DELIA ROMERO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ROMULO PADLAN and
ARTURO SIAPNO
NOVEMBER 23, 2011
Padlan was a former classmate of petitioner.
Padlan went to petitioner’s stall (wedding gown rentals) to
inquire about securing a job in Israel. Convinced by
petitioner’s words of encouragement and inspired by the
potential salary of $700 to $1,200 a month, he deposited
$3,600 to petitioner as processing fee. Petitioner
contacted Jonney Erez Mokra who instructed Padlan to
attend a briefing at his house in Pampanga. Padlan was
able to leave for Israel and was able to secure a job.
Unfortunately, after two and a half months, he was caught
by Israel’s immigration police and detained him for 25
days. He was subsequently deported because he did not
possess a working visa. On his return, Padlan demanded
from petitioner the return of his money, but the latter
refused.
Siapno, after learning that Padlan suffered the
same fate, checked with the DOLE Dagupan district office
whether petitioner and Mokra had any license or
authority to recruit employees for overseas employment.
Finding that petitioner and the others were not
authorized, Padlan and Siapno filed a complaint against
petitioner and Mokra before the NBI. Consequently, an
information was filed against petitioner and Mokra for the
crime of illegal recruitment.
The trial court found petitioner guilt. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate
court.
Petitioner claims that the testimony of Siapno
saying that he paid a certain amount of money to
petitioner must not be given credence due to the absence
of any receipt or any other documentary evidence proving
such.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the
act of illegal recruitment.
HELD: YES. As the testimonies of Padlan and
Siapno shows that petitioner was able to convince the the
private respondents to apply for work abroad after parting
with their money in exchange for services she would
render. Such act of petitioner, without a doubt, falls
within the meaning of recruitment and placement as
defined in Article 13 of the LC.
The court ruled that in illegal recruitment cases,
the failure to present receipts for money that was paid in
connection with the recruitment process will not affect the
strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution as
long as the payment can be proved through clear and
convincing testimonies of credible witnesses.
vs.
MA. HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES, MARICAR B.
INOVERO, MARISSA DIALA, and BERNA M. PAULINO
G.R. No. 195668, June 25, 2014
Ponente: Justice Lucas P. Bersamin
FACTS: The City Prosecutor of Makati City filed in the
RTC two informations charging Inovero, Ma. Harleta
Velasco y Briones, Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino with
illegal recruitment. Only Inovero was arrested and
prosecuted, the other accused having remained at
large. The prosecution presented the five (5) private
complainants as witnesses to prove the crime of Illegal
Recruitment, namely: Novesa Baful ("Baful"), Danilo
Brizuela ("Brizuela"), Rosanna Aguirre ("Aguirre"),
Annaliza Amoyo ("Amoyo"), and Teresa Marbella
("Marbella"), and Mildred Versoza ("Versoza") from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
("POEA").
All attested that Inovero promised them
employment abroad and was even the one who conducted
seminars and who received money from the complainants.
In her defense, Inovero denied the allegations
hurled against her. As summarized in the assailed
Decision, she claimed that she is the niece of accused
Velasco, the owner of HARVEL, but denied working there.
Explaining her presence in HARVEL, she alleged that she
worked for her uncle, Velasco’s husband, as an office
assistant, hence, for at least two or three times a week,
she had to go to HARVEL on alleged errands for her uncle.
She also testified that her alleged errands mainly
consisted of serving food and refreshments during
orientations at HARVEL. Inovero likewise denied receiving
any money from the complainants, nor issuing receipts
therefor.
RTC convicted Inovero of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale.Inovero appealed, contending
that: the trial court gravely erred in finding
accusedappellant guilty of the crime charged despite the
prosecution’s failure to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. On August 26, 2010, the CA affirmed
the conviction.
Hence, this petition. Inovero insists that the CA
erred in affirming her conviction by the RTC because she
had not been an employee of Harvel at any time; that she
could be faulted only for her association with the
supposed illegal recruiters; that in all stages of the
complainants’ recruitment for overseas employment by
Harvel, they had transacted only and directly with Diala;
and that the certification from the POEA to the effect she
was not a licensed recruiter was not a positive proof that
she engaged in illegal recruitment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Inovero should be held liable for
illegal recruitment.
RULING: YES. The court ruled that the RTC
correctly found that Inovero committed illegal recruitment
in large scale by giving private complainants the
impression that she can send them abroad for
employment purposes, despite the fact that she had no
license or authority to do so.
All that Inovero’s appeal has offered was her
denial of complicity in the illegal recruitment of the
complainants. But the complainants credibly described
and affirmed her specific acts during the commission of
the crime of illegal recruitment. Their positive assertions
were far trustworthier than her mere denial.
Also, the court concurred with the RTC and the
CA that Inovero was criminally liable for the illegal
recruitment charged against her. Strong and positive
evidence demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt her
having conspired with her co-accused in the recruitment
of the complainants.
As a co-conspirator, then, Inovero’s civil liability
was similar to that of a joint tortfeasor under the rules of
the civil law. Joint tortfeasors are those who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who
approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They
are also referred to as those who act together in
committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of each
other, unite in causing a single injury. Under Article 2194
of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for
the resulting damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are
each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the
same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves.
It would not be an excuse for any of the joint
tortfeasors to assert that her individual participation in
the wrong was insignificant as compared to those of the
others. Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. They are
jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. Hence,
Inovero’s liability towards the victims of their illegal
recruitment was solidary, regardless of whether she
actually received the amounts paid or not, and
notwithstanding that her co-accused, having escaped
arrest until now, have remained untried.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ALELIE TOLENTINO
JULY 11, 2015
Private complainants alleged that sometime in
November of 2001, they had a meeting with respondent
Tolentino. Respondent told them the procedure for
overseas employment and offered them assistance to find
work abroad for a fee of P80,000. When asked about her
license to recruit overseas, respondent told the private
complainants that she would show it to them on their next
meeting. Days later, private complainants again met the
respondent and each of them deposited P20,000 as partial
payment. Respondent promised to secure their visas and
employment contracts within three months.
The parties met again for the signing of contracts.
Private complainants signed the contracts and paid
P15,000 each as their second partial payment. February
2002, private complainants received information that
respondent was arrested for illegal recruitment.
Respondent denied the charges against her and promised
private complainants that they would get their money
back. Subsequently, they were able to secure a
certification from the POEA that respondent was not
licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.
For the defense, appellant was presented as the
lone witness. Appellant denied the charges against her.
She testified that she was introduced to private
complainants by a certain Cezar Manonson and that the
owner of the office she is renting is her relative. Private
complainants allegedly sought her help regarding possible
work in Korea and that she merely explained the
procedure for overseas employment to them. She was
hesitant to help them because she does not recruit
workers as she herself was also applying for work as
factory worker through Narcisa Santos. She admitted
having received money from private complainants and
issuing receipts for the payments, upon instructions from
Narcisa Santos. She confirmed her signature on the petty
cash vouchers she issued to private complainants,
evidencing their payments. She testified that she gave the
payments to Narcisa Santos. However, she admitted that
she does not have proof that she indeed turned over the
money to Narcisa Santos.
The trial court found respondent guilty of the
offense of large scale illegal recruitment which constitute
economic sabotage. The appellate court affirmed said
decision.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilt of the crime
illegal recruitment
HELD: YES. Respondent is a non-licensee or non-
holder of authority. Part of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution is a POEA Certification, stating that
respondent is not licensed by the POEA to recruit workers
for overseas employment. Respondent admitted that she
has no valid license or authority required by law to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers.
Despite the absence of a license or authority to
undertake recruitment activities, respondent gave the
impression that she has the power or ability to secure
work for private complainants in Korea. Private
complainants Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, and
Jimmy Lejos all testified that appellant promised them
work as factory workers in Korea and induced them to pay
placement fees, which included the expenses for medical
examination and the processing of their documents for
work in Korea. Respondent even showed pictures of
previous applicants, whom she allegedly helped find work
abroad. Respondent also explained to them the procedure
for overseas employment and promised them that she
would secure their visas and employment contracts
within three months. The testimonies of Orlando Layoso,
Donna Magboo, and Jimmy Lejos were corroborated by
Marcelino Lejos and Lederle Panesa, whose Affidavits of
Complaint were adopted as their direct testimonies.
This Court has held in several cases that an accused who
represents to others that he could send workers abroad
for employment, even without the authority or license to
do so, commits illegal recruitment
 ROSA C. RODOLFO vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: That in or about and during the period from
August to September 1984, in Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused representing herself to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers
for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job
placement abroad to VILLAMOR ALCANTARA, NARCISO
CORPUZ, NECITAS R. FERRE, GERARDO H. TAPAWAN
and JOVITO L. CAMA, without first securing the required
license or authority from the Ministry of Labor and
Employment.
RTC rendered judgment finding accused guilty of
the crime of illegal recruitment.
On appeal, accused-appellant denied ever
approaching private complainants to recruit them for
employment in Dubai. On the contrary, it was the private
complainants who asked her help in securing jobs abroad.
As a good neighbor and friend, she brought the private
complainants to the Bayside Manpower Export Specialist
agency because she knew Florante Hinahon, the owner of
the said agency. While accused-appellant admitted that
she received money from the private complainants, she
was quick to point out that she received the same only in
trust for delivery to the agency. She denied being part of
the agency either as an owner or employee thereof. To
corroborate appellant’s testimony, Milagros Cuadra, who
was also an applicant and a companion of private
complainants, testified that appellant did not recruit
them. On the contrary, they were the ones who asked help
from appellant. To further bolster the defense, Eriberto C.
Tabing, the accountant and cashier of the agency,
testified that appellant is not connected with the agency
and that he saw appellant received money from the
applicants but she turned them over to the agency
through either Florantino Hinahon or Luzviminda
Marcos.
The appellate court dismissed the petition and
her motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner bewails the failure of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals to credit the testimonies of her
witnesses, her companion Milagros Cuadra, and Eriberto
C. Tabing who is an accountant-cashier of the agency.
Further, petitioner assails the trial court’s and the
appellate court’s failure to consider that the provisional
receipts she issued indicated that the amounts she
collected from the private complainants were turned over
to the agency through Minda Marcos and Florante
Hinahon. At any rate, she draws attention to People v.
Señoron wherein this Court held that the issuance or
signing of receipts for placement fees does not make a
case for illegal recruitment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Rodolfo amounts to
illegal recruitment.
RULING: YES. The elements of the offense of illegal
recruitment, which must concur, are: (1) that the offender
has no valid license or authority required by law to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers;
and (2) that the offender undertakes any activity within
the meaning of recruitment and placement under Article
13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of the Labor Code. If another element is present
that the accused commits the act against three or more
persons, individually or as a group, it becomes an illegal
recruitment in a large scale.
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines
"recruitment and placement" as "any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not."
That appellant in this case had been neither
licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment was certified by Veneranda C. Guerrero,
officer-in-charge of the Licensing and Regulation Office;
and Ma. Salome S. Mendoza, manager of the Licensing
Branch – both of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration. Yet, as complainants convincingly
proved, she recruited them for jobs in Taiwan.
The second element is doubtless also present. The
act of referral, which is included in recruitment, is "the
act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for
employment after an initial interview of a selected
applicant for employment to a selected employer,
placement officer or bureau." Petitioner’s admission that
she brought private complainants to the agency whose
owner she knows and her acceptance of fees including
those for processing betrays her guilt.
That petitioner issued provisional receipts
indicating that the amounts she received from the private
complainants were turned over to Luzviminda Marcos and
Florante Hinahon does not free her from liability. For the
act of recruitment may be "for profit or not." It is sufficient
that the accused "promises or offers for a fee employment"
to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.
STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP vs.
SULPECIO MEDEQUILLO, JR.
JANUARY 18, 2012
Respondent filed a complaint before the
Adjudication Office of the POEA against the petitioners for
illegal dismissal under the first contract and for failure to
deploy under the second contract.
Respondent alleged that he was hired by
petitioner on behalf of its principal Chung-Gai Ship
Management of Panama as Third Assistant Engineer. He
joined the vessel “MV Stolt Aspiration” for nearly three
months and while the vessel was at Batangas, he was
ordered by the ship’s master to disembark the vessel and
repatriated back to Manila for no explanation. Upon his
return, he immediately proceeded to petitioner’s office
where he was transferred employment with another vessel
under the same terms and conditions of the first contract.
The second employment contract was approved
by the POEA without knowledge on its part that
respondent was not actually deployed. Despite the
commencement of the contract on April 21, 1992,
petitioners failed to deploy him. December 22, 1994, he
demanded for his passport, seaman’s book and other
employment documents. He was constrained to sign a
document involuntarily because without the documents
he could not seek employment from other agencies.
The LA found that respondent was constructively
dismissed; that the first contract entered into by the
parties had been novated by the second contract.
Petitioners appealed stating that respondent cannot be
considered as having been illegally dismissed because he
had not even been deployed yet. The NLRC affirmed with
modification.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not there was novation of
the first contract by the second contract;
2. Whether respondent was
constructively dismissed
HELD: 1. YES. The parties impliedly extinguished
the first contract by agreeing to enter into the second
contract to placate respondent , who was unexpectedly
dismissed and repatriated to Manila. The record also
reveal that the 2nd contract extinguishes the first one by
changing its object or principal. Contrary to petitioner’s
assertion, the first contract was a previous valid contract
since it had not yet been terminated at the time of
respondent’s repatriation. The legality of his dismissal
had not yet been resolved with finality. Undoubtedly, he
was still employed under the first contract when he
negotiated with petitioners on the second contract. As
such, the NLRC correctly ruled that petitioner could only
be liable under the second contract.
2. NO. Even without actual deployment, the
perfected contract gives rise to obligation on the part of
petitioners. The Employment contract commences “upon
actual departure of the seafarer”, this does not mean that
the seafarer has no remedy in case of non-deployment
without any valid reason.
The court ruled that distinction must be made
between the perfection of the employment contract and
the commencement of the ER-EE relationship. The
perfection of the contract is coincided with the date of the
execution thereof, occured when the parties agreed on the
object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and
conditions therein. Commencement of the ER-EE
relationship, would have taken place had petitioner been
actually deployed from point of hire.
Thus, even before the start of any ER-EE,
contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment
contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations,
the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action. The
breach of contract in this case happened on February of
1992 and the law applicable at that time was the 1991
POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas
Employment. The penalty for non-deployment as
discussed is suspension or cancellation of license.
ACE NAVIGATION CO., INC. vs. TEODORICO
FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 197309, October 10, 2012
Ponente: Justice Arturo D. Brion
FACTS: On October 9, 2008, seaman Teodorico
Fernandez (Fernandez), assisted by his wife, Glenita
Fernandez, filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a complaint for disability benefits,
with prayer for moral and exemplary damages, plus
attorney’s fees, against Ace Navigation Co., Inc., Vela
International Marine Ltd., and/or Rodolfo Pamintuan
(petitioners).
The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint,
contending that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over
the dispute. They argued that exclusive original
jurisdiction is with the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators, pursuant to Section 29 of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), since the
parties are covered by the AMOSUP-TCC or AMOSUP-
VELA (as later cited by the petitioners) collective
bargaining agreement (CBA). Under Section 14 of the
CBA, a dispute between a seafarer and the company shall
be settled through the grievance machinery and
mandatory voluntary arbitration.
Fernandez opposed the motion. He argued that
inasmuch as his complaint involves a money claim,
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case is vested
with the labor arbiter.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the motion to
dismiss. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the ruling of the LA.
On appeal, the CA ruled that the appeal should
not prosper where it clarified that while the law allows
parties to submit to voluntary arbitration other labor
disputes, including matters falling within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters under Article
217 of the Labor Code as this Court recognized in Vivero
v. Court of Appeals, the parties’ submission agreement
must be expressed in unequivocal language. It found no
such unequivocal language in the AMOSUP/TCC CBA
that the parties agreed to submit money claims or, more
specifically, claims for disability benefits to voluntary
arbitration.
On appeal to the SC, the petitioners claim that
the CA committed a reversible error in ruling that the
AMOSUP-VELA CBA does not contain unequivocal
wordings for the mandatory referral of Fernandez’s claim
to voluntary arbitration.
The petitioners assail the CA’s failure to explain
the basis "for ruling that no explicit or unequivocal
wordings appeared on said CBA for the mandatory referral
of the disability claim to arbitration." They surmise that
the CA construed the phrase "either party may refer the
case to a MANDATORY ARBITRATION COMMITTEE"
under Section 14.7(a) of the CBA as merely permissive
and not mandatory because of the use of the word "may."
They contend that notwithstanding the use of the word
"may," the parties unequivocally and unmistakably
agreed to refer the present disability claim to mandatory
arbitration.
ISSUE: Who has the jurisdiction over the money claims
of Fernandez?
RULING: VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. The Court ruled that
the CA erred in reading the provision separately, or in
isolation of the other sections of Article 14, especially
14.7(h), which, in clear, explicit language, states that the
"referral of all unresolved disputes from the Grievance
Resolution Committee to the Mandatory Arbitration
Committee shall be unwaivable prerequisite or condition
precedent for bringing any action, claim, or cause of action,
legal or otherwise, before any court, tribunal, or panel in
any jurisdiction" and that the failure by a party or seaman
to so refer the dispute to the prescribed dispute resolution
mechanism shall bar any legal or other action.
Read in its entirety, the CBA’s Article 14
(Grievance Procedure) unmistakably reflects the parties’
agreement to submit any unresolved dispute at the
grievance resolution stage to mandatory voluntary
arbitration under Article 14.7(h) of the CBA. And, it
should be added that, in compliance with Section 29 of
the POEA-SEC which requires that in cases of claims and
disputes arising from a seafarer’s employment, the parties
covered by a CBA shall submit the claim or dispute to the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
The SC upheld the jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators over the
present dispute, not only because of the clear language of
the parties’ CBA on the matter; more importantly, we so
uphold the voluntary arbitrator’s jurisdiction, in
recognition of the State’s express preference for voluntary
modes of dispute settlement, such as conciliation and
voluntary arbitration as expressed in Sec. 3 Art. XIII of the
Constitution, the law and the rules.
As held in the case of Dulay vs. Aboitiz: “It is
settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a
procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a
dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure
should be strictly observed.”
JESUS VERGARA vs.
HAMMONIA MARITIME SERVICES and ATLANTIC
MARINE LTD.
OCTOBER 06, 2008
Petitioner was hired by respondent Hammonia for
its foreign principal, Atlantic Marine. Petitioner left the
Philippines on April 15, 2000 to carry out his work as
pumpman. Months later, while attending to a defective
hydraulic valve, he felt he was losing his vision. He
complained to the Ship Captain that he was seeing black
dots and hairy figures floating in front of his right eye. His
condition developed into a gradual visual loss. The ship’s
medical log entered his condition as “internal bleeding” in
the eye of glaucoma. He was given eye drops to treat his
condition. Petitioner went and consulted a physician in
Port Galveston, Texas. He was diagnosed as suffering from
vitreal hemmorrhage with small defined area of retinal
traction. Differential diagnosis includes incomplete vitreal
detachment ruptured macro aneurism and valsulva
retinophaty. He was advised to see an opthalmologist
when he returned home to the Philippines.
He was sent home on September 05, 2000 for
medical treatment. The company-designated physician,
Dr. Lim, confirmed the correctness of his diagnosis in
Texas. Dr. Lim then referred petitioner to an
opthalmologist in Chinese General Hospital who
subjected petitioner’s eye to several eye laser treatments.
On January 31, 2001, the opthalmologist
pronounced petitioner fi to resume in his seafaring
duties per the report of Dr. Lim, Medical Coordinator.
Petitioner then executed a certificate of fitness for
work in the presence of Dr. Lim. Claiming that he
continued to experience gradual visual loss despite
treatment, he sought a second opinion from another
physician, Dr. Echiverri, who was not a company
designated physician. According to Dr. Echiverri,
petitioner was not fit for work as a pumpman because the
job could precipitate the resurgence of his former
condition. Dr. Vicaldo, who was not a company designated
physician declared that although petitioner was fit to
work, he had a grade X disability which he considered as
permanent partial disability.
Armed with these separate diagnoses, petitioner
demanded from his employer payment of disability and
sickness benefits, pursuant to POEA Standard
Employment Contract and the existing CBA in the
company. The company did not heeded his demand,
prompting petitioner to file a complaint for disability
benefits, sickness allowance, damages and attorney’s
fees.
The LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed LA’s decision stating that
petitioner had been declared fit to work and was not
entitled to any disability benefits.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s claim for
permanent total disability benefits has legal basis.
HELD: None. The temporary total disability only
becomes permanent when so declared by the company
physician within the period he is allowed to do so, or upon
the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical
treatment period without a declaration either fitness to
work or the existence of a permanent disability. In the
present case, while the initial 120-day treatment or
temporary total disability period was exceeded, the
company designated doctor duly made a declaration well
within the extended 240 day period that petitioner was fit
to work. Viewed from this, both the NLRC and CA were
correct when they refused to recognize any disability
because the petitioner had already been declared fit to
work. The POEA Standard Employment Contract and
CBA clearly provide that the fitness or unfitness of a
worker from work shall be determined by the company
designated physician.
If the physician appointed by the seafarer
disagrees with the company physician’s assessment, the
opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly by the
seafarer and employer to be the final and binding
decision.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC.,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES
FACTS: Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency,
Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a
one-year employment contract for a monthly salary of
NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan
Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged
that in her employment contract, she agreed to work
as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked
to work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain
Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior
notice, that she was terminated and that “she should
immediately report to their office to get her salary and
passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate
repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from June
26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted
NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and
Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed
LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission finding respondent illegally
dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of
salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation,
and attorney’s fees
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was entitled to the
unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal dismissal.
HELD: YES. The Court held that the award of the three-
month equivalent of respondent’s salary should be
increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term
of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that
the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause and substantive due
process.
A statute or provision which was declared
unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”
The Court said that they are aware that
the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in
Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act
No. 10022 in 2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is
supreme. No branch or office of the government
may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with
the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law
that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be
trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light
of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is
a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null
because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity
cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the
same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of
law that was already declared unconstitutional remains
as such unless circumstances have so changed as to
warrant a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause,
this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates
the constitutional rights to equal protection and due
process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have
failed to show any compelling change in the
circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the
precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022
amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
ANTONIO SERRANO vs.
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW
NAVIGATION CO., INC.
MARCH 24, 2009
For Petitioner, a Filipino seafarer, the last clause
in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, RA 8042 limits their
entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum
salary either for the unexpired portion of their
employment contract or for three months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less. Petitioner claims
that said last clause violates the OFWs’ constitutional
rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract,
deprives them of equal protection and denies them due
process.
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In
case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to
the full reimbursement of his placement
fee with interest of twelve percent (12%)
per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment
 contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.
Petitioner was hired by respondents under a
POEA-approved contract of employment. On the date of
his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract to for the position of a
Second Officer with a monthly salary of $1,000, upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver to their promise. Hence,
petitioner, refused to stay and was repatriated to the
Philippines.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period
of 12 months (March 19, 1998 - March 19, 1999), but at
the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had
served only two months and seven days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-
three days.
Petitioner filed a complaint before the LA for
constructive dismissal and payment of his money claims.
The LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner awarding
him monetary benefits. However, in awarding petitioner a
lump-sum salary of $8,770, the LA based his computation
on the salary period for three months only- rather than
the entire unexpired portion.
Upon appeal, the NLRC corrected the LA’s
computation by reducing the applicable salary rate from
$2,590 to $1,400 because RA. 8042. Does not provide for
award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have
actually performed, and for vacation leave pay. Petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The
CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of salary
rate; however, it skirted the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not section 10, paragraph 5 of
RA 8042 is unconstitutional
HELD: YES. The court declared it as
unconstitutional. The subject clause creates a sub-layer
of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods
are for more than one year; those who are illegally
dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts
shall be entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion
thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one
year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered
by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited
to their salaries for three months only.
According to the court, the subject clause does
not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose;
and it is for that reason that the clause violates not just
petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her tight to
substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution. The subject clause being unconstitutional,
petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire
unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his
employment contract, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence prior to enactment of RA 8042.
KESTREL SHIPPING CO., INC. / CAPT. AMADOR P.
SERVILLON and ATLANTIC MANNING LTD.,
vs.
FRANCISCO D. MUNAR
G.R. No. 198501, January 30, 2013
Ponente: Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes
FACTS: Francisco D. Munar, entered into a 6-month
contract with Kestrel Shipping Co., in behalf of its
principal Atlantic Manning Ltd., as pump man for MV
Southern Unity. While in his employment he suffered an
injury. He was repatriated and underwent treatment in
the Philippines.
Meantime, on April 17, 2007, Munar filed a
complaint for total and permanent disability benefits. His
complaint was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. OFW-07-
04-00970-00 and raffled to Labor Arbiter Veneranda
Guerrero (LA Guerrero). Munar claimed that the mere fact
that his medical condition, which incapacitated him to
engage in any gainful employment, persisted for more
than 120 days automatically entitles him to total and
permanent disability benefits.
Pursuant POEA-SEC provisions he was offered by
Kestrel Shipping Co. disability benefits for Grade 8
disability as assessed by the company designated doctor,
contrary to the Grade 1 assessment of Dr. Chiu, an
independent orthopedic hired by Munar.
The LA awarded him with total and permanent
disability benefits. This was affirmed by the NLRC and
later by the CA with modification as to the attorney’s fee,
lowering it from 10% to 2%.
Petitioners contend that Munar cannot claim that
he is totally and permanently disabled and claim the
benefits corresponding to Grade 1 disabilities simply
because he has not yet fully recovered after the lapse of
120 days from the time he signed-off from M/V Southern
Unity. The nature of disability and the benefits attached
thereto are determined by the manner they are graded or
classified under the POEA and not by the number of days
that a seafarer is under treatment. If a seafarer has an
injury or medical condition that is not considered a Grade
1 impediment under the POEA-SEC, then he cannot claim
that he is totally or permanently disabled. To allow the
contrary would render naught the schedule of disabilities
under the POEA-SEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of total and permanent
disability to Munar was proper.
HELD: Yes. Permanent disability is the inability of a
worker to perform his job for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part
of his body. As gleaned from the records, respondent was
unable to work for more than 120 days, due to his medical
treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was
permanent. Total disability, on the other hand, means the
disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same
kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a
person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does
not mean absolute helplessness. In disability
compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated,
but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the
impairment of one’s earning capacity.
Consequently, after the expiration of the 120-day
period, Dr. Chua had not yet made any declaration as to
Munar’s fitness to work and Munar had not yet fully
recovered and was still incapacitated to work sufficed to
entitle the latter to total and permanent disability
benefits.
JULIUS TAGALOG vs.
CROSSWORLD MARINE SERVICES, INC ET AL.
JUNE 22, 2015
Respondents hired petitioner as Wiper/Oiler
onboard the vessel M/V Ocean Breeze. Petitioner’s
contract of employment was for a fixed period of 12
months. Sometime on November of 2005, petitioner
injured his eye when he accidently splashed his eyes with
the cleaning solution mixed with a strong chemical while
cleaning the cooler of the main engine of the vessel.
December 02, 2005, he was brought to a hospital in Port
of Spain where he was diagnosed to have bilateral
pterygium and declared unfit to work. On December 8 and
15, 2005, petitioner underwent operations on both eyes
at the port. January 10, petitioner went to see an
ophthalmologist in the Port of Sea Lots due to pain and
excessive tearing on his right eye. He was diagnosed to
have granuloma of the conjunctive right. An excision was
done on the same day and continuing medication was
advised.
January 2006, petitioner arrived in Manila. He
reported to Crossworld where he was referred to the
company-designated physician, Dr. Ong-Salvador.
Petitioner was diagnosed to have aggressive fleshy
pterygium S/P Excision of Pterygium and Granuloma,
both eyes. On February 23, 2006, petitioner underwent
an operation at UST hospital. He was discharge two days
after and given oral pain relievers. On March 17, 2006,
petitioner was subjected to the same operation on his left
eye; and on May 03, 2006, Dr. Ong-Salvador declared
petitioner fit to work. Petitioner the executed a
Certificate of Fitness for Work attesting that he is fit work
and that he has no claims whatsoever against
respondents in relation to his injury.
September 07, 2006, however, petitioner sought
a second opinion and consulted a private physician, Dr.
Canta. Upon examination, Dr. Canta concluded that
petitioner was unfit to work.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the arbitration
branch of NLRC for disability benefits, sickness
allowance, damages and attorney’s fees against
respondents. Petitioner claims that he is entitled to
permanent total disability benefits because he was
declared unfit to work in the last week of November 2005
until April 20, 2006, which is beyond the 120 day period.
The LA ruled in favor of petitioner. The NLRC
affirmed the findings of the LA but deleted the award of
damages. On appeal, the appellate court set aside the
decision of NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to
permanent disability benefits?
HELD: NO. The mere lapse of the 120 day period
does not automatically warrant the payment of permanent
total disability benefits. The court affirms the ruling of the
CA which states that only 102 days have passed from the
time private respondent signed-off from the vessel up to
the time the company physician made a pronouncement
that he was fit to work. Verily, the initial 120-day period
had not yet lapsed. The Court furthermore uphold the
CAs’ reliance on the medical findings of the company
designated physician. According to the POEA-SEC if a
doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the
assessment of the company designated doctor, a third
doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on the parties.
Verily, petitioner in this case did not seek the opinion of a
third person as mandated by POEA-SEC. Therefore, the
findings of the company-physician will prevail.
DOEHLE-PHILMAN MANNING AGENCY INC., DOHLE
(IOM) LIMITED AND CAPT. MANOLO T. GACUTAN,
vs.
HENRY C. HARO
G.R. No. 206522, April 18, 2016
Ponente: Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
FACTS: On May 30, 2008, Doehle-Philman, in behalf of
its foreign principal, Dohle Ltd., hired respondent as oiler
aboard the vessel MV CMA CGM Providencia for a period
of nine months with basic monthly salary of US$547.00
and other benefits. Before deployment, respondent
underwent pre-employment medical examination (PEME)
and was declared fit for sea duty.
On November 2008, Haro experienced heartache
and loss of energy after hammering and lifting a 120-kg
machine. He was thereafter confined to a hospital in
Rotterdam, where he was informed of having a hole in his
heart that needed medical attention.
After Haro’s repatriation in December 2008, Haro
reported to DOEHLE -PHILMAN, which referred him to
Clinico-Med. The findings were confirmed, and a doctor in
the UST Hospital recommended that Haro have a heart
operation. Haro had not yet proceeded with the operation.
Haro was declared unfit for work.
 Consequently, on June 19, 2009, respondent
filed a Complaint for disability benefits, reimbursement of
medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees against petitioners.15 Respondent claimed
that since he was declared fit to work before his
deployment, this proved that he sustained his illness
while in the performance of his duties aboard the vessel;
that he was unable to work for more than 120 days; and
that he lost his earning capacity to engage in a work he
was skilled to do. Thus, he insisted he is entitled to
permanent and total disability benefits.
DOEHLE-PHILMAN denied that Haro had a hole
in his heart, and pointed out that his condition was
instead "aortic regurgitation, moderate"; and that his
condition was not work-related.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Haro is entitled to permanent
and total disability benefits?
HELD: NO, Haro is not entitled to such benefits, because
the employer is liable for disability benefits only when the
seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness
during the term of his contract.
To be entitled to compensation and benefits, the
seafarer must prove by substantial evidence that he
contracted the illness during the term of his contract and
[that] such infirmity was work-related or at the very least
aggravated by the conditions of the work for which he was
engaged. Failing on this aspect, the assertion of
[respondent] that his illness was work-connected is
nothing but an empty imputation of fact without any
probative weight.
In the present case, although the heart condition
of Haro manifested while aboard the vessel, the illness
was nonetheless not work-related. There must be a
reasonable link between the employee’s work and his
illness in order for a rational mind to determine that such
work contributed to, or at least aggravated, his illness.
Lastly, the Court holds that the fact that
respondent passed the PEME is of no moment in
determining whether he acquired his illness during his
employment. The PEME is not exploratory in nature. It is
not intended to be a thorough examination of a person's
medical condition, .and is not a conclusive evidence that
one is free from any ailment before deployment.54 Hence,
it does not follow that because respondent was declared
fit to work prior to his deployment, then he necessarily
sustained his illness while aboard the vessel.
INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL & MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, INC. (IPAMS) vs.
JOSE DE VERA and ALBERTO ARRIOLA
MARCH 07, 2016
Arriola, a licensed surgeon in the Philippines was
offered by SNC-Lavalin (IPAMS’s principal) a position of
Safety Officer in its Ambatovy Project site in Madagascar.
Arriola was then hired through its local manning agency,
IPAMS, and his overseas employment contract was
processed with the POEA.
After three months, Arriola received a notice of
pre-termination of employment. It stated that his
employment would be pre-terminated due to diminishing
workload in the area of his expertise and the
unavailability of alternative assignments. Consequently,
Arriola was repatriated.
Aggrieved, Arriola filed a complaint against
petitioners for illegal dismissal before the LA. He claimed
that SNC-Lavalin still owed him unpaid salaries
equivalent to the 3-month unexpired portion of his
employment contract. He asserted that SNC-Lavalin never
offered any valid reason for his early termination and was
not given sufficient notice.
Petitioners denied the charge of illegal dismissal.
They claimed that SNC-Lavalin was greatly affected by the
global financial crises thus, it had no choice but to
minimize its expenditures and operational expenses. It
invoked the case of EDI-Staffbuilders vs. NLRC, pointing
out that the particular labor laws of a foreign country
incorporated in a contract freely entered into between an
OFW and a foreign employer through the latter’s agent
was valid. In the present case, all of Arriola’s employment
documents were processed in Canada, the principle of lex
loci celebrationis was applicable. Thus, petitioner insisted
the Canadian law governed the contract.
The LA dismissed Arriola’s complaint for lack of
merit. It ruled that, the rights and obligations among and
between the parties were governed by the employment
contract and as petitioner averred, governed by a foreign
law. The NLRC reversed the LA’s decision and rules that
Arriola was illegally dismissed.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Canadian law will
govern the employment contract
2. Whether or not respondent Arriola
was validly dismissed.
HELD: 1. The general rule is that Philippine laws
apply even to overseas employment contracts. This rule is
rooted in the constitutional provision of Section 3, Article
XIII that The State shall afford full protection to labor,
whether local or overseas. Hence, even if the OFW has his
employment abroad, it does not strip him of his rights to
security of tenure, humane conditions of work and a living
wage under our Constitution. As an exception, the parties
may agree that a foreign law shall govern the employment
contract. However, in this case, the petitioners failed to
show on the face of the contract that a foreign law was
agreed upon by the parties.
Further, it was shown that the overseas labor
contract was executed by Arriola at his residence in
Batangas and it was processed at the POEA. Considering
that no foreign law was specified in the contract and the
same was executed in the Philippines, the doctrine of Lex
Loci Celebrationis applies and the Philippine law shall
govern.
2. YES. The petitioners simply argued that they
were suffering from financial loses. It was not clear what
specific authorized cause, whether retrenchment or
redundancy, was used to justify his dismissal. Worse,
petitioner did not even present a single credible evidence
to support their claim of financial loss. They simply
offered and unreliable news article. Time and again, the
court ruled that in illegal dismissal case, the onus of
proving that the employee was dismissed for a valid cause
rest on the employer, and failure to discharge the same
would mean that the dismissal is not justified and
therefore illegal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ANGEL MATEO y JACINTO and VICENTA LAPIZ y
MEDINA
G.R. No. 198012, April 22, 2015
Ponente: Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
FACTS: Sometime during the period from January to
March 1998, the five private complainants, namely, Abe]
E. Balane (Abel), Emilio A. Cariaga (Emilio), Victorio D.
Flordeliza (Victorio), Manuel Oledan (Manuel) and Virgiiio
N. Concepcion (Virgiiio), met appellants on separate
occasions at Plaza Ferguzon, Malate, Manila to apply for
overseas employment. Appellant Mateo, representing
himself to have a tie-up with some Japanese firms,
promised them employment in Japan as conversion
mechanics, welders, or fitters for a fee. Appellants also
promised that they could facilitate private complainants'
employment as direct hires and assured their departure
within three weeks.
However, after the private complainants paid the
required fees ranging from P18,555.00 to P25,000.00,
appellants failed to secure any overseas employment for
them. Appellants likewise failed to return private
complainants' money. This prompted Manuel to go to the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
where he was issued a Certification stating that
appellants are not licensed to recruit applicants for
overseas employment. Thereupon, the private
complainants filed their Complaint and executed their
respective affidavits with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). The NBI referred the charges to the
Department of Justice which subsequently found
probable cause against appellants for large scale illegal
recruitment and estafa and accordingly filed the
corresponding Informations for the same before the RTC
of Manila.
For their defense, appellants proffered denials.
Mateo claimed that he is a legitimate car importer and not
a recruiter. Lapiz, on the other hand, denied knowing any
of the private complainants whom she claimed to have
met for the first time at the Prosecutor's Office.
RTC found the accused guilty of illegal
recruitment. In their appeal before the CA, appellants
essentially claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the
elements of the crimes for which they were charged. They
contended that Abel has not shown any receipt to prove
that they received money from him; that there is likewise
no proof that Virgilio borrowed money from a friend of his
aunt which money he, in turn, gave to them; that the
testimony of Emilio that appellants were holding office
inside the van of Abel cannot be easily accepted; and that
their transactions with Manuel and Victorio were limited
to the processing of their travel documents. The CA
however, affirmed the ruling of the lower court.
Hence, this present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling of the RTC and CA
convicting the appellants should be sustained.
RULING: YES. The offense of illegal recruitment in
large scale has the following elements: (1) the person
charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined
under Section 6 of RA 8042; (2) accused did not have the
license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused committed the
same against three or more persons individually or as a
group.
These elements are obtaining in this case. First,
the RTC found appellants to have undertaken a
recruitment activity when they promised private
complainants employment in Japan for a fee. This factual
finding was affirmed by the CA. "The time-tested doctrine
is that the matter of assigning values to declarations on
the witness stand is best and most competently performed
by the trial judge." And when his findings have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. Second,
the Certification issued by the POEA unmistakably
reveals that appellants neither have a license nor
authority to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Notably, appellants never assailed this Certification.
Third, it was established that there were five
complainants. Clearly, the existence of the offense of
illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved by the
prosecution.
Appellants' argument that there was no proof that
they received money from the private complainants
deserves no credence. Suffice it to say that money is not
material to a prosecution for illegal recruitment
considering that the definition of "illegal recruitment"
under the law includes the phrase "whether for profit or
not." Besides, even if there is no receipt for the money
given by the private complainants to appellants, the
former's respective testimonies and affidavits clearly
narrate the latter's involvement in the prohibited
recruitment.
In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains the
lower courts' conviction of appellants for the crimes
charged.