Renato Reyes So vs. Lorna Valera, G.R. No.

150677, June 5, 2009,

the Supreme Court was faced with the unique situation where the husband and the wife were in a common law relationship for 19
long years, had 3 children, and then got married in. The husband subsequently filed a petition for annulment of marriage based on
his wife’s alleged psychological incapacity.

Renato and Lorna first met in 1973 and lived together as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage, before they got
married in 1991. In the course of their relationship, they had three (3) children (born in 1975, 1978 and 1984) and established a
business.
On May 14, 1996, Renato filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with
Lorna. He alleged that their marriage was null and void for want of the essential and formal requisites. He also claimed that Lorna
was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as shown by the following circumstances: Lorna
failed and refused to cohabit and make love to him; did not love and respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give him
emotional, spiritual, physical, and psychological help and support; failed and refused to have a family domicile; and failed and
refused to enter into a permanent union and establish conjugal and family life with him.
The RTC nullified the marriage of Renato and Lorna in its decision of November 8, 1999. The RTC concluded that Lorna was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her martial obligations.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA, in its Decision dated July 4, 2001, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The CA ruled that Renato failed to prove Lorna’s psychological incapacity. According to the CA, Lorna’s character, faults, and
defects did not constitute psychological incapacity warranting the nullity of the parties’ marriage. The CA reasoned out that while
Lorna “appears to be a less than ideal mother to her children, and loving wife to her husband,” these flaws were not physical
manifestations of psychological illness. The CA further added that although Lorna’s condition was clinically identified by an expert
witness to be an “Adjustment Disorder,” it was not established that such disorder was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The prosecution also failed to establish that Lorna’s disorder was incurable and permanent in such a
way as to disable and/or incapacitate Lorna from complying with obligations essential to marriage.
The CA likewise held that Lorna’s hostile attitude towards Renato when the latter came home late was “a normal reaction of an
ordinary housewife under a similar situation”; and her subsequent refusal to cohabit with him was not due to any psychological
condition, but due to the fact that she no longer loved him. Finally, the CA concluded that the declaration of nullity of a marriage
was not proper when the psychological disorder does not meet the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in the case of Molina.
Renato moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated October 18, 2001.
The Supreme Court agreed with the CA and ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Ramon failed to establish Lorna’s
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations. The Supreme Court did not give much credence to the
testimony and report of Renato’s expert witness. According to the Supreme Court:
Our own examination of the psychologist’s testimony and conclusions leads us to conclude that they are not sufficiently in-depth
and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In the first place, the facts on which the psychologist based her conclusions were
all derived from statements by the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. It does not appear to us that the
psychologist read and interpreted the facts related to her with the awareness that these facts could be slanted. In this sense, we
say her reading may not at all be completely fair in its assessment. We say this while fully aware that the psychologist appeared at
the petitioner’s bidding and the arrangement between them was not pro bono. While this circumstance does not disqualify the
psychologist for reasons of bias, her reading of the facts, her testimony, and her conclusions must be read carefully with this
circumstance and the source of the facts in mind.
In examining the psychologist’s Report, we find the “Particulars” and the “Psychological Conclusions” disproportionate with one
another; the conclusions appear to be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated incidents, rather than from
continuing patterns. The “particulars” are, as it were, snapshots, rather than a running account of the respondent’s life from which
her whole life is totally judged. Thus, we do not see her psychological assessment to be comprehensive enough to be reliable. . .
As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived with the petitioner for 18 years and begot children with
him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 – developments that show a fair level of stability in the relationship and a healthy degree of
intimacy between the parties for some eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry and joined her husband in the communications
business – traits that do not at all indicate an irresponsible attitude, especially when read with the comment that she had been strict
with employees and in business affairs. The petitioner’s Memorandum itself is very revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage
Contract was a sham, the petitioner interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) “[S]ince at that time, the relationship between the
petitioner and respondent was going well,and future marriage between the two was not an impossibility, the petitioner signed these
documents.”
The Supreme Court also noted that there was no proof that Lorna’s psychological disorder was incurable:
. . . the psychologist’s testimony itself glaringly failed to show that the respondent’s behavioral disorder was medically or clinically
permanent or incurable as established jurisprudence requires. Neither did the psychologist testify that the disorder was grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. . .
In Molina, we ruled that “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as indicative of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.” In the present case, the psychologist simply narrated adverse “snapshots” of
the respondent’s life showing her alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not convincingly prove her permanent incapacity
to meet her marital duties and responsibilities; the root or psychological illness that gave rise to this incapacity; and that this
psychological illness and consequent incapacity existed at the time the marriage was celebrated.
Given the foreoging, the Supreme Court ruled that based on the evidence, psychological incapacity was not proved:
Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here of parties who have very human faults and frailties;
who have been together for some time; and who are now tired of each other. If in fact the respondent does not want to provide
the support expected of a wife, the cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable psychological malady whose effects go as far as
to affect her capacity to provide marital support promised and expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to give up
on one’s situation and on one’s husband are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so
labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This
simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific
situation – a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason of a
grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital
life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to provide any
permanent remedy.

Halili v. Halili G.R. No. 165424 June 6, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner and the respondent married on July 4,1995 at the City Hall of Manila. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites
thinking that it was a joke. After the wedding, they continued to live with their respective parents and never lived together but
maintained their relationship nonetheless. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided
to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop
dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was
not fake.

Petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a petition for the nullity of their marriage on the ground that he was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. He also pointed out that they never lived together as husband
and wife and they never consummated their marriage.

On April 17, 1998, the Regional Trial Court found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly
dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan and declared that the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is null and void.

The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, on January 26, 2004. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court on the ground that totality of the evidence presented failed to established petitioner’s psychological
incapacity.

The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court for reconsideration. On June 9, 2009, the Supreme Court set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity.
RULINGS:
Yes, because ultimately the psychologist sufficiently established that petitioner had psychological condition that was grave and
incurable and had a deeply rooted cause and that already existed at the time of the celebration of his marriage to the respondent

Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent personality disorder, petitioner typically acted
in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take
advantage of him. This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father who treated his
family like robots and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his father. When petitioner could no longer take
respondents domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end
their marriage.

It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply
rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that
effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage and thus the Court declared the marriage null and
void.

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA v. EDWARD RUMBAUA

Facts:

On February 23, 1993, Rowena Padilla and Edward Rumbaua were married in City of Manila. However, they never
lived together in one habitat because their marriage was a secret to Edward's family. In 1994, their respective families learned
about the marriage. In 1995, Edward's mother died and he
blamed Rowena being responsible for her death associating it to the discovering of their "secret marriage."

The petitioner alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as
shown by the following circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise to live with her under one roof after finding work; he
failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her for his mother’s death; he represented himself as single in his transactions;
and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman in Novaliches, Quezon City

Rowena filed for nullity of their marriage due to psychological incapacity in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The
Court nullified the marriage in its decision on April 19, 2002.

The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals due to prematurity, as it was rend
despite the absence of required certifications from the Solicitor General. On June 25, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court due to prematurity thus denied the nullification of the parties' marriage.

Rowena, not happy with the decision of the Court of Appeals, filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying for the
Court of Appeal's decision be set aside and regional Trials Court's decision be reinstated. The Supreme Court on August
14, 2009, deny the petition for lack of merit, thus affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 25, 2004.

Issue: Whether or not, the psychologist was able to prove that the respondent is indeed psychologically incapacitated
according to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Held: No, Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of respondent’s condition

the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted
in some psychological illness. As the petitioner’s testimony reveals, respondent merely refused to cohabit with her for fear of
jeopardizing his application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his family. The respondent’s failure to greet
the petitioner on her birthday and to send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner for his
mother’s death and of representing himself as single in his visa application, could only at best amount to forgetfulness, insensitivity
or emotional immaturity, not necessarily psychological incapacity. Likewise, the respondent’s act of living with another woman four
years into the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was
shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent
was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later.

Dr. Tayag’s psychological report and court testimony

The psychologist did not have enough proof because in her psychiatric report, she did not mention the cause of the respondent's
so-called "narcissistic personality disorder", she failed to explain to the court an insight into the respondent's development years.
Furthermore, she did not explain why she came to the conclusion that the respondent's incapacity is "deep seated and incurable",
when Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines states that evidence presented must show that the incapacitated party was
mentally or physically ill so that he or she could not have known the marital obligations assumed in marriage

ASPILLAGA v. ASPILLAGA
Doctrine:
The fact that certain psychological conditions will hamper their performance of their marital obligations does not mean that they
suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Psychological disorders do not manifest
that both parties are truly incapacitated to perform the basic marital covenants. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity.
Psychological incapacity is reserved to the most serious cases of personality disorder.
Facts:
Rodolfo Aspillaga filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora
Aspillaga. Aurora alleged upon her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into their conjugal
home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfo’s cohabitation with her cousin led to the
disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation.
During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained that both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The RTC found the
parties psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and declared the marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora Aspillaga valid. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the motion was also denied. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of the parties’ psychological incapacity
Held:
No. As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995), it has been categorically ruled that:
In the instant case, Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that the psychological conditions were grave or serious enough to bring about an
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba was able to establish the parties’ personality
disorder; however, he failed to link the parties’ psychological disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated
to perform their obligations as husband and wife. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their performance of
their marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity.
It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations (Republic v. CA). The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage (Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No. 157610, October 19, 2007).
Psychological disorders do not manifest that both parties are truly incapacitated to perform the basic marital covenants. Moreover,
there is nothing that shows incurability of these disorders. Incompatibility and irreconcilable differences cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity as understood juristically.
As to Rodolfo’s allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the same likewise fails to convince. While disagreements on money matters
would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one’s marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a
marriage null and void. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements regarding money matters are a
common, and even normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.

G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010

Jordan Chan Paz vs Jeanice Pavon

Facts:

In 1996, Jordan and Jeanice met when Jeanice was 19 and Jordan was 27. They had their civil wedding in 1997. They have one
son, who was born on 1998. After a big fight, Jeanice left their conjugal home on 1999.

Jeanice then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan alleging that Jordan was psychologically incapable
of assuming the essential obligations of marriage; manifested by Jordan's tendency to be self-preoccupied and violent.

Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with “Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his
impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability.”[5] Gates concluded that Jordan’s psychological maladies antedate their marriage
and are rooted in his family background. Gates added that with no indication of reformation, Jordan’s personality disorder appears
to be grave and incorrigible.

Jordan denied Jeanice allegations and denied any interview or psychological tests by Gates.

RTC Ruling: granted Jeanice petition.

Jordan then filed a notice of appeal which was promptly approved. Jeanice filed a motion to dismiss with the court of appeals.

CA: dismissed Jordan's appeal and the next motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether Jordan is incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations.

Held: Petition has merit.

Jeanice failed to prove Jordan's incapacity. Saying that psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, judicial
antecedence and incurability.

The totality of the evidence presented by Respondent failed to show that Petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of
their marriage. Petitioner’s alleged psychological incapacity was not shown to be so grave and so permanent as to deprive him of
the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond

RICARDO P. TORING V. TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165321,
FACTS:
Petitioner Ricardo and Respondent Teresita are husband and wife with three children. After 20 years of marriage, Ricardo filed a
petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. Therefore, he asked the court
to declare his marriage to Teresita null and void. He alleges that Teresita is a squanderer because she did not know how to manage
the funds of the family and is always incurring debts. Aside from this, Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts she collected as
sales agent of a plastic-ware and cosmetics company. She left the family’s utility bills and their children’s tuition fees unpaid. She
also missed paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo acquired for the family. He also alleges that Teresita is
an adultress because she presents herself as a single woman and sees other men while Ricardo is away for work as an overseas
contract worker. He also suspected that she was pregnant with another man’s child and proved himself correct when Teresita
incurred a miscarriage. He claims that he could not have fathered the child because his three instances of sexual contact with
Teresita were characterized by “withdrawals”.
To bolster his position, Ricardo introduced the testimony and evidence prepared by Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran. The doctor stated that
the demise of the marriage of the spouses was due to the Narcissistic Personality Disorder of Teresita. Her behavioral patterns
indicate this kind of disorder which is considered to be grave and incurable based on the fact that individuals do not recognize the
symptoms as it is ego syntonic and they feel there is nothing wrong in them. Interestingly, the doctor based her diagnosis from the
testimony given by Ricardo and Richardson, the eldest child of the couple. This is because Dr. Albaran was not able to conduct a
personal psychiatric evaluation over Teresita.
In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that there was no basis to declare
Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son Richardson)
only revealed a vague and general conclusion on these parties’ personality traits but not on Teresita’s psychological makeup. The
OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically identify and sufficiently prove the medical cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that the alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of
marriage, nor that the incapacity was grave and incurable.
The RTC ruled to annul the marriage on the basis of the evidence and testimony presented in court. However, the Solicitor General
appealed the case and the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling on the ground that the RTC did not satisfy the rules
and guidelines set by this Court in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. The RTC failed point out the root illness or defect that caused Teresita’s psychological
incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of celebration of marriage.
The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation do not appear to have been drawn from well-
rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardo’s allegations on
Teresita’s overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code. These allegations, even if true, could only effectively serve as grounds for legal separation or a criminal
charge for adultery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.
HELD:
No, the CA is correct in reversing the decision made by the trial court because the decision of the latter failed to comply with the
standards and guidelines provided for by jurisprudence.
In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence to be insufficient to prove that
Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. First of all, the testimony given by Dr. Albaran was based
solely on the testimony of Ricardo, the petitioner and their son, Richardson. No personal evaluation was made as to the condition of
Teresita to properly conclude that she is indeed inflicted with the Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Conclusions and generalizations
about Teresita’s psychological condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in kind from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Second, it was not proven that the condition of Teresita was present from the moment the marriage was celebrated. The only other
party outside of the spouses who gave statements for purposes of Teresita’s psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses’
eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have been
there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until
long after his birth.
Finally, the contention of Ricardo that the root cause of the psychological incapacity need not be alleged in the petition is without
merit. While in other cases, the court has allowed the petition to do away with the root cause, it is because the root cause has been
described based on the physical manifestations which are indicative of the psychological incapacity. The statement of the root cause
does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown
to science. It is enough to merely allege the physical manifestations constituting the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Hence, the statement of the root cause is a requirement that cannot be dispensed with but it may be proven either by an express
statement or through the description of its physical manifestations.
G.R. NO. 185286, AUGUST 18, 2010
SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, VS. RAMON REYES,
FACTS:
Marital difficulties, which mostly is due to the respondent’s actions, caused the petitioner to file a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with the respondent alleging psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained
that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his family—both as a spouse to petitioner and father to their children.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist
Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social
Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality
Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality
Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic
features.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their
psychological incapacity.
The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the RTC decision and declared the parties’
marriage valid and subsisting. It held that the petitioner failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her
husband, as well as of herself.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct when it rejected the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas.
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held:
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being
hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality
disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during
the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their
individual assessment of the present state of the parties’ marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner.
Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience, respondent’s pattern of behavior which
she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of
the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified
on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. These
were also used as the basis of the doctors’ assessments.
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on a number of
factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge
thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent
consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the
clinical findings of experts.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan
and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize
and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money
obligations.

G.R. No. 173138

Baccay vs Baccay and Republic

FACTS:
Noel and Maribel were sweethearts. He found Maribel's snobbish and hard-to get traits attractive.
Around 1997, he decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with another woman. They agreed to see each
other on a friendly basis but the two had several romantic episodes.
In November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly married
Maribel. The two lived on Noel's family. Maribel remained aloof and didn't contribute to his family's coffer. She refused to have sex
with him.
Sometime in 1999, Noel and Maribel had an intense quarrel about Maribel's alleged miscarriage causing the latter to leave the
house and never came back.
Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. RTC declared the marriage null and void on
the ground of Maribel's alleged psychological incapacity. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist who presented as Noel's
witness, found Maribel unable to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage due to a Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Noel and Maribel null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
No. Noel failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noel's evidence
merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their
quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. The psychologist failed to establish that Maribel's alleged
Narcissistic Personality Disorder incapacitated her from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. The same
psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one.
Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated under the Article 36 of the Family Code.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.

Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa, petitioner vs Bona J. Alano and Republic of the Philippines, respondents
G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011
Facts:
Bona’s illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of their marriage on October 27, 1973, when Jose was assigned in various
parts of the country as an officer in the AFP. She continued her infidelity even when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio, Makati
City sometime in 1985, whenever Jose was out of their living quarters.
In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion for the alleged participation of the failed coup d’etat. He heard
circulation of rumors of Bona getting caught having sex with his driver, Corporal Gagarin.
He got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona about the rumors, which she and Gagarin admitted. Since then
they were separated, and their foundling, Ramona Celeste, stayed with Bona in Basilan until 1994 to live with Jose.
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and Bona J. Alano, based on the
ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations of marriage.
Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses, testified and submitted a psychological evaluation report on Bona’s
mental state. The interviews she had with Jose and two of his witnesses brought her to the conclusion that respondent was
suffering from histrionic personality disorder, and it was traceable to her family history.
On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court declared the marriage of Jose and Bona void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court finds that Bona’s illness
exhibited gravity, antecedence, and incurability.
OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA subsequently granted the appeal and reversed the ruling of the trial
court decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation?
Ruling:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage.
Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of “juridical antecedence”. Her persistent sexual
infidelity and abandonment are not badges of psychological incapacity nor can’t it be traced to the inception of their marriage.
The psychiatrist’s conclusion about Bona’s HPD which made her prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity existed before her
marriage to Jose, cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence since the method by which such an inference was reached
leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity.
Dr. Rondain’s conclusion was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose. No other witness testified to Bona’s
family history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of their marriage. The two witnesses only started to live with
them in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition directly from the information gathered solely from Jose and his
witnesses. These factual circumstances evoke the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrists is tainted with bias for
Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Article 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO

GR. No. 184063 [January 24, 2011]
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Yambao (hereinafter petitioner wife) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her marriage with respondent
Patricio Yambao (hereinafter respondent husband) after 35 years of marriage. She invoked the ground of psychological incapacity
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner wife alleged that since the beginning, her marriage with the respondent husband had been marred by bickering, quarrels,
and recrimination due to the latter’s inability to comply with the essential obligations to married life. She elaborated by saying that
through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and took care of the children and
that respondent husband just ate and slept all day and would spend time with friends. In addition, she claimed that
respondent husband would venture into several businesses but all of these failed. Respondent husband was also a gambler.
Petitioner wife also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help to change their diapers or feed
them, even while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about
children. Later, respondent husband became insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he would see petitioner talking to
other people, even to her relatives. When respondent husband started threatening to kill petitioner, she decided to leave the
conjugal abode and live separately from him. She then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Respondent husband denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent job, but was always
unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications. He also claimed that he did not stay long in the jobs he had because the
same could not support the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that were not commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had
ventured into small businesses but they failed due to various economic crises. Respondent further claimed that he was not, in fact,
contented with living with petitioner’s relatives since his every move was being watched with eagle eyes. He also denied that he
gambled. He alleged that even without a steady source of income, he still shared in the payment of the amortization of their house
in BF Homes, Parañaque City. He also denied that he threatened to kill petitioner, considering that there was never any evidence
that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on petitioner to justify the latter having a nervous breakdown. He further
alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit holding that wife’s evidence failed to support her argument that husband was
indeed psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
The RTC rejected petitioner’s claim that she suffered through respondent’s overbearing jealousy. It found that respondent only
became jealous when he thought that petitioner was cheating on him. The RTC determined that jealousy was not a
character trait that contributed to respondent’s psychological dysfunction; much less did it amount to psychological or
mental torture on petitioner.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that:
Petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
Petitioner exerted efforts to find a source of income to support his family. However, his failure to find a suitable job and the failure
of his business ventures were not mental but physical defects and, hence, could not be considered “psychological incapacity” as
contemplated under the law.
the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to be unsupported by sufficient evidence since
the findings therein were not corroborated by any other witness. Moreover, the CA said, neither the report nor petitioner’s
testimony established that respondent’s psychological condition was grave enough to bring about the inability of the latter to
assume the essential obligations of marriage, so that the same was medically permanent or incurable.
ISSUE:
WON the totality of petitioner wife’s evidence establish respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage?
HELD:
No.
RATIONALE:
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. These guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be
annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.
In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so severe that he was
unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondent’s efforts, though few and far between they
may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his
failure was brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is
that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological
incapacity.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true
inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness.
That respondent, according to petitioner, “lacked effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility” does not mean
he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures,
and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount
to a psychological abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondent’s faults amount to psychological incapacity, it has not
been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Furthermore, as found by both RTC and CA, respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused petitioner or their children.
In fact, considering that the children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume that both made an impact in the children’s
upbringing. Still, the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood “without any major parenting problems,” and such fact
could hardly support a proposition that the parties’ marriage is a nullity.

Danilo AURELIO V. Vida AURELIO

G.R. No. 175367, [June 06, 2011]
FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons,
namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of
performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of
psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her
marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. It alleged among others that said psychological
incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the
plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between
hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the family.
On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change
very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was
very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs.
She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each
other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of
their marriage.
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to state
a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of
the Family Code.
RTC denied the petition to dismiss by Danilo. In denying petitioners motion, the RTC ruled that respondents petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void?
HELD:
Petition denied. The marriage is null and void and complied with Molina doctrine.

RATIO:
First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the
complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were
discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist
clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for
them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality
Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As can be
easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that
“the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.”

REPUBLIC V. GALANG

G.R. No. 168335, [June 6, 2011]

DOCTRINE:

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer
to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.”

FACTS:

In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga and thereafter they resided in the house of the Nestor’s father.
Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator while Juvy stayed at home. They had one child, Christopher.

In August 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article
36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of
marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler; that Juvy suffers from “mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted
discernment and total lack of care, love and affection [towards him and their] child.” He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was “extremely
serious” and “appears to be incurable.”

Having found no collusion between the parties, the case was set for trial. In his testimony, Nestor alleged that he was the one who
prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors’ care; and
Christopher almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there. He added that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his
signature to encash the check representing Nestor’s father’s pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing “mahjong” and
“kuwaho” three (3) times. Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense that their son
was confined in a hospital.

Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test on Nestor. In her
Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following findings:

Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-matured individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem
he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has a little ability
to endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional pain, depression
and lack of self-esteem and gained emotional tensions caused by his wife’s behavior.

The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very irresponsible and very lazy
and doesn’t manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being
an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude towards her husband
and child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable to perform
her marital obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just few reasons to believe that the defendant is
suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.

The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The RTC Judge, relying on the Santos Case, stated
in the decision that the psychological incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage can be
characterized by (a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered
by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life

and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before marriage although
its overt manifestations appear over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary means or
subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of the subject – are all obtaining in this case.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether there is basis to nullify the respondent’s marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying with her essential marital obligations.

HELD:

None. The Supreme Court held that the totality of Nestor’s evidence – his testimonies and the psychologist, and the psychological
report and evaluation – insufficient to prove Juvy’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

RATIO:

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by

(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [Louel Santos vs. CA]

It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence
shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. [Brenda
Marcos vs. Marcos]
Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina Doctrine unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological
incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. [Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te] In Ting vs. Velez-Ting, far from abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case
simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements; the Ngo Te case merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.

In the present case, the psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests which she administered on Nestor and the
root cause of Juvy’s psychological condition. There was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage.
The report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvy’s alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is
serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties; the report did not even categorically state the particular type
of personality disorder found. The report failed to establish the incurability of Juvy’s condition. The report’s pronouncements that Juvy
“lacks the initiative to change” and that her mental incapacity “appears incorrigible” are insufficient to prove that her mental condition
could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake.

Petition was granted. Galang’s petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code
was dismissed.

RP v. CA and EDUARDO DE QUINTOS, JR.

GR NO 159594 November 12, 2012
FACTS
On 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage to wife Catalina, citing psychological incapacity on
the part of Catalina. Catalina did not interpose an objection but prayed to be given a share in the conjugal house and lot.

Eduardo’s allegations with respect to Catalina’s before are as follows: that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that
she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her
time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by
gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live
with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.

Results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation administered on Catalina by a psychiatrist showed that she had traits of Borderline
Personality Disorder, and Catalina’s disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity. For her part, Catalina admitted her
psychological incapacity but denied abandoning the conjugal home without Eduardo’s consent. She also said that she had only one
live-in partner.

RTC and CA granted the petition. The RTC ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with her
family, and her incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her duty to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. It also held that the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was the best evidence of
Catalina’s psychological incapacity. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity on the part of Catalina.

HELD: NO
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In thiscase, both lower courts did
not exact a compliance with the requirement of
sufficiently explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina’s purported psychological incapacity. Rather, they were
liberal in their appreciation of the scanty evidence that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity.

Both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity of
factual foundation to support the claim of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. The report claims that Catalina’s behavior and attitude
before and after the marriage is highly indicative of a very immature and childish person, rendering her psychologically
incapacitated to live up and meet the responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage.
However, it was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalina’s
supposed psychological incapacity. In other words, the totality of evidence presented fell short of the required standards.
Immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity.
With respect to the allegation of abandonment (to live with another man), the Court held that such was established and even
admitted by Catalina in her Answer. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family
Code. It did not also constitute
psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code.

On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made
her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce such evidence,
rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.

WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner, vs.AVELINA AMORES,Respondent. G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012
SUMMARY
Dutch national seeks to reimburse funds he invested in allowing his Filipina spouse to buy parcels of Filipino land after their
marriage was declared null.
FACTS
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29,
1980. After several years, the RTC declared the nullity of their marriage on basis of psychological incapacity. Consequently,
petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated praying for the distribution of properties claimed to have
been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage.
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots W, X, Y, and Z, parcels of land, were registered in the name of respondent, these
properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent did not
have sufficient income. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence,
invalid.
The RTC ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots W, X, Y and Z, petitioner could not have acquired
any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to acquire them notwithstanding his knowledge of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands. This was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner
executed purporting to show that the subject parcels of land were purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein
respondent.
Petitioner’s plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase
the foregoing properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having come to court with clean hands. CA affirmed.
Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE: W/N a foreigner may reimburse his investment in the purchase of Filipino land
DECISION
The Court AFFIRMED the rulings of the RTC and CA.
In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller
the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a
foreigner against his former Filipina spouse. It held that the foreigner cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it
is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land
enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well
aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent
registered the subject properties in the latter’s name.
Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the
Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling. The time-honored principle is that he who has done inequity shall
not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and
void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. It does not apply if the action is
proscribed by the Constitution.

Mendoza v. Republic
G.R. No. 157649; November 12, 2012

FACTS:
Anabelle and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. After a month of
courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy led to her pregnancy. They got married 8 months after on June 24, 1991. Being
one with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the family’s expenses. Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a
celebratory bash with his friends. In September 1994, she discovered his illicit affair with his co-employee and they started to
sleep in separate rooms affecting their sexual relationship. Dominic eventually got fired from his employment and was
criminally charged with the violation of B.P. 22 and estafa.

ISSUE:
Is the marriage null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code?

HELD:
The appeal has no merit. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that the petitioner harbored against Dominic furnished the
basis to doubt the findings of the expert witness; that such findings were one-sided and that he did not participate in the
proceedings. The findings and conclusions on his psychological profile were solely based on the self-serving
testimonial descriptions of him by the petitioner and her witnesses. The court finds the totality of evidence adduced by the
petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit. Accordingly, the RTC’s findings that Dominic’s psychological
incapacity was characterized by gravity, antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness
and lack of remorse did not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. The court denies the petition for certiorari and affirms
that decision of the Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children. To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia. While
still in Saudi Arabia, Cesar learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez (Alvin). Subsequently,
Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated.
Thereafter, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas
psychological incapacity.

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home. He testified that he
continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.

RTC declared Cesars marriage to Lolita void. Upon reconsideration, CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The Office of the Solicitor
General then filed the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify the marriage.

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

CIVIL LAW: Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. In interpreting this
provision, the Court have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the
celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse. In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove
Lolitas alleged psychological incapacity.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown
that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring
spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.

Petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA is set aside.

Republic v. De Gracia
G.R. No. 171557; February 12, 2014

FACTS:
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at a church in Zamboanga Del Norte. On December 25, 1998, Rodolfo
filed a verified complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations. Petitioner furthered that he was forced to marry her barely 3 months into their
courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. He was 21, she was 18. Natividad left their conjugal abode and sold their
house without his consent. Thereafter, she lived with a certain Engineer Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, she contracted a
second marriage with another man. Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated finding
that both parties suffered from “utter emotional immaturity”.

RTC and CA declared the marriage null and void.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity?

HELD:
The petition is meritorious. There exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity. The RTC relied heavily on Dr. Zalsos
testimony which does not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted and
incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. The petition is, therefore, granted and the decision of CA
reversed and set aside.
 VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.

ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and
eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel
(Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay). Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with
Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March 1983.

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone
started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his marriage with
Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver. The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the
children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on
weekends.

In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded
only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US. After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live
with Malyn.

Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger children,
Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged
weekend plans with their father.

On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s
alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).

RTC - the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code.

CA - Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both parties
allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. The parties faults tend only to picture their immaturity and
irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation. Moreover, the psychological
report submitted by petitioners expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy
the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage.

However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the
marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.

Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated
as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.

Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to
every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family
Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version
of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity
“not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity
that no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage;
hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts,
which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions
of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis
by experts.

Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered

We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable
social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because
such a marriage has no legal existence.

There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician,
because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.”

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an
assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in
interpreting such other evidence on the causation.

Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any
probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would
not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional temperaments

The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view
and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of
the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.

The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and
treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold
that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article
36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn
from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the
veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts,
“despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or
absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and
responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and
responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions
would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-
term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children.

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of
parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the
culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for
parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated
her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September
19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code.

G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015 - GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner, v. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent.

FACTS:
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married in civil rites held in Lipa City,
Batangas. Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant, however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn
alleged that the infant’s death was caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy. Sometime in
March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to
work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.

On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. He alleged that Mary
Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house. She
thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked heavily even when she was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to
perform even the most essential household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited the
foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship.

Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo
(Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back in college. Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual
love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of
the couple’s marriage.

On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void
on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to
cite the root cause of Mary Grace’s disorder. Further, the RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayag’s
statements anent the gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The RTC resorted to mere generalizations and conclusions.
Besides, what psychological incapacity contemplates is downright incapacity to assume marital obligations. In the
instant case, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown, but these do not
warrant the grant of Glenn’s petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this does not translate into a
psychological illness.

On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage
between
Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting.

ISSUE: Whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.

RULING: NO.
The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."

In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence
offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The respondent’s
stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be
rooted in some psychological illness.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance ofand to assume basic marital obligations. Mere
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.

Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present
more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the former’s condition. Glenn,
however, failed in this respect. Glenn’s testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of
Glenn. Glenn’s statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary Grace’s traits and acts, which
she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the antecedence of Mary Grace’s alleged incapacity. Glenn even
testified that, six months before they got married, they saw each other almost everyday. Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and well
educated person" in Mary Grace.

We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.

The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest to the antecedence
of a person’s psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the law requires.
While the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides inadequate basis for
the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse

MALLILIN v. JAMESOLAMIN G.R. No. 192718

Facts:

Robert Malilin and Luz Jamesolamin were married on September 6, 1972 and begot three children. The petitioner filed a complaint
for nullity of marriage on the grounds that the respondent allegedly suffered from psychological and mental incapacity at the
time of the marriage celebration, unpreparedness to enter into such marital life, and to comply with its essential obligations
and responsibilities. . Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of
immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and
oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.

He testified that Luz was already living in California, USA, and married an American. While they were still together though, Robert
disclosed that respondent did not perform responsibilities of being a housewife like keeping the house in order, preparing meals,
washing clothes and taking care of the children. He also stated that she dated several men and contracted loans without his
knowledge.

In turn Luz filed her answer with a counterclaim, averring that it was Robert who manifested psychological incapacity.

On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage
invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as
contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).

On September 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations but the Court of
Appeals, in its November 20, 2009 Decision, reversed the RTC decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Held:

The petition is DENIED.

The Supreme Court stated that Robert’s evidence failed to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz. Other than his self-
serving testimony, no other witness corroborated his allegations on her behavior. As the Court has repeatedly stressed,
psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

There was also nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was subjected to a psychological
examination.

On interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, yes, they are given great respect by our courts, but
they are neither controlling nor decisive.

It must be pointed out that the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT was not
the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature similar to
Article 36 of the Family Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who
suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
obligations to be mutually given and accepted.

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

Lastly, on petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff.
Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a
marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to
uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.