57

G.R. No. 166620

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts:

The present controversy arose from a Petition forCertiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 378 dated October 25, 2004, issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President
Arroyo). Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf of all their
co-employees at the National Printing Office (NPO).

The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino (President
Aquino), by virtue of Executive Order No. 285which provided, among others, the creation of the NPO from the
merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency
(PIA). Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 reads:

SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. There is hereby created a National Printing Office out of
the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information
Agency. The Office shall have exclusive printing jurisdiction over the following:

a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable forms of national, provincial, city and
municipal governments, including government corporations;

b. Printing of officials ballots;

c. Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General Appropriations Act, Philippine Reports,
and development information materials of the Philippine Information Agency.

The Office may also accept other government printing jobs, including government publications, aside from
those enumerated above, but not in an exclusive basis.

The details of the organization, powers, functions, authorities, and related management aspects of the Office
shall be provided in the implementing details which shall be prepared and promulgated in accordance with
Section II of this Executive Order.

The Office shall be attached to the Philippine Information Agency.

On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6
of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing
services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their
printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services
offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the
NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its
income.

Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners
now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to
amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised
legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the
way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.

ISSUE: Whether the E.O no. 378 is Constitutional.

HELD: Yes. It is constitutional

POLITICAL LAW: reorganization

In the present case, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices,the assailed action is a mere
reorganization under the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest
of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of the President motivated and
carried out, according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court
could only but accept.

Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: "[T]he president shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices." Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also
known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:

SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The President, subject to the policy
in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.:

The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the Office of the President Proper
and the agencies under it. The agencies under the Office of the President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8,
Title II of the Administrative Code:

Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.The agencies under the Office of the President refer to
those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision and control of the
President, those under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for
policy and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any specific
department.

The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is likewise recognized in general
appropriations laws.

Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The President
did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the Presidents
constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the
Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily ordains an executive
agencys position in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is primary, but subject to the
Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices
in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify the President to deactivate the
functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures. The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law.

The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an exercise of a delegated legislative power
granted by the aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987,
which provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the Office of the President, "in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." This is a matter already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. The
reorganization of such an office through executive or administrative order is also recognized in the
Administrative Code of 1987.

The Petition is denied.

58

MATHAY vs CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST COMPANY

G.R. No. L-23136

August 26, 1974ZALDIVAR, J.:p

Facts:

Samuel Mathay, et.al. were former stockholders of Consolidated Mines Inc. (CMI).Petitioners filed a case for a
class suit against CMI containing six causes of action. Petitionersalleged that in violation of the Board
resolution, the defendants unlawfully acquiredstockholdings in the defendant Bank in excess of what they were
lawfully entitled,hence depriving the petitioners of their right to subscribe at par value, in proportionto their
equities established under their respective "Pre-Incorporation Agreementsto Subscribe" to the capital stock and
that the Articles of Incorporation were fraudulentlyamended by the defendants. The complaint was dismissed by
the Trial Court on the ground thatthe class suit could not be maintained because of the absence of a showing in
the complaint thatthe plaintiffs-appellants were sufficiently numerous and representative, and that the
complaintfailed to state a cause of action. The CA affirmed the ruling, hence, the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the instant action is a class suit.

Held:

The action at bar is not a class suit.

The necessary elements for the maintenanceof a class suit are accordingly:

(1) that the subject matter of the controversy is oneof common or general interest to many persons, and

(2) that such persons be sonumerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all to the court.

The statuterequires that the complaint should allege the existence of the necessary facts, theexistence of a class
and the number of members in the said class so as to enablethe court to determine whether the members of the
said class are so numerous asto make it impractical to bring them all to court. The complaint in the instant
casefailed to state the number of said CMI subscribing stockholders that the trial courtcould not infer nor make
sure that the parties are indeed so numerous that theycannot practically appear in court and that the plaintiffs are
representative of theother stockholders.

The statute also requires that the subject-matter of thecontroversy be of common interest to numerous persons.
In the instant case, theinterest that appellants, plaintiffs and intervenors, and the CMI stockholders had inthe
subject matter of this suit was several, not common or general in the senserequired by the statute. Each one of
the appellants and the CMI stockholders haddeterminable interest; each one had a right, if any, only to his
respective portion of the stocks. No one of them had any right to, or any interest in, the stock to whichanother
was entitled.
59

MVRS vs Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Phils. (2003)

Bellosillo, J.

FACTS:

Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than seventy(70) Muslim religious
organizations, and individual Muslims (Linzag, Arcilla, de Guzman,da Silva, Junio) filed in the RTC a
complaint for damages in their own behalf and as aclass suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide
against MVRS Publications, Inc.,arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily
tabloid.

The article reads:"

ALAM BA NINYO?Naangmgababoy at kahitanonguri ng hayopsa Mindanao ay hindikinakain ng mga

Muslim?

Para sakanilaangmgaito ay isangsagradongbagay. Hindi nilaitokailangangkaininkahitnasila pa ay magutom at

mawalan ng ulamsatuwingsila ay kakain. GinagawanilaitongDiyosatsinasamba pa nilaitosatuwingaraw ng
kanilangpangingilinlalung-lalonasaarawnatinatawagnilang 'Ramadan'."

Islamic Da’Wah: the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; notonly published out of
sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam,; that on
account of these libelous words Bulgarinsulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim
world MVRS Publications, Inc.,: the article did not mention respondents as the object of thearticle and therefore
were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely anexpression of belief or opinion and was
published without malice nor intention to cause damage

RTC: dismissed the complaint; persons allegedly defamed by the article were notspecifically identified

CA: reversed RTC decision. The defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamicfaith. The suit for
damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious
status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it therequisite personality to sue and protect the interests of all
Muslims.

ISSUES:

1. WON Islamic Da’Wah has a cause of action for libel.NO.

2. WON this is a valid class suit.NO

HELD:

1. NO, there is no cause of action for libel.

Defamation - which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person'scharacter, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements.
It is that which tends toinjure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the
plaintiff orto excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.

It is the publication of anythingwhich is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring
him intodisrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion whichothers in
the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable
as libel or slander per se, and merewords of general abuse however ill-natured, whether written or spoken, do
not constitute abasis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. Thefact
that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to anidentified or identifiable
individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to aparticular member of a class, no member
of such class has a right of action without at allimpairing the equally demanding right of free speech and
expression, as well as of the press.

There was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgararticle. Since the persons
allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondentshave no individual causes of action; hence, they
cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged.An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and
distinct in the community.A Muslim may find the article dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as
anopportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the non-believers and the "infidels." There isno injury to the
reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that cangive rise to an action for group
libel. Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single
common reputation that will give them a commonor general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

2. NO, it is not a valid class suit.DOCTRINE:

class suit elements: (a) whether the interest of thenamed party is coextensive with the interest of the other
members of the class; (b) theproportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class;
and, (c)any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.

Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert theinterests not only of the Muslims in
the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well. Butthey obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to
represent such a global group and were notable to demonstrate they have the same interests with the rest of
Muslims
Cruz v. Mijares

G.R. No. 154464, Sept 11, 2008 |

FACTS:

Petitioner Cruz sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC in a
civil case for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation
personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from
the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty.
Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to
which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer
had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, “Hay naku, masama‘yungmarunong pa saHuwes. Ok?” and
proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing.

Petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge
Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the
trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the
judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that
justice will not be served.

In an Order, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of
partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was
said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a MR of the said order.

Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure
of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the
requirements or conditions under Rule 138A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

In Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138A,
but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different
circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138A. Petitioner filed this case
with Supreme Court (SC).

ISSUES

1) Whether or not the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules ofCourt may issue.

2) Whether or not respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to
inhibit herself from trying the case.

HELD
1) Yes. It should be filed with Court of Appeals (CA), but SC took cognizance because it involves
interpretation of procedural rules.

This Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not
exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the CA. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to
choose the court where the application therefor will be directed. A becoming regard of the judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the
RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals.

The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the
nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.
Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule
138A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizanceof herein petition.

2) No. But it erred in denying petitioner’s appearance.

Sec. 34 or Rule 138 recognizes the right of an individual to represent him in any case to which he
is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an
attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar.
The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from
commencement to the termination of the litigation. Considering that a party personally conducting
his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice
law, petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his
own ignorance.

Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation. He would
then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself. The
trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore,
be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138ÂA,
when the basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of Rule138. The former rule provides for
conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a
non-lawyer as a party representing himself.
Spouses Bautista vs Silva

Silva, thru her Atty-In-Fact Hermes Dorado, wishes to annul, reconvey and collect damages for the sale of a
parcel of land with Certificate of Title No. V-2765 in favor of Spouses Bautista.

Spouses Berlina F. Silva and Pedro M. Silva own a 216 square meters parcel of land in Barrio Parada,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

In 1988, Perdo Silva thru a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
said parcel of land in favor of Spouses Bautista. As a consequence, the title under the name of Spouses Silva
was cancelled and a transfer certificate was issued in the names of Spouses Bautista.

The trial court, however, found that the signature of Berlina Silva in the SPA was forged. Therefore, the sale
executed by Perdo Silva thru a SPA in favor of Spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlina. The trial court
declared the sale between Pedro and Spouses Bautista null and void ; ordered the Spouses Baustista to reconvey
the property together with the improvements to Berlina; ordered for Spouses Baustista to pay P5,000 for
attorney’s fees and costs of the suit; and dismissed the counterclaim of Spouses Bautista. Further, the trial court
condemned Pedro Silva to pay P70,000 to Spouses Bautista for the contract price of the property with interest at
the legal rate from the date of the execution of the sale. The decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by
the CA.

Issues:

1. Respondent as represented by Hermes Dorado in his capacity as attorney-in-fact has no legal

authority to file action against spouses petitioners.
2. The petitioners are considered as purchasers in good faith and for value having relied upon a
Special Power of Attorney which appears legal, valid and genuine on its face;
3. Gratia argumenti that the special power of attorney is a forgery and the deed of sale executed by
the husband is null and void, the nullity [thereof] does not include the one half share of the
husband

Ruling:

The Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the CA and the trial court.

According to the Court, Dorado needs no written authorization because the complaint was filed by Berlina
herself. Respondent signed the verification attached to the complaint.

Further, the Court did not agree that Spouses Bautista are buyers in good faith and for value. In the first place,
whether or not they are buyers in good faith and for value is a question of fact not cognizable by the Supreme
Court in a petition for review. The Court only resolves questions of law. The finding of the trial in this matter is
binding to the Court,

A buyer in good faith “buys the property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives
the thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it.” The following conditions must also concur: the
seller is the registered owner of the land; the seller is in possession thereof; and at the time of the sale, the buyer
was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or any defect or restriction in the
title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property.
However, if the capacity of the seller is restricted as in the present case, the buyers must exercise reasonable
precaution by inquiring beyond the title.

The RTC and CA found that the inquiry conducted by the plaintiffs was superficial.

Spouses Bautista conducted the following inquiry: inspection of the photocopy of the SPA presented by Pedro,
presented the SPA to a notary public to confirm its genuineness, and inspection of the original SPA after they
paid P55,000 to Pedro as advanced payment.

Also, Spouses Bautista knew that Berlina was in Germany when Pedro executed the Deed of Absolute Sale.

In summary, a buyer is considered in good faith if he proves that he inquired to the capacity of a seller who has
a limited capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the sellers
duly notarized SPA.

As to the third issue, “it is a well-settled rule that the nullity of the sale of a conjugal property contracted by the
husband without the marital consent of the wife affects the entire property, not just the share of the wife.”
Lagazon vs Reyes

Facts:

Plaintiff who was driving a tricycle collided with a passenger-jeepney driven by Moises San Angel on April 1,
1972. Plaintiff filed a criminal complaint for damage to property and serious physical injuries against San Angel
before the Municipal Court of Macabebe, Pampanga. San Angel pleaded guilty and was found by the trial court
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Damage to Property and Serious Physical Injuries through
Reckless Imprudence and was sentenced to suffer two months of imprisonment and payment of P604.00 fine.

In 1973, plaintiff filed a civil complaint for damages against the operator of the jeepney, the herein defendant
Visia Reyes, before the RTC of Pampanga. He prayed for P2,980 actual and compensatory damages, P3,000
moral damages, P3,000 attorney’s fees, and costs. He claimed that defendant has liability under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, or based upon the conviction of San Angel in the criminal case before the trial court of
Macabebe, Pampanga.

The RTC of Pampanga ruled in favor of defendant. It contended that defendant’s liability is only subsidiary.
Since San Angel has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted, there is no liability
on the part of employer and operator defendant.

Plaintiff appealed before the CA, but his case was dismissed for lack of factual and legal basis.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on pure technicality
2. Whether or not the lower court in not ordering motuproprio that the defendant be impleaded as a party
defendant

Ruling:

According to the Court, Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the employer is “subsidiarily liable
for the adjudicated civil liability of his employee in the event of the latter's insolvency. The decision convicting
an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the defendant employer in a civil case filed to
enforce the latter's subsidiary liability under the said article not only with regard to the former's (employee) civil
liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows
that of his employee” (Miranda vs. Malate Garage and Taxicab, 99 Phil. 670).

Further the Court enumerated the requisites to be had before an employer may be held subsidiary liable for the
adjudicated civil liability of his employee: 1.) he is an employer of the convict; 2.) that he is engaged in some
kind of industry; 3.) the crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of his duties; and 4.) execution
against the employee is unsatisfied (Ozoa vs. De Madula).

It was clear that when plaintiff filed a civil complaint against defendant, there was still no adjudicated civil
liability of San Angel. Plaintiff reserved the right to institute a separate civil action, therefor no civil liability
was adjudged to the same when he pleaded guilty to the offense charged.

On the other hand, the court agreed that San Angel must have been impleaded as party-defendant if plaintiff
wished to collect from defendant Reyes. The rule provides that “all persons materially interested, either legally
or beneficially, in the subject matter of the suit, should be made parties to it in order that the whole matter in
dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation, thus avoiding multiplicity of suits.”

The Court ruled that if San Angel has paid the damages, defendant Reyes shall have no subsidiary liability.
Otherwise and if plaintiff desires to enforce Reyes subsidiary liability for the entire amount or the remaining
unpaid amount, he may take the proper steps and satisfy the requirements as laid in Ozoa vs. De Madula. The
trial court’s decision was set aside.
Borlasa vs Polistico

Facts:

Plaintiffs and defendants formed TuruhanPolistico& Co. in April 1911. The life of the association was fixed at
fifteen years.Under the by-laws each member obligated himself to pay to Vicente Polistico, as president-
treasurer, before 3 o'clock in the afternoon of every Sunday the sum of 50 centavos, except that on every fifth
Sunday the amount was P1, if the president elected to call this amount, as he always did. There was continuous
collection from April 1911 to April 1917. The by-laws provide that a lottery should be conducted weekly
among the members of the association and that the successful member should be paid the amount collected each
week, from which, however, the president-treasurer of the society was to receive the sum of P200, to be held by
him as funds of the society.

It is alleged that defendant Politico received approximately P74,000 from April 1911 to April 1917. The
plaintiffs filed a complaint to account for and surrender the money and property of the association in order that
its affairs may be liquidated and its assets applied according to law.

The defendants raised the question of lack of parties and set out a list of persons to be brought in as parties
defendant on the ground that they were in default in the payment of their dues.

The trial court then ordered for the amendment of the complaint to include all necessary and indispensable
parties. Plaintiffs agreed, but were not able to list all the necessary and indispensable parties. The defendant
demurred to the amended complaint as it lacked the necessary parties. In effect, the trial court dismissed the
complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not the dismissal of the case, on the ground that the amended complaint did not include all
indispensable and necessary parties,by the trial court was proper

Ruling:

The Court reversed the order appealed from and the defendants required to answer to the amended complaint
within the time allowed by the law and the rules of court.

The Court treated the complaint as a class suit. A class suit “contemplates an exceptional situation where there
are numerous persons all in the same plight and all together constituting a constituency whose presence in the
litigation is absolutely indispensable to the administration of justice.” In a class suit, the sufficient
representation of a class interest which will be affected by the judgment is indispensable. However, it is not
indispensable to make each member of the class a party to the suit. The Court accordingly recommended for the
inclusion of the words,” in their own behalf and in behalf of other members of Turuhan&Polistico, Co.” after
the names of the parties plaintiffs.
[G.R. No. 106194. January 28, 1997]

SANTIAGO LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. The HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and the HEIRS OF NORBERTO J. QUISUMBING, respondents.

FACTS

Norberto J. Quisumbing, acting as assignee of the mortgagor, Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Incorporated,
brought an action against the Philippine National Bank to enforce an alleged right to redeem certain real
properties foreclosed by it.

With notice of the pending civil action, petitioner purchased from PNB one of the properties subject of the
litigation.

Petitioner filed a motion to intervene, with its answer in intervention attached, alleging that it was the transferee
pendente lite of the property and that any adverse ruling or decision which might be rendered against PNB
would necessarily affect it (petitioner). Petitioner also raised as affirmative defenses the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction based on the alleged failure of plaintiff Quisumbing to pay the docket fee and Quisumbing's alleged
lack of cause of action against the PNB due to the invalidity of the deed of assignment to him.

Quisumbing opposed SLDC's motion for intervention arguing that SLDC's interest in the subject property was a
mere contingency or expectancy, dependent on any judgment which might be rendered for or against PNB as
transferor.

The lower court granted petitioner's motion for

intervention. As intervenors, it served interrogatories upon respondents.

In turn, private respondents filed a motion to quash or disallow the motion. However, it was denied. They then
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and it was favorable to them. Hence, this present petition by SLDC.

ISSUES

Whether or not petitioner, as transferee pendente lite of the property in litigation, has a right to intervene

Whether or not the CA correctly took cognizance of the issue regarding the propriety of petitioner SLDC's
motion for intervention

RULING

No.

The purpose of Rule 12, 2 on intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party to protect his
interest and the court incidentally to settle all conflicting claims. On the other hand, the purpose of Rule 3, 20 is
to provide for the substitution of the transferee pendente lite precisely because he is not a stranger but a
successor-in-interest of the transferor, who is a party to the action. As such, a transferee's title to the property is
subject to the incidents and results of the pending litigation and is in no better position than the vendor in whose
shoes he now stands.

Under Rule 3, 20, the action may be continued against PNB, the original defendant. In the alternative although
it was not essential that the transferee be substituted and the latter insist on such substitution the trial court could
have directed that petitioner be either substituted as party-defendant or joined with defendant PNB. But
petitioner could not be allowed to intervene for the reason already stated that the conditions under which one
may be allowed to intervene are significantly far different from the conditions under which a transferee
pendente lite is substituted in place of the original party. For the fact is that an intervenor can withdraw and
refuse to be bound by any decision that may be rendered in the case but the fortunes of a transferee pendente
lite, although not formally impleaded as a party, are bound up with those of his transferor.

In connection with the first issue, because the transferee pendente lite simply takes the place of the transferor,
he is barred from presenting a new or different claim.

The appellate court therefore properly refused to pass upon petitioner's attempt to inquire into the consideration
paid for the assignment of the right of redemption to the late Norberto J. Quisumbing, as well as petitioner's
claim that the transfer of interest to Quisumbing was made in violation of Art. 1491(5) of the Civil Code. This
matter was never alleged by PNB in its answer to Quisumbing's complaint. Since petitioner is a transferee
pendente lite with notice of the pending litigation between Quisumbing and PNB, petitioner stands exactly in
the shoes of defendant PNB and is bound by any judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against
PNB.
G.R. No. 88537 April 17, 1990

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), WORKERS OF LIANGA BAY LOGGING
CORPORATION, and PHILIPPINE AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government, filed a
Complaint before respondent Sandiganbayan against the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Peter
Sabido, et al for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. Among the assets/properties
sought to be recovered are the shares of stock in the Lianga Bay Logging Corporation and two (2) parcels of
land located in Palawan known as the Yulo King Ranch.

Workers ofLianga Bay Logging Corporation filed a motion for Leave to Intervene and a Complaint for
Intervention claiming that they own 60% of the shares of Lianga Bay Logging Corporation.

Philippine Agri-Business Corporation also filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and a Complaint-in-
Intervention anchored on its claim of ownership over two (2) parcels of land under sequestration.

Petitioner filed an opposition maintaining that it cannot be sued without its consent; the cause of action of
intervenors does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as expressly spelled out in PD 1606 and
EO No. 14; intervenors have no legal interest in the matter in litigation; intervenors' claims are cognizable not
by respondent Sandiganbayan but by the regular courts. However, the two complaints-in-intervention were
admitted by respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUES

Whether or not the claims of private respondents are cognizable by respondent Sandiganbayan, not by the
regular courts

Whether or not the complaint-in-intervention can prosper because it is a suit against the State which has not
given its consent

RULING

Yes, the claims of private respondents are cognizable by respondent Sandiganbayan.

Executive Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of former
President Marcos, his wife, Imelda, members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close
and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees, specifically provides in section 2 that "The
Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the
Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof. Necessarily, those who wish to
question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases is must seek recourse in the same court, the
Sandiganbayan, which is tested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and
final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.

This case deals with the recovery of "ill-gotten wealth", therefore, the Sandiganbayan has jusrisdiction, not the
regular courts.

Yes, the complaint-in-intervention can prosper.

Under the Rules, Section 2(c), Rule 12, authorizing intervention, the intervenor may unite with the plaintiff by
filing a complaint in intervention: but where the intervenor unites with the defendant, intervention may be made
in the form of an answer to the complaint.

In the case at bar, private respondents intervened in the court below as plaintiffs in intervention by filing their
respective complaints in intervention. The complaints-in-intervention do not seek money judgment from nor do
they demand any affirmative performance by the State in its political capacity which would otherwise call for
the application of immunity from suit. Herein intervenors merely seek the resolution of the issue of ownership
over the sequestered properties, i.e., whether they pertain to petitioner, defendant Peter Sabido or to private
respondents. The complaints in intervention are mere incidents of the main action which, necessarily fall under
the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction. By uniting with petitioner as plaintiffs, private
respondents cannot be said to have filed a suit against the State without its consent. The same conclusion may
be arrived at had private respondents chosen to file an answer in intervention, in effect resisting the claims of
petitioner. The State, by filing an action against an individual, divests itself of its sovereign character thereby
submitting itself open to any counterclaim. After descending to the level of an ordinary citizen, the State cannot
unilaterally ascend back to its privileged position of non-suability behind the cloak of sovereign immunity in the
face of a counter suit the origin of which the State itself initiated.
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.

TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.

FACTS

The SangguniangPanlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 which became effective on December 28,
2001.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 of the ordinance to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies valid until April 30, 2003.

Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor
Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the
oil companies.

ISSUES

Whether or not petitioners have well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act

Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal
of the Pandacan Terminals

RULING

Yes, petitioners have right to the performance of the act.

It has been ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to
compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties
in interest and they need not show any specific interest.Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct
interest in the enforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to
institute this proceeding.

Yes, respondent is mandated to immediately enforce the ordinance.

Under Rule 65, Section 3of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed
to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative
duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.

The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city." As long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or
annulled by the courts, he has no other choice but it is his ministerial duty to do so.

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing
the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these
officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing
duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from
the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
G.R. No. 166429 February 1, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), and the MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, In his capacity as Presiding and Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 117, Pasay City and PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.,
Respondents

FACTS

NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO)
was voided for being contrary to law and public policy.

Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through expropriation filed a
petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending that a mere deposit of the assessed value of the
property with an authorized government depository is enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court).

However, respondents aver that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued, direct payment of just
compensation must be made to the builders of the facilities, citing RA No. 8974 and a related jurisprudence
(2004 Resolution).

ISSUE

Whether or not RA 8794 should be applied in the instant expropriation case and not Rule 67

RULING

Yes.

Rule 67 of the Rules of Court cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming
that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then
apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court’s requirement in
the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government
may take over the property.

It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of
“immediate payment” in cases involving national government infrastructure projects.
Citizens Surety and Insurance Company vs. Melencio-Herrera
L-32170 (38 SCRA 369), March 31, 2971

Facts:

Citizens Surety and Insurance Co (Citizens) alleged that at the request of Santiago Dacanay, it issued 2
surety bonds to guarantee payment of P5, 000.00 promissory notes in favor of Gregorio Fajardo and
Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company respectively. As security, the Santiago and Josefina Dacanay executed
an Indemnity Agreement to jointly indemnify Citizens for losses, costs and expenses with 12% annual interest
and a REM over a parcel of land in Baguio. The Dacanays failed to pay the promissory notes compelling
Citizens to pay. The Dacanays failed to reimburse Citizens however, forcing the latter to cause the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage and file a case to recover the unsatisfied balance.

At the request of the petitioner, the respondent Judge caused summons to be made by publication in the
Philippine Herald. But despite such publication and deposit of copy with the Manila post office, the defendant
did not appear within 60 days from the last publication. Plaintiff sought the defendants to be declared in default,
but the Judge eventually dismissed the case, the suit being in personam and the defendants not having appeared.

Issue:

Whether or not summons made by publication is sufficient for the court to acquire jurisdiction.

Ruling:

No.

In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons, within the forum, is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot – consistently with the due process
clause in the Bill of Rights – confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.

The proper recourse for the creditor is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident defendant
debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached, in which case, the attachment converts the action
into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may be valid.

Given the skill of debtors to conceal their properties however, the decision of the respondent Judge
should be set aside and held pending in the archives until petitioners tracks down the whereabouts of the
defendant’s person or properties.
SPOUSES ALGURA ET AL. VS. CITY OF NAGA
GR No. 172595, April 10, 2008

Facts:

In 1999, the City of Naga demolished a portion of the house owned by spouses Antonio and
LorencitaAlgura for alleged being a nuisance as the said portion of the house was allegedly blocking the road
right of way.

In September, the spouses then sued Naga for damages arising from the said demolition (loss of income
from boarders), which to the spouses is an illegal demolition. Simultaneous to their complaint was an ex-parte
motion for them to litigate as indigent litigants. The motion was granted and the spouses were exempted from
paying the required filing fees.

In February 2000, during pre-trial, the City of Naga asked for 5 days within which to file a Motion to
Disqualify Petitioners as Indigent Litigants. Under the Rules of Court, a party may be qualified as a pauper
litigant if he submits an affidavit attesting that a.) His gross monthly income does not exceed P1, 500.00 (now
not more than double the monthly minimum wage) and b.) He should not own property with an assessed value
of not more than P18, 000.00 (now not more than P300, 000.00 market value). The City asserted that the
combined income of the Alguras is at least P13, 400.00 which is way beyond the threshold P1, 500.00. The City
presented as proof Antonio’s pay slip as a policemen (P10, 400) and Lorencita’s estimated income from her
sari-sari store. The claim of the spouses that they were property-less, as proven by the City Assessors’
certification, was not disputed by the City.

The spouses argued that since the boarding house was demolished by the City, they only relied on the
income of Antonio which was barely enough to cover their family needs like food, shelter, and other basic
necessities for them and their family.

The judge, however, granted the motion of the City and so the spouses were qualified as pauper-
litigants. Subsequently, the case filed by the spouses against the City was dismissed for the spouses’ failure to
pay the required filing fees.

Issue:
Whether or not the spouses should be disqualified as pauper-litigants.

Ruling:
No.

There was no hearing on the matter hence, the case was remanded back to the lower court. In this case,
the Supreme Court reconciled the provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 3 and Sec.19, Rule 141 (then Sec.16, Rule 141).
Sec.21, Rule 3, merely provides a general statement that indigent litigants may not be required to pay the filing
fees. On the other hand, Sec.19, Rule 141 provides the specific standards that a party must meet before he can
be qualified as an indigent party and thus be exempted from paying the required fees.

If Sec.19, Rule 141 (in this case, then Sec.16, Rule 141) is strictly applied, then the spouses could not
qualify because their income exceeds P1, 500.00, which was the threshold prior to 2000. But if Sec.21, Rule 3 is
to be applied, the applicant (the Spouses) should be given a chance in a hearing to satisfy the court that
notwithstanding the evidence presented by the opposing party (Naga), they have no money or property
sufficient and available for food, shelter and other basic necessities for their family, and are thus, qualified as
indigent litigants under said rule. Therefore, the court should have conducted a trial in order to let the spouses
satisfy the court that indeed the income they are having, even though above the P1, 500.00 limit, was not
sufficient to cover food, shelter and their other basic needs.
 SALIGUMBA VS PALANOG
GR. No. 143365. DEC 4 2008

FACTS:

Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino Palanog filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with
Damages (Civil Case No. 2570) against defendants, spouses Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr.
before the RTC.In the complaint, spouses Palanogs alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and
continuous possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land located in Solido, Nabas, Aklan. The
spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the subject premises and had
destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land.

On 7 August 1987, RTC-Branch 3 rendered a judgment declaring spouses Palanogs the lawful owners of
the subject land and ordering spouses Saligumbas, to vacate the premises. A motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution of the said decision was filed but the trial court, in its Order dated 8 May 1997, and ruled that since
more than five years had elapsed after the date of its finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere
motion. Thus, on 9 May 1997, Monica Palanog (respondent), now a widow, filed a Complaint seeking to revive
and enforce the Decision dated 7 August 1987 which she claimed has not been barred by the statute of
limitations. She impleaded petitioners Generoso Saligumba and Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs the spouses
Saligumbas, as defendants. It appears that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984 while Valeria
Saligumba died on 2 February 1985. No motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor did an order
issue for the substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas in Civil Case No. 2570. Atty. Miralles and
petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr., despite notices sent to them to appear, never confirmed the death of Eliseo
Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. The record is bereft of any evidence proving the death of the spouses,
except the mere notations in the envelopes enclosing the trial court’s orders which were returned unserved.

ISSUE: WON the death of the party would affect the validity of the decision.

HELD:

Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action involving real
property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death
of a party. And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides for the procedure.

Under Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the court to order the legal
representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court,
after receiving an informal notice of death by the mere notation in the envelopes, failed to order the appearance
of the legal representative or heir of the deceased. There was no court order for deceased’s legal representative
or heir to appear, nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted for the deceased.
Neither did the respondent ever procure the appointment of such legal representative, nor did the heirs ever ask
to be substituted.

Likewise, the plaintiff or his attorney or representative could not be expected to know of the death of the
defendant if the attorney for the deceased defendant did not notify the plaintiff or his attorney of such death as
required by the rules.19 The judge cannot be blamed for sending copies of the orders and notices to defendants
spouses in the absence of proof of death or manifestation to that effect from counsel.

It is the duty of counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the death of his client. The failure of counsel to
comply with his duty under Section 16 to inform the court of the death of his client and the non-substitution of
such party will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such
party. The decision rendered shall bind the party's successor-in-interest.
 Heirs of Regoso v. CA et al
G.R. No. 91879 July 6, 1992

FACTS:

The heirs of Maximo Regoso seek a review of the resolution dated October 9, 1989 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 20183 dismissing the appeal filed by Regoso's former counsel.

The case involves an action for judicial partition of property with accounting and damages (Civil Case
No. 1464-V-81), which was filed by Belen Cruz-Regoso against her husband, Maximo Regoso, in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch XV of Malolos, Bulacan.

Regoso died on January 17, 1985 after the case had been submitted for decision, but he was not
substituted as defendant by his heirs because, apparently, the trial court was not informed of his death until the
decision had been promulgated on November 14, 1988.

On November 29, 1988, Regoso's counsel, Attorney Adriano Javier, Sr., filed a notice of appeal which
the trial court approved. The appeal was docketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. No. 20183.

The plaintiff, Belen Cruz-Regoso, through counsel, moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the
deceased defendant ceased to have legal personality and that Attorney Javier's authority to represent him was
terminated or expired upon his demise, hence, the notice of appeal filed by said counsel was invalid, a worthless
piece of paper.

The Court of Appeals issued a resolution on October 6, 1989, dismissing the appeal.

The Motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs' new counsel was likewise denied by the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE: WON the Appellate Court erred in dismissing their appeal and in not declaring that the judgment
which the trial court rendered after the death of said defendant, was null and void.

RULING:

The petition has no merit.

Under the rules, it is the duty of the attorney for the deceased defendant to inform the court of his
client's death and to furnish the court with the names and residences of the executor, administrator, or legal
representative of the deceased.

The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the deceased party is in a better position than
the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of his client and to inform the court of the names and
addresses of his legal representative or representatives.

In the case at bar, no such notice of death, nor a motion for substitution of the deceased defendant, was
ever made. Hence, the trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of
defendant, Maximo Regoso, without the proper manifestation from his counsel. It must be remembered that the
fault or negligence was Attorney Javier's alone.

The supervening death of the defendant, Maximo Regoso, did not extinguish his wife's action for
partition of their conjugal assets, for it is an action that survives. The trial of the case on the merits was already
finished before the defendant died. Since it was not informed about that event, the trial court may not be faulted
for proceeding to render judgment without ordering the substitution of the deceased defendant. Its judgment is
valid and binding upon the defendant's legal representatives or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in
the property subject of the action is concerned.

Attorney Javier's appeal from the decision of the trial court was correctly dismissed by the appellate
court for upon the death of Maximo Regoso, Attorney Javier's authority to represent him also expired. Then
notice of appeal, which Attorney Javier filed on behalf of the decedent was an unauthorized pleading, hence,
invalid.
85. POLYTRADE CORPORATIONvsVICTORIANO BLANCOG.R. No. L-27033

Facts:Polytrade filed a suit before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on four causes of action against
Blanco.Plaintiff Corporation has its principal office and place of business in Makati, Rizal. Defendant is a
resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Defendant moved to dismiss upon the ground of improper venue. He claims
that by contract suit may only be lodged in the courts of Manila. The Bulacan court overruled him. He did not
answer the complaint. In consequence, a default judgment was rendered againstIn addition, defendant shall pay
plaintiff attorney's fees amounting to 25% of the principal amount due in each cause of action, and the costs of
the suit.

Issues: 1. WON venue was properly laid in the province of Bulacan where the defendant is a resident?

2. WON the award of attorneys' fees which is 25% of the total principal indebtedness is exorbitant and
unconscionable?

Held: 1. YES. Under Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions which provides
that such actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Qualifying this
provision in Section 3 of the same Rule which states that by written agreement of the parties the venue of an
action may be changed or transferred from one province to another. In the case at bar, the first two causes of
action the general rule set forth in Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs. The venue was properly laid in Bulacan, the
province of defendant's residence. The agreements covering the third and fourth causes of action which the
parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of
plaintiff or defendant. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the
venue are totally absent. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may
resort

2. NO.Thesubject matter attorneys' fees here are in the nature of liquidated damages. Under Article 2227 of the
Civil Code which states that Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be
equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. The attorney’s fees awarded in favor of Polytrade
and not his counsel. Such an arrangement is not illegal. It is the litigant, not counsel, who the judgment creditor
is entitled to enforce the judgment by execution. Further, Polytrade may have spent much for its counsel
considering its counsel’s high standing.
 The American Insurance Company vs. Macondray Co. Inc., et al.(GR No. L-24031, August 19, 1967)

Facts:

The American Insurance Company (AIC) filed a complaint in the CFI against Macondray Co.
Inc., (MCI) and Bureau of Customs (BC) as alternative defendants for the recovery of sum of money. In BC’s
Answer, it prayed for the dismissal of the case contending that it cannot be sued without its consent.

AIC on July 3, 1964, filed an amended complaint, it includes the Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
as party defendant. The action is for collection of sum of money representing an unsatisfied claim for loss and
non-delivery of goods consigned to an importer who was subrogated by the AIC as insurer, upon payment of
the latter of the loss. The participation of the BC was that it has been operating as the arrastre service at the port
of Manila.

The Republic and the BC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter because as operator of the arrastre service, the amount being involved is less than P10,
000, hence, within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Manila.

In the decision of the trial court, said court dismissed the case with respect to the Republic and BC upon
the ground set forth in their motion.

Hence, the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the money claim may be joined with a subject matter involving admiralty in one suit,
filed in the CFI against alternative defendants.

Held:

The SC ruled in the affirmative.

Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court

Joinder of Causes of Action ---- Subject to the rules regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
parties, a party in one pleading, state in the alternative or otherwise, as many as causes of actions
as he may have against an opposing party (a) if the said causes of action arise out of the contract
transaction or relation between the parties, or (b) if the causes of action are for demands for
money, or are of the same nature and character.

In the cases falling under clause (a) of the preceding paragraph, the action shall be filed in the
inferior courts unless any of the causes joined falls within the jurisdiction of the CFI, in which
case it shall be filed in the latter court.

From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the causes of action against the alternative
defendants arose out of the same contract or transaction, and one of the cause of action, that of admiralty against
the MCI falls within the jurisdiction of the CFI, hence said court has jurisdiction.
Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. Java Pacific and Hoegh Lines and Manila Railroad (GR No.
L- 21760, April 30, 1966)

Facts:

1000 bags of American wheat flour were shipped and it belonged to Java Pacific and Hoegh
Lines (steamship company), the shipment being consigned to Climaco Trading Manila and insured by the
Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. (insurer) against all risk of loss and damage.

After vessel arrived in Manila, it was examined by a representative of Manila Port Service, a
subsidiary of Manila Railroad Company (MRC), and found that there were deficiencies and shortages which the
insurer is compelled to pay.

The steamship company and MRC offered to pay but the insurer refused to accept it and then it
commenced an action before CFI of Manila for the recovery of the amount loss making the steamship company
and MRC as alternative defendants. The reason behind that is because at the time of the commencement of the
filing of the complaint, it was not known whether the loss occurred while the goods are in transit or in the
custody of the MRC.

The trial court in its decision, ordered the MRC to pay the amount claim in the complaint, on the other
hand, the steamship company was absolved by court.

Hence, MRC interposed the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the case may be entertained by the CFI upon the theory that both the defendants are sued
in the alternative, considering that the case against the steamship company is under the CFI, while the case
against MRC is in the MTC.

Held:

Yes.

The SC held that under Section 5, Rule 2 of Rules of Court, a party in one pleading state in the
alternative as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party if they arise from the same
transaction with the particularity that the case may be filed in the CFI in any said of causes of actions falls
exclusively within its jurisdiction.

Thus, in the present case, the CFI has jurisdiction of the case since the claims of the insurer arose out of
the same contract or transaction.
 Magdalena Estate Inc., vs. Rene Nieto and Helen Garcia (GR No. L- 54242, (November 25, 1983)

Facts:

Rene Nieto and Helen Garcia (Nieto and Garcia) bought a parcel of land from Magdalena Estate Inc.
(MEI). Even if Nieto and Garcia had not fully paid the consideration of the said lot, the former were able to
have title to said lots. Nieto and Garcia had partial payment only and the remaining balance of their account was
secured by a promissory note under certain terms and conditions.

Since Nieto and Garcia paid only two installments, MEI wrote a letter of demand calling the
attention of the two about the installments in arrears under the promissory note, but the latter did not comply
with their obligation. MEI then with its legal counsel sent a letter of demand against Nieto and Garcia which
was received by them; they did not comply or even failed to make a reply.

The trail court declared Nieto and Garcia in default. The court also allowed the service of summons and
copy of the complaint upon Nieto and Garcia through publication of such in a newspaper of general circulation.
MEI contended that personal service could not be served against the two because they concealed themselves to
avoid service of summons.

Hence, Nieto and Garcia appealed the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case through service of summons by
publication.

Held:

No.

The SC held that service of summons by publication is proper in all actions without distinction, provided
the defendant is residing in the Philippines but his identity is unknown or his address cannot be ascertained. It is
well settled principle of Constitutional Law that in an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons
essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction divert the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit
himself to the authority of the court. Summons by publication cannot consistently with the due process clause in
the Bill of Rights.

Thus, the trial court’s order is set aside and rendered it null and void.
 VicentaPantaleonvsHonorato Asuncion (GR No. L-13141, May 22, 1959)

Facts:

Vincent Pataleon, instituted an action in the CFI to recover from HonoratoAsuncio the sum of P2,000,
with interest.

The summons originally issued was returned by the sheriff unserved because Asuncion was residing in
Tala, Estate, Caloocan Rizal. An alias summons was issued for service in place last mention; however, the
provincial sheriff returned it unserved because Asuncion had left the said place. On Pantaleon’s motion, the
court ordered that Asuncion be summoned by publication and said summons were published. Upon failure to
appear, Asuncion was declared in default and after a hearing, the rendered its decision in favor of Pantaleon.

On October 24, 1955, Asuncion filed a petition for relief from court’s order and the judgment upon the
ground of mistake and excusable negligence. It questioned the service of summon upon him because he had not
receive any. Thus, he perfected his present appeal upon the contention that the questioned summons by
publication had not been made in conformity with the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not service of summon by publication conferred on the trial court the jurisdiction of the case.

Held:

No.

The SC opined that it is a well-settled principle that in an action strictly in personam, personal service of
summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of the jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
who does not voluntarily submit to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot
consistently, with the due process in the Bill of Rights, confer jurisdiction of the case.

Thus, it is inescapable that the lower court had no authority or whatsoever to issue the said order,
declaring Asuncion in default and to render the decision null and void.
87. HI-YIELD REALTY, INCORPORATED vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Roberto H. Torres (Roberto), for and on behalf of Honorio Torres & Sons, Inc. (HTSI), filed a Petition
for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage and Foreclosure Saleover two parcels of land located in Marikina and
Quezon Cityagainst Leonora, Ma. Theresa, Glenn and Stephanie, all surnamed Torres, the Register of Deeds of
Marikina and Quezon City, and petitioner Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. (Hi-Yield) before Branch 148 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition on grounds of improper venue and payment
of insufficient docket fees. RTC denied the motion and held that the case wasa real action in the form of a
derivative suit cognizable by a special commercial court pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 00-11-03-SC.It
further ruled that the prayer for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure proceedings was merely incidental to
the main action.

Issues: 1.WON venue was properly laid

2. WON there was proper joinder of parties

3. WON the action to annul the real estate mortgage and foreclosure sale is a mere incident of the derivative suit

Held:

1. YES. Under Section 5, Rule 1 of A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC which statesthe venue of derivative suitsshall be
commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the
corporation, partnership, or association concerned. Where the principal office of the corporation,
partnership or association is registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission as Metro Manila, the
action must be filed in the city or municipality where the head office is located.Respondents correctly
filed the derivative suit before the Makati RTC where HTSI had its principal office.

2. YES. For a derivative suit to prosper, the minority stockholder suing for and on behalf of the corporation
must allege in his complaint that he is suing on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all
other stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in the suit. In the case at bar, Robertothe
complaining stockholder satisfactorily show that he is instituting the instant proceeding by way of a derivative
suit to redress wrongs done to petitioner corporation and vindicate corporate rights due to the mismanagement
and abuses committed against it by its officers and controlling stockholders

3. YES. Both the RTC and Court of Appeals ruled that the action is in the form of a derivative suit although
captioned as a petition for annulment of real estate mortgage and foreclosure sale.A derivative action is a suit by a
shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action Under the Corporation Code, where a corporation is an injured party,
its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors or trustees. But an individual stockholder may be permitted to
institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights whenever the
officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold control of the corporation.In such actions,
the corporation is the real party-in-interest while the suing stockholder, on behalf of the corporation, is only a nominal
party.
86. G.R. No. L-57250 October 30, 1981

NEVILLE Y. LAMIS ENTS, and/or NEVILLE Y. LAMIS vs HON. ALFREDO J. LAGAMON as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch III, and SANTIAGO MANINGO

Facts: Neville Y. Lamis Ents is a single proprietorship with principal office address at Marikina, Metro Manila
through its proprietor and General Manager Neville Y. Lamisobtained a loan from Santiago Maningo, a resident
of Bajada, Davao City, specifically to advance for the petitioner’s logging operations. It has been agreed that in
case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of Davao City.Petitioner have not paid said loan nor
any part thereof, despite demand for payment. Private respondent Maningo failed to release the balance of P50,
000.00in spite of the petitioner's repeated calls and demands for the release of the same. Both parties did not
comply with their obligations executed in memorandum of agreement dated January 27, 1979. In this regard,
Santiago Maningo filed a collection of sum of money complaint against Neville Y. Lamis Ents before the
Court of First Instance of Davao at Tagum dated November 3, 1981 with a civil case no. 1395 invoking also in
one of his causes of action is the case filed by Neville Y. Lamis Entsbefore the Court of First Instance of Rizal
on eight causes of action against Maningo dated November 16, 1979 with civil case number 35199

Issues: 1. WON venue was properly laid?

2. WON the civil case No. 1395 is in Lis Pendens and or multiplicity of suit of a prior existing civil case
no. 35199

Held:

1. YES, Venue is properly laid. The proper venue for Civil Case No. 1395 should be Davao City where the
plaintiff resides and as stipulated in the promissory note and chattel mortgage. Anent the claim that
Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice it to say that astipulation as to venue does not
preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff ordefendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, Rules of
Court, in the absence of qualifying or restrictivewords in the agreement which would indicate that the
place named is the only venue agreedupon by the parties.
2. YES. Under Rule 16, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss an action may
be made on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.
For this ground to be invoked there must be, between the action under consideration and the other
action, (1) Identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (2)
Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the
Identity on the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on
the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action
under consideration. In the case at bar, the claim of the private respondent for P55,000 admittedly arose
from the same transactionthe Memorandum of Agreement sued upon in Civil Case No. 35199,
notwithstanding that no mention of the agreement is made in Civil Case No. 1395. Similarly the private
respondent's claim for the purchase price of the tractor is barred. This claim should have been set up in
Civil Case No. 35199, of which, in one of the causes of action it was alleged that there was a
misdelivery of tractor for which reason the plaintiff therein asks for the delivery of the tractor specified
in the Memorandum Agreement. The private respondent's claims are in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim and to allow it in the present action will violate the principle against multiplicity of suits.
GR No L-3884 Nov 29,1951

INTERNATIONAL COLLEGES INC (ICI)

VS

NIEVES ARGONZA ET AL

FACTS:

This case had its origin in the Municipal Court of Manila where 25 dismissed teachers of the ICI, a
domestic corporation, jointly sued for unpaid salaries, the complaint alleging that the teachers were employed
by ICI for the whole school year ending April 30,1949, but without justification and in violation of their
contract they were dismissed on December 10, 1948 by ICI without being paid their respective salaries due
under the contract, all aggregating P14,211.13 but with the highest individual claim not exceeding P1,300.00.
Instead of filing an answer ICI moved for dismissal of the complaint, contending that there were misjoinder of
parties-plaintiffs and that the total amount involved was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. The motion having
been denied ICI filed a case by certiorari before the Court of First Instance of Manila. Upholding ICI’s
contention, the CFI revoked the order complained of and order the complaint in the Municipal Trial Court
dismissed without pronouncement to cost. From this decision the teachers have appealed before the IAC which
reverses the decision of the CFI.

ISSUE: WON THERE WAS A MISJOINDER OF PARTIES-PLAINTIFFS AND THE AGGREGATE

AMOUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM SHOULD CONSTITUTE THE BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE
COURT’S JURISDICTION

HELD: No

The SC held that, ’when two or more plaintiffs, each having separate and distinct demand, join in a
single suit, the demand of each must be of the requisite jurisdictional amount. Aggregation of the claims to
make up the jurisdictional amount is permitted only if the claims are of a joint nature, as when it is sought to
enforce a single right in which plaintiffs have a common interest.Where several claimants have separate and
distinct demands against a defendant or defendants, which may properly be joined in a single suit, the claims
cannot be added together to make up the required jurisdictional amount; each separate claim furnishes the
jurisdictional test.

The petitioner believes that the joining of plaintiffs having separate claims should be controlled by the
principle bearing on the court’s jurisdiction in suits where one plaintiff alleges in one complaint several
independent causes of action, in which case it is the aggregate amount which determines the jurisdiction. But
there is a fundamental difference between such cases and one like that before us. In the first, the total demand
accrues to one person, while in the latter only part of the combined demand, which does not exceed the
jurisdictional amount, pertains to a single plaintiff. In other words, the court takes into account what one party
would recover and not what is adjudged to all the parties or some of them.

GR No L-3211 May 30, 1950

A SORIANO Y CIA

VS

GONZALO M JOSE

FACTS:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila denying a petition for certiorari
filed against Judge Almeda Lopez of the municipal court. The question for decision is whether the jurisdiction
of the municipal court is governed by the amount of each claim or by the aggregate sum of all the claims when
there are several plaintiffs suing jointly but having independent causes of action.

Alleging that prior to August 28, 1948, A. Soriano y Cia engaged the plaintiffs as employees or laborers
at its surplus department at Sta. Mesa yard in different capacities, and that on diverse dates between May 17 and
September 30, 1948, Soriano y Cia. had dismissed them without cause, the plaintiffs, twenty-nine in number,
brought a joint complaint in the municipal court, which was docketed as civil case No. 6058, against their
former employer, praying that judgment be rendered sentencing the defendant to pay each of them one month
salary in lieu of 30 days’ notice. The total of the claim is P5,235, and the largest single claim is P300.
Contending that the municipal court had no jurisdiction to try the action because the amount of the demand
exceeded P2,000, exclusive of interest and costs, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, and, after that motion
was denied, instituted proceedings for certiorari in the Court of First Instance.

ISSUE: WON THERE WAS A MISJOINDER OF PARTIES-PLAINTIFFS AND THE AGGREGATE

AMOUNT OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM SHOULD CONSTITUTE THE BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE
COURT’S JURISDICTION

HELD: NO

It is admitted that the plaintiffs’ demands are separate, distinct and independent of one another.
Nevertheless, it is also admitted that the plaintiffs’ joint suit is proper, expressly authorized by section 6 of Rule
3, entitled "Permissive Joinder of Parties," which provides that "All persons in whom or against whom any right
to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether
jointly severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be
joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all
such defendants may arise in the action.."

It is held that the present case were compared with one in which several actions commenced by different
plaintiffs, handled by the same attorneys, raising the same questions, and founded on the same facts or
evidence, were tried together and only one judgment were handed down. If the plaintiffs and the court had
adopted such procedure, we do not think that the court’s jurisdiction would be open to attack on the ground that
the judgment, by reason of the joint trial, adjudicated a greater amount than the law allowed.
88. KOREA EXCHANGE BANKvsHON. ROGELIO C. GONZALES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, PHI-HAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., LOURDES
DE MESA MENDOZA, MENELEO MENDOZA, ANTUSA DE MESA MAGNO, FRANCISCO
MAGNO, TEODORO DE MESA, FIRMO DE MESA and MERCEDES DE MESA

FACTS:Korea Exchange Bank (KEB) granted a loan to thePhi-Han Development, Inc(PHDI) in the amount of
US$500,000.00executed a real estate mortgage over their properties located in Lubao, Pampanga as a
security.PHDItogether with Teodoro de Mesa, AntusaMagno and Lourdes Mendoza, filed a complaint in the
RTC of Guagua, Pampanga docketed as Civil Case No. G-3012, against Jae IlAum (president of PHDI) and the
KEB for collection of sum of money with damages alleging Aumby forging the signature of Lourdes Mendoza,
could not have withdrawn the dollar and peso account without the connivance of the KEB. MeanwhileKEB
filed a Complaintdocketed as Civil Case No. G-3119against the PHDI, et alfor sum of money and reformation
of real estate mortgage executed by PHDI in its favor for not paying the loanand the increment thereof despite
demands. The PHDI, et al. filed a motion to dismissthe complaint on the ground of forum shopping, asserting
that the KEB should have filed its counterclaim for the reformation of the real estate mortgage and the
collection of US$500,000.00. KEB opposed the motion, contending that the complaint involved is a corporate
fraud, hence the RTC had no jurisdiction over the actionand as such, could not interpose any counterclaims
therein. The petitioner notes that although the respondents alleged set-off of the US$160,000.00 in their special
and affirmative defenses, they, however, repleaded and incorporated, by way of reference, the said allegations
in their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees; hence, the claim of set-off or
compensation of the respondents was a counterclaim. The respondents were, thus, mandated to append a
certificate of non-forum shopping to their counterclaims as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, but failed to do so. The petitioner avers that there is identity of causes of action, issues and reliefs prayed
for in the complaint of the respondents in Civil Case No. G-3012, and their counterclaims for set-off or
compensation of the US$160,000.00, moral damages of P500,000.00 and P500,000.00 as exemplary damages in
Civil Case No. G-3119

Issue: WON set-off or recoupment can be considered as a counterclaim

Held: YES. Counterclaim, as now used and understood, includes both set-off and recoupment and is broader
than both; it includes equitable demands and secures to the defendant full relief. A set-off is a money demand
by the defendant against the plaintiff arising upon contract and constituting a debt independent of and
unconnected with the cause of actions set forth in the complaint, and may be used to offset a plaintiffs claim but
not to recover affirmatively. As in the case with recoupment, set-off may be used to offset a plaintiff’s claim but
not to recover affirmatively. In Lopez v. Gloria and Sheriff of Leytethe Court ruled that for set-off or
recoupment to be considered as a counterclaim, the following must concur: (1) the same be essentially a
genuine action of the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) the same should have as its object to neutralize, wholly
or partially, that which the plaintiff is trying to obtain; (3) the same does not have for its object to destroy
directly the action of the plaintiff; and (4) the same ought not to pray for a positive remedy distinct from the
payment of money. In the case at bar the respondents claim of set-off or compensation of the US$160,000.00
against the claim of US$500,000.00 of the petitioner against the respondents is a counterclaim. The respondents
admit in their complaint in Civil Case No. G-3012 and in their answer in Civil Case No. G-3119 that they
secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of US$500,000.00, but maintain that they are not liable for the
payment of the said loan because the petitioner, in connivance with Jae Il Aum, had withdrawn not only
US$160,000.00 but the entire deposit of US$500,000.00 from the peso and dollar accounts of respondent PHDI
without the consent of the respondents. The latter did not seek to recover affirmatively from the petitioner.
Carpio Vs Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas Batangas, Inc.

GR. No. 153171, May 4, 2006

Facts:

Rodolfo Carpio and Remedios Orendain file with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for annulment of
foreclosure sale and damages against Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, Inc.

Petitioners further alleged that the sale was conducted without proper publication as the sheriff’s notice of sale
was published in a newspaper which is not of general circulation. Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, Inc.
filed its answer with counterclaim, denying specifically the material allegations of the complaint.

The Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas
counterclaim was not accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.

The RTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss the counterclaim. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed orders.

Issue:

Whether or not a certification against forum shopping is necessary in filing a counterclaim

Held:

No. Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure provides that the plaintiff shall file his
complaint or other initiatory pleading with certification against forum shopping.

Petitioners’ contention is utterly baseless. It bears stressing that the Rule distinctly provides that the required
certification against forum shopping is intended to cover an "initiatory pleading," meaning an "incipient
application of a party asserting a claim for relief." Certainly, respondent bank’s Answer with Counterclaim is a
responsive pleading, filed merely to counter petitioners’ complaint that initiates the civil action.
Asia United Bank Vs. Goodland Company Inc.

GR No. 191388, March 9, 2011

Facts:

Goodland Company, Inc. (Goodland) executed Third Party Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over two parcels of
land in favor of Asia United Bank (AUB). The mortgage secured the obligation amounting to P 250,000,000.00
of Radio Radiomarine Network, Inc. (RMNI).

Goodland then filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court for the annulment of REM on the ground that
the same was falsified and done in contravention of parties’ verbal agreement (annulment case)

While the annulment case was pending, RMNI defaulted in payment of its obligation to AUB. AUB filed its
application for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage under Act No. 3135. The mortgaged
properties were sold in public auction to AUB as the highest bidder. Certificate of Sale was issued and was
registered with the Registry of Deeds.

Goodland filed another complaint against AUB and its officers. This complaint sought to annul the foreclosure
of sale and to enjoin the consolidation of title. (Injunction case)

AUB filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to a Temporary Restraining Order in the injunction case. They
brought to the court’s attention Goodland’s forum shopping given pendency of the annulment case. They argued
that the two cases both rely on the alleged falsification of the real estate mortgage as basis for the reliefs sought.

Issue:

Whether or not Goodland committed forum shopping

Held:

Yes. The different ways by which forum shopping may be committed were explained in Chua v. Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company:

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is
litispendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous
case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting causes of action, where the ground for
dismissal is also either litispendentia or res judicata).

Thus, what is involved here is the third way of committing forum shopping, i.e., filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action, but with different prayers. As previously held by the Court, there is still forum
shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different, so long as both cases raise substantially the
same issues.
CHUA VS. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 182311, August 19, 2009

FACTS:

Fidel O. Chua, the president of Filiden Realty and Development Corporation obtained a loan of P 4,000,000.00
from Metrobank, which was secured by a real estate mortgage (REM) on parcels of land. Since the value of
collateral was more than the loan, petitioners were given a n open credit line for future loans. Chua obtained
other loans.

Having failed to fully pay their obligations after the demand of Metrobank, Metrobank sought to extra-judicially
foreclose the REM. AttyRomualdoCelestra then issued a Notice of Sale.

Chua filed before the Branch 257 of Regional Trial Court , a complaint for injunction with prayer for issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order docketed as Civil Case NO. CV-01-0207. After the expiration of the TRO and
no injunction having been issued Atty. Celestre proceeded with the auction sale, and a certificate of sale was
accordingly issued to respondent Metrobank as highest bidder of the foreclosed properties.

Chua filed with RTC-Branch 257 a motion to admin amended complaint with writ of preliminary injunction,
alleging that the certificate of sale was a falsified document. RTC-Branch 257 denied Chua’s application for
injunction. Chua filed a petition to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals reversed the order of RTC-Branch
257 and remanded the case for further proceedings. The RTC-Branch 257 set the hearing.

Chua filed with RTC Branch-195 a verified complaint for damages against Metrobank and other respondents
docketed as Civil Case NO. CV-05-0402.

ISSUE:

Whether or not successively filing Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and CV-05-0402 amounts to forum shopping

HELD:

Yes. The proscription against forum shopping is found in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court. Forum
shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails himself of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely
by some other court.

In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioners failed to state in the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping,
attached to their Verified Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 before RTC-Branch 195, the existence of
Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 pending before RTC-Branch 258. Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action, although with different prayers.

If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be dismissed without
prejudice, on the ground of either litispendentia or res judicata. However, if the forum shopping is willful and
deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice..43 In this case,
petitioners did not deliberately file Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 for the purpose of seeking a favorable decision
in another forum. Otherwise, they would not have moved for the consolidation of both cases. Thus, only Civil
Case No. CV-05-0402 is dismissed and the hearing of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 before RTC-Branch 258 will
be continued.
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO

G.R. No. L-2809; March 22, 1950

Facts:

Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention
because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive,
kidnap and detain one ArtemiaFabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving
said ArtemiaFabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just
instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter.

Issue:

Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.

Held:

Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : “If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the
court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the
Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.”
This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for
a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be
heard by counsel.

The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does
not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the
commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this
matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the
supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court
became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had
nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of
the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have
seen to it that the accused be assistedby counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the
seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.
 (90)[G.R. No. 131692. June 10, 1999]

FELIPE YULIENCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and ADVANCE CAPITAL
CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:

ACC alleged that petitioner failed and refused to pay the amounts reflected in the promissory notes upon their
maturity and despite several demands to pay made to the petitioner, the last one being sent on January 9, 1995.

Petitioner filed his answer on July 17, 1995, alleging in sum, that the trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over
ACC's complaint because there is another case pending between ACC and the petitioner involving the same
subject matter, and that ACC's complaint should have been filed as a necessary and compulsory counterclaim in
the said case. Also, ACC's complaint was allegedly in violation of the proscription against splitting of a cause of
action. Alternatively, petitioner countered that the promissory notes upon which ACC based its claim are fake,
and do not express the true intent of the contracting parties.

On April 19, 1996, petitioner filed a memorandum/motion to dismiss with the trial court, setting up the special
and affirmative defenses in his answer as grounds for the dismissal of ACC's suit.

Thereafter, YULIENCO filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or
injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42835, questioning the aforementioned orders of the RTC of Quezon
City. YULIENCO challenged the jurisdiction of the RTC over Civil Case No. Q-95-23691 principally on the
ground of litispendentia, because another case, Special Case No. Q-93-2521, which, he claimed, involved the
same parties (he and Advance Capital Corporation [hereafter ACC]) and subject matter, is pending before the
RTC of Makati City.
The Court of Appeals rejected YULIENCO's argument and consequently dismissed the petition in its
decision of 4 December 1997.
Unable to accept the decision, YULIENCO filed the instant petition. He insists that the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not in accord with law and jurisprudence, because: (1) Civil Case No. Q-95-23691 violated
the fundamental rules on splitting of causes of action and/or necessary joinder of causes of action in that the
cause of action therein (complaint for collection of sums of money covered by Promissory Notes Nos. 56, 57,
59 and 60) should have been set up as compulsory counterclaim in Special Case No. Q-93-2521; and (2) in
filing Civil Case No. Q-95-23691, ACC was guilty of forum shopping.
On its part, ACC maintains that Civil Case No. Q-95-23691 of the RTC of Quezon City is separate and distinct
from Special Civil Case No. 93-2521 of the RTC of Makati City. The first is an ordinary collection suit, while
the second is for injunction, and while both cases involve promissory notes, they are not the same promissory
notes. The dissimilarity arises from the disparate obligations and transactions entered into or incurred by
YULIENCO in different years. Hence, there is no violation of the rule concerning splitting causes of action or
the necessary joinder of causes of action.

ISSUE : WON there was no violation of the rule against splitting causes of action or necessary joinder of causes
of action.

HELD: YES.
 We agree with ACC.

A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against
an opposing party.[6] A counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim.[7] In other words, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of a
separate action but should be asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence giving rise
to it.[8]
The criteria or tests by which the compulsory or permissive nature of specific counterclaims can be
determined are as follows:
(1) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim
rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as defendant's
counterclaim?
(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?[9]
re is, therefore, a dissimilarity in the subject matter of both cases arising from separate and distinct
transactions and necessarily requiring different evidence to support the divergent claims. More importantly, the
"one compelling test of compulsoriness" i.e., the logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, does
not apply here. To reiterate, there is no logical relationship between YULIENCO's petition for injunctive relief
and ACC's collection suit, hence separate trials of the respective claims of the parties will not entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time as the factual and/or legal issues involved, as already explained, are
dissimilar and distinct.[10] A judgment in Special Civil Action No. 93-2521 will not therefore bar Civil Case No.
Q-95-23691; "this, [additionally] on the theory that what is barred by prior judgment are not only the matters
squarely raised and litigated, but all such matters as could have been raised but were not."[11] Obviously, each
averment by ACC for the collection of a sum of money covered by Promissory Notes Nos. 56, 57 59 and 60 is
not a "matter" that could have been raised as counterclaim in the injunction suit.
In light of the above showing, there was no violation of the rule against splitting causes of action or
necessary joinder of causes of action.
(91)G.R. No. L-44388 January 30, 1985

VICTORIANO BULACAN, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FAUSTINO TORCINO and FELIPA TORCINO, defendants-appellants.

FACTS: A complaint for forcible entry and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction was filed with the
Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte by VictorianoBulacan against Faustino Torcino and FelipaTorcino. The
complaint was signed by Nicolas Nuñes, Jr., "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff" but was verified by the plaintiff-
appellee himself. When the defendants-appellants filed their answer, they did not question the fact that the
complaint was signed by Nicolas Nuñes, Jr. Due to the failure of the parties to settle their case amicably, the
court rendered a decision ordering the Torcinos to demolish and remove the portion of their house which was
illegally constructed on the land of the plaintiff The municipal court stated that there is no doubt that
VictorianoBulacan is the owner and has been in possession of Lot No. 5998 and that the lot of the defendants-
appellants is on the eastern portion of said lot. The court found that the Torcinos constructed a residential house
which unfortunately encroached on the lot of the plaintiff.

The Torcinos appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Leyte.

On September 18, 1973, the appellants Torcinos filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or by an admitted attorney, and therefore must be considered as sham
and false.

Four days later, another motion to dismiss the complaint was filed with the additional discussion that the fact
that the complaint is verified, does not in itself cure the defect obtaining in the complaint.

On September 24, 1973, appellee Bulacan opposed the motion and alleged that the motion to dismiss was not
filed on time and the defenses therein were not pleaded in the answer in the municipal court and therefore, are
deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal in the Court of First Instance. The opposition
also stated that the complaint substantially conforms to the Rule.

On September 24, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Leyte denied the motion to dismiss. A motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

On December 7, 1973, when the case was called for continuance, the parties presented to the court a stipulation
of facts

The stipulation of facts was signed by plaintiff VictorianoBulacan, his new counsel Atty. Diego A. Cala
defendants Faustino and FelipaTorcino, and their counsel Gerardo A. Pabello

The court issued an order directing surveyor Jaime Kudera to conduct the relocation work on the basis of the
stipulation.

On December 17, 1983, Kudera submitted his report and on the basis of his findings, the Court of First Instance
of Leyte affirmed the decision of the municipal court.

The Court of Appeals in a resolution dated August 7, 1976 certified the appeal to us on the ground that no
testimonial or oral evidence was presented by the parties and, therefore, no factual matters are in issue in the
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint for forcible entry and detainer should be dismissed by a municipal court on
the ground that the plaintiff knowingly asked a non-member of the bar to sign and file it for him.

HELD: We affirm the decision of the lower court.

The Torcinos allege that the complaint is irregular as it was signed not by the plaintiff but by one who was not a
member of the bar and who designated himself merely as "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff." The appellants
argue that the municipal court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. They invoke Section 5, Rule 7 which
states:

SEC. 5. Signature and address.—Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be

signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated A
party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with
intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken out as sham and false and the action
may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if
scandalous or indecent matter is inserted. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the facts of this case, however, the applicable provision is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
which states:

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation
in person with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must
be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

The Rules are clear. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a friend, agent, or an attorney.
However, in cases before the regional trial court, the litigant must be aided by a duly authorized member of the
bar. The rule invoked by the Torcinos applies only to cases filed with the regional trial court and not to cases
before a municipal court.
(92)G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983

ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila,
and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.

FACTS:on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against Patrolmen
Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively, and were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the U.P.assistance to
the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their
separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario
C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16,
1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as
private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the Orders of
respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in plain violation of
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining
respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf from conducting any proceedings in Criminal
Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs.
Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on
any such dates as may be fixed by said respondent judge.

Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: têñ.£îhqwâ£

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and conduct
his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an attorney.
However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney.

On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was done
by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£

SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.

xxxxxxxxx

SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless the offended party has
waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal
 action, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.

And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and control of
the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later on, requires the prior approval
of the fiscal.

ISSUE: WON PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

HELD:

We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the municipal
court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the purpose.
Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a
case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to
property through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal
court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in
conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private
prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to
handle the case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in
the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he
can just manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the
case under his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel
or as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to
appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.

In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the
offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and,
therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo
Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he
cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.
Associated Bank v. Sps Ponstroller

G.R. No 148444 September 9, 2009

Facts:

The controversy stems from the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by spouses Eduardo and Ma. Pillar Vaca
who owned a foreclosed property and the bidding of which was subsequently won by the Associated Bank. The
latter then sold the property to spouses Rafael ang Monaliza Ponstroller for P7.5m with 10% downpayment.
Associated bank thru Atty. Soluta then executed a letter-agreement setting forth the conditions of the sale.

Prior to the expiration of the 90-day period within which to make the escrow deposit, in view of the pendency
of the case filed by the spouses Vaca who commenced an action for the nullification of the real estate mortgage
and foreclosure sale, the Ponstrollers requested that balance be payable upon service on them of the final
decision affirming the Associated’s right to posses the property. Respondents’ proposal was referred to
petitioner’s Asset Recovery and Remedial Recovery Management Committee. Because the Board of Directors
deferred action on the respondent’s request, the petitioner thru Atty. Soluta and the respondents executed
another Letter-Agreement allowing the respondents to pay the balance upon receipt of the final order. However,
after one-year and after the banks reorganization, the board rejected the respondents’ request and asked them to
submit the new proposal if they were still interested. The Pronstrollers showed the letter-agreement which
granted them an extension but they were informed that Atty. Soluta was not authorized to give such extension.
The proposal submitted by the Ponstrollers was also disapproved. After the Associated’s right to posses the
property was upheld by the court in the case commenced by the spouses Vaca, the Ponstrollers filed a
Complaint for Specific Performance before the RTC and they likewise caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens in the petitioner’s title. While the case was pending, the Associated Bank sold the subject land back to
Vaca. Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of the Ponstrollers. Hence, this petition for Reconsideration by the
Associated Bank and Motion for Leave to Intervene by spouses Vaca who allege that they are the registered
owners of the subject property and are thus a real parties-in-interest.

Issue:

WON spouses Vaca be allowed to intervene

Held:

NO.

The intervention would unduly delay and prejudice the rights especially of the respondents who have been
deprived of the subject property for so long. Furthermore, the motion for leave to intervene before this court
was belatedly filed in view of Sec. 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and
served on the original parties.

Hence, the Motion for Leave to Intervene must be denied.