Religion, State & Society, Vol. 35, No.

4, December 2007

The Attitude of the Moscow Patriarchate towards Other

Orthodox Churches

ALICJA CURANOVIĆ

ABSTRACT
The Moscow Patriarchate is a transnational subject of political relations which acts both inside and
outside the Russian Federation. It has specific goals: to maintain the integrity of its canonical
territory and to gain dominance within the Universal Orthodox Church. It is in competition with
the Patriarchate of Constantinople, it makes alliances with Slavic Orthodox churches and it
pursues diplomacy. The activity of the Moscow Patriarchate is of interest to the Russian
government. This article examines relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and other
Orthodox churches and their significance for Russian foreign policy.

Introduction
Increasing attention is being paid to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)1 within the
Russian Federation for its importance as a political institution. Not only its specific ties
with the state but also its complicated relations with other religious organisations are
carefully studied. One issue that is often overlooked, however, is the question of
relations inside the Universal Orthodox Church. Orthodoxy is often incorrectly
considered as a community that shares one point of view. Although theoretically the
Universal Orthodox Church should be unanimous, the decentralised structure of the
Orthodox world means that the individual churches often have divergent interests. Just
like states, the churches govern their canonical territories, compete and form alliances;
and all this can be observed in the example of the international activity of the ROC.
Relations with other Orthodox churches constitute the main axis of the
international policy of the Moscow Patriarchate. Within Russia the ROC cooperates
with state structures, and inside the Universal Orthodox Church the ROC has a well-
thought-out policy that coincides in many respects with the goals of the Russian
Foreign Ministry. Firmly convinced that a dominating role for the ROC within the
Orthodox world will allow the Moscow Patriarchate to take better care of its own
interests as well as those of the state, the Russian authorities are interested in
reinforcing the position of the Russian church in the worldwide Orthodox community.
It is not an exaggeration to claim that the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian state
support each other in their international activity.
As we keep such an interrelationship in mind, we should first look at the role of an
autocephalous Orthodox Church as a transnational political subject, examining the

ISSN 0963-7494 print; ISSN 1465-3974 online/07/040301-18 Ó 2007 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09637490701621679
302 Alicja Curanovic´

relations between the ROC and other Orthodox churches and their significance for
Russian foreign policy.

The Orthodox Church as a Transnational Subject of Political Relations

Undoubtedly, some religious organisations can be considered transnational subjects –
that is, nonsovereign and exterritorial units outside the state, capable of taking actions
influencing relations inside and outside their respective states (Pietraś and Piórko,
2006, p. 140). An autocephalous (‘local’) Orthodox church fulfils all three criteria of a
transnational subject as identified by Brian Hocking and Michael Smith: it represents
a certain social group, enjoys freedom of action and can influence the international
environment (Hocking and Smith, 1990, p. 71). The dispersed structure of the
Universal Orthodox Church also favours trans-border activity by its constituent
churches. At present Orthodoxy is a community of 13 autocephalous churches,2 each
with the right to solve its problems independently and choose its own bishops
(Roberson, 2005, p. 47). The supreme authority in each church lies with a ‘local’
council of clergy and laymen. According to church canons, all these churches are
equal. The patriarch of Constantinople (the ecumenical patriarch) is considered
primus inter pares, but he has no right to intervene in the other churches’ affairs. In the
international arena the churches act independently of the sacramental and canonical
community which they comprise. An autocephalous church has an exclusive territory
of jurisdiction which usually coincides with the territory of a state. However, in case of
the patriarchates of Moscow and Serbia, where the canonical territory of the churches
extends beyond the boundaries of their states, church structures function as parastate
institutions.
The egalitarianism and decentralisation of Orthodoxy allow the autocephalous
churches to enjoy much freedom of action, but they also bind them to their states
more strongly than is the case with other religious organisations. The traditionally
close relations between Orthodox churches and their state authorities have been
determined by historical factors, including the concept of ‘symphonia’ that has applied
to the Eastern Orthodox Church for centuries.3 What ties state and church together is
the specific sphere of common interest. A consequence of the fact that churches and
states act on the same territory is the fact that they share some interests, which
motivates them to cooperate in both domestic and foreign policy. Another result of a
symbiotic relation of this kind between the state and an Orthodox church is the
phenomenon of the internalisation of Orthodoxy, which manifests itself in the binding
of religion with such phenomena as ethnicity,4 national myths and patriotism.
These two features of the Orthodox churches – the strong bond with state and
nation and the right of self-determination – have led to a conviction among Orthodox
societies that a national autocephalous church is one of the attributes of a sovereign
state. Such a perception influences the policies of the governments of, for example,
FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Ukraine: they emphasise direct relations between
state sovereignty and the canonical independence of local churches and demand
recognition for their national Orthodox churches.
The strong connection between an autocephalous church and a state means that the
church tends increasingly to resemble a political organisation with its own particular
interests in the international environment. In the context of interorthodox relations
three types of church activity are to be distinguished. First, the church maintains
relations with other Orthodox churches. Second, it cooperates with international
organisations: thus the Serbian and Moscow Patriarchates asked the OSCE to join in
negotiations on the future of Kosovo, and bishops of the Romanian Orthodox
 The Moscow Patriarchate and Other Orthodox Churches 303

Church filed a charge in the European Court of Human Rights against the decision of
the Moldovan government to ban the uncanonical Bessarabian archdiocese. Third, it
directly or indirectly5 influences interstate relations, and is itself influenced by state
policy,6 and thus also fulfils the last criterion of transnational subjectivity.
Among Orthodox transnational subjects the ROC deserves special attention
because of its large number of adherents, the size of its canonical territory and its
significance for Russian policy. Together with the Patriarchate of Constantinople the
ROC plays a key role in shaping interorthodox relations. It is not limited to
interchurch relations but is also involved in interstate relations between Orthodox
countries.

The Priorities of the International Activity of the ROC after 1991

From the perspective of the ROC one of the most important consequences of the fall
of the USSR was the fragmentation of the postsoviet area. As a result of the political
emancipation of the Soviet republics a large part of the ROC’s canonical territory
remained outside the borders of the Russian Federation. At present, the administra-
tion of the ROC covers the whole postsoviet area apart from Georgia; this leaves the
church’s structures abroad without the protection of the Russian Federation. In order
to secure its own territorial integrity the Moscow Patriarchate therefore has to
cooperate not only with the Russian authorities but also with the authorities of its 13
neighbour countries. These circumstances shape the activity of the ROC. The church
determines its goals in the context of the existence of three geographical areas: its own
canonical territory inside Russia; its canonical territory outside Russia; and areas
outside the borders of its canonical territory.
In the first area the ROC strives to maintain a privileged position and limit the
activity of other religious organisations in Russia. For this reason it is tightening its
relations with the state authorities. The obvious ‘canonical monopoly’ of the ROC in
this field means that interorthodox issues play only a supporting role. However,
recently serious efforts have begun to overcome inner schism and reunite the Russian
Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) (also known as the Russian Orthodox
Church Abroad (ROCA)) with the ROC.
In the second area the Moscow Patriarchate concentrates on retaining its
jurisdiction, reaching reconciliation with rebel churches and taking care of the
Russian diaspora. The ROC takes an active part in public life in the countries where it
has its own administrative structures. Moreover, here interorthodox relations gain
importance. That part of the ROC’s canonical territory outside Russia has become a
place where interests of particular churches clash.
In the third area, relations within Orthodoxy play a key role. The main goal of the
Moscow Patriarchate’s activity outside its own territory is to assert its own primacy in
the Universal Orthodox Church. The ROC plays a sophisticated political game in
which other churches are involved either as opponents or allies. This rivalry, which
also involves state structures, takes place in many regions, including Western Europe,
the Balkans and especially the Far East.

The Russian Orthodox Church Facing the Problem of Supremacy in

the Postsoviet Area
Observing the gradual fragmentation of the Soviet state, two months before the
official collapse of the USSR, on 22 October 1991, the Holy Synod of the ROC
accepted the formula ‘several states but one patriarchate’ (‘neskol’ko gosudarstv – odin
304 Alicja Curanovic´

patriarkhat’) (Ryabykh, 2001, p. 125). The ROC thus declared its priority as
maintaining the unity of its canonical territory. Under the pressure of political
changes, however, the ROC agreed to make some concessions and granted a certain
degree of autonomy to the local churches most prone to schism. In January 1990 by a
decision of the church Council two exarchates were created in Belarus’ and Ukraine.
Three years later the Estonian, Latvian and Moldovan churches were given autonomy
(Roberson, 2005, p. 70). Their new status allows these churches a certain freedom of
activity within limits set by the ROC.7 The range of autonomy may be different for
each church: in Moldova, Estonia and Latvia the Holy Synod in Moscow takes
decisions about the administrative structure, the building of monasteries and convents
and the founding of theological schools; in Belarus’ Moscow additionally approves
the proceedings of the local Synod (Mitrokhin, 2004, p. 84).
The autonomy thus granted did not stop secessionist tendencies within the Moscow
Patriarchate, however. The first signal came from Kiev: only a few months after
establishing the Ukrainian exarchate, the local clergy demanded a broadening of their
independence. The Council of the ROC responded positively on 27 October 1990
(Robertson, 2005, p. 70). Eventually the Ukrainian exarchate of the ROC obtained
wide privileges, including the right to designate its own bishops (Mitrokhin, 2004,
p. 84). In spite of these concessions, the section of the Ukrainian clergy gathered
around the Kiev metropolitan Filaret kept struggling for autocephaly, especially after
Ukraine gained independence on 24 August 1991. If the Moscow Patriarchate agreed
to Ukrainian autocephaly it would not only have to face the loss of Ukraine but would
also set a precedent threat to the integrity of its canonical territory. Following its
formula ‘several states but one patriarchate’, in April 1992 the ROC definitively
refused to change the status of the Ukrainian church. That same year Filaret was
deprived of the title of metropolitan of Kiev8 and expelled from the priesthood
(Roberson, 2005, p. 146). During the absence of Patriarch Mstyslav, Filaret became
increasingly active inside the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC).9
In November 1992 Patriarch Mstyslav of the UAOC broke off relations with Filaret,
which led to a split in the UAOC. The secessionists established their own organisation:
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP). On 22 October 1995
Filaret was designated the patriarch of the UOC-KP; as a result he was
excommunicated by the Moscow Patriarchate.
At present there are three independent Orthodox jurisdictions and two main camps
in Ukraine: the Kiev Patriarchate, which is trying to establish a united autocephalous
Ukrainian church in union with the UAOC; and the Moscow Patriarchate, struggling
against the acceptance of the Ukrainian schism by the Orthodox community.
Representatives of both camps are looking for the support of the state authorities in
Ukraine. After so-called ‘Black Tuesday’ (18 July 1995)10 a Ukrainian Council of
Churches was established on the initiative of President Leonid Kuchma (20 June 1996);
it was designed to become a platform for dialogue between the conflicting sides.
Unfortunately, the Ukrainian religious space has become even more polarised as a
result of the Orange Revolution (November 2004 – January 2005). Each of the camps
supported its own candidate: the Kiev Patriarchate was for Viktor Yuschenko, while
the Moscow Patriarchate was for Yanukovych. Both churches urged people to vote for
a specific party. Clergy of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church instructed
believers to pray for the victory of Yanukovych’s ‘Party of Regions’, and cases were
reported of clergy refusing to absolve the sins of supporters of Yuschenko. The
situation even led to protests among the faithful. The victory of Yuschenko’s ‘Our
Ukraine’ party aggravated the religious situation in the country. The ROC did not trust
 The Moscow Patriarchate and Other Orthodox Churches 305

the new president, who had officially called for the uniting of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. All
efforts made either by the authorities or by other churches with the aim of legitimising
the uncanonical structures provoke strong protests from the Moscow Patriarchate,
which is determined to prevent the repetition of the ‘Estonian model’ in Ukraine.
As a result of a decision by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, since 20 February 1996
there have been two parallel canonical jurisdictions in Estonia: the Estonian Apostolic
Orthodox Church (EAOC)11 under Constantinople; and the structures of the ROC.
Just as in Ukraine, in Estonia the granting of autonomy by the ROC in 1993 did not
prevent a local schism, and in August 1993 the schismatic church was registered by the
Ministry of Administration. The compromise reached in 1996 by the Holy Synods of
Constantinople and Moscow did not satisfy either of the conflicting sides: one of the
reasons was the lack of a solution to the question of property. The ROC tried to win
the support of international institutions; in 1999, for example, it asked the head of the
OSCE mission in Estonia Berndt Braun to examine the Estonian government’s policy
towards the Russian minority in the country; one of the archbishops of the ROC even
suggested that Estonia should be allowed to join the EU only on the condition that the
Estonian government solve the problem of the church’s property in a way that would
satisfy the Moscow Patriarchate.
The relations between the ROC, the EAOC and the Estonian authorities have
distinctly improved since the visit of the Russian patriarch Aleksi II in September
2003. The ROC regained its place on the Estonian Church Council and started to take
part in public events. On the strength of the protocol which had been signed by both
churches at the end of 2001 the EAOC ceded 18 churches to the ROC. The state
authorities have guaranteed the ROC the right of exclusive usage of the land it owns
for a period of 50 years and have awarded the ROC compensation of 35 million
kroon.12 As a gesture towards reconciliation the president of Estonia awarded
Patriarch Aleksi a decoration and the patriarch gave the president a prize for
‘outstanding work in strengthening the unity of Orthodox nations’. After state
mediation, the conflict has been mitigated, but controversies remain. The EAOC
keeps complaining that the representatives of the ROC regularly boycott meetings
while the Russian side accuses the Estonians of mistreating the Russian minority.
The Estonian conflict is one example of rivalry between the Patriarchates of
Moscow and Constantinople. The case of Moldova – another site of dispute on the
ROC’s canonical territory – also involves two patriarchates: those of Moscow and
Romania. Parallel structures of these two patriarchates have existed in Moldova since
December 1992 as a result of the decision of the Romanian Orthodox Church to re-
establish the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia.13 In contrast with the situation in
Ukraine or Estonia, the Moldovan authorities support the Moscow Patriarchate; for
ten years they effectively banned the activity of the Church of Bessarabia and on 27
September 2001 even announced that the ROC was the only legal Orthodox church in
Moldova. Only an order from the European Court of Human Rights (13 December
2001) forced Chişinau to register the Bessarabian metropolitan (30 July 2002) and pay
the church e27,000 in compensation.
In the background of the controversy over jurisdiction between the Romanian and
Moscow Patriarchates lies the unsolved status of Transdnistria. The ROC is probably
the only institution still keeping both parts of the split country together. This might be
one reason why President Vladimir Voronin cares so much for good relations with the
ROC. This assumption seems to be confirmed by the declaration made by Aleksi II
during his first visit in 15 years to Chişin
au. The patriarch, awarded an order by the
republic, gave his support to the president in his efforts to reconcile the people of
306 Alicja Curanovic´

Moldova and Transdnistria and underlined the need to respect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the former Soviet republic.
None of these three territorial disputes has been solved according to the
expectations of the Moscow Patriarchate. Things have definitely gone too far for
the ROC’s liking in Estonia, where thanks to a decision by Constantinople a de facto
canonical Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church has been established. What the ROC
fears the most is the repetition of the ‘Estonian model’ in Ukraine. Facing a real threat
to its own structures, the ROC is prepared for a serious confrontation with the
Ecumenical Patriarchate, and Constantinople seems to be well aware of this fact.
While trying to keep its opponents out of its own canonical territory, the Moscow
Patriarchate actively supports all integration initiatives in the postsoviet area. In the
late 1990s the ROC seriously hoped for the union of Belarus’ and Russia, and on
2 April 1996 Patriarch Aleksi II personally blessed the treaty on special cooperation
between the two countries. After Belarusian–Russian integration failed the Moscow
Patriarchate had to settle for giving a prize for ‘outstanding work in strengthening the
unity of Orthodox nations’.
Retaining jurisdiction on its canonical territory is of great importance for the ROC.
However, its success in this field depends to a large extent on its position within the
Universal Orthodox Church.

The Moscow Patriarchate in Rivalry for Supremacy within the Universal Orthodox
Church
Tensions between the ROC and other patriarchates such as the Romanian are
symptoms of a larger rivalry between the two major patriarchates – Moscow and
Constantinople.
The clash of the patriarchates has a long history.14 Constantinople represents the
Greek tradition in Orthodoxy and Moscow the Slavic tradition. The Russian church is
numerically dominant, with 80 million faithful as against 3.5 million under the
jurisdiction of Constantinople. However, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has the canons
on its side. In 381 the Council of Constantinople declared the bishop of
Constantinople the first hierarch after the bishop of Rome and in 451 the Council
of Chalcedon confirmed the bishop of Constantinople the superior of all bishops
outside the Byzantine Empire (Roberson, 2005, p. 49). Finally, in 680 – 81 the Third
Council of Constantinople, which founded the Patriarchate of Constantinople, put the
Orthodox churches in order, with the Ecumenical Patriarchate in first position and the
Moscow Patriarchate in fifth. The interpretation of this hierarchy remains a bone of
contention within the Universal Orthodox Church. In the Greek tradition,
Constantinople is claimed to have special supremacy over other churches: among
other things it is to act as an appeal court in relation to the courts of other
patriarchates, and it is the head of the whole Orthodox diaspora (the faithful who live
outside the jurisdictions of the other Orthodox churches) (Znosko, 1973, part 2,
pp. 112 – 28). Meanwhile, from the point of view of the ROC,

The ecumenical patriarch does not have the right to govern other local
churches. Only under special circumstances, when a church cannot act
independently . . . is Constantinople entitled, even obliged, to help other
churches and is allowed to stand in defence of the existing canon law on its
own initiative; but it must not violate the rights of others. (Znosko, 1973,
part 2, pp. 126 – 27)
 The Moscow Patriarchate and Other Orthodox Churches 307

Some theologians go even further, questioning the right of the patriarch of

Constantinople to use the title ‘ecumenical’, arguing that it was justified only in the
Byzantine Empire (Znosko, 1973, part 2, p. 119). The ROC accuses Constantinople of
hellenisation of the Universal Church, of support for Greek nationalism and even of
the heresy of an eastern version of papism.15
The theological dispute has a practical dimension in the interpatriarchate rivalry,
which concentrates on three issues: jurisdiction; mediation in Orthodox disputes; and
representing Orthodoxy in the international arena.
The problem of jurisdiction, which is to do with delimiting the zones of the exclusive
influence of each church, generates the greatest tension. What complicated the
interrelations between the patriarchates was the collapse of the USSR, when some
groups of clergy who were aiming at achieving independence from Russia or even
autocephaly for their own church started seeking acceptance by Constantinople as the
only way of staying in the canonical community. As a rule, all contacts made by
Constantinople with schismatic groups in the postsoviet area trigger the irritation of
the ROC.
The most serious crisis took place on 20 February 1996 after the Holy Synod of
Constantinople had agreed to accept the autonomous Estonian church into its
jurisdiction. In response Moscow broke off relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate
and removed the name of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomaios from the liturgical
diptychs (Roberson, 2005, p. 124). A compromise reached in April 1996 confirmed the
parallel structures of the two patriarchates in Estonia. Nevertheless, it is hard to talk
about genuine agreement between the churches, for the ROC considers the ‘Estonian
model’ as a defeat; it keeps reminding Constantinople that it broke Orthodox canon
the law by re-establishing the EAOC, and it protested both before and during the visit
of Bartholomaios to Estonia (October – November 2000).
The defeat in a small Baltic republic has made the ROC determined to spare no
effort to prevent the ‘Estonian model’ being followed in Ukraine.16 The External
Affairs Department of the Moscow Patriarchate carefully observes and immediately
reacts to all Constantinople’s actions concerning the Ukrainian schism. In 1995 the
Moscow Patriarchate was alarmed by Bartholomaios’ decision to take under his
jurisdiction two Ukrainian churches located outside the country: the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church of the USA and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church of
North and South America and the Diaspora (Litvinenko, n.d.). The Moscow
Patriarchate also reacted negatively to meetings in Istanbul between the ecumenical
patriarch and Ukrainian politicians connected with the UOC-KP; nor did the visit of
Bartholomaios to Ukraine in 1997 contribute to an improvement in interchurch
relations. The ROC still criticises the Ukrainian activity of Constantinople, but its
tactics have changed: recently it has been the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow
Patriarchate (UOC-MP) which has been taking steps to limit the actions of
Constantinople. On 28 June 2000, for example, the UOC-MP called on Bartholomaios
to stop interfering in the domestic affairs of the Ukrainian churches;17 similarly, an
appeal by the ecumenical patriarch in September 2001 to the faithful at the Monastery
of the Caves in Kiev was called ‘a misuse of the Orthodox tradition’ by Metropolitan
Agafangel (Savvin) of Odessa (RPTs, 2001). Three months earlier Metropolitan
Agafangel had threatened that any attempt to force through the ‘Estonian model’ in
Ukraine would result in a breaking-off of relations between the patriarchates.
Mistrust between the two patriarchates has increased since the Orange Revolution.
After his victory Viktor Yuschenko, supported by the uncanonical churches,
announced the creation of a united Ukrainian Orthodox Church as one of the
308 Alicja Curanovic´

priorities of his policy. The new president ordered that steps be taken to bring about
dialogue between the jurisdictions. The Moscow Patriarchate sees Yuschenko’s plan
as another intrigue on the part of the government in Kiev to collaborate with
Constantinople in aiming to weaken the ROC’s position in Ukraine. The fears of the
ROC were enhanced by the positive attitude of Bartholomaios towards Yuschenko
and his supporters and the fact that he offered his help with solving the problem of
Ukrainian Orthodoxy, and serious tension arose after it was revealed that the
ecumenical patriarch had authorised the Ukrainian minister for foreign affairs, Boris
Tarasyuk, to coordinate relations between the Orthodox churches in Ukraine
(7 March 2006).
As a counterbalance to the familiarity between the presidential camp and
Constantinople, the ROC has been consolidating good relations with the premier,
Viktor Yanukovych, who has vowed not to intervene in church matters. At the same
time, the ROC is trying to get closer to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox
Church (UAOC) in order to prevent the creation of one united uncanonical Ukrainian
church. In March 2006 Metropolitan Mefodi (Kudryakov) confirmed the readiness of
the UAOC to start a dialogue with the UOC-MP. Officially, meanwhile,
Constantinople recognises in Ukraine only the canonical structures of the ROC.
For the moment the ecumenical patriarch has to accept the actual domination of the
ROC in this area and can do little more but make occasional symbolic gestures which
are anyway immediately condemned by Moscow as symptoms of ‘eastern papism’.
Another region where the patriarchates are clashing is Western Europe. The biggest
recent crises have been in Biarritz, Nice and the Diocese of Sourozh (the UK).
Problems surfaced in Biarritz in December 2004, when a group of parishioners
gathered around the archpriest Georgi chose to move under the jurisdiction of the
Moscow Patriarchate. This evoked protests from Constantinople which has been
governing the Biarritz church since 1931. The Holy Synod of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate decided to dismiss Fr Georgi and took the case to the French courts; they
ruled that the church should remain with the exarchate of the Russian Orthodox
Church in Western Europe (ROC-WE), which despite its name is under the jurisdiction
of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. However, that part of the parish community which
favours the Moscow Patriarchate has not accepted the court’s decision and as a sign of
protest continues to celebrate in a rented building next to the church.
The case of Nice also had to be settled by a civil court ruling. With the approach of
the expiry date of the land lease of the ROC-WE for St Nicholas Church (founded by
the Romanov family and built 1903 – 12) in the winter of 2006 the Moscow
Patriarchate revealed its intention of regaining this historic shrine. Is aspirations were
supported by the Russian government, which declared itself the rightful owner of the
church, claiming it as a part of the Russian cultural heritage, and asked the French
court to make an inventory of the church’s property. Constantinople and local leaders
protested against these moves. In the latest proposal for a compromise (October 2006)
the Russian embassy suggested a new lease agreement that would recognise the
Russian government as the rightful proprietor.
The most controversial case has been that of the Diocese of Sourozh. On 8 June
2006 Bishop Basil (Osborne) left the Moscow Patriarchate and submitted himself to
Constantinople with the consent of the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
The Moscow Patriarchate expressed its deep concern over the ‘uncanonical activity’ of
the Western European exarchate and called on Constantinople to solve the problem in
bilateral talks ‘for the sake of the unity of the universal church’ (Chleny, 2006). In July
the Moscow Patriarchate found Constantinople’s decision invalid and contrary to the
 The Moscow Patriarchate and Other Orthodox Churches 309

canons. The case caused a split within Orthodoxy: Patriarch Theodore II of

Alexandria, Patriarch Theofilos III of Jerusalem and Metropolitan Chrysostomos
of the church of Cyprus supported Constantinople, while Patriarch Ignatius IV of
Antioch together with leaders of the Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian churches took
Moscow’s side.
Simultaneously with rivalry in the sphere of jurisdiction, then, there is also a
struggle between the patriarchates of Moscow and Constantinople for the role of main
mediator in the Universal Orthodox Church. At the same time, churches which are in
conflict try to profit from the tensions between the two patriarchates. The Serbian
schism illustrates this very well: Belgrade, which disapproves of the independent
Orthodox churches of Macedonia and Montenegro, expects Patriarch Aleksi to take
part in the negotiations, whereas Skopje and Podgorica hope for the mediation of
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomaios, who in fact agreed to do so in August 2005 (V
Skop’ye, 2005). The ecumenical patriarch has also offered his assistance to Moscow
and Bucharest (regarding the archdiocese of Bessarabia) and to three Ukrainian
Orthodox churches, but the Moscow Patriarchate has refused it. From the point of
view of the Moscow Patriarchate accepting Constantinople’s help would mean
acknowledging its privileged role in the Universal Orthodox Church. The ecumenical
patriarch seems, incidentally, to be quite a successful mediator, having helped to
resolve ecclesiastical problems in Bulgaria (1998), Cyprus (2005)18 and Jerusalem
(2005).19
The two patriarchates also compete for the right to represent Orthodoxy worldwide.
In order to achieve this goal both churches have to establish relations with non-
Orthodox transnational subjects and exercise an active foreign policy. In the
international arena Constantinople tries to present itself as an open and progressive
church, in contrast to a benighted and xenophobic Russian Orthodox Church. The
contrast is clear in the attitudes of the patriarchates towards the Vatican. While
Moscow keeps refusing to allow the pope to make an official visit to Russia and
considers ecumenism a kind of ‘Catholic proselytism’, Constantinople emphasises the
need for the cooperation of all Christians in order to stop the secularisation of
Europe. The warm welcome which Pope Benedict received in Phanar in autumn 2006
had a significant and positive impact on the image of the ecumenical patriarch. The
common prayer of the two hierarchs and their declaration of cooperation on behalf of
Christian Europe were widely seen as a serious step towards rapprochement between
the western and eastern churches. The fact that the Moscow Patriarchate is not
participating in this initiative weakens its position in Europe. Patriarch Aleksi is a
known critic of globalisation and liberalism, while Bartholomaios takes part in events
symbolising global change, such as the forum at Davos in 2006.20 The ecumenical
patriarch is also active outside Europe: in 2004, for example, he was in Cuba and thus
became the first Orthodox patriarch to visit Latin America.
To both patriarchates the Middle East is a place of a special importance. The
prestige of the church taking care of the Holy Land and the profits from religious
tourism are at stake here. Constantinople and the Patriarchates of Alexandria,
Jerusalem and Antioch form a particular ‘Greek bastion’; but paradoxically this is
also Constantinople’s weak point, a fact that is skilfully exploited by the Moscow
Patriarchate. In all four ancient patriarchates Greeks dominate among the clergy,
while the majority of the faithful are Arabs. Moscow is able to use this disparity as the
basis for a criticism of the hellenisation of the Orthodox Church in the Middle East – a
charge especially inconvenient for the Ecumenical Patriarchate since the Jerusalem
scandal of 2005. The Moscow Patriarchate seeks close relations with the Arab states in
310 Alicja Curanovic´

the region; since the Soviet period it has been on good terms with the Palestinian
authorities, including Hamas.21 In 2006 the Moscow Patriarchate not only condemned
the intervention of Israel in Lebanon, but also sent humanitarian aid to Beirut and
donated US$45,000 for renovation of the Orthodox churches in southern Lebanon.
The Russian Orthodox Church has been active in the Middle East since the nineteenth
century, and has acquired extensive property and land, much of it in the Jewish part of
Jerusalem.The experience gathered over 100 years has worked to the advantage of the
Moscow Patriarchate, which can be observed gradually regaining its historical
property and extending its influence in the Holy Land.

Church Allies of the Moscow Patriarchate

A common interest, the universal basis of all alliances, often comes down to the
existence of a common opponent. Supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate share its
reluctance to see the supremacy of Constantinople or, more generally, Greek
dominance in the Universal Orthodox Church. One can identify three main alliances
which have been formed under Moscow’s leadership: an anti-Constantinople alliance;
and anti-Greek (Slavic) alliance; and an anti-schismatic alliance.
Concern over the rise of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has, paradoxically, brought
the Moscow Patriarchate and the Greek Orthodox Church (GOC) closer together.
The GOC sympathises with Moscow’s protests against Constantinople’s expansionism
because it is itself in dispute with Patriarch Bartholomaios about the right to nominate
bishops in northern Greece22 – a dispute which even caused a short break in bilateral
relations (between 30 April and 28 May 2003).23 The Greek church also has another
reason to support Moscow unofficially in the interpatriarchate rivalry. In March 2003,
according to the press, the Greek government instructed the Greek Foreign Office to
support Constantinople in the international arena and to promote Bartholomaios as
the leader of world Orthodoxy. It seems that the Greek government is aiming to limit
the influence of the antiwestern and conservative GOC. However, the tensions
between Constantinople and the GOC do not change the fact that the two churches
are strongly connected and belong to the ‘Greek camp’. For this reason, the anti-
Constantinople alliance between Moscow and the GOC is likely to be temporary: it is
well camouflaged and is based mainly on the resentment the two churches currently
share.
The second alliance – the anti-Greek (Slavic) alliance – is important for the
significance of the ROC within the Universal Orthodox Church. What binds the
members of this group is not only a negative element – reluctance to see Greek
domination – but also a positive one – a sense of historical and cultural community, the
myth of Slavic brotherhood and a few hundred years’ tradition of cooperation. The
concept of fraternity among Orthodox Slavs inclines the patriarchates of Serbia and
Bulgaria and the autonomous churches of Ukraine and Belarus’ to rally around the
Moscow Patriarchate.24 To those local churches the ROC seems to be a counterpoise to
Constantinople, the representative and guardian of Orthodox Slavdom.
The ROC is traditionally on good terms with the Bulgarian church (see Broun, 2000,
pp. 278 – 79), but a special place is reserved for the Serbian church. Russia supported
Serbia during the war in former Yugoslavia. The External Affairs Department of the
Moscow Patriarchate supports the aim of keeping Kosovo within the Serbian state and
demands special protection for the Serbian minority and Orthodox churches in the
region. The ROC organises summer camps in Russia for (Orthodox) children from
Kosovo. The leaders of the two churches regularly exchange official visits and the
churches frequently organise joint conferences, meetings and projects.
 The Moscow Patriarchate and Other Orthodox Churches 311

Close ties between the Russian and Serbian churches also form the axis of the third
alliance, the antischismatic alliance, which also includes the Bulgarian church, itself
still recovering from a schism which officially ended in 1998 (see Broun, 1993, 2000,
2002, 2004; Bogomilova, 2005). In January 2002 the patriarchs of Russia and Serbia,
Aleksi and Pavle, signed an agreement establishing an interchurch commission for
preventing schisms. The ROC openly supports the maintaining of the integrity of the
canonical territory of the Serbian Patriarchate and tries to convince the Macedonian
and Montenegrin churches that they should adhere to the ‘several states but one
patriarchate’ rule. However, it should also be noted that the Moscow Patriarchate
does not want to alienate what could after all be two new potential Slavic allies: thus
Patriarch Aleksi emphasises Montenegro’s right to independence, meets Macedonian
politicians and encourages Belgrade to maintain a serious dialogue with Skopje.
The alliance against schism seems to be prospective. Now that the Moscow
Patriarchate has succeeded in reuniting with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad25
(the celebration was held on 17 May 2007) the ROC is likely to gain prestige as the
church that managed to overcome its own schism with its own resources, and to win
wider recognition not only among its traditional allies but more widely in the
Universal Orthodox Church.
One church that belongs to none of these three alliances is the Georgian Orthodox
Church. This church is however bound to the ROC by history and geographical
proximity.26 The two churches emphasise their friendly relations, and Patriarch Aleksi
and Catholicos Ilia stress that even the recent crisis between the two states has not
weakened their ‘brotherhood’.27 The Georgian church loyally supports the Moscow
Patriarchate’s policies in Estonia, in Moldova and above all in Ukraine. The alliance
is however one of necessity, between a weaker partner and a stronger one. It is no
secret that Tbilisi accuses the Moscow Patriarchate of interference inside Georgian
canonical territory and of mistreating the Georgian minority in Russian parishes.28
The Georgian church seems to be quite helpless in the face of the activity of Russian
clergy in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Catholicos Ilia
protested against the participation of Russian priests in a military parade on 20
September 2005 in Tshinvali, South Ossetia, and against the presence of Bishop
Feofan of Stavropol’ and Vladikavkaz at the inauguration of the president of Ossetia
in November 2006. In response the ROC labelled the charges as provocation, vowed
to respect the integrity of the Georgian church and offered mediation between Tbilisi
and the rebel regions. Despite the fact that the Georgian and Russian churches both
belong to the ‘postsoviet Orthodox camp’, and despite the basically friendly relations
between them, the Georgian church thus has good reason to be concerned about the
ROC’s strengthening position in the Universal Orthodox Church.
The controversies around Ossetia and Abkhazia illustrate how the international
activity of the Moscow Patriarchate is interwoven with Russian foreign policy. For
this reason, an analysis of the relations between the ROC and other Orthodox
churches and of the position of the ROC in Orthodoxy has to include a consideration
of the relationship between the ROC and the Russian state.

The Attitude of the Russian Federation towards the International Activity

of the Moscow Patriarchate
The Moscow Patriarchate has come to occupy a special position in today’s Russian
state. There has been a revival of interest in and involvement with Orthodoxy; opinion
polls show a high degree of confidence in the ROC; although only a small minority
actually practise the faith, for the majority of Russians the Orthodox faith is one of
312 Alicja Curanovic´

the crucial component of their identity. The ROC is also the institution that connects
the presoviet tsarist period of Russian history with the postsoviet Russian Federation.
In the exclusive circle of so-called traditional religions, Orthodoxy is considered
primus inter pares. The ROC is supported by the state authorities, keeps close ties with
the police, the army and the security services and cooperates with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs outside Russian borders.
When one analyses the ROC’s international activity one cannot help noticing the
similarity between the visions of world order on the part of the ROC and the Russian
state. The Moscow Patriarchate criticises globalisation, which it equates with
liberalisation and Americanisation. Meanwhile Russian foreign policy questions the
Pax Americana and aims at shaping a multipolar international order. The two
partners’ common interest is particularly clear when one compares the notion of the
‘Near Abroad’ with that of the ‘canonical territory’ of the ROC.29 Both the Russian
state and the Moscow Patriarchate are interested in retaining dominance in the
postsoviet area, and to achieve this goal they support each other. Their cooperation in
fact extends even beyond the borders of the former USSR. The Russian authorities
perceive the ROC as an ally in looking after state interests and strengthening the
country’s position in the international arena, and therefore supports the ROC’s
transnational activity.
The Moscow Patriarchate can count on help in cases when its territorial integrity is
in danger.30 When in 1996 the Estonian government established the Estonian
Apostolic Orthodox Church with the help of the Ecumenical Patriarchate the Russian
Foreign Office adopted a stricter approach towards Estonia31 and the Duma
demanded that President Yel’tsin impose economic sanctions against it (Evans,
2002, p. 37). Russian diplomacy was involved in trying to resolve the conflict between
the two patriarchates and to convince them to restore canonical relations. After a
positive solution to the question of the status of the ROC in Estonia in 2002 the
Kremlin rewarded Tallinn with the signing of a number of bilateral agreements. The
Russian authorities even allowed Estonia to entertain hopes for the final regulation of
disputes over their common border, emphasising that the new positive impulse here
was a consequence of the new policy of the Estonian government towards the Moscow
Patriarchate.
Russian diplomacy and the External Affairs Department of the ROC work hand in
hand in Ukraine since both are interested in keeping the pro-Russian vector in Kiev’s
foreign policy alive. Since the early 1990s the Moscow Patriarchate – the most
influential church in Ukraine – has been calling for close cooperation amongst Slavic
republics and strongly supported the idea of Ukrainian participation in the plans to
integrate Russia and Belarus’. At the time of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine
Russian diplomacy and the Moscow Patriarchate supported Yanukovych’s party, and
the prowestern policies of Viktor Yuschenko and his attempts to establish one
Ukrainian Orthodox Church have brought the Kremlin and the Moscow Patriarchate
even closer.
Such divergences as can be seen between the international activities of the Russian
state and the ROC often have a tactical character. In situations where the Russian
Federation is obliged by international law to act with restrain, it makes use of the
ROC’s connections for diplomatic purposes. A good example is the situation with
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Officially, Russia declares that it respects the territorial
integrity of Georgia and that it does not acknowledge the secessionist republics, but
Russian clergy present in both regions help to maintain the ties between Russia and
the rebel areas. Palestine is another example illustrating the usefulness of ROC
 The Moscow Patriarchate and Other Orthodox Churches 313

contacts to Kremlin diplomacy. Officially, Russian foreign policy is supposed to have

distanced itself from the Palestinian authorities (Freedman, 2001; Katz, 2005).
However, the Kremlin still has at its disposal the diplomatic powerbase of the
Moscow Patriarchate. The ROC skilfully seeks good relations with Arab society, for
instance by providing Lebanon with humanitarian aid during the conflict with Israel
in 2006. In the Middle East the ROC carries the responsibility for creating a positive
image of Orthodoxy as a Christian religion peacefully coexisting with Islam and of
Russia as a country that sympathises with the Arabs and an independent Palestine.
For its part, the Russian government helps to reinforce the ROC’s global position.
As noted earlier, it is a party in the lawsuit on behalf of the church in Nice. In the
Middle East, a region of high strategic significance, the Russian state supports
Orthodox institutions financially: for instance the Ministry of Foreign Affairs helps the
Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Association32 to stimulate religious tourism, organise
academic conferences and regain its lost property. In 2006 President Putin himself
visited the Sergiyevo podvor’ye (the branch of the ROC in Jerusalem, at present
occupied by the Israeli Ministry of Justice), and instructed the Russian minister of
foreign affairs to start negotiations with the Israeli government on the return of this
historic site. The Russian government is involved in the ‘Russian Palestine’ project,
which is supported by the ROC and which aims to set up a Russian research institute in
the region. When President Putin paid an official visit to Jordan in February 2007 King
Abdullah handed over to the ROC, through Putin, a hectare of land on the ‘holy banks’
of the Jordan to build a church and a house for Russian pilgrims.
The Russian government clearly finds it advantageous to work with the Moscow
Patriarchate in the international arena. First, the ROC is an important institution
taking care of the Russian diaspora; and by supporting the ROC the Kremlin can thus
reinforce its own influence in the postsoviet area. Second, it can be convenient for the
Russian government to use the Moscow Patriarchate’s diplomatic links, especially in
situations when direct action by the Russian state would be considered a violation of
international obligations. Third, the image of an Orthodox country is useful in foreign
policy: the Kremlin promotes this image not only in relations with Slavic states such as
Belarus’, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria, but also with Greece and even Arab
states. The Russian government supports the Moscow Patriarchate’s aspirations to
lead the Universal Orthodox Church and without a doubt this support is of a great
significance to the ROC.

Conclusion
The Universal Orthodox Church is the most important field of the Moscow
Patriarchate’s international activity. The collapse of the Soviet Union forced the
Moscow Patriarchate to strengthen its diplomatic activity: it had to deal with
separatist tendencies and with the Ecumenical Patriarchate on its own canonical
territory. The rivalry between these two most influential patriarchates is the main
factor that determines the activity of the ROC within Orthodoxy: the other Orthodox
churches can hardly avoid siding with one or other of them. Meanwhile the Orthodox
world is waiting for a Universal Council that will have the authority to define the
attitude of the Universal Orthodox Church to present and future challenges. In line
with its leadership ambition, in 2000 the Moscow Patriarchate promulgated its
document The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church (Osnovy
sotsial’noi kontseptsii Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi) which expounds the church’s views
on religion, law and church–state relations, the concept of the nation, ownership,
314 Alicja Curanovic´

health care, war and peace, bioethics, ecology, the role of the media, globalisation,
liberalisation and secularisation. This pioneer publication has aroused much interest
and has become a point of reference for many Orthodox churches. Recently the
Moscow Patriarchate has been promoting the notion of ‘Orthodox civilisation’,
referring to the thesis of Samuel Huntington.33 In 2006 the World Council of Russian
People (Vsemirny sobor russkogo naroda), an annual gathering convened by the ROC,
formulated an Orthodox Declaration of Human Rights (Deklaratsiya o pravakh i
dostoinstve cheloveka) which is ‘to make a stand against liberal ideology, emphasise
values of Russian patriotism and defend the rights of the whole community instead of
alienated individuals’ (Deklaratsiya, 2006). The concept of an ‘Orthodox civilisation’
seems to be close to the vision of other Orthodox churches in the region such as those
of Greece and Serbia. As one of the poles of a new global order, ‘Orthodox
civilisation’ corresponds to the main goals of Russian foreign policy. The idea of a
civilisation with the potential to reconcile western Christianity and Islam could give a
new dimension to the international role of Russia, and the supremacy of the Moscow
Patriarchate within the Universal Orthodox Church would be in the common interest
both of the Russian Orthodox Church and of the Russian state.

Notes
1 In this article the name Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is used a synonym for the Moscow
Patriarchate.
2 Autocephalous churches: the patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch,
Jerusalem, Moscow, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia; the churches in Greece,
Poland, Albania and the Czech Republic/Slovakia. Note that the autocephaly of the
Orthodox Church in the USA, acknowledged by the ROC, has not been recognised by most
Orthodox churches, including Constantinople.
3 The principle of symphonia legitimised the model of close relations between the patriarch
and the emperor, which took shape in the Byzantine Empire in the time of Justinian (527 –
65). According to this principle the two branches of power – the spiritual power of the
church and the secular power of the state – are two gifts given by the same Grace of God and
are thus called upon to act in harmony.
4 It is a common belief among the Orthodox nations that the deciding factor as to whether one
is a member of a certain community is one’s faith rather than one’s ethnic origin. In the eyes
of many in Orthodox societies the abandoning of Orthodoxy for some other faith means the
loss of national identity: a real Russian, Serb or Greek has to be Orthodox.
5 An example of direct influence is provided by the tense relations between the governments of
Serbia and Macedonia regarding the conflict between their churches. Indirect influence can
be demonstrated by the example of protests organised by the churches in Russia, Ukraine
and Belarus’ against the NATO bombardment of Serbia, which in consequence forced
Russia to radicalise its diplomatic stance.
6 Examples of political events having negative consequences on relations between churches
were the crisis between Russia and Georgia in the late autumn of 2006 and the conflict
between Russia and Belarus’ over gas prices.
7 Autonomy (from the Greek autos, self, and nomos, law) is a form of privileged dependency
of a certain organised unit on a mother church. An autonomous church is not permitted to
act beyond boundaries set by the mother church in legal, administrative and judicial matters.
See Znosko (1973, part 1, p. 173).
8 He was replaced by Vladimir (Sabodan) from Rostov.
9 Founded in 1921, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church has been recognised by
none of the canonical churches. In 1930 the church merged with the Moscow Patriarchate. It
reactivated itself in June 1990 by choosing the banished Metropolitan Mstyslav as its head.
 The Moscow Patriarchate and Other Orthodox Churches 315

After Mstyslav’s death Dmytrii (Vladimir Yarema) was chosen as his successor (on 7 March
1993) (Roberson, 2005, p. 146).
10 Citing the constitutional principle of neutrality, the Ukrainian authorities did not give
permission to the UOC-KP to bury Patriarch Vladimir (Romanyuk) in the cellars of the
Cathedral of Saint Sofia. On 18 February there were violent clashes between members of this
church and the police blocking the entrance to the cathedral. Not being able to reach the
sanctuary, the believers buried the patriarch under the pavement outside the church wall
(Tataryn, 2001, p. 163).
11 The Ecumenical Patriarchate recognised the EAOC as the lawful successor of the Estonian
Orthodox Church which existed from 1923 to 1945 under the jurisdiction of Constantinople
(see Roberson, 2005, p. 71). Before that period the territory of present-day Estonia was a
part of the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate, which in 1920 gave the Estonian
church a certain degree of autonomy. The incorporation of the Estonian church into the
structure of the Moscow Patriarchate was confirmed in 1978 by the patriarch of
Constantinople, Dimitrios: see http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/print/1666674.html (accessed
30 January 2007).
12 On the basis of a contract signed in 2003 with the EAOC the Estonian government became
the owner of two churches (St George and St John the Baptist, both located in the town of
Tartu), which it later leased to the ROC.
13 The archdiocese of Bessarabia was originally founded by the Romanian Patriarchate in 1918
but was incorporated by the ROC after Moldova became part of the USSR in 1940.
14 This article is too short to present a detailed account of the matter, but a few points are
worth stressing. After the conquest of Constantinople by Turks in 1453 the Russian church
was, for almost 400 years, the only Orthodox church in a state ruled by an monarch of the
Orthodox faith. The new role of the Russian church was further legitimised by the theory
put forward by Filofei of Pskov according to which after the fall of Byzantium (the New
Rome) Russia became the Third Rome – the guide, guardian and representative of the whole
Orthodox community. The special status of the Russian church was confirmed by the
foundation of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1580. However, Constantinople was not
completely marginalised in the Universal Orthodox Church. Paradoxically, the role of the
patriarch of Constantinople in the Ottoman Empire was strengthened as a result of the millet
system, which organised the subjects of the empire according to their religion. Inside the
Orthodox Christian millet the patriarch of Constantinople was considered the leader of the
community of Christians over which also he exercised a quasi-independent secular rule in the
fields of justice, taxation and finance. The patriarch was the head of a multiethnic Orthodox
community, and this fact enabled him to maintain a limited power over the ancient
patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem.
15 The problem of ‘eastern papism’ divided the two patriarchates at a meeting of Orthodox and
Catholics in Belgrade in October 2006. The Russian church protested against treating
Constantinople as the ‘Orthodox Vatican’. Recently Bishop Ilarion (Hilarion) of Vienna and
Austria, the head of the Representation of the ROC to the European Institutions, stressed
that the precedence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Universal Church is only of an
honorary nature.
16 Drawing on the experience of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate has been trying to persuade the ecumenical patriarch
to annul the transition of jurisdiction over the Ukrainian church from Constantinople to
Moscow which took place in 1686.
17 The appeal was a reaction to a rumour that on the previous day Constantinople had claimed
that Ukraine was part of its own canonical territory (Litvinenko, n.d.).
18 Bartholomaios was asked for counsel by the bishops of Cyprus regarding the lengthy
illness of Archbishop Chrysostom, the head of the church. In May 2005, on the initiative
of the ecumenical patriarch, a council was convened in Switzerland where the problem
was discussed (Sobor, 2005). Since September 2006 the church of Cyprus has had a new
leader.
316 Alicja Curanovic´

19 In 2005 the Patriarchate of Jerusalem was hit by a scandal after it was revealed that the
plenipotentiary of Patriarch Irenaios had leased land in the historical part of Jerusalem for a
period of 199 years to Jewish organisations. This evoked fierce protests from the faithful,
mostly Arabs. Outrage grew after revelations in the Greek media suggesting that Irenaios
had become patriarch with the help of intrigues including the deliberate slandering of
opponents. On 6 May 2005 Irenaios was stripped of the title of patriarch by decision of the
other bishops. Some of the bishops turned to Bartholomaios asking for help in their efforts
to normalise the situation. The ecumenical patriarch summoned a council, which met in
Phanar on 24 May 2005 and confirmed the bishops’ decree. On 22 August a new patriarch,
Theophilos, was installed.
20 Bartholomaios was at Davos as a member of the Turkish delegation. The patriarch is a
Turkish citizen, but enjoys the unofficial patronage of Greece, which supports him in the
international arena. The Greek government regularly reminds Ankara that it must respect
the rights of the Greek minority living in Turkey and that it should treat the ecumenical
patriarch not only as the head of the local Orthodox church but as the leader of world
Orthodoxy. Relations between the two states were strained when in September 2004 a group
of Turkish nationalists, protesting against the opening of an Orthodox seminary in Turkey,
demanded that the seat of the patriarch be moved from Istanbul to Greece; such calls have
been repeated since then.
21 Russia was the first state to receive the newly elected Hamas government; the leaders of
Hamas were invited to Moscow by President Putin. Patriarch Aleksi tried to convince the
members of the delegation to continue peace talks with the Israeli government.
22 Some of churches in northern Greece traditionally come under the jurisdiction of
Constantinople. However, between 1928 and 2003 administrative powers over this area,
including the selection of bishops, were held by the Greek church. This changed in 2003
when Bartholomaios reserved to himself the right to ordain bishops.
23 The analogy with the ‘Estonian experience’ is obvious. It should be noted that the Greek
church supported the Moscow Patriarchate in the latter’s dispute with Constantinople over
Estonia in 1996.
24 Romania might also be considered as a part of the Slavic alliance in the light of the
experience of repression and persecution which the Romanian Orthodox Church shared
with its Slavic neighbours in the communist period. However, the dispute over the
archdiocese of Bessarabia could present an obstacle to future cooperation.
25 Spokesmen for the Moscow Patriarchate today say that the patriarchate never ruled out the
possibility of the union of the two churches. The ROC acted against the expectations of the
émigrés and symbolically rejected ‘Sergianism’ when in 2000 it canonised Tsar Nicholas II
and his family. A year later the two churches officially exchanged letters; in November 2003
their representatives met in Moscow and in June 2004 a joint commission for dialogue was
formed. After two years the commission produced an act of canonical union that was
approved by the Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate on 26 December 2006.
26 From 1811 to 1943 the Georgian Orthodox Church was in fact under the jurisdiction of the
ROC.
27 It should be noted, however, that in its official documents the ROC blamed the Georgian
government for the crisis in bilateral relations between the two states.
28 On 13 May 2006 13 leading Georgian personalities sent a letter to the leaders of all the
autocephalous Orthodox churches in which they protested against restrictions on the use of
the Georgian language in the Church of St George in Moscow (Slukhi, 2006).
29 The ‘Near Abroad’ comprises the states that used to be part of the Soviet Union. The ROC
considers them to be part of its ‘canonical territory’. The exception is the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania): while the ROC continues to regard them as its ‘canonical
territory’ the Russian state no longer regards them as part of the ‘Near Abroad’.
30 The canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate is an important category in the politics
of President Putin. In summer 2003 he stated that an official visit of the pope to Russia could
take place only with the consent of the ROC.
 The Moscow Patriarchate and Other Orthodox Churches 317

31 The case of the violation of the rights of the Russian minority in Estonia was also raised at
the OSCE and the Council of Europe.
32 The Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Association (Imperatorskoye pravoslavnoye palestinskoye
obshchestvo) is the oldest Russian nongovernmental organisation for education. It was
established by Tsar Alexander III on 21 May 1882. Since 2003 it has had the status of an
international nongovernmental organisation.
33 In his writings on the ‘clash of civilisations’ Samuel Huntington distinguishes eight major
civilisations, including the Orthodox civilisation, which dominates in Eastern Europe and
the Balkans.

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