[G.R. No. 102342. July 3, 1992.]
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo,
Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Hector B. Almeyda for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION; 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD DOES NOT APPLY TO OFFENSES SUBJECT TO SUMMARY PROCEDURE. — Section 1,
Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for
offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly
signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary
procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the
cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read
in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative
intent.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION (B) REFERS TO SECTION 32(2) OF BP NO. 129. — Where paragraph
(b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P.
No. 129, vesting in such courts: Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than
four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos. These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
3. ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; APPLIES TO VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR CITY
ORDINANCES. — As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the
offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the
charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTS ONLY WHEN THE CASE IS ACTUALLY FILED IN
COURT. — Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or
preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the
prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case
shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution
decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on
any date before that.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION IN CONSONANCE WITH ACT NO. 3326. — This
interpretation is in consonance with Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription
shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of
fact, it does.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION IN CRIMINAL
CASES IS A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. — The Court feels that if there be a conflict between the
Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326
and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in
criminal cases is a substantive right.
7. ID.; ID.; CRIME PRESCRIBES IF THE PROSECUTOR DELAYS INTENTIONALLY OR NOT THE
INSTITUTION OF NECESSARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. — The Court realizes that under the
above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the
prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the
applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain
language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof
to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for
violations of municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor’s permit
in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the
Province of Rizal.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of the police
was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The
corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October
2, 1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed,
but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was
1
sustained by the responded judge. 4 constituting jeopardy.

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge SECTION 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing
against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)
Procedure:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory
SECTION 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should
the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in the following have been dismissed on the ground prescription.
cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the
filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with
the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985
B. Criminal Cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:cralawnad

1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; SECTION 1. How Instituted. — For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in
special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
2. Violations of rental law; library

3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the
complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged does preliminary investigation therein;
not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both,
irrespective of other impossible penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
arising therefrom. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with
x x x the fiscal’s office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint
may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.

SECTION 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of (Emphasis supplied.)
a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in
Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the
information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio, the complaint with the Officer of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such
corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction,
party. including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in
Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar,
this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the
conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions
holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period
of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this
conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period
of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without
distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or
investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the

2
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations
already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to
deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months
before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other
hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was
added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply
to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in
the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those
offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to
the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest
of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers
are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that
rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to
Section 32 (2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be
filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct
a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is actual filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the
period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary
to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of
fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should
prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right. 7
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would
have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral
defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the
instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six
months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or not, he delays
the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that
possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent
as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the
meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be
corrected.cralawnad
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner
commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months
thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May
30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have
interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is
SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby
DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
3
[G.R. No. 69863-65 : December 10, 1990.]
192 SCRA 183
LINO BROCKA, BENJAMIN CERVANTES, COSME GARCIA, RODOLFO SANTOS, VALENTINO
SALIPSIP, RICARDO VEGA, ERIC MARIANO, JOSE EMMANUEL OYALES, RONNIE MATTA,
ALFREDO VIAJE, RUBEN EUGENIO, REYNALDO ORTIZ, ORLANDO ORTIZ, NOEL REYES,
EDUARDO IMPERIAL, NESTOR SARMIENTO, FRANCO PALISOC, VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN,
ALBERTO REYES, JESSIE PINILI, ROMULO AUGUIS, DOMINADOR RESURRECION III, RONNIE
LAYGO, ROSAURO ROQUE, CLARENCE SORIANO, OCTAVO DEPAWA, CARLITO LA TORRE,
SEVERNO ILANO, JR., DOMINGO CAJIPE, ALAN ALEGRE, RAMON MARTINEZ, MA. GILDA
HERNANDEZ, EDNA P. VILLANUEVA, DOLLY S. CANU, MELQUIADES C. ATIENZA, ELIGIO P.
VERA CRUZ, ROGER C. BAGAN, ABUNDIO M. CALISTE, Petitioners, vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
MAJ. GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, BRIG. GENERAL PEDRO BALBANERO, COL. ABAD, COL.
DAWIS, SERGIO APOSTOL, P/LT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and JUDGE RICARDO TENSUAN,
Respondents.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to secure the release of petitioners on
habeas corpus and to permanently enjoin the City Fiscal of Quezon City from investigating
charges of "Inciting to Sedition" against petitioners Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme
Garcia and Rodolfo Santos, (hereafter Brocka, et al.). On learning that the corresponding
informations for this offense has been filed by the City Fiscal against them on February 11,
1985, a supplemental petition was filed on February 19, 1985 (p. 51, Rollo) to implead the
Presiding Judge, 1 and to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024
and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo) and the issuance of warrants for their arrests, including their
arraignment. Since then President Ferdinand E. Marcos had ordered the provisional release
of Brocka, et al., the issue on habeas corpus has become moot and academic (p. 396, Rollo).
We shall thus focus on the question of whether or not the prosecution of the criminal cases
for Inciting to Sedition may lawfully be enjoined.:-cralaw
Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police District
following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy with the
jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO). Thereafter,
they were charged with Illegal Assembly in Criminal Cases Nos. 37783, 37787 and 37788 with
Branch 108, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Quezon City. 2
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly and
for whom no bail was recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail of
P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent petition
for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7, 1985 were held.
However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et al. remained
in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly
issued against them on January 28, 1985 (p. 6, Rollo). Neither the original, duplicate original
nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them (p. 367, Rollo).
Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with Inciting to Sedition,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo), without
prior notice to their counsel (p. 7, Rollo). The original informations filed recommended no
bail (p. 349, Rollo). The circumstances surrounding the hasty filing of this second offense are
cited by Brocka, et al. (quoting from a separate petition filed on their behalf in G.R. Nos.
69848-50 entitled "Sedfrey A. Ordoñez vs. Col. Julian Arzaga, et al."), as follows:
"x x x
"6. The sham' character of the inquest examination concocted by all respondents is starkly
bizarre when we consider that as early as 10:30 A.M. today, February 11, 1985, Benjamin
Cervantes was able to contact undersigned petitioner by phone informing counsel that said
Benjamin Cervantes and the 4 other persons who are the subjects of this petition will be
brought before the Quezon City Fiscal at 2:30 for undisclosed reasons: subsequently, another
phone call was received by petitioning counsel informing him that the appearance of
Benjamin Cervantes et al. was to be at 2:00 P.M. When petitioning counsel arrived in the
office of Assistant City Fiscal Arturo Tugonon, the complainants' affidavits had not yet been
received by any of the panel of three assistant city fiscals, although the five persons under
detention were already in the office of said assistant fiscal as early as 2:00 P.M. It was only at
3:00 when a representative of the military arrived bringing with him alleged statements of
complainants against Lino Broka (sic) et al. for alleged inciting to sedition, whereupon
undersigned counsel asked respondent Colonel Agapito Abad 'who ordered the detained
persons to be brought to the office of Assistant Fiscal Arturo Tugonon since there were no
charges on file;' and said Colonel Agapito Abad said aloud: 'I only received a telephone call
from Colonel Arzaga about 11:00 A.M. to bring the detained persons today — I am only the
custodian.' At 3:15, petitioning counsel inquired from the Records Custodian when the
charges against Lino Broka (sic) had been officially received and he was informed that the
said charges were never coursed through the Records Office.
"7. Under the facts narrated above, respondents have conspired to use the strong arm of the
law and hatched the nefarious scheme to deprive Lino Broka (sic) et al. the right to bail
because the utterances allegedly constituting inciting to sedition under Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code are, except for varying nuances, almost verbatim the same utterances
which are the subject of Criminal Cases No. 37783, 37787 and 37788 and for which said
detained persons are entitled to be released on bail as a matter of constitutional right.
Among the utterances allegedly made by the accused and which the respondents claimed to
be violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are: 'Makiisa sa mga drivers, "Makiisa sa
aming layunin, "Digmaang bayan ang sagot sa kahirapan,' Itigil ang pakikialam ng
imperyalismo sa Pilipinas,' 'Rollback ng presyo ng langis sa 95 Centavos.' (See Annex B)
"8. That when petitioning counsel and other members of the defense panel requested that
they be given 7 days within which said counsel may confer with their clients — the detained
persons named above, the panel of assistant fiscals demanded that said detained persons
should sign a 'waiver' of their rights under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a
condition for the grant of said request, which is a harassing requirement considering that
Lino Broka (sic) et al. were already under the detention, albeit illegally, and they could not
have waived the right under Rule 125 which they did not enjoy at the time the ruling was
made by the panel of assistant city fiscals." (pp. 4-6, Rollo in G.R. 69848-50).
4
They were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on orders of then President F. E.
Marcos. The circumstances of their release are narrated in Our resolution dated January 26,
1985, as quoted in the Solicitor General's Manifestation as follows:
"G.R. Nos. 69848-50 (Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, Petitioner, vs. Col. Julian Arzaga, et al.,
Respondents). — Petitioner Sedfrey A. Ordoñez filed this petition for habeas corpus in behalf
of Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia, Alexander Luzano, and Rodolfo Santos,
who were all detained under a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on January 28, 1985. They were charged in three separate informations
of the crime of illegal assembly under Art. 146, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by PD 1834. On February 7, 1985, the Honorable Miriam Defensor Santiago,
Regional Trial Judge of Quezon City, issued a resolution in the above criminal cases, directing
the release of the five accused on bail of P6,000.00 for each of them, and from which
resolution the respondent fiscals took no appeal. Immediately thereafter, the accused filed
their respective bail bonds. This notwithstanding, they continued to be held in detention by
order of the respondent colonels; and on February 11, 1985, these same accused were
'reinvestigated,' this time on charges of 'inciting to sedition' ** under Art. 142 of the Revised
Penal Code, following which corresponding cases were filed. The respondents complied with
Our resolution requiring them, inter alia, to make a RETURN of the writ of habeas corpus. In
their RETURN, it appeared that all the accused had already been released, four of them on
February 15, 1985 and one February 8, 1985. The petitioner, nevertheless, argued that the
petition has not become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the
custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition." (p. 395, Rollo).
Hence, this petition.
Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are sufficient
bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the second offense of
inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one and the same act of attending and
participating in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain that while there may be a complex
crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into
two offenses and filing two informations therefor, further, that they will be placed in double
jeopardy.
The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution of a case, since the
two other issues raised by Brocka, et al. are matters of defense against the sedition charge.
We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second offense
of inciting to sedition.
Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by
injunction, preliminary or final. There are however exceptions, among which are:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez
vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano,
supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil.
202);
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil.
62);
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young
vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil.
1140);
"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R.
No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto
vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8,
1962; Cf, Guingona, et al vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA
438).
"7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1958)." (cited in
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that the
criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been undertaken by state
officials in bad faith.: nad
Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s release from
detention (before their release on orders of then Pres. Marcos). This PDA was, however,
issued on January 28, 1985, but was invoked only on February 9, 1985 (upon receipt of the
trial court's order of release). Under the guidelines issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24
hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours (outside Metro Manila). (Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748,
October 28, 1985, 139 SCRA 349). Noteworthy also is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite
subpoenas for its production, the prosecution merely presented a purported xerox copy of
the invoked PDA (par. 4, Counter-Rejoinder, p. 367, Rollo).
The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor General's office. In fact they
found petitioner's plight "deplorable" (par. 51, Manifestation, p. 396, Rollo).
The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and inoperational PDA,
certainly betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to pursue criminal charges
against Brocka, et al.
We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan case that "individuals against whom PDAs have
been issued should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified
true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of the
apprehension" (supra, p. 369).
We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a public official's prosecution of criminal
offenders. We, however, believe that this should not be a license to run roughshod over a
5
citizen's basic constitutional lights, such as due process, or manipulate the law to suit
dictatorial tendencies.
We are impelled to point out a citizen's helplessness against the awesome powers of a
dictatorship. Thus, while We agree with the Solicitor General's observation and/or
manifestation that Brocka, et al. should have filed a motion to quash the information, We,
however, believe that such a course of action would have been a futile move, considering the
circumstances then prevailing. Thus, the tenacious invocation of a spurious and inoperational
PDA and the sham and hasty preliminary investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors
intended to keep Brocka, et al. in detention until the second offense of "Inciting to Sedition"
could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew. As a
matter of fact the corresponding informations for this second offense were hastily filed on
February 11, 1985, or two days after Brocka, et al.'s release from detention was ordered by
the trial judge on February 9, 1985.
Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this gesture is the true sign of
democracy. These may not be set aside to satisfy perceived illusory visions of national
grandeur.: nad
In the case of J. Salonga v. Cruz Paño, We point out:
"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal
procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and
punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution . . ." (G.R. No. L-59524,
February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438-at p. 448).
We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of
criminal charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying
provisional release until such time that charges were filed, and where a sham preliminary
investigation was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be
enjoined.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED
from proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

6
G.R. No. L-32849 July 31, 1984
QUIRICO A. ABELA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE CESARIO C. GOLEZ, Judge, Court of First Instance of Capiz, Branch I, and
AGUSTIN ALMALBIS respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
Direct appeal by City Fiscal Quirico A. Abela, of Roxas City, from a decision dated August 27,
1970 of then Court of First Instance Judge Cesario C. Golez, compelling him to "file the proper
action for estafa arising from the bouncing check Exhibit B. Without pronouncement as to
costs." (p. 41, Rollo)
On December 28, 1968, private respondent Agustin Almalbis filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Roxas City a complaint for estafa against one Virginia Anisco. After conducting a
preliminary investigation, herein petitioner Quirico A. Abela dismissed the complaint "for lack
of merit." Thereafter, private respondent Almalbis commenced the action for mandamus in
the Court of First Instance of Roxas City against herein petitioner Quirico A. Abela. In due
course said court rendered the above-mentioned decision. Hence, this appeal.
The findings of the petitioner are contained in his Order, from which we quote:
It appeared from the testimony of the complainant, that sometime in
1967, the complainant entered into a business arrangement with the
respondent, Virginia P. Anisco. The former, who is both owner and
operator of several fishing boats and fishponds, sends fish by the tons to
the respondent to be sold at the Manila Divisoria Market. From the
proceeds of such sales, which were entirely supervised and controlled by
the respondent, respondent got four per cent (4%) commission from the
gross proceeds plus whatever expenses she has advanced as expenses in
the process. Respondent in turn has the obligation to remit the balance
of the proceeds to the complainant.
This business arrangement had continued for sometime at a more or less
irregular interval of two weeks to the satisfaction of both parties, until
the respondent later became late and irregular in her remittances of the
balance of the proceeds due the complainant.
Remittances of the net proceeds were mostly done by respondent by
sending her personal checks and later, when respondent had been late in
her remittances, complainant proposed that respondent give him a check
book, each and every check of which is presigned in blank. The blanks
corresponding to the amount and the payee to be filled in later by the
complainant as the value of the shipment is determined after each sale.
This was done and the business again continued under the above
arrangement. Then Checks Nos. 378389 dated September 16, 1968,
392377 dated October 20, 1968, 392379 dated October 29, 1968, 392380
dated October 30, 1968, and 392381 dated October 30, 1968 drawn on
the Prudential Bank and Trust Company of Manila as prepared and filled
in by the complainant were all dishonored for lack of funds, when
presented for payments by the complainant through the Roxas City
Branch of the Philippine National Bank.
The foregoing is the summary of the testimony of complainant, Agustin
Almalbis. and with the submission of his aforementioned exhibits, rested
his case.
Respondent failed to appear on the dates scheduled for her turn and was
considered to have waived her rights to present evidence in her defense.
THE ISSUE
The question is, has the respondent committed Estafa by giving,
presigned blank checks to the complainant which were later dishonored
by the bank for lack of funds, as defined under Art. 315 paragraph 2-d of
the Revised Penal Code.
xxx xxx xxx
There is a deceit when one is misled, either by guile or trickery or by
other means, to believe to be true what is really false.
When, therefore, the parties agreed to the arrangement, that the
respondent give a check book, all the individual checks contained therein
already signed by the respondent as drawer in blank, leaving the
complainant to fill in the payee and the amount to be drawn later after
the amount is determined after the sale of each shipment of fish
consigned to the respondents such arrangement can only be considered
as an agreement for business convenience between those concerned and
no more.
Certainly, deceit can not be attributed to the respondent if the checks
from the aforesaid check book under the control of the complainant,
prepared and filled in by him as to the date, the payee and amount,
turned out to be dishonored as it did due to lack of funds for the simple
reason, that except for presigning the checks the respondent had no
hand in the preparation of the same thereby giving her no chance to
determine the sufficiency of her original bank deposit or the necessary
amount for replenishment of such deposit.
xxx xxx xxx
7
 Considering, further, the element mentioned herein before, that the
check dishonored must have been issued in payment of an obligation
contracted at the same time without which the transaction would not
have been consummated as held in the case of People vs. Obieta et al.
(CA-52 O.G. 065224), the inapplicability of the penal provision relied
upon by the complainant becomes glaringly clear.
That act of the respondent in signing the checks in blank, delivering the
same to the complainant to be filled in later by the latter as to the date
indicating the date of the issuance, the name of the payee and the
amount to be drawn, in payment for the costs of future shipments of fish
to be sold at the Manila Market, can never be interpreted or considered
as checks issued in the payment of an obligation contracted at, the same
time even by the wildest stretch of imagination. The law contemplates, as
ruled in the case of People vs. Obieta aforecited, of one uninterrupted
transaction. The consummation of the transaction and the issuance must
be concurrent. (pp. 17, 20, 21, 22, Rollo)
The Honorable Judge Golez overruled petitioner, saying:
The first check so issued is PBTC (Prudential Bank and Trust Company) Check AD
No. 378389, dated September 16, 1968, payable to the order of Mr. Agustin
Almalbis in the amount of P6,000.00 and signed by Virginia P. Anisco (Exhibit B).
The second check issued was PBTC Check AD No. 392377, dated October 20, 1968,
payable to the order of Cash in the amount of P3,637.05 and signed by Virginia P.
Anisco. (Exhibit C).
The third check issued was PBTC Check No. 392379, dated October 29, 1968,
payable to the order of Agustin Almalbis in the amount of P3,426.85 and signed by
Virginia P. Anisco. (Exhibit D).
The fourth and fifth checks issued were PBTC Check AD No. 392381, and PBTC
Check AD No. 392380, both dated October 30, 1968, in the amount of P1,360.50
and P3,000.00, respectively, both payable to Cash both signed by Virginia P. Anisco.
(Exhibits E and F).
It also appears that Virginia P. Anisco, the respondent mentioned in the
aforementioned letter-complaint Exhibit A, was handling the sales of the fish which
the petitioner in Roxas City was shipping from time to time to Manila where the
said fish was sold by Virginia P. Anisco in the Divisoria Market for which service
Anisco was paid by Almalbis a commission of 4% on the gross proceeds of the sales.
According to Almalbis it was their agreement that Anisco would remit to him here
in Roxas City the net proceeds of the sales of fish made by Anisco in Manila after
deducting her commission and other incidental expenses therefrom.
The five checks Exhibits B, C, D, E and F adverted to elsewhere above
represented the net proceeds realized from the sales made by Virginia P.
Anisco of the fish of Agustin Almalbis.
The petitioner Agustin Almalbis further narrated that the PBTC Check AD
No. 378389, dated September 16, 1968 (Exhibit B), was hand-carried by
Amador Anisco, from Manila to Roxas City where Amador delivered the
said check Exhibit B to the said petitioner. Then Almalbis indorsed the
check Exhibit B to the Philippine National Bank, Roxas City Branch, where
it was accepted for deposit only. Later on the check Exhibit E was
returned to Almalbis, dishonored by the Prudential Bank and Trust
Company against which it had been drawn, for lack of funds. When the
check Exhibit B had found its way back to Almalbis, the latter left for
Manila to inquire from Virginia why the said check bounced back. Virginia
begged of him to give her a little more time to get sufficient funds for The
said check Exhibit B. But the funds never came.
Meanwhile, and upon the plea of Virginia, the petitioner continued to
make shipments of fish to her, and as part of this new understanding,
Virginia agreed to sign, as she signed, checks in blank which she delivered
to petitioner who was to fill the blanks therein with the amount and date
corresponding to the sales of fish made by Virginia and reported by her
by telegram to said petitioner. By virtue of this arrangement the checks
Exhibits C, D, E and F were made out by Almalbis himself by filling up the
pre-signed blank checks provided him by Virginia. But the said checks
Exhibits C, D, E and F also bounced back for lack of funds or for the
reason of "Exceeds Arrangements" (Exhibit D-5 and E-5).
Almalbis declared that he placed all of the foregoing facts at the disposal
of the respondent City Fiscal Quirico Abela who conducted the
preliminary investigation on his within mentioned letter-complaint of
26th December 1968.
xxx xxx xxx
The instant petition is also a two-fold action, firstly, for certiorari upon
the ground that the respondent Fiscal gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the within mentioned complaint with the result that the
petitioner herein has been deprived of his right as the aggrieved party in
a criminal transaction-and, secondly, for mandamus to compel the said
respondent to bring the corresponding criminal action. The second phase
of the action, i.e., mandamus, depends entirely upon the success or
failure of the first phase of the action, i.e., certiorari, in the sense that
should it be found that the respondent herein did gravely abuse his
discretion in dismissing petitioner's complaint mandamus would lie to
rectify his error. (Bonilla, et al., vs. Sec. of Agriculture & Natural
Resources, L-20083, April 27, 1967).
8
 In the given state of facts such as spelled out elsewhere above the right
of the petitioner, with specific reference to the check Exhibit B, cannot be
said to be dubious, uncertain or nebulous, but in fact well- defined, clear
and certain, not at all found within the sphere of speculation or
probability, but is firmly secured within the realm of certainty, and this
condition should entitle the petitioner herein to a relief for official
inaction obtainable through the extraordinary remedy of mandamus.
(See the following cases: Aquino v. General Manager, GSIS, L-24859, Jan.
31, 1968; Aprueba et al. v. Ganzon, et al., L-20867, Sept. 3, 1966; Kwok
Kam Lien v. Vivo, L-22354, Mar. 31, 1965; Alzate v. Aldana L-18085, May
1963; Villamor, et al. v. Lacson, et al., L-15945, Nov. 28, 1964; People v.
Orais, 65 Phil. 744, 747.)
While as already shown the discretion of the court will not ordinarily be
controlled by mandamus, it is not universally true that the writ will not
issue to control such discretion or to require a judicial tribunal to act in a
particular way. Where the discretion of the court can be legally exercised
in only one way, mandamus will lie to compel the court to exercise it; and
in some cases has been employed to correct the errors of inferior
tribunals and to prevent a failure of justice or irreparable injury where
there is a clear right, and there is an absence of any adequate remedy, as
for instance where no appeal lies, or where the remedy by appeal is
inadequate. It may also be employed to prevent an abuse of discretion or
to correct an arbitrary action which does not amount to the exercise of
discretion. (Corpus Juris, sec. 85, pp. 608-609, as quoted in People v.
Orais, supra)
So that where the fiscal filed an information for homicide over the
insistence of the aggrieved party that the crime committed was murder
as shown by the declaration of witnesses disclosing the presence of
qualifying circumstances the Supreme Court ruled that his failure to file
the proper information rendered the Fiscal subject to the writ of
mandamus. (Bernabe v. Bolinas, et al., L-22000, Nov. 29, 1966.) " (pp. 33,
35, 39, 4 1, Rollo)
There is merit in the appeal. The public prosecutor is entitled to use his judgment and
discretion in the appreciation of evidence presented to him and, in the exercise thereof, he
may not be controlled by mandamus. Whether an information should be filed in court is a
matter address to the sound discretion of the fiscal according to whether the evidence is in
his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the fiscal can not be compelled to act in a distinct manner whether to
prosecute or not to prosecute and, instead, is allowed to stand on his opinion and conviction,
"reserving only to the Secretary, in any appropriate case when the latter believes public
interest impels that a different course of action should be taken, to temporarily relieve the
fiscal of the duty to act by designating somebody else to take his place solely and only for the
purpose of such particular case. ... Under Sections 1679 and 1689 of the Revised
Administrative Code, in any instance where a provincial or city fiscal fails, refuses or is
unable, for any reason, to investigate or prosecute a case and, in the opinion of the Secretary
of Justice it is advisable in the public interest to take a different course of action, the
Secretary may either appoint as acting provincial or city fiscal, to handle the investigation or
prosecution exclusively and only for such case, any practicing attorney or some competent
officer of the Department of Justice or office of any city or provincial fiscal, with complete
authority to act therein in all respects as if he were the provincial or city fiscal himself, or
appoint any lawyer in the government service or not in the government service, temporarily
to assist such city or provincial fiscal in the discharge of his duties, with the same complete
authority to act independently of and for such city or provincial fiscal, provided that no such
appointment may be made without first hearing the fiscal concerned and never after the
corresponding information has already been filed with the court by the corresponding city or
provincial fiscal without the conformity of the latter, except when it can be patently shown
to the court having cognizance of the case that said fiscal is intent on prejudicing the interest
of justice. The same sphere of authority is true with the prosecutor directed and authorized
under Section 3 of Republic Act 3783, as amended and/or inserted by Republic Act 5184."
(Estrella vs. Orendain Jr., 37 SCRA 640)
However, the matter of instituting an information should be distinguished from a motion by
the fiscal for the dismissal of a case already filed in court. The judge may properly deny the
motion where, judging from the record of the preliminary investigation, there appears to be
sufficient evidence to sustain the prosecution. This is, as it should be, because the case is
already in court and, therefore, within its discretion and control.
But then, the question may be asked: What are the remedies of the offended party or
complainant when the prosecuting officer refuses or fails to file an information or to
prosecute the criminal action? As stated above, "[i]n case the provincial fiscal should fail or
refuse to act even when there is sufficient evidence on which action may be taken, the
offended party may take up the matter with the Secretary of Justice who may then take such
measures as may be necessary in the interest of justice under Section 1679 of the Revised
Administrative Code. (Pañgan vs. Pasicolan, 103 Phil. 1143). " He may also file with the
proper authorities or courts criminal and administrative charges against the prosecuting
officer. As held in Bagatua vs. Revilla, 104 Phil. 393, "[w]hile it is the duty of the fiscal or the
City Attorney, as prosecuting officer, to prosecute persons who, according to the evidence
received from the complainant; are shown to be guilty of a crime, said officer is likewise
bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless, false or malicious
prosecution. The prosecuting officer would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he
files the information based upon a complaint, where he is not convinced that the sufficiency
and strength of the evidence would warrant the filing of the action in court against the
accused. This duty of the prosecuting officer involves discretion, hence, it cannot be
controlled by mandamus unless there has been a grave abuse thereof which is not shown in
the case at bar." Or, he may file a civil action for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil
Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated August 27, 1970, of respondent judge is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
9
G.R. No. L-27204 August 29, 1975
CASIMIRO V. ARKONCEL petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BASILAN CITY, presided by HON. REGINO HERMOSISIMA;
CITY FISCAL ANDRION and GERARDO ESPERAT, respondents.
Beltran, Beltran & Beltran for petitioner.
City Fiscal Emilio C. Andrion and Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo.
Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro & Solicitor Enrique M. Reyes for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Casimiro V. Arkoncel, a lawyer serving as officer-in-charge of the Basilan Branch of the Board
of Liquidators, was charged with qualified theft by the City Fiscal of Basilan City in the Court
of First Instance of Basilan, together with his laborers named Rogelio Lachica, Moro Hasi,
Anastacio Inid and Geronimo Inid (Criminal Case No. 1763).
It was alleged in the information that the accused stole 5,000 coconuts from the land of
Gerardo Esperat. The Fiscal, after certifying that he had conducted the proper preliminary
investigation, added "that the accused were duly subpoenaed but failed to appear".
According to the Fiscal, when Arkoncel appeared in court and was about to be arrested, the
arrest was not effected because of his supplication that the case be settled and, if it could
not be settled, that he be allowed to go home so that he could prepare the requisite bail
bond.
Instead of posting bail, Arkoncel filed on December 14, 1966 the instant special civil action of
prohibition in order to enjoin his prosecution for qualified theft.
He alleged that he was denied due process because he was not subpoenaed to appear at the
preliminary investigation. That assertion is not correct. The truth is that in two subpoenas
dated September 13 and 21, 1966 (containing the usual warning: "Fail not under penalty of
law") he was required to appear at the preliminary investigation. He did not appear at the
scheduled hearings. The hearing set for September 29, 1966 was postponed at the instance
of Atty. Engracio S. Bautista, a land investigator of the Zamboanga City office of the Board of
Liquidators, who presumably appeared for Arkoncel.
Atty. Bautista informed the Fiscal that he had requested the Manila office of the Board of
Liquidators to furnish him certain data relevant to the case. The hearing was postponed for
three weeks. After the expiration of that period Arkoncel and Bautista did not get in touch
with the Fiscal. He filed the information in October, 1966.
The issue is whether Arkoncel's prosecution can be enjoined. We hold that this case falls
within the general rule that injunction or prohibition does not lie to restrain a criminal
prosecution. It does not fall within the exceptions where the prosecution may be enjoined (a)
for the orderly administration of justice, (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in
an oppressive and vindictive manner, (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions, (d) to afford
adequate protection to constitutional rights, and (e) where the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional or was declared void (Hernandez vs. Albano, L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19
SCRA 95, 98-99; Ramos vs. Torres, L-23454, October 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 557).
The reason for the general rule is that the accused has an adequate remedy at law by
establishing as a defense to the prosecution that he did not commit the act charged, or that
the statute, on which the prosecution is based, is void, and, in case of conviction, be taking
an appeal (Gorospe vs. Peñaflorida, 101 Phil. 886). Public interest requires that criminal acts
be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society (Nicomedes vs.
Chief of Constabulary, 110 Phil. 52; Griñen vs. Consolacion, 115 Phil. 697).
There is another reason which justifies the dismissal of the petition. Arkoncel did not exhaust
his remedies. He did not raise in the lower court the alleged lack of due process. He came to
this Court without first filing in the lower court a motion to quash or asking for a
reinvestigation. His contention in this Court that his prosecution was merely an act of
harassment, while he was in the lawful performance of his duties as a government officer, is
a factual allegation that has no basis in the record. It is controverted by the respondents. He
should have raised that issue in the lower court.
The rule is that in a preliminary investigation conducted by the provincial or city fiscal, or
state attorney, it is sufficient if the accused was given a chance to be heard (Sec. 14, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court). In this case, Arkoncel was afforded an opportunity to appear at the
preliminary investigation. He waived his appearance. A "preliminary investigation may be
done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the
due process clause to a fair trial" (Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).
WHEREFORE, the petition, which is patently frivolous and dilatory, is dismissed with treble
costs against the petitioner.
So ordered.
10
G.R. No. L-39962 April 7, 1976
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO BERIALES, BENEDICTO CUSTODIO and PABLITO CUSTODIO, accused-appellants.
Francisco D. Abas for appellants.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and
Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for appellee.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V, Ormoc City, in
Criminal Case No. 562-0, convicting the accused Ricardo Beriales Benedicto Custodio and
Pablito Custodio of the crime of murder, sentencing each one of them to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to jointly and severally pay the heirs of Saturnina Gonzales
Porcadilla the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. 1
It appears that in Criminal Case No. 562-0 the herein appellants were charged with the crime
of murder in an information filed by the City Fiscal of Ormoc City on November 22, 1974,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th of September, 1974, at around 9:00 o'clock in
the morning at Barrio Mahayahay, this city, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, RICARDO BERIALES
BENEDICTO CUSTODIO and PABLITO CUSTODIO, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping and aiding one another, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, strike and stab
the person of SATURNINA PORCADILLA, without giving the latter
sufficient time to defend herself, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which caused her death. ... 2
At the hearing of November 26, 1974, appellants' counsel moved for a reinvestigation of said
ease, along with two other related cases 3 which the court a quo granted, in its Order reading
as follows:
On motion of Atty. Abas counsel for the accused and without objection
on the part of Fiscal Ramon So Jr., let the reinvestigation of this case
immediately take place at the Office of the City Fiscal and let the
arraignment and trial be postponed until December 5 and 6, 1974 at 7:30
a.m. of each day, if and when the Fiscal shall recommend that the case
shall proceed after it shall have been reinvestigated, with notice to Attys.
Abas and Cornejos as well as Fiscal Solis in open court. 4
On December 3, 1974, the trial court postponed the hearing of the case to December 17 and
18, 1974. 5 in view of the City Fiscal's motion "for a deferment of the hearing or trial set for
December 5 and 6, 1974 until such time the REINVESTIGATION shall have been terminated
for which the result of said reinvestigation will be submitted to this Honorable Court for its
resolution in the premises." 6
On December 6, 1974, however, the trial court, motu proprio cancelled the aforesaid
hearings on December 17, and 18, 1974, and, instead, reset the arraignment and trial of the
case to December 10 and 11, 1974. 7
At the hearing of December 10, 1974, appellants counsel manifested to the court that
pursuant to its approval of his motion for reinvestigation, the City Fiscal had set the
reinvestigation for December 12, 1974 and had already issued the corresponding subpoena
to secure the attendance of the witnesses. 8 Nevertheless, the court a quo, issued an order
setting the hearing of the case to the next day, December 11, 1974, 9 at which hearing,
appellants' counsel reiterated his manifestation that since the City Fiscal had already ordered
the reinvestigation on December 12, 1974, the said reinvestigation should first be finished
and the corresponding resolution rendered thereon and submitted to the court before any
trial of the case should take place. 10
The trial court, however, relying on the mandate of the New Constitution that "All persons
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies" 11 re-scheduled the hearing to December 13, 1974. 12 Immediately
thereafter, Special Counsel Rosario R. Polines, in representation of the City Fiscal, manifested
that the private prosecutor, Atty. Procadilla, be authorized to conduct the case for the
prosecution.
When the case was called for hearing on December 13, 1974, counsel for the appellant asked
the court to wait for the City Fiscal to appear, since the reinvestigation of the case had
already been terminated and the Fiscal, if given a chance, might be able to report on said
reinvestigation. 14 The trial court, however, insisted in arraigning the appellants. 15 When
arraigned, the three appellants declined to plead, saying: "I am not going to answer the
question because the Fiscal is not yet around." 16 Thereupon, the trial court entered a plea of
"Not Guilty" for each of them. 17
Thereafter, appellants' counsel again manifested that the City Fiscal was absent and that they
could not go to trial without the fiscal and his report on the reinvestigation conducted by
him. 18 Nonetheless, the trial court, ordered the presentation of evidence by the private
prosecutor since he had been previously authorized by the City Fiscal to handle the case. 19
After the direct examination of the witnesses presented by the private prosecutor, the trial
court asked the counsel for the defense if he desired to cross-examine the witnesses.
Appellants' counsel, however, reiterated his manifestation that they would not go to trial
until the City Fiscal shall have submitted the result of the reinvestigation to the court, and
11
the court each time ruled that it considered such manifestation as a waiver on the part of the criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appeal for the government. 30 As
appellants to cross-examine the witnesses. 20 stated by this Court, "once a public prosecutor has been entrusted with the investigation of a
case and has acted thereon by filing the necessary information in court he is b law in duty
Thereafter, the private prosecutor rested the case for the prosecution and the court called bound to take charge thereof until its finally termination, for under the law he assumes full
for the evidence of the defense. Again, appellants' counsel manifested that the appellants responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to
were not agreeing to the trial of the case unless they first received the result of the pursue it to its termination." 31 While there is nothing in the rule of practice and procedure in
reinvestigation conducted by the City Fiscal. 21 Whereupon, the court considered the case criminal cases which denies the right of the fiscal, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to
submitted for decision and announced the promulgation of the decision on December 17, turn over the active conduct of the trial to a private prosecutor,32 nevertheless, his duty to
1974. 22 direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be present during
the proceedings. Thus, in the case of People vs. Munar 33 this Court upheld the right of the
private prosecutor therein to conduct the examination of the witnesses because the
When the case was called on December 17, 1974, appellants' counsel manifested that the
government prosecutors were present at the hearing; hence, the prosecution of the case
accused were not in conformity with the promulgation of the decision on the ground that
remained under their direct supervision and control.
they did not agree to the trial of the case. 23Nonetheless, the trial court promulgated its
judgment on the same day. 24
In the present case, although the private prosecutor had previously been authorized by the
special counsel Rosario R. Polines to present the evidence for the prosecution, nevertheless,
Hence, the appellants interpose this appeal, upon the principal ground that they were denied
in view of the absence of the City Fiscal at the hearing on December 13, 1974, it cannot be
due process of law. 25The Solicitor General agrees with such contention and recommends
said that the prosecution of the case was under the control of the City Fiscal. It follows that
that the judgment under review be set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for
the evidence presented by the private prosecutor at said hearing could not be considered as
another arraignment and trial. 26
evidence for the plaintiff, the People of the Philippines. There was, therefore, no evidence at
all to speak of which could have been the basis of the decision of the trial court.
We sustain the appellants. After the trial court granted the appellants' motion for
reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance the arraignment
Moreover, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, "to permit such prosecution of a
and trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have conducted and made his report on the
criminal case by the private prosecutor with the fiscal in absentia can set an obnoxious
result of such reinvestigation. That was a matter of duty on its part, not only to be consistent
precedent that can be taken advantage of by some indolent members of the prosecuting arm
with its own order but also to do justice aid at the same time to avoid a possible miscarriage
of the government as well as those who are oblivious of their bounden duty to see to it not
of justice. It should be borne in mind, that the appellants herein were charged with the
only that the guilty should be convicted, but that the innocent should be acquitted — a duty
serious crime of murder, and considering that their motion for reinvestigation is based upon
that can only be effectively and sincerely performed if they actively participate in the conduct
the ground that it was Felipe Porcadilla (husband and father, respectively, of the two
of the case, especially in the examination of the witnesses and the presentation of
deceased, Saturnina Porcadilla and Quirino Porcadilla) who was the aggressor for having
documentary evidence for both parties." 34
attacked and seriously wounded appellant Pablito Custodio 27 it was entirely possible for the
City Fiscal to modify or change his conclusion after conducting the reinvestigation. When the
trial court, therefore, ignored the appellants' manifestations objecting to the arraignment WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the
and the trial of the case, until after the City Fiscal shall have rendered a resolution on his trial court for another arraignment and trial. Costs de oficio.
reinvestigation, but instead considered such manifestations on their part as a plea of riot
guilty and proceeded to try the case, received the evidence for the prosecution, and then SO ORDERED.
rendered judgment against them on the basis thereof, it committed a serious irregularity
which nullifies the proceedings below because such a procedure is repugnant to the due Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
process clause of the Constitution. 28

Besides, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "what is more deplorable and
which renders patently irregular all the proceedings taken in this case, was the total absence
of the City Fiscal and/or any of his assistants or special counsel on December 13, 1974, when
the appellants were arraigned and when the private prosecutor presented evidence and
rested the case supposedly for the People.

Under the Rules of Court, "All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal." 29 In the trial of

12
[G.R. No. 116237. May 15, 1996.] mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FE ARCILLA y CORNEJO, Accused-
Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FLEETING ABSENCE OF FISCAL, NOT SUFFICIENT
GROUND TO INVALIDATE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS. — The fleeting absence of
Fiscal de Joya is not a sufficient ground to invalidate the testimony of Lilia Lipio as urged by
appellant. To begin with, appellant herself did not object to the continuation of the
testimony of Lipio despite the momentary absence of the prosecutor. Appellant has not also
shown any prejudice caused to her by the incident. Through counsel, she was able to fully
cross-examine Lipio and test her credibility. To be sure, appellant misappreciates the reason
requiring the public prosecutor to be present in the trial of criminal cases.
2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PUBLIC PROSECUTION HAS THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO PROTECT
RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE IN THE TRIAL OF THE ACCUSED; ABSENCE OF PROSECUTION CANNOT
BE RAISED TO INVALIDATE TESTIMONY OF STATE WITNESS IN THE ABSENCE OF PERSONAL
PREJUDICE. — A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name
of the People of the Philippines. For this reason, Section 5 of Rule 110 provides that "all
criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of the fiscal." Only private crimes like adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness can be prosecuted at the instance of the
offended party. The presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary
to protect vital state interests at stake in the prosecution of crimes, foremost of which is its
interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people. As the
representative of the State, the public prosecutor has the right and the duty to take all steps
to protect the rights of the People in the trial of an accused. It ought to be self-evident that
the right belongs to the public prosecutor and not to the accused. The absence of a
prosecutor cannot therefore be raised by an accused to invalidate the testimony of a state
witness if he cannot prove personal prejudice as in the case at bar.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTY; RECLUSION PERPETUA; A SINGLE INDIVISIBLE PENALTY. — In an
en banc resolution, dated January 9, 1995, this Court clarified its earlier ruling in People v.
Lucas and held that "although Section 17 of R.A. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion
perpetua from twenty years (20) and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty." In accord with
this clarification, the proper penalty to be imposed on the appellant is reclusion
perpetua without any divisible period. It is then needless to address appellant’s plea that the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be considered in her favor. Appellant’s
voluntary surrender will not alter her penalty of reclusion perpetua, the same being a single
and indivisible penalty.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In an Information, dated August 5, 1992, 1 accused FE ARCILLA y CORNEJO was charged with
Parricide before the Regional Trial Court of Daraga, Albay, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about 9:00 A.M. of May 1, 1992, at Brgy. Namantao, Daraga, Albay, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill and while armed with a fan knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack and stab her husband, ANTONIO F. ARCILLA, hitting and inflicting upon the latter fatal
wound on his left chest, which injury directly caused and resulted to the death of said
Antonio F. Arcilla, all to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased."cralaw
virtua1aw library
"CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library
Accused pleaded not guilty 2 and underwent trial.

3. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; TRIAL COURT’S ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES The evidence for the prosecution shows that accused Fe Arcilla y Cornejo and the victim,
DESERVES GREAT RESPECT. — For the nth time, we reiterate that the trial court’s assessment Antonio Arcilla, were married in Goa, Camarines Sur, on April 19, 1975. 3 They had five (5)
of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect since it has the important opportunity children.
to observe first-hand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses at the trial. We find no
cogent reason to depart from this well-settled rule. Accused was a teacher while Antonio was an employee of National Power Corporation in
Daraga, Albay. In 1983, she left her family to work in Singapore. Her children remained in
4. ID.; ID.; TO BE BELIEVED, IT MUST NOT ONLY COME FROM THE MOUTH OF CREDIBLE their conjugal home in Camarines Sur. Antonio, on the other hand, stayed most of the time in
WITNESS BUT ALSO MUST BE CREDIBLE IN ITSELF; CASE AT BAR. — Anent the third Albay.
assignment of error, we have examined the testimony of appellant and we are not convinced
that the stabbing at bar was merely accidental and through the own doing of the victim. The Unknown to the accused, Antonio developed an illicit affair with Lilia Lipio. The house of
location of the victim’s wounds, the position of the accused and the victim, and their relative Lilia’s parents in barangay Namantao, Daraga, Albay, served as their love nest. Antonio sired
strength negate the credence of appellant’s story. Indeed, her claim that she twisted her two (2) children during his amorous union with Lilia.
body at an angle that allowed the knife to pass just below her armpit and pierce the victim’s
chest and left thigh, is incredulous. Evidence to be believed must not only come from the Eventually, the accused learned of her husband’s infidelity. She returned to the country in

13
1988 but her return did not stop the illicit relationship between Lilia and Antonio. convicted the accused. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision, dated May 27,
1994, 4 states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
The illicit relationship came to a tragic end on May 1, 1992. At about 9:00 A.M. of said
date, Accusedwent to Lilia’s residence in Namantao, Daraga, Albay looking for Antonio. It was "CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING RATIOCINATION, the court hereby finds the accused FE
the barangay’s feast day and Lilia’s family had a lot of guests. The accused found Antonio ARCILLA Y CORNEJO to have committed beyond reasonable doubt the act of stabbing her
having a drinking spree with his friends in a kiosk, just a few meters away from Lilia’s house. lawfully wedded husband ANTONIO ARCILLA, resulting to the latter’s untimely death.
Accused is therefore declared GUILTY of the crime of parricide as defined and penalized
The meeting immediately started to be violent. Accused approached Antonio and slapped under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. She is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
him. She then went inside Lilia’s house and instructed Antonio to tell Lilia to join them. The RECLUSION PERPETUA and the accessory penalties provided by law.
three proceeded to the bedroom where the three (3) year old son of Lilia and Antonio was
sleeping. A heated altercation between accused and Antonio followed. Lilia left the bedroom "Having been found (guilty) of the capital offense, the bail bond filed for her provisional
and sat on a sofa in the receiving room. The sofa was about two (2) meters away and she liberty is hereby cancelled and accused is ordered committed to the provincial jail.
could see the bickering couple through the bedroom’s door which was then half-closed.
"Accused is likewise hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim ANTONIO
At the height of their arguments, the accused took a fan knife from her shoulder bag and ARCILLA, the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for the fact of death; TWENTY
stabbed Antonio on the chest, causing him to embrace her tightly. Lilia barged back to the THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED (P20,100.00) PESOS, as actual or compensatory damages; and
room, held Antonio’s belt at the back and pulled him away from accused. Accused was able another TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, as moral damages.
to pull out the knife from Antonio’s chest and she delivered a second thrust to Antonio. She
hit him on the left thigh. Accused then fled with the fan knife. Blood stained her clothes. "Cost against the accused."cralaw virtua1aw library

Antonio was rushed to the hospital where he died due to "hypovolemic shock due to massive Subsequently, the trial court amended the dispositive portion of its Decision.
hemorrhage secondary to stab wound."cralaw virtua1aw library Treating reclusion perpetuaas a divisible penalty under Republic Act No. 7659, the trial court
sentenced the accused as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Accused gave a different version.
"CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING RATIOCINATION, the Court finds the accused FE ARCILLA Y
She testified that she received an urgent letter from her eldest daughter asking for money to CORNEJO to have committed beyond reasonable doubt the act of stabbing her lawfully
pay her tuition fees. Thus, in the early morning of May 1, 1992, she went to see her husband wedded husband ANTONIO ARCILLA, resulting to the latter’s untimely death. Accused is
in his office in Daraga, Albay. The security guard told her that Antonio was in Namantao. She therefore truly and truthfully guilty of the crime of parricide. There being no aggravating or
proceeded to Lilia’s residence and found Antonio drinking with some friends. Antonio mitigating circumstance and after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is hereby
advised her up go home and not to make a scene. Irked, she slapped him and then went sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND ONE (1)
inside Lilia’s house. Antonio followed her up the bedroom where the three-year old son of DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL as minimum, to TWENTY-EIGHT (28) YEARS, (8 MONTHS AND
Lilia was sleeping. Lilia joined the couple in the bedroom. Accused then asked them if the ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum and all the accessory penalties provided
child was theirs. Lilia denied the accusation but Antonio boldly admitted that the boy was by law.
theirs. The admission provoked a heated verbal exchange between the accused and Antonio
while Lilia brought the child outside the bedroom. The altercation became violent when "x x x" 5
Antonio pushed the accused and she hit the concrete wall and felt dizzy. Seeing a fan knife in
a cabinet, she held it with her right hand and warned Antonio not to go near her or she Hence, this appeal where appellant contends:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
would stab him. Antonio did not heed her warning. They grappled for the knife until Antonio
was able to twist her left arm at her back. She managed to free her left arm and held the "FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR
knife with both hands. However, Antonio moved behind her, wrapped his arms around her,
held her hands and tried to force the knife towards her. She twisted her body and the knife THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF LILIA LIPIO DESPITE THE
struck Antonio’s left thigh. Undaunted, Antonio tried to direct the knife towards her a second ABSENCE OF A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR IN THE TAKING THEREOF.
time. She bit his arm but his grip even tightened. Again, she twisted her body and, in the
process, the knife struck Antonio. When his embrace loosened, she ran away. SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR

She chanced upon a barangay tanod who helped her surrender to the barangay captain of THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF LILIA LIPIO RELATIVE
Namantao. She was then taken to the police headquarters in Daraga, Albay. TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE DEATH OF ANTONIO ARCILLA.

The trial court gave more credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Lilia Lipio and THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR

14
 stabbed by accused. She declared: 8
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT RELATIVE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE DEATH OF HER HUSBAND "ATTY. NINOFRANCO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ANTONIO ARCILLA."cralaw virtua1aw library
What happened when you entered the room?
The appeal lacks merit.
(LILIA LIPIO)
We reject the first contention of the appellant. The records do not show that the entire
testimony of the prosecution star witness, Lilia Lipio, was given in the absence of the After I entered the room Fe Arcilla asked Antonio Arcilla whether the child who was sleeping
prosecuting fiscal. As explicitly stated by the trial judge in his Decision, viz:chanrob1es virtual is the child of Antonio Arcilla with me?
1aw library
Q What did Antonio Arcilla answer or what was the answer of Antonio Arcilla?
x x x
A Antonio Arcilla said: "yes, is it not that you knew it already.

"From the records of Branch I of the Regional Trial Court, Prosecutor de Joya only attended x x x
the pre-trial of the case. The pre-trial was, however, waived by the defense. It appears that
Prosecutor de Joya, after the pre-trial went back to Branch 2, as in fact he cross-examined a
witness for the defense in People v. Rogelio Andez. This case was heard after the hearing in Q How far were you from Antonio and Fe when you seated yourself in the receiving room?
instant case. So Prosecutor de Joya was absent for only a few minutes. He was not absent for
all the time that Lilia Lipio took the witness stand. A More or less two meters.

The Presiding Judge had a chance to talk to Prosecutor de Joya. According to him, he stayed Q What happened while you were already seated in the receiving room.
at Branch I for not more than five (5) minutes, then, returned to Branch 2. When he returned
to Branch 2, the private prosecutor was still conducting his direct examination on Lilia." A Fe Arcilla asked Antonio Arcilla: "what do you like me to do, do I have to kill you."cralaw
(Emphasis supplied) virtua1aw library

The fleeting absence of Fiscal de Joya is not a sufficient ground to invalidate the testimony of Q What was the answer of Antonio Arcilla?
Lilia Lipio as urged by appellant. To begin with, appellant herself did not object to the
continuation of the testimony of Lipio despite the momentary absence of the prosecutor. A Antonio Arcilla answered, "just do it."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appellant has not also shown any prejudice caused to her by the incident. Through counsel,
she was able to fully cross-examine Lipio and test her credibility. To be sure, appellant Q What else happened after that?
misappreciates the reason requiring the public prosecutor to be present in the trial of
criminal cases. A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name A Antonio Arcilla was standing fronting Fe Arcilla.
of the People of the Philippines. 6 For this reason, section 5 of Rule 110 provides that "all
criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under Q Where was he facing, was he looking at Fe Arcilla when he said that?
the direction and control of the fiscal . . ." Only private crimes like adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness can be prosecuted at the instance of the A Yes, sir, but his face was a little bit lower.
offended party. 7 The presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is
necessary to protect vital state interests at stake in the prosecution of crimes, foremost of Q With that position of Antonio Arcilla so, what did Fe Arcilla do?
which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people. As the
representative of the State, the public prosecutor has the right and the duty to take all steps A I saw Fe Arcilla opened her shoulder bag.
to protect the rights of the People in the trial of an accused. It ought to be self evident that
the right belongs to the public prosecutor and not to the accused. The absence of a Q What did he got from that bag?
prosecutor cannot therefore be raised by an accused to invalidate the testimony of a state
witness if he cannot prove personal prejudice as in the case at bar. A That fan knife.

In her second assignment of error, appellant assails the credibility of Lilia Lipio. The records Q What did she do with the fan knife?
will show that Lilia Lipio was clear and categorical when she testified on how Antonio was

15
A She immediately stabbed Antonio Arcilla. (LILIA LIPIO)

Q Was Antonio Arcilla hit by that stabbing? Only that altercation and Fe Arcilla even asked Antonio Arcilla: ‘What do you want me to do,
do I have to kill you now?’
A Yes, sir.
Q: That child who was sleeping inside the room was he awakened?
Q Where, on what part of his body?
A No, sir, my child was not awakened but I told somebody to get my son and brought (sic)
A At this juncture witness pointing to her left breast. him to me.

x x x Q You mean after the stabbing incident, your son was still sleeping?

A Yes, sir.
Q Now, after Fe Arcilla stabbed Antonio Arcilla on the left breast what else happened?
x x x
A Antonio Arcilla was able to embrace Fe Arcilla.

Q What did you do? Q You did not witness any commotion before the stabbing incident?

A Inasmuch as the hands of Fe Arcilla could not extricate from the body of Antonio Arcilla A No, sir, only the door was moved by them.
what I did was to grab Antonio Arcilla by his belt on his back as there was blood oozing from
his body. Q Why, were they grappling for something?

Q What happened when you grabbed Antonio Arcilla at his belt? A No, sir, but Antonio Arcilla was able to embrace Fe Arcilla when Antonio Arcilla was
stabbed by Fe Arcilla.
A Fe Arcilla was able to pull the knife and stabbed Antonio Arcilla again for the second time.
Q And you witnessed all these?
Q Where was Antonio Arcilla hit with the second stab?
A Yes, sir and even my other child was able to witness it. My other child fainted.
A On the left thigh.
Q The one who was not asleep?
(Witness pointing to his left thigh).
A Yes, sir, my daughter.
Q After the second stab what did Fe Arcilla do?
Q And you said that Fe Arcilla again stabbed Antonio Arcilla for the second time hitting him
A She hurriedly went out of the house. on the left thigh?

x x x A When Fe Arcilla pulled the knife from Antonio Arcilla’s breast and then she thrust (sic) it
again on the left thigh.

During her cross-examination, Lipio remained firm and certain on what transpired that Q How, will you demonstrate?
fateful day. She testified: 9
A At this juncture witness demonstrated how Antonio Arcilla was stabbed for the second
"ATTY. JACOB:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library time on the left thigh. Probably the intention of Fe Arcilla was to stab the genitals of Antonio
Arcilla.
Before Fe Arcilla stabbed Antonio Arcilla, nothing happened as to any conversation which
took place between the two? Q But she failed?

A Antonio Arcilla was hit on the left thigh.

16
Q And he was facing Fe Arcilla?
A Yes, sir, that is why he was able to embrace Fe Arcilla and even had a hard time in pulling
the knife that is why I grabbed Antonio Arcilla on his back by pulling his belt.
Q And so, you were at the back of Antonio Arcilla when he was stabbed for the second time?
A Yes, sir, going out of the sala because Fe Arcilla passed by the sala as she was going out of
the room Fe Arcilla passed by the right side.
Q And so, let us get this clear Fe Arcilla stabbed Antonio Arcilla for the second time using the
same hand?
A Yes, sir, the same hand, the right hand.
Q And it was done in the same manner by which she made the first thrust?
A When she pulled the knife and made a thrust and he was hit on the left thigh.
Q But by then Fe Arcilla was closer to Antonio Arcilla than when she made the first thrust?
A Yes, sir, because I was able to grab him and she was able to pull the knife and made the
second thrust.
Q Romeo Lipio your brother was inside the compound of your parent’s house at that time of
the incident?
A Yes, sir, because he was in-charge of the cooking of the food."cralaw virtua1aw library
x x x readily
The records show that the demeanor of Lipio while on the witness stand impressed the trial
judge. In his Decision, the trial judge declared:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty." In accord with
"The court is then called upon (to) choose between these two . . . opposing actions of
incompatibles. The court is wary and conscious of this state of things, so that it was quite
critical and keen in the observation of the witnesses when they took the witness stand. The
court was then particularly watchful and paid strict attention when prosecution witness Fe
Arcilla, the accused herself, testified. Lilia may be considered a biased witness considering
that she was the other woman in the life of Antonio. They have lived together for quite a
number of years and in fact begotten two children out of their relation. Fe Arcilla, however,
could not be far behind. She may likewise be considered as a biased witness on the footing
and level as Lilia, as she is the accused in this case. . . .
"As seen and sensed by the court through a careful analytic attention, Lilia was quite honest
and sincere when she took the witness stand. She was emphatic in her testimony and
straightforward. The court could not detect any evasiveness in her testimony. She was
composed and cool.
"The court, on the other hand, could feel any (sic) perceived that the accused was not
disturbed by the incident which is quite unnatural. At times, she seemed to be amused and
would smile, although there was nothing funny about the matter."cralaw virtua1aw library
For the nth time, we reiterate that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses
deserves great respect since it has the important opportunity to observe first-hand the
expression and demeanor of the witnesses at the trial. 10 We find no cogent reason to
depart from this well settled rule.
Anent the third assignment of error, we have examined the testimony of appellant and we
are not convinced that the stabbing at bar was merely accidental and through the own doing
of the victim. The location of the victims, wounds, the position of the accused and the victim,
and their relative strength negate the credence of appellant’s story. Indeed, her claim that
she twisted her body at an angle that allowed the knife to pass just below her armpit and
pierce the victim’s chest and left thigh, is incredulous. Evidence to be believed must not only
come from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself. 11
We also reject the contention of the accused that she was forced to use the knife to resist
the victim’s assault. While the estranged couple had a heated argument before the stabbing
incident, the evidence shows that it was the accused who provoked the victim. By her own
admission, the victim initially dissuaded her from making a scene. Nonetheless, she could not
control her emotion and she slapped the victim in front of his friends. Even assuming
arguendo, that the victim harmed her prior to the stabbing, there was no reasonable
necessity for her to use the knife as there were many people outside the house who could
render assistance to her.
We now come to the penalty imposed by the trial court in its amended decision. In an en
banc resolution, 12 dated January 9, 1995, this Court clarified its earlier ruling in People v.
Lucas 13 and held that "although section 17 of R.A. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion
perpetua from twenty years (20) and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear
this clarification, the proper penalty to be imposed on the appellant is reclusion
perpetua without any divisible period. It is then needless to address appellant’s plea that the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be considered in her favor. Appellant’s
voluntary surrender will not alter her penalty of reclusion perpetua, the same being a single
and indivisible penalty.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed amended decision is AFFIRMED, with
modification that accused FE ARCILLA y CORNEJO is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. No costs.
17
G.R. Nos. 74989-90 November 6, 1989
JOEL B. CAES, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Special Cases Division), Hon. ALFREDO M.
GORGONIO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, Branch CXXV, National Capital Region and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Sanchez & Montebon Law Office for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
We deal with a simple matter that should not detain us too long. Fittingly, we shall decide it
in favor of individual liberty rather than upon rebuttable presumptions and dubious
implications.
The facts are simple and mostly undisputed.
On November 21, 1981, petitioner Joel Caes was charged in two separate informations with
illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. 1 The cases were consolidated on December 10, 1981. 2
Arraignment was originally scheduled on January 11, 1982, but was for some reason
postponed. 3
4
On August 31, 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was scheduled for
October 13, 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties. 5
On November 15, 1982, the trial was again postponed for reasons that do not appear in the
record. 6
On December 20, 1982, the trial was again postponed because the prosecution witnesses
were absent. 7
On January 19, 1983, the third resetting of the case was also canceled, no reason appearing
in the record. 8
On February 21, 1983, no trial could be held again, the because witnesses being absent. 9
On March 21, 1983, the trial was reset once more, again because the prosecution witnesses
were absent. 10
On April 19, 1983, the trial of the case had not yet started. It was reset because the
prosecution witnesses were again absent. 11
On June 3, 1983, a sheriffs return informed the trial court that the prosecution witnesses,
namely, Capt. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado had been personally served with
subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing scheduled on June 6, 1983. 12
On June 6, 1983, the trial was again postponed, this time because there was no trial fiscal. 13
On July 12, 1983, trial was reset for lack of material time. 14
On September 6, 1983, The trial was once more reset by agree-judgment of the parties. 15
On October 19, 1983, the trial was reset to November 14, 1983. 16
On November 14, 1983, the prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the case
because its witnesses had not appeared. On the same date, Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio
issued the following order:
In view of the failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear on several
scheduled hearing and also for the hearing today which is an indication of
lack of interest, upon motion of the trial fiscal for the provisional
dismissal of these cases and with the conformity of the accused, the
above-entitled cases are hereby ordered Provisionally Dismissed, with
costs de oficio. 17
On January 9, 1984, a motion to revive the cases was filed by Maj. Dacanay (he had been
promoted in the meantime) and Sgt. Lustado who alleged that they could not attend the
hearing scheduled on November 14, 1983, for lack of notice. 18 Copy of the motion was
furnished the City Fiscal of Caloocan City but not the petitioner.
On May 18, 1984, the respondent judge issued the following order:
Acting on the "Motion for the Revival of the Case" dated December 5,
1983 filed by the complaining witnesses to which no opposition has been
filed either by the Fiscal or the defense, and considering that the
dismissal of these cases was only provisional, for reasons stated in the
motion, the same is granted.
WHEREFORE, let these cases be set anew for hearing on June 13, 1984 at
8:30 in the morning. 19
A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner dated June 7, 1984, was denied on
October 9, 1984, and the revived cases were set from hearing on November 19, 1984. 20
18
The petitioner questioned the judge's order on certiorari with this Court, which reffered his
petition to the respondent court. The petition there was dismissed for lack of merit on May
20, 1986, and reconsideration was denied on June 17, 1986. 21 Caes then came to us again.
The present petition is based on two arguments, to wit: (a) that the motion to revive the
cases was invalid because it was riot filed by the proper party nor was a copy served on the
petitioner; and (b) the revival of the cases would place the petitioner double jeopardy in
violation of the Bill of Rights.
We sustain the petitioner on both counts.
It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the government
prosecutor and must always be under his control. 22 This is true even if a private prosecutor is
allowed to assist him and actually handles the examination of the witnesses and the
introduction of other evidence. 23 The witnesses, even if they are the complaining witnesses,
cannot act for the prosecutor in the handling of the case. Although they may ask for the filing
of the case, they have no personality to move for its dismissal or revival as they are not even
parties thereto nor do they represent the parties to the action. Their only function is to
testify. In a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government prosecutor,
or one acting under his authority, and by no one else.
It follows that the motion for the revival of the cases filed by prosecution witnesses (who
never even testified) should have been summarily dismissed by the trial judge. The mere fact
that the government prosecutor was furnished a copy of the motion and he did not interpose
any objection was not enough to justify the action of these witnesses. The prosecutor should
have initiated the motion himself if he thought it proper. The presumption that he approved
of the motion is not enough, especially since we are dealing here with the liberty of a person
who had a right at least to be notified of the move to prosecute him again. The fact that he
was not so informed made the irregularity even more serious. It is curious that the motion
was granted just the same, and ex parte at that and without hearing, and the petitioner's
subsequent objection was brushed aside.
On the second issue, the position of the public respondent is that double jeopardy has not
attached because the case was only provisionally dismissed and it was with the conformity of
the accused. The petitioner denies that he consented to the dismissal and submits that the
dismissal was final notwithstanding its description.
Fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey," the right against double jeopardy prohibits
the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previously acquitted or
convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring
the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second
charge against him for the same offense.
It has been held in a long line of cases 24 that to constitute double jeopardy, there must be:
(a) a valid complaint or information; (b) filed before a competent court; (c) to which the
defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or
which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the case at bar. What we
must resolve is the effect of the dismissal, which the petitioner contends finally and
irrevocably terminated the two cases against him. His submission is that the dismissal was
not provisional simply because it was so designated, more so since he had not expressly
consented thereto.
It is settled that a case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused
himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused. 25 Such a
dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. But a dismissal is not provisional even if so
designated if it is shown that it was made without the express consent of the accused. This
consent cannot be presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or
his failure to object. As we have held in a number of cases, such consent must be express, so
as to leave no doubt as to the defendant's conformity. 26 Otherwise, the dismissal will be
regarded as final, i.e., with prejudice to the refiling of the case.
There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final and to dispose of the
case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself. The
first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused after
the prosecution has rested. Such dismissal has the effect of a judgment on the merits and
operates as an acquittal. In People v. City of Silay, 27 for example, the trial court dismissed the
case on motion of the accused on the ground of insufficiency of the prosecution evidence.
The government came to this Court on certiorari, and the accused pleaded double jeopardy.
Our finding was that the case should not have been dismissed because the evidence
submitted by the prosecution was not insufficient. Even so, the petitioner had to be denied
relief because the dismissal amounted to an acquittal on the merits which was therefore not
appealable. Justice Muñoz-Palma said: "However erroneous the order of the respondent
Court is, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, such error cannot
now be lighted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy."
The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because
of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a failure to prosecute. Concerning
this right, the ruling in the old case of Conde v. Rivera 28 is still valid doctrine. Here the
prosecution was dismissed because the accused was made to "dance attendance on courts"
and subjected to no less than eight unjustified postponements extending over a year that
unduly delayed her trial. In dismissing the charges against her, Justice Malcolm declared for a
unanimous Supreme Court:
On the one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without
resources, but fortunately assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the
other hand has been the Government of the Philippine Islands which
should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the
administration of justice. The Court is thus under a moral and legal
obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the
accused is discharged from the custody of the law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant
19
 against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance
for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief ...
The case at bar is not much different from Conde. As the record shows, the petitioner was
arraigned on August 31, 1982, but was never actually tried until the cases were dismissed on
November 14, 1983, following eleven postponements of the scheduled hearings, mostly
because the prosecution was not prepared. The accused was never absent at these aborted
hearings. He was prepared to be tried, but either the witnesses against him were not
present, or the prosecutor himself was absent, or the court lacked material time. Meantime,
the charges against him continued to hang over his head even as he was not given an
opportunity to deny them because his trial could not be held.
It is possible that as a result of its in attention, the petitioner has been needlessly molested if
not permanently stigmatized by the unproved charges. The other possibility, and it is
certainly worse, is that a guilty person has been allowed to escape the penalties of the law
simply because he may now validly claim the protection of double jeopardy. In either event,
the responsibility clearly lies with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City for its
negligence and ineptitude.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the respondent court
dated May 20, 1986, and the orders of the trial court dated May 18, 1984, and October 9,
1984, are SET ASIDE. The dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. C-16411(81) and C-16412(81) is
hereby declared as final.

Under these circumstances, Caes could have himself moved for the dismissal of the cases on Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Secretary of Justice.
the ground of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This would have been in keeping
with People v. Cloribel, 29 where the case dragged for almost four years due to numerous SO ORDERED.
postponements, mostly at the instance of the prosecution, and was finally dismissed on
motion of the defendants when the prosecution failed to appear at the trial. This Court held
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
"that the dismissal here complained of was not truly a dismissal but an acquittal. For it was
entered upon the defendants' insistence on their constitutional right to speedy trial and by
reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on the date of trial."

The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against the petitioner was described by the
trial judge as "provisional" did not change the nature of that dismissal. As it was based on the
"lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the consequent delay in the trial of the cases, it was
final and operated as an acquittal of the accused on the merits. No less importantly, there is
no proof that Caes expressly concurred in the provisional dismissal. Implied consent, as we
have repeatedly held, is not enough; neither may it be lightly inferred from the presumption
of regularity, for we are dealing here with the alleged waiver of a constitutional right. Any
doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the accused.

We conclude that the trial judge erred in ordering the revival of the cases against the
petitioner and that the respondent court also erred in affirming that order. Caes having been
denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and not having expressly consented to the
"provisional" dismissal of the cases against him, he was entitled to their final dismissal under
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 30

The Court expresses its stern disapproval of the conduct in these cases of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Caloocan City which reveals at the very least a lack of conscientiousness in
the discharge of its duties. The informations appear to have been filed in haste, without first
insuring the necessary evidence to support them. The prosecution witnesses repeatedly
failed to appear at the scheduled hearings and all the prosecution did was to perfunctorily
move for a resetting, without exerting earnest efforts to secure their attendance. In the end,
it moved for the "provisional" dismissal of the cases without realizing, because it had not
studied the matter more carefully, that such dismissal would have the effect of barring their
reinstatement. Characteristically, it was also non-committal on the motion to revive the
cases filed by the prosecution witnesses only, thereby surrendering, by its own silence, its
authority in conducting the prosecution.

20
G.R. No. L-53373
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY,
9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR
GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal
case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the
case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment
and trial on the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena
City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set
for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was
a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the
presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment
was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the
appellate court. 3
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was
filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In
an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding
with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that
was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due
course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ
and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of
the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition
for review. 7
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed
the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April
10, 1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary
Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an
opposition thereto.10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the
arraigniment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised
on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident
from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to
move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for
the payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can only be civil
and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the
accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary
of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but
also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as
without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at
9:00 o'clock in the moming.
SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for
the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the
Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a
restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of
arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October
25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of
January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was
denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays
that said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from
enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal
case, declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering
respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as
purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course
to the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to
dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he
recommends that the petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent
through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate conunent to the petition
asking that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second
Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of
February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.
21
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed
a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The
institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or
may not file the complaint or information, follow or not fonow that presented by the
offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason for placing the
criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the
complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have
the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence
received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the
jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an
investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish
a prima faciecase. 22
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the
existence of a puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts
cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not
prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding
originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him
is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to
prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere
with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for
the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that
grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently
move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent
or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views
between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and
the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the
other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued
by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is
necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the
use of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and vindictive manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The
same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as
the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the
power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the
Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or
otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the
case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submited himself to the
Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether
a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the
filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal
find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the
Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the
fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition
the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not
impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process of
law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation
by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was
submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or
deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the
case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the
fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the
prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the
Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the
fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order
of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see
that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before
the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed
with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to
arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or
acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of
the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution
of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will
be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the
prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private
prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of
the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose
22
his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the
Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before
or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of
Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in
Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Teehankee C.J., took no part.

23
G.R. No. 88442 February 15, 1990
FELIX A. VELASQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO and EDGARDO
AVILA, respondents.
Joanes G. Caacbay for petitioner.
Tomas R. Leonidas for respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Petition for certiorari to annul and/or set aside the resolution/ letter dated January 4, 1989
of the public respondent, Undersecretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero ordering a
reinvestigation of I.S. No. 86-28751.
Respondent Edgardo Avila was a Cash and Business Development Consultant of the
Techtrade Management International Corporation, authorized to follow-up business
transactions, including loan applications submitted to the company.
On September 29, 1986, Avila informed the company that he had a borrower (whom he did
not identify) for P200,000 with interest of 3%/month for a 30-day term from September 29
to October 29, 1988. This was approved by the company which issued to him a pay-to-cash
check for P194,000 after deducting the 3% interest of 6,000. Instead of returning the
borrowed amount on due date or giving a satisfactory explanation for the supposed
borrower's failure to pay the loan despite written demands, Avila resigned from the company
on December 17, 1986 promising that: "... I shall set aside the P200,000 upon its subsequent
collection (subject of Atty. Caacbay's letter of 12/10/86) to answer for the P100,000 portion
of Tony's P700,000 loan to you; please treat the P100,000 — balance,less my unpaid
professional fee and gas expenses from November 16 to December 15, 1986, as my
separation and compulsory benefit" (p. 6, Rollo).
On December 23, 1986, petitioner Felix A. Velasquez, as Executive Vice-President/Managing
Director of Techtrade, filed a complaint for estafa against Avila in the Manila City Fiscal's
Office, where it was docketed as I.S. No. 86-28751. Assistant Fiscal Romulo Lopez dismissed
the complaint. However, upon review by the Chief, Investigation Division of the City Fiscal's
Office, the latter set aside Fiscal Lopez' resolution and ordered the filing of an information for
estafa against Avila in the Regional Trial Court.
Avila twice sought a reconsideration of that resolution, but both motions were denied by the
City Fiscal (Annexes F & H).
Before arraignment, Avila filed on June 29, 1987 in the Department of Justice a petition for
review (Annex I) which the petitioner opposed (Annex J). On February 15, 1988, Justice
Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III denied the petition for review (Annex L). A motion for
reconsideration (Annex M) of the denial did not prosper (Annex O).
On October 14, 1988, Avila filed a second motion for reconsideration which the
Undersecretary of Justice, Honorable Artemio Tuquero granted on January 4, 1989 (Annex A,
Petition). He directed the City Fiscal:
... to conduct a reinvestigation of this case to afford respondent to
properly present evidence that he was duly authorized to pay the subject
creditors and for complainant to rebut the same with controverting
evidence, and thereafter to resolve the case anew on the basis of all the
evidence adduced. (p. 15, Rollo.)
The complainant filed a motion for reconsideration (Annex C) of that resolution but it was
denied on May 15, 1989 (Annex B, Petition). Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The petition is meritorious. This case is governed by our decision in Crespo vs. Mogul, 151
SCRA 462, where we ruled that once the information is filed in court, the court acquires
complete jurisdiction over it. A motion for reinvestigation should, after the court had
acquired jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and to him alone. Neither
the Secretary of Justice, the State Prosecutor, nor the Fiscal may interfere with the judge's
disposition of the case, much less impose upon the court their opinion regarding the guilt or
innocence of the accused, for the court is the sole judge of that.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of
the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of
the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who
has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion
was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor[e] to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already
been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
24
 determination of the Court. (Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, 471 &
472.)

Crespo vs. Mogul was reiterated in Marquez vs. Alejo, 154 SCRA 302; Sta. Rosa Mining Co. vs.
Asst. Provincial Fiscal Augusta Zabala, 153 SCRA 367; Republic vs. Judge Sunga, G.R. No.
38634, June 20, 1988; Peralta vs. CFI of La Union, 157 SCRA 476 and Almazar vs. Judge
Cenzon, 161 SCRA 454.

The Undersecretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in ordering the re-investigation of
the criminal case against Avila after it had been filed in court. The avowed purpose of the
reinvestigation "to give an opportunity to the private respondent to present an authentic
copy of the board resolution of the offended party (Techtrade Management International
Corporation) which [allegedly] had authorized him to deal and otherwise dispose of the
funds of the corporation" (p. 72, Rollo), can also be achieved at the trial in the lower court
where that piece of evidence may be presented by the accused as part of his defense.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The order dated January 4, 1989 of the
public respondent (Annex A, Petition) is hereby annulled and set aside, with costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

25
G.R. No. L-38634 June 20, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I, Camarines Sur, ARISTON
ANADILLA, RAFAEL ANADILLA and JOSE ANADILLA, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order * of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, 10th Judicial District, Branch I, dated 20 March 1974, dismissing motu
proprio Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled "People of the Philippines, Complainant versus
Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, Accused," as well as of the order dated 22
April 1974 of the same court denying the motion for reconsideration of said earlier order.
The facts are not disputed.
On 10 August 1964, an information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal
of Camarines Sur against accused-private respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and
Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set on 11 and 12 March 1974. The hearing set on 11
March 1974 was, however, postponed in view of the absence of one of the accused,
respondent Rafael Anadilla who had not yet been arrested by the police authorities. On the
same date, the court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same
time set the trial of the case for 29 and 30 July 1974.
On 20 March 1974, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads:
Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in
the further prosecution of this case and there being no objection on the
part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla,
this case is hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused
Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is hereby ordered lifted and has no
force and effect.
The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby
ordered cancelled.
In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is
hereby ordered to release said accused from their detention immediately
upon receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED. 1
The affidavit of desistance, relied upon by the aforequoted order, was executed by the
offended party on 20 March 1974 and subscribed and sworn to before the branch Clerk of
Court Atty. R.B. Torrecampo. It alleged, among others, that:
That he was the complainant in Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled, People
vs. Ariston Anadilla, et al., for Attempted Homicide, which case is pending
before the first branch of this Court; that he is no longer interested in the
further prosecution of this case and that he has already forgiven the
accused for their acts; that his material witnesses could no longer be
contacted and that without their testimonies, the guilt of the accused
cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that in view of these
circumstances, he requests the Prosecuting Fiscal for the dismissal of the
said case. 2
The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was denied by the
court a quo in an order dated 22 April 1974. 3 This petition was thereupon filed before this
Court.
The issue in this petition is whether the courta a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis
of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss
filed by the prosecuting fiscal.
The issue presented is not novel. In Crespo v. Mogul, 4 promulgated on 30 June 1987, the
Court had occasion to state the rule in regard to the respective powers of the prosecuting
fiscal and the court, after the complaint or information has been filed in court. In said case,
the issue raised was whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case
filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case
was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and
trial of the case on the merits.
In the Crespo case, an information for Estafa had already been filed by the Assistant Fiscal
before the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. Arraignment of the accused and trial of the
case were, however, deferred because of a pending appeal by the accused/respondent to the
Secretary of Justice. Reversing the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, the
Undersecretary of Justice directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused. Upon such instructions, the Provincial Fiscal filed a
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. The Judge denied the motion and set the
arraignment. On a certiorari recourse to the Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed.
Review of the Court of Appeals decision was then sought by the accused with this Court,
raising the issue previously stated herein, Resolving, the Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
26
 The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal The prosecuting fiscal in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case,
action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the obviously believed that despite such manifestation of the complainant, he (fiscal) could
authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the prove the prosecution's case.
complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued
by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to To avoid similar situations, the Court takes the view that, while the Crespo doctrine has
the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction settled that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed
over the person of the accused. (after the complaint or information has been filed in court), still, any move on the part of the
complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case, even if without objection of the
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal for his own view on the matter. He
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution is, after all, in control of the prosecution of the case and he may have his own reasons why
of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the the case should not be dismissed. It is only after hearing the prosecuting fiscal's view that the
proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets Court should exercise its exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the case.
in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the
fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.
the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation
the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the
SO ORDERED.
Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court or not [sic], once the case had already been brought to Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the
case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.
The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process
of law.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or

information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of
the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case
is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before
or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after
a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation." (Emphasis supplied). 5

In the case at bar, the Court has taken note that before the case was set for trial, almost ten
(10) years had elapsed from the date of filing of the information. It was not, therefore,
unusual that the complainant-offended party, in his affidavit of desistance manifested that
his material witnesses could no longer be contacted, but, without their testimony, the guilt of
the accused could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

27
G.R. No. L-12260 October 20, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOROTEA ORTEGA and RAMON CHUA YAP, defendants-appellants.
Thomas Lislie McGirr for appellants.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
Tirso de Irureta Goyena for private prosecutor.
CARSON, J.:
The defendants and appellants in this case were convicted on the 12th day of June, 1916, in
the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal, of the crime of adultery, committed, as
charged in the complaint, in the municipality of Antipolo in that province, between the 9th
and 12th days of May, 1914. The complaint was filed by Antonio Seng Queng, the husband of
Dorotea Ortega, on the 26th day of October, 1915.
It appears that on November 15, 1914, a judgment was entered in a criminal action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, acquitting these accused of another charge of the crime of
adultery set forth in a complaint filed in that court on the 12th day of October, 1914, alleging
the commission of the crime of adultery in the city of Manila, between the 1st and 10th days
of October, 1914.
It further appears that on or about October 15, 1914, a civil action for divorce was instituted
against the wife by the husband in the Court of First Instance in the city of Manila, and that
prior to the date of the institution of the criminal proceedings in the Province of Rizal,
judgment on the merits had been rendered in the civil action against the plaintiff husband
and in favor of the defendant wife, absolving her from the charges of adulterous relations set
forth in the complaint.
At the time when the criminal action was instituted and decided in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, an appeal was pending in this court from the judgment rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila in favor of the wife in the civil for divorce; and when the appeal from
the judgment in the criminal action in the Province of Rizal was first submitted to this court,
our attention was invited and directed to the fact that the appeal in the civil action was still
pending. Some time thereafter the appeal in the civil action was dismissed on the motion of
the appellant; and the judgment in favor of the wife in the civil action for divorce in the Court
of First Instance of Manila became final and unappealable, prior to the date of the
resubmission of the appeal in the case at bar at the opening of the present term. 1awphil.net
On the appeal in the case at bar, counsel for the defendants and appellants renewed their
contentions in the court below that the judgments in the criminal and the civil actions, in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, sustained their pleas of "autrefois acquit," and res
adjudicata under the provisions of article 436 of the Penal Code, which were submitted in
due form upon their arraignment, and supported by the introduction into the record of
copies of the proceedings had in the former cases, including the judgments entered therein.
The Attorney-General contends with much force that the plea of "autrefois acquit." based on
the judgment in the former criminal actions, should not be sustained, because the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila had no jurisdiction in a criminal action over the adulterous
acts with which the accused were charged, and of which they were convicted in the case at
bar. This because the complaint in the case at bar and the evidence submitted at the trial
disclose that these alleged adulterous acts, if committed at all, were committed in the
Province of Rizal and beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of the First Instance of
Manila; and it is contended that an acquittal in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila, on a charge of the commission of the crime of adultery within the jurisdictional limits
of that court, should not be held to be a bar to a prosecution and conviction upon another
charge of adultery committed beyond the jurisdictional limits of that court, when the second
charge is submitted in the Court of First Instance of the province wherein it is alleged and
proven that the crime was committed.
We do not deem it necessary, however, to discuss or decide this question, because we are of
the opinion that a judgment in favor of the wife in a civil action for divorce is a bar to her
subsequent prosecution and conviction in a criminal action for adultery, based upon the
commission of alleged adulterous acts prior to the institution of the civil action — and this
without regard to the place where it is alleged that such adulterous acts are committed.
Article 436 of the Penal Code is as follows:
A final judgment in favor of a defendant in an action for divorce upon the ground of
adultery shall be conclusive in a criminal prosecution for the same offense.
If the decision in the civil case is to the effect that adultery has been committed, a
prosecution shall, nevertheless, be necessary for the imposition of a penalty.
The first paragraph of the article is manifestly conclusive as to the rights of the defendants
and appellants in the case at bar. It may be well be observe, however, that in a civil action for
divorce on the ground of adultery the inquiry as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant
spouse is not limited to the commission of adulterous acts within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court wherein the action is pending: so that in such an action a judgment on the merits,
declaring that there are no sufficient grounds for a divorce, is in substance and effect a
judicial finding that there is no merit in the allegations set forth in the complaint of the
plaintiff spouse praying for divorce on the ground of the alleged unfaithfulness of the
defendant spouse. In other words, the judgment is a solemn declaration that the defendant
spouse has not been guilty of adultery prior to the date of the institution of the civil action
for divorce.
In this jurisdiction, criminal actions for adultery cannot be instituted except on the complaint
of the offended spouse, and the provisions of article 436 of the Penal Code as to the
28
conclusiveness in such an action of a judgment in favor of the defendant in a civil action for
divorce is, therefore, no more than a formal declaration of the logical effect of such a
judgment to deny to the complaining party the right to harass and prosecute his spouse with
the prosecution of criminal proceedings based upon charges which have been judicially
determined to be without foundation in a solemn judgment rendered in a civil action in
which he was a complaining party, and in the course of which he was afforded an
opportunity to establish the truth of such charges if they were well founded. No such
contentions can be advanced, therefore, against the conclusiveness of a judgment in a civil
action for divorce in a subsequent criminal action charging that offense, as was submitted by
the Attorney-General against the claim of the alleged conclusiveness of an acquittal in a
criminal action for adultery with relation to a subsequent criminal action for that crime,
charging the commission of the adulterous acts beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
court wherein the first criminal action was tried.

We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below convicting and sentencing these
defendants and appellants of the crime of adultery should be reversed, and that, it appearing
that final judgment has been entered in favor of the defendant wife in an action for divorce
upon the ground of adultery, that judgment is conclusive in this action, so that the
defendants and appellants should be acquitted of the crime of adultery with which they were
charged in the complaint filed in the court below and their bail bonds exonerated, with costs
of both instances de officio. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

29
G.R. No. L-55082 April 19, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICANOR DE LOS SANTOS, defendant-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Does a court have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint for rape not subscribed or initiated by
the victim who was already of legal age at the time the crime was committed? This is the
main issue presented to this Court by appellant who was convicted of the crime of rape by
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XV in Criminal Case No. AR-288.
As gathered from the records of this case, the essential facts are as follows:
In April, 1973, Luzviminda Tan, a beautiful lass at the age of 23, went to stay with her aunt
Calixta de los Santos in Alcoy, Cebu for a vacation. At about eight o'clock in the evening of
April 28, 1973, Luzviminda told her aunt that she had to go to the comfort room which was
located approximately 20 meters away from the house. Inasmuch as Luzviminda failed to
return after 20 minutes, her aunt began to worry. Unable to find her anywhere near the
house, Calixta went to a nearby store to ask a certain Jaime Carulasan to help her look for her
niece. Carrying a torch light, Jaime and Calixta proceeded towards the town poblacion. On
the way, they met three men who informed them that Luzviminda was in the house of a
certain Gildo Egon. Immediately thereafter, they went to the said house.
Upon arriving therein, Calixta went up and met Nicandro Anore, the co-accused of appellant
in the lower court, who said, "I have nothing to do with that." Upon hearing this statement,
Calixta and Jaime barged into a room and saw the seemingly unconscious Luzviminda lying
on the floor with her dress raised up to her waist. She was not wearing panties. They also
saw appellant Nicanor de los Santos, the son of the then incumbent mayor of Alcoy, near
Luzviminda. He was fixing his pants to cover his still exposed private organ. Upon seeing the
two, appellant put off the light and ran away. Calixta, on the other hand, went to assist the
trembling girl and with the help of Nicanor, brought her home.
The next day, Calixta filed a report of the incident in the PC Headquarters of Sibonga, Cebu.
On April 30, 1973, a physical examination of Minda was conducted at the PC Crime
Laboratory.
The findings of the medico-legal were contained in a medical report which reads:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRA-GENITAL:
Fairly developed, nourished and slightly coherent nervous female subject.
Breasts are hemispherical with dark-brown areola and nipples from
which no secretion could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and tight.
The following injuries are noted:
Trunk and upper extremity;
(1) Hematoma, scapular region, measuring 3 x 3 cm., 10 cm. right of the
posterior midline, 110 cm. above the heel.
(2) Graze abrasion, proximal 3rd of right forearm, measuring 0.3 x 0.2
cm., 3 cm. lateral to its posterior midline.
(3) Hematoma, middle 3rd of right arm, measuring 3 x 2.5 cm., 5 cm.
lateral to its anterior midline.
Lower extremities;
(4) Hematoma, proximal 3rd of the right thigh, measuring 9 x 3 cm., just
lateral to its anterior midline.
(5) Linear abrasion, middle 3rd of right leg, measuring 4.5 x 0.1 cm., 3.5
cm. lateral to its anterior midline.
(6) Linear abrasion, distal 3rd of right thigh, measuring 1.5 x 0.2 cm., 3
cm. medial to its anterior midline.
(7) Linear abrasion, proximal 3rd of right leg, measuring 2.5 x 0.1 cm., 2.5
cm lateral to its posterior midline.
GENITALS:
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and
coaptated with the dark-brown labia minora presenting in between. On
separating the same are disclosed an elastic fleshy type hymen, with
indentations at 5 and 7 o'clock positions and an abraided vulvar mucosa.
External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the introduction of
the examining index finger and virgin size vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal
is tight with slightly shallowed rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color
and consistency.
Vaginal and peri-urethal smears are positive for spermatozoa.
REMARKS:
30
 Findings are compatible with that of a recent sexual intercourse.
Barring unforeseen complications, it is estimated that the above injuries
will resolve in 7-9 days. 1
Later, a complaint for rape was filed by the father of Luzviminda against appellant Nicanor de
los Santos and Nicandro Anore .
On June 13, 1980, after due trial, the lower court rendered a decision finding appellant
Nicandro de los Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and imposed on
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and required him to indemnify the offended party in
the amount of P40,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The trial
court, however, acquitted Nicandro Anore for want of sufficient evidence.
Hence, this appeal by Nicanor de los Santos.
Regarding the main issue, appellant argues that jurisdiction was never conferred upon the
trial court since the complaint was not signed by the victim herself who was already of age,
but by her father Paulino Tan . 2 The lower court, on the other hand, ruled that the father of
the victim had the perfect right to file the complaint in view of the incapacity of the latter
who was not in complete possession of her mental and physical faculties. 3 Section 4, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Court is the applicable provision of the Rules in this regard, to
wit:
Sec. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions:.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
The offense of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall
not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or
her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender
has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case
may be.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the above provision of law, the right to institute a criminal action for the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviouness is reposed exclusively and successively in
the persons enumerated in the provision, in the order in which they are mentioned. This
means that no one has the authority to proceed if there is some other person previously
mentioned therein with legal capacity to appear and institute the action. 5 Therefore, a
father cannot file a complaint for any of the abovementioned crimes committed against his
daughter if the latter has the legal capacity to appear and institute the action.
After a careful scrutiny of the voluminous records of this case, We hold that the complaint
filed by the father of Luzviminda is valid and sufficient and is not in violation of the
jurisdictional requirement of the law since the rape victim was incapacitated to file it herself.
Although the purpose of the law in placing the offended party in the first rank is to give her
the preferential right in the filing of the complaint, this does not apply where she is
otherwise physically or legally incapacitated to do so.
The finding of the lower court that "the victim was not in complete possession of her mental
and physical faculties and was incapacitated by reason of insanity" is well-supported.
Witnesses declared under oath that after the incident, the victim would not talk, refused to
eat and just spent her time as a timid and immobile person. This was corroborated by Dr.
Ortega, who, after an examination of the victim, concluded that she was not capable of
testifying in any court proceeding. The trial court judge personally examined the girl in court
and saw for himself the pitiable state she was in. She could not even do such simple acts like
standing up and sitting down so much so that somebody else had to assist her. Questions
propounded to her were answered with blank stares. Hence, the lower court made the
pronouncement that she is insane and that she cannot testify in court.
We cannot help but agree with the above finding after taking a look at the photographs of
Luzviminda which were offered as exhibits in the lower court. One cannot deny that the
picture taken of her after the incident is that of a skinny, untidy, and frightened girl so
different from that taken of her previous thereto where she appears to be very healthy and
strikingly beautiful. Accordingly, it is unreasonable to expect her to file the necessary
complaint with the proper authorities. In view of the foregoing, We hold that the father of a
rape victim has the perfect right to initiate the prosecution of a rape case in behalf of his
daughter, even if she is of legal age, if she is mentally incapacitated to do so.
Appellant, however, insists that he cannot be convicted of the crime of rape on the basis of
the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution which allegedly does not clearly
establish his guilt. He also maintains that the lower court should not have considered the
testimonies of Calixta de los Santos and Jaime Carulasan because they are incredible and are
contradictory to each other. Appellant also claims that the injuries of Luzviminda were
caused by her aunt who continously whipped her with coconut leaves after finding her half
naked in the house of Egon He further explains that when Calixta saw Luzviminda, without
her panties, in the kitchen of the house, the latter was only urinating. Lastly, appellant insists
that he could not have raped Luzviminda as he considered her a relative.
We cannot agree with appellant that there is no sufficient basis for the judgment of
conviction. Although the victim was not able to testify in court due to her mental illness, the
facts and circumstances surrounding this case clearly prove the commission by the appellant
of the crime of rape against her person.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed if the offender had common
knowledge of a woman and such act is accomplished under the following circumstances:
31
 1. By using force or intimidation; WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED
with costs against appellant.
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
SO ORDERED,
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of
the circumstances lances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraph Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
shall be present.

The findings of the medico-legal officer who examined Luzviminda the day after the incident
showed that the victim had sexual intercourse very recently and that force was applied on
her as evidenced by the presence of numerous abrasions, lacerations and other injuries. As
to the Identity of the offender, the aunt of the victim and witness Jaime Carulasan were
positive that it was appellant whom they saw inside the room with the girl, his private organ
still exposed although he belatedly tried to avoid being Identified by putting off the light and
scampering away.

As to the testimonies of Calixta de los Santos and Jaime Carulasan. We reiterate the oft-
repeated rule that inconsistencies and contradictions on minor matters do not affect the
credibility of such testimonies.

On the contrary, it is the testimony of the appellant which appears unconvincing. It is hardly
believable that Calixta de los Santos would mercilessly whip her already physically weak and
very frightened niece on the sensitive parts of her body causing all those injuries found on
her by the medico-legal officer. Furthermore, the explanation of appellant that the victim
was just urinating in the kitchen when Calixta de los Santos and Jaime Carulasan arrived is
incredible. In the first place, it is not probable that a young, unmarried lady like Luzviminda
would venture to go alone to a very dark room in a stranger's house without bringing any
lamp or any other form of illumination with her. Besides, it does not seem to be a practice of
women to remove their panties in order to urinate. Pulling them down is sufficient for the
purpose.

We also reject the contention of appellant that since he considers Luzviminda as his relative,
his claim of innocence is fortified. Apparently, appellant got strongly attracted to Luzviminda
because, as described by his own witness, she was very beautiful that night. 6 If there were
cases of men raping their own daughters, with more likelihood there could be cases of men
raping their distant relatives. Moreover, the family of Luzviminda does not consider appellant
as their relative.

We also take into consideration the fact that appellant failed to show any motive on the part
of the parents of Luzviminda to fabricate a rape charge against him. There was also no reason
given by him for Calixta testifying against him when his own mother declared that Calixta had
good relations with them before the incident.7 This observation holds true as well for the
other prosecution witness Jaime Carulasan whom appellant considered as a closed friend. 8

]The guilt of appellant is all the more made evident by the fact that his father interceded to
settle the case.

32
G.R. No. L-39881 February 20, 1934 Street, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ARSENIO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Laurel, Del Rosario and Lualhati and Francisco G. Perez for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

BUTTE, J.:

The appellant was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga of the crime of rape
upon the following information:

"Que en o hacia el 2 de febrero de 1933, en el Municipio de Arayat, Provincia de Pampanga,

Islas Filipinas, el referido acusado, Arsenio de la Cruz, por medio de engaño, fuerza, amenaza
e intimidacion, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente, yacio con Emiliana Balatbat contra su
voluntad. Hecho cometido contra la ley y con las circunstancias agravantes de nocturnidad,
despoblado y premeditacion." Upon conviction he was sentenced to seventeen years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal.

We have carefully examined all the evidence in this case but we do not deem it necessary to
restate it at length. We cannot find that the accused exercised over the offended party, a girl
sixteen years of age, such continuous intimidation, even during many hours of separation
and absence, and with many opportunities of escape and calls for assistance, as the
prosecution has tried to prove in this case. The offended girl may be ignorant, as argued by
the Solicitor-General, but she is not an idiot. No rational person, who can testify so
intelligently as Emiliana Balatbat, even under cross-examination, would long remain under
the fear that the accused could strike her dead by raising his hand. Nor can we believe that a
virtuous girl who valued her honor would not have challenged him to try his alleged
miraculous power. The defendant denied that he ever made any claim to supernatural power
and there is no evidence in the record that anybody ever heard him make such a claim
except Emiliana Balatbat and Filomena Maño, who both charge him with the crime of rape.
We are not convinced beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence in this case that the consent
of the offended party was entirely lacking.

While we have arrived at the conclusion that the judgment of guilt this information must be
reversed, we are inclined to believe that a prosecution under article 343 of the Revised Penal
Code for rapto con anuencia might have prospered. Without, however, prejudging in the
slightest degree that question, we direct the defendant be not discharged (see section 37 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure) but that he be held for trial upon an information charging a
crime under article 343 aforesaid; provided that such information be filed within ten days
from and after a copy of this decision is served upon the Solicitor-General, failing which it is
ordered that the accused be discharged from further custody.

Judgment reversed with costs de oficio.

33
G.R. No. L-3181 October 10, 1907
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, defendant-appellant.
Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos, for appellant.
Rafael Palma and P. Salas, for private prosecutors.
CARSON, J.:
The complaint charges the defendant with the crime of seduction (estupro) of a woman over
12 and under 23 years of age, as defined and penalized in article 443 of the Penal Code,
which is as follows:
The seduction of a virgin over 12 and under 23 years of age, committed by any
public authority, priest, servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or by any person in
charge of her education or guardianship, under any name whatsoever, shall be
punished with the penalty of prision correccional, in its minimum and medium
degrees.
Whosoever shall commit incest with his sister or descendant, even though she
were older than 23 years of age, shall incur the same penalty.
Seduction, when committed with fraud by any other person on a woman over 12
years of age, but under 23, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor.
Any other unchaste abuse committed by the same persons and under similar
circumstances shall be punished with the same penalty.
It is alleged that the defendant seduced Teofila Sevilla under promise of marriage early in the
year 1902, at which time she was less than 21 years of age. The complaint was not filed until
February, 1906, when she was more than 24 though less than 25 years of age, and was
signed, sworn, and submitted by one Esteban Sevilla, at whose "instance" these proceedings
were had, he appearing as the private prosecutor and alleging that he is the father of the said
Teofila Sevilla.
The facts as to the age of the woman were developed at the trial of the case and are not
controverted.
We think that since the complaint was not filed until after the offended party had attained
her majority, criminal proceedings based on the alleged seduction could only be instituted
and maintained at her "instance", and she, and she alone, could file a complaint which would
give the trial court jurisdiction over the offense charged. The complaint having been filed by
her father, at whose instance the proceedings in the case were had, the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged, and its judgment of conviction should be reversed and
the complaint upon which it was based dismissed. Article 448 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Criminal proceedings for seduction can only be instituted on the complaint of the
offended person or her parents, grandparents, or guardian.
In order to proceed in cases of rape and in those of abduction committed with
unchaste design, the denunciation of the interested party, her parents,
grandparents, or guardians, shall suffice even though they do not present a formal
petition to the judge.
If the person injured should, by reason of her age or mental condition, lack the
requisite personality to appear in court, and should, besides, be wholly
unprotected, not having parents, grandparents, brothers, or guardian of person or
property to denounce the crime, the procurador sindico or the or the public
prosecutor may do so, acting on the strength of public rumor.
In all the cases of this article the express or implied pardon of the offended party
shall extinguish penal action or the penalty, if it should have been already imposed
on the culprit.
The pardon shall never be presumed, except by the marriage of the offended party
with the offender.
It is contended that these provisions authorize the institution of criminal proceedings by the
father in all cases of seduction because the offense can only be committed upon a woman
under age and legally incapacitated to institute criminal proceedings on her own behalf. But
if the father does not institute such proceedings until after his daughter has attained full age,
we are of opinion that he loses the right so to do, and that this right vests exclusively in the
offended party, unless, of course, there is some legal impediment, not arising out of nonage,
which prevents her from maintaining such criminal action.
The right to institute criminal proceedings in cases of seduction could not be reposed in the
offended person, her parents, grandparents, and guardian, at one and the same time,
without occasioning grave difficulties in the administration of justice, resulting from the
attempts of some of these persons to institute criminal proceedings contrary to the wish and
desire of the others; and that this was not the intention of the lawmaker becomes manifest
in the light of the peculiar provisions of the above-cited article of the Penal Code, whereby
the offended party is given the right to pardon the offender and thus extinguish and destroy
the cause of the criminal action, or remit the penalty prescribed by law, where judgment of
conviction has been actually pronounced and sentence imposed.
34
Hence, although these persons are mentioned disjunctively, the above provision of the Penal
Code must be construed as meaning that the right to institute criminal proceedings in cases
of seduction is exclusively and successively reposed in these persons in the order in which
they are named, so that no one of them has authority to proceed if there is any other person
previously mentioned therein with legal capacity to appear and institute the action.
This construction of the law imposes upon the woman the obligation and the right to
determine whether criminal proceedings shall be instituted for seduction, if it appears that
she is of age, and is not otherwise legally incapacitated from appearing in court to maintain
the action at the time when it is imposed to institute such proceedings.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a woman 23 years old is of age. From that period she
is in the full possession of her civil rights, save only in certain exceptional cases expressly
prescribed in the code. The right to appear and prosecute or defend an action in the courts is
not one of these exceptions, and indeed, it is inherent to the full exercise of civil rights. (For
the purpose of this decision it is not necessary to consider the effect of American legislation
as modifying this provision by reducing the number of years at which woman becomes of
age.)
Since the offended party in this case was over 23 but less than 25 years of age at the time
when the complaint was filed, it may be well to add that article 321 of the Civil Code, which is
as follows —
. . . Daughters of the family who are of full age but less than 25 years old can not abandon
the paternal roof without permission of the father or of the mother in whose company they
live, unless it be to marry, or when the father or mother have contracted another marriage"
— does not imply a limitation to the right of a woman of full age to appear and defend an
action, nor confer authority upon the father to appear for and instead of his daughter in legal
proceedings, for this article, since it confers exceptional authority on the father, must be
construed strictly and should not be extended beyond its own proper terms and the object
and purposes indicated therein. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, October 13,
1890.) lawphil.net
Counsel for the prosecution insists that since no objection was made to the complaint in the
court below, the appellant is not entitled to raise an objection thereto for the first time in
this court, and should be held to have waived such objection by his failure to urge it in the
trial court. In support of this contention, he cites the case of the United States vs. Sarabia (4
Phil. Rep., 566), wherein this court, adopting the general rule in the United States, that an
objection to the complaint to be available in the appellate court must have been raised
below, held "that no objection to a complaint based upon a defective statement, either in
the matter of form or substance of "the acts or omissions complained of" as required by
section 6, paragraph 3, of General Orders, No. 58, not made in the court below" will be
available in the Supreme Court.
It is to be observed, however, that under the provisions of the above-cited article 448 of the
Penal Code, jurisdiction over the crime of seduction is expressly denied the trial court unless
such jurisdiction be conferred by one of certain persons specified in the law; in this case, as
we have seen, by the offended person herself. The objection in this case is not, strictly
speaking, to the sufficiency of the complaint, but goes directly to the jurisdiction of the court
over the crime with which the accused was charged. It has been frequently held that a lack of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the
proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and
large array of cases there cited), and, indeed, where the subject matter is not within the
jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 1 190 Ind., 79;
Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by
law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties.
Hence, the accused in a criminal case can not, by express waiver or otherwise, confer
jurisdiction on a court over an offense as to which such jurisdiction has not been conferred
upon such court by law. (Harkness vs. Hyde, 98 U.S., 476; Nazos vs. Cragin, 3 Dill (U.S.), 474; 3
Tex., 157; 2 5 Mich., 331; 3 Ohio St., 223; 4 82 Wis., 664; 91 Ill., 311. 5 ) Counsel further
contends that since the offended party appeared in court and testified, she may be said to
have instituted the proceedings, as provided in article 448, although the complaint is signed
and sworn to by her father. It may be sufficient answer to this contention to point out that
there is nothing in the record to indicate that the proceedings were, in fact, had at the
instance of the daughter rather than the father, the fact that she appeared and gave
testimony not justifying such conclusion because, being duly subpoenaed, she would have
been compelled so to do whether she appeared voluntarily or otherwise; but, as has been
shown before, the provisions of article 448 are so explicit and so positive that even though it
appears that she had, in fact, taken an active part in all the proceedings, this would not be
sufficient unless the complaint was submitted and the action formally maintained by her.
That this is the meaning of the provisions of the said article becomes clear upon a
comparison of the language used as to proceedings for seduction and proceedings in a case
of rape. In proceedings for seduction the language used expressly provides that they can only
be instituted and maintained on the complaint (a instancia) of the persons therein
mentioned; while in cases of rape and those of abduction committed with dishonest designs,
the denunciation (la denuncia) of the interested party, or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, shall suffice, "though they do not present a formal complaint to the judge" (aunque
no formalicen instancias). (U.S. vs. Santos, 4 Phil. Rep., 527.)
The judgment of conviction of the trial court should be, and is hereby, reversed and the
complaint instituted in these proceedings should be, and is hereby, dismissed, with the
costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.
35
G.R. No. 85328 July 4, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BIENVENIDO LEOPARTE, alias "EMBEN," accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Joaquin M. Trinidad for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena, Branch 60,
convicting accused-appellant Bienvenido Leoparte, alias "Emben," of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
indemnification of the offended party in the sum of P30,000.00. 1
Taking an atypical but laudable stand in this case, the Solicitor General, in lieu of an
appellee's brief, filed a manifestation and motion recommending the acquittal of appellant
since his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Rare though such
instances may be, it is tangible proof that said government counsel, although tasked with
representing the prosecution against an appeal from a judgment of conviction, yields in
proper cases to the paramount consideration that while guilt should not escape, innocence
must not suffer. Our task then is to subject this case to a painstaking review to ascertain the
validity of the now joint submission of the prosecution and the defense.
Appellant was charged with abduction with rape in an information which reads as follows:
The undersigned upon complaint filed by the offended party, Marinel
Idea, accuses Bienvenido Leoparte alias Emben (prisoner) of the crime of
forcible abduction with rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of September 1985, at Padre Burgos,
Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a deadly
weapon, moved by lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and forcibly abduct the complainant Marinel Idea, against her
will and consent by taking and carrying her away from her home and
bringing her, thereafter, to different places where said accused, by means
of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously had (sic) carnal knowledge several times with the said
Marinel Idea against her will and consent. 2
Appellee narrates that the prosecution presented Marinel Idea, the alleged offended party,
who testified 3 that on September 16, 1985, at about 7:00 P.M. more or less, she was
returning home by the railroad tracks from the house of her brother which was about two (2)
kilometers away, when appellant suddenly pulled her by the right arm threatening that if she
should shout, he would kill her. Appellant then allegedly succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her at the nearby banana plantation. She declared that appellant first
fondled the different parts of her body, more particularly her bust, and kissed her several
times. Then he opened her thighs, inserted his fingers and, later, his penis inside her vagina.
She allegedly resisted the appellant, but the latter threatened to kill her with a pointed
weapon if she would not surrender herself to him.
After the alleged assault on her honor, appellant brought her to the house of his sister,
arriving there at around 8:00 P.M. Appellant's sister, his nephews and nieces were present.
There, appellant had carnal knowledge of her three times, despite her resistance and her
telling appellant not to do it because she was getting married to another man. However,
appellant allegedly boxed her in the thigh and again threatened to kill her if she would not
submit to his wishes.
The following day, September 17, 1985, at about 7:00 A.M., they left the house of appellant's
sister and proceeded to the house of appellant's uncle, Vicente Liwag, located at Barangay
Marao, Padre Burgos, Quezon. Appellant introduced her to his uncle, to the latter's wife and
to their children telling them that she and appellant had eloped. She allegedly denied what
appellant said, but his uncle did not believe her. They remained in the house of appellant's
uncle for two days. During the night, they slept in a separate house which was also owned by
appellant's uncle and built just beside the latter's residence. There she was allegedly sexually
abused by appellant three (3) more times at 8:00 P.M., 9:00 P.M. and, finally, at 10:00 P.M.
Leaving the residence of appellant's uncle, appellant and the offended party proceeded to
the house of appellant's father, where appellant himself resided. Appellant's parents, his
brothers and sisters were there. Appellant announced to his family that she eloped with him,
but she allegedly told them to bring her home because her own mother, brothers and sisters
must be looking for her. There, she was once again allegedly abused by appellant in a room
on the third floor. The following day, her parents, accompanied by Philippine Constabulary
soldiers, arrived and took her away and appellant was arrested.
Thereafter, Marinel Idea went to the municipal hall and talked to a certain Commander Aris
of the Burgos Police Station, who told her to see a doctor. She consulted Dr. Umali of the
Padre Burgos Hospital. She then returned to Commander Aris to consult another physician at
the Quezon Memorial Hospital, which she did. She also gave a copy of the examination
results to Commander Aris. Thereafter, she was investigated by Commander Aris, which
investigation was reduced into writing and was marked in court as Exhibit "A."
Appellant, on the other hand, adduced evidence materially contradicting the prosecution's
allegation of abduction with rape and intended to establish that appellant and Marinel Idea
were lovers and that they agreed to elope that night of September 16, 1985. Hence, it is
claimed complainant's going with appellant and the sexual relations between them were
voluntary. 4
36
The defense also presented as a witness one Pastor Opo, Barangay Captain of Barangay
Marao, who testified that the accused together with the offended party went to his house
and informed him that they eloped and intended to get married, so he told appellant's
mother to attend to the matter so that the two could get married. 5
On August 29, 1988, as stated at the outset, a judgment of conviction was rendered by the
court below. Appellant is now before us, seeking the reversal of said decision on the
following assignment of errors:
I cooperation of the offended party in the prosecution of the case, as witness, clearly indicates
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE
COMPLAINT FILED BY MARINEL IDEA AND HER MOTHER WHICH
ACCORDING TO THE TRIAL COURT IS FOUND IN THE RECORDS OF THE
PROVINCIAL FISCAL;
II
THE TRIAL COURT, NOR ANY COURT FOR THAT MATTER, DID NOT
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THIS CASE; and
III
THE PROSECUTION MISERABLY FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 6
The first and second assignment of errors are palpably without merit. The complaint by the
offended party provided for in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code does not determine the
jurisdiction of the courts over crimes against chastity but is only a condition precedent for
the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute. 7
The same not being jurisdictional, the failure of appellant to raise said issue at the trial court
barred him from raising said issue on appeal, in consonance with Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
Sec. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before
he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file
a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the
grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided
for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule.
Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefiting the accused. When it is
said that the requirement in Article 344 that a complaint of the offended party or her
relatives is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory
proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The
court's jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law. 8 Such condition has been imposed out
of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. 9
The overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition
precedent prescribed in Article 344 has been complied with is the intent of the aggrieved
party to seek judicial redress for the affront committed. 10In the case at bar, the active
said intent. Moreover, the information filed by the fiscal specifically states that the same was
instituted upon the complaint of the offended party.
On the third assignment of error, appellant contends that he is entitled to an acquittal. We
agree.
In view of the severity of the penalties for the offense of rape, the judiciary must take
extreme care to avoid an injustice to the accused. If a reasonable doubt exists, the verdict
must be one of acquittal. Rape is an accusation easy to make, hard to prove, but harder to
defend by the accused, though innocent. The evidence for the prosecution must be clear and
convincing to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Rape is an offense to
which, as is often the case, only two people can testify, thus requiring the most conscientious
effort on the part of the arbiter to weigh and appraise the conflicting testimonies. If a
reasonable doubt exists, the verdict must be one of acquittal. 11
In the case at bar, the evidence for the People is undeniably insufficient to sustain a
conviction. The uncorroborated, vacillating and inherently improbable testimony of the
offended party has itself created doubts as to the guilt of the accused. For one, it failed to
establish the presence of violence or intimidation which is the common element of the
component offenses charged here as a complex crime. A number of circumstances, culled
from the testimony of the offended party, belies her claim that she was forcibly abducted
and raped by appellant.
Graphic illustrations thereof are found in the following observations of the Solicitor General
which we quote with approval:
1. From September 16, 1985 to September 20, 1985 appellant and
complainant transferred from one house to another. They travelled by
the road, in broad daylight at that, meeting several people on the way.
Complainant, therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek the
help of other people and free herself from appellant if indeed she was
abducted and abused by the latter. She met several members of
appellant's family and relatives. At least one of them could have
disfavored the alleged abduction and could have helped complainant had
there been any perceivable indication of resistance on her part. On the
contrary, the allegation of appellant's sister that she suggested to bring
complainant home because she knew complainant's mother, but yet
37
complainant refused as she would rather be with appellant. This
assertion of appellant's sister on the witness stand remains unrebutted.
2. Significantly, the house of appellant's sister where she and appellant
spent the night after the first sexual intercourse by the banana plantation
is just a stone's throw away from the P.C. Detachment (tsn Leoparte,
November 18, 1987, p. 11). Right there and then, complainant could have
readily sought the help of the P.C. authorities if she wanted to. That she
did not only points to the inevitable conclusion that indeed she eloped
with appellant.
3. Per complainant's own testimony, the first in the series of sexual
encounters between her and appellant occurred at the banana plantation
around 7:00 p.m. of September 16, 1985. The details of this first sexual
intercourse were revealed during the cross examination. The banana
plantation adverted to is about 2 kilometers away from the railroad track
where allegedly appellant first accosted complainant (tsn Idea,
September 18, 1986, p. 30).i•t•c-aüsl There, while she was sitting down
in a squatting position, appellant started to remove her clothings: first
her maong shorts, then her panty, the blouse, and the skirt (Ibid, Nov. 27,
1986, p. 16), and appellant also removed her brassiere. While appellant
was engaged in the ceremony of removing all her clothings and
underwear (according to complainant she was wearing several clothings
and underwears one after the other), he was kissing her on the cheeks
(Ibid, p. 10). Then appellant transferred towards her back in order to
loosen and remove her bra. From behind appellant continued kissing her
on the lips and cheeks, at the same time caressing her nipples with his
left and right hands (Ibid, p. 13). Later, when both of them were totally
naked, appellant made her lie down on a banana leaf which appellant
had earlier prepared as cover (Ibid, p. 18). And the sexual act was
consummated.
This vivid description coming as it does from complainant herself of the
preliminaries and the sexual union itself between her and appellant
cannot be anything else but a manifestation of a mutual passion and
longing for each other. Certainly, the foregoing circumstances belie any
pretense on the part of the complainant that she offered resistance
thereto. On the contrary complainant's testimony is pure and simple
lovemaking, immoral though it may be, yet still lovemaking in the true
sense of the art. For, a rapist, whose only objective at the moment is the
satisfaction of his lust, would not understandably have the time much
less the concern to remove all of his victim's clothing, including his own,
and indulge in the sexual act preceded as it was by such intimate and
elaborate foreplay. That the sexual union was consummated when
appellant and complainant were in total nakedness, appellant having
removed complainant's dress and underwear with such ease, only
signifies that she was a willing partner to the love tryst. In fact,
complainant while describing the sexual intercourse, never mentioned on
her own initiative any form of resistance from her. For that matter, the
resistance she claims to have employed, albeit weakly, was only in
response to the question of counsel, aware perhaps that without
resistance the complaint for rape against appellant is doomed. Worse still
is the reason advanced by complainant for resisting the sexual act. She
allegedly resisted appellant not because she does not like it but simply
because she was already getting married to another man.
In the same vein, the subsequent sexual intercourses between
complainant and appellant in a house of the latter's uncle, where only the
two of them stayed for two nights, and in appellant's own house, were no
less than part of their pre-marital honeymoon. They indulged in the
sexual activity while being completely naked with such frequency and
regularity. No resistance ever came from complainant except the lame
allegation that she was getting married to another man.
4. As complainant's theory of abduction with rape crumbles, appellant's
claim that they eloped because they are sweetheart gains more solid
grounds. Complainant admitted that the various woman's dresses and
underthings in appellant's possession were hers. However, she failed to
explain why they were all in appellant's possession. The only logical
explanation is that which was offered by appellant. That when he and
complainant met on the night of September 16, 1985, she was carrying
with her some clothes, aside from what she was wearing. Here again the
physical facts of the case belie any claim of abduction. For when a
woman leaves her own house with some extra clothes with her, the
theory of elopement is more credible than the allegation of abduction.
5. Appellant's claim that he and complainant eloped because they were
lovers is further fortified by the unrebutted testimony of Pastor Opo, the
Barangay Captain, who categorically stated that appellant and
complainant appeared before him seeking his help so that they could be
married. He even reduced their statements into writing and let them sign
it. The prosecution's inability to present evidence to rebut this damaging
allegation only proves that the charge of abduction with rape is more
imaginary than real.
6. Finally, it is intriguing how complainant's parents and the P.C.
authorities were able to trace that she was with appellant. Her parents
must have had some idea of the blooming love affair between her and
appellant such that when she disappeared her parents knew right away
where to locate her. It can, therefore, be safely assumed, without fear of
contradiction that the criminal case against the appellant was initiated by
the family of the complainant and the latter was only freed to sustain the
same. 12
38
The recital of the foregoing circumstances, taken not only from the defense evidence but
from that of the prosecution itself, cannot but support the claim of appellant that the
offended party went with him voluntarily and that their sexual relations thereafter were with
their mutual consent. We are accordingly convinced that, as prayed for by appellant and
recommended by the Solicitor General, a verdict of not guilty should be handed down in this
case.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-
appellant Bienvenido Leoparte is ACQUITTED of the crime charged, with costs de oficio. His
immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless he is being held on other legal
grounds.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

39
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila;
and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce,
only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us
the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate,
Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed
by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in
private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage
and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where
the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under
German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding
and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that,
while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as
early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant
Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review,
the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of
two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed
and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal
Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the
other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as
Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the
same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be
dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No.
87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to
both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if
the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further
proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely
reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the
suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the
petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was
also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied
by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed
the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter
entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the
petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel
were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the
lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that
the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private
offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree
under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of
Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for
the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
40
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed
by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary
Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it
is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court
cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is
made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule
in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment
did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended
spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation
to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in
civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil
cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean
that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have
been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by
the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the
complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which
cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the
offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action,
or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to
suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as
cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that
the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action
for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law
would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant
to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status
or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if
his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status beforeor subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or
was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We
would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when
he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific
issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist
where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized
as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for
adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and
existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse
no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute
provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce
subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings
to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint
of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband
of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had
ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists
that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We
have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse,
as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the
statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be
such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced
that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
41
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter
filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property
and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the
right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously
demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any
of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the
husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void,
until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it
cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the
declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent
to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint
for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on.
Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in
said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe
termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and
requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in
this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore
cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals
that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery,
although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue
determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is
hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the
decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or
consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular
formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article
333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be
afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare
adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be

42
G.R. No. L-32215 October 17, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANTIAGO 0. TAÑADA Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
(Branch V), respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
We set aside the dismissal decreed in the Order dated May 4, 1970 of respondent Judge
Santiago O. Tañada in Criminal Case No. V-13048 entitled "People v. Postrero" of the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cebu, Branch V.
The information in Criminal Case No. V-13048 charging Romulo Postrero of rape was filed on
September 17, 1968, by Assistant Cebu City Fiscal Jose Batiquin. It reads:
The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of the City of Cebu, upon sworn complaint
originally filed by the offended party, Victoria Capillan, attached hereto and made
part hereof and marked as Annex "A" accused Romulo Postrero of the crime of
RAPE, committed as follows:
That in the evening of August 15, 1968, (sometime past 6:40 p.m. thereof) at the
Queen Hotel of this city, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of, or sexual intercourse with the complainant Victoria Capillan, through
the expediency and by means of depriving the latter of her reason and otherwise
facilitating the carnal knowledge by rendering said complainant tired, weakened
and semi-conscious the accused having previous thereto offered and given Victoria
Capillan a beverage to drink (seven-up) and from the partaking of which said
complainant felt physical weakness and still much later deprived of reason, thus
the accused brought about this condition on the complainant to ravish the
complainant with impunity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Annex "A" referred to in the information is the sworn letter-complaint for rape filed by
Victoria Capillan with the Office of the City Fiscal, Cebu City, on September 16, 1968. Said
letter-complaint reads:
Sir:
I am filing a criminal charge of RAPE against Romulo Postrero of 183-D B. Rodriguez
Street, Cebu City committed as follows:
That on or about 6:40 p.m. or so, on August 15, 1968, in the City of Cebu, one
Romulo Postrero invited me for a snack at Quiapo Restaurant of this City and he
ordered me to consume my soft drink (seven-up) at once and, thereafter, I felt
sleepy, drowsy, dizzy and very weak. Then he brought me to Queen Hotel, and then
and there raped me and have carnal knowledge with me and while I was still half
conscious as if I was drugged, to my own damage and prejudice.
I hope that a preliminary investigation be conducted immediately preparatory to
the filing of a criminal complaint.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) VICTORIA A. CAPILLAN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 16th day of September, 1968, at the
City of Cebu, Philippines.
(Sgd.) JOSE BATIQUIN
Asst. Fiscal, City of Cebu 2
On April 21, 1970, the accused filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground that
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the offense charged, as the information filed by
the fiscal is not a complaint signed by the offended party as required by the provisions of
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court to the
effect that 'the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party."
Over the opposition of the prosecution, respondent judge issued the Order dated May 4,
1970, 3 granting the motion and dismissing the case for lack of a valid complaint. The
prosecution moved for a reconsideration, but the same was denied in an Order dated June
13, 1970. Hence, the present recourse.
As above intimated, we find the petition meritorious.
In granting the motion of the accused, respondent judge relied upon our decision in People v.
Santos 4 to the effect that unless the same is filed in court, a "salaysay" or sworn statement
of the offended party, which prompted the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation and
then to file an information in court, is not the complaint required by Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code.
This ruling is not controlling in the case at bar. In the first place, the rule of "complaint filed in
court" enunciated therein has already been modified. In the 1966 case of Valdepeñas v.
People 5 this Court, through then Associate, later Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, clarified:
... It is true that pursuant to the third paragraph of Art. 344 of the Revised Penal
Code,
43
 ... the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be instituted upon the sworn complaint of the offended party, and even attached and
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents ... incorporated the complaint as follows:

The provision does not determine, however, the jurisdiction of our courts over the The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of the City of Cebu, upon sworn complaint originally filed by
offenses therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same the offended party, Victoria Capillan—attached hereto and made part hereof and marked as
is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal Code, which Annex "A"—accuses Romulo Postrero of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows: ...
deals primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the
punishment of the culprit. The complaint required in said Article is merely a Clearly, the letter-complaint filed by the offended party Capillan contains all the elements of
condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to a valid complaint as it "states the names of the defendants, the designation of the offense by
prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has been imposed out of the the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer offended party, the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. wherein the offense was committed. 10
(Samilin v. CFI of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298, 304)
Upon these premises alone, it is evident that the respondent judge erred in finding that there
In the case at bar, the offended woman and her mother have negated such was no valid complaint filed by the offended party in the charge of rape.
preference by filing the complaint adverted to above ... 6
There is another cogent reason why the import of the appealed orders cannot be sustained.
This ruling was followed in the subsequent case of People v. Babasa 7 where the Court, citing
the Valdepeñas case, ruled that "Art. 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of
As correctly pointed out by counsel for the People, to rule that the complaint for rape in the
benefiting the accused. When it is said that the requirement in Article 344 that there should
instant case, and in all other crimes covered by the third paragraph of Article 344 of the
be a complaint of the offended party or her relatives is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it
Penal Code should be filed in court, is violative of the Charter of Cebu City and contravenes
is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers
our decision in Balite v. People 11 to the effect that all complaints must first be filed before
jurisdiction on the Court to try the case. The court's jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary
the City Fiscal since he has the exclusive power to investigate all charges of crimes pursuant
Law ..." 8
to the provisions of the first paragraph, Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 58 (Cebu City
Charter).
In People v. Ilarde 9 we again cited the Valdepenas case in setting aside the orders which
dismissed an information for adultery under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code filed by
Accordingly, the procedure taken by the offended party in the instant case of filing first a
the City Fiscal of Iloilo upon a sworn complaint originally lodged before the fiscal's office,
complaint before the Office of the City Fiscal, which complaint was adopted by the fiscal and
charging the private respondents therein with the crime of adultery, which sworn complaint
attached to and made part of the corresponding information filed after investigation,
was attached to the information. In overruling the lower court's reliance on People v. Santos,
sufficiently complies with the requirement of Article 344 of the Penal Code and Section 4,
supra, in dismissing the case, the Court, through Justice Venicio Escolin, correctly emphasized
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in accordance with our pronouncement in the Valdepeñas
that the overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition
case. Further, it was the proper procedure, and it remains so, pursuant to the Charter of
precedent prescribed in Article 344 has been complied with is the intent of the aggrieved
Cebu City.
party to seek judicial redress for the affront committed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Secondly, as we pointed out in the Ilarde case, the "salaysay" executed by the complainant in
Branch V, in Criminal Case No. V-13048, dated May 4 and June 13, 1970, are hereby set aside,
Santos was not considered the complaint contemplated by Article 344 of the Revised Penal
and respondent judge or the incumbent presiding judge is directed to proceed with the trial
Code because it was a mere narration of how the crime of rape was committed against her.
of the case on the merits without delay.
However, in the letter-complaint submitted by Victoria Capillan, the latter not only narrated
the facts and circumstances constituting the crime of rape, but she also explicitly and
categorically charged accused Romulo Postrero with the said offense. Thus- Considering the number of years that this case has been pending, and in the interest of
justice, this decision is immediately executory. No costs.
I am filing a criminal charge of RAPE against Romulo Postrero ...
SO ORDERED.
Moreover, in Santos, the fiscal did not mention the offended party in the opening statement
of the information. In the case at bar, the fiscal expressly stated that the information was Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

44
G.R. No. L-12724 January 31, 1958 foreign exchange, the only subject of the authority of theMonetary Board to license under
Section 74; and (e) that Circular No. 37 (now Circular No. 60) amends and enlarges the scope
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, of Sections 2710 and 2711of the Revised Administrative Code.
vs.
CARIDAD CAPISTRANO, defendant-appellant. While there are good reasons for upholding the validity of Circular No. 60of the Central Bank
under the authority given to the Monetary Board by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 265 as
C.A.S. Sipin, Jr. for appellant. interpreted by this Court in Peoplevs. Exconde, 101 Phil., 1125 we don't deem it necessary
Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for appellee. however to go into ameticulous discussion of the issues raised by appellant, it being
sufficientto state that, on the hypothesis that such circular is valid, the informationsuffers
from a fatal defect in that it does not allege an important elementwhich is considered
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
indispensable to constitute a violation of the circularin question.

Caridad Capistrano was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal with the violation of
As expressly recited in the information, appellant is accused of violatingSection 1 (b) of
Circular No. 37, as implemented by Circular No. 60, Section 1 (b) of the Central Bank, in
Circular No. 60 of the Central Bank the pertinent portions of which we quote:
relation to Section 34 of Republic ActNo. 265, committed as follows:

Section 1. The import and export of Philippine coins and notes including but not
The undersigned City Attorney accuses Caridad Capistrano of Violation of Circular
limited to drafts checks, money orders and/or other bills of exchange inPhilippine
No. 37, as implemented by Circular No. 60, Section 1 (b) of the Central Bank, in
pesos drawn on banks operating in the Philippines, or any order for payment in
relation to section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, committed as follows:
Philippine pesos, is prohibited without the necessary license issued by the Central
Bank, except in the following cases;
That on or about the 31st day of March, 1955, in the Manila International Airport,
Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
(b) Outgoing Philippine residents and transient visitors leaving the Philippines may
above-named accused, Caridad Capistrano, and outgoingPhilippine resident who
take with them Philippine coins and notes in an amount not exceeding P100,
had booked passage and ready to leave the Philippinesfor Hongkong through
provided the coins do not exceed P5. (Emphasis supplied).
Philippine Air Lines plane, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in her possession and control, concealed in her person, in a sanitary pad
(Kotex brand) the following, to wit. From the above it is manifest that in order that the pertinent portion of the circular may be
infringed, it is necessary to allege that the outgoing Philippine resident or transient visitor
has taken or is about to take out ofthe Philippines Philippine coins and notes in excess of the
100 pcs at P50.00 each —— P5,000.00 Contrary to Law.
exempted amounts without the necessary license issued by the Central Bank. An examination
of the information does not show any averment of this element. This omission makes the
A motion to quash having been denied, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. When the charge alleged in the information insufficient to constitute an offense for which apppelant
case was called for trial, however, she admitted the act alleged in the information but may be convicted and rendered amenable to the penalty prescribed by law.
averred that said act did not constitute a public offense. Thereafter, without either the
prosecution or the defense adducing any evidence, the lower court rendered judgment
. . . The complaint, in a criminal case, must state every fact necessary tomake out
finding the accusedguilty and sentencing her to suffer one month imprisonment and pay a
an offense, (U. S. vs. Cook, 17 Wall. (U.S.), 168.) The complaint must show, on its
fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. She
face that, if the facts alleged are true, an offense hasbeen committed. It must state
appealed from this decision directly to this Court on purely questions of law.
explicitly and directly every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute an
offense. (U.S., vs. Pompeya, 31 Phil., 245, 256-257).
In this appeal the accused reiterated her plea that the act alleged in the information does not
constitute a public offense because Circular No. 60 of the Central Bank, the violation of which
Where the information is not merely defective but it does not charge any offense
she is charged, is null and void, predicating her contention on the following grounds: (a) that
at all, technically speaking that information does not exist in contemplation of law.
it was not approved by the President of the Philippines as required by the Central Bank Act
(People vs. Austria, 50 Off. Gaz., No. 5, p. 1967; 94 Phil., 897.).
(Republic Act No. 265); (b) that the exercise of the powers by theMonetary Board of the
Central Bank under Section 74 of said Act is authorized only during exchange crisis; (c) that
the delegation by Congress to the Monetary Board of the power to declare the existence of Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The appellant is acquitted and
an exchange crisis is unconstitutional; (d) that Circular No.60 is ultra vires in that it treats of the sum of P5,000 confiscated from her ordered returned to her,with costs de oficio.
the licensee of the importation and exportation of Philippine currency which is alien to

45
[G.R. Nos. 116259-60. February 20, 1996]
SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, Third Division, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 118896-97. February 20, 1996]
SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated original actions for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioner Salvador P. Socrates assailing the orders and resolution issued by respondent
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028, both entitled People of
the Philippines vs. Salvador P. Socrates. In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, petitioner assails the legality
of (a) the order dated February 9, 1994 denying petitioners Amended and Consolidated
Motion to Quash the Informations;1 (b) the order dated May 24, 1994 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation;2 and (c) the order dated July 20, 1994 denying the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order of May 24, 1994.3 On the other hand, in G.R.
Nos. 118896-97 petitioner seeks the annulment of the Resolution dated December 23,
19944 ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner as Provincial Governor of Palawan for
a period of ninety (90) days, and to enjoin respondent court from enforcing the same.
The antecedent facts, as may be culled from the Comment filed by the Solicitor General
in G.R. Nos. 116259-60, are as follows:
Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was first elected governor of the said
province in 1968 and was again reelected in both the 1971 and 1980 elections, until he was
replaced by private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez as Officer-In-Charge Governor after
the EDSA Revolution in February 1986. Subsequently, both petitioner and Rodriguez ran for
governor in the 1988 elections where the latter emerged victorious. In the 1992
synchronized national and local elections, the two again contested the gubernatorial post;
and this time, it was petitioner who won.
Meanwhile, at the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the province, the Provincial
Government of Palawan, as represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial Board Members of
Palawan, filed before the Office of the Tanodbayan two (2) complaints both
dated December 5, 1986 and docketed as TBP No. 86-01119. The first complaint charged
petitioner with violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the second charged petitioner, together with
several other provincial officers, with violation of Section 3(a) and (g) of the same law
(Annexes A & A-I , respectively, Petition).
Instead of filing a counter-affidavit as directed, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend
Preliminary investigation dated September 3, 1987 on the ground that upon the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution, the present Tanodbayan has been transformed into the Office of
the Special Prosecutor and has, therefore, lost his power to conduct preliminary investigation
(Annex C, ibid).
In a letter to the Honorable Tanodbayan dated June 23, 1988, however, Nelia Yap-Fernandez,
the Deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor from the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto
Princesa City, requested that she be allowed to inhibit herself from handling the preliminary
investigation of the present case considering that petitioner appears to be her co-principal
sponsor in a wedding ceremony held last May 28, 1988 (Annex C-3, ibid.).
On January 16, 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman received a letter from Rodriguez, who
was then the incumbent governor of the province, inquiring about the present status of TBP
No. 86-01 119 (Annex D, ibid.). In its 4th Indorsement dated February 7, 1989, the
Ombudsman referred the matter of continuing and terminating the investigation of the
present case to the newly deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor, Sesinio Belen from the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor (Annex D-1, ibid.). However, the latter, in his 5th Indorsement
dated February 27, 1989 to the Ombudsman, requested that the present case be reassigned
to another Prosecutor considering that he is a long time close friend and compadre of
petitioner and that one of the complainants therein Eustaquio Gacott, Jr., who was formerly
a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is now the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan, his
present superior (Annex D-2, ibid.).
On April 25, 1989, petitioner was directed by the Ombudsman to comment on the letter-
manifestation dated April 4, 1989 filed by Rodriguez requesting that an amendment be
effected on certain portions of the present complaint (Annexes E & E-2, ibid.). No comment
having been received by the Ombudsman as of May 24, 1989, petitioner, on an even date,
was again directed to comment thereon (Annex E-1, ibid.). Finally, petitioner filed his
required comment dated June 2, 1989 (Annex E-3, ibid.).
Based on the Resolution dated August 27, 1992 of Special Prosecution Officer I Wendell
Barreras-Sulit (Annex F-2, ibid.), which affirmed the Resolution dated February 21, 1992
rendered by Ombudsman Investigator Ernesto Nocos recommending the filing of appropriate
charges against petitioner, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed on September 16, 1992
with the respondent Court two (2) Informations against petitioner, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028. The first was for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No.
3019, and the second for violation of Section 3(e) of the same law (Annexes F & F-1, ibid.).
Before his arraignment could be set, petitioner initially filed an Urgent Motion for Quashal of
Information and/or Reinvestigation in the Light of Supervening Facts. However, when the
said motion was subsequently called for hearing, petitioners counsel was made to choose
46
which of the aforesaid two (2) conflicting motions he preferred to take up with respondent
Court. Thus, onJanuary 18, 1993, petitioner filed an Amended and Consolidated Motion to
Quash the Information in the Above-entitled Cases. After an Opposition and a Reply were
filed by the prosecution and petitioner, respectively, respondent court issued its first assailed
Resolution on February 9, 1994, denying the same (Annex G, ibid.).
On March 15, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation,
which was subsequently denied by respondent court in its second assailed Resolution issued
on May 24, 1992 (Annex H-1 , ibid.).5
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. Nos.
116259-60, challenging the aforementioned orders of the Sandiganbayan for allegedly having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It was
likewise prayed that respondent court be enjoined from taking cognizance of and from
proceeding with the arraignment of petitioner and the trial and hearing of Criminal Cases
Nos. 18027-28 pending before it. Respondents thereafter filed their Comment to which a
Reply was submitted by petitioner.
In the meantime, no temporary restraining order having been issued by this Court in
G.R. Nos. 116259-60, respondent court proceeded with the arraignment of herein petitioner
on October 5, 1994 wherein a plea of not guilty was entered for him by the court after he
refused to do so. Thereafter, with the denial of petitioners motion to quash the informations,
the prosecution filed on October 11, 1994 before respondent court a Motion to Suspend
Accused Pendente Lite6 pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. Petitioner opposed
said motion on the ground that the validity of the informations filed against him is still
pending review before the Supreme Court. He further contended therein that Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, on which the motion to suspend is based, is unconstitutional in that it
constitutes an undue delegation of executive power and is arbitrary and discriminatory.
In view of the filing of the motion for his suspension, petitioner filed on October 14,
1994 in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 a Supplemental Petition7 questioning the veracity of and
seeking to restrain respondent court from acting on said motion to suspend pendente
lite, the hearing of which was scheduled on October 17, 1994. However, before respondents
could file their comment thereto as required by this Court, petitioner, who initially sought
the holding in abeyance of further action on his supplemental petition until after respondent
court shall have resolved the motion to suspend pendente lite, eventually decided to
withdraw the same purportedly in order not to delay the disposition of the main petition.
Hence, on January 16, 1995, this Court issued a resolution8 granting the motion to withdraw
the supplemental petition and considering the petition in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 as submitted
for resolution.
In the interim, petitioner filed before respondent court on November 28, 1994 an
amended motion to include as co-principals: (a) in Criminal Case No. 18028, the members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who authorized the purchase and repair of the vessel in
question; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 18027, the Board of Directors of ERA Technology and
Resources Corporation which entered into a contract with the Province of
Palawan.9 Petitioner argued that the non-inclusion of these co-principals violates his right to
due process and equal protection of the laws which thus rendered the informations null and
void. It appears that the prosecution did not oppose nor object to this amended motion.
On December 23, 1994, respondent court, without ruling on petitioners motion to
include co-principals, issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to
suspend pendente lite and ordering the suspension of petitioner as Provincial Governor
of Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days from notice.
His motion for the reconsideration thereof having been denied, another petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a restraining order was filed by petitioner on
February 20, 1995 against the same respondents, docketed as G.R. Nos. 118896-97, and
which seeks to annul as well as to enjoin respondent court from enforcing its resolution
dated December 23, 1994 ordering his suspension pendente lite. On March 8, 1995, the Court
resolved to consolidate this second petition with G.R. Nos. 116259-60.
From the mosaic of the foregoing events and the incidents interjected therein, the
following pattern of contentious issues has emerged:
In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, the validity of the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos.
18027-28 is being contested on three grounds, viz.: (1) the respondent court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case on the ground that an inordinate delay of six (6) years between the
conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent filing of the informations
against petitioner constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of
the case and due process of law pursuant to the Tatad doctrine; (2) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; and (3) since the acts charged in the complaints filed before the
Tanodbayan are different from the charges contained in the informations, another
preliminary investigation should have been conducted, in the absence of which there is a
denial of due process.
In G.R. Nos. 118896-97, petitioner questions the validity of the suspension order in
that: (1) he may not be suspended while the issue on the validity of the informations filed
against him is still pending review before the Supreme Court; and (2) Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 3019, which forms the basis of the order of suspension, is unconstitutional on the
ground that it constitutes an undue delegation of the authority to suspend which is
essentially an executive power. Petitioner contends that the jurisprudential doctrines relied
upon by respondent court in upholding the constitutionality of Section 13 are not applicable
to the cases at bar which involve an issue not yet passed upon by this Court. In addition,
petitioner again attacks the legality of the subject informations for having been filed in
violation of the due process and equal protection clauses by reason of the non-inclusion
therein, as co-principals, of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who approved the
purchase of the vessel, as well as the board of directors of ERA Technology and Resource
Corporation which entered into a contract with the Province of Palawan.
I. G.R. Nos. 116259-60
1. In asserting that there was a violation of his right to a speedy trial by reason of the
unreasonable delay of six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary investigation and
the filing of the informations, petitioner invokes the doctrine laid down in the leading case
of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.10 In said case, all the affidavits and counter-affidavits had
already been filed with the Tanodbayan for final disposition as of October 25, 1982 but it was
only on June 12, 1985, or three (3) years thereafter, that the informations accusing Tatad of a
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The Court held
there that an inordinate delay of three (3) years in the conduct and termination of the
preliminary investigation is violative of the constitutional rights of the accused to due process
47
and speedy disposition of his case, by reason of which the informations filed against the
accused therein were ordered dismissed. It must be emphasized, however, that in
the Tatad case, no explanation or ratiocination was advanced by the prosecution therein as
to the cause of the delay.
In the present case, as distinguished from the factual milieu obtaining
in Tatad, respondent court found that the six-year delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation was caused by petitioners own acts. Thus:
In the cases at bar, the record shows that delay in the filing of the Informations in these cases
was caused, not by inaction of the prosecution, but by the following actuations of the
accused:
(1) Sometime after the complaint of private complainant was filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of the City of Puerto Princesa, preliminary investigation was held in abeyance on
account of the motion of accused Salvador P. Socrates, entitled Motion to Suspend
Preliminary Investigation. Suspension was prayed for until an Ombudsman, as provided in
Executive Order No. 243, shall have been appointed;
(2) Preliminary investigation was interrupted when private complainant, then Governor
Victoriano J. Rodriguez, filed on April 24, 1989, a letter-manifestation correcting the
complaint;
(3) Only on September 22, 1989 did the accused in these cases file with the Office of the
Ombudsman a reply to complainants manifestation;
(4) In view of the foregoing actuations of the parties, preliminary investigation of these cases
was started in earnest only on June 25, 1990. Respondents then, including the accused
herein, were required to submit counter-affidavits;
(5) Interrupting preliminary proceedings again, accused Governor Salvador P. Socrates,
on August 13, 1990, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds:
(a) That the Honorable Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent; and
(b) That the complaint does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.
The private complainant was, as a matter of right, granted a period of time within which to
oppose the motion. The prosecution necessarily had to ponder on the motion after
protracted deliberations;
(6) On April 1, 1991, counsel for the accused filed an Appearance and Motion for Extension of
Time to File Appropriate Pleading. Counsel prayed that respondents be granted an extension
of twenty (20) days within which to comply with the order of March 11, 1991;
(7) The accused Governor Salvador P. Socrates, through counsel, filed a motion to
quash/dismiss on December 17, 1991. This pleading was received by the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman only on January 13, 1992. It took some time for the prosecution to resolve the
motion and there never was any intimation on the part of the accused that the accused was
invoking his right to a speedy disposition of the complaint against him. The motion to
quash/dismiss was in fact denied by the prosecution in an order dated January 20, 1990;
(8) A motion for reconsideration having been filed thereafter, the Informations in these cases
were after all filed on September 16, 1992, but only after the ruling of the prosecution on the
motion to quash/dismiss.11
Petitioner, in a futile attempt to refute the foregoing factual findings of respondent
court, could only raise the defense that the motion to suspend the preliminary investigation
did not affect the proceedings therein; that the preliminary investigation really started on
February 18, 1987 when the Tanodbayan issued subpoenas to the respondents; that the
motion to dismiss/quash the complaints was purposely for the early termination of the
preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated, as may be
gleaned from the affidavit of complainant Rodriguez; and that pursuant to Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, the case should have been resolved within ten (10) days from the
time the investigation was concluded.
Clearly, the facts of the case at bar are diametrically opposed to the factual situation
in Tatad because the obviously delaying tactics resorted to by herein petitioner were not
present in the latter case. Furthermore, the allegation that the filing of the complaint was
politically motivated does not serve to justify the nullification of the informations where the
existence of such motive has not been sufficiently established nor substantial evidence
presented in support thereof. The situation in Tatad was quite to the contrary since the
accused therein successfully proved that the charges were filed against him only after it
became widely known that he actually had a falling out with the late President Marcos.
That scenario impelled the Court to make the admonition therein that prosecutors
should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used
or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or
subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice
evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak
or strong, powerless or mighty. Such an exigency apparently does not obtain in the case at
bar. There is nothing in the records from which it can be conclusively inferred, expressly or
impliedly, that the investigating prosecutors were politically motivated or even coerced into
filing these criminal charges against petitioner.
We likewise do not adhere to petitioners asseveration that the orders issued by
Branches 51 and 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City quashing the
informations for technical malversation filed against herein petitioner, on the ground that
the inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation constitutes a
violation of petitioners right to due process and speedy disposition of his case which thereby
ousted said courts of jurisdiction thereover, have become final and conclusive by reason of
the prosecutions failure to file an appeal therefrom. We have carefully scrutinized the orders
adverted to and we find and so hold that the same cannot effectively deter the prosecution
herein from proceeding with the trial before the Sandiganbayan.
48
 First, the criminal cases for technical malversation filed before said Regional Trial Court
are different from the charges for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 filed with the
Sandiganbayan. The former is covered by a general law while the latter involves a special law,
with variant elements of the offenses being required, hence double jeopardy cannot set
in. Second, and more importantly, it will be noted that the trial court in the malversation case
hastily concluded that there was an inordinate delay of six (6) years in the termination of the
preliminary investigation through the mere expedient of counting the number of years that
had elapsed from the institution of the complaint with the Ombudsman until the filing of the
informations in court, without bothering to inquire into the pertinent factual considerations
and procedural technicalities involved.
In arriving at such a self-serving conclusion, the trial court confined itself strictly to a
mathematical reckoning of the time involved, instead of undertaking a more substantive
appreciation of the circumstances and particulars which could have possibly caused the
delay. On the contrary, herein respondent court has convincingly shown that the preliminary
investigation dragged on for several years owing, ironically, to petitioners evident propensity
to resort to dilatory tactics. In the cases now before us, it cannot be successfully and validly
contended that petitioners right to speedy trial has been violated.
We have only to reiterate the declaration made in Tatad to the effect that in the
application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases,
particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. It is
palpably clear that the application of the Tatad doctrine should not be made to rely solely on
the length of time that has passed but equal concern should likewise be accorded to the
factual ambiance and considerations. It can easily be deduced from a complete reading of
the adjudicatory discourse in Tatad that the three-year delay was specifically considered vis--
vis all the facts and circumstances which obtained therein. Perforce, even on this ground
alone, the instant petition for certiorari should be dismissed.
A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the
rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The primordial
purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an accused by delaying
criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time.12 In the cases at bar, while there may
have been some delay, it was petitioner himself who brought about the situation of which he
now complains.
2. Petitioner then questions the sufficiency of the allegations in the informations in that
the same do not constitute an offense supposedly because (a) in Criminal Case No. 18027,
there is no statement that herein petitioner actually intervened and participated, as a board
member of ERA Technology and Resources Corporation, in the latters contract with the
Province of Palawan, which is allegedly an element necessary to constitute a violation of
Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 18028, the information
failed to show a causal relation between the act done by the accused and the undue injury
caused to the provincial government of Palawan.
With respect to the alleged defects in the information filed in Criminal Case No. 18027
for violation of Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law, petitioner invokes the ruling in the case
of Trieste, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan13 where it was held that what is contemplated in Section
3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has
financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. In the cited case, however,
the Court found that the petitioner therein did not, in any way, intervene in making the
awards and payment of the purchases in question since he signed the voucher only after all
the purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for by the municipal treasurer.
The purchases involved therein were previously ordered by the municipal treasurer
without the knowledge and consent of the accused municipal mayor, were subsequently
delivered by the supplier, and were thereafter paid by the treasurer again without the
knowledge and consent of the mayor. The only participation of the accused mayor in the
transaction involved the mechanical act of signing the disbursement vouchers for record
purposes only. Thus, the Court did not consider the act therein of the accused mayor to be
covered by the prohibition under Section 3(h) of the law.
Contrariwise, in the present cases, petitioner Socrates stands charged with a violation
of Section 3(h) for intervening in his official capacity as Governor of Palawan in reviewing and
approving the disbursement voucher dated August 2, 1982 for payment in favor of ERA
Technology Resources Corporation where he was one of the incorporators and members of
the board of directors. Such allegation clearly indicates the nature and extent of petitioners
participation in the questioned transaction. Without petitioners approval, payment could not
possibly have been effected.
We likewise do not find any flaw in the information filed in Criminal Case No. 18028,
for violation of Section 3(e), which would warrant the dismissal thereof. Evidentiary facts
need not be alleged in the information because these are matters of defense. Informations
need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the
trial.14 Hence, there is no need to state facts in the information which would prove the causal
relation between the act done by the accused and the undue injury caused to
the Province of Palawan. Antipodal to petitioners contention, a reading of the information in
Criminal Case No. 18028 will readily disclose that the essential elements of the offense
charged have been sufficiently alleged therein. It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the
charges right at the outset without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller
ventilation and examination. Given all the circumstances of this case, we feel it would be
unwarranted to cut off the prosecutory process at this stage of the proceedings and to
dismiss the information.15
3. It is likewise asserted by petitioner that the elements of the offenses charged in the
complaints are different from those stated in the informations which were filed before the
Sandiganbayan, and that since there was no preliminary investigation conducted with
respect to the latter, such informations should be declared null and void for lack of due
process.
The first complaint for violation of Section 3(b) became the basis for the filing of an
information in Criminal Case No. 18027 for a violation of Section 3(h). In both, petitioner is
accused of intervening in his official capacity as Provincial Governor in the contracts for the
installation and construction of waterwork projects, with the ERA Technology and Resources
Corporation, where he was an incorporator and a member of the board of directors, thereby
directly or indirectly benefiting from said transactions. In Criminal Case No. 18028, petitioner
was charged with a violation of Section 3(e) as a result of the complaint filed against him and
several others for a violation of Section 3(a) and (g). In both instances, petitioner is charged
with the disbursement of public funds for the purchase of a motor launch which was grossly
49
and manifestly disadvantageous to the provincial government of Palawan because the same
broke down only after its maiden voyage.
It is thus clearly apparent that the complaints and the informations are based on
substantially the same factual settings, except that the respective designations are different.
Axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but its
description in the complaint or information.16 The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. It is not the technical name given
by the fiscal appearing in the title of the information that determines the character of the
crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information.17
This Court has repeatedly held that when the facts, acts and circumstances are set
forth in the body of an information with sufficient certainty to constitute an offense and to
apprise the defendant of the nature of the charge against him, a misnomer or innocuous
designation of a crime in the caption or other parts of the information will not vitiate it. In
such a case, the facts set forth in the charge controls the erroneous designation of the
offense and the accused stands indicted for the offense charged in the statement of facts.
The erroneous designation may be disregarded as surplusage.18
Furthermore, it will be observed that it is the same section of the law which is involved
in the present case, that is, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, albeit it defines several
modes of committing the same offense. It is an old and well-settled rule in the appreciation
of indictments that where an offense may be committed in any of several different modes,
and the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or more
of the modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed through any one of
them, provided that it be such as to constitute the substantive offense. Thereafter, a
judgment of conviction must be sustained if it appears from the evidence in the record that
the accused was guilty as charged of any one of these modes of the offense.19
Neither will the absence of a preliminary investigation, assuming that it is necessary to
conduct a new one, affect the validity of the informations filed against petitioner. It has been
consistently held that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity
of the criminal information or render it defective. Dismissal of the case is not the remedy.20 It
is not a ground for the quashal of a complaint or information. The proper course of action
that should be taken is for the Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance the proceedings upon
such information and to remand the case to the office of the Ombudsman for him or the
Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation,21 if the accused actually makes out
a case justifying such relief.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, therefore, we rule and so hold that the
informations filed against petitioner are valid and legal.
II. G.R. Nos. 118896-97
The main issue submitted herein for resolution is the legality of the petitioners
preventive suspension, which is premised on several grounds.
1. Initially, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of
discretion in ordering his suspension despite the fact that the validity of the informations
filed against him is still pending review before the Supreme Court. In support thereof, he
invokes the rule laid down in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.22 that even if no temporary restraining order was issued by the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals could have refrained from taking any action while the petition for
certiorari was pending with the Supreme Court. Petitioner insists that this is what respondent
court should have done. Under this particular issue, petitioner is in effect seeking a review of
the order issued by the Sandiganbayan, dated February 9, 1994, denying his amended and
consolidated motion to quash the information.
We have but to reiterate the fundamental rule that an order denying a motion to
quash is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for
certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from
the judgment after trial.23 In other words, it cannot be the subject of appeal until the
judgment or a final order is rendered. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is
to enter a plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from
the final judgment.24 Although the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case
there is a grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction, that vitiating error is not attendant
in the present case.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides that:
SEC. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. - Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law,
but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.25
This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a
public officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a pre-
suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to
determine basically the validity of the information, from which the court can have a basis to
either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold
the suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which
impairs its validity. That hearing may be treated in the same manner as a challenge to the
validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.26
In the leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al.27 we have set out the guidelines
to be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension under Section
13 of the law, to wit:
(c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension
from office of public officers charged under a valid information under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019 or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery,
pursuant to Section 13 of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of such
information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused
50
officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended
from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the
prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a
motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of
the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly
hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and
thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order or suspension should it
uphold the validity of the information or withhold such suspension in the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state
that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of
the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due
preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the
Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under
Section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the
grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed by
the Act upon determination of the pendency in court of a criminal prosecution for violation
of the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information requires at the same time that
the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt
suspension envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground alleged in
the quashal motion not to be indubitable, then it shall be called upon to issue the suspension
order upon its upholding the validity of the information and setting the same for trial on the
merits.
With the aforequoted jurisprudential authority as the basis, it is evident that upon a
proper determination of the validity of the information, it becomes mandatory for the court
to immediately issue the suspension order. The rule on the matter is specific and categorical.
It leaves no room for interpretation. It is not within the courts discretion to hold in abeyance
the suspension of the accused officer on the pretext that the order denying the motion to
quash is pending review before the appellate courts. Its discretion lies only during the pre-
suspension hearing where it is required to ascertain whether or not (1) the accused had been
afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the information against him, (2)
the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 or of the provisions of Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or (3) the informations
against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court. 28
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court
must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it.
This is because a preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed as a result of
judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.
In view of this latter provision, the accused elective public officer does not stand to be
prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in the event that the
information is subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the case dismissed as
against him. Taking into consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a
public officer charged under a valid information, the protection of public interest will
definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the accused.29
To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of Republic Act
No. 3019, it is said that the court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine
whether or not a preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his
office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing
malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended, he may
frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way
that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant
for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the
accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court. 30
Applying now the procedure outlined in Luciano, the records of the instant case do not
show that the proceedings leading to the filing of the informations against petitioner were
tainted with any irregularity so as to invalidate the same. Likewise, the informations show
that the allegations contained therein meet the essential elements of the offense as defined
by the substantive law. The record is also bereft of undisputed facts to warrant the quashal
of the informations under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court.31 Finally, a cursory reading of the order dated February 9, 1994 issued by respondent
court will show that petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard on his motion to
quash. Veritably, the Sandiganbayan did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying
the motion to quash and ordering the preventive suspension of herein petitioner.
2. Additionally, petitioner avers that the informations filed against him on which the
order of suspension was based, are null and void in view of the non-inclusion of his co-
principals which thus constitutes a violation of petitioners right to due process and equal
protection of the law and, therefore, ousted respondent court of its jurisdiction over the
case. Petitioner alleges that in Criminal Case No. 18027, the board of directors of ERA
Technology Corporation should have been included as principals by indispensable
cooperation because without them he could not possibly have committed the offense.
Also, he claims that in Criminal Case No. 18028, the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan who issued the resolutions authorizing the purchase and repair of the motor
launch should likewise have been included as principals by inducement or indispensable
cooperation, considering that petitioner was allegedly merely implementing their
resolutions. Hence, according to him, since the informations are null and void, the
suspension order which is based thereon should necessarily also be declared null and void.
We find no merit in petitioners arguments.
First, the rule under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as reformulated in
Section 2, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is that all criminal actions must
be commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the
Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved. The
law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever the
evidence may show to be responsible for an offense. This does not mean, however, that they
shall have no discretion at all; their discretion lies in determining whether the evidence
submitted justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense. What the rule
demands is that all persons who appear responsible shall be charged in the information,
51
which conversely implies that those against whom no sufficient evidence of guilt exists are
not required to be included.32
This notwithstanding, it has equally been ruled that the failure of the fiscal to include
the other public officials who appear to be responsible for the offense charged as co-accused
in the information filed against the accused does not in any way vitiate the validity of the
information under the Rules.33
Second, a failure to include other persons who appear to be responsible for the crime
charged is not one of the grounds provided under Section 3, Rule 117 for which a motion to
quash the information against the accused may be filed, most especially in the case at bar
where there is prima facie proof that petitioner is probably guilty of the offense charged,
aside from the fact that there is no allegation of conspiracy in the informations. Besides, such
an infirmity would neither have the effect of extinguishing or mitigating petitioners liability if
he is subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. No one would contend that if for lack
of knowledge of the facts, by mistake or for any other reason the prosecuting officer fails to
include the names of one or more persons in an information filed by him, who were in fact
guilty participants in the commission of the crime charged therein, such persons will be
relieved of criminal liability; or that those accused who have been charged with the offense,
brought to trial, and found guilty will be permitted to escape punishment merely because it
develops in the course of the trial, or after the trial, that there were other guilty participants
in the crime.34
Granting arguendo that this plaint of petitioner may be invoked as a ground for the
quashal of the informations, the motion to quash must still be denied for having been filed
only after petitioner had been arraigned. Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that (t)he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the
grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy. The failure to
include a co-accused is not covered by the exception; hence, the same is deemed waived.
Third, where the government prosecutor unreasonably refuses to file an information or
to include a person as an accused therein despite the fact that the evidence clearly warrants
such action, the offended party has the following remedies: (1) in case of grave abuse of
discretion, he may file an action for mandamus to compel the prosecutor to file such
information; (2) he may lodge a new complaint against the offenders before the Ombudsman
and have a new examination conducted as required by law; (3) he may institute
administrative charges against the erring prosecutor, or a criminal complaint under Article
208 of the Revised Penal Code, or a civil action for damages under Article 27 of the Civil
Code; (4) he may secure the appointment of another prosecutor; or (5) he may institute
another criminal action if no double jeopardy is involved.
Fourth, it is significant and demonstrative of petitioners strategy that from the
inception of the criminal complaint before the Ombudsman and during the conduct of the
preliminary investigation, until the filing of the informations before the Sandiganbayan and
up to the denial of his amended and consolidated motion to quash, herein petitioner has not
been heard to complain about the alleged non-inclusion of the other supposed offenders.
Indeed, it is now much too late for petitioner to invoke and exploit this particular unfounded
issue.
Prescinding from the averments raised in the complaint and information, from the facts
and evidence of record, we do not deem it necessary to include the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan and the board members of the ERA Technology and
Resources Corporation as co-accused in the informations filed against herein petitioner.
Insofar as the board members of said corporation are concerned, they may be prosecuted
only under Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides that (i)t shall be unlawful for
any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses
defined in Section 3 thereof. In the information filed in Criminal Case No. 18027, petitioner
stands charged with a violation of Section 3(h). It does not contain any allegation to the
effect that the board members knowingly induced or caused herein petitioner to commit the
offense defined therein, which is an essential element of the crime in Section 4(b).
Indubitably, therefore, the board members cannot be included as co-principals in Criminal
Case No. 18027.
On the other hand, the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot likewise be
included in the information for violation of Section 3(e) filed in Criminal Case No. 18028, for
the simple reason that it is not the validity of their resolution which is in issue here. While it
is true that said sanggunian passed a resolution authorizing the allocation of funds for the
purchase of a motor launch, and that petitioner merely acted on the strength thereof, it is
not the fact of such authorization which is the subject of the charges against petitioner but
rather the manner by which that resolution was implemented by the latter. There is nothing
in the averments in the information from which it could be inferentially deduced that the
members of the sanggunian participated, directly or indirectly, in the purchase of the vessel,
and which fact could be the basis for their indictment.
3. Lastly, petitioner questions the legality of his suspension on the ground that Section
13 of Republic Act No. 3019, which is the basis thereof, is unconstitutional for being an
undue delegation of executive power to the Sandiganbayan. He postulates that the power of
suspension, which is an incident of the power of removal, is basically administrative and
executive in nature. He further submits that the power of removal vested in the court under
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3019 is an incident of conviction, that is, it can only be
exercised after a conviction has been handed down. Hence, according to petitioner, since the
power to suspend is merely incidental to the power of removal, the former can only be
exercised as an incident to conviction. Also, considering that Section 13 authorizes the court
to exercise the power of suspension even prior to conviction of the accused, it cannot be
considered as an exercise of judicial power because it is not within the ambit of the courts
power of removal. In addition, petitioner avers that Section 13 is arbitrary and discriminatory
because it serves no purpose at all, in that it does not require a proceeding to determine if
there is sufficient ground to suspend, except for the fact that it is required by law.
Although presented differently, the issue on the courts power of suspension under
Section 13 has been squarely and directly raised and adjudicated in the case of Luciano vs.
Provincial Governor, et al.,35 the pronouncements wherein we quote in extenso:
3. Proceeding from our holding that suspension is not automatic, who should exercise the
mandatory act of suspension under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
52
 Three theories have been advanced. One is that the power of suspension - where a
criminal case has already been filed in court - still is with the Provincial Governor, relying on
Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. Another is that, following the ruling
in Sarcos vs. Castillo x x x, because the main respondents are elective municipal officials, that
power of suspension must be held to repose in the Provincial Board, under Section 5 of the
Decentralization Act of 1967 (Republic Act 5185). The third is that, by Section 13 of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, solely the court in which the criminal case has been filed
shall wield the power of suspension.
We opt for the third. Common sense and the scheme of the law so dictate.
It is true that nothing in Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act grants with
specificity upon the Court of First Instance the power to suspend an official charged with a
violation thereof. It would seem to us though that suspensions by virtue of criminal
proceedings are separate and distinct from suspensions in administrative cases. An accurate
reading of Section 13 yields two methods of investigation, one separate from the other: one
criminal before the courts of justice, and the other administrative. This is the plain import of
the last sentence of Section 13, which says that if acquitted, defendant in an Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices case shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him. Our interpretation but preserves, as it should, the
substantial symmetry between the first part of Section 13 and the last part thereof just
quoted.
And so, there is in this legal provision a recognition that once a case is filed in court, all other
acts connected with the discharge of court functions - which here include suspension -
should be left to the Court of First Instance.
Not that this view finds no statutory support. By Section 9 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, the court is empowered to punish any public official committing any of the
unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the law, amongst others,
to perpetual disqualification from public office. Here, the Makati elective officials heretofore
named have been charged with and found guilty of a violation of Section 3(g) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and were sentenced by the court below, amongst others to
be perpetually disqualified to hold office. Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that
the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification entails (t)he deprivation of the public
offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular
election. No stretch of the imagination is necessary to show that perpetual absolute
disqualification - which, in effect, is encompassed in the punishment set forth in Section 9 of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act - covers that of removal from the office which each
of the respondent municipal official holds.
Since removal from office then is within the power of the court, no amount of judicial
legerdemain would deprive the court of the power to suspend. Reason for this is that
suspension necessarily is included in the greater power of removal. It is without doubt that
Congress has power to authorize courts to suspend public officers pending court proceedings
for removal and that the congressional grant is not violative of the separation of powers. For,
our Constitution being silent, we are not to say that from Congress is withheld the power to
decide the mode or procedure of suspension and removal of public officers.
A look into the legislative intent, along with the legislative scheme, convinces us the more
that the power of suspension should be lodged with the court. While the law may not be a
model of precise verbal structure, the intent is there. Section 13 requires as a pre-condition
of the power to suspend that there be a valid information. Validity of information, of course,
is determined by the Court of First Instance where the criminal case is pending. That is
essentially a judicial function. Suspension is a sequel to that finding, an incident to the
criminal proceedings before the court. Indeed, who can suspend except one who knows the
facts upon which suspension is based? We draw support from Lacson vs. Roque, supra, at
page 469: We are certain that no authority or good reason can be found in support of a
proposition that the Chief Executive can suspend an officer facing criminal charges for the
sole purpose of aiding the court in the administration of justice. Independent of the other
branches of the Government, the courts can well take care of their own administration of the
law.
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, an important legislation, should not be
artificially construed so as to exclude the courts from the power to suspend - a prime tool
designed by Congress to prevent the power which an official wields from frustrating the
purity and certainty of the administration of justice. Surely, we should not be pedantically
exacting in reading its provisions. We should rather say that if the courts power of
suspension incident to the court proceedings is to be withheld or narrowed by construction,
Congress should have spelled it out in no uncertain terms x x x.
The Court then hastened to clarify that such a view may not be taken as an
encroachment upon the power of suspension given other officials, reiterating in the process
that a line should be drawn between administrative proceedings and criminal actions
in court, that one is apart from the other. Elucidating further on the possible danger which
may arise if the power of suspension, in consequence of a criminal action under Republic Act
No. 3019 is vested in any authority other than the court, it declared that:
There is reasonable ground to believe that Congress did really apprehend danger should the
power of suspension in consequence of a criminal case under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act be lodged in any authority other than the court. Quite apart from the fact that
the court has a better grasp of the situation, there is one other factor, and that is, the rights
of the person accused. The court could very well serve as a lever to balance in one equation
the public interests involved and the interests of the defendant. And then, there is the
danger that partisan politics may creep in. The hand of political oppression cannot just be
ignored especially if the majority members of the Provincial Board and the defendant public
local elective officer are on opposite sides of the political fence. Power may be abused.
Conversely, if both are of the same political persuasion, the suspending authority will display
reluctance in exercising the power of suspension. It is thus that the statute should catch up
with the realities of political life. There is indeed the dispiriting lesson that in a clash between
political considerations and conscience it is the latter that quite often gets dented. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
53
Therefore, since suspension is incident to removal and should proceed from one who should
logically do so, and considering that in the operation of a given statute fairness must have
been in the mind of the legislators, we brush aside needless refinements, and rule that under
Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, once a valid information upon the
provisions thereof is lodged with the Court of First Instance, that court has the inescapable
duty to suspend the public official indicted thereunder.

These cases have long been on the line, unduly stretched beyond their logical
parameters and the permissible time frame. Indeed, it is high time, ironically in fairness to
petitioner himself, that the same be now calcined in the judicial crucible into their ultimate
configuration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 and 118896-
97 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Romero (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

54
[G.R. No. 119601. December 17, 1996]
DANILO BUHAT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Delicate and sensitive is the issue in this case, which is, whether or not the upgrading of
the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of murder is such a substantial
amendment that it is proscribed if made after the accused had pleaded not guilty to the
crime of homicide, displaying as alleged by the defense, inordinate prejudice to the rights of
the defendant.
On March 25, 1993, an information for HOMICIDE[1] was filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)[2]against petitioner Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe. The information alleged
that on October 16, 1992, petitioner Danilo Buhat, armed with a knife, unlawfully attacked
and killed one Ramon George Yu while the said two unknown assailants held his arms, using
superior strength, inflicting x x x mortal wounds which were x x x the direct x x x cause of his
death[3].
Even before petitioner could be arraigned, the prosecution moved for the deferment of
the arraignment on the ground that the private complainant in the case, one Betty Yu,
moved for the reconsideration of the resolution of the City Prosecutor which ordered the
filing of the aforementioned information for homicide. Petitioner however, invoking his right
to a speedy trial, opposed the motion. Thus, petitioner was arraigned on June 9, 1993 and,
since petitioner pleaded not guilty, trial ensued.
On February 3, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, finding Betty Yus
appeal meritorious, ordered the City Prosecutor of Roxas City to amend the information by
upgrading the offense charged to MURDER and implead therein additional accused Herminia
Altavas, Osmea Altavas and Renato Buhat[4]
On March 10, 1994, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to amend
information. The amendment as proposed was opposed by the petitioner.
The amended information read:
The undersigned assistant City Prosecutor accuses DANNY BUHAT, of Capricho II,
Barangay V, Roxas City, Philippines, HERMINIA ALTAVAS AND OSMEA ALTAVAS
both resident of Punta Tabuc, Roxas City, Philippines, of the crime of Murder,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of October, 1992, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, the above-
named accused, Danny Buhat armed with a knife, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, did and then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously [sic] without justifiable
motive and with intent to kill, attack, stab and injure one RAMON GEORGE YU, while the two
other accused held the arms of the latter, thus using superior strength, inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Ramon George Yu in such amount as maybe [sic]
awarded to them by the court under the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
The prosecution had by then already presented at least two witnesses.
In an order,[6] dated June 2, 1994, the RTC denied the motion for leave to amend
information. The denial was premised on (1) an invocation of the trial courts discretion in
disregarding the opinion of the Secretary of Justice as allegedly held in Crespo vs.
Mogul[7] and (2) a conclusion reached by the trial court that the resolution of the inquest
prosecutor is more persuasive than that of the Secretary of Justice, the former having
actually conducted the preliminary investigation where he was able to observe the
demeanor of those he investigated[8]
The Solicitor General promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. He filed a
petition for certiorari[9] assailing the aforecited order denying the motion for leave to amend
information. Finding the proposed amendment as non-prejudicial to petitioners rights,
respondent court granted the petition for certiorari in a decision, dated March 28, 1995, the
decretal portion of which reads:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, herein petition is hereby granted: the Order dated
June 2, 1994 is set aside and annulled; amendment of the information from
homicide to murder, and including as additional accused Herminia Altavas and
Osmea Altavas is allowed; and finally, the writ of preliminary injunction we issued
on January 30, 1995 is made permanent by prohibiting the public respondent from
hearing aforementioned criminal case under the original information.[10]
Hence this petition raising the sole issue of whether or not the questioned amendment
to the information is procedurally infirm.
The petition lacks merit.
The additional allegation of conspiracy is only a formal amendment, petitioners participation
as principal not having been affected by such amendment
-------------------------------------------------
Petitioner asseverates that the inclusion of additional defendants in the information on
the ground of conspiracy is a substantial amendment which is prohibited by Sec. 14, Rule 110
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, because the allegation of conspiracy x x x is a
substantial amendment saddling the [p]etitioner with the need of a new defense in order to
met [sic] a different situation at the trial [c]ourt[11]
Petitioner cites the case of People v. Montenegro[12] as jurisprudential support. Indeed,
we stated in the Montenegro case that the allegation of conspiracy among all the private
respondents-accused, which was not previously included in the original information, is x x x a
substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to
55
meet a different situation in the trial court[13]. And to explain the new defense theory as a bar
to substantial amendment after plea, we cited the case of People v. Zulueta[14] where we
elucidated, thus:
Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original charges will
have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. For undoubtedly the
allegation of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the
accused Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even omissions of his co-
conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendment
thereby widens the battlefront to allow the use by the prosecution of newly
discovered weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it
would seem inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this stage of the
controversy, bearing in mind that the accused is only guaranteed two-days
preparation for trial. Needless to emphasize, as in criminal cases the liberty, even
the life, of the accused is at stake, it is always wise and proper that he be fully
apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to
injustice. The prosecution has too many facilities to covet the added advantage of
meeting unprepared adversaries.
This jurisprudential rule, however, is not without an exception. And it is in the same
case of Zulueta that we highlighted the case of Regala v. Court of first Instance of
Bataan[15] as proffering a situation where an amendment after plea resulting in the inclusion
of an allegation of conspiracy and in the indictment of some other persons in addition to the
original accused, constitutes a mere formal amendment permissible even after
arraignment. In Zulueta, we distinguished the Regala case in this wise:
Some passages from Regala contra El Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Bataan are quoted by petitioners. Therein the accused pleaded not guilty to an
information for murder, and later the fiscal amended the indictment by including
two other persons charged with the same offense and alleging conspiracy
between the three. Five justices held that the amendment was not
substantial. But that situation differs from the one at bar. The amendment there
did not modify theory of the prosecution that the accused had killed the
deceased by a voluntary act and deed. Here there is an innovation, or the
introduction of another alternative imputation, which, to make matters worse, is
inconsistent with the original allegations.[16]
Applying our aforegoing disquisition in the 1946 case of Regala, we likewise ruled in
the 1983 case of People v. Court of Appeals[17] that a post-arraignment amendment to further
allege conspiracy, is only a formal amendment not prejudicial to the rights of the accused
and proper even after the accused has pleaded not guilty to the charge under the original
information. We held in said case of People v. Court of Appeals:
x x x The trial Judge should have allowed the amendment x x x considering that
the amendments sought were only formal. As aptly stated by the Solicitor
General in his memorandum, there was no change in the prosecutions theory
that respondent Ruiz willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and
shot with a gun Ernesto and Rogelio Bello x x x. The amendments would not have
been prejudicial to him because his participation as principal in the crime
charged with respondent Ruiz in the original informations, could not be
prejudiced by the proposed amendments.
In a case (Regala vs. CFI, 77 Phil. 684), the defendant was charged with
murder. After plea, the fiscal presented an amended information wherein two
other persons were included as co-accused. There was further allegation that the
accused and his co-defendants had conspired and confederated together and
mutually aided one another to commit the offense charged. The amended
information was admitted x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise stated, the amendments x x x would not have prejudiced Ruiz whose
participation as principal in the crimes charged did not change. When the
incident was investigated by the fiscals office, the respondents were Ruiz, Padilla
and Ongchenco. The fiscal did not include Padilla and Ongchenco in the two
informations because of insufficiency of evidence. It was only later when
Francisco Pagcalinawan testified at the reinvestigation that the participation of
Padilla and Ongchenco surfaced and, as a consequence, there was the need for
the information of the informations x x x.
The aforegoing principle, by way of exception to the general rule, also appositely
applies in the present controversy.
Petitioner undoubtedly is charged as a principal in the killing of Ramon George Yu
whom petitioner is alleged to have stabbed while two unknown persons held the victim's
arms. The addition of the phrase, "conspiring, confederating and helping one another" does
not change the nature of petitioner's participation as principal in the killing.
Whether under the original or the amended information, petitioner would have to
defend himself as the People makes a case against him and secures for public protection the
punishment of petitioner for stabbing to death, using superior strength, a fellow citizen in
whose help and safety society as a whole is interested. Petitioner, thus, has no tenable basis
to decry the amendment in question.
Furthermore, neither may the amendment in question be struck down on the ground
that Herminia Altavas, Osmea Altavas and Renato Buhat would be placed in double jeopardy
by virtue of said amendment. In the first place, no first jeopardy can be spoken of insofar as
the Altavases are concerned since the first information did not precisely include them as
accused therein. In the second place, the amendment to replace the name, "John Doe" with
the name of Renato Buhat who was found by the Secretary of Justice to be one of the two
persons who held the arms of the victim while petitioner was stabbing him, [18] is only a
formal amendment and one that does not prejudice any of the accused's rights. Such
amendment to insert in the information real name of the accused involves merely a matter
of form as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the accused of a fair opportunity to present
a defense; neither is the nature of the offense charged affected or altered since the
revelation of accused's real name does not change the theory of the prosecution nor does it
introduce any new and material fact.[19] In fact, it is to be expected that the information has
to be amended as the unknown participants in the crime became known to the public
prosecutor.[20]
56
Abuse of superior strength having already been alleged in the original information charging
homicide, the amendment of the name of the crime to murder, constitutes a mere formal
amendment permissible even after arraignment
--------------
--------------
--------------
- sustain a contrary holding. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
In the case of Dimalibot v. Salcedo,[21] we ruled that the amendment of the information
so as to change the crime charged from homicide to murder, may be made even if it may
result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to the
rights of the accused. In that case, several accused were originally charged with homicide,
but before they were arraigned, an amended information for murder was
filed. Understandably raised before us was the issue of the propriety and legality of the
afore-described amendment, and we ruled, thus:
x x x it is undisputed that the herein accused were not yet arraigned before the
competent court when the complaint for homicide was amended so as to charge
the crime of murder. x x x the amendment could therefore be made even as to
substance in order that the proper charge may be made. x x x The change may
also be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as
it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. [22]
Thus, at the outset, the main consideration should be whether or not the accused had
already made his plea under the original information, for this is the index of prejudice to, and
the violation of, the rights of the accused. The question as to whether the changing of the
crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of murder is a substantial
amendment proscribed after the accused had pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide
was, it should be noted, categorically answered in the affirmative by us in the case
of Dionaldo v. Dacuycuy,[23] for then we ruled:
x x x the provision which is relevant to the problem is Rule 110, Sec. 13 [now Sec.
14 under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure] of the Rules of Court which
stipulates:
x x x The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, at any time before the defendants pleads; and thereafter
and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
To amend the information so as to change the crime charged for homicide to the
more serious offense of murder after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the
former is indubitably proscribed by the first paragraph of the above-quoted
provision. For certainly a change from homicide to murder is not a matter of
form; it is one of substance with very serious consequences.[24]
Indeed, petitioner forcefully and strongly submits that, in the light of this ruling, we are
allegedly obliged to grant his prayer for the reversal of the assailed decision of respondent
Court of Appeals and the affirmance of the trial courts ruling that the post-arraignment
amendment sought by the People is prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110, of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, the same being a substantial amendment prejudicial to the rights of
the accused.
The cited ruling, however, differs from the case at bench because the facts herein
x x x the original Information, while only mentioning homicide, alleged:
Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe as the accused; [sic] of Danny Buhat stabbing
the deceased Ramon while his two other companions were holding the arms of
Ramon, thus, the information already alleged superior strength; and inflicting mortal
wounds which led to the death of Ramon.
Superior strength qualifies the offense to murder (Article 248).
xxx xxx xxx
Before us, the Information already alleged superior strength, and the
additional allegation that the deceased was stabbed by Buhat while
the arms of the former were being held by the two other accused,
referring to John Doe and Richard Doe. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
If the killing is characterized as having been committed by superior
strength, then to repeat, there is murder x x x
Also the case of Dacuycuy was mentioned, as a justification for not
allowing change of designation from homicide to murder, but then the
body of the Information in the Dacuycuy ruling did not allege
averments which qualifies [sic] the offense of murder. The case before
us instead is different in that the Information already alleges that
Buhat attacked the deceased while his two other companions held him
by the arms, using superior strength. x x x We would even express the
possibility that if supported by evidence, Buhat and the Altavases could
still be penalized for murder even without changing the designation
from homicide to murder, precisely because of aforementioned
allegations.The proposed change of the word form homicide to
murder, to us, is not a substantial change that should be prohibited.[25]
In the matter of amending a criminal information, what is primarily guarded against is
the impairment of the accuseds right to intelligently know the nature of the charge against
him. This right has been guaranteed the accused under all Philippine Constitutions[26] and
incorporated in Section 1 (b), Rule 115, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure[27]
57
 In a criminal case, due process requires that, among others, the accusation be in due
form, and that notice thereof and an opportunity to answer the charged be given the
accused;[28] hence, the constitutional and reglementary guarantees as to accuseds right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. An accused should be given
the necessary data as to why he is being proceeded against and not be left in the unenviable
state of speculating why he is made the object of a prosecution, [29] it being the fact that, in
criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake. It is always wise and
proper that the accused be fully apprised of the charged against him in order to avoid any
possible surprise that may lead to injustice.[30]
In order to sufficiently inform the accused of the charged against him, a written
accusation, in the form of a criminal information indicting the accused and subscribed by the
fiscal, must first be filed in court.[31] Such information must state, among others, the name of
the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. [32] Evidently, the important end to be
accomplished is to describe the act with sufficient certainty in order that the accused may be
apprised of the nature of the charged against him.[33] In the event, however, that the
appellation of the crime charged as determined by the public prosecutor, does not exactly
correspond to the actual crime constituted by the criminal acts described in the information
to have been committed by the accused, what controls is the description of the said criminal
acts and not the technical name of the crime supplied by the public prosecutor. As this court,
through Justice Morelands authoritative disquisition, has held:
x x x Notwithstanding apparent contradiction between caption and body, x x x
the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is
immaterial and purposeless x x x the facts stated in the body of the pleading
must determine the crime of which the defendant stands charged and for which
he must be tried. The establishment of this doctrine x x x is thoroughly in accord
with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice. x x x Procedure
in criminal actions should always be so framed as to insure to each criminal that
retributive punishment which ought swiftly and surely to visit him who willfully
and maliciously violates the penal laws of society. We believe that a doctrine
which does not produce such a result is illogical and unsound and works
irreparable injury to the community in which it prevails.
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in
no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x That to which his attention
should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most
interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime
given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts
alleged in the body of the information in the matter therein set forth. If he did, it
is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive
right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The
designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the
facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the
fiscal. x x x For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the
crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his
substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, Did you perform
the acts alleged in the manner alleged? not, Did you commit a crime named
murder? If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law
determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty
therefore. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it
is named. If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then
heought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of
the crime which those acts constitute.
The plea of not guilty ought always to raise a question of fact and not of
law. The characterization of the crime is a conclusion of law on the part of the fis
cal. The denial by the accused that he committed that specific crime so
characterized raises no real question. No issue can be raised by the assertion of a
conclusion of law by one party and a denial of such conclusion by the other. The
issues raised by the pleadings in criminal actions x x x are primarily and really
issues of fact and not of law. x x x
x x x Issues are not made by asserting and denying names. They are framed by
the allegation and denial of facts. x x x To quibble about names is to lose sight of
realities. To permit an accused to stand by and watch the fiscal while he guesses
as to the name which ought to be applied to the crime of which he charges the
accused, and then take advantage [sic] of the guess if it happens to be wrong,
while the acts or omissions upon which that guess was made and which are the
real and only foundation of the charge against him are clearly and fully stated in
the information, is to change the battle ground in criminal cases from issues to
guesses and from fact to fancy. It changes lawyers into dialecticians and law into
metaphysics -- that fertile field of delusion propagated by
language.[34] [Underscoring ours]
In other words, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of the law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law which in no way affect the legal
aspects of the information, but from the actual recital of facts as alleged in the body of the
information.[35]
Petitioner in the case at bench maintains that, having already pleaded not guilty to the
crime of homicide, the amendment of the crime charged in the information from homicide to
murder is a substantial amendment prejudicial to his right to be informed of the nature of
the accusation against him. He utterly fails to dispute, however, that the original information
did allege that petitioner stabbed his victim using superior strength. And this particular
allegation qualifies a killing to murder, regardless of how such a killing is technically
designated in the information filed by the public prosecutor.
Our ruling in the case of People v. Resayaga[36] is clearly apropos:
The appellant maintains that the information filed in this case is only for
Homicide. x x x
The contention is without merit. Reliance is placed mainly upon the designation
of the offense given to it by the fiscal. x x x In the instant case, the information
specifically alleges that the said accused conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and taking advantage of
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
58
 assault and stab with ice picks one Paulo Balane x x x Since the killing is
characterized as having been committed by taking advantage of superior
strength, a circumstance which qualifies a killing to murder, the information
sufficiently charged the commission of murder.[37]
On another aspect, we find merit in the manifestation of the Solicitor General to the
effect that the respondent Court of Appeals erroneously supposed that petitioner and
Renato Buhat are one and the same person, hence the non-inclusion of Renato Buhat as
additional accused in its order allowing the amendment of the information. [38] We also agree
with the observation of the Solicitor General that the amended information filed in this case
still fails to embody the correct identity of all of the persons found to be indictable in the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Explained the Solicitor General:
In its Decision under review, the Court of Appeals erroneously supposed that
Danny Buhat and Renato Buhat are one and the same person (CA Decision,
1st par.). This, however, is not correct because Danny Buhat and Renato Buhat
are, in fact, brothers. Moreover, it was not Osmea Altavas and his wife Herminia
Altavas who held the arms of the victim while Danny Buhat stabbed
him. According to the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, which is requoted
hereunder:
The evidence on hand clearly shows that while Osmea Altavas was
continuously hitting Ramon Yu with his fists, his wife Herminia aided
him by hitting the victim with a chair.It was also during this time that
Danny Buhat and two (2) unidentified persons appeared and joined
spouses Osmea and Herminia. One of the unidentified persons was
later identified as Renato Buhat. Renato Buhat and the other
unidentified held the arms of Ramon Yu while Danny Buhat stabbed
Ramon Yu twice on the chest which resulted in his death. The restraint
on the person of Ramon Yu before he was stabbed was described by
eyewitness Susan Labrador during the continuation of the preliminary
investigation of the instant case on December 2, 1992.
The Amendment Information to be filed in this case must, therefore, reflect the
above facts set forth in the aforesaid Resolution of the Secretary of Justice -
which was the result of thepreliminary investigation (as reviewed by the
Secretary of Justice) conducted in this case. Strangely enough, however, the
Amended Information (Annex C) that was subsequently filed before the Roxas
City RTC in this case by Assistant City Prosecutor Alvin D. Calvez of Roxas City
does not reflect the above facts set forth in the aforesaid Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice. Said Amended Information in effect alleges that Osmea and
Herminia Altavas were the ones who held the arms of the victim while Danny
Buhat stabbed him, whereas, according to the Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice
abovecited, it was Renato Buhat and another unidentified person who held the a
rms of the victim while Danny Buhat stabbed him. According to the said
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the participation of Osmea Altavas in the
crime was that of hitting the victim with his fists, while x x x the participation of
Herminia Altavas in the crime was that of hitting the victim with a chair.
Verily, the statement of facts in the Information or Amended Information must
conform with the findings of fact in the preliminary investigation (in this case, as
reviewed by the Secretary of Justice) so as to make it jibe with the evidence x x x
to be presented at the trial. x x x
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case (which merely resolved
affirmatively the legal issues of whether or not the offense charged in the
Information could be upgraded to Murder and additional accused could be
included in said Information) should not be made the basis of the Amended
Information herein as the said Decision does not constitute
the preliminary investigation conducted in this case. Such Amended Information
should be based
on the findings of fact set forth in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, as
above quoted and requoted.[39] [Underscoring theirs]
The Solicitor General prays for at least the remanding of this case to respondent Court
of appeals for the correction of the error abovecited and for the ordering of the filing of the
correct Amended Information by the City Prosecutor of Roxas City. Considering, however,
that further delay of the trial of this case is repugnant to our inveterate desire for speedy
justice and that the full and complete disposition of this case virtually serves this end, we see
it to be within our jurisdiction and authority to order the correct amended information to be
filed in this case without the need to remand the same to respondent appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The City Prosecutor of Roxas
City is HEREBY ORDERED to file the correct Amended Information fully in accordance with the
findings of fact set forth in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, dated February 3, 1994,
and in disregard of the finding of the Court of Appeals in its Decision, dated March 28, 1995,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 35554 to the effect that Danny Buhat and Renato Buhat are one and the
same person.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J. (Chairman), in the result.
Bellosillo, J., no part.
59
G.R. No. L-29129 May 8, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO MABUYO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra
and Solicitor Hector C. Fule for plaintiff-appellee.
Domingo M. Angeles for defendant-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in its Criminal
Case No. 2486 finding the accused Domingo Mabuyo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance, and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Norberto Anillo in the sum of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.
On June 18, 1966, at about midnight, Norberto Anillo was shot dead at the doorstep of his
house in Bo. Ambulong, Tanauan, Batangas. Immediately thereafter a police team headed by
Lt. Roque Garcia, Deputy Chief of Police of Tanauan, went to the scene of the incident and
conducted an investigation. Fifteen empty carbine shells were recovered from the premises.
Agaton Anillo, the father of the deceased, and Adelaida Mirania, the widow, when
interviewed by Lt. Garcia, declined to name the assailants but promised to go to his office
after the interment to disclose to him their identities.
Dr. Francisco M. Garcia, the Municipal Health Officer of Tanauan who performed the post
mortem examination of the deceased in the early morning of June 19, 1966, found eleven
(11) gunshot wounds on his body.
As promised, Agaton Anillo and Adelaida Mirania went to the Office of the Chief of Police of
Tanauan on June 20 and submitted themselves to a formal investigation. In their respective
statements they named Domingo Mabuyo as the triggerman and alluded to a certain Juan
Mendoza as the instigator of the crime. The following day, June 21, a complaint for murder
was filed in the Municipal Court of Tanauan against both Mendoza and Mabuyo. Upon a
finding of a probable cause, the municipal judge ordered the issuance of the corresponding
warrants of arrest, but Domingo Mabuyo was nowhere to be found.
Juan Mendoza waived his right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation and the
municipal court forwarded the record of the case to the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
where an information for murder was filed against him alone as principal by inducement.
Upon a plea of "not guilty" the accused went to trial, after which he was acquitted "on
ground of reasonable doubt" in a decision promulgated on January 7, 1967..
On March 27, 1967, Domingo Mabuyo presented himself at the Office of the Chief of Police
of Tanauan, but only to be fingerprinted since he had with him an order of release issued by
the Municipal Court. It appears that Mabuyo had previously prepared a bail bond in the sum
of P30,000.00, which was approved by the Municipal Judge. Through counsel Mabuyo waived
his right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation. Accordingly the municipal court
in its order dated March 27, 1967 elevated the case to the Court of First Instance of Batangas
for further proceedings. On April 5, 1967 the Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding
information for murder against Mabuyo, alleging the circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. The case went to trial upon a "not guilty" plea. The widow of the deceased,
who appeared to be the lone eyewitness to the commission of crime, testified that at about
midnight Of June 18, 1966, while she was reading in bed, she heard her husband asking her
to open the door. She stood up, and taking with her a lighted kerosene lamp, went
downstairs. Suddenly there were two successive gun shots. She heard her husband cry out
"aray," followed by a sound of a falling object. As she came near the door there were other
successive shots. Undaunted, she opened the door to see what was happening outside. With
the aid of the light of the kerosene lamp, which she was holding over her head, she saw
Domingo Mabuyo firing at her prostrate husband with what appeared to her to be a carbine.
Mabuyo aimed it at her, so she immediately closed the door and shouted for help. Shortly
thereafter her father-in-law, whose house was nearby, arrived. She told him that it was
Domingo Mabuyo whom she saw shooting her husband.
Another witness for the prosecution, Aniceto Sumarraga of Bo. Ambulong, narrated that on
June 16, 1966, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, while he was at home reading, Domingo
Mabuyo arrived with a carbine. They talked briefly inside the house. Domingo Mabuyo
inquired if he (the witness) would go with him to kill Norberto Anillo. Aniceto refused, saying
that he did not want to be involved in any such undertaking. Domingo Mabuyo then told him
that if that was his decision, then he alone would go. After his visitor had left, Aniceto went
to the store of a certain Alejandro Perez, also in Bo. Ambulong, and played mahjong. He
noticed that Norberto Anillo was also there watching the game. As he was engrossed in the
game Aniceto did not warn Norberto about Mabuyo's criminal design against him. At about
midnight Anillo left the store. A few minutes later the mahjong players heard gun reports
coming from the direction of Norberto Anillo's place. They stopped the game and went to
Anillo's house and there saw the lifeless body of Norberto Anillo lying on its face on the
ground.
Testifying also for the prosecution, Agaton Anillo said that in the evening of June 18, 1966 he
was at his home. At about midnight he heard gun reports coming from the house of his son
Norberto. At first there were two shots, followed shortly by several more in rapid succession.
When he was about to go downstairs he heard the shouts of his daughter-in-law that her
husband had been fired upon. He ran to her house, where he saw his son already dead. His
daughter-in-law met him and told him that she had seen Domingo Mabuyo do the shooting.
Agaton Anillo further testified that on June 16, or two days before the fatal incident, his son
told him that there was a plot for his liquidation and that it was Domingo Mabuyo who would
carry it out; that on June 18 he (Agaton) saw Domingo passing in front of his house; and that
after Norberto was killed Domingo disappeared and went into hiding.
60
Domingo Mabuyo's defense was alibi. He claimed that early in the morning of June 3, 1966
he left Bo. Ambulong, Tanauan, Batangas for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, arriving there at about
7:00 o'clock in the evening, and did not return to Tanauan until March 27, 1967, when he
surrendered to the authorities. While away from home he worked in the logging concession
of Gabaldon Vice-Mayor Isabelo Aquino in Ibuna Estate, Dingalan, Quezon. In the evening of
June 18, 1966, the date when Norberto Anillo was killed, he was detained in the municipal
jail of Gabaldon for drunkenness and was released at about 8:00 o'clock the next morning.
On March 23, 1967 he went to Dolores, Quezon, with some members of the family of Vice-
Mayor Aquino, and attended the annual Holy Week rites of his religious sect known as
"Iglesia dela Ciudad Mistica." While there somebody informed him that he was being charged
in court. At first he did not mind the information, but when he happened to meet Atty. Juan
Mendoza, who told him the same thing, he decided to surrender to the authorities, On
March 27, 1967 he and Atty. Mendoza went to Calamba, Laguna, and asked a certain
Patrolman Dionisio Samiano to accompany them to the Tanauan Police Department. While
he was at the Tanauan Police Department somebody fetched him and took him to the office
of the municipal judge, where he was asked to sign certain papers which turned out to be his
bail bond. After said bond was approved by the municipal judge he was ordered released
temporarily from the custody of the police authorities. He further claimed that he had no
motive to kill the deceased because the latter was not only his friend but also a nephew of
his wife. He added that he was Norberto's confidant even in connection with the latter's
extra-marital affairs.
Corroborating the alibi of the accused, Vice-Mayor Isabelo Aquino of Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija,
testified that on June 2, 1966 he sent Antonio Berganos to Ambulong, Tanauan, Batangas to
fetch Domingo Mabuyo; that the following day, June 3, 1966, both Antonio Berganos and
Domingo Mabuyo arrived in Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija; that from June 6, 1966 to March 22,
1967, Domingo Mabuyo worked under him as a laborer — first as a log cutter in his
concession in Dingalan, Quezon and then as a rattan gatherer; that Domingo Mabuyo
stopped working on March 22, 1967 because he went to Dolores, Quezon, to attend a
religious ceremony of his sect; and that the distance from Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija to Tanauan,
Batangas could be negotiated by means of a bus in about ten (10) hours. In the course of his
testimony Aquino identified a time book he was keeping, wherein it was shown that
Domingo Mabuyo rendered services as one of his laborers from June 1966 to November l966.
Also identified by him were the payrolls from April 1966 to November 1966, showing the
amounts paid to Domingo Mabuyo from June 1966 to November 1966, and his signatures as
payee.
Gabaldon Police Chief Francisco Gamit testified on the entries in the police blotter of his
department, showing that Domingo Mabuyo was detained for drunkenness in the municipal
jail on June 18, 1966 at 9:00 o'clock in the evening and released at 8:00 o'clock the next
morning.
Another corroborating witness, Atty. Juan Mendoza, testified that in the first week of June
1966 Domingo Mabuyo was fetched from barrio Ambulong by Antonio Berganos, one of the
laborers of Vice-Mayor Aquino, to work in the logging concession of the latter in Dingalan,
Quezon; that from the time of Domingo Mabuyo's departure, it was only on March 23, 1967,
in Dolores, Quezon, that they met again; that upon meeting Domingo Mabuyo, he informed
the latter that he was facing a court charge for having allegedly killed Norberto Anillo and
advised him to surrender immediately after the festivities of their sect; that early in the
morning of March 27, 1967 he and Mabuyo went to Calamba, Laguna and asked Patrolman
Samio of the Calamba Police to accompany them to the Tanauan Police Department; and
that from the time, they met each other in Dolores, he had Domingo Mabuyo under his
surveillance until he surrendered on March 27, 1967..
Upon the evidence presented the trial court rendered its judgment of conviction as
aforestated; hence, this appeal.
The appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him of a crime not properly
charged in the information since he was charged with murder allegedly committed in Bo.
Bagumbayan, Tanauan, Batangas, but was found guilty of said crime committed in Bo.
Ambulong, some 12 kilometers away in the same municipality and province. The alleged
irregularity does not constitute a reversible error. It is a settled rule that unless the particular
place of commission is an essential element of the offense charged, conviction may be had
even if it appears that the crime was committed not at the place alleged in the information,
provided the place of actual commission was within the jurisdiction of the court. 1 In the
instant case the place of commission does not constitute an essential element of the offense
charged and the evidence discloses that said offense was in fact committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the
appellant was misled or surprised by the variance between the proof and the allegation in
the information as to the place where the offense was committed.
With respect to the appellant's claim that he was denied the right to preliminary
investigation, We find the same to be without factual basis, it appearing from the order
dated March 27, 1967 of the Municipal Court of Tanauan that he "had renounced his right to
the second stage of the preliminary investigation." Furthermore, the record does not show
that he raised the question of lack of preliminary investigation at any stage of the trial in the
court of first instance. It is well-settled that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a
fundamental right and may be waived expressly or by silence.2
We now take up the merits of the case. In asking for his acquittal the appellant vigorously
assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the widow who identified him
as the murderer of her husband. He urges that since the testimonies of said witnesses as
regards the guilt of Juan Mendoza were not given credence, the same should likewise be
rejected in his case in order to be consistent. We cannot sustain the appellant. It is to be
noted that in Criminal Case No. 2388 Juan Mendoza was prosecuted on the theory that he
directly induced the herein appellant, who was then at large during the pendency of said
case, to kill Norberto Anillo. In the case under review, the appellant himself was charged as
the sole author of the crime after the acquittal of his supposed inducer. Under the foregoing
factual setting, the trial, court aptly observed that the incredibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution against Juan Mendoza as principal by inducement did not necessarily mean that
said witnesses were also incredible when they testified against the very person who allegedly
shot to death the victim. In fact, it found that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Adelaida Mirania, Agaton Anillo and Aniceto Sumarraga against the appellant "were in accord
to what they disclosed in their written statements executed less than two days after the
commission of the imputed crime," but such was not the case when they testified against
Juan Mendoza. In People vs. Malillos,3this Court had occasion to state that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
61
 It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with
respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. And it
has been aptly said that even when witnesses are found to have
deliberately falsified in sonic material particulars, it is not required that
the whole of their uncorroborated testimony be rejected, but such
portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited. Suffice it to
say, in this connection, that a trial court by reason of its proximate
contact with witnesses, are in a more competent position to discriminate
between the true and the false, and We really find no cogent reason to
disturb the above-quoted conclusion of the court below in the decision
appealed from.
Adelaida Mirania could not possibly have been mistaken as to the identity of the appellant.
She knew him very well, he being from the same barrio where his house was not far away
from hers. At the time of the incident she was carrying a lighted kerosene lamp. Although the
lamp was not presented in evidence it was adequately described as a bottle of beer with the
wick held in place at its mouth by means of a tin plate. It is a common enough source of
illumination in our barrios. Undoubtedly it was sufficient to light an area within a radius of
five meters.
While it is true that Adelaida Mirania did not report immediately to the Deputy Chief of
Police the identity of the assailant, it is to be noted that she promised to identify him after
her husband was interred, which she readily did by going to the police department where she
executed a sworn statement.
In a further attempt to discredit the identification made by Adelaida Mirania, the appellant
insists that she could not have possibly seen the assailant because, as testified to by Mateo
Simbahan, she was not at home at the time of the incident but in the house of her father-in-
law, watching a game of "bingo." However, the testimony of said witness contains flaws
which render it unworthy of belief. He went to Agaton Anillo's house, he said, in order to ask
the latter to help him find a job. Yet he did not talk to Agaton Anillo immediately upon his
arrival but waited until midnight on the lame excuse that he got interested watching
the bingo game. Furthermore, considering that Adelaida Mirania had nine (9) children and
was then again pregnant, it is hardly believable that she would leave her house just to watch
the bingo game, remaining on her feet until midnight.
The appellant also insists that the widow pointed to him as the assailant because she was
angry with him because he refused to stop helping her late husband in his extra-marital
affairs. We find this motive insufficient for her to accuse him falsely of so grave a crime as
murder. Besides, it is unthinkable that she would fabricate evidence to send an innocent man
to jail and let the real murderer of her husband go free.
The appellant having been clearly and positively identified by the widow, his alibi cannot be
sustained. Moreover, after examining the evidence in support of his defense We find that his
alibi has the aspect of fabrication. Firstly, the police blotter of Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, was not
properly accomplished. While the Chief of Police testified that the appellant was brought to
the municipal jail by his two policemen at about two o'clock in the afternoon of June 18,
1966, it appears in the blotter that the appellant was detained at 9:00 o'clock in the evening.
Also, while the appellant was supposedly released on June 19, 1966 at 8:00 o'clock in the
morning, the release was entered on the page for June 18, 1966. It is a fair conclusion that
the fact of release was entered on said page because it could no longer be accommodated on
the page for June 19, 1966, there being already legitimate entries thereon and the blank
spaces having been crossed out. The Chief of Police was even surprised why the questioned
entry appeared as it did. Secondly, as correctly observed by the trial court, from all
appearances the payrolls from April 1966 to November 1966 were all prepared at the same
time. Thirdly, the protestation of the appellant that he never knew that he was being
implicated in the killing of Norberto Anillo or that he was being charged in court therefor
until he was so informed by Juan Mendoza on March 23, 1967 is belied by the fact that even
before that date he had already taken steps to prepare his bail bond. It appears from the
record that his bondsmen secured the necessary papers in connection with their respective
properties to be offered as security on February 28, 1967 and that the bail bond itself was
prepared on March 4, 1967. Lastly, if it were true that he was working from June 1966 to
March 1967 under Gabaldon Vice-Mayor Aquino and not hiding from the authorities as
alleged by the prosecution, he would at least have returned home to visit his family during
that long period. He never did, not even on Christmas day, which is traditionally a day for
family reunion. If anything, his long absence from his barrio supports the theory of the
prosecution that his flight immediately after the commission of the crime was not for any
innocent reason.
The trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery against the
appellant. The attack was sudden: the victim was knocking at the door and asking his wife to
open it when he was shot. Although he was apparently aware of the plot to liquidate him,
the circumstances, including the use by the appellant of a high power firearm, rendered the
victim defenseless. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be considered
in favor of the appellant. The fact that it took him almost nine months after the issuance of
the warrant of arrest against him before he presented himself to the police authorities
negates the spontaneity of his surrender.
The crime committed was murder, and there being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the appellant was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, with the only modification that the indemnity payable to the heirs of the
deceased Norberto Anillo is increased from P6,000.00 to P12,000,00, the decision appealed
from is affirmed with costs.
Fernando, Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
62
G.R. No. L-2733 March 27, 1906
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICOLAS ARCEO, defendant-appellant.
Alfredo Chicote, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
In a written complaint dated October 15, 1903, Nicolas Arceo Tanuco was charged by the
assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila with the crime of illegal marriage. The
complaint as filed sets forth the following facts : That on or about May 1, 1901, the
defendant, being the legal husband of one Tranquilina Arcilia, willfully and illegally did enter
into a second matrimonial bond with one Teodora de Guia in the Province of Rizal within the
police and court jurisdiction of Manila, the former matrimonial bond not having been legally
dissolved at the time.
The case having been tried upon the said complaint, it was shown, especially by the
documentary evidence introduced and which forms a part of the record, that according to a
certificate of marriage (fol. 20) signed by the pastor of the church at Bacolor, Pampanga, the
defendant, Nicolas Arceo, did marry Tranquilina Arcilia on February 3, 1897, in accordance
with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church. The ceremony was performed by Gregorio
Dizon, a priest, in the presence of witnesses, in the parochial church of said pueblo of
Bacolor.
It was further shown that, according to a certificate signed by the secretary to the archbishop
of Manila, attached to the record (fol. 37), by a decree dated April 29, 1901, signed by the
archbishop, the last two banns were ordered suppressed at the request of the defendant in
order to expedite his marriage with Teodora de Guia, and in view also of the report from the
pastor of Tambobong, which stated that the first bann proclaimed in his church met with no
opposition. The certificate further sets forth that the defendant appeared before the pastor
at Tambobong and declared that he was unmarried.
By virtue of said decree from the archbishop of Manila, the defendant was married on the 1st
of May, 1901, to Teodora de Guia, in accordance with a the rites of the Roman Catholic
Church and in the presence of witnesses in the church of Tambobong. The defendant signed
the marriage papers as an unmarried man (fol. 21), as testified by the Rev. Mateo
Evangelista.
It was thus proved that the defendant did enter into a second marriage with Teodora de Guia
while his first wife, Tranquilina Arcilla, still lived (for. 98 of the record); that the marriage
ceremony took place in the pueblo of Tambobong, which is now included in the Province of
Rizal, but formerly was part of the city of Manila.
Assuming that article 471 of the Penal Code has been violated, and considering that the
crime was committed in the pueblo of Tambobong, which is now included in the territory of
Rizal Province, the first point to be determined is whether or not the judge who presided at
the trial had jurisdiction to try the case. The defense raised this point and questioned the
right of the Court of First Instance of Manila to hear and determine this case.
The decision of this court in the case of the United States vs. C. M. Jenkins1 (4 Off. Gaz., 523),
wherein it was held that the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila had no jurisdiction
over crimes committed in the Province of Rizal and within the 5-mile limit, as fixed by section
3 of Act No. 183, for police purposes, has definitely settled the question of jurisdiction. The
proceedings had in the lower court therefore void.
It is a general principle of law that the place where a crime is committed should be first
ascertained in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court of judge.
Act No. 140 fixes the territorial jurisdiction of the various courts of the Islands, including the
Court of First Instance of Manila. Although Act No. 183, section 3, extended the jurisdiction
of the city government to a radius of 5 miles for police purposes, it was never intended to
confer upon the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila jurisdiction over it. No other view
can be taken, since Act No. 183, section 3, does not amend or modify the jurisdiction of the
courts prescribed in Act No. 140.
Any change in the territorial jurisdiction of a court enlarging or restricting the same can never
be established by mere deduction or inference. Judicial divisions and boundaries of provinces
and districts are always fixed by law. So that alterations of such boundaries can only be made
in express terms by the legislative body. Nothing to this effect is contained in Act No. 183,
section 3, amending Act No. 140; therefore it is the opinion of this court that the judgment of
the court below should be, and it is hereby, set aside and the case dismissed with costs de
oficio.
It is also ordered that, in the event of the filing of a new complaint, the judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal shall proceed in accordance with law.
The court below and the Solicitor-General shall be notified of this decision and the record
returned to the interior court with a certified copy of this opinion and of the judgment to be
entered in accordance herewith for its execution. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.
63
G.R. No. 7987 September 11, 1913
BEHN, MEYER & CO., LIMITED, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellant.
O'Brien and DeWitt, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
On October 27, 1907, the plaintiff imported into the Philippine Islands fifty cases of faience
plates. The value as appraised for duty was $1,291.15 United States currency, This was also
the value stated in the consular invoice, dated Hamburg, August 29, 1907, presented at the
time of the entry. According to this invoice of the merchandise was purchased by the
importer from one Arnold Otto Meyer of Hamburg, and, although shipped from that port,
appears to have been placed on board ship at the port of Antwerp, Belgium. The back of this
invoice has the statement that Arnold Otto Meyer was the agent of the purchaser, Behn,
Meyer, & Co., Limited, the importer.
Some time after the entry was liquidated, the importer filed a protest against said liquidation
on the ground that a clerical error had been made in the preparation of the consular invoice,
in that the person who had prepared it had mistaken the currency of the manufacturer's
invoice for Dutch florins and converted it into marks at the rate of 1.70 marks per florin,
whereas in fact the prices appearing in said manufacturer's invoice were in francs and should
so appeared. In its protest the importer made an offer to produce a corrected consular
invoice, if necessary, and obtain the same from Europe without delay. No bond, however,
was filed for the production of such corrected consular invoice as required by law and the
regulations of the Bureau of Customs and the long established custom in such cases.
Thereafter a second consular invoice, alleged to be a correction of the first, was presented,
issued at Antwerp, Belgium, in which the currency is stated in francs and Antwerp is given as
the port of shipment. This invoice was not accepted by the Bureau of Customs as a correction
of the invoice previously presented, for the reason that it had been consulted in a different
country and by a different consul, the first one having been certified by the American consul
at Hamburg, Germany, where, says the invoice, the goods were purchased by the importer.
Later a third consular invoice, issued, as was the first one, at Hamburg, and dated April 22,
1908, was filed as a substitute for the first one. In this invoice the currency shown is francs,
which had been reduced to marks, and the port of shipment is given as Hamburg. This third
invoice was not accepted by the Bureau of Customs for the reasons that:
In each of these three invoices, Arnold Otto Meyer appears as the seller of the
merchandise on the faces of the documents and also in the briefs of the invoices,
yet in each instance he has declared himself as "agent of the purchasers." All of
which said invoices are, therefore, irregular for the reason that Arnold Otto Meyer
cannot use a seller's invoice and act in the dual capacity of seller and agent of the
purchasers in one and the same transaction. If, as a matter of fact, he is the agent
of the purchasers in this transaction, then each of the invoices is defective, because
no original invoice showing from whom he obtained the goods, and whence he
obtained them and at what price, is attached to the invoice filed, as required by
law. (See Tariff Decision Circular No. 863.)
On comparison of a French commercial invoice, which forms part of the record
(which may be the original bill of the item involved, and which gives Paris as the
place of original sale) with the invoice from Antwerp, and the so-called corrected
invoice from Hamburg, it is found that the latter are merely copies of the
commercial invoice. Consequently, the consulted copies of the French commercial
invoice do not represent the value of the merchandise either at Antwerp, or at
Hamburg the place of sale.
In so far as the importer has failed in each instance to present an invoice which
conforms with the law and the facts, the appraiser's return, based on an invoice
filed at the time of entry, must be accepted.
The last two invoices not being in conformity with the law, the protest of the importer was
overruled, it being held that no corrected consular invoice had been presented as required
by law.
Plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila from the decision of the
Insular Collector of Customs overruling its protest, and that court, after hearing the case,
reversed the decision of the Insular Collector of Customs and held that the Collector erred in
accepting as correct the appraisers' return, as it was based upon an incorrect invoice.
Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Act of Congress of June 10, 1890, as amended, known here as the
Customs Administrative Act of the United States, are as follows:
SEC. 2. That all invoices of imported merchandise shall be made out in the currency
of the place or country from whence the importations shall be made, or, if
purchased, in the currency actually paid therefor, shall contain a correct
description of such merchandise, and shall be made in triplicate or in quadruplicate
in case of merchandise intended for immediate transportation without
appraisement, and signed by the person owning or shipping the same, if the
merchandise has been actually purchased, or by the manufacturer or owner
thereof, if the same has been procured otherwise than by purchase, or by the duly
authorized agent of such purchaser, manufacturer, or owner.
SEC. 3. That all such invoices shall, at or before the shipment of the merchandise, be
produced to the consul, vice-consul, or commercial agent of the United States of the consular
district in which the merchandise was manufactured or purchased, as the case may be, for
export to the United States, and shall have indorsed thereon, when so produced, a
declaration signed by the purchaser, manufacturer, owner, or agent, setting forth that the
invoice is in all respects correct and true, and was made at the place from which the
64
merchandise is to be exported to the United States; that it contains, if the merchandise was
obtained by purchase, a true and full statement of the time when, the place where, the
person from whom the same was purchased, and the actual cost thereof, and of all charges
thereon, as provided by this act; and that no discount bounties, or drawbacks are contained
in the invoice but such as have been actually allowed thereon; and when obtained in any
other manner than by purchase, the actual market value of wholesale price thereof, at the
time of exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of the country from whence
exported; that such actual market value is the price at which the merchandise described in
the invoice is freely offered for sale to all purchasers in said markets, and that it is the price
which the manufacturer or owner making the declaration would have received, and was
willing to receive, for such merchandise sold in the ordinary course of trade in the usual
wholesale quantities, and that it includes all charges thereon as provided by this act; and the
actual quantity thereof; and that no different invoice of the merchandise mentioned in the
invoice so produced has been or will be furnished to anyone. If the merchandise was actually
purchased, the declaration shall also contain a statement that the currency in which such
invoice is made out is that which was actually paid for the merchandise by the purchaser.
SEC. 4. That, except in case of personal effects accompanying the purchaser
[passenger], no importation of any merchandise exceeding one hundred dollars in
dutiable value shall be admitted to entry without the production of a duly certified
invoice thereof as required by law, or of an affidavit made by the owner, importer,
or consignee, before the collector or his deputy, showing why it is impracticable to
produce such invoice,; and no entry shall be made in the absence of a certified
invoice, upon affidavit as aforesaid unless such affidavit be accompanied by a
statement in the form of an invoice, or otherwise, showing the actual cost of such
merchandise, if purchased, or if obtained otherwise than by purchase, the actual
market value or wholesale price thereof at the time of exportation to the United
States in the principal markets of the country from which the same has been
imported; which statement shall be verified by the oath of the owner, importer,
consignee, or agent desiring to make entry of the merchandise, to be administered
by the collector or his deputy to examine the deponent under oath, touching the
sources of his knowledge, information or belief, in the premises, and to require him
to produce any letter, paper, or statement of account, in his possession, or under
his control, which may assist the officers of customs in ascertaining the actual value
of the importation or any part thereof; and in default of such production, when so
requested, such owner, importer, consignee, or agent shall be thereafter debarred
from producing any such letter, paper, or statement for the purpose of avoiding
any additional duty, penalty or forfeiture incurred under this act, unless he shall
show to the satisfaction of the court or the officers of the customs, as the case may
be, that it was not in his power to produce the same when so demanded; and no
merchandise shall be admitted to entry under the provisions of this section unless
the collector shall be satisfied that the failure to produce a duly certified invoice is
due to causes beyond the control of the owner, consignee, or agent thereof;
Provided, That the Secretary of the Treasury may make regulations by which books,
magazines and other periodicals published and imported in successive parts,
numbers of volumes, and entitled to be imported free of duty, shall require but one
declaration for the entire series. And when entry of merchandise exceeding one
hundred dollars in value is made by a statement in the form of an invoice, the
collector shall require a bond for the production of a duty certified invoice.
These sections are applicable to the Philippine Islands by virtue of the provisions of section
20 of Act No. 355, known as the Philippine Customs Administrative Act, reading as follows:
SEC. 20. If any case shall arise not provided for by this Act or by the regulations of
the Insular Collector, or by the lawful decrees, orders or regulations existing at the
passage of this Act and not by this Act repealed, the laws of the United States and
the regulations of the Treasury Department of the United States in analogous
cases, so far as the same are consistent with the provision of this Act, in the
discretion of the Insular Collector, shall be followed and applied so far as they may
be practicable.
Under these provisions the importer in this case was, from the facts appearing, under
obligation to file with his entry a consular invoice from the place of the manufacture or
purchase and having presented one certified at Hamburg, Germany, showing the
merchandise in question to have been purchased there, the presumption was that the goods
were either purchased or manufactured at that place. That being the case, the market value
of said articles for tariff purposes was their value at Hamburg and not what they would be
sold for in Gien, France, the alleged place of manufacture, where the importer claims to have
purchased them.
Sections 174 and 177 of Act No. 355 are as follows:
SEC. 174. In the assessment of duties upon merchandise subject to ad valorem rate
duty, or to a duty based upon or regulated in any manner by the value thereof, the
kind of money expressed in the invoice shall be reduced to the currency of the
United States at the rate of value of foreign money, as established by the Secretary
of the Treasury of the United States upon the first days of January, April, July, and
October of every year. The date of the invoices will indicate the value of the
money, but the reduction of Insular or local currency quarter by the Civil Governor
in accordance with law.
SEC. 177. Whenever imported merchandise is subject to an ad valorem rate of
duty, or to a duty placed or regulated in any manner by the value thereof, the duty
shall be assessed upon the actual market value or wholesale price of such
merchandise as brought and sold in usual wholesale quantities at the time of
exportation to the Philippine Islands in the principal markets of the country from
whence imported, and in the condition in which such merchandise is there brought
and sold for exportation to the Philippine Islands, or consigned to the Philippine
Islands for sale including the value of all cartons, cases, crates, boxes, sacks, and
coverings of any kind, and all other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing
the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the Philippine Islands;
and if there be used for covering or holding imported merchandise, whether
dutiable or free, any unusual article or form designed for use otherwise to the
Philippine Islands, additional duty shall be levied and collected upon such material
65
 or article at the rate to which the same would be subject if separately imported.
The words "value" or "actual market value," whenever used in any law relating to
the appraisement of imported merchandise, shall be construed to mean the actual
market value or wholesale price as above defined.
Under these provisions the market value of imported articles is their value in the country of
export, which is required to be shown upon a consular invoice covering the importation; and
as the goods in this case were imported from Hamburg, Germany, as shown by the consular
invoice certified at that place and by the statement of the shipper on the back thereon, it is
clear that the correct dutiable value of the importation was that in Hamburg, Germany, and
not the value at which the manufacturer would sell them at Gien. According to the testimony
of Edward Plique, manager of the Comptoir Ceramique of Paris, France, the manufacturer of
the plates imported, the prices appearing in the commercial or manufacturer's invoice were
factory prices and they represented, with slight modification, the market value of the plates
in Franc. It is not denied that the prices shown in the commercial invoice and the evidence
attached thereto are more or less fairly representative of the market value of the articles in
France; but it is clear that they do not show that market value of said goods either at
Hamburg, where the goods were sold and consulted, or at Antwerp, where they were placed
on board ship bound to the Philippine Islands.
It is obvious that if the goods are of French manufacture and were taken to Antwerp or to
Hamburg and sold in either of these places, as the consular invoices in the case show,
something must be added to their price in Paris, France, or at Gien, the place of manufacture,
in order to arrive at the correct market value in either Hamburg or Antwerp. There should be
added to their value at the place of manufacture the cost of transportation to Antwerp or
Hamburg, as the case may be, the duties to which such goods would be subject upon their
importation into Belgium or France for consumption therein, the costs of placing them in the
market ready for sale in the particular country, and a reasonable profit to the seller.
In the case of the United States vs. Passavant (169 U. S., 16), certain velvets were imported
from Germany into the United States, which had been originally imported from another
country in the gray and there subjected to process of dyeing and finishing while under bond
in that country. The invoices covering the merchandise gave certain figures as the net invoice
value and contained also certain additional sums under the heading "German duty." This
duty was a tax imposed by the German Government of the particular class of merchandise in
question when it was sold by the manufacturers thereof for consumption or sale in the
markets of Germany, but which duty or tax was remitted by the German Government when
the merchandise was purchased in bond or consigned while in bond for exportation to a
different country. The merchandise was purchased in bond for exportation to a foreign
country at the net invoice price stated and the so-called German duty was not paid upon its
exportation. In the appraisement of the merchandise the appraiser, in determining the
wholesale price thereof at the time of exportation in the principal markets of the country
whence imported, decided that the dutiable value of the same was the net invoice value,
plus the German duty. The importers filed a protest in accordance with the provisions of law,
and the Board of General Appraisers acting thereon reversed the decision of the collector of
customs on the ground that the so-called German duty was not a lawful element of dutiable
value. An appeal was taken to the United States circuit court for the southern district of New
York, where the decision of the Board General Appraisers was affirmed. That court certified
two questions for review to the Supreme Court of the United States. The first one was
whether or not the Board of General Appraisers had a right to inquire into and reverse the
collector's decision as to dutiable value, and the second, if it was decided that the Board of
General Appraisers had such right, was the German duty lawfully included in the estimate of
dutiable value?
In the decision of this case the court interpreted section 19 of the Act of Congress of June 10,
1890, and from which section 177 of Act No. 355 is adapted. That section reads as follows:
That whenever imported merchandise is subject to an ad valorem rate of duty, or
to a duty based upon or regulated in any manner by the value thereof, the duty
shall be assessed upon the actual market value or wholesale price of such
merchandise as bought and sold in usual wholesale quantities, at the time of
exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of the country from
whence imported, and in the condition in which such merchandise is usually [there]
bought and sold for exportation to the United States or consigned to the United
States for sale, including the value of all cartons, cases. . . . .
The court answered the first question in the affirmative and held "that what was to
be ascertained was the actual market value or wholesale price of the merchandise
as bought and sold in usual wholesale quantities at the time of exportation in the
principal markets of the country form whence imported. This market value or price
was the price in Germany and not the price after leaving that country, and the Act
does not contemplate two prices or two market values. The certificate of facts
states that the German duty is imposed on merchandise when 'sold by the
manufacturers thereof for consumption or sale in the market of Germany;' and 'is
collected when the finished product goes into consumption in Germany.' As the tax
accrues when the manufacturer sells, his wholesale price includes it, and the
purchaser who buys these cotton velvets in wholesale quantities in the German
markets pays a price covering the tax, and that is the price for the merchandise
when bought and sold in these markets . . . but the laws of this country in the
assessment of duties proceed upon the market value in the exporting country and
not upon that market value less such remission or amelioration as that country
chooses to allow in accordance with its own views of public policy. . . .
The second question must also be answered in the affirmative.
It is to be noted in the case at bar that the value appearing on the first invoice presented by
the importer at the custom-house was accepted as the dutiable value of the merchandise. If
this value was incorrect, then it became the duty of the importer to treat such invoice as pro
forma merely and file a bond for the presentation of a correct consular invoice. (United
States vs. Frank & Lambert, United States Treasury Decision No. 31973; United
States vs.Bennet & Loewenthal, id., No. 31975.) This was not done, but the importer sought
to amend the original invoice by the presentation of a second invoice consulted in another
consular district, and, on the hearing in the Court of First Instance, he was permitted, over
the objections and exceptions of the appellant herein, to prove the value of the merchandise
in France, a place and country from which no consular invoice covering the merchandise in
66
question had been presented. The importer did not, however, offer any evidence as to the
value of the goods either in Hamburg, the place from which they were originally invoiced, or
in Antwerp, the place where they were alleged to have been placed on board ship bound to
the Philippine Islands.

In the absence of a bond to produce a corrected consular invoice, and especially where a
second and third invoice have been presented which are defective, the first invoice cannot
be impugned by the importer presenting it, nor can he be heard to say that it is incorrect. In
an importer desires to correct his own mistake relative to the contents of an invoice, he must
comply with the requirements of law and the rules and regulations of the department
pertaining to such correction. It is presumed that every importer is familiar with the law and
with the rules of the department. It is usually his own fault if he does not comply with them.
While the result in this particular case may be a hardship on the importer and while, in many
respects, it is clear that he has paid a higher duty than he ought to have paid if his contention
as to the facts is true, nevertheless it appears that all that was a result of his own negligence
or failure to meet properly the requirements of the law and the rules and regulations of the
department. Courts are not permitted to abrogate laws or destroy reasonable rules and
regulations of a department. They were made, the one by the legislature, the other by
officials with full power in the premises. Courts cannot abrogate the one unless
unconstitutional, and it will not interfere with the other where they are just and reasonable.

The presumption is that the action of the Insular Collector of Customs was correct (par. 14,
sec. 334, Code of Civil Procedure; Vandiver vs. United States, 156 Fed. Rep., 961;
Lazard vs. Magone, 40 Fed. Rep., 662), and the burden being upon the importer to prove that
his contention is right (Chung Yune vs. Kelly, 14 Fed. Rep., 639; In re Austin, 47 Fed. Rep.,
873; In re Sherman, 49 Fed., Rep., 224), if he fails in sustaining this burden, the action of the
collector stands. (Tiffany vs. United States, 105 Fed. Rep., 766; In re Solvay Process Co., 134
Fed. Rep., 678; United States vs. Knowles, 122 Fed. Rep., 971; Legg vs. United States, 163
Fed. Rep., 1006.) When an importer challenges by legal steps the correctness of the
assessment of a duty by the Collector of Customs, the question to be decided is not whether
the collector was wrong, but whether the importer was right, the burden being on the latter
to establish the correctness of his own contention. In view of the statutory requirement
relative to the presentation of a consular invoice showing the value of the merchandise in
the country in which it was purchased, sold or consigned for shipment to the Philippine
Islands, the presumption that an invoice presented conforms to this requirement, the
acceptance of the invoice presented and the appraisal of the merchandise in accordance
therewith by the customs authorities, the failure of the importer to treat the invoice
presented by him as pro forma and file a bond for the presentation of a corrected consular
invoice as required by law, it cannot be said that the protestant has removed the burden laid
upon him or that he has shown cause to overrule the decision of the Insular Collector of
Customs.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the decision of the Insular Collector of
Customs overruling the protest is affirmed.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

67
G.R. No. 72994 January 23, 1991 The accused, thru counsel de officio, Atty. Lilio L. Amora, moved to quash the
information,3 alleging that the statement of the time of commission of the felony charged,
FELICISIMO ROCABERTE, petitioner, "from 1977 to December 1983, . . . a period of seven years," or "about 2,551 days," was
vs. fatally defective: there was "so great a gap as to defy approximation in the commission of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. ANDRES S. SANTOS, Judge, RTC, Tagbilaran, one and the same offense" (citing Peo. v. Reyes, 108 SCRA 203); "the variance is certainly
Bohol, respondents. unfair to the accused for it violates their constitutional right to be informed before the trial
of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend
themselves . . ." (invoking Peo. v. Openia, 98 Phil. 698).
Lilio L. Amora for petitioner.

The motion was denied4 as was, too, the defendants' motion for reconsideration.5 In the
motion for reconsideration, the accused drew attention to Section 4, Rule 117 "of the 1985
NARVASA, J.:
Rules on Criminal Procedure," as a remedy that could be alternatively granted, viz.:

The case at bar treats of the sufficiency of the averment in the information of the time of the
Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. — If the motion to quash is based
commission of the felony of theft ascribed to petitioner Felicisimo Rocaberte and two (2)
on an alleged defect in the complaint or information which can be cured by
others. The information, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, City of Tagbilaran,1 Judge
amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be made. (2a)
Andres S. Santos, presiding, reads as follows:2

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal hereby accused Felicisimo Rocaberte,
Florencio Ranario and Flaviana Ranario of the crime of Theft, committed as follows:
That on or about the Period from 1977 to December 28, 1983 at the off offshore of
West Canayaon, municipal of Garcia-Hernandez, province of Bohol, Philippines . . .,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with
intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following properties, to
wit:
One (1) pc. sledge hammer, valued at P136.00
One (1) pc. H beam, valued at 400.00
Felicisimo Rocaberte then instituted in this Court, thru his aforenamed counsel de oficio, the
special civil action of certiorari at bar, impugning the denial by respondent Judge Santos of
his motion to quash, or his refusal, at the very least, to direct the amendment of the
information pursuant to Section 4, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Court, supra. He is correct,
and will be granted appropriate relief.
The rules of criminal procedure declare6 that —
. . . A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the defendant;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time
of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.

Two (2) cut abrasive steel plates for cargo
berth cover protector
Ninety-nine (99) blocks of aluminum, alloy
anodes at P3,750.00 each block
TOTAL
and — as regards the time of the commission of the offense, particularly — that:7
158.00
. . . It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at
which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the
P371,250.00 offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to
the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or
P371,944.00 complaint will permit.

in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
FORTY-FOUR PESOS (P371,944.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to and owned by
the Philippine Sinter Corporation, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Articles 308, 309 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In line with this last mentioned rule, a variance of a few months between the time set out in
the indictment and that established by the evidence during the trial has been held not to
constitute an error so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score.
Hence, where the information sets the date of commission of a robbery at March 25, 1900,
evidence was allowed to show that the offense was actually perpetrated on the 5th or 6th of
March; and an amendment of an information so as to change the year therein stated to that

68
following it, was allowed it appearing that the alteration impaired none of the defendant's Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
rights.8

Where, however, there was a variance of several years between the time stated in the
information, 1947, and the proof of its actual commission adduced at the trial, 1952, the
dismissal of the case by the Trial Court was sustained by this Court, since to allow
amendment of the indictment to conform to the evidence would be violative of defendant's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.9

Again, the statement of the time of the commission of the offense which is so general as to
span a number of years, i.e., "between October, 1910 to August, 1912," has been held to be
fatally defective because it deprives the accused an opportunity to prepare his defense.10

A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is not,
however, a ground for a motion to quash under Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Even if it
were, a motion for quashal on that account will be denied since the defect is one that can be
cured by amendment; instead, the court shall order the amendment to be made by stating
the time with particularity.11

The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of the
offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of particulars, provided for in Section
6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court of 1964.12

Bill of particulars. — Defendant may, at the time of or before arraignment, move

for or demand a more definite statement or a bill of particulars of any matter
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him
properly to plead or prepare for trial. The motion shall point out the defects
complained of and the details desired.

From all that has been said, the conclusion should be clear. The information against
petitioner Rocaberte is indeed seriously defective. It places on him and his co-accused the
unfair and unreasonable burden of having to recall their activities over a span of more than
2,500 days. It is a burden nobody should be made to bear. The public prosecutor must make
more definite and particular the time of the commission of the crime of theft attributed to
Rocaberte and his co-defendants. If he cannot, the prosecution cannot be maintained, the
case must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the writ of certiorari prayed for is ISSUED,
ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the challenged Orders of respondent Judge dated August
12, 1985 and September 10, 1985 in Criminal Case No. 3851, and DIRECTING the amendment
of the information in said case by the prosecution within such time as the respondent Judge
may deem proper, failing which the criminal prosecution against the petitioner and his co-
defendants shall be dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

69
[G.R. No. 41903. June 10, 1992.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, Br.
V, Mauban, Quezon; RAMON S. REYES alias "CAPING", GUILLERMO UNTALAN, NATALIO
ALVAREZ and WILFREDO SALIENDRA, Respondents.
The Solicitor General for Petitioner.
Roman R. Mendioro and Norma Chionglo-Sia for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; COMMENCEMENT
OF CRIMINAL ACTION; RULE. — As early as 1916, this Court in the case of U.S. v. Pablo, (35
Phil. 94 at 100) said: "The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the
attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power instinctively charged by the
common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the
community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty
of the exercise of his rights." From this decision, we deduce that all criminal actions must be
commenced either by a "complaint or information in the name of the People of the
Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved." Thus,
while the offended party is authorized to initiate proceedings, the prosecution is required to
be in the name of the People of the Philippines whose peace, in legal theory, has been
breached.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE STATE BE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN
THE BODY OF THE INFORMATION AS AN OFFENDED PARTY; REASON THEREFOR. — In the
present case, (Sec. 2, Rule 110, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure) complied with when the
criminal action for qualified theft under Presidential Decree No. 330 was instituted by the
provincial fiscal in the name of the People of the Philippines. Despite such compliance with
the rules, the lower court found the information to be defective in form and substance
because "nowhere in the information is cited any damage or prejudice caused to the State."
The lower court reasoned out that since the fiscal admitted that it is the State which is the
actual offended party and not Aluk Logging Corporation (or Operation) as alleged in the
information, the evidence of the prosecution would be at variance with the allegations in the
information. This reasoning cannot be sustained. Again what is important, as required by the
Rules, is that "in criminal action the complaint or information shall be in writing in the name
of the People of the Philippines . . . . The rules do not require that the State be specifically
mentioned in the body of the information as an offended party. It is sufficient that the
People of the Philippines appear in the caption of the information to emphasize that penal
laws of the State have been violated. For indeed, a crime is an offense against the State.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NAME OF THE OFFENDED PARTY; DESIGNATION THEREOF, NOT ABSOLUTELY
INDISPENSABLE AS LONG AS THE CRIMINAL ACT CHARGED CAN BE PROPERLY IDENTIFIED;
CASE AT BAR. — We rule that it was error for the lower court to dismiss the information. The
information was already sufficient in form and substance. The argument that it was fatal for
the prosecution not to have alleged the State as the offended party is without merit for in
the case of Sayson v. People, (G.R. No. 51745, October 28, 1988, 166 SCRA 680) in construing
Sec. 11 of Rule 110 (now Sec. 12, Rules of Court of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), we
have clearly held that in offenses against property, the designation of the name of the
offended party is not absolutely indispensable as long as the criminal act charged in the
complaint or information can be properly identified.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent
court dated October 24, 1975 dismissing the information for qualified theft against the
private respondents in Criminal Case No. 380 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch
V, 1 on the ground that it does not charge an offense for failure to allege the proper offended
party therein.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Private respondents Ramon Reyes alias "Caping," Guillermo Untalan, Natalio Alvarez and
Wilfredo Saliendra were charged in Criminal Case No. 380 at the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Branch V, with qualified theft, as defined and punished under Section 1, Presidential
Decree No. 330 2 in an information filed by Special Counsel Hjalmar Quintana of the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon, on August 5, 1975, in the following manner:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
x x x
"That on or about the 16th day of April 1974, at Barrio San Jose, in the Municipality of
Mauban, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Ramon Reyes alias "Caping", Guillermo Untalan, Natalio Alvarez
and Wilfredo Saliendra, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter a
public forest zone under lease to the ALUK LOGGING CORPORATION and once inside, illegally
cut, take, steal and carry away two (2) Lauan trees consisting of 1,200 board feet, without the
consent of the latter, valued at ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY (P1,920.00) PESOS,
Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Aluk Logging Corporation in the
aforesaid sum.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 3
On September 17, 1975, the private respondents were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to
the charge. 4 After the arraignment, the private respondents moved to quash the aforesaid
information based on the following grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. That the facts charged do not constitute the crime of qualified theft, there being no
70
offended party, Aluk Logging Corporation being neither a timber lessee or licensee;
Before us, petitioner assigns the following errors, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
2. That the pretended owner, Arsenio Lukang, has no timber license to operate in Mauban,
Quezon; I

3. That the information is defective as it does not describe the "situs" of the offense with
particularity, defendant Ramon S. Reyes being a timber licensee in Mauban, Quezon." 5 The respondent court erred in ruling that the information filed against the private
respondents in Criminal Case No. 380 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch V, does
On September 29, 1975, the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon filed an opposition to private not charge an offense for failure to cite the State as offended party and complainant.
respondent’s quashal arguing that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
II
1) the information is sufficient in form and substance and that there is a specific offended
party;
The respondent Court erred in quashing the information on the basis of the said alleged
2) the place of the commission of the offense is sufficiently described; defect.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

3) the allegation that Ramon S. Reyes is a timber licensee over the forest zone in question is a The resolution of this case hinges on the determination of whether or not the information for
matter of defense and evidentiary in nature that should be proven during the trial; qualified theft properly charges an offense due to its failure to allege the proper offended
party therein.
4) the motion to quash was filed after the arraignment of the accused and, therefore, said
accused should be considered as having waived all objections which are grounds for a motion As early as 1916, this Court in the case of U.S. v. Pablo, 12 said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
to quash. 6
"The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a
The provincial fiscal of Quezon prayed that the prosecution be allowed to amend the natural law belongs to the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common will of the
information by replacing the word "Corporation" with the word "Operation," being a members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the
typographical error committed by oversight. 7 individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise
of his rights."cralaw virtua1aw library
On October 9, 1975, the private respondents filed their reply reiterating the grounds stated
in their motion to quash. 8 From the decision, we deduce that all criminal actions must be commenced either by a
"complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons
The respondent court, in its assailed order dated October 24, 1975, quashed the information who appear to be responsible for the offense involved." 13 Thus, while the offended party is
for failure to conform substantially to the prescribed form 9 under Sec. 3(d) Rule 117, authorized to initiate proceedings, the prosecution is required to be in the name of the
specifically the failure to state the name of the offended party as embodied in Sec. 11, Rule People of the Philippines whose peace, in legal theory, has been breached.
110 of the Old Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In the present case, the above rule was complied with when the criminal action for qualified
In quashing the information, respondent judge reasoned that the prosecuting fiscal’s theft under Presidential Decree No. 330 was instituted by the provincial fiscal in the name of
categorical admission that the State and not Aluk Logging Corp. was the offended party was the People of the Philippines. 14
fatal to the information. Such admission by the fiscal deviated from the allegations of the
information which affected not only its form but also its substance. The court held that such Despite such compliance with the rules, the lower court found the information to be
a defect in the designation of the name of the offended party could not be cured by mere defective in form and substance because "nowhere in the information is cited any damage or
amendment in view of another claim by one of the accused, Ramon S. Reyes, as the duly prejudice caused to the State." The lower court reasoned out that since the fiscal admitted
registered timber licensee. 10 that it is the State which is the actual offended party and not Aluk Logging Corporation (or
Operation) as alleged in the information, the evidence of the prosecution would be at
As an additional reason for the quashal, the trial court also observed that Aluk Logging Corp. variance with the allegations in the information. 15
was not a duly registered partnership or corporation and proceeded to conclude that,
necessarily, it had no capacity to become a lessee nor be a registered holder of any timber This reasoning cannot be sustained.
license. 11
Again what is important, as required by the Rules, is that "in criminal action the complaint or
Hence, the petition.

71
information shall be in writing in the name of the People of the Philippines . . . . 16 The rules
do not require that the State be specifically mentioned in the body of the information as an
offended party. It is sufficient that the People of the Philippines appear in the caption of the
information to emphasize the penal laws of the State have been violated. For indeed, a crime
is an offense against the State.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Proceeding now to the main issue, we rule that it was error for the lower court to dismiss the
information. The information was already sufficient in form and substance. The argument
that it was fatal for the prosecution not to have alleged the State as the offended party is
without merit for in the case of Sayson v. People, 17 in construing Sec. 11 of Rule 110 (now
Sec. 12, Rules of Court of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), we have clearly held that in
offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not
absolutely indispensable as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information
can be properly identified. 18

Indeed, the crime of qualified theft under Presidential Decree No. 330 was described with
particularity in the information as to properly identify the offense charged. Hence, the
erroneous allegation as to the person injured is deemed immaterial as the same is a mere
formal defect which does not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant. 19

On the other hand, the amendment sought by herein petitioner changing the word
"Corporation" to "Operation" such that "Aluk Logging Corporation" would read "Aluk Logging
Operation" is merely formal. Even private respondents alternately used the words
"corporation" and "operation" in their pleadings. 20 Thus, it was not surprising that this
formal defect was glossed over by the lower court.

WHEREFORE, the Order dated October 24, 1975 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
case is REMANDED to the lower court for immediate disposition on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

72
G.R. No. L-51745 October 28, 1988
RAMON F. SAYSON, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Federico P. Roy for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision finding him guilty of attempted
estafa.
On March 25, 1972, an information for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of a
Commercial Document was filed against the herein petitioner, Ramon F. Sayson before the
Court of First Instance of Manila, the pertinent portion of which reads:
... the said accused having come in possession of a blank US dollar check
#605908142, with intent to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of
America, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously forge and
falsify or cause to be forged and falsified the said check, by then and
there writing or filling or causing to be written or filled up the following
words and figures: "March 10, 1972," "Atty. Norberto S. Perez,"
"2,250.00" and forging the signature of the Asst. Cashier, Manager of the
Bank of America, Dania Branch, making it appear, as it did appear, that
the said check was duly issued by the Bank of America, when in truth and
in fact, as the accused well knew, the said check was never issued nor
authorized by the said bank; that thereafter, said accused wrote or
affixed the signature "Norberto Perez" on the back of said check as
indorser; that once the said cheek had been forged and falsified in the
manner above described, the said accused by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations which he made to Ernesto
Rufino, Sr. that he is "Atty. Norberto Perez" who is the payee of the said
Check, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in
inducing the said Ernesto Rufino, Sr. to change said dollar cheek, as in
fact, said Ernesto Rufino, Sr. issued Manufacturer's Bank Check No. 87586
dated March 22, 1972 payable to "Norberto Perez" in the amount of "Pl
4,850.00" in exchange for said dollar check; ... [Rollo, pp. 23-24.]
Arraigned on December 8, 1972, petitioner pleaded not guilty. On October 9, 1974, after
several postponements, the prosecution rested its case. At the hearing of December 9, 1974,
when the defense was scheduled to present its evidence, only the petitioner appeared. He
said that his counsel had another case in a different court. In the morning of the said day, his
lawyer also sent a telegram to the court requesting cancellation of the hearing because he
was sick. The court denied the motion for postponement and the case was considered
submitted for decision without petitioner's evidence.
The trial court rendered judgment on January 30, 1975, finding the accused guilty of the
crime charged and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1
day to 6 years of prison correccional to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment
and to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed but modified the penalty by imposing six
months of arresto mayor and eliminating the fine. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
The background facts as found by the appellate court as well as its conclusions thereon
follow:
On March 22, 1972, appellant Ramon Sayson y Fernandez was introduced
by Vicente Jaucian a former employee of the Luzon Theatres, Inc. to
Anselmo Aquiling, private secretary to Ernesto Rufino, Sr., General
Manager of the corporation. Vicente Jaucian had known appellant as
"Fiscal Perez" who wanted to exchange dollars for pesos, having been
introduced to him in that capacity by his (Jaucian's) cousin. Thinking that
Rufino might be interested in dollars, Jaucian accompanied appellant to
the offices of the Luzon Theatres, Inc. and Mever Films, Inc. at the
Avenue Hotel on Rizal Avenue, Manila. Upon being introduced to
Anselmo Aquiling, appellant showed the latter an Identification card
indicating that he was Norberto S. Perez, a Prosecuting Attorney from
Angeles City. After making the introduction, Jaucian left. Mr. Rufino said
that he was not personally interested in dollars but suggested to his
secretary to inquire if Mever Films, Inc. needed dollars.
Mr. Rufino was also Chairman of the Board of the aforesaid corporation;
and when told that Mever Films needed dollars, he authorized the
transaction. Appellant then presented to Edgar Mangona, the assistant
accountant of Mever Films, a Bank of America check in the amount of
$2,250,00 payable to the order of Atty. Norberto S. Perez, a xerox copy of
which was introduced in evidence as Exhibit E. Actually, Exhibit E appears
to be a bill of exchange or draft drawn by the Dania, Florida Branch of the
Bank of America on its San Francisco Branch in favor of said payee and
bears serial number 605908142. Edgar Mangona prepared a check of the
Manufacturer's Bank and Trust Company in the amount of P14,850.00 at
the exchange rate of P6.60 to a dollar (Exh. B). He then walked over to
the office of Mrs. Teresita Rufino Litton whom he asked to sign the check
and thereafter Mangona asked Mr. Rufino to countersign it. Finally, the
check was exchanged with appellant's Bank of America draft and the
latter signed the voucher for the peso check.
73
On the same day, March 22, 1972, appellant repaired to the Tayuman
Branch of the Banco Filipino and informed its Branch Manager, Mrs.
Maria Fe Relova that he wanted to open a savings account. He was given
an application form which he filled up with the name Norberto S. Perez as
the applicant, among other things. Appellant then presented the
Manufacturer 's Bank check Exhibit B, payable to the order of Norberto S.
Perez, and after endorsing the same, it was posted in the passbook issued
to him. Unknown to appellant, however, Mrs. Relova, an astute woman
had been auspicious of the former's actuations. So that after he left, she
called up the office of the PLDT and inquired if the telephone number
which appellant had unsolicitedly given her was listed in Perez' name. She
was told that the number referred to had not yet been issued by PLDT.
She then telephoned the office of Mever Films, Inc., the drawer of the
check, and inquired if the check was in fact issued by it and she was
answered in the affirmative. Despite this assurance, she tested her
suspicions further by sending out a bank employee to deliver a brochure
to the address given by appellant and the messenger returned without
locating the place.
Within a short time, the officials of the Mever Films, Inc. became
doubtful of the genuineness of the Bank of America draft. And on March
24, 1972, two days after the issuance of the Manufacturer's Bank check
and one day after the check was cleared with the Central Bank, Mever
Films which was convinced that the draft was spurious ordered its
payment stopped (Exhibit D). On the same day, Vicente Jaucian who had
introduced appellant to Anselmo Aquiling and the latter himself went to
the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and there gave
written statements on what they knew about appellant (Exhibits F and
G). Also on the same day, the Assistant Manager of the Bank of America,
Manila Branch, who must have been informed of the transaction
involving the draft, addressed a letter to the NBI authorities (Exh. B)
which reads:
Gentlemen:
This is to certify that U.S. Dollar draft No. 605908142
drawn on the Bank of America NT & SA, San
Francisco, in favor of Atty. Norberto S. Perez for
$2,250.00 and dated March 10, 1972, is one of the
blank drafts surreptitiously taken from a shipment
sent to us by our San Francisco Headquarters
sometime in the latter part of 1970.
Issuance of the above-mentioned draft was not authorized by this bank.
Jose R. Lopez, the abovementioned assistant manager who issued the
aforestated certification, testified that the draft in question was one of
the 900 blank drafts which were missing from a shipment received from
their head office in the United States sometime in 1971. He declared that
the words "Dania Branch" and "Dania, Florida" appearing on the face of
the draft were superimposed so as to make it appear that the draft was
drawn by the Dania, Florida Branch of the Bank of America on the San
Francisco Branch, when in fact the blank draft was for the exclusive use
of the Manila Branch, as revealed by the first four code figures of the
draft's serial number.
We are satisfied with Lopez' testimony that the draft in question was a
forgery. Since the same was a blank draft appertaining to the Manila
Branch of the Bank of America, of which he was the Assistant Manager,
Lopez was competent to state whether or not the draft was a forgery.
And the fact that appellant had openly and falsely represented himself to
be Atty. Norberto S. Perez indicated in the forged draft as the payee, is a
strong circumstantial evidence that he was instrumental in its forgery.
[Rollo, p. 25-30.]
xxx xxx xxx
The appellant has raised the issue of due process, alleging denial of his right to be heard and
to present evidence. This requires inquiry into the extent of the rights accorded an accused in
a criminal case and whether the accused-appellant has been denied the rights to which he is
entitled.
The right to be heard by himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights of the
accused. But while the accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to
present evidence for his defense by direct constitutional grant, such right is not exempt from
the rule on waiver as long as the waiver is not controverted to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law
[Article 6, Civil Code.] There is nothing in the Constitution nor in any law prohibiting such
waiver. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid
waiver of rights has been made, as in this case.
Petitioner claims though that he was not waiving such right; on the contrary, he was
vigorously asserting his right to be heard by counsel and to present evidence in his verbal
motion for postponment due to absence of his counsel de parte. He thus assails the denial of
his motion as it in effect deprived him of his day in court.
It is too well established to require citation of authorities that the grant or refusal of an
application for continuance or postponement of the trial lies within the sound discretion of
the court. Justice Malcolm, in a 1919 decision, expounded on such judicial discretion as
follows:
Applications for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of
the court. In this respect, it may be said that the discretion which the trial
court exercises must be judicial and not arbitrary. It is the guardian of the
74
 rights of the accused as well as those of the people at large, and should
not unduly force him to trial nor for fight causes jeopardize the rights and
interests of the public. Where he consideration--that it to be necessary
for the more perfect attainment of justice, it has the power upon the
motion of either party to continue the case. But a party charged with a
crime has no natural or inalienable right to a continuance.
The ruling of the court will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a
clear abuse of discretion. When the discretion of the court is exercised
with a reasonable degree of judicial acumen and fairness, it is one which
the higher co is loathe to review or disturb. The trial judge must be to a
certain extent free to secure speedy and expeditious trials when such
speed and expedition are not inconsistent with fairness. Since the court
trying the case is, from personal observation, familiar with all the
attendant circumstances, and has the best opportunity of forming a
correct opinion upon the case presented, the presumption will be in favor
of its action. It would take an extreme case of abuse of discretion to make
the action of the trial court a denial of due process. (Emphasis supplied;
U.S. v. Ramirez, 39 Phil. 738 (1919).]
The factual background of the case penned by Justice Malcolm, which was quoted with
approval in the case of People v. Mendez [G.R. No. L-27348, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 880], is
very similar to that of the case at bar. In the instant case, the information was filed on March
25,1972 and arraignment was held on December 8,1973. The prosecution started presenting
its evidence on March 12,1973 and after 1 year, 10 months and 1 day from the day of
arraignment, it rested its case. During this time, petitioner had already secured seven
postponements, which it admitted in its brief filed with the Court of Appeals [Rollo, p. 20]
thus prompting the trial judge to remark that "this is a notoriously postponed case' and that
"the defense had abused the rules" [TSN, December 12,1973, pp. 2-3.]. Since the judge's
comments were home out by the record regarding the postponements which were admitted
by petitioner himself in his brief filed before the Court of Appeals, petitioner cannot rightfully
cast aspersion on the integrity of said judge by attributing to him a non-existent attitude of
bias and hatred toward the petitioner-accused.
No grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for postponement can be
imputed to the trial court. First, the petitioner's motion was not seasonably filed as the
three-day notice required by the rules (Rule 15, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court) was
not complied with. Moreover, it was not accompanied by an affidavit nor a medical
certificate to support the alleged illness of counsel, controverted to what Rule 22, Section 5
of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 5. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for illness of party or
counsel.—A motion to postpone trial on the ground of illness of a party
or counsel may be granted if it appears upon affidavit that the presence
of such party or counsel at the trial is indispensable and that the
character of his illness is such as to render his non-attendance excusable.
Besides, when petitioner himself sought postponement of the case during the December 9
hearing, he claimed that his counsel had another case in a different court. Certainly, the
conflicting stories advanced by petitioner and his counsel only indicate the lack of a good
cause for the postponement.
Petitioner's lament that 'at least, in the name of justice and fair play, the trial court should
have warned accused that no further postponements shall be entertained by the court'
[Rollo p. 97] is baseless. As he was aware that the case had already been postponed seven
times at his initiative, he had no right to assume that his motion would be granted; rather, he
should have foreseen that any further motions for postponement might not be met with
approval by the trial court. Besides, the record of the case clearly shows that the accused had
repeatedly appeared in court without his counsel, seeking postponements which were
liberally granted by the court with an order directing his counsel to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt for repeated failure to appear at the trial of the case. In fact,
the court, in its Order dated August 1 2, 1974, categorically declared: "In the meantime, let
the trial of this case be DEFINITELY POSTPONED FOR THE LAST TIME to August 14, 1974 at
8:30 a.m. as previously scheduled, with the warning to the accused to be ready with his
present counsel or another counsel on said date as the court will not entertain any further
delays in the proceedings in this case and shall proceed with the trial of this case with or
without his counsel." [Original Records, p. 430]. This, certainly, was enough warning.
Finally, the motion for postponement was properly denied inasmuch as the defendant failed
to present any meritorious defense. This Court's pronouncement—that in incidents of this
nature before the trial court, two circumstances should be taken into account, namely, 1) the
reasonableness of the postponement and 2) the merits of the case of the movant should not
be lightly ignored [Udan v. Amon G.R. No. L-24288, May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 837.] There may
be an accident, surprise or excusable neglect justifying postponement or reconsideration but
if the movant does not present a meritorious claim or defense, denial of his motion for
postponement may not be considered as an abuse of the discretion of the court.[De Cases v.
Peyer G.R. No. L-18564, August 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 11 65.]
Absent any meritorious case in defendant's favor, his motion for postponement was properly
denied. His invocation of his right to counsel and to present evidence was an empty gesture
revealing his dilatory scheme. Under the circumstances, the petitioner must be deemed to
have waived his rights and to have been extended the protection of due process.
Moreover, the petitioner in negotiating the check presented himself as a lawyer; he was
addressed in the Notice of the Order dated September 11, 1972 as "Atty. Ramon Sayson y
Fernandez" [Original Records, p. 381 and he himself filed the Motion to Quash [Original
Records, p. 22] and a pleading captioned "Compliance" dated December 2, 1972 [Original
Records, p. 41.] These facts indicate that he was capable of defending himself That he
himself was allowed to file pleadings clearly negatives the alleged deprivation of his right to
due process of law. Consequently, there being no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court, its order will not be disturbed.
The Court finds the petitioner's plea that it was incumbent upon the trial judge to appoint a
counsel de oficio who for him when he appeared without his counsel utterly without legal
75
basis. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio when the accused has no counsel
of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of
arraignment (Rule 116, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court This is no longer so where the
accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his choice but
when the time for the presentation of the evidence for the defense has arrived, he appears
by himself alone and the absence of his counsel was inexcusable. This Court's holding in a
previous case that there is no deprivation of the light to counsel in such a case is squarely
applicable:
As the appellant was represented by counsel of his choice at the
arraignment, trial and in the incidental motions to dismiss and to
postpone the resumption of the trial of the case, the trial court was not in
duty bound to appoint a counsel de oficio to assist him in his defense. His
failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the hearing of the case,
notwithstanding repeated postponements and warnings that failure to so
appear would be deemed a waiver on the part of the appellant to present
his evidence and the case would be deemed submitted for decision upon
the evidence presented by the prosecution, was sufficient legal
justification for the trial court to proceed and render judgment upon the
evidence before it. Taking into consideration all the steps taken by the
trial court to safeguard the rights of the appellant, the latter cannot
pretend that he was deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel and to
present evidence in his behalf. Moreover, the repeated failure of the
appellant to appear with counsel at the resumptions of the trial of the
case may be taken as a deliberate attempt on his part to delay the
proceedings. [People vs. Angco, 103 Phil. 33, 39 (1958).]
At the most, the appointment of a counsel de oficio in situations like the present case is
discretionary with the trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with in the absence
of abuse. Here, the trial court had been liberal in granting the postponements secured by the
petitioner himself, at the same time admonishing the latter to be ready with his present
counsel or another counsel [Original Records, p. 430]. Notwithstanding this admonition, the
petitioner kept on attending the hearings without securing another lawyer to substitute his
present counsel who was constantly absent during the hearings. Still, as admitted by
petitioner in his memorandum, the trial court, at the December 9, 1974 hearing, allowed him
to look for a lawyer but no one was available at the time (Rollo, p. 94). These steps
undertaken by the trial court removes any doubt that its order was tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.
The last issue to be resolved dwells on the effect of the alleged variance between the
prosecution's allegation and proof.
The petitioner vigorously maintains that he cannot be justifiably convicted under the
information charging him of attempting to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of
America because the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution show very clearly
that the accused allegedly attempted to defraud Mever Films, Inc., a corporate entity entirely
separate and distinct from Ernesto Rufino, Sr. He firmly asserts that his conviction was in
gross violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
Petitioner's claim is unavailing. The rule in this jurisdiction is that "variance between the
allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution in support
thereof does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal." [People v. Catli G.R. No. L-
11641, November 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 642.]
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name and
surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed
or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known and if there is no
better way of Identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name (Rule 110,
Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended
party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint
or information can be properly Identified. Thus, Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court
provides that:
Section 11. Name of the offended party-
xxx xxx xxx
(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended
party is unknown, the property, subject matter of the offense, must be
described with such particularity as to properly Identify the particular
offense charged.
(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of the person against whom
or against whose property the offense was committed is disclosed or
ascertained, the court must cause the true name to be inserted in the
complaint or information or record.
xxx xxx xxx
In U.S. v. Kepner [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall
have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to Identify the act, an
erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a
mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant.
Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual backdrop similar to the instant
case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the misappropriation of the proceeds
of a warrant which he had cashed without authority, the erroneous allegation in the
complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the
cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the one which suffered a loss, was held
to be immaterial on the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the warrant, was
described in the complaint with such particularity as to properly Identify the particular
offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the
76
Revised Penal Code, since the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was
described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes
immaterial, for purposes of convicting the accused, that it was established during the trial
that the offended party was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of
America as alleged in the information.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto with costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan C.J., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part.

77
G.R. No. L-12453 July 15, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO LAHOYLAHOY and MARCOS MADANLOG, defendants-appellants.
W. A. Kincaid for appellants.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This case is submitted to the Supreme Court for review of a decision of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Iloilo, sentencing the defendants Pedro Lahoylahoy and Marcos
Madanlog to death upon a complaint charging the crime of robbery with multiple homicide
under the circumstances stated below.
It appears that in the year 1912 some ten or a dozen people were living on the small island of
Sicogon, in the jurisdiction of the municipality of Balasan, Province of Iloilo. Two of these
were an aged couple named Francisco Seran and his wife Juana. Two others were Roman
Estriba and his wife Rosa. The latter couple had two children Miguela and Bartolome, aged at
that time respectively about 14 and 9 years. Upon the night of the commission of the crime
charged in the complaint the two children were staying with Juana, their grandmother, in a
house some distance removed from that occupied by Roman and Rosa and located farther
back from the shore. The grandfather, Francisco, had gone to the beach as was his custom to
watch for turtles. After the grandmother and the children had gone to rest on a mat where
they slept together, and probably only a short while after it had become dark, the two
accused appeared and demanded money of Juana. She gave them P100 in money in
response to this demand, and the accused then required the three to leave the house and go
in the direction of the sea. When the party had arrived at or near the beach, a further
demand was made upon the old woman for money, which demand she was unable to
comply with. Lahoylahoy then struck her with a bolo just below her breast, killing her
instantly. The two children were at the time close to their grandmother, and being greatly
frightened, they ran away separately for some distance and remained hidden during the
night in the bushes.
The next morning the children made their way to the house where the old couple had lived,
which was vacant; but they there found each other and proceeded together to the house of
their parents. Going in that direction they stopped at the house of their sister, the wife of the
defendant Madanlog. When they went a little later to the house where their parents had
lived, the fact was revealed that Francisco, Roman, and Rosa had also been killed. All the
bodies were collected and buried early in the morning by the two accused, assisted by
Eugenio Tenedero, son-in-law of Lahoylahoy. The two children Miguela and Bartolome say
that they were threatened with death if they should make complaint. Nevertheless their lives
were spared, and for sometime they stayed with their sister in the home of Madanlog; and
after staying for a long time on the island, they were afterwards taken to the home of
another sister, named Dionisia Estriba, at Escalante, on the Island of Panay. They here
revealed the facts above narrated. This sister, Dionisia, afterwards filed the complaint in this
case. Pedro Lahoylahoy was arrested first; and when he was examined before the justice of
the peace, he made a confession in which he stated that the four deceased persons had been
killed by Madanlog, with is assistance.
At the trial the two children gave a very consistent account of the robbery and of the murder
of their grandmother; but the boy said that he did not remember that Madanlog was present
when Lahoylahoy struck the fatal blow. Another important witness for the prosecution was
Eugenio Tenedero, the son-in-law of Lahoylahoy. This witness testified that the defendants
killed the four deceased persons, and that early in the morning they came to his house and
required him to help them bury the dead, which he did. The accused gave no explanation to
Tenedero of their motive or of the reason for the commission of the deed, and told him not
to tell anybody. During the next day or two after the tragedy above narrated, the defendant
Madanlog went to the house where Francisco and Juana had lived and carried away some
palay, some dawa, three pigs, and a trunk containing wearing apparel. We believe that the
asportation of these things should not be considered as a continuation of the acts of robbery
and murder previously committed, but rather as a spoliation of the state of a deceased
person. It results that the only property taken in the act of robbery was the P100 obtained
from Juana.
As against Madanlog, the case rests chiefly upon the testimony of Miguela, who says he was
present at the robbery and at the murder of Juana. His guilt is also indicated by his own
conduct subsequent to the murder. We are satisfied with the conclusion reached by the
lower court with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, and we have no doubt of the guilt
of both the accused.
An important question arises upon the matter of the complaint in connection with the proof
as to the ownership of the property which was taken by the accused. The part of the
complaint here material to be considered reads as follows:
The aforesaid accused taking advantage of the darkness of the night, voluntarily,
illegally, and criminally and by means of force on the things, took and appropriated
to themselves with intent of gain and against the will of the owner thereof, the
sum of P100, 5 bayones of palay, 4 bayones of dawa, and 1 trunk which contained
various wearing apparel, of the total value of P150, the property of Roman Estriba;
in consequence thereof and on the occasion of the said robbery, the aforesaid
accused criminally and with known premeditation and treachery, killed Roman
Estriba, Rosa Galoso, Francisco Seran, and Juana.
According to the proof the person robbed was Juana; while the complaint charges
that the property taken belong to Roman Estriba. What is the effect of this variance
between the language of the complaint and the proof? Subsection 5 of section 6 of
General Orders No. 58 declares that a complaint or information shall show, among
others things, the names of the persons against whom, or against whose property,
the offense was committed, if known. The complaint in this case therefore properly
contained an averment as to the ownership of the property; and upon principle, in
charging the crime of robbery committed upon the person, the allegation of the
78
 owner's name is essential. But of course if his name cannot be ascertained, it may
be alleged that it is unknown.
From the fact that the name of the injured person may, in case of necessity, be
alleged as unknown it should not be inferred that the naming of such person, when
known, is of no importance. Where the name of the injured party is necessary as
matter of essential description of the crime charged, the complaint must invest
such person with individuality by either naming him or alleging that his name is
unknown. (Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice, 9th ed., secs. 111, 112.) It is
elementary that in crimes against property, ownership must be alleged as matter
essential to the proper description of the offense.
To constitute larceny, robbery, embezzlement, obtaining money by false pretenses,
malicious mischief, etc., the property obtained must be that of another, and
indictments for such offenses must name the owner; and a variance in this respect
between the indictment and the proof will be fatal. It is also necessary in order to
identify the offense. (Clark's Criminal Procedure, p. 227. See also page 338.)
Now a complaint charging the commission of the complex offense of robbery with homicide
must necessarily charge each of the component offenses with the same precision that would
be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. It is well recognized in
this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the
charge as to one of the component offenses the defendant can be convicted of the other.
The mere circumstance that the two crimes are so related as to constitute one transaction in
no way affects the principles of pleading involved in the case. To permit a defendant to be
convicted upon a charge of robbing one person when the proof shows that he robbed an
entirely different person, when the first was not present, is violative of the rudimentary
principles of pleading; and in addition, is subject to the criticism that the defendant is
thereby placed in a position where he could not be protected from a future prosecution by a
plea of former conviction or acquittal. If we should convict or acquit these defendants today
of the robbery which is alleged to have been committed upon the property of Roman Estriba,
it is perfectly clear that they could be prosecuted tomorrow for robbery committed upon the
property of Juana; and the plea of former jeopardy would be of no avail.
Reference to a few accredited decisions from American courts will make this clear.
In Comm. vs. Hoffman (121 Mass., 369), it was held that an acquittal on an indictment for
breaking and entering the dwelling house and stealing therein, the property of A, is no bar to
a complaint for stealing in the same dwelling house at the same time the property of B,
without proof that A and B are the same persons.
In Comm. vs. Andrews (2 Mass., 409), the defendant in an indictment for receiving stolen
goods which were the property of A, alleged that he had been convicted of receiving stolen
goods the property of B. The plea was adjudged insufficient, although it was alleged that the
two parcels of stolen goods were received by the defendant of the same person, at the same
time, and in the same package, and that the act of receiving them was one and the same.
In Alexander vs. State (21 Tex. Cr. App., 406; 57 Am. Rep., 617), it was held that where the
goods of two different owners were stolen at the same time, an acquittal on an indictment
for stealing the goods of one would not constitute a bar to an indictment for stealing the
goods of the other; though it was observed that if the defendant had been convicted upon
the first trial, he would have been protected from the second prosecution.
(See Wright vs.State, 17 Tex. Cr. App., 152.)
In Comm. vs. Wade (17 Pick. [Mass.], 395), the offense of burning a building was charged,
and the indictment stated that the owner was a certain individual (naming him). It was held
that, although the name might possibly have been omitted altogether, yet as the indictment
did allege the name, the allegation of ownership was material, being descriptive of the
offense, and must be proved.
It should be borne in mind that the plea of former conviction or acquittal, or former
jeopardy, is supposed to be proved by the pleadings and judgment in the former case,
supplemented only by proofs showing the identity of the party, or parties. Courts are not
accustomed to determine the plea of former jeopardy by examining the proof to discover
just what facts may have been developed in the former case. (Henry vs. State, 33 Ala., 389;
Grisham vs.State, 19 Tex. Cr. App., 504.) In fact it is not always practicable or even possible to
produce for inspection upon the trial of this issue the evidence which was adduced in court
at the trial of the former case.
The second sentence of section 7 of General Orders No. 58 declares that when an offense
shall have been described with sufficient certainty to identify the act, an erroneous allegation
as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial. We are of the opinion that this
provision can have no application to a case where the name of the person injured is matter
of essential description as in the case at bar; and at any rate, supposing the allegation of
ownership to be eliminated, the robbery charged in this case would not be sufficiently
identified. A complaint stating, as does the one now before us, that the defendants "took and
appropriated to themselves with intent of gain and against the will of the owner thereof the
sum of P100" could scarcely be sustained in any jurisdiction as a sufficient description either
of the act of robbery or of the subject of the robbery. There is a saying to the effect that
money has no earmarks; and generally speaking the only way money, which has been the
subject of a robbery, can be described or identified in a complaint is by connecting it with the
individual who was robbed as its owner or possessor. And clearly, when the offense has been
so identified in the complaint, the proof must correspond upon this point with the allegation,
or there can be no conviction.
In United States vs. Kepner (1 Phil. Rep., 519), this court had before it a case where the
defendant was charged with estafa in the misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant
which he had cashed without authority. It was said that the erroneous allegation in the
complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the check,
when in reality the bank, which cashed the warrant was the sufferer, was immaterial. This
observation was, we think, correct as applied to that case, for the act constituting the offense
of estafa was described in the complaint with sufficient fullness and precision to identify the
act, regardless of the identity of the offended person. Section 7, General Orders No. 58, was
therefore properly applicable. It should be added, however, that the observation to which
reference has been made was, strictly speaking, unnecessary to the decision, for it is further
79
stated in the opinion that there was in fact an injury to the owner of the check, which
consisted of the "delay, annoyance, and damage caused by the unlawful misappropriation of
the warrant." (U.S. vs. Kepner, 1 Phil. Rep., 519, 526.) There is evidently nothing in the case
cited which can afford support for the idea that an erroneous allegation in a complaint as to
ownership of the property robbed is immaterial. If we should hold that a man may be
convicted of robbing one person when he is charged with robbing another, the complaint
instead of being a means of informing him of the particular offense with which he is charged
would rather serve as a means of concealing it.
It is important to note that the complaint in this case is not defective in form, for the charge
is clear, direct, and unambiguous. No formal objection could possibly be made by the
defendants to this complaint; and their only course, if desirous of making any defense, was to
plead not guilty, as was done in this case. The difficulty of the case arises from the facts
adduced in evidence. Section 10, General Orders No. 58, declares that no complaint is
insufficient by reason of a detect in matter of form which does not tend to prejudice a
substantial right of the defendant upon the merits. This provision has no application to such
a case as that now before us; and all arguments based upon the circumstance that the
defendants made no objection to the complaint in the Court of First Instance are irrelevant
to the matter in hand.
The case of United States vs. Manalang (2 Phil., Rep., 64) has been called to our attention as
an authority upon the point that insufficiency of a complaint is waived by failure of the
defendant to object thereto in the Court of First Instance. It there appeared that the
statutory offense with which the defendant was charged could only be committed by a
Constabulary officer. There was no allegation in the complaint that the defendant was such;
but he appeared at the trial, testified in his own behalf, without questioning his character as
such officer. It was held upon appeal that the objection to the complaint on the ground
stated was unavailing, "as no exception was taken to this defect by counsel for the defendant
in the court below, in which it might have been successfully raised by demurrer."
severance, the penalties corresponding to all of the offenses which are charged and proved
may be imposed. The doctrine announced in that case applies with even greater propriety
offenses in one complaint. (See sec. 11, General Orders No. 58.)
The acts causing the violent death of the four deceased must be qualified as homicide, as the
record does not satisfactorily show how and in what manner they were executed.
Even conceding the benefits or article 11 of the Penal Code, this circumstance, as regards
both defendants is counterbalanced by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and that
the crime was committed in an uninhabited place, and, as respects Marcos Madanlog, by
that of relationship by affinity. The accused Pedro Lahoylahoy has accordingly become liable
to four penalties, each of seventeen years four months and one day, reclusion temporal, and
his co-accused Marcos Madanlog also, to the same number of penalties of twenty years
each, reclusion temporal, for the homicide of the four deceased, each also being liable to
one-half of the costs.
In view of rule 2 of article 88 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the maximum duration of three
times the length of the most severe of the penalties to be imposed upon the accused
exceeds forty years, the judgment reviewed is reversed, and we find that each of the accused
Lahoylahoy and Madanlog should be, as they are hereby, sentenced to suffer of aforesaid
penalties of reclusion temporal, not to exceed forty years, to the accessories prescribed by
article 59, to indemnify, severally and jointly, the heirs of each of the deceased in the amount
of P1,000 and each to pay one-half of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

The following cases are also found in our Reports, showing that a complaint may be held
sufficient although the commission of the offense is charged by inference only, provided no
objection is made in the court below. (U.S. vs.Cajayon, 2 Phil. Rep., 570; U.S. vs. Vecina, 4
Phil. Rep., 529; U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 566.) In all of these cases the complaint was
demurrable for defect of substance, but the language used was so far sufficient that the
commission of the crime could be inferred. These cases are not relevant to the case at bar, as
the complaint is not demurrable for defect of any sort.

In the light of what has been said it is evident that, by reason of the lack of conformity
between the allegation and the proof respecting the ownership of the property, it is
impossible to convict the two accused of the offense of robbery committed by them in this
case; and therefore they cannot be convicted of the complex offense of robbery with
homicide, penalized in subsection (1) of article 503 of the Penal Code. No such difficulty
exists, however, with respect to the quadruple homicide committed upon the persons named
in the complaint; and in conformity with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code, the
penalties corresponding to all these crimes must be severely imposed. This court has already
held in United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil. Rep., 260), that where more than one offense (not
complex offenses) are charged in the complaint, and the accused fails to demur or ask for a

80
[G.R. No. L-8596. May 18, 1956.] While it is probably true that the fiscal or his clerk made a clerical error in putting in the
information the name of Pastora Somod-ong instead of that of Demetria Somod-ong, as the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. JULIANA UBA and CALIXTA
offended party, the mistake thus committed was on a very material matter in the case, such
UBA, Defendants-Appellees.
that it necessarily affected the identification of the act charged. The act of insulting X is
distinct from a similar act of insult against Y, even if the insult is preferred by the same
person, in the same language and at about the same time. Note that the pleading that give
DECISION the court jurisdiction to try the offense is not the complaint of the offended party, but the
LABRADOR, J.: information by the fiscal, because the charge is the utterance of insulting or defamatory
language, not the imputation of an offense which can be prosecuted only at the instance of
Appeal by the People against a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, the offended party. (People vs. Marquez, 68 Phil., 521; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryBlanco vs.
absolving Juliana Uba and Calixta Uba of the offense of oral defamation of which they are People, 70 Phil., 735.)
charged in an information filed by the provincial fiscal.
The case of Lahoylahoy, 38 Phil., 330, appears to us to be in point and decisive of the case.
On August 1, 1952, Demetria Somod-ong filed a complaint in the justice of the peace court of The reasons for the decision in that case were, first, because, to convict a person of robbing X
Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, charging above-named Juliana and Calixta Uba with having when the person robbed is Y is violative of the principles of pleading and, second, because
uttered in public against complainant certain defamatory words and expressions. The then the plea of double jeopardy would be of no avail to an accused. To this same effect is
complaint was supported by the affidavits of Pastora Somod-ong, Marciano Calibog and our decision in People vs. Balboa, 90 Phil., 5.
Anacoreta Rocaldo. The court found the existence of probable cause and forwarded the case
to the Court of First Instance, where the provincial fiscal filed the information charging the We, therefore, find that the court a quo did not err in dismissing the case for variance
accused Juliana and Calixta Uba of serious oral defamation. However, instead of mentioning between the allegations of the information and the proof. But the evidence showed that the
the complainant Demetria Somod-ong as the offended party, the information named Pastora accused were guilty of another act, that of insulting Demetria Somod-ong. The Court should
Somod-ong as the person offended. have, therefore, ordered the fiscal to file another information with Demetria Somod-ong as
the offended party and hold the accused in custody to answer the new charge.
When the case came for trial both Demetria and Pastora testified for the prosecution.
Demetria is the daughter of Pastora and when the latter testified she declared that it was her The order of dismissal is hereby affirmed, but the provincial fiscal of Misamis Occidental is
daughter Demetria who was insulted by the accused. When Demetria testified she declared hereby ordered to file a new information charging the same accused with the offense of
the accused insulted her corroborating her mother’s testimony. Two other witnesses serious oral defamation against Demetria Somod-ong. Judgment modified.
testified that the accused insulted Demetria Somod-ong calling her lascivious and a Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion,
prostitute. When the prosecution had rested, counsel for the accused promptly moved for Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.
the dismissal of the case on the ground that all the defamatory statements supposed to have
been uttered by the accused were against Demetria, not against the offended party, Pastora.
The judge then ordered counsel for the parties to present the motion and the answer thereto
in writing which they did. The judge sustained the motion to dismiss and entered decision
acquitting the accused of the charge. Hence, this appeal.
The Solicitor General contends in this appeal that the trial court should have ordered the
fiscal to amend the information by changing the name of the offended party so as to make it
conform with the evidence. It is claimed that the change would merely be one of form,
permitted by Section 13 of Rule 106, which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“SEC. 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or
form, without leave of court, at any time before the Defendant pleads; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave
and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the
rights of the Defendant.
If it appears at any time before judgment that mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense, provided the Defendant would not be place thereby in
double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the
trial.”

81
G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON.
IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134,
Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE,
State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL;
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having
committed rebellion complexed with murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second information reads:
That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village,
Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, having reasonable ground to believe or
suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime,
did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly
obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the
issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable
cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent
Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that
"there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD
No. 1829."
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss
the Information on the grounds that:
(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis;
and
(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against
Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged
meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or
concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.
On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30,
1990.
The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to
quash/ dismiss the information on the following grounds, to wit:
I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a
supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component
element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen.
Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same
meeting on 1 December 1989;
III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one
prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion;
IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;
V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for
rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due
process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this
Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for
violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding
the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special
law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil.
515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus
of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar,(G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990).
82
The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription
against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate
prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling
of the Court, which that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on
the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis
supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex
crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately
for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or
committed in furtherance of rebellion.
The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c)
which states:
SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a
fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon
any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or
delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he
knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed
any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest,
prosecution and conviction.
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and
accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his
house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not
do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the
petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD
No. 1829.
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits
executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the
fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and
birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989.
The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December,
1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The
prosecution thereby concluded that:
In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio
"Gringo" Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed
soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were co-
conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65;
Emphasis supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or
include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential
Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is
only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there
could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan
and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is
readily apparent.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo
Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring
or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus
constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to
commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve
a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a
complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us
that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956];
People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v.
Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is
clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of People v.
Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed
or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S.,
ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a
criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when
the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identified with
the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or
used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for
83
 possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a
robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a
prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not
a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in
conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is
punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code;
hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument
is specious in rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale
remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which
are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become
absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a
crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same
and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application
of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at
p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery,
kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the
instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases
must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are
perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel
Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for
practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No.
1829.
Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of
conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion
and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of
rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence
overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated
in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as
"common" offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the
same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v.
Hernandez, supra, p. 541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and
convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession
of firearms. The Court ruled:
An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with
which the accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary
element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same
accused is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he
pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is
charged in the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and
so to press it further now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at
page 663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where
the Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner
Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD
1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his arguments on
the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion.
The Court, however, clarified, to wit:
... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the
qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under
PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE
BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez,
Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.
The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under
PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The
prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion
alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated
murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and
violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution
for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the
independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.
84
As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce
Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply
because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely
different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of
rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being
punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition
to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court
to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is
QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their
successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the
arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is
made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,

Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Medialdea, J., took no part.

Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave.

85
G.R. No. L-8476 February 28, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABUNDIO ROMAGOSA alias DAVID, defendant-appellant.
Benedicto P. Bonifacio for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor General Jose G.
Bautista for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This appeal is related to the case of People vs. Federico Geronimo alias Comdr. Oscar, et al.,
G.R. No. L-8936, decided by this Court on October 23, 1956 (100 Phil., 90; 53 Off. Gaz. No. 1,
68).
Herein appellant Abundio Romagosa alias David was, in all information filed by the Provincial
Fiscal, accused in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur of the complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, under three counts that are the last
three of the five counts charged against Federico Geronimo, et al., in said case No. G.R. L-
8936, supra:
That on or about May 28, 1946 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto
and continuously up to the present time in the province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and in other
municipalities, cities and provinces and other parts of the country where they have
chosen to carry out their rebellious activities, the above-named accused being then
ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or
otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed force of
said Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) having come to an agreement and
decide to commit the crime of Rebellion, and therefore, conspiring together and
confederating among themselves with all of the thirty-one accused in criminal case
Nos. 14071, 14282, 14315, 14270, 15344 and with all the accused in criminal case
number 19166 of the Court of First Instance of Manila with the other members,
officers and/or affiliates of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan and with many others whose identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, acting in accordance with their conspiracy and in
furtherance thereof, and mutually helping one another, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, help support, promote, maintain, direct and/or
command the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) or the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB),
to rise publicly and take arms against the government of the Republic of the
Philippines, or otherwise participate in such public armed uprisings for the purpose
of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government
and laws thereof, as in fact the said Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or the
Hukbalahaps (HUKS) pursuant to such conspiracy, have risen publicly and taken
arms against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to attain said
purpose, by then and there making armed raids, sorties, and ambuscades, attacks
against the Philippine Constabulary, the civilian guards, the Police and the Army
Patrols and other detachments as well as upon innocent civilians, and as a
necessary means to commit the crime of Rebellion, in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof, have then and there committed wanton acts of murder,
pillage, looting, plunder, kidnappings and planned destructions of private and
public property and plotted the liquidation of government officials, to create and
spread disorder, terror, confusion, chaos and fear so as to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, among which are follows to wit:
1. That on or about the years 1951 to 1952 in the municipality of, Pasacao,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, a group of Armed Huks under Commander Rustum
raided the house of one Nemesio Palo, a Police sergeant of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur and as a result, said HUKS were able to capture said Nemesio Palo and once
captured with evident premeditation, treachery and intent to kill, stab, shot and
cut the neck of said Nemesio Palo thereby causing the instantaneous death of
Nemesio Palo.
2. That on or about January 31, 1953, at barrio of Santa Rita, Del Gallego,
Camarines Sur a group of HMBS with Federico Geronimo alias Commander Oscar
ambushed and fired upon an Army Patrol headed by CPL Bayrante, resulting in
seriously wounding of PFC Pancracio Torrado and Eusebio Gruta, a civilian.
3. That on or about February 1954 at barrio Cotmo, San Fernando, Camarines Sur,
Abundio Romagosa, one of a group of four HMBS led by accused Commander Oscar
with evident premiditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed one
Policarpio Tipay, a barrio lieutenant.
As in the case of Federico Geronimo, appellant Romagosa, upon arraignment, entered a plea
of guilty to the information. In view of the voluntary plea of guilty, the prosecution
recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be imposed on the accused, on the
ground that the charge being a complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnappings, the penalty provided for by law is the maximum of the most serious crime
which is murder. Counsel for the accused, on the other hand, argued that the proper penalty
imposable upon the accused was only prision mayor, since there is no such complex crime as
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, because the latter being the natural
consequences of the crime of rebellion, the crime charged against the accused should be
considered only as simple rebellion.
On October 13, 1954, the lower court rendered judgment finding accused Romagosa guilty of
the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings; and giving him the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; to pay a fine of P10,000; to indemnify the heirs of the two
persons killed named in the information, in the sum of P6,000 each; and to pay the cost of
the proceedings.
86
From the judgment accused Romagosa appealed to this Court, insisting that there is no crime not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of
of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, and that he should have been Policarpio Tipay in the sum of P6,000 solidarily with Federico Geronimo, alias Commander
convicted only of simple rebellion and imposed the penalty of prison mayor in its minimum Oscar, (G.R. No. L-8936), and other adjudged guilty of having participated in the slaying of
period, in view of his voluntary plea of guilty. said deceased; and to pay the costs. So ordered.

The question of whether there is a complex crime of rebellion with murder, robbery, and Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, and Felix, JJ., concur.
kidnapping under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, is exactly the same question raised
and decided in the cases of People vs. Hernandez, et al., * 52 Off. Gaz., No. 11, 5506,
and People vs. Geronimo, supra. None of the members of this Court has found reason to
change his respective stand on the matter as expressed in the Geronimo case, wherein the
majority of this Court held that where the crimes of murders, robberies, and kidnappings are
committed as a means to or in furtherance of the rebellion charged, they are absorbed by,
and form part and parcel of, the rebellion, and that therefore, the accused can be convicted
only of the simple crime of rebellion. Consistently with that precedent, we hold that the
lower court erred in holding appellant Romagosa guilty of the complex crime of rebellion
with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, and in imposing upon him the penalty for such
crime.

As in the Geronimo case, there is the further question of whether, in view of appellant's plea
of guilty to the information, he should be deemed to have admitted the commission of the
simple crime of rebellion alone, or of rebellion and other separate crimes, if any of the
counts of the information charges crimes independent of and not constituting essential acts
or ingredients of the rebellion charged. As already stated, the three counts of the
information against herein appellant Romagosa are exactly the same as the last three of the
five counts charged against Federico Geronimo (G.R. No. L-8936). As ruled the majority in the
preceding case, the first count under the present information (the third count against
Geronimo) does not charge appellant's participation and can not, therefore, be taken into
consideration in this case; the second (the fourth count against Geronimo) alleges essential
act of rebellion and is absorbed by that crime; while the third (the fifth count against
Geronimo) charges the murder of one Policarpio Tipay, a barrio lieutenant, which killing,
though committed within the jurisdiction of the lower court, does not appear to be related to
the rebellion and hence constitutes an independent offense in itself.

The same majority of six justices of this Court maintain their view express in the Geronimo
case that by his plea of guilty, appellant has admitted the commission of the independent
crime of murder alleged in count 3 of the information, the averment that said crime was
perpetrated "in furtherance" of the rebellion being a mere conclusion and not a bar to
appellant's conviction and punishment for said offense, appellant having failed, at the
arraignment, to object to the information on the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged.
Therefore, appellant must be held guilty, and sentenced for the commission, of two separate
offenses, simple rebellion and murder.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that appellant Abundio
Romagosa alias David is convicted of the crimes of simple rebellion and murder; and
considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, appellant is sentenced for the rebellion:
to suffer 8 years of prison mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000 (without subsidiary
imprisonment pursuant to Article 38 of the Revised Penal Code), and for the murder: to an
indeterminate sentence of not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum and

87
G.R. No. L-45772 March 25, 1988 Three (3) heart shape with assorted birthstones

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, One (1) lady's (ring) white gold setting
vs.
Hon. EDUARDO MONTENEGRO, Presiding Judge, Branch IV-B, CFI Rizal, Quezon City; One (1) white gold ring mounting 18 karats
ANTONIO CIMARRA, ULPIANO VILLAR, BAYANI CATINDIG, and AVELINO DE
LEON, respondents.
One (1) white gold ring mounting 18 karats

One (1) yellow gold stud

PADILLA, J.:
One (1) lady's white gold ring setting

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, to set
One (1) white gold ring mounting
aside the order of the respondent court, dated 10 February 1977, denying petitioner's
Motion to Admit Amended Information and the order, dated 22 February 1977, of the same
court, denying the Motion for Reconsideration of said earlier order. One (1) pc. white gold earring mounting

On 21 March 1977, the court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent
court from proceeding to hear and decide the case until further orders from the Court.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On 20 September 1976, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, thru Assistant Fiscal Virginia G, Valdez,
filed an Information for "Roberry" before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV-B,
Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-6821, against Antonio Cimarra, Ulpiano Villar,
Bayani Catindig and Avelino de Leon. Said accused (now private respondents) were all
members of the police force of Quezon City and were charged as accessories-after-the-fact in
the robbery committed by the minor Ricardo Cabaloza, who had already pleaded guilty and
had been convicted in Criminal Case No. QF-76-051 before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City. Ricardo Cabaloza was convicted for the robbery of the same
items, articles and jewelries belonging to Ding Velayo, Inc. valued at P 75,591.40 and
enumerated in the original information 1 against herein private respondents as:
One (1) Arminius revolver, cal. 22 with six ammo SN-165928
One (1) gold men's ring 'signet'
Five (5) ID plates yellow gold
Four (4) ID plates yellow gold
Six (6) bracelets lock yellow gold
Twelve (12) pcs. of semi-precious stone bands with one broken
Two (2) Ivory bracelets
One (1) Silver bracelets
One (1) yellow ring gold with blue stone
Two (2) wedding gold rings yellow
One (1) Minolta pocket size camera
One (1) pink handbag
One (1) bunch keys
Upon arraignment on 25 October 1976, all of the accused (now private respondents) entered
a plea of "not guilty" to the charge filed against them. Accordingly, trial on the merits was
scheduled by the respondent court. However, before the trial could proceed, the prosecuting
fiscal filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information, dated 28 December 1976, seeking to
amend the original information by: (1) changing the offense charged from "Robbery" to
"Robbery in an Uninhabited Place," (2) alleging conspiracy among all the accused, and (3)
deleting all items, articles and jewelries alleged to have been stolen in the original
Information and substituting them with a different set of items valued at P71,336.80 2 to wit:

Four (4) pcs. of I.D.

One (1) anniversary pendant yellow gold
Plates

88
 14 Karat yellow P 24.00 Nine (9) pcs. of
gold each diamond design

Thirteen (13) pcs. of earrings 14 KYG

I.D.

Plates KYG P 26.40 Five (5) pcs. of Sput-nik

each cross

Five (5) pcs. of 4 KYG

anniversary

Pendant 14 KYG P 17.00 One (1) pc. of ladies

each ring

Three (3) pcs. of mounting 14 KYG

pendant w/
One (1) pc. of lady's
birthstones 14 P 16.00 sole diamond ring,
KYG each
about .40ct w/
Two (2) pcs. of Signet yellow gold
plain
ring mounting,
14 Karat yello gold P 204.00 and one pair
rings each
of earrings white
Four (4) pcs. of lady's gold solo
bracelet,
diamond about
14 KYG oval shape P 30.00 .25ct w/ black
each
onyx
Four (4) pcs. of P 140.00 each
necklace 14 KYG
One (1) pc. lady's P 1,500.00
One (1) set of ring & bracelet 14 KYG
earrings
One (1) pc. chain
mounting w/ 23 24KYG necklace
brills 14 KYG
w/ small diamond
Two (2) pcs. of ladies
I.D.
One (1) pc. Lapiz Lazuli P 1,000.00
bracelet 14 KYG P 120.00 ring 14 KYG
each
One (1) pc. Lapiz Lazuli P 1,000.00

89
18 KYG One (1) pc. bronze
bracelet
One (1) pc. Lady's ring
w/ 2 Jade stone, One (1) pc. ring blue
stone YG
white gold w/
small One (1) pc. Lapiz Lazuli
band
diamonds and one
pc. One (1) pc. Coral band

lady's ring white One (1) pc. ring w/

gold, diamond stone,

14 K w/ 2 small 14 KWG mounting

diamonds
Two (2) pcs. of 14 YG
w/ one Jade P part bracelet
2,000.00
Three (3) pcs. of men's
Six (6) pcs. of fancy P 40.00 ring 14 KYG
chains and bracelets each
One (1) pc. pendant 14
One (1) pair of yellow KYG
gold earrings w/
One (1) pc. loose
pearl for children P 70.00 diamond about

One (1) pc. yellow gold 4.50 karats antigo

ring w/ blue

sapphire for P 150.00 One (1) pc. loose

children diamond about

One (1) brown 2.05 carats each

envelope, containing 2 antigo cut

pairs of 1/g loop One (1) pc. Cannon

earrings, camera w/

14 karat P 780.00 black case

Cash money (inside the P 555.00

said envelope) One (1) pc. Yashika
camera w/
One (1) pc. silver P 50.00
bracelet lens cover

90

One (1) pc. Cannon
camera w/
black case
Private respondents opposed the admission of the Amended Information. The respondent
court resolved to deny the proposed amendments contained in the Amended Information in
the previously referred to order dated 10 February 1977. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the respondent court, on 22 February 1977,
denied said motion; hence, this petition.
Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may be
made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the
trial, amendments to the information may also be allowed, as to matters of form, provided
that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an
accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense
under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after
the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. 3
On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing
essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at
anytime. 4
The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case, are clearly
substantial and have the effect of changing the crime charged from "Robbery" punishable
under Article 209 to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302 of the
Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private respondents-accused to a higher penalty as
compared to the penalty imposable for the offense charged in the original information to
which the accused had already entered a plea of "not guilty" during their arraignment.
Moreover, the change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen into entirely
different articles from those originally complained of, affects the essense of the imputed
crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the
amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to the charge filed against them.
It will be observed that private respondents were accused as accessories-after-the-fact of the
minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in
the original information. To charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime
different from that committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be
allowed by the Court.
The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not
previously included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling
the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the
trial court. In People v. Zulueta, 5 it was held that:
P Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original
1,100.00 charges will have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. For
undoubtedly the allegation of conspiracy enables the prosecution to
attribute and ascribe to the accused Zulueta all the acts, knowledge,
admissions and even omissions of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in
furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendment thereby widens the
battlefront to allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered
weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it
would seem inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this stage
of the controversy, bearing in mind that the accused is only guaranteed
two-days' preparation for trial. Needless to emphasize, as in criminal
cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake, it is always wise
and proper that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible
surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too many
facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared
adversaries.
To allow at this stage the proposed amendment alleging conspiracy among all the accused,
will make all of the latter liable not only for their own individual transgressions or acts but
also for the acts of their co-conspirators.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The orders of the respondent court, dated 10
February 1977 and 22 February 1977 are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued
on 21 March 1977 is LIFTED.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
91
G.R. No. L-28701 March 25, 1983
PEDRITO L. CATINGUB, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. RICARDO C. PUNO and THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, respondents.
GUERRERO, J:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38698-
R entitled "PEDRITO L. CATINGUB, Petitioner, versus HON. RICARDO C. PUNO, Judge of the
CFI Manila, Branch 24, and the PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, Respondents."
Herein petitioner, Pedrito L. Catingub, was charged with the crime of malversation in
Criminal Case No. 75696 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIV, under the
following Information:
That on or about and during the period covered from January 20 to
February 24, 1963, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
being then a Sales Supervisor of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, Cagayan de Oro Branch, an instrumentality of the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, duly qualified, appointed and acting as
such, and as such is responsible and/or accountable for public funds
received by him by reason of his said office and position for the proper
discharge of his duties and functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, with grave abuse of confidence,
misappropriate, embezzle, and take away from the said funds the total
amount of P12,314.50 which he thereupon appropriated and converted
to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
public interests and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in
the aforesaid amount of P12,314.50, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law. 1
Assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Ramon Academia during arraignment, petitioner pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. 2 Trial commenced on August 30, 1965 during which
petitioner appears to have submitted to the court a paper purporting to be a Motion to
Quash. 3 This motion, however, was withdrawn by petitioner, through counsel, on the ground
that the facts to support lack of jurisdiction "are not yet apparent or they do not yet appear
on record ..." 4At the continuation of trial on October 4, 1965, petitioner again filed a Motion
to Quash on the ground that the trial court "is without jurisdiction to try the present case,"
the correct situs of the crime being Cagayan de Oro City. 5 The court held in abeyance the
resolution of said Motion "until after the prosecution shall have rested its case." 6 In the
meantime, trial proceeded and on February 21, 1966, the prosecution closed its evidence.
The prosecution evidence established that petitioner was appointed in Manila on April 13,
1960 as Salesman I, Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, with compensation at the rate of
Pl,800.00 per annum, effective upon assumption of office (Exhibit "A") which he assumed on
May 9, 1960 after taking his oath of office in Manila on May 5, 1960. Thereafter, he was
designated Temporary Sales Supervisor of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
assigned at the Cagayan de Oro Branch. As such, he received sweepstakes tickets on
consignment, with the express obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sales of these
tickets to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office as shown in Exhibits "D", "D-1", "D-2",
and "D-3". On March 12, 1963, petitioner was informed by the Auditing Examiner of the
PCSO Cagayan de Oro Branch that he has been found short of P12,307.45 (Exhibit "F-2").
Petitioner was ordered to explain the shortage in writing and to produce the missing amount.
He failed to do so. On April 23, 1963, in view of his failure to settle his ticket accounts, and
pursuant to Resolution No. 137 of the Board of Directors dated April 2, 1963, the services of
the petitioner were terminated effective as of March 1, 1963, without prejudice to whatever
court action the PCSO will take for the recovery of the amount involved. (Exhibit "B-1"). In a
letter dated May 20, 1963, petitioner proposed to the General Manager of the PCSO Manila,
to settle his shortages by making monthly payments in the amount of at least P200.00, which
proposal was, however, denied by the General Manager.
On April 25, 1966, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the sole ground that "the
prosecution made a wrong choice of jurisdiction." He contended that "on the basis of the
prosecution's evidence, the offense charged, together with all its essential ingredients
occurred and the consummation thereof (was) completed, in Cagayan de Oro." 7
The trial court on May 18, 1966, denied the aforesaid Motion to Dismiss in the following
Order, to wit:
Acting upon the defendant's "Motion to Dismiss", dated April 22, 1966,
the plaintiff's opposition thereto, dated April 28, 1966, and the reply
dated May 10, 1966, filed in behalf of the accused, and considering the
evidence on record, the Court believes and so rules that for the proper
determination of the issues involved in this case, the accused should be
heard in his defense.
Wherefore, the aforesaid motion to dismiss is hereby denied and the
continuation of the trial of this case is hereby set for July 6, 1966, at 8:30
o'clock in the morning.8
Reconsideration of the foregoing Order sought by petitioner was denied in another Order
dated November 3, 1966. 9Petitioner assailed these two Orders of the Court of First Instance
in his petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before respondent Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) dismissed the petition in a decision
promulgated December 19, 1967, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, we are of the
considered opinion that the accused's motion to dismiss upon improper
venue is without merit and accordingly the present petition for certiorari,
92
 prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction should be, as it is
hereby dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. 10
Petitioner now comes to this Court by way of appeal by certiorari, raising the following
errors:
A. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of
Manila is vested with jurisdiction to try an offense under an Information
charging Manila as the place of commission when the evidence adduced
by the prosecution clearly establishes another place of commission.
B. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the consignment invoices of
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, objected to as incompetent,
control in every instance the ultimate situs of prosecution in a crime
involving malversation even when the elements thereof have been
shown to have taken place in another territorial jurisdiction.
C. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting an equitable relief to
petitioner by having him tried in the place of actual commission of the
offense to afford him all the opportunity in an adversary proceeding to
present his evidence and witnesses.
D. The Court of Appeals erred in not resolving at least the doubt where
the crime was committed in favor of the accused.
The main issue for resolution is whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction to continue with the trial of the offense as charged in view of the evidence
presented by the prosecution.
The Information filed in the trial court specifically alleges that the crime imputed against
petitioner, was committed "in the City of Manila, Philippines." Such an averment would be
sufficient if "the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients occurred at
some place within the jurisdiction" of the Court of First Instance of Manila pursuant to
Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court. Sec. 14(a) also provides:
Sec. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. - (a) In all criminal
prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one
of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of malversation of public funds or
property as follows:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property.— Presumption of
malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same, or shall take or appropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty
of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation
does not exceed two hundred pesos.
xxx xxx xxx
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds
or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal uses. (As amended by Rep. Act No.
1060.)
The above presumption of malversation "takes the place of affirmative proofs showing the
actual conversion (and) obviates the necessity of proving acts of conversion on the part of
the accused, a thing almost always extremely difficult to do (U.S. vs. Acebedo, 18 Phil. 428,
431).
Respondent Court of Appeals, in upholding the trial court's dismissal of herein petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction, adverted to the written condition on the
consignment invoices covering the sweepstakes tickets delivered to and received by said
accused, Exhibits "D", "D-1", "D-2" and "D-3" that "I (petitioner) bind myself to comply strictly
with existing rules and regulations and to turn over to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office the proceeds of these tickets." As the following heading: "Republic of the Philippines,
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, Manila," was printed on the consignment invoices, the
appellate court concluded that the PCSO mentioned or referred to therein was no other than
the central or Manila office, and that petitioner's obligation was to turn over the proceeds of
the sale to the PCSO in Manila. Accordingly, since petitioner had the obligation to turn over
the proceeds of his ticket sales to the PCSO Manila and he failed to do so, the appellate court
held that the courts of Manila had the jurisdiction to try the malversation charge against him.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals for We find on record the testimony of
prosecution witness Adriano M. Ruiz, Branch Manager of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office at Cagayan de Oro showing that "we require the fieldmen who receive the tickets to
turn over the proceeds of their sales either to the branch office or to the home office, and to
return unsold booklets, if any, one week before the draw direct to the central office" (t.s.n.,
p. 11, Vol. II).
93
It may be true that as testified to by the Auditing Examiner, Amando Dominguez, assigned by by reason of the duties of his office. In the case of U.S. vs. Cardel, 23 Phil. 207, and U S. vs.
the GAO to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office that fieldmen "are bound to turn over Mesina,42 Phil. 66, it was held that estafa was consummated in the place where the accused
the proceeds of the tickets at the branch where they are assigned or in Manila" (t.s.n., p. 2, is required to render an accounting and failed to do so. Applying the same ruling in the
Vol. IV) and that as declared by Lope V. Salvatoria, Assistant Department Manager of PCSO at instant malversation case and Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court
Manila that "when the proceeds are turned over to the branch cashier, the responsibility hereinbefore quoted, We hold and rule that the present case of malversation may be tried in
ends there and the branch cashier in turn transmits the amount to the treasurer in Manila" Manila since the offense charged was consummated in Manila.
(t.s.n., p. 25, Vol. V), the option to deliver the proceeds to the local branch office appear to
be tor convenience and for security reasons. But the final accounting, the settlement of Indeed, petitioner could have been charged and tried in Cagayan de Oro City for it is not
accounts and the final clearances would have to be taken up in the central or Manila office. disputed that he received the sweepstakes tickets from the PCSO, Cagayan de Oro branch.
Petitioner himself recognizes this fact for as the evidence disclosed, he proposed to settle his The essential ingredient of receiving the sweepstakes tickets took place in Cagayan de Oro
shortages by paying P 200.00 monthly in his letter addressed to the General Manager of City. He could also be charged in the City of Manila since the final accounting must be
PCSO in Manila (Exhibit "K"). rendered in the Central Office, Manila. This is therefore, a case of concurrent jurisdiction by
the proper court of the place wherein "anyone of the essential ingredients thereof took
We also agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that the case of People vs. Angco, 103 place." But the choice of venue lies with the prosecuting officer and not with the accused.
Phil. 33, is substantially on all fours with the case at bar. In the said Angco case, the Supreme
Court laid down this ruling: Petitioner pleads for equitable relief by having him tried in Cagayan de Oro City to afford him
all the opportunity in all adversary proceeding to present his evidence and witnesses. We
The appellant presses the question of jurisdiction raised in a motion to cannot accept petitioner's plea for equity because having admitted in writing his shortages in
quash which was denied by the trial court. He insists that as the his letter to the General Manager of PCSO in Manila Exhibit "K", he comes to court with
malversation was committed while he was a travelling sales agent in unclean hands. He who seeks equity must come to court with clean hands.
Cagayan, as charged in the information, and that as it is not charged that
the fund or part thereof was malversed in Manila, the Court of First WHEREFORE, IN VIEW ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the case. True it is alleged in The records of this case are hereby ordered remanded to the trial court for further
the information that he had his "headquarters at Tuguegarao, Cagayan" proceedings in the ordinary course of law. No costs.
but it is also alleged that he was a "Travelling Sales Agent of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, in said City," (Manila) ... "charged
Petition denied.
with selling sweepstakes tickets entrusted to him for sale in his district,
with the obligation of turning over the proceeds of the sale of said tickets
to the Treasurer of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office in Manila," SO ORDERED.
... , and that he "wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, with
grave abuse of confidence," misappropriated, embezzled. misapplied and Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
converted the amount of P3,960.95, the unaccounted and unpaid
balance of the proceeds of the sale of the tickets to his own personal use Aquino, J., is on leave.
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office. These allegations are sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the Court of First Instance of Manila to the exclusion of the Abad Santos, J., reserves his vote.
concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. The
findings of the trial court to the effect that the appellant "was bonded
and was authorized to sell sweepstakes tickets, with the obligation of
turning over the proceeds of the sale to the treasurer of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, Manila," and that the appellant failed to
account for and pay part of the proceeds of the sale of tickets made by
him, bear out the charge proferred against him in the information.

The crimes of estafa and malversation are similar in nature in that both involve
misappropriation of funds or property, the difference being that in estafa, the property or
funds misappropriated is private in character whereas in malversation, the property
constitutes public funds or property for which the accused as a public officer is accountable

94
[G.R. NO. 136994. September 17, 2002]
BRAULIO ABALOS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the consolidated decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
dated August 10, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP No. 42482 and CA-G.R. SP No. 43237. The CA had
dismissed for lack of merit petitioners separate appeals from the order of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Branch 40, in Civil Case No. 95-00752-D, and the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69, in Civil Case No. 17576.
The antecedents of this petition, based on the findings summarized by the Court of
Appeals, duly supported by the records, are as follows:
On November 11, 1994, an Information for Falsification of Private Documents was filed
against the accusedappellant Braulio Abalos (hereinafter referred to as the accused-
appellant) before the Municipal Trial Court of Dagupan City, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 22707. The information alleged-
That on or about the 12th day of July, 1994, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ENGR. BRAULIO ABALOS,
with intent to cause damage to the heirs of Roman Soriano of Lingayen, Pangasinan, among
them is EVELYN C. SORIANO, complainant herein, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, cause(d) the production of and the filling in of entries on Cash Receipts Nos.
39185, 39414 and 41775 of the Pangasinan Photostat, and thereafter offered the same to
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37 of Lingayen, Pangasinan, as supporting documents to his
Bill of Cost in Civil Case No. 15958, giving the impression to the court that the receipts were
authentic when in fact, to his own knowledge, they were not, thereby making untruthful
statements in a narration of fact; that as a consequence thereof, the adverse party in Civil
Case No. 15958, represented by EVELYN C. SORIANO, sustained damages.
Thereafter, or on December 12, 1994, another Information for Falsification of Private
Document was filed against the accused-appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 10024.
Meanwhile, on June 5, 1995, during his arraignment before the Dagupan Municipal Trial
Court, the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. On August 7, 1995, he filed a
Motion to Quash, arguing that the Municipal Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
On October 20, 1995, the Municipal Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 2, ordered the
quashal of Criminal Case No. 22707 for lack of jurisdiction. Private complainants Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on November 20, 1995.
On January 3, 1996, private complainant filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City. On May 14, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40
issued the Order now on appeal, reversing and setting aside the October 20, 1995 and
November 20, 1995 Orders of the Municipal Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 2, in Criminal
Case No. 22707.
xxx
On the other hand, after the filing of the Information before the Lingayen court, the accused-
appellant filed a Motion to Quash x x x. The court a quo denied the Motion to Quash in its
Order of September 8, 1996. Undaunted, the accused-appellant went on Certiorari to the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69 which rendered a Decision on
October 28, 1996, dismissing the Petition for Certiorari of the accused-appellant for lack of
merit.[2]
Twice rebuffed by two different trial courts, petitioner appealed the said cases to the
Court of Appeals. The appeal in Criminal Case No. 22707 was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
42482, while that in Criminal Case No. 10024 was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43237. On
February 22, 1997, petitioner moved to consolidate the two appeals, which the Court of
Appeals granted on April 4, 1997.
On August 10, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, both Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42482 and 43237 are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On December 14, 1998, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the present petition, where petitioner ascribes the following errors to the Court
of Appeals:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING AND RULING THAT:
(a) UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE AT BENCH (sic), BOTH MTC LINGAYEN
AND MTCC DAGUPAN HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPECTIVE
INFORMATION FILED FOR FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS;
(b) THAT THE FACTS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION IN THE MTC
LINGAYEN AND IN THE INFORMATION IN THE MTCC DAGUPAN DO NOT
95
 CONSTITUTE ONLY ONE CRIME OF FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE
DOCUMENTS; AND
(c) THAT IN THE CASE AT BENCH (sic), EACH FALSIFICATION COMMITTED
ON EACH OF THE INDIVIDUAL RECEIPTS AND VOUCHERS CONSTITUTES
A SEPARATE CRIME EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY HAVE BEEN COMMITTED
IN THE COURSE OF A CONTINUOUS TRANSACTION ON THE SAME DATE
OR EVEN ON THE SAME PIECE OF PAPER.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING AND RULING THAT THE
COMPLAINANT EVELYN C. SORIANO AND THE PEOPLE ARE NOT GUILTY OF
FORUM SHOPPING IN THE FILING OF TWO INFORMATIONS FOR ONE AND
SAME OFFENSE IN TWO DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT.
III. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE
DECISION APPEALED FROM, THAT THE FALSIFICATION OF EACH RECEIPT AND
EACH INVOICE CONSTITUTES A SEPARATE OFFENSE, THE INFORMATION IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 10024, MTC LINGAYEN IS DISMISSIBLE FOR CHARGING
MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE, AND THE DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CASE NO.
22707 MTCC DAGUPAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED.[4]
The main issue to be resolved is whether MTCC-Dagupan and MTC-Lingayen have
jurisdiction over the crimes allegedly committed by petitioner. In this connection, we must
also resolve whether the filing of separate complaints supported by the identical affidavits
and annexes to the informations filed in two courts constitutes forum shopping.Lastly, we
must also determine whether the respective informations in Lingayen as well as in Dagupan,
MTCC, were dismissible for multiplicity of offenses merged in one information.
Primarily, petitioner assails the assumption of jurisdiction over the criminal cases for
falsification by the MTCC-Dagupan and the MTC- Lingayen. He argues that both courts could
not have simultaneous jurisdiction over his case. He avers that only one crime was
committed pursuant to the unified and indivisible nature of the criminal intent proved.
Petitioner also contends that the filing of two separate complaints using the same
complaint-affidavit and supported by the same annexes constitutes forum shopping. He
points out that if indeed the acts committed by him constitute several offenses, then the
informations filed against him in Criminal Cases Nos. 10024 and 22707 should be dismissed
on the ground of multiplicity of felonies charged in a single information.[5]
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that both MTCC-
Dagupan and MTC-Lingayen have properly assumed jurisdiction over petitioners criminal
cases since these involved different acts of falsification, where some were committed in
Dagupan and others in Lingayen. The OSG adds that each falsified document constitutes one
separate act of falsification, such that there could be as many acts of falsification as there are
falsified documents.[6] Citing People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 7 SCRA 942 (1963), the OSG
contends that in this case, the use of several falsified documents during one occasion does
not diminish the number of acts of falsification that petitioner had committed.[7]
On the issue of jurisdiction, we find enlightening the findings of the Court of Appeals:
Stripped to the core, the issue in these consolidated cases is whether or not the Dagupan and
Lingayen trial courts have jurisdiction over the respective information for Falsification of
Private Documents.
This question finds its answer in the case of Alfelor, Sr. vs. Intia, 70 SCRA 480, citing the case
of Lopez vs. City Judge, 18 SCRA 616, where the Supreme Court stated:
xxx
It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was committed
not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction (U.S. v.
Pagdayuman, 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, municipal courts have original jurisdiction only over criminal offenses committed
within their respective territorial jurisdiction.
xxx
Coming now to the cases at bench (sic), it is clear that both the Dagupan and Lingayen courts
may exercise jurisdiction over the respective criminal cases filed before it.
In the Dagupan case involving the cash receipts issued by the Pangasinan Photostat of
Dagupan City, the Information alleges that the offense was committed in Dagupan City. This
suffices to give said court jurisdiction over the crime of falsification as charged. Petitioners
argument that the crime of falsification x x x arose ONLY when the intent to cause damage
became evident, that is, when the receipts and invoices were submitted in court as proof of
the Bill of Costs proves futile in light of the pronouncement in Lopez (supra), that the act of
falsification is committed by the signing of the document and the coetaneous intent to cause
damage and whether the falsified private document was thereafter put or not put to the
illegal use for which it was intended is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime
of falsification of a private document.
As for the Lingayen case, it appears that the subject invoices were issued by the Xerox
Copying Machine of Lingayen, Pangasinan. Again, it suffices for jurisdiction to vest that the
Information alleges that the crime of falsification, as charged, was committed within the
municipality of Lingayen.[8]
A detailed disquisition could throw but little additional light on the issue of
jurisdiction. Petitioner was charged with five counts of falsification. The first three,
concerning Cash Receipts Nos. 39185, 39414, and 41775, were allegedly committed in
Dagupan. The other two counts, involving Invoices Nos. 1070 and 1071, were allegedly
committed in Lingayen. It is obvious the cases had to filed where the offenses had been
committed, either in Dagupan or in Lingayen, respectively.
For jurisdiction to be acquired by a court in a criminal case, the offense should have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. The Dagupan court could not validly take cognizance of
offenses committed in Lingayen. Nor could the Lingayen court legally entertain charges for
96
acts done in Dagupan. The fact that the falsified receipts and invoices were allegedly used at
the same time in one court proceedings (at the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Branch 7, in
connection with Civil Case No. 15958) is of no moment. The offenses of falsification took
place much earlier, separately, when the cash receipts were produced repetitively in
Dagupan and Lingayen.

Likewise, considering that five separate offenses of falsification were involved, there
can be no forum-shopping. It was erroneous for petitioner to argue that only one offense
was committed. There are as many acts of falsification as there are documents falsified.[9]

The real problem, however, is why the first three offenses were lumped in a single
information filed in Dagupan. Likewise, why were two offenses joined in a single information
filed in Lingayen? Thus, petitioner now claims, with ostensible merit, that Section 13, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court was violated.[10]

The Rules of Court, particularly Rule 110, Section 13, indeed frowns upon multiple
offenses being charged in a single information. However, petitioner failed to raise this issue
during arraignment, in Lingayen as well as in Dagupan. His failure to do so amounts to a
waiver, and his objection on this point can no longer be raised on appeal. [11] In his Motion to
Quash filed in Dagupan City, petitioner alleged lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, in his
Motion to Quash filed in Lingayen, petitioner alleged forum-shopping, double jeopardy, lack
of jurisdiction, and that the facts do not constitute an offense. He only raised the issue of
multifariousness of offenses alleged in his petition before this Court. By this time, his
objection is belated, and obviously to no avail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The consolidated decision of the
Court of Appeals dated August 10, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP No. 42484 and CA-G.R. SP No. 43237,
is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

Callejo, Sr., J., no part. Concurred in subject decision.

97
G.R. No. 117488 September 5, 1996
SANTIAGO IBASCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
His motion to reconsider the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals of 11 August 1994 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 13300 affirming in toto the decision 2 of 20 November 1991 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G, 2756-G, and 2757-G
having been denied, 3 the petitioner filed this petition for review. The trial court found him
guilty of the offense punished in B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 2755-G dated 31 March 1987
reads as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of April 1984, at Barangay Camohaguin,
Municipality of Gumaca, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check No. DAT
41911, in the amount of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND NINETY PESOS and TEN
CENTAVOS (P18,090.10), Philippine currency, drawn against the United
Coconut Planters Bank, Daet Branch, and payable to Manuel Trivinio in
payment for feeds purchased from the latter; that the accused knew fully
well at the time of the issuance of said check that he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said
check in full upon presentment; that upon presentation of said check to
the bank for payment, the same was dishonored and refused payment
for the reason that there was no sufficient funds to cover said check; and
that despite notice to the accused by said Manuel Trivinio that said check
was dishonored for lack of funds, said accused failed to deposit the
necessary amount to cover said check, to the damage and prejudice of
Manuel Trivinio, now represented by his heirs, in the aforesaid sum.
Contrary to law. 4
The informations in Criminal Case No. 2756-G and Criminal Case No. 2757-G are similarly
worded as in Criminal Case No. 2755-G except as to the date of the violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
the number of the checks, and the amounts thereof. In Criminal Case No. 2756-G, the
violation was committed on 23 March 1984 and involved Check No. DAT 41910 in the
amount of P17,900.00 5 In Criminal Case No. 2757-G, the violation was committed on 24
February 1984 and involved Check No. 41909 in the amount of P15,576.30. 6
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the charges.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals as follows:
The facts are as follows [sic]: The complaining witness Maria Negro
Trivinio and her late husband Manuel Trivinio operate an animal feed mill
in Gumaca, Quezon while accused-appellant Santiago Ibasco and his wife
operate a piggery in Daet, Camarines Norte. On or about October 26,
1983, accused-appellant Santiago Ibasco and his wife, came to the
residence of the Trivinios at Sitio Seawall, Bgy. Camohaguin, Gumaca,
Quezon and requested credit accommodation for the supply of
ingredients in the manufacture of animal feeds (TSN March 15, 1988, p.
7). In accordance with the agreed credit arrangement, the Trivinios made
three delivered of darak with a total value of P51,566.49 (Id., p. 9) and in
payment, accused-appellant issued three (3) postdated checks, to wit: (1)
Check No. 41909, postdated February 24, 1984, for P15,576.30 (Exh. A —
Criminal Case No. 2757-G; Id., p. 9); (2) Check No. 41910, postdated
March 23, 1984 for P17,900.00 (Exh. A — 2756-G; Id., p. 5) and (3) Check
No. 41911, postdated April 18, 1984 for P18,090.10 (Exh. A — Criminal
Case No. 2755-G; Id., p. 10). All checks were drawn against United
Coconut Planters Bank, Daet Branch. Upon presentment to the Bank for
payment of their due dates, the checks bounced for being drawn against
insufficient funds (Exh. B-2755-G, B-2756-G and B-2757-G). The Trivinio
spouses notified accused-appellant of the dishonor (TSN, March 13, 1988,
p. 11). Accused-appellant replied by telegram offering his real property in
Daet as security. Accused-appellant invited the Trivinios to come to Daet
and inspect the property (Exh. C; Folder of Minutes and Exhibits, p. 13).
When the Trivinios arrived in Daet, the accused told them that the
property is across the sea, and, not wanting to cross the sea, the couple
did not anymore inspect the property (TSN, March 15, 1988, p. 14). For
failure of the accused to settle his account with the Trivinios, the instant
case was filed. 7
The original records of the aforementioned criminal cases show that after the presentation
of the evidence for both parties had been concluded, the trial court required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. However, before submitting his memorandum, the
petitioner's new counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since,
it is claimed, the checks were "prepared, issued and delivered to the payee . . . at the office
of the accused in Daet, Camarines Norte." 8
In its order 9 of 14 November 1991, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss considering
that the informations alleged that the violations were committed in Barangay Camohaguin,
Gumaca, Quezon, and that pieces of evidence, viz., the affidavits 10 of Maria Negro, the
surviving spouse of Manuel Trivinio who was presented by the defense as a hostile witness,
established that the checks were issued in the said place.
98
On 17 December 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision 11 dated 20 November 1991
convicting the petitioner. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court firmly believes and so holds that the prosecution
had equitably proved its case by the evidences [sic] presented, finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G,
2756-G and 2757-G, and imposes the penalty in each criminal cases [sic]:
In Criminal Case No. 2755-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of
P36,180.20.
In Criminal Case No. 2756-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of
P35,800.00.
In Criminal Case No. 2757-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of
P31,152.60. 12
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the evidence offered by the prosecution and,
disregarding the theory of the defense, it opined and ruled as follows:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was purposely enacted to prevent the
proliferation of worthless checks in the mainstream of daily business and
to avert not only the undermining the Banking System of the country, but
also the infliction of damage and injury upon trade and commerce
occasioned by the indiscriminate issuance of such checks. By its very
nature, the offenses defined BP 22 are against public interest while the
crime of Estafa is against property.
Since the act and commission specified in BP Blg. 22 are not necessarily
evil or wrongful from their nature and neither are they inherently illicit
and immoral and considering that the law which penalize [sic] such act or
commission is a special statutory law, the offenses are considered mala
prohibita and considering the rule in cases of mala prohibita, the only
inquiry is whether or not the law has been violated (People vs. KIBLER,
106, NY, 321, cited in U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132) — criminal intent is
not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy
(People vs. Conosa, C.A. 45, O.G. 3953). The defense of good faith and
absence of criminal intent would not prosper in prosecution for violation
(Res. No. 447, S. 1980, Tomayo vs. Desederio, Dec. 8, 1980 & Res. No.
624, S. 1981. ESCOBAR vs. SY, Sept. 1, 1981).
xxx xxx xxx
It is of no moment that by the evidence presented by the accused that a
pre-existing obligation took place and that the products delivered by the
deceased husband of complaining witness was [sic] below par; and that
his piggery suffered losses. This situation can be a basis for a civil action
which accused actually filed against complaining witness, but it cannot
divest of the glaring fact that the checks he issued bounced and was [sic]
dishonored. 13
As to the issue of jurisdiction, the trial court held:
. . . The sworn statement of Maria Negro Trivinio which repudiated the
allegation of the accused in questioning the jurisdiction of this Court;
between the protestation of the accused that the place of issuance to be
at [sic] Daet, Camarines Norte and the positive allegation of witness
Maria Negro Trivinio that the checks were delivered at their residence in
Gumaca. Quezon by the accused, this Court gives weight and credence to
the testimony of said witness and accused is bound by his own
evidence. 14
The petitioner seasonably appealed 15 the decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed
the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 13300.
In his Brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 13300, the petitioner contended that the trial court erred: (a) in
not dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction; (b) in not dismissing the cases for failure of
the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; (c) in not taking
into consideration that the liability of the accused should have been civil in nature and not
criminal; and (d) in not disregarding the testimony of Maria Negro vda. de Trivinio since it is
not clear and convincing and is incredible. 16
In its challenged decision 17 of 11 August 1994, the Court of Appeals rejected these claims of
the petitioner and affirmed in toto the trial court's decision. As to the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals ruled:
We agree with the lower court. The sworn statement, Exhibit 10, of Maria
Trivinio who was presented by accused-appellant as his last witness, in
the words of the lower court, "repudiated the allegation of the accused in
questioning the jurisdiction of this Court; between the protestation of the
accused that the place of issuance to be at [sic] Daet, Camarines Norte
and the positive allegation of witness Maria Negro Trivinio that the
checks were delivered at their residence in Gumaca, Quezon by the
accused, this Court gives weight and credence to the testimony of said
witness and accused is bound by his own evidence" (Decision, pp. 16-
17; Rollo, pp. 96-98).
At any rate, as held in the case of People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154, a
violation of BP 22 is an offense that appears to be continuing in nature.
The knowledge on the part of maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is
by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one
territory or another. Said the Supreme Court:
99
 In respect of the Bouncing checks case, the offense
also appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that
offense is committed by the very fact of its
performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May
29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks
Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check
but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of
a bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L-
62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could
have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que
vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18,
September 11, 1987 "the determinative factor (in
determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the
check". However, it is likewise true that knowledge
on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of
the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential
ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing
eventuality, whether the accused be within one
territory or another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R.
Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly,
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies
in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case,
jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations
in the Information, which are controlling (Arches vs.
Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, 193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz,
No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). The
Information filed herein specifically alleges that the
crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga,
and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court
below. (at page 164)
This ruling was reiterated in the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487,
where it was held:
Besides, it was held in People
v. Hon. Manzanilla, supra, that as "violation of the
bad checks act is committed when one "makes or
draws and issues any checks [sic] to apply on account
or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds" or having sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank . . . shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the
full amount of the check if presented within a period
of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon,
for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank," "knowledge" is an essential ingredient of the
offense charged. As defined by the statute,
knowledge, is, by itself, a continuing eventuality,
whether the accused be within one territory or
another. This being the case, the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City has jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No.
2089-R (688).
Moreover, we ruled in the same case of People
v. Hon. Manzanilla, reiterated in People
vs. Grospe, supra, that jurisdiction or venue is
determined by the allegations in the information. The
allegation in the information under consideration that
the offense was committed in Baguio City is therefore
controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. (at pages 492-493)
In the case at bench it appears that the three (3) checks were deposited
in Lucena City. 18
As to the second error wherein the petitioner asserted that the checks were issued "as a
guarantee only for the feeds delivered to him" and that there is no estafa if a check is issued
in payment of a pre-existing obligation, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the petitioner
obviously failed to distinguish a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 from estafa under Article 315(2)[d] of
the Revised Penal Code. 19 It further stressed that B.P. Blg. 22 applies even in cases where
dishonored checks were issued as a guarantee or for deposit only, for it makes no distinction
as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or
merely to guarantee the said obligation and the history of its enactment evinces the definite
legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing. 20
As to the contention that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the drawing and
issuance of the checks the petitioner had insufficient funds at the drawee bank to cover the
face value of the checks, the Court of Appeals held that the mere issuance of a dishonored
check gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued
the check without sufficient funds. 21
The Court of Appeals also saw no reason to disregard the testimony of Maria Negro.
Still unsatisfied with the decision, the petitioner filed this petition for review. In addition to
reiterating the arguments he raised before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner asserts that
the Court of Appeals erred in applying the doctrine that the mere issuance of a bad check is a
crime in itself.
The petitioner admits that the checks he issued were dishonored. His main defense as to the
dishonored checks is that they were issued not for value but for accommodation or
guarantee and invokes our ruling in Magno vs. Court of Appeals, 22 where we held that there
was no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 where the bounced check was issued to cover a required
100
warranty deposit. He also cites Ministry Circular No. 4 issued by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) on 15 December 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads:
2.3.4 Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or
secure the payment of the obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the
drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
It was subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 issued on 8 August 1984,
which admitted its misinterpretation of B.P. Blg. 22. The pertinent portion of the
latter reads:
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency
having interpreting authority may reverse its administrative
interpretation of a statute, but that its new interpretation applies only
prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn. 476; 20
a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the
check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an
obligation or to facilitate collection will no longer be considered as a valid
defense.
The petitioner also argues us to apply our ruling in Co vs. Court of Appeals, 23 where we held
that dishonored checks issued prior to 8 August 1984 to guarantee or secure payment of an
obligation, whether pre-existing or not, are governed by Circular No. 4 of 15 December 1981
of the DOJ and the drawer thereof cannot be liable for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
In the resolution of 31 May 1995, 24 we denied the petition for failure of the petitioner to
show any reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner sought a
reconsideration primarily on the basis of Co vs. Court of Appeals. 25 In our resolution of 7
August 1995, 26 we granted the motion for reconsideration, reinstated the petition and
required the respondents to comment on the petition.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General countered that the trial court had
jurisdiction over the cases inasmuch as the questioned checks were delivered to Manuel
Trivinio in Gumaca, Quezon, and cited in support thereof People vs. Yabut. 27 It further
argued that all the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are present in these cases. The petitioner's
knowledge of insufficient funds is legally presumed from the fact of dishonor; and the
defense that the dishonored checks were issued as guarantee to secure a pre-existing
obligation is without merit pursuant to the rule laid down in Que vs. People. 28
We sustain the petitioner's conviction.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is in the nature of a continuing crime. Venue is determined by the
place where the elements of making, issuing, or drawing of the check and delivery thereof
are committed. Thus, as explained in People vs. Yabut, 29 "[t]he theory is that a person
indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense
was in part committed. . . . The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not
necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive
importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to
its consummation as an obligation."
In her testimony, Maria Negro categorically stated that the three checks were delivered by
the petitioner to their residence in Gumaca, Quezon.
It is well-settled in criminal jurisprudence that where the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court,
considering it was in a better position to settle such issue. Indeed, the trial court has the
advantage of hearing the witness and observing his conduct during trial, circumstances which
carry a great weight in appreciating his credibility. 30 We see no oversight on the part of the
trial court in giving credence to the testimony of Maria Negro. Besides, we have repeatedly
ruled that the testimony of a lone witness, when credible and trustworthy, is sufficient to
convict. 31
Besides, it is not without convincing reason to believe that delivery of the checks was in fact
made at Gumaca, Quezon, it being the place of business of the late Manuel Trivinio and from
where the animal feeds were delivered. Consequently, payment should be considered
effected at Gumaca, Quezon. 32
The petitioner's defense of accommodation cannot exculpate him from his wrongdoing. The
case of Magno is inapplicable to him. The material operative facts therein obtaining are
different from those established in the instant petition. In Magno, the bounced checks were
issued to cover a "warranty deposit" in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also
the financier of the deposit. It was as modus operandi whereby the supplier of the goods is
also able to sell or lease the same goods at the same time privately financing those in
desperate need so they may be accommodated. The maker of the check thus becomes an
unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The
maker did not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for an
accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value. Also,
in Magno, the payee in the former was made aware of the insufficiency of the funds prior to
the issuance of the checks.
Equally untenable is the petitioner's argument that since he issued the checks prior to 8
August 1984 as accommodation or security, he is similarly situated with Co in the Co case.
In Co, we held that the rubber checks issued prior to 8 August 1984 as a guarantee or as part
of an arrangement to secure an obligation or to facilitate collection was a valid defense in
view of Ministry Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice. In the case of the petitioner,
although he issued the checks prior to such date, they were issued in payment of his
indebtedness, and not for the accommodation of the Trivinios nor security of their
indebtedness.
101
Accommodation pertains to an arrangement made as a favor to another, not upon a
consideration received. On the other hand, guarantee refers to a promise to answer the debt
of another, in case the latter should fail to do so. 33Neither occurred in this case.

The petitioner's theory of accommodation is debunked by the following circumstances: (1)

The checks were issued after all deliveries were made at such time when the petitioner's
obligation was already in existence; (2) The sum of the checks equalled the petitioner's total
obligation in the amount of P51,566.40; (3) The petitioner prepared a statement of
account, 34 where the checks issued were applied to his accounts due to Manuel Trivinio; (4)
The act of the petitioner in issuing three checks of different dates is inconsistent to his
claim 35 that Manuel Trivinio requested a post-dated check to show to his creditors; and (5)
After the checks bounced, the petitioner offered a property for its replacement. 36 All these
incidents verily indicate that the checks were issued as payment and for value and not for
accommodation. Needless to state, the checks failed to bear any statement "for
accommodation" or "for guarantee" to show the petitioner's intent.

The fact that the object of the contract, the animal feeds, was not of good quality is
irrelevant in the prosecution of a case involving B.P. Blg. 22, for the said law was enacted to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, but the act of
making and issuing a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. 37

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G, 2756-G, and 2757-G is
hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

102
[G.R. No. 116688. August 30, 1996]
WENEFREDO CALME, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former 10th Division with HON.
ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ as Chairman and HON. CANCIO C. GARCIA and HON.
RAMON MABUTAS, as members, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner Wenefredo Calme appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 28883 dated 10 December 1993 and its resolution dated 14 July 1994 upholding
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Oroquieta City over the information
for murder filed against him (Calme).
Petitioner and four other persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by allegedly
throwing him overboard the M/V Cebu City, an interisland passenger ship owned and
operated by William Lines, Inc., while the vessel was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City on
the night of 12 May 1991. Petitioner impugned the Oroquieta RTCs jurisdiction over the
offense charged through a motion to quash which, however, was denied by Judge Celso
Conol of RTC, Branch 12, Oroquieta City. Petitioner Calmes petition for certiorari and
prohibition was denied due course and dismissed by the Court of Appeals in its decision
dated 10 December 1993. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied
in the Court of Appealss resolution of 14 July 1994. Hence, the present appeal wherein the
only issue for resolution is whether or not the Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the
offense charged against petitioner.
Petitioner asserts that, although the alleged crime took place while the vessel was in
transit, the general rule laid down in par. (a) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court is the applicable provision in determining the proper venue and
jurisdiction and not Sec. 15(c) (now Section 14) thereof since the exact location where the
alleged crime occured was known.[1]
Petitioner thus claims that the proper venue is Siquijor because, according to the
Marine Protest filed by the vessels captain, Elmer Magallanes, the ship was 8.0 miles off
Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, when he (Capt. Magallanes) received the report that a
passenger jumped overboard.[2]
Petitioners contention is unmeritorious. The exact location where the alleged offense
was committed was not duly established. The Marine protest simply adverted that the vessel
was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the captain was informed[3] of the incident,
which does not necessarily prove that the alleged murder took place in the same area. In any
case, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it
occurred while the vessel was in transit. In transit simply means onthe way or passage; while
passing from one person or place to another. In the course of transportation.[4] Hence,
undoubtedly, the applicable provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 which
provides that (w)here an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage,
the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or
of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject
to the generally accepted principles of international law.
Petitioner further contends that even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 governs, Oroquieta City
would still be excluded as a proper venue because the reckoning point for determining the
venue under the aforementioned paragraph is the first port of entry or the
municipalities/territories through which the ship passed after the discovery of the crime,
relying on Act No. 400.[5]
We disagree. Obviously, Act No. 400 was amended by Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court in that under the former law, jurisdiction was conferred to the CFI of
any province into which the ship or water craft upon which the crime or offense was
committed shall come after the commission thereof, while the present rule provides that
jurisdiction is vested in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or
territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage x x x. This is the applicable
provision and since it does not contain any qualification, we do not qualify the same. We fully
concur with the findings of the Court of Appeals, thus:
To support his arguments, petitioner relies on Act 400, which according to him is the spirit
behind the present Sec. 15(c), Rule 110. The said Act specifically provides, among other
things, that for crimes committed within the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago,
on board a ship or water craft of Philippine registry, jurisdiction may be exercised by the
Court of First Instance in any province in which the vessel shall come after the commission of
the crime.
Petitioners reliance on Act 400 is erroneous. The provision of said Act vesting jurisdiction in
the province where the vessel shall come after the commission of the crime is not carried in
the present Rule.
xxx xxx xxx
It is a basic rule in statutory construction that where the provisions of the law or rule is clear
and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined from the language employed. It must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation (Globe Mackay Cable
and Radio Corp. vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA [7]01; Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561).
The words of Sec. 15(c) being clear, there is no reason to rely on Act 400 in determining
its true meaning, regardless of whether said Act was indeed the moving spirit behind it. In
fact, it does not seem that the provision of Act 400 was carried into the present rule, as it is
now worded.[6]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
103