country to w/c the
moral damages. TWA raised the defense that goods are to be transported governs the liability
overbooking was an accepted practice in the US, of the common carrier in case of loss, destruction
hence, there was no bad faith. or deterioration. In all matters not regulated by
the NCC, the rights & obligations of CC shall be
ISSUE: WON award of moral damages was governed by the Code of Commerce & spl. Laws.
proper? YES
ISSUE: Who has the burden of proof? The
HELD: The US law or regulation allegedly common carrier has the burden of proof to prove
authorizing overbooking has never been proved. that it was not at fault of that it did not act
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the negligently (PROVE EXTRAORDINARY
courts take judicial notice of them. TWA relied DILIGENCE) The NCC provides that if loss,
solely on the statement of its customer service destruction or deterioration is not one of those
agent that the Code of Federal Regulations of the enumerated in art 1734 (flood, storm,
Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. But earthquake, lightning & other natural disasters)
even if said law was proved, it still is inapplicable in the carrier is presumed to be negligent.
the Phils in accordance w/ the principle of lex loci
contractus w/c require that the law of the place ISSUE: Was the carrier at fault? YES There
where the ticket was issued should be applied by was actual fault on the part of the carrier in that
the court where the passengers are residents & when the smoke was noticed the fire was already
nationals of the forum & the ticket is issued in such big & that the same must have started 24 hours
State by the defendant airline. Since the ticket was before it was noticed. After the cargoes were
sold & issued in the Phils the applicable law would stored in the hatches, no regular inspection was
be Phil law. made as to their condition during the voyage.

A contract of carriage generates a relation ISSUE: How much is the liability of the carrier?
attended w/ public duty – a duty to provide public
service & convenience to its passengers w/c must There is no stipulation in the Bills of
be paramount to self-interest or enrichment. Even Lading limiting the liability of the carrier for loss
on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, or destruction. According to the COGSA, said
TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its liability should not exceed $500 per package BUT
passengers beforehand that it could breach the in no case more than the amount of damage
contract even if they have confirmed tickets if there actually sustained.
was overbooking.
SAMAR MINING VS. NORDDEUTSCHER
Moreover, TWA was guilty of bad faith in LLOYD
not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of
giving less priority to discounted tickets. FACTS: Samar imported equipment & loaded the
same on one of the ships owned by Lloyd. Upon
arrival in Manila, the aforementioned importation
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT was unloaded & delivered in good order &
condition to the bonded warehouse of AMCYL.
EASTERN SHIPPING VS. IAC However, the goods were never delivered to
Samar. It filed a claim against Lloyd & its agent
FACTS: M/S Asiatica was owned by Eastern Sharp & Co. It was stipulated in the Bill of Lading
Shipping Lines. It was loaded in Kobe, Japan & was that the delivery of the goods to the warehouse
bound for Manila. However, en route the vessel was part of Lloyd’s duty to transship the goods fr.
caught fire & sank resulting in the total loss of the Manila to Davao.
cargo & the vessel. Included in the cargo were 28
packages consigned to Phil Blooming Mills & 7 cases ISSUE: WON Lloyd liable? NO
of spare parts consigned to Central Textile Mills.
Both sets of goods were insured against marine risk HELD: Pursuant to the Bill of Lading, Lloyd’s
for their stated value w/ Respondent Dev’t responsibility as a common carrier ceased the
Insurance & Surety. moment the goods were unloaded in Manila & in
the manner of transshipment, it acted merely as
404
an agent of Samar. Under 1736, the carrier may Issue: Is a passenger bound by the terms of a
be relieved of the responsibility for the loss or ticket declaring that the limitations of liability set
damage to the goods upon actual or constructive forth set forth in the Warsaw Convention as
delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee, amended by the Hague Protocol shall apply in
or to the person who has a right to receive them. case of loss, damage or destruction to registered
luggage of a passenger?
Two undertakings appeared embodied in
the Bill. The first is for the transport of goods fr. Held: There is no dispute that there was a notice
Bremen, Germany to Manila. The second, the on the ticket stating the applicability of the
transshipment of the same fr. Manila to Davao, w/ Warsaw Convention in case of death/ injury to a
Lloyd acting as agent of Samar. At the hiatus passenger; loss, damage or destruction of
between these two undertakings of Lloyd w/c is the luggage. Such is sufficient notice. While
moment when the subject goods are discharged in contracts of adhesion are not entirely prohibited,
Manila, its personality changes fr. carrier to agent of neither is blind reliance on them encouraged.
the consignee. Thus the character of its possession Passengers are not always bound by the
changed fr. possession in its own name as carrier stipulated amounts on a ticket or printed
into possession in the name of the consignee. Such elsewhere. The reasons behind the stipulations
being the case, there was actual delivery of the limiting liability arise fr. the difficulty, if not
goods fr. Lloyd as carrier to the same Lloyd as impossibility, of establishing w/ clear
agent of the consignee Samar. Upon such delivery, preponderance of evidence, the contents of a lost
Lloyd ceases to be responsible for any loss or suitcase unless the contents are declared. It will
damage. always be the passenger’s word vs. the airline’s.
The Warsaw Convention

WARSAW CONVENTION Specifically provides it is applicable to


int’l carriage defined as any carriage in w/c,
according to the agreement between the parties,
Art. 28(1). A complaint could be instituted only the place of departure & the place of destination
in the territory of one of the High Contracting are situated either w/in the territories of 2High
Parties, before: Contracting Parties or w/in the territory of a
single High Contracting Party if there is an
The court of the domicile of the carrier; agreed stopping place w/in the territory of
The court of its principal place of business; another State.
The court where it has a place of business Nowhere in the convention is such detailed notice
through w/c the contract has been made; or of baggage liability limitations required.
The court of the place of destination.
It is, however, a common, safe &
practical custom for air carriers to indicate
beforehand the precise sums equivalent to those
PAN AM V. RAPADAS
fixed by the Convention.
Facts: Rapadas was en route fr. Guam to Manila.
SANTOS III V. NORTHWEST
Pan Am Airlines’ handcarry control agent ordered
him to check in his attaché case. Rapada tried to
get out of doing so but was constrained to do so Facts: Santos, a minor & resident of the Phils.,
purchased in San Francisco a Northwest (NW)
eventually. It was his brother that checked in the
ticket fr. SF to Manila via Tokyo & back. The
luggage w/o declaring its contents nor their value.
scheduled departure fr. Tokyo was De. 20 w/ no
When he arrived in Mania he was handed back all
date specified for the return to SF. Despite
his luggage except the attaché case. He filed an
confirmation & re-confirmation, when Santos
action for damages of $42,403.90 representing the
checked in at the SF airport he was informed he
value of the contents. Pan Am contended that the
had no reservation for the connecting flight fr.
claim was subject to Notice Of Baggage Liability
Tokyo to Manila. He was waitlisted. Thus Santos
Limitations attached to the plane ticket & thus its
sued NW for damages in the RTC-Makati. NW
liability is limited to $180 as R did not declare a
filed MTD for lack of jurisdiction based on Art.
higher valuation.
28(1) of the Warsaw Convention.

405
Issues: The obligor must be free of participation in, or
WON Art. 28(1) of the WC is const’l? Yes. aggravation of, injury to the creditor.
WON Phil. courts have jurisdiction? No.
In the CAB, the captain & crew were well
Held: The WC is a treaty commitment voluntarily aware of the risk they were taking as the
entered by the Phil. gov’t & as such has the force & typhoon’s course was posted on weather
effect of law. The presumption is that this joint bulletins at 6-hr. intervals. In taking a calculated
legislative & executive act was first carefully studied risk the captain & crew failed to exercise the
& determined to be constitutional before it was extraordinary diligence explicitly required by law.
adopted. The Phil. gov’t has done nothing to reject
the WC since it came into existence in 1950. As to the total loss of vessel, the liability
of the shipowner is limited to the value of the
The wording of the convention w/c vessel or the insurance thereon. Despite loss the
indicates where actions should be brought shows insurance will answer for the damages resulting
mandatory character & not merely a matter of fr. the death of passengers.
venue. This is consistent w/ its aim to regulate in a
uniform manner the conditions of international
transport by air. Furthermore, there is no provision Art. 1467. A contract for the delivery at a
in the WC prescribing rules of jurisdiction other certain price of an article w/c the vendor in the
than Art. 28(1). ordinary course of his business manufactures or
procures for the general market , whether the
In CAB,. It appearing that the Phils. is not same is on hand at the time or not, is a contract
one of those enumerated action may be properly of sale, but if the goods are to be manufactured
filed, then Phil. courts have no jurisdiction. The specially for the customer & upon his special
court w/c is called upon to determine the order, & not for the general market, it is a
applicability of the limitation provision must first be contract for a piece of work.
vested w/ the appropriate jurisdiction. The action
must have been commenced properly under Art. Art. 1725. The owner may w/draw at will fr.
28(1) before Santos may avail himself of the the construction of the work, although it may
provisions of the WC. have been commenced, indemnifying the
contractor for all the latter’s expenses, work &
the usefulness w/c the owner may obtain
MARITIME LAW therefr., & damages.

Art. 1726. When a piece of work has been


VASQUEZ V. CA entrusted to a person by reason of his personal
qualifications, the contract is rescinded upon his
Facts: The MV Pioneer Cebu had on board the death.
Velasquez spouses & their minor son as well as
other families. Due to Typhoon Klaring the vessel In this case the proprietor shall pay the heirs
struck a reef & sank resulting in the death of the of the contractor in proportion to the price agreed
young Velasquez & other minors & passengers. upon, the value of the part of the work done, &
The parents of the minors filed a claim for damages of the materials prepared, provided the latter
against Filipinas Pioneer Lines (owner of the vessel) yield him some benefit.
w/c claimed force majeure & extinction of liability
due to total loss of the vessel. TC ruled in favor of The same rule shall apply if the contractor
the parents, CA reversed. cannot finish the work due to circumstances
beyond his control.
Issue: WON Filipinas Pioneer Lines is liable for
damages?
NAKPIL & SONS VS. CA
Held: Yes. To constitute a caso fortuito that would
exempt a person fr. liability, it is necessary that : FACTS: The Phil. Bar Association (PBA) decided
The event must be independent of human will; to construct an office building. the construction
Occurrence must render it impossible to the debtor was undertaken by the United Construction, Inc.
to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; &
406
on an “administration basis.” The plans & 2. Co-ownership or co-possession does not of
specifications for the building were prepared by the itself establish a partnership, whether such co-
other third party defendants Nakpil & Sons. The owners or co-possessors do or do not share any
building was completed in June, 1966. On August 2, profits made by the use of the property;
1968, an unusually strong earthquake hit Mla. & the 3. The sharing of gross returns does not of
building in question sustained major damage. PBA itself establish a partnership, whether or not the
commenced an axn. for the recovery of damages persons sharing them have a joint or common
arising fr. the partial collapse of the building vs. right or interest in any property fr. w/c the
United Construction, Inc. returns are derived;
4. The receipt by a person of a share of the
ISSUE: WON an act of God-an unusually strong profits of a business is prima facie evidence that
earthquake w/c caused the failure of the building, he is a partner in the business, but no such
exempts fr. liability parties who are otherwise liable inference shall be drawn if such profits received
bec. of their negligence in payment:
a. As a debt by installments or otherwise;
HELD: NO. Art. 1723 of the NCC applies. The b. As wages of an employee or rent to a
engineer or architect who drew up the plans & landlord;
specifications for a building is liable for damages if c. As an annuity to a widow or
w/in 15 years fr. the completion of the structure, representative of a deceased partner;
the same should collapse by reason of a defect in d. As interest on a loan, though the
those plans & specifications, or due to the defects in amount of payment vary w/ the profits of the
the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible business;
for the damage if the edifice fags w/in the same e. As the consideration for the sale of a
period on account of defects in the construction or goodwill of a business or other property by
the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by installments or otherwise.
him, or due to any violation of the terms of the
contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the Art. 1782. Persons who are prohibited fr.
construction, he shall be solidarily liable w/ the giving each other any donation or advantage
contractor. cannot enter into universal partnership.

Acceptance of the building after completion,


does not imply waiver of any of the COA by reason YULO VS. YANG
of any defect mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. The action must be brought w/in ten FACTS: Yang (D) proposed to Yulo (P) the
years following the collapse of the building. formation of a partnership. Def. suggested the
operation of a theater on the land leased by Pet.
In the CAB, the happening of the fortuitous fr. the Sta. Marina sisters. So Yang & Co. was
event or an act of God was concurred in by
formed & its capital was P100,000, P20,000 of
negligence of the defendants ( United Construction w/c was to come fr. P. A supplementary
& Nakpil & Sons) by deviating fr. the plans & agreement was later made whereby it was stated
specifications & failing to observe the requisite that the partnership is extended for 3 more years
workmanship in the construction as well as to & that the building shall belong to P at its
exercise the requisite degree of supervision. Hence, expiration. The lessors, the Sta. Marina sisters,
they can be held liable. desiring to terminate the lease brought an action
for ejectment vs. P. TC for the lessors. Later,
when P demanded fr. D her share in the profits of
PARTNERSHIP the business, the latter refused to do so. P thus
brought this action. D, in answer claims that what
existed between the parties was an agreement of
Art. 1769. In determining whether a partnership lease w/c was made to appear as a K of
exists, these rules shall apply: partnership to get around the prohibition in P’s
lease contract w/ the lessors w/c prohibited P fr.
1. Except as provided by Art. 1825, persons subleasing the property. For D.
who are not partners as to each other are not
partners as to third persons;

407
ISSUE: WON the K was for sublease or a K of sharing in the profits or losses. Where a
partnership partner paid expenses representing a loss to
the partnership, & there’s no income fr. the
partnership to reimburse him, he has a right
HELD: For sublease. The ff. are requisites of a
to look to the estate of his other partners for
partnership: 1. 2 or more persons who bind reimbursement.
themselves to contribute money, property, or Industrial Partner. - An industrial partner
industry to a common fund 2. intention on the part cannot claim any part of the property
of the partners to divide the profits among contributed; he can share only in the profits
themselves. These requisites are not present. For & benefits, unless the contrary is stipulated.
one, P did not furnish her P20T capital; neither did He cannot be held liable for losses unless he
she help in the management of the theater; & she is specifically made to participate in the
has never demanded fr. D any accounting of the losses.
business.

BAVIERA: The agreement stating that P was to Art. 1799. A stipulation w/c excludes one or
get P3T as her monthly participation also more partners fr. any share in the profits or
shows that there was no partnership losses is void.
agreement as she gets the same whether or
not the business experiences a loss. Also
shown by the stipulation that P is to get the TOLENTINO: The essence of partnership is that
building after the partnership’s termination. the partners share in the profits & losses. Thus,
If it were really a partnership, then the the law prohibits the exclusion of 1 or more
partners fr. the profits or losses. If such a
assets of the business should be liquidated at prohibited stipulation is made, the profits & losses
termination & the proceeds thereof paid to will be distributed according to Art. 1797 par. 2,
the creditors. Only if there is an excess would i.e., as if no stipulation / agreement was made.
the partners get something by dividing the
excess between themselves. Under French jurisprudence, a violation of this
article annuls the entire contract of partnership
(analogous to obligations based on an illicit
condition).
Art. 1797. The losses & profits shall be
distributed in conformity w/ the agreement. If only
the share of each partner in the profits has been
Art. 1800. The partner who has been
agreed upon, the share of each in the losses shall
appointed manager in the articles of partnership
be in the same proportion.
may execute all acts of administration despite the
opposition of his partners, unless he should act in
In the absence of stipulation, the share of each
bad faith; & his power is irrevocable w/o just or
partner in the profits & losses shall be in proportion
lawful cause. The vote of the partners
to what he may have contributed, but the industrial
representing the controlling interest shall be
partner shall not be liable for the losses. As for the
necessary for such revocation of power.
profits, the industrial partner shall receive such
share as may be just & equitable under the
A power granted after the partnership has
circumstances. If besides his services he has
been constituted may be revoked at any time.
contributed capital, he shall also receive a share in
the profits in proportion to his capital.

BAVIERA :
TOLENTINO: The theory behind irrevocable agency
(when appointment is made in the articles) is that
the partner concerned would not have joined the
This relates exclusively to the settlement of partnership were it not for the fact that he would
partnership affairs among the partners themselves. be appointed manager thereof.
It has nothing to do w/ the liability of partners to
3rd person. Rule: If the one managing partner is designated
Profits & Losses. - Parties can validly stipulate a in the articles of partnership, he can bind the
distribution of losses different fr. that of the partnership in all acts of administration. If the
profits, so long as nobody is excluded fr. others oppose, the remedy is to remove him.
408
If the duties of the managers are
Q: A owns 40%, B owns 40% & C owns 20% share specified, each one is considered as the sole
in a partnership. C was designated as managing manager as to the acts w/in the sphere of his
partner in the articles of partnership. The authority.
partnership went bankrupt. A wants to revoke C’s
management. Can he do so?
A: No. The law provides that such a management Art. 1802. In case it should have been
is irrevocable unless there is 1) lawful cause, &; 2) stipulated that none of the managing partners
controlling interest votes for the revocation.
Although lawful cause may be present, A by himself shall act w/o the consent of the others, the
does not represent the controlling interest. concurrence of all shall be necessary for the
validity of the acts, & the absence or disability of
one of them cannot be alleged, unless there is
TOLENTINO: imminent danger of grave or irreparable injury to
A managing partner is presumed to have all the the partnership.
incidental power to carry out the object of the
partnership in the transaction of business.
Exception: when the powers are specifically TOLENTINO:
restricted.
If the articles don’t specify the managing partner’s
This refers to joint management.
powers, he has the powers of a general agent.
The obligation to secure the consent of the other
SC has held that a managing partner has the
partner rests on the partner entering into the
power to contract for services, to dismiss EE’s &
contract, not on the 3rd person bec. the 3rd
to issue official receipts for amounts delivered
person can presume that the consent was
to the partnership through him.
given unless the contrary has been previously
manifested to him. Even if made w/o
consent, if the 3rd person acted in good faith
Art. 1801. If 2 or more partners have been & the transaction concerns matters w/in the
entrusted w/ the management of the partnership business of the partnership, the contract
w/o specification of their respective duties, or w/o cannot be annulled.
stipulation that one of them shall not act w/o the The requirement of previous approval refers to
the execution of formal contracts in writing,
consent of all the others, each one may separately not to routine transactions bec. they come
execute all acts of administration, but if any of them w/in the scope of the general authority of the
should oppose the acts of the others, the decision manager of a business.
of the majority shall prevail. In case of tie, the
matter shall be decided by the partners owning the Art. 1803. When the manner of
controlling interest. management has not been agreed upon, the ff.
rules shall be observed :

BAVIERA: The only one who can make an All of the partners shall be considered agents
objection is a co-managing partner. This first vote & whatever any one of them may do alone shall
should be among the managing partners only. If bind the partnership, w/o prejudice to the
there is a tie, then all (even the non-managing
partners) will vote. This, however, is an internal provisions of Art. 1801
agreement. Take note of Art. 1818. None of the partners may, w/o the consent
of the others, make any important alteration in
TOLENTINO: This deals w/ solidary management the immovable property of the partnership even if
(also found in Art. 1803). it may be useful to the partnership. But if the
refusal of consent by the other parties is
Gen. rule: Each manager can execute any act of manifestly prejudicial to the interest of the
administration w/o other managers’ consent. partnership, the court’s intervention may be
But: Each manager, however, has the right to
sought.
object to the act before it is executed. Such
opposition is enough to prevent it. If the manager
still executes the opposed act, it will be void, even
against 3rd person who had or who could have TOLENTINO: Gen. rule: Authority granted to
known of the opposition. each manager, or each partner when no
managers are designated, is only for acts of
administration. For acts of disposition or

409
modification of partnership articles, unanimous, not Assign the partnership property in trust for
just majority, consent is required. creditors or on the assignee’s promise to pay the
debts of the partnership;
Art. 1816. All partners, including industrial Dispose of the goodwill of the business;
ones, shall be liable pro rata w/ all their property & Do any other act w/c would make it
after all the partnership assets have been impossible to carry on the ordinary business of a
exhausted, for the contracts w/c may be entered partnership;
into in the name & for the account of the Confess a judgment;
partnership, under its signature & by a person Enter into a compromise concerning a
authorized to act for the partnership. However, any partnership claim or liability;
partner may enter into a separate obligation to Submit a partnership claim or liability to
perform a partnership contract. arbitration;
Renounce a claim of the partnership.

BAVIERA: This applies only to a partnership’s No act of a partner in contravention of a


contractual obligations. restriction on authority shall bind the partnership
to persons having knowledge of the restriction.
TOLENTINO: To enforce liability, both the
partnership & the separate partners may be joined
in the same action, but the property of the partners
cannot be taken in payment of the partnership debt BAVIERA: Why make the liability of partners
until the property of the partnership is exhausted. only pro-rata & subsidiary for contractual
obligations when they are mutual agents of each
The industrial partner is also liable for debts other?
& obligations of the partnership, although Art. 1797
states they are not liable for losses. A liability is TOLENTINO: The principle of agency that one
different fr. a loss. The inability to pay a debt to a who accepts / retains benefits of the
third party at a particular time does not mean that unauthorized acts of his agents, w/ knowledge of
the partnership as a whole has been operated at a material facts surrounding the transaction, will be
loss. deemed to have ratified those acts, is equally
applicable to a question of ratification of a
partner’s unauthorized acts.
Art. 1817. Any stipulation against the liability
laid down in the preceding article shall be void,
except as among the partners. Art. 1819. Where title to real property is in
the partnership name, any partner may convey
Art. 1818. Every partner is an agent of the title to such property by a conveyance executed
partnership for the purpose of its business, & the in the partnership name; but the partnership
act of every partner, including the execution in the may recover such property unless the partner’s
partnership name of any instrument, for apparently act binds the partnership under the provisions of
carrying on in the usual way the business of the Art. 1818 par. 1, or unless such property has
partnership of w/c he is a member binds the been conveyed by the grantee or a person
partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact claiming through such grantee to a holder for
no authority to act for the partnership in the value w/o knowledge that the partner, in making
particular matter, & the person w/ whom he is the conveyance, has exceeded his authority.
dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no
such authority. Where title to real property is in the name of
the partnership, a conveyance executed by a
An act of a partner w/c is not apparently for the partner, in his own name, passes the equitable
carrying on of business of the partnership in the interest of the partnership, provided the act is
usual way does not bind the partnership unless one w/in the authority of the partner under the
authorized by the other partners. provisions of Art. 1818 par.1.

Except when authorized by the other partners Where title to real property is in the name of
or unless they have abandoned the business, one or one or more but not all the partners, & the record
more but less than all partners have no authority to: does not disclose the right of the partnership, the
partners in whose name the title stands may

410
convey title to such property, but the partnership Art. 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or
may recover such property if the partner’s act omission of any partner acting in the ordinary
doesn’t bind the partnership under the provisions of course of the business of the partnership or w/
Art. 1818 par. 1, unless the purchaser or his the authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is
assignee, is a holder for value, w/o knowledge. caused to any person, not being a partner in the
partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the
Where the title to real property is in the names partnership is liable therefor to the same extent
of all the partners, a conveyance executed by all the as the partner so acting or omitting to act.
partners passes all their rights in such property.

TOLENTINO:
TOLENTINO: The right to mortgage is included in
the right to convey under this article. This concerns liability for wrongful acts. On the
principle of mutual agency, the partnership, or
every member of it, is liable for torts committed
by one of the members acting in the scope of the
Art. 1820. An admission or representation firm business, even if they didn’t participate in,
made by any partner concerning partnership affairs ratify, or have knowledge of the tort.
w/in the scope of his authority in accordance w/ this
Title is evidence against the partnership. The test of liability is based on a determination of
WON the wrong committed in behalf of & w/in
the reasonable scope of the business of the
partnership.
TOLENTINO: Where the admission is made after
dissolution & is not for the winding up of
However, if the injury results fr. a wanton or
partnerships affairs, it shouldn’t affect the
willful act of one of the parties, committed
partnership.
outside the agency or common business, the
person doing the act & causing the injury is alone
The partnership is not bound by admissions
responsible, unless it was authorized or
or statements made by a former partner after the
subsequently ratified by the other partners.
latter has w/drawn fr. the partnership as to what
took place during the period of partnership.
Art. 1823. The partnership is bound to make
good the loss:
Art. 1821. Notice to any partner of any matter
relating to partnership affairs, & the knowledge of Where one partner acting w/in the scope of
the partner acting in the particular matter, acquired his apparent authority receives money or
while a partner or then present to his mind, & the property of a third person & misapplies it; &
knowledge of any other partner who reasonably Where the partnership in the course of its
could & should have communicated it to the acting business receives money or property of a third
partner, operate as notice to or knowledge of the person & the money or property so received is
partnership, except in the case of a fraud on the misapplied by any partner while it is in the
partnership, committed by or w/ the consent of that custody of the partnership
partner.
Art. 1824. All partners are liable solidarily w/
the partnership for everything chargeable to the
partnership under Arts. 1822 & 1823.
TOLENTINO:

When notice is given to the partner while he is a


partner, the effect is the same as if notice was had BAVIERA: Under Arts. 1822 (on tort
by all the partners. liability) & 1823 (liability for breach), the
liability is solidary. This is absurd. Why
Where the partner acting in the particular matter
acquired knowledge before he became a partner, & make the liability for these cases larger
the knowledge is then present in his mind, the than that for contractual breach?
partnership should be charge w/ knowledge.
Q: Can 2 corporations create a partnership?

411
A: No. Corps. can go into joint ventures, but not In the Uniform Partnership Act of the US
partnerships bec. partnerships require mutual (fr. w/c we got some provisions), partners’
agency.
liability was joint. But “joint” under
common law has a different meaning.
TOLENTINO: Under common law, a partnership has no
separate personality like it does here, so
All partners are liable jointly & severally for the partners had to be sued “jointly,” i.e.,
everything chargeable to the partnership by reason as an aggregate.
of a partner’s wrongful act or breach of trust
wherein a third person is adversely affected. Code Commission changed “joint” to pro-
rata, meaning the liability was divided
While the liability of partners are merely according to each partner’s contribution.
join in transactions entered into by the partnership,
the partners are liable to 3rd persons solidarily for In doing so, it manifested its ignorance of
the whole obligation if the case involves loss or the meaning of “joint” in common law.
injury caused to any person not a partner, & Note that under the old CC, an industrial’s
misapplication of a 3rd person’s money or property partner’s contribution was deemed
received by a partner or the partnership. This is equivalent to the smallest contribution.
bec. the law protect 3rd persons who in good faith
relied upon the authority, real or apparent, of a
partner.
Art. 1832. Except in so far as may be
necessary to wind up partnership affairs or to
ISLAND SALES INC. VS. UNITED PIONEERS complete transactions begun but not then
GEN. CONSTRUCTION CO. (65 S 554) finished, dissolution terminates all authority of
any partner to act for the partnership.
Facts: UPGC, a registered general partnership,
purchased fr. ISI a motor vehicle. UPGC executed a 1. With respect to the partners,
promissory note for P9,440, payable in 12 mo. a) when the dissolution is not by the act,
installments, w/ the condition that failure to pay of insolvency or death of a partner or;
the installments would render the whole unpaid b) when the dissolution is by such act,
balance immediately demandable. UPGC having insolvency or death of a partner, in cases
failed to pay, ISI sued UPGC, & the co.’s general where article 1833 so requires;
partners: Daco, Guizona, Sim, Lumauig & Palisoc.
Later, on ISI’s motion, the complaint was dismissed 2. With respect to persons not partners,
against Lumauig alone. as declared in Art. 1834.

Issue: WON dismissal of the complaint vs. one of Art. 1833. Where the dissolution is caused
the gen. partners increases the joint & subsidiary by the act, death or insolvency of a partner, each
obligations of the others partner is liable to his copartners for his share of
any liability created by any partner acting for the
Held: No. CC provides that partners shall be partnership as the partnership had not been
liable pro rata for contractual obligations, i.e., each dissolved unless:
partner is not liable for the whole debt of the
partnership. Since there are 5 general partners in 1) The dissolution being by act of any
CAB, liability of each partner shall be limited to only partner, the partner acting for the partnership
one-fifth (1/5) of the obligations of the partnership. had knowledge of the dissolution; or
That the complaint against Lumauig was dismissed 2) The dissolution being by the death or
doesn’t unmake him as a gen. partner. ISI merely insolvency of a partner, the partner acting for the
condoned Lumauig’s individual liability to it. partnership had knowledge or notice of the
death or insolvency.
BAVIERA: SC here interpreted the term “pro-
Art. 1834. After the dissolution, a partner
rata” as joint, i.e., obligations shall be divided
can bind the partnership, except s provided in the
into as many partners as there are, w/o
third paragraph of this article:
considering their respective contributions.

412
1) By an act appropriate for winding up another representing him as a partner in a
partnership affairs or completing transaction partnership engaged in carrying on a business.
unfinished at dissolution;
2) by any transaction w/c would bind the
partnership if dissolution had not taken place, Baviera: A partner can w/draw anytime fr.
provided the other party to the transaction: the partnership but he must first notify the
managing partner. Notice of the
a. had extended credit to the dissolution must be given to third persons
partnership prior to dissolution & had no knowledge who are distinguished as to whether they
or notice of the dissolution: or have been creditors of the partnership or
b. though he had not so extended not.
credit, had nevertheless known of the partnership
prior to the dissolution, the fact of dissolution had Those dealing w/ the partnership
not been advertised in a newspaper of general for the first time are not entitled to notice
circulation in the place ( or in each place if more of the dissolution as they are duty bound to
than one) at w/c the partnership was regularly inquire as top the authority of the partner,
carried on. that is WON he can bind the partnership.
However, no notice is required when the
The liability of the partner under the first 3rd person dealing w/ a judicially declared
paragraph, No. 2 shall be satisfied out of insolvent partner acting in the usual way.
partnership assets alone when such partner had
been prior to dissolution:
Gen. Rule: All partners have authority to act for
1. unknown as partner to the person w/ whom the partnership. In this connection, a 3rd person
the contract is made; & dealing for the first time w/ the partnership
2. so far unknown & inactive in partnership ( during the winding up ) can still bind the
affairs that the business reputation of the partnership if the fact of dissolution is not
partnership could not be said to have been in any published.
degree due to the connection w/ it.

The partnership is in no case bound by any act CIR V. SUTER


of a partner after dissolution:
Facts: In 1947, a limited partnership was
1. Where the partnership is dissolved bec. it is formed between William as gen. partner & Spririg
unlawful to carry on the business, unless the act is & Carlson as limited partners. Spirig & William
appropriate for winding up partnership affairs: or; got married & Carlson sold his share in the
2. Where the partner has become insolvent; partnership to the spouses. The sale was
3. Where the partner had no authority to wind recorded w/ the SEC. In later years, the CIR
up partnership affairs, except by a transaction w/ declared that William incurred a deficiency tax. It
one who appears that the CIR consolidated the income of
the partnership w/ the income of the spouses.
a) had extended credit to the The spouses appealed the CIR assessment.
partnership prior to dissolution & having no
knowledge or notice of his want of authority; or Issue: WON the consolidation of the partnership
income w/ that of the spouses is proper?
b) had not extended credit to the
partnership prior to dissolution & having no Held: No, it is not proper. The partnership
knowledge or notice of his want of authority, the business of the spouses is a particular one not a
fact of his want of authority has not been advertised universal partnership w/c is prohibited. The
in the manner provided for advertising the fact of partners contributed fixed sums of money &
the dissolution in the first paragraph, No. 2 (b). neither of the spouses is an industrial partner.
the marriage between the partners did not
Nothing in this article shall affect the liability dissolve the partnership as it is not one of the
under Art. 1825 of any person who after the grounds for dissolution & it did not have the
dissolution represents himself or consents to effect of converting the partnership into a single
proprietorship. The partnership has a separate
413
personality of its own, thus, its income cannot be the latter is released fr. all obligations of the
consolidated w/ that of spouses. partnership. A mortgage on the partnership
properties was also executed in favor of
DIRA V. TANEGA Saldajeno. The partnership however was
continued & no liquidation nor winding up ever
Facts: In 1946, Dira, Tanega & Pagulayan formed a took place.
partnership to last for 5 years for the purpose of
engaging in the printing business. Each was Later, Saldajeno caused the foreclosure
required to contribute a uniform sum of money to & sale of the assets mortgaged to her & she
buy equipment. Dira borrowed money fr. bought the properties. It appears however, that
Pagulayan. Later, Dira requested Tanega to pay his the partnership contracted w/ the plaintiff,
debt to Pagulayan pledging his share in the Singson & the partnership has not been able to
partnership. Pagulayan was paid, then he later sold pay Singson. Singson then brought this action to
his share to Tanega. When Dira failed to pay his enforce he partnership liability against the
debt to Tanega, the latter foreclose the pledge thus partners including Saldajeno. Saldajeno raised
becoming the owner of all the shares in the the defense that she is no longer a part of the
partnership. Tanega, in 1947, then changed the partnership, hence she is not liable to Singson.
name of the partnership & moved to a new place of
business. In 1961, Dira, who claimed to be Pres. of Issue: WON under the circumstances, Saldajeno
the partnership filed this action for acctg. of his is liable to Singson for partnership obligations?
share on the partnership. LC dismissed on the
ground of prescription. Held: Saldajeno is still liable for partnership
obligations. The w/drawal of Saldajeno fr. the
ISSUE: WON Dira’s action is barred by partnership was never published nor made
prescription? known to the public. The public therefore, had a
right to expect that whatever credit they
HELD: YES. Art. 1829 w/c provides that a extended to Gariba & Tubungbanua doing the
partnership is not dissolved upon termination but business in the name of the partnership “ Isabella
continues until the winding up is completed is not Sawmill” could be enforced against the properties
applicable in the case at bar. Such provision of said partnership. Thus, the judicial foreclosure
contemplates continuation of partnership. In the of the chattel mortgage executed in favor of
CAB, there is no more partnership. Tanega had Saldajeno did not relieve her fr. liability to the
already repudiated the partnership as early as 1947 creditors of the partnership.
w/ the knowledge of Dira. Tanega’s acts of
changing the business name & place of business are While the partnership was technically
acts of repudiation. dissolved bec. of her w/drawal therefr., the
partnership was not terminated as it continued
Tanega did not become a trustee of Dira doing business under the partnership name.
after the expiration of the partnership term of 5 Saldajeno is to be blamed for not causing the
years in 1951. Under Art. 1132, WON Tanega is in liquidation of the partnership assets.
GF or BF, he has already acquired through
acquisitive prescription through his uninterrupted
possession for more than 8 years the partnership. Art. 1844. Two or more persons desiring to
He has already acquired ownership in 1955 counted form a limited partnership shall:
fr. 1947 when Tanega repudiated the partnership.
This action was brought only in 1961, the action of (1) Sign & swear to a certificate, w/c shall
Dira has already prescribed. state--

SINGSON V. ISABELLA SAWMILL (a) The name of the partnership, adding


thereto the word “Limited”;
Facts: Garibay, Saldajeno & Tubungbanua formed (b) The character of the business;
a partnership under the firm name Isabella Sawmill. (c) The location of the principal place of
Saldajeno later field a civil action for dissolution of business;
the partnership. As a consequence of the civil
action, a memorandum of agreement was entered
into between the two partners & Saldajeno whereby
414
(d) The name & place of residence of each Baviera: A limited partner may still be given
member, general & limited partners being the right to intervene in the articles & still
respectively designated; have the limited liability of a limited
(e) The term for w/c the partnership is to exist; partner.
(f) The amount of cash & a description of the
agreed value of the other property contributed by
each limited partner; AGENCY
(g) The additional contributions, if any to be
made by each limited partner & the times at w/c or
events on the happening of w/c they shall be made; Art. 1883. If an agent acts in his own name,
(h) The time, if agreed upon, when the the principal has no right of action against the
contribution of each limited partner is to be persons w/ whom the agent has contracted;
returned; neither have such persons against the principal.
(I) The share of the profits or other
compensation by way of income w/c each limited In such a case the agent is the one directly
partner shall receive by reason of his contribution; bound in favor of the person w/ whom he has
(j) The right, if given of a limited partner to contracted, as if the transaction were his own,
substitute an assignee as contributor in his place, & except when the contract involves things
the terms & conditions of the substitution; belonging to the principal.
(k) The right, if given, of partners to admit
additional limited partners; The provisions of this article shall be
(l) The right, if given, of one or more of the understood to be w/o prejudice to the actions
limited partners to priority over other limited between the principal & the agent.
partners, as to contributions or as to compensation
by way of income, & the nature of such priority;
(m) The right, if given, of the remaining
DE LEON:
general partner or partners to continue the business
on the death, retirement, civil interdiction, insanity
KINDS OF PRINCIPAL:
or insolvency of a general partner; &,
(n) The right, if given, of a limited partner to 1. Disclosed Principal - if at the time of the
demand & receive property other than cash in transaction contracted by the agent, the other
return for his contribution. party thereto has known that the agent is acting
for a principal & of a principal’s identity. This is
(2) File for record the certificate in the Office of the usual type of agency.
the Securities & Exchange Commission.
2. Partially Disclosed Principal - if the other
party knows or has reason to know that the
A limited partnership is formed if there has agent is or may be acting for a principal but is
been substantial compliance in good faith w/ the unaware of the principal’s identity. The partially
foregoing requirements. disclosed principal may enforce against the third
person the contract of the agent like any
Art. 1852. Without prejudice to the provisions disclosed principal. Similarly, the third person
of Article 1848, a person who has contributed to has a right of action against the principal.
the capital of a business conducted by a person or
partnership erroneously believing that he has 3. Undisclosed Principal - if the party has no
notice of the fact that the agent is acting as such
become a limited partner in a limited partnership, is
for a principal.
not, by reason of his exercise of the rights of a
limited partner, a general partner w/ the person or Art. 1883 speaks of a case where the agent (a)
in the partnership carrying on the business, or being authorized to act on behalf of the principal,
bound by the obligations of such person or (b) acts instead on his own name:
partnership; provided that on ascertaining the
mistake he promptly renounces his interest in the GENERAL RULE: The agent is the one directly
profits of the business, or other compensation by liable to the person w/ whom he had contracted
way of income. as if the transaction were his own.

Reason for the Rule: There is no representation


of the principal when the agent acts in his own

415
name. In effect, the contractual relation is only NFA VS. IAC 184 SCRA 166
between the agent & the 3rd person. Therefore,
the principal cannot have a right of action against Facts: Medalla, a commission agent of Superior
the third person nor vice-versa. Shipping (SS), entered into a contract w/ the NFA
EXCEPTION: When the contract involves things for the transportation of the latter’s sacks of rice
belonging to the principal. using the vessel of SS, in his own name. NFA,
despite a contrary demand of SS, paid the
In this case, the contract is considered as entered freightage to Medalla. As the company was not
into between the principal & the third person. able to get the payment fr. Medalla, an action
was filed against the latter & NFA.
This exception is necessary for the protection of the
3rd persons against possible collusion between the Issue: Can NFA be held solidarily liable for the
agent & the principal. payment of the freightage?

Held: YES. The exception in Art. 1883 applies.


Baviera: The general rule in this article is As the contract here in question involved things
based on the theory that when the principal belonging to the principal, then SS as such
is undisclosed, there is no privity of contract undisclosed principal, can bring an action vs. NFA
between him & the third party. Hence, they despite the fact that Medalla acted in his own
have no COA against each other. name. The contract is considered one entered
into between the principal & the third party
As to the exception prov. for in the (NFA).
article, the same is based on the principal’s
right of ownership over the things w/c are
the subject of the contract. But for the Baviera: The exception under Art. 1883
exception to apply, it is required that the applies in CAB as the agent was acting
agent must have acted w/in the scope of his w/in the scope of his authority.
authority & the thing is owned by the
principal. In such a case, the non-disclosure
of the principal constitutes a mere
NICOLAS VS. BORMAHECO 70 O.G. NO. 20
technicality. He has a right to vindicate his
P. 3971
property right w/c he was wrongfully
deprived of under Art. 559.
Facts: Bengson transferred to BORMAHECO 3
tractors by virtue of a pacto de retro sale. As no
Q: The agent (A) was authorized to borrow
redemption was made, ownership was
money by the principal (P) but the former
consolidated in Bormaheco. Later, upon
borrowed in his own name & did not turn
Bengson’s request, Bormaheco’s VP Cervantes
over the proceeds to P. Is P bound by the
allowed the former to try to sell the tractors to
contract of loan?
other persons. Petr Nicolas , who was in need of
A: No.
a tractor asked to see the tractors Bengson was
Q: Same facts, but this time, A gave the
selling. After inspection, the same was bought
money to P. P bound?
by N who paid Bengson P12T therefor.
A: Still no.
Bormaheco learned of such payment to Bengson
& refused to deliver the tractor until N paid it
The general rule is that to be bound,
P10T. Hence, this action by N for recovery of
the contract must have been entered into in
personal property w/ damages.
the name of the principal & the agent must
have acted w/in the scope of his authority.
Held: Under the exception of Art. 1883, the
In such a case, the principal is bound even if
representation of Bengson as to the ownership of
the agent misappropriates the proceeds of
the tractor yields to Bormaheco’s being the true
the contract of loan or does not turn over the
owner thereof, & that, in reality & effect, the
same.
Deed of sale must be considered as having been
entered into between N & Bormaheco. The fact
that Benson sold the tractor as owner thereof &
that he personally executed the Deed of Sale may

416
only be violations of his authority to sell it. The buy. Now, before the end of the 5 years but
question is not what representation he made &/or after 2 years into the K, P decide to exercise its
what he did to sell it, but what property he sold. If option to buy. The NDC denied the same &
the property he sold belonged to the principal & he canceled the contract. P sued.
was authorized to sell the same, whatever the
agent said or did to effect the sale is beside the HELD: The agreement is an agency coupled w/
point. Bormaheco can only proceed against an interest as P transferred its right to purchase
Bengson (wrt the money). It was Bormaheco’s the vessels to NDC & furnished technical advice
omission w/c led Nicolas to believe that the tractors in the construction & outfitting of the vessels.
belonged to Bengson & thus made possible the But the interest is limited to 2 years. After the 2
commission of fraud by the agent. years, the agency became a simple agency for a
fixed term as it was no longer a contract
imposing reciprocal obligations. With regard to
Article 1927. An agency cannot be revoked if a the exercise of the option by P, the same was
bilateral contract depends upon it; or if it is the premature. Besides, even if its was not
means of fulfilling an obligation already contracted premature, the offer by P was not accepted by
or if a partner is appointed manager of a NDC.
partnership in the contract of partnership & his
removal fr. the management is unjustifiable. Baviera: The agency is irrevocable for the
first two years as the same was instituted
Article 1930. The agency shall remain in full for the benefit of both the principal &
force & effect even after the death of the principal, agent.
if it has been constituted in the common interest of
the latter & of the agent, or in the interest of a third
person who has accepted the stipulation in his PEREZ V. PNB
favor.
FACTS: On August 29, 1939, Vicente Perez
mortgaged Lot No. 286-E of the Kabankalan
Baviera: If the agency falls under these Cadastre to the appellant Philippine National
articles, then it falls under the category of Bank, Bacolod Branch, in order to secure
contract as the same is bilateral. As a payment of a loan of P2,500. On October 7,
general rule, the agency is constituted for the 1942, Vicente Perez, mortgagor, died intestate,
benefit of the principal so he has the power survived by his widow & children (appellees
to revoke the same although he must give herein). At that time, there was an outstanding
notice to third persons. balance of P1,917.00, & corresponding interest,
on the mortgage indebtedness.
On October 18, 1956, the widow of Perez
instituted Special Proceedings No. 512 of the
DELA RAMA V. TAN
Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros for
the settlement of the estate of Vicente Perez. The
FACTS: In 1940, P obtained a loan of 75 M
widow was appointed Administratrix & notice to
fr. G to purchase vessels. But these vessels were
creditors was duly published. The Bank did not
turned over to the US Maritime Comm. for war
file a claim. The project of partition was
service in 1941. Thereafter P secured an option w/
submitted on July 18, 1956; it was approved &
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces to
the properties distributed accordingly. Special
have 3 vessels constructed in Japan at favorable
Proceedings No. 512 was then closed.
prices. G thru the NDC, extended aid to P. Bur
On January 2, 1963, the Bank, pursuant
DRS in turn assigned its right to purchase the
to authority granted it in the mortgage deed,
vessels to NDC. dRS, under said contract, also
caused the mortgaged properties to be
bound itself to give technical assistance in the
extrajudicially foreclosed. The Provincial Sheriff
construction & maintenance of the vessels. The K
accordingly sold Lot No. 286-E at auction, & it
of mgt & operation also granted P an option to
was purchased by the Bank. In the ordinary
purchase the vessels after 5 years but NDC after 2
course after the lapse of the year of redemption,
years may cancel in a year’s notice the general
Certificate of Title No. T-29530 in the name of
agency if it finds the situation unsatisfactory. In
Vicente Perez was cancelled, & Certificate T-
case of such cancellation, P would have no option to

417
32066, dated May 11, 1962, was issued in the name American General Insurance Co., Inc., thereunder
of the Bank. The widow & heirs were not notified. binding themselves "jointly & severally" to
Three months later, on August 15, 1962, indemnify the Philippine American General
the widow & heirs of Vicente Perez instituted this Insurance Co., Inc., for whatever it may suffer
case against the Bank in the court below, seeking to under its aforesaid surety bond.
annul the extra-judicial foreclosure sale & the
transfer of the Certificate of Title. Philippine American General Insurance
Co., Inc., on November 3, 1961, filed a complaint
HELD: The argument that foreclosure by in the Court of First Instance of Bataan against
the Bank under its power of sale is barred upon the Ramos spouses. Plaintiff alleged that
death of the debtor, bec. agency is extinguished by Associated Reclamation & Development
the death of the principal, under Article 1732 of the Corporation failed to pay its obligation under the
Civil Code of 1889 & Article 1919 of the Civil Code promissory note, as a result of w/c plaintiff paid
of the Philippines, neglects to take into account that its liability under its surety bond. Defendants on
The power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency January 26, 1962 filed a motion to dismiss,
that contemplates exclusively the representation of asserting that the complaint stated no cause of
the principal by the agent but is primarily an action. It was contended that under the
authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the Agreement of Counter-Guaranty w/ Real Estate
latter's own protection. It is, in fact, an ancillary Mortgage, the defendants were guarantors only
stipulation supported by the same causa or so that plaintiff must first exhaust the properties
consideration for the mortgage & forms an essential of the principal debtor, Associated Reclamation &
& inseparable part of that bilateral agreement. As Development Corporation, before proceeding
can be seen in the preceding quotations fr. Pasno against defendants.
vs. Ravina, 54 Phil. 382, both the majority & the
dissenting opinions conceded that the power to HELD: Schedule B, the indemnity agreement,
foreclose extrajudicially survived the death of the reads in part as follows:
mortgagor, even under the law prior to the Civil
Code of the Philippines now in force. KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, THAT,
We, the undersigned ASSOCIATED
RECLAMATION & DEVELOPMENT CORP.
Baviera: This is a case of an irrevocable represented by its President, Antonio R. Banzon;
agency in the sense that the same was & Eugenio B. Ramos & P. Miranda, jointly &
instituted for the benefit of both the principal severally bind ourselves unto the PHILIPPINE
& the agent. Also, it is a means of fulfilling AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
the obligation already contracted. INC., a corporation duly organized & existing
under & by virtue of the laws of the Philippines,
w/ head office at Manila, Philippines, hereinafter
PHIL-AM V. RAMOS called the COMPANY, in the consideration of it
having become SURETY upon a bond in the sum
FACTS: Associated Reclamation & Development of Pesos ELEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
Corporation executed on March 29, 1961 a SIXTY-FIVE . . . (P11,765.00), Philippine
promissory note for P11,765.00 in favor of General Currency, in favor of GENERAL ACCEPTANCE &
Acceptance & Finance Corporation. Philippine FINANCING CORPORATION in behalf of
American General Insurance Co., Inc., on the same ASSOCIATED RECLAMATION & DEVELOPMENT
date, executed a surety bond in the amount of CORPORATION . . . subject to the following
P11,765.00 to secure payment of the terms & conditions:
aforementioned promissory note. Subsequently, on INDEMNITY: The undersigned agree at all times
April 5, 1961, the spouses Eugenio Ramos & Pilar to jointly & severally indemnify the COMPANY &
Miranda signed a counter-guaranty agreement w/ keep it indemnified & hold & save it harmless fr.
real estate mortgage, in favor of Philippine & against any & all damages, losses, costs,
American General Insurance Co., Inc., against its stamps, taxes, penalties, charges & expenses of
liability under the surety bond. The next day, April whatsoever kind & nature w/c the COMPANY
6, 1961, the Ramos spouses & Associated shall or may at any time sustain or incur in
Reclamation & Development Corporation executed consequence of having become surety upon the
an indemnity agreement in favor of Philippine bond hereinabove referred to . . . .

418
xxx xxx as Associated) acted as surety of Sta. Maria, filing
xxx surety bonds in favor of the bank to answer for
OUR LIABILITY THEREUNDER: It shall not be prompt repayment of the loans. Petitioner
necessary for the COMPANY to bring suit against Antonio R. Banzon & Emilio Ma. Naval in turn
the principal upon his default, or exhaust the acted as indemnitors of Associated & were
property of the principal, but the liability hereunder obligated to indemnify & hold harmless
of the undersigned indemnitors shall be jointly & Associated fr. any liability thus acting as surety of
severally, a primary one, the same as that of the the loan. Sta. Maria failed to pay his obligations
principal, & shall be eligible immediately upon the to the bank, w/c accordingly demanded payment
occurrence of such default. fr. Associated as surety.
It is clear fr. the foregoing that the Instead of paying the bank, Associated
amended complaint sufficiently states a cause of filed a complaint dated November 19, 1956 w/
action against defendants. For the creditor may the Court of First Instance of Manila 1 against
proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or debtor Sta. Maria & indemnitors Banzon & Naval,
some or all of them simultaneously (Art. 1216, New alleging that the outstanding obligations of Sta.
Civil Code). It should not be overlooked, also, that Maria w/ the bank guaranteed by it amounted to
the above-quoted indemnity agreement could not P6,100.00, P9,346.44 & P14,811.32, or a total of
have been modified by Schedule C, the counter- P30,257.86, excluding interest. On December 11,
guaranty agreement, since the former was executed 1957, the said court rendered judgment ordering
one day after the latter. Sta. Maria, Banzon & Naval "to pay jointly &
Finally, even under Schedule C, the severally unto plaintiff for the benefit of the
defendants as counter-guarantors are not entitled Philippine National Bank" the amounts mentioned
to demand exhaustion of the properties of the above, w/ interest thereon at 12% per annum,
principal debtor. For Schedule C is a counter- P593.76 for premiums & documentary stamps
guaranty w/ real estate mortgage. It is accepted due, & 15% attorney's fees, "the 15% & the
that guarantors have no right to demand exhaustion interest to be paid for the benefit only of the
of the properties of the principal debtor, under plaintiff."
Article 2058 of the New Civil Code, where a pledge The Rizal court ordered Banzon to
or mortgage has been given as a special security surrender for cancellation his owner's duplicates
of titles to his two Caloocan City lots w/c had
been levied upon & purchased at the execution
BANSON V. CRUZ sale by Associated in supposed satisfaction of the
Manila court's judgment.
FACTS: As the above decision became final &
executory, the corresponding writ of execution
Sta. Maria ----- debtors of PNB was issued & levy was made upon the properties
Associated ------- acted as surety for Sta. Maria of the judgment debtor Antonio R. Banzon. After
Banzon & Naval -- indemnitors of Associated the proceedings required by law in connection w/
FIRST ACTION: Associated v. Sta. Maria, Banzon & execution sales, the aforesaid properties were
Naval sold, the judgment creditor, Associated Insurance
Judgment was for 3 defendants to pay & Surety Co., Inc., having been the highest
jointly & severally Associated for the benefit of PNB bidder. As the period of redemption expired on
June 20, 1960 w/o the judgment debtor or any
SECOND ACTION: PNB v. Sta. Maria & Assoc. proper party having exercised it, the judgment
Judgment in favor of PNB but debt was creditor & purchaser obtained in due time the
collected directly fr. Sta. Maria, the principal debtor, corresponding final certificate of sale, w/c was
w/o Assoc. contributing anything at all. Payment to likewise duly registered.
PNB prompted latter to discharge Assoc.
Despite the judgment, Assoc. never
THIRD ACTION: Banzon v. Cardenas for discharged its liability to the bank & relieve Sta.
reconveyance of levied properties of the former. Maria. Not receiving any payment, PNB sued the
debtor Sta. Maria & Assoc. PNB collected fr. the
Sometime in 1952, Maximo Sta. Maria obtained crop debtor directly w/o the surety giving any amount
loans fr. the Philippine National Bank (hereinafter at all. PNB released Assoc bec. of the payment
referred as the bank). Respondent Associated made by Sta. Maria.
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to
419
Assoc was obligated to the Cardenas against Banzon's properties would not been
spouses. To satisfy its obligation, the former issued.
allowed the latter to levy on 2 parcels of land Furthermore, Associated’s conduct, upon being
owned by Banzons. Cardenas sought a writ of sued by the Philippine national bank directly w/
possession. Banzon filed this action for the principal debtor sta. Maria for collection of the
reconveyance of the properties since Assoc was debt 23e & sentenced by the Pampanga court of
already released fr. liability. first instance in 1963 (w/c it did not appeal) to
pay the debt in the much lesser amount of only
HELD: The suit of Associated against Banzon as p15,446.44, excluding interests, in not so
indemnitor & the execution against him of the discharging its liability notw/standing that it had
judgment obtained in trust "for the benefit of the already executed its 1957 judgment against
Philippine National Bank" were absolutely premature Banzon as indemnitor & taken in execution
& uncalled for, since Article 2071 of the Civil Code Banzon’s two properties, was indeed rank fraud.
permits the surety, even before having paid, to Associated therefore stands legally bound by
proceed only "against the principal debtor ... (4) force of law to now discharge its implied trust &
when the debt has become demandable, by reason return Banzon’s properties to him as their true &
of the expiration of the period for payment" & that rightful owner.
"the action of the guarantor is to obtain release fr. The obligation imposed upon associated
the guaranty, or to demand a security that shall as implied trustee to so restore Banzon’s
protect him fr. any proceedings by the creditor & fr. properties becomes even more compelling when
the danger of insolvency of the debtor." it is considered that in the premature execution
sale by virtue of the basic 1957 judgment,
Article 2071 of the Civil Code permits the associated ostensibly was the highest bidder
surety to file such an advance suit against the therefor applying its purported judgment credit of
principal debtor (not against an indemnitor such as p41,000.00 when in law such judgment was not
Banzon) only to obtain release fr. the guaranty or subject to execution since the condition of
security against the danger of the debtor's associated as surety being made to pay the bank
insolvency. Where the debtor directly discharged his to make the judgment operable & enforceable
loan obligation to the bank w/c in turn released had not materialized & in fact associated not
Associated fr. its suretyship liability w/o Associated having paid anything to the bank did not possess
having incurred a centavo of liability, it is such purported judgment credit of P41,000.00,
indisputable that Associated in turn would nor did it put out a single centavo for w/c it could
necessarily release Banzon as indemnitor & the hold Banzon answerable & therefore take
basic 1957 judgment would be inoperable & Banzon’s properties in execution & satisfaction
unenforceable against Banzon. thereof. Actually, as already indicated above, the
When Associated nevertheless prematurely principal debt of the bank's debtor, when directly
& contrary to the intent & condition of the basic collected by the bank six (6) years later,
1957 judgment levied in execution on the two amounted merely to 1/2 the amount or
Caloocan City lots of Banzon the interest it acquired p15,446.44 as of august, 1963, excluding
was clearly impressed w/ a trust character. Such interests. As already stated above, associated did
acquisition of Banzon's properties by Associated was not pay even this much lesser amount,
effected, if not through fraud 23a on Associated's notw/standing the Pampanga court's judgment
part, certainly through mistake 23b & there against it in the suit directly filed by the bank.
Associated was "by force of law, considered a Finally, it would be an outrage on simple
trustee of implied trust for the benefit of the person justice & iniquitous unjust enrichment if a surety
fr. whom the property comes" by virtue of Article such as associated, after taking title in execution
1456 of the Code since Associated not having paid to the indemnitor's properties in order to protect
nor having been compelled to pay the bank had no or reimburse itself fr. liability to the creditor for
right in law or equity to so execute the judgment the debt guaranteed by it, were to be allowed to
against Banzon as indemnitor. Had there been no retain ownership of the properties even though it
fraudulent concealment or suppression of the fact of did not incur or discharge its liability at all, since it
such non-payment by Associated or a mistaken succeeded in evading payment to the creditor
notion just assumed w/o factual basis that who thereafter collect the debt directly fr. the
Associated had paid the bank & was thus entitled to debtor. Thus, the law (article 1456, civil code)
enforce its judgement against Banzon as impresses properties thus acquired w/ trust
indemnitor, the writ for execution of the judgment character & constitutes the erring surety as
420
"trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the auction. Instead of sale in a public auction,
person fr. who the property comes," in this case, parties agreed to have them sold & were in fact
Banzon as the true & rightful owner of the sold at a private sale. The net proceeds were
properties. applied to partial satisfaction of judgment. More
than 5 years but less than 10 years fr. the date
As was emphasized by Mr. Justice Reyes for when the decision became executory, PNB filed in
the Court in General Indemnity Co., Inc. vs. same court an action to revive judgment. Def
Alvarez, while a guarantor may under Article 2071 claims that the private sale was null & void & that
of the Civil Code proceed against the principal PNB was not entitled to a deficiency judgment.
debtor, even before having paid, when the debt has
become demandable, "(T)he last paragraph of this HELD: While the decision in the CPI was for the
same article, however, provides that in such sale of the mortgaged properties in a public
instance, the only action the guarantor can file auction, there is nothing illegal or against public
against the debtor is 'to obtain release fr. the policy in the agreement of resorting to private
guaranty, or to demand a security that shall protect sale w/c was entered into freely & voluntarily. As
him fr. any proceeding by the creditor & fr. the held in the PNB v. de Poli, under Art. 1306 of the
danger of insolvency of the debtor.' An action by NCC, the contracting parties may stipulate that in
the guarantor against the principal debtor for case of violation of the conditions of the
payment, before the former has paid the creditor, is mortgage contract, a creditor may sell, at a public
premature." sale & w/o previous advertisement or notice the
whole or part of the goods mortgaged for the
Article 1927. An agency cannot be revoked if a purposed of applying the proceeds thereof on the
bilateral contract depends upon it; or if it is the payment of the debt. Said stipulation is valid. As
means of fulfilling an obligation already contracted the disposition of the mortgaged personalities in
or if a partner is appointed manager of a a private sale was by agreement of the parties, it
partnership in the contract of partnership & his is clear that they are now estopped to question it
removal fr. the management is unjustifiable. except on the ground of duress, w/c they failed
to invoke.
Article 1930. The agency shall remain in full It is clear that fr. Art. 2141 that the
force & effect even after the death of the principal, provisions of the NCC on pledge shall apply to a
if it has been constituted in the common interest of chattel mortgage only in so far as they are not
the latter & of the agent, or in the interest of a third counter to any provision of the Chattel Mortgage
person who has accepted the stipulation in his Law, otherwise the provisions of the latter shall
favor. apply. The provisions of the CM Law w/ regard to
the effects of the foreclosure of a chattel
mortgage, are precisely contrary to the provisions
of Art. 2115 w/c were applied by the trial court.
Baviera: If the agency falls under these In case of a sale under a foreclosure of a chattel
articles, then it falls under the category of mortgage, there is no question that the
contract as the same is bilateral. As a mortgagee or creditor may maintain an action or
general rule, the agency is constituted for the the deficiency, if any should occur. And the fact
benefit of the principal so he has the power that Act. No. 1508 permits a private sale, such
to revoke the same although he must give sale is not in fact, a satisfaction of the debt to
notice to third persons. any greater extent than the value of the property
at the time of sale. The amount received at the
time of sale is only a payment pro tanto, & an
CHATTEL MORTGAGE LAW action may be maintained for a deficiency in the
debt.

PNB V. MANILA INVESTMENT


ABIZA V. IGNACIO
Facts: In a civil case, PNB was the judgment
creditor & defendant co. was judgment debtor. Def. Facts: Def. borrowed fr. Pf a certain amount of
was ordered to pay PNB & in case of non-payment, money, payable in 30 days. To secure the loan,
personal properties of Def. covered by a chattel def. executed a chattel mortgage on an
mortgage in favor of PNB should be sold at public Oldsmobile car. He failed to pay on maturity, so
421
Pf extrajudicially foreclosed the property & sold it at Chattel mortgage is a consensual contract,
public auction. There was still a balance remaining whereas pledge is a real contract.
so Pf instituted present action. TC dismissed the
In CM, the possession of the thing mortgaged
case on the ground that under Art. 2141 on the law
remains w/ the debtor, whereas in pledge, the
of pledge, the sale of the thing pledged shall possession of the thing pledged is vested in the
extinguish the principal obligation, whether or not creditor.
the proceeds of the sale are more or less than the
amount due. In CM, the requirement that the contract must be
recorded in the CM register is essential for
HELD: Pf can still collect the deficiency. It is clear validity, whereas in the pledge, the requirement
fr. Art. 2141 that the provision of the NCC on that the contract must be in a public instrument
pledge shall apply to chattel mortgage ONLY insofar is merely for the purpose of binding third
persons.
as they are not in conflict w/ the CM Law. Here, we
find the CML w/ regard to the effects of foreclosure The procedure for the foreclosure of a CM is
precisely contrary to the provisions on pledge. Sec different fr. the procedure for the sale at public
14 of the CML provides that xxx the proceeds of auction of the thing pledged.
such sale shall be applied to the payment first, of
the cost & expenses of keeping & sale & then to the In CM, if the price of the sale in case of a
payment of the demand or obligation secured by foreclosure is less than the amount of the
such mortgage, & the residue shall be paid to the principal obligation, the creditor is entitled to
persons holding subsequent mortgages in that order recover deficiency fr. the debtor, whereas in
pledge, the creditor is not entitled to recover such
& the balance, after paying that mortgage shall be
deficiency.
paid to the mortgagor or person holding under him
on demand. The TC overlooked the fact that the
chattels included in the chattel mortgage are only COMPROMISE
given to as a security & not as payment of the debt,
in case of failure of payment.
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the ff.
questions shall be valid:
Please note this: (stated in the decision)
The civil status of persons
Mr. Justice Kent have said that in case of a
The validity of a marriage or a legal
sale under a foreclosure of chattel mortgage, there
separation
is no question that a mortgagee or a creditor may
Any ground for legal separation
maintain for the deficiency, if any should occur. And
Future support
the fact that this Act No. 1508 permits a private
The jurisdiction of courts
sale, such sale is not in fact satisfaction of the debt,
Future legitime
to any greater extent than the value of the property
at the time of the sale. The amount received at the
ART. 2037. A compromise has upon the
time of sale, of course, always requiring good faith
parties the effect & authority of res judicata but
& honest in the sale is only a payment, pro tanto &
there shall be no execution except in compliance
any action may be maintained for a deficiency of
w/ a judicial compromise.
the debt.

Jurado: Baviera: The compromise must be judicially


approved.
Q: What is a chattel mortgage?

A: By a chattel mortgage, personal property is


ART. 2041. If one of the parties fails or
recorded in the Chattel Mortgage Register as a
security for the performance of an obligation. If the refuses to abide by the compromise, the other
movable, instead of being recorded, is delivered to party may either enforce the compromise or
the creditor or a third person, the contract is a regard it as rescinded & insist upon his original
pledge & not a chattel mortgage. demand.

Distinguish between a contract of chattel


mortgage & a contract of pledge.

422
SAMONTE V. SAMONTE

Facts: Spouses Faustino & Bernardina Samonte PREFERENCE OF CREDIT


have 6 children. During their marriage, they
acquired properties consisting of 3 parcels of land.
Wife died, & the husband continued to administer Chapter. 2 CLASSIFICATION OF CREDIT
the conjugal properties fr. w/c income, Faustino
entered into long term leases of first class fishponds ART. 2241. With reference to specific
in Bulacan. Later, F married again w/o first movable property of the debtor; the ff. claims or
liquidating the conjugal properties of the first liens shall be preferred:
marriage & the income therefr.. Pltfs-the children,
requested their father & the 2 nd wife to account, Duties, taxes & fees due thereon to the State
partition & settle what is due to them, out of the or any subdivision thereof;
properties brought by products fr. the leased Claims arising fr. misappropriation, breach of
fishponds. Upon F’s refusal, a complaint for trust, or malfeasance by public officials
issuance of preliminary injunction was commenced. committed in the performance of their duties, on
On 9/15/67, the parties assigned & executed a the movables, money or securities obtained by
compromise agreement w/c settled their respective them;
claims over the properties in litigation, including the Claims for the unpaid price of movables sold,
leased fishponds. The agreement was approved by on said movables, so long as they are in the
the court on 9/19/67. On 3/14/68 former pltfs filed possession of the debtor, up to the value of the
a motion to suspend the compromise agreement & same; & if the movable has been resold by the
to maintain the status quo, alleging that due to the debtor & the price is still unpaid, the lien may be
misrepresentation of their father & his 2nd wife, they enforced on the price; this right is not lost by the
were deprived of the benefits & enjoyment of the immobilization of the thing by destination,
leased fishponds for 2 years. TC denied, P’s provided it has not lost its form, substance &
appealed. identity; neither is the right lost by the sale of the
thing together w/ other property for a lump sum,
Held: AFFIRMED. It is now a well-established when the price thereof can be determined
doctrine that a judgment of the Court approving a proportionally;
compromise agreement is final & immediately Credits guaranteed w/ a pledge so long as
executory. The reason for this is that the parties, the things pledged are in the hands of the
when they agree to settle their differences to end a creditor, or those guaranteed by a chattel
litigation & request the court to render judgment on mortgage upon the things pledged or mortgaged,
the basis of their agreement, impliedly waives their up to the value thereof;
right to appeal fr. the judgments. But there is an Credits for the making, repair, safekeeping or
exception to this rule. A party to a compromise the preservation of personal property, on the
agreement may move to set it aside on the ground movables thus made, repaired, kept or
of fraud, mistake, or duress in w/c case an appeal possessed;
may be taken fr. the order denying the motion. This Claims for laborers’ wages on the goods
judgment may be set aside not under R37 but manufactured or work done;
under R38 of the Rules of Court (Pet’n for Relief). It For expenses of salvage; upon the goods
can safely be concluded that the 6 month period salvaged;
w/in w/c Pltfs could file their motion to set aside Credits between the landlord & the tenant,
should have started fr. 9/16/67, the date of arising fr. the contract of tenancy on shares, on
approval. And since they filed the motion only on the shares of each in the fruits or harvest;
4/10/68 , they were not only out of the 60-day Credits for the transportation, upon the
period fr. knowledge of the jmt but also beyond the goods carried for the price of the contract &
6 month limit fr. its rendition. incidental expenses, until their delivery & for 30
days thereafter;
Q. What is a contract of compromise ? Credits for the lodging & supplies usually
A. A compromise is a contract whereby the furnished to travelers by hotel keepers, on the
parties, by making reciprocal concessions, movables belonging to the guests as long as such
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already movables are in the hotel, but not for the money
commenced. (Art. 2028 NCC) loaned to the guests;

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Credits for seeds & expenses for cultivation & executions, upon the property affected, & only as
harvest advanced to the debtor, upon the fruits to later credits;
harvested; Claims of co-heirs for warranty in the
Credits for rent for one year, upon the personal partition of an immovable among them, upon the
property of the lessee existing upon the immovable real property thus divided;
leased & on the fruits of the same, but not on Claims of donors of real property for
money & instruments of credit; pecuniary charges or other conditions imposed
Claims in favor of the depositor if the depositary upon the donee upon the immovable donated;
has wrongfully sold the thing deposited, upon the Credits of insurers, upon the property
price of the sale. insured, for the insurance premium for two years.
In the foregoing cases, if the movables to w/c
the lien or preference attaches have been
wrongfully taken, the creditor may demand them fr. Baviera: Ma'am said that under 2241 &
any possessor, w/in 30 days fr. the unlawful 2242, there is no need for insolvency
seizure. proceedings. The SC erred in ruling thus.
Under this article, what is the use of the 1st,
2nd & 3rd mortgages on the property when
Baviera: The enumeration of liens under this the debts will be satisfied pro rata
article w/ the exception of no. 1 should be regardless of dates.
satisfied pro rata.

In the case of no. 3, the vendor loses ART. 2243. The claims or credits
his right when the thing is already pledged enumerated in the two preceding articles shall be
to a third person as possession is no longer considered as mortgages or pledges of real or
w/ the buyer. The same applies in case of personal property or liens w/in the purview of
chattel mortgage, as constructive possession legal provisions governing insolvency. Taxes
passes to the mortgagee. mentioned in No. 1, article 2241, & No.1, article
2242, shall first be satisfied.

ART. 2242 With reference to specific ART. 2244. With reference to other
immovable property & real rights of the debtor, the property, real & personal of the debtor, the
following claims, mortgages, & liens shall be following claims or credits shall be preferred IN
preferred, & shall constitute an encumbrance on the THE ORDER NAMED:
immovable or real right;
Proper funeral expenses for the debtor, or
Taxes due upon the land or building; children under his or her parental authority who
For the unpaid price of the real property sold, have no property of their own, when approved by
upon the immovable sold; the court;
Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics & other Credits for services rendered the insolvent by
workmen, as well as of architects, engineers & employees, laborers, or household helpers for
contractors, engaged in construction, reconstruction one year preceding the commencement of the
& repair of the building, canals or other works, upon proceedings in insolvency;
said buildings, canals or other works; Expenses during the last illness of the debtor
Claims of furnishers of materials used in the or of his or her spouse & children under his or
construction, reconstruction, or repair of buildings, her parental authority, if they have no property of
canals or other works upon said buildings, canals or their own;
other works; Compensation due the laborers or their
Mortgage credits recorded in the Registry of dependents under laws providing for indemnity
property, upon the real estate mortgage; for damages in cases of labor accident or illness
Expenses for the preservation or improvement resulting fr. the nature of the employment;
of real property when the law authorizes Credits & advancements made to the debtor
reimbursement , upon the immovable preserved or for support of himself or herself & family during
improved; the last year preceding the insolvency;
Credits annotated in the Registry of Property, in Support during the insolvency proceedings &
virtue of a judicial order, by attachment or for three months thereafter;
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Fines & civil indemnification arising fr. a criminal value of the immovable or real right to w/c the
offense; preference refers.
Legal expenses & expenses incurred in the
administration of the insolvent’s estate for the Art. 2249. If there are two or more credits
common interest of the creditors, when properly w/ respect to the same specific real property or
authorized & approved by the court; real rights, they shall be satisfied pro rata, after
Taxes & assessments due the national the payment of the taxes & assessments upon
government, other than those referred to in articles the immovable property or real right.
2241, No.1 & 2242 No.1;
Taxes & assessments due any province, other ART. 2250. The excess, if any, after the
than those referred to in articles 2241, No.1 & payment of the credits w/c enjoy preference w/
2242, No.1; respect to specific property, real or personal, shall
Taxes & assessments due any city or be added to the free property w/c the debtor
municipality, other than those referred to in articles may have, for the payment of the other credits.
2241, No.1 & 2242, No.1;
Damages for death or personal injuries caused ART. 2251. Those credits w/c do not enjoy
by a quasi-delict; any preference w/ respect to specific property &
Gifts due to public & private institutions of those w/c enjoy preference as to the amount not
charity or beneficence; paid, shall be satisfied according to the following
Credits w/c, w/o special privilege, appear in a) a rules:
public instrument; or b) in a final judgment, if they In the order established in article 2244;
have been the subject of litigation. These credits Common credits referred to in article 2245
shall have preference among themselves in the shall be paid pro rata regardless of dates.
order or priority of the dates of the instruments & of
the judgments, respectively.
Mamay

Baviera: Under this article, there must be


actual insolvency proceedings & the debts Art. 110 (LABOR CODE) Worker Preference
shall be satisfied in order of preference, not in Case of Bankruptcy – In the event of
pro rata. Sabi nga ni Ma'am, kailangan ilibing bankruptcy of liquidation of an ER’s business, his
muna bago magbayad ng buwis. Judgment workers shall enjoy first preference as regards
in no. 14 refers to judgment arising fr. any their wages & other monetary claims, any
breach of contract & not those awarded in provision of the law to the contrary not
no. 12, i.e. damages from QD & crimes. w/standing. Such unpaid wages & monetary
claims shall be paid in full before claims of the
gov’t & other creditors may be paid.
Chapter 3 – ORDER OF PREFERENCE OF
CREDITS
Baviera: This applies only to employers
ART. 2245. Those credits w/c enjoy engaged in business.
preference w/ respect to specific movables, exclude
all others to the extent of the value of the personal
property to w/c the preference refers. CARRIED LUMBER V. ACCFA

ART. 2247. If there are two or more credits w/ Facts: Facoma purchased on credit fr. Carried
respect to the same specific movable property, they Lumber Co. (CLC) lumber & materials used in
shall be satisfied pro rata, after the payment of constructing its warehouse. ACCFA has earlier
duties, taxes & fees due the State or any approved Facoma’s loan of P 27,200 for the
subdivision thereof. construxn & as security, the lease rts,
warehoused & ricemill bldg. Were mortgaged in
ART. 2248. Those credits w/c enjoy ACCFA’s favor. Facoma failed to pay CLC, & the
preference in relation to specific real property or latter secured a WOE over the lease rts.,
real rights, exclude all others to the extent of the warehouse & ricemill bldg. ACCFA filed a 3P
claim bec. It acquired in a prior case v. Facoma a
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cert. Of sale & possession over the mortgaged taxes in order of pref. Such claims enjoy their
property. privileged char. as liens & may be paid only to
the extent that taxes have been paid fr. the
Issue: WON Facoma’s credit is preferred proceeds of the spec. prop. involved, & only in
respect of the remaining balance of such
Held: No. CLC & ACCFA have concurrent liens over proceeds. Moreover, these other Cts., although
Facoma’s prop in the proportion of their credits. liens, are to be treated on an equal basis & to be
The enumeration in Art. 2242 is NOT an order of satisfied concurrently & proportionately.
preference. The article lists the credits w/c may
concur w/ respect to spec. real prop. & w/c wld. Be
satisfied pro rata accdg. To Art. 2249. No dispute DBP V. NLRC
that the warehouse was constructed w/ materials
supplied by CLC & that the construxn was financed Facts: The workers of ATLAS are claiming
by ACCFA. It is just & proper that the 2 creditors unpaid wages fr. the latter. Atlas, in turn, has
shld. have pro rata shares in that warehouse. mortgaged some of its prop. to DBP w/c acquired
ACCFA is entitled to deduct fr. the earnings of the such thru a foreclosure sale. The workers then
warehouse or its rental value the taxes & nec. & filed their claim v. Atlas & DBP w/c NLRC w/c
useful expenses it incurred. By reason of its lien, held the workers have preference over the prop.
CLC has a pro rata share in the net earnings or under Art. 110 LC.
rental value of the warehouse, as it supplied
materials only for the construction of the Issue: WON Ees have lien over Er’s prop
warehouse. ACCFA has a mort. Lien on the ricemill
bldg. w/c it had foreclosed. Held: No lien in favor of workers over the Er’s
prop. Claims for unpaid wages do not fall at all
w/in the category of spec. pref. claims est. under
REPUBLIC V. PERALTA Arts. 2241 & 2242 cc. A distinction shld. be
made bet. a preference of Ct & a lien. A pref.
Facts: In the voluntary insolvency proceedings of applies only to claims w/c do not attach to spec.
Qlty. Tobacco Corp., the ff. Were the claims: (1) prop. A lien creates a charge on a part. prop.
USTC Assn. EEs & Workers Union for separation The rt. of 1st pref. as regards unpd. wages under
pay, (2) Fed. De la Industria (labor union also) for Art. 110 LC does NOT constitute a lien over the
sep’n pay, (3) B of Customs claims &, (4) BIR prop over the insolvent debtor. It is but a
claims. preference o Ct in the workers’ favor, a pref. of
applic’n. It is a method adopted to det. & specify
Issue: WON Ees claims preferred the order in w/c Cts shld. be paid in the final
dist’n of the proceeds of the insolvent assets.
Held: “Wages” under Art. 110 LC may be regarded Monetary claims in CAB are not involved in
to include severance/termination/ separation pay. judicial proceeding in rem in adjudication of Crs
The latter is add’l remuneration to w/c Ees become claims v. debtor’s assets, nor such claims accrued
entitled, to. Art. 100 LC has to be viewed in rel. to after effectivity of RA 6715 (amending Art. 110
the Civil Code as to preference of credits. The CC LC) Hence, (1) Art. 110 LC must be read in
provisions classify credits v. a particular insolvent conjnxn w/ CC, (2) LC & CC require jud’l
into 3 gen. Categories: (1) spec. preferred Cts in proceedings in rem in adjudication of Crs’ claims
2241 & 2242, (2) ord. preferred Cts in2244 & (3) v. the debtor’s assets to become operative, (3)
common Cts in 2245. Special pref. Cts constitutes a RA 6715 expand “worker pref” to inc. not only
lien or encumbrance on the spec. mov. or immov. unpd. wages but also the monetary claims of
prop. to w/c they relate. Art 2243 makes it clear labors, to w/c even gov’t claims must be deemed
that these Cts shall be considered morts. or pledges subordinate, & (4) RA, w/c took effect 21 Mar
of real or pers. prop. or liens w/in the purview of 1989 has only prospective applic’n.
legal provisions on insolvency. It shld. be
emphasized that taxes, duties & fees due to the
State or any subd. thereof & taxes due upon the
insolvent’s land or bldgs. stand first in pref. in
respect of the past. mov. or immov. to w/c the tax
liens have attached. The claims listed in Nos. 2-3
Art. 2241 & Nos. 2-10 Art. 2242, all come after
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