[G.R. No. 145391.
August 26, 2002] The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE
LAROYA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution [1] dated December
28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution[2] dated August 24, 2000
denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas,
Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for brevity) and
the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by
petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two
cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of Capas,
Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation
stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the
ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted
the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied
the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of
Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,[3] assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling
certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the
MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should
have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not
a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that
the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an
abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied
the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and believe
that the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself
to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the
second party. On the other hand, the second party, together with his operator, believing
themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict
against the first party who is the very private complainant in the criminal case.[4]
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless
imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for
quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
The Courts Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on
the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan
and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the
private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper
time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from
the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved
party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and
2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal
action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the
independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the
vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.
1
 In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state
the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right
to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal.
Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is
already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal
question of whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the
independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping
under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order
of dismissal[5] that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the
order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal
expressly states it is with prejudice.[6] Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with
prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on
the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is
not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule
65.Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the
proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment.[8] Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is
identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.[9] However, there is no forum-shopping
in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil
action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for
damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the
same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on
culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa
aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa
aquiliana read:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance
of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of
another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under
these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a
criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
(2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a
separate civil action, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a
separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil
action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity), as
amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal
action provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the
offended party reserved the civil action before the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed impliedly
instituted in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-
delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages for violation
of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985
Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such
action.Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
2
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now
provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the criminal
action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the
other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed
instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any
reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is
not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these
articles of the Civil Code.The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles of
the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the
civil action deemed instituted in the criminal action.[10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a
separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal
action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to
make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the
civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet
commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation
under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from the same act or omission
filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if
reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in
the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before the commencement of the
criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal
action until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the
separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent
civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed
independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this
procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless,
before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of
the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal
action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be
deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal
case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil
actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the
civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended
shall be tolled.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
3
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil
action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal
action.Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the
criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the
offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended
party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offendedparty. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules,
expressly allows the offended party to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an
independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule
111 expressly states that the offended party may bring such an action but the offended party
may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not
to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos[12] where
the Court held that the accused therein could validly institute a separate civil action
for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused
in the criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that
time the Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly
instituted civil actions and the necessary consequences and implications thereof. Thus, the
Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case and
disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the accused may file
a separate civil case against the offended party after the criminal case is terminated and/or in
accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-
claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily
complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules
precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is
barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal
case. However, the same provision states that any cause of action which could have been the
subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a
separate civil action. The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a
separate civil action which shall proceed independently of the criminal action, even as the
civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be
filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the
criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these
articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to
the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the
commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The
first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed
instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum
shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action
for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no
reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the
filing of another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission
he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the
present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a
separate civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from
setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal
case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the
offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action
for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of
the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is
independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action
for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny
him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo
is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-
shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the
criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This
possibility has always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the
concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But
4
the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter. In Azucena vs. Potenciano,[13] the Court declared:

x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil
action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it
be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil
action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a
civil action separate and independent from the criminal action although arising from the
same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and
irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil
action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more
apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to
deal with such remote possibilities.

One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1,
2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the
amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive
effect considering the well-settled rule that -

x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent.[14]

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions
dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are
ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

5
G.R. No. 89306 September 13, 1990
MARCELO JERVOSO and NORMA CLOSA, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES & HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
In this petition for review, the petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming, with modification of the penalty only, the decision of the trial court which
convicted petitioner Marcelo Jervoso of homicide for the fatal stabbing of Rogelio Jervoso,
but which appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The
trial court and the Court of Appeals also convicted his wife, Norma Closa, of slight physical
injuries committed against the deceased.
The Court of Appeals set forth in its decision the conflicting versions of the prosecution and
the defense as to how the crime was committed, thus:
"The facts as summarized in the People's brief as borne out by the evidence and WE quote,
[are] as follows:
"'The evidence for the prosecution showed that on October 24, 1982, at about 2:20 o'clock
in the afternoon, prosecution eyewitness Felicisimo Pamaus, a childhood friend of appellant
spouses Marcelo Jervoso and Norma Closa as well as of the victim, Rogelio Jervoso, was in
the poblacion of MacArthur, Leyte going towards the store of appellants for the purpose of
buying bread. While said eyewitness was about four meters distance from the store, he saw
the victim, Rogelio Jervoso, walking back and forth in front of said store and appellant
Marcelo Jervoso was also present thereat. It was while Rogelio, who was still walking back
and forth, had his back turned away from Marcelo when the latter, in the presence of his
spouse and co-appellant Norma Closa, pulled from his waist a short bolo or 'pisao' measuring
about 7-1/2 inches in length (Exh. 'D') and stabbed Rogelio at the back with said weapon (pp.
2-6, tsn, March 16, 1984).
"'After being wounded, Rogelio ran away but was chased by Marcelo who was still holding
the 'pisao' with his right hand and was closely being followed by his wife and co-appellant,
Norma Closa, across the national highway and inside the hollow block-fenced yard of a
certain Mrs. Olmedo. Catching up with Rogelio inside the fenced yard of Mrs. Olmedo where
Rogelio had already fallen face downward upon entering the same, Marcelo stabbed Rogelio
again at the back of the latter with the 'pisao.' Meanwhile, Norma Closa, who had picked up a
stone measuring about 8 inches in length and 3-3/4 inches in width (Exh. 'E') struck the fallen
Rogelio with said stone held by both her hands, hitting the latter on the left side of the face
near the ear (pp. 5-8, 20, 21, 23, 24, tsn, March 16, 1984).
"'Another eyewitness who was present and who saw the incident in question from its
inception up to the time of its termination and who in fact tried to pacify Marcelo and
Rogelio was Eleno Requioma. After Marcelo inflicted on Rogelio the second stab wound at
the back and Norma Closa hit the latter with a stone (Exh. 'E') on the left side of the face near
the ear and appellants went back to their house, it was Requioma, together
with Dominador Moquia and Rolando Molero, who brought the victim to the Abuyog General
Hospital where he later expired (pp. 5, 25, 26, 28, tsn, March 16, 1984). Requioma, however,
failed to testify for the prosecution as he died during the pendency of trial of the case (p. 6,
decision, p. 229, record).'
"The defense' evidence was briefly stated in the appellant's brief which WE also quote, as
follows:
"'At the trial of this case, principal accused MARCELO JERVOSO declared that on October 24,
1982 at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon he was in his office situated in front of his main
house which is also near his store, making list of goods to be purchased in Tacloban City for
his store; that his wife Norma Closa was inside their house bathing their children preparatory
to their taking their afternoon nap; that Rogelio Jervoso, son of the brother of his adoptive
father, entered his office without knocking, and arrogantly asked him why he was possessing
the lands of Domingo Jervoso when he is not the real son and he is not also a legally adopted
son; that Rogelio Jervoso was drunk at the time, demanded that an accounting of all the
produce of the coconuts and palay of Domingo Jervoso's lands; that he told Rogelio to come
back the next day so both of them would go and see his adoptive mother Afra Diaz who can
enlighten him (Rogelio) about the matter.
"'Seeing Rogelio already belligerent, Marcelo went outside his office. While he was already
outside and about a meter from his store, he saw Ramon Taro and heard him shout: 'Boy,
don't do that!' 'Boy' is the nickname of Rogelio Jervoso. Upon hearing Ramon Taro shout,
Marcelo looked back just as Rogelio delivered a stabbing blow on him, hitting him on the left
back part of his upper arm, with a 'pisao' (Exhibit 'D').
"'After the first stab blow delivered by Rogelio, he (Marcelo) ran across the National Highway
towards the gate of the house of Mrs. Olmedo. Marcelo was able to enter the front yard of
Mrs. Olmedo's premises and he tried to escape, but Rogelio intercepted him by passing the
other way. Marcelo ran toward the corner but was met by Rogelio, so he tried to retrace his
steps to the gate, but when he was about to go out of the gate. Rogelio lunged at him and
delivered another stabbing blow but he was able to get hold of the right writs of Rogelio's
hand holding the deadly weapon. Meanwhile, Rogelio's left arm was choking his check (sic)
and pushing him towards the concrete fence of Mrs. Olmedo.
"'So, he struggled to get hold of the 'pisao' and was able to wrest it from the hold of Rogelio
by twisting Rogelio's right hand, but Rogelio was still holding his neck pinned in his left arm
against the concrete fence. To defend himself, Marcelo delivered two stabbing blows at the
back of Rogelio -- the first blow, with a downward stroke on his right back portion and the
second by an upward stroke on his left back portion.
"'After stabbing the victim Rogelio, he pushed Rogelio who fell to the ground on his left side,
he ran towards the gate of Mrs. Olmedo'spremises and on his way out he saw Ramon Taro
and called him instructing him to fetch a policeman.'" (pp. 31-34, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that the plea of self-defense was not
proven by clear and convincing evidence:
"Regrettably missing in the appellants' evidence are the elements of self-defense which
are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent and
repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
6
himself. The defense failed to demonstrate the concurrence of the three essential elements
with satisfactory evidence so as to entitle the appellant of the defense of self-defense.
"WE are entirely in accord with the trial court that the affirmative defense of self-defense
was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence is doubtful, and lacks that
requisite of certainty and sufficient credulity to sustain the plea of self-defense.
"Suffice it to say that the trial court did not err in finding that the guilt of both appellant was
proven with proof beyond reasonable doubt." (p. 36, Rollo.)
The dispositive part of its decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that the penalty to
be imposed on appellant Marcelo Jervoso, should be an imprisonment of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years of prisionmayor as maximum,
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso in the amount of P30,000.00,
Philippine Currency.
"In all other respects, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against both
appellants." (p. 37, Rollo.)
In their petition for review, the petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred:
(1) in ordering them (petitioners) to pay indemnity of P30,000 to the heirs of
Rogelio Jervoso despite the reservation by said heirs of their right to file a separate civil
action against the accused, which they did file in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXXI where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 83-18958 entitled, "Digna Carino-Jervoso, et al.
vs. Marcelo Jervoso and Norma Closa;" and
(2) in finding the petitioners guilty of the crimes charged without support of competent
evidence and contrary to applicable laws and decisions of this Court.
The first assignment of error is meritorious. Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
provides:
"Section. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to instituteit separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
"Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused.
"A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of or the
reservation of the right to file any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
"The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
"In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of th
e accused.
"xxx xxx xxx."
The filing of a separate civil action for damages against the accused by the heirs of the
deceased victim is authorized under Article 33 of the Civil Code which provides:
"Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence."
The term "physical injuries" in Art. 33 is used in a generic sense. It includes consummated,
frustrated, or attempted homicide (Madeja vs. Cruz, 126 SCRA 293, cited in Vol. I, p. 62 Civil
Code, 1990 Ed., by R.C. Aquino). Having reserved and filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila a separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising from the
crimes charged, the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso, are precluded from recovering
damages in the criminal case against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover
damages twice for the same criminal act of the accused. The trial court erred in awarding to
the heirs of Rogelio Jervoso in the criminal case P30,000 as civil indemnity for his death
despite their reservation to file a separate civil action for that purpose. The Court of Appeals
likewise erred in affirming the award.
The second assignment of error raises a purely factual issue: whether the evidence is
sufficient to convict the accused of homicide. That issue may not be reviewed by this Court
in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where only legal issues may be
raised.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Cr No. 04472 entitled, "People
of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs. Marcelo Jervoso and Norma Closa, defendants-
appellants" is affirmed, except the award of P30,000 as indemnity for damages to the heirsof
Rogelio Jervoso, which should be deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
7
[G.R. No. 49588. December 21, 1990.] fault nor negligence, for which he can not in any way be held liable, should and is hereby
acquitted of the charge." 3
DIONG BI CHU, alias PATRICK CHANG, CHANG KA HEE and LU LIONG
CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, As an offshoot of the criminal case, on 31 March 1978, private respondents filed a civil action
as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI; JAIME NAVOA and 4 against Diong Bi Chu, Chang Ka Hee and Lu Liong Corporation for recovery of damages
MILAGROS DE LEOS, Respondents. arising from guaranty and fraud, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 21,
docketed as Civil Case No. 29077. Petitioners Diong Bi Chu and Chang Ka Hee were the
Neri, De Leon & Caldito, for Petitioners. majority stockholders of Lu Liong Corporation.

Recto Law Offices for Private Respondents. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the civil action for damages filed against them, on the
ground that the same is barred by the prior judgment of Military Commission No. 3 and by
private respondents’ failure to reserve their right to file a separate civil action. 5 On 30 May
DECISION 1978, the court denied said motion to dismiss. 6 Petitioners’ first and second motions for
reconsideration were likewise denied on 10 July and 31 August 1978, respectively. 7

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the 16 October 1978 resolution 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 08363-SP. The antecedent facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
In a complaint filed by private respondents Jaime Navoa and Milagros de Leos before Military
Commission No. 3, docketed as Criminal Case No. MC-3-57, petitioners Diong Bi Chu alias
"Patrick Chang" and Chang Ka Hi alias "Chang Ka Hee", were charged with estafa for violation
of Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. It was alleged in the complaint that thru false
pretenses and fraudulent acts, petitioners Diong Bi Chu and Chang Ka Hee succeeded in
inducing private respondents to mortgage a parcel of land belonging to and registered in the
name of Jaime Navoa, and that they (petitioners) misappropriated the proceeds therefrom,
causing damages to private respondents in the amount of P670,000.00.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, a demurrer to evidence
was filed by Chang Ka Hee. The charge against him was dismissed on the ground that he had
nothing to do with the transaction. 2 To hold a person liable for damages under the foregoing provision, only a preponderance of
On 3 August 1977, Military Commission No. 3 rendered judgment acquitting petitioner Diong
Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang", holding that the transaction between the parties was a joint
venture, requiring each party to contribute to a common fund and that —
A petition for certiorari was then filed by herein petitioners before the Court of Appeals,
assailing the aforesaid orders of the court a quo. In a resolution dated 16 October 1978, the
appellate court dismissed said petition, holding that the civil action for damages under Art.
33 of the Civil Code is independent of the criminal case and that the dismissal of the criminal
case against petitioner Chang Ka Hee and the acquittal of petitioner Diong Bi Chu do not
constitute a bar to the prosecution of the civil action for damages against them. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration of said resolution, but the same was denied in a resolution dated
29 December 1978. 8
Not satisfied with the foregoing rulings of the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed the petition
at bar, raising the sole issue of whether or not a civil action for damages based on fraud
under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is barred by a prior judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.
Art. 33 of the Civil Code provides that" (I)n cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library
evidence is required. An acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar to the filing of an action for
civil damages, for one may not be criminally liable and still be civilly liable. Thus, the outcome
or result of the criminal case, whether an acquittal or conviction, is really inconsequential
and will be of no moment in the civil action.chanrobles law library : red

"There was no fraus (sic) nor deceit on the part of the accused Diong Bi Chu since it was
admitted that Industria Phils. Inc., did have a contract with the PVTA for the exportation of
foreign leaf tobacco for blending purpose. Unfortunately, after the initial shipment, and for
the subsequent shipments, the President prohibited the importation of Virgina leaf tobacco,
and for the loss suffered, no one is to blame. This is one of the attendant risks in a joint
venture which could not be foreseen.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"WHEREFORE, it is the sentence of this Commission that the transaction being a joint
venture, with the accused Diong Bi Chu alias Patrick Chang, acting in good faith and without
To subordinate the civil action contemplated in Arts. 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code to the
result of the criminal prosecution would render meaningless the independent character of
the civil action when, on the contrary, the law provides that such civil action "may proceed
independently of the criminal proceeding and regardless of the result of the latter." Art. 33 of
the Civil Code contemplates a civil action for recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated
to the purely criminal aspect of the case. This is the reason why only a preponderance of
evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt is deemed sufficient in such civil action. 9
The civil action under Art. 33 need not be reserved because the law itself already makes the
8
reservation. 10 In the case of Bonite v. Zosa, 11 it was held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure
that there be a reservation in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil
action, has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized
amendment to the substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a
reservation. In fact, the reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been
deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance
with the decisions of this Court declaring such requirement of a reservation as
ineffective."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, dismissal of the criminal case against Chang Ka Hee and acquittal of Diong Bi Chu
before Military Commission No. 3 for the charge of estafa is not a bar to the civil action for
damages against them, based on fraud.

While a military commission or tribunal was declared to have no jurisdiction to try, even
during the period of martial law, civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them, as long
as the civil courts are open and functioning, 12 however, such ruling applies only to future
cases or cases still on-going or not yet final —

"In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be
applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that
decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final
judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians
before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be
disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State
shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the
nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer
possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of
the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process." 13

Applying the foregoing principles, despite the validity of the acquittal of Diong Bi Chu and the
dismissal of the criminal case against Chang Ka Hee by Military Commission No. 3, such fact
does not deprive private respondents of their right to recover civil damages against said
persons based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the case is hereby remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera J., took no part.

9
G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983
MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA, and
RENATO YAP, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY LINER, INC., respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioners against
private respondents in the concept of an independent civil action for damages for physical
injuries resulting from reckless imprudence.
On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated
by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee, private respondent
Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death
and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an
information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed
against Felardo Paje in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745).
On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case. No. 4425) was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and RenatoYap, together with their respective parents,
against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that the mishap was due to the
reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus.
While said Civil Case No. 4425 was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the
criminal action proceeded in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No.
2745). The accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal
to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted in a decision promulgated on November 9, 1962,
based on the findings, to wit:
"1. That the Victory Liner bus left its post, kilometer post no. 156, in San Marcelino,
Zambales, at about 2:00 A.M.;
"2. That on the highway at Lubao, Pampanga, between Posts Nos. 83 and 84, the appellant
driver thereof, saw a cargo truck parked in the middle of the right lane of the road to Manila,
without lights;
"3. That appellant slackened the speed of his truck from 60 km. p.h. to 35 or 40 km. p.h. in
order to pass said truck;
"4. That the appellant did not see the oncoming jeep until it swerved to the left, preparatory
to passing the parked truck;
"5. That the jeep was still far so appellant attempted to pass the truck but before he could do
so, the jeep came very fast at the center of the road and out of its lane.
"6. That the passengers of the bus shouted at the appellant to bring the bus to the side so as
to avoid a frontal collision with the jeep, and appellant brought his bus to the right shoulder
of the road going to Bataan;
"7. That the jeep driven by the deceased Clemente Marcia was running at a fast pace for
which reason the driver lost control and veered sharply to the right shoulder of the road and
crashed into the bus, parked thereat a few seconds before.
"8. That appellant was not speeding, was diligent, and hence, not liable for the collision
which at the least, was a fortuitous event for which no one was responsible."
and the conclusion that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant
was NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE. Insofar as appellant was concerned, it was a case
of PURE ACCIDENT."
As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case No. 4425 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of
the Court of Appeals acquitting Felardo Paje and citing Section 1(d), Rule 107 of the Rules of
Court (now Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court), which reads:
"SECTION 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. Except as otherwise provided
by law, the following rules shall be observed:
... ... ...
"(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. In the other cases, the persons entitled to the civil action may
institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may
be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered."
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and, thereafter, continued to hear defendants'
(herein private respondents) evidence. The following were presented as defendants'
evidence in chief:
"(a) the whole record of Criminal Case No. 2745 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in
which defendant Felardo Paje was by reason of the occurrence prosecuted criminally and
convicted of homicide with serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence;
"(b) the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01691-Cr, acquiting the accused; and
"(c) copy of the brief of the said defendant as accused-appellant in the said Court of Appeals
case."
On August 10, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint against the defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioners appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR No. 38964-R) alleging that the
acquittal of Paje in the criminal action for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence "is not a ground for dismissing the complaint in the instant civil action; that the
instant civil action is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action and shall proceed
10
independently of the criminal prosecution, so that whatever may have been the result of the
criminal action is irrelevant to this civil action; that Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
and not Section 3, paragraph (c) of the said rule applies; that the statement in the decision of
the Court of Appeals in the criminal action that defendant Paje as accused therein was not
guilty of civil negligence is without the jurisdiction of the said Court to make and is to be
completely disregarded as an extraneous, officious and void statement which cannot affect in
any way the instant civil action; that the records of the criminal action against defendant Paje
are inadmissible evidence; that it has been established in the case at bar, not only by
preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted, conclusive evidence that petitioners
suffered damages as a proximate result of the negligence of respondent Paje; and that it has
been established, not only by preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted, conclusive
evidence, that the damages suffered by petitioners as a result of the negligence of private
respondents is in the amount of P250,817.96, and that the latter should be sentenced, jointly
and severally, to pay the same to petitioners."
In the meantime, the heirs of Clemente Marcia who, as aforesaid, died as a result of the
collision, instituted a separate civil action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No.
6880) for damages based on the alleged reckless imprudence of bus driver Felardo Paje,
praying that the driver and the Victory Liner, Inc. be ordered to pay jointly and severally the
amount of damages claimed. The complaint of the heirs of Clemente Marcia was dismissed
by the trial court. Appeal on questions of law was taken to this Court (Laura Corpus, et al. vs.
Felardo Paje, et al. 28 SCRA 1062) which, however, affirmed the order for the reason, among
others, that "(1) The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the
criminal action on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged
against him did not exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the
civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the
same criminal negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal
action."
Following the ruling of this Court in the Corpus vs. Paje decision, respondent Court of Appeals
held that the private respondents cannot be held civily liable after it had ruled in the criminal
action that negligence was wanting and that the collision was a case of pure accident.
Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners have come to Us alleging that the Court of Appeals
erred:
I.
"IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS' INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENCE IS AN
INDEPENDENT ONE, ENTIRELY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE CRIMINAL ACTION,
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 33, 2176 AND 2177 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND
SECTION 2 OF RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT, AND IN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE
INSTANT ACTION IS NOT AMONG THE INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE
SAID PROVISIONS.
II.
"IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF RESPONDENT FELARDO PAJE, DRIVER OF
RESPONDENT VICTORY LINER, INC., IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION BASED ON THE SAID PHYSICAL
INJURIES AND NEGLIGENCE IS ENTIRELY IRRELEVANT TO THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR
DAMAGES BY VIRTUE OF THE AFORECITED PROVISIONS OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE
RULES OF COURT, AND IN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE SAID ACQUITTAL IS A BAR TO THE
INSTANT CIVIL ACTION UNDER SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111 AND SECTION 49(c) OF RULE 39 OF
THE RULES OF COURT.
III.
"IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE
INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES, CONSISTING OF THE RECORDS OF THE CRIMINAL
ACTION IN THE TRIAL COURT, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ACQUITTING
RESPONDENT PAJE AND THE COPY OF THE BRIEF OF THE SAID RESPONDENT AS ACCUSED-
APPELLANT, ARE INADMISSIBLE IN THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES.
IV.
"IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR, NOT ONLY BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, THAT
PETITIONERS SUFFERED DAMAGES AS A PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF
RESPONDENT PAJE.
V.
"IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, NOT ONLY BY PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, THAT THE DAMAGES
SUFFERED BY PETITIONERS AS A RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANTS IS IN THE
AMOUNT OF P250,817.96, AND IN NOT SENTENCING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY TO PAY THE SAME TO PETITIONERS."
It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section
3(c) thereof, should apply in the case at bar.
"Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence."
We do not agree. Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent
civil action without waiting for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires
only preponderance of evidence to prosper and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as
required for conviction in criminal cases. However, an acquittal based on the finding that the
facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is
based on the crime. As early as 1952, We have held in the case of Tan vs. Standard Vacuum
Oil Company, 91 Phil. 672, that "the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not
necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the court states 'that the
evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for
which the accused cannot be held responsible,' this declaration fits well into the exception of
the rule which exempts the accused, from civil liability." Likewise, in Albornoz vs. Albornoz,
11
98 Phil. 785, it was the ruling that "where the judgment in a criminal action contains an and Renato Yap suffered physical injuries in the same accident. The heirs of Clemente Marcia
express declaration that the basis of claimant's action did not exist, the latter's action for civil filed Civil Case No. 6880 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against herein respondents. The
liability is barred under section (d) Rule 107 of the Rules of Court." And, in De Mesa vs. Priela, case was dismissed and appealed directly to this Court. The order appealed from was
24 SCRA 582, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that affirmed, as recorded in Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje, 28 SCRA 1062.
"extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil The case at bar (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap against the
might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it same defendants in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. After trial, the case was dismissed and
in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is now before Us on appeal by certiorari from the said
for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered (Sec. 3[c], decision.
Rule 111, Rules of Court.)" Relative to the admissibility of the documents, to wit; (a) the records of the criminal case
As held in Corpus vs. Paje, supra, reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the against Paje, (b) the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the latter; and (c) copy of the
three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides: brief of the respondent Paje as accused-appellant, suffice it to say that since petitioners'
cause of action is based on the alleged recklessness and imprudence of respondent Paje, it
"ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, necessarily follows that his acquittal by the Court of Appeals and its declaration that the
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. mishap was "pure accident" are relevant and material evidence. In fact, the lower court may
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require even take judicial notice of the decision of the Court of Appeals in said criminal case.
only a preponderance of evidence."
Finally, with respect to the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, well settled is the rule
The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered that the same are final and cannot be disturbed by Us, particularly where they are based, as
by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not they are in the case at bar, upon substantial evidence.
inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the
connection therewith. Further, Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that "(c) petitioners.
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil SO ORDERED.
might arise did not exist." Otherwise stated, unless the act from which the civil liability arises
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
is declared to be non-existent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. Thus, if a person is charged with homicide
and successfully pleaded self-defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his civil
liability. He has not incurred any criminal liability. On the other hand, if his acquittal is, for
instance, due to the fact that he was not sufficiently identified to be the assailant, a civil
action for damages may be maintained. His acquittal is not due to non-existence of the crime
from which civil liability might arise, but because he was not, in the eyes of the court,
sufficiently identified as the perpetrator of the crime.
In People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, said
that "the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense."
The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and
physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3)
crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution.
The case of Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje (supra) is the same as the case at bar, the only
difference being the party-plaintiffs or petitioners. Clemente Marcia died, while Edgar Marcia
12
G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on Certiorari of the Orders of respondent Judge
in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against
respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 'o'clock in the afternoon, a three-way vehicular accident
occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned
and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar;
and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felino Timbol and driven by Freddie
Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless
Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie
Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The case against truck-driver Montoya,
docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for causing damage to the jeep owned by
Salazar, in the amount of P1,604.00, by hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said
jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes
Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-228,
was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00.
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner-driver Salazar
overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left going towards the poblacion of
Marilao, and hit his car which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before
the impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep
was bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the
accident was adopted by truck-driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the other
hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal
indicating his intention to turn left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the
intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position,
his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montoya causing him to be thrown
out of the jeep, which then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was coming
from the opposite direction.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria, rendered
judgment, stating in its decretal portion:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to property thru reckless imprudence in Crim. Case
No. SM-227, and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify Rodolfo
Salazar in the same amount of P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, both as to fine and indemnity, with costs.
"Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged in Crim. Case No.
SM-228, with costs de officio, and his bond is ordered cancelled.
"SO ORDERED."[1]
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in
view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the
result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by
Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against
truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed Civil Case
No. 80803 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver
Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by
Montoya, for indemnification for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision
involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as
defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum, allegedly for the reason that petitioner
was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief against both or only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 80803 on
the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it
fails to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the aforementioned Motion to Dismiss. On
September 30, 1970, petitioner sought before this Court the review of that dismissal, to
which petition we gave due course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge also
dismissed the case as against the former. Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while
it is true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose,
the New Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express
reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the same would
be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 x x x."[2] Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
thereof was denied in the Order dated February 23, 1971, with respondent Judge suggesting
that the issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more decisive interpretation of the rule."[3]
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before us, also to review
the last two mentioned Orders, to which we required jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an
Answer.
The Complaint against truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970, dismissing
petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
13
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge sustained Timbol's
allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-
227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner
and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep
driver Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not state a cause of action against truck-
owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the one solely
responsible for the damage suffered by his car.
of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and
collide with petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint.[6]
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge
committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said
case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.

Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the "Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that
actions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of cause of action.
petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we agree independent civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action, invoking section 2,
with petitioner that there is no identity of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 rule 111, Rules of Court, which says:
and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck driver Montoya
"Section 2. - Independent civil action. - In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34
was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was
and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate
truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had put it "the owner of the
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the
Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding
(Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-
section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
228."[4] And more importantly, in the criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement
require only a preponderance of evidence."
of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florido,[7] said:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al:[5]
"As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a
"The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-
civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-
delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a
contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal
independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal
Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code,
writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-
and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under
delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and
the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to
regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with
1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it
reference to x x x Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of
inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily
the said articles, for these articles were drafted x x x and are intended to constitute as
and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code."
exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso,
which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict is
law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation
evident from the recitals in the complaint, to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car
required in the proviso.' x x x x ".
along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly
swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car; that the sudden swerving of
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further observed
Salazar's jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya,
that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and
Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck in the same direction as Sa-
different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal
Lazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive
Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule
damage amounting to P12, 248.20 and that he likewise incurred actual and moral damages,
111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the
litigation expenses and attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of
Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot
action must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a
stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature
Mercedes Benz , and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which violated
superseding the Rules of 1940."
plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or

14
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No. 80803
is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to
file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
The suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-
228, presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability coexists with criminal
responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under
section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with
the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the
offended party.[8]
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had
opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not
on culpa aquiliana, as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the
prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be
involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need
for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil
liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action lie. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of
jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the trial Court in this wise:
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. x x x "
And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex-
delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal
case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil
action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of
the Civil Code quoted hereunder:
"Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. x x x
"If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the
text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground."
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we sustain
respondent Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on
different grounds.
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against
private respondent Felino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971
and February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803 against respondent
Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.

"In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya No costs.
would be held liable for having bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the
SO ORDERED.
accused Rodolfo Salazar.

"Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.
and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the
truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this Court believes that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be
held liable for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car."[9]

Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeep-owner-
driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner's car. In other
words, "the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist." Accordingly, inasmuch as
petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex-delictu, founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished
consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court[10] which provides:
"Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. - In all cases not included in the preceding
section the following rules shall be observed:

x x x

15
G.R. No. L-50959 July 23, 1980 acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the disputed order, and that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., petitioners, course of law except thru the present petition.
vs.
HONORABLE FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and ROMEO After the private respondents had filed their comment,[12] this Court Resolved to consider the
VILLA Y CUNANAN, respondents. said comment as answer to the petition, and the case was deemed submitted for decision on
September 3, 1979.

The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the respondent Judge
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in
This is a petition for certiorari, premised upon the following facts: dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.

On September 25, 1974, the petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., namely: Crisanta Salazar,
Pedro Tayag, Jr., Renato Tayag, Gabriel Tayag, Corazon Tayag and Rodolfo Tayag, filed with
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I, presided over by the respondent Judge, a
complaint[1] for damages against the private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and
Romeo Villa y Cunanan -- docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5114 -- alleging among others
that in the afternoon of September 2, 1974, while Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle
along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac on his way home, he was bumped
and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74,
driven by Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his
instantaneous death. In due time, the private respondents filed their answer,[2] admitting
some allegations and denying the other allegations of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
"Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
Evidently, the above quoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based, not on
the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation
arising from other sources,[13] like quasi delict.[14]
In the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint clearly show that petitioners' cause of
action was based upon a quasi delict.[15] Thus, the complaint alleged among others:

Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial[3] dated April 30, xx xx xx xx xx xx xx
1975, on the ground that the criminal case[4]against the driver of the bus Romeo Villa was still
pending in said court, and that Section 3, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the "4. That on September 2, 1974, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Sitio Pag-asa, Bo.
suspension of the civil action until the criminal action is terminated. The respondent Judge San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac, along Mac-Arthur Highway and while riding on a bicycle on his way
granted the motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing of Civil Case No. 5114. [5] home to Bo. San Sebastian, Tarlac, Tarlac, Pedro Tayag, Sr. was bumped and hit by a
Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74 and as result of
On October 25, 1977, the respondent Judge rendered a decision [6] in Criminal Case No. 836, which he sustained physical injuries which cause his instantaneous death and the bicycle he
acquitting the accused Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable was riding on was damaged and destroyed;
doubt.
"5. That the Philippine Rabbit Bus x x x x was at the time of the accident being driven by
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss [7] Civil Case No. 5114 on the defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan in a faster and greater speed than what was reasonable
ground that the petitioners have no cause of action against them, the driver of the bus and proper and in a grossly negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent manner, without due
having been acquitted in the criminal action. The petitioners opposed the motion[8] alleging regards to injuries to persons and damage to properties and in violation of traffic rules and
that their cause of action is not based on crime but on quasi delict. regulations;

Acting upon the said motion as well as the opposition thereto, the respondent Judge issued "6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has failed to exercise the diligence of a
an order[9] dated April 13, 1978, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 5114. good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly
defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan, otherwise the accident in question which resulted in the
The petitioners moved to reconsider;[10] however, the same was denied by respondent Judge death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property would not have occurred;"
in his order[11] dated May 30, 1979.

Hence, the petitioners interposed the present petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside xx xx xx xx xx xx
the order of respondent Judge dated April 13, 1977, claiming that the respondent Judge All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or
omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondents; (2) damage
16
caused by the said act or omission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act
or omission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. In the case
of Elcano vs. Hill,[16] this Court held that:

"x x x, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to
in Par. (e), Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law."
The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict, the acquittal of the driver,
private respondent Romeo Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar to
the prosecution of Civil Case No. 5114 for damages based on quasi-delict.[17]

In the light of the foregoing, We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside, and the case is
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Abad Santos and De Castro,* JJ., concur.

Barredo, (Chairman) J., I concur and also in the opinion of Justice Aquino. I just like to add
that in my view the proceeding and trial in Civil Case No. 5114 should not have been
suspended at all just because of the filing of the criminal case.
Aquino, J., see concurrence.

17
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO
HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court
of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular
accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated
by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this
suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising
from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents
moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit,
invoking Rule 111, section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
"(b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be
found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;"
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension
of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on
August 25, 1970,[1] petitioner elevated the matter on Certiorari to the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had
acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law
and jurisprudence.[2]
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for Certiorari on the ground
that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the
civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent
civil action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under
the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the resolution of
the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, Certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is
defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of Mandamus (Annex
"R"). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an Order
dated November 14, 1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on
February 25, 1971.[3]
Petitioner makes these:
"ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
"1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE
SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
"2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID DELAY THE OFFENDED
PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
"3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS NOT
PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS INTERLOCUTORY.
"4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS DEFECTIVE."[4]
all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an
independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is
evident that the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual, predicated principally
on articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)".
"Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
" xxx xxx xxx
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
" xxx xxx xxx
"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage. (1903a)"
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver,
Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepneyowned by the Pepitos which caused the collision
between his automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner
because of the collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the damages he
suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that
defendant, Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her
18
employees, particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based
on quasi-delict.[5]
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
"Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. (n)"
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which is readily
discernible from the foregoing codal provision, has been expounded in Barredo vs. Garcia, et
al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621,[6] thus:
"Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
imprudence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault
or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of
negligence - even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for
quasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to
bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the
laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will
not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpaaquiliana or quasi-delito, which
is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
"Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot
be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there would be many instances
of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
"Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective, and that is,
to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to
compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining a
relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way,
which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of
the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because
the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a
matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public
conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then,
should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and
probably useless procedure? In contruing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
"At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and
their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and
employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It
is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful
conduct for the personnel and partimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, 'they
should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor
selection and all for their negligence.' And according to Manresa, 'It is much more equitable
and just that such responsibility should fail upon the principal or director who could have
chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the such employee because of his
confidence in the principal or director'. (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this
primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by
the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third
persons the employer and employee 'vienen a
ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la
de quien la emplea y utiliza' (become as one personality by the merging of the person of the
employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.) All these observations acquire a
peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of
stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
"Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa-
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the Civil
responsibility arising from crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by
our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious
and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high
time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal
Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it
reestablishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to
secure adequate and efficacious redress." (Garcia vs. Florido, 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31,
1973). (Emphasis supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in
section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
"Sec. 2. Independent civil action. - In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and
2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of
the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such
19
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence."
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for
in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action".
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in
suspending the civil action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, supra, which refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in the
section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case "once the criminal
action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted
and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered". Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to
in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the
criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense and not the civil
action based on quasi-delict.
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:
"Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court
of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the
criminal case is finally terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the other
errors assigned becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of Certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court
of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case
No. 189 of that Court.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of

obligation "not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony". Article 1157 of
the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:
"Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)" (Underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept
of quasi-delict, as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. [7] It makes no distinction
between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the
other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that it includes both
injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property
injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. An
instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages
caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful "to persons or property".

20
G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983
CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR. EVA A.
JAFZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death
of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the
deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen
L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil
Case No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross
negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
which motion invoked Section 3 (a) of Rule III of the Rules of Court which reads:
"Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. - In all cases not included in the preceding
section the following rules shall be observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but
after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." x x x
According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3(a), Rule III, New Rules of
Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered
in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.)
The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is highly impressed with merit.
Section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the
applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow:
"Sec. 2. Independent civil action. - In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and
2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of
the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence." (Rule III, Rules of Court.)
"Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (Civil Code.)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest
from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution."
This conclusion is supported by the comment of the Code Commission, thus:
"The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to
enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the State
attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and initiative to
habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the vindication of their own
private rights. It is true that in many of the cases referred to in the provision cited, a criminal
prosecution is proper, but it should be remembered that while the State is the complainant
in the criminal case, the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who
has suffered directly. He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which
peculiarly affects him. " (Report, p. 46.)
And Tolentino says:
"The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal
action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception to this rule when the offense is
defamation, fraud, or physical injuries. In these cases, a civil action may be filed
independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the
injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not
given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended until
the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of
the result of the criminal action." (I Civil Code, p. 144. [1974].)
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.
"The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.'
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein,
so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them
any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this
apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms physical injuries' could not
have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is
difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article -
some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term 'physical
injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries,
because the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission
recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault
and battery in American Law, and this recommendation must have been accepted by the
Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to
establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil
action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie
21
whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or
attempted homicide, or even death." (Carandang vs. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].)

Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence
or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of
eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the
result.
In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may
proceed independently of the criminal action against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby
set aside; no special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., seeconcurrence.

22
[G.R. No. L-13134. February 13, 1960.] GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

MARIA C. ROA, plaintiff and appellant, v. SEGUNDA DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., defendants and
appellees. Direct appeal to this Court from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for damages upon defendants’ motion on the ground that it
Felimon Cajator for Appellant. was barred by prior judgment.

Valeriano Silva and Abel de Ocera for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WHEN CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIME MAY BE DETERMINED
IN THE CRIMINAL CASE. — The civil liability arising from crime may be determined in the
criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not
reserve his right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant.
2. ID.; WHEN OFFENDED PARTY MAY INTERVENE IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE CRIMINAL
CASE. — An offended party in a criminal case may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the
prosecution of the offense, only if he has not waived the civil action or expressly reserved his
right of institute it, subject, always, to the direction and control of the prosecuting fiscal.
3. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF INTERVENTION. — The right of intervention reserved to the offended
party is for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of
demanding punishment of the accused.
The facts are not disputed. In Criminal Case No. 1225 of the court below, Segunda de la Cruz,
one of herein defendants, was charged with serious oral defamation. The offended party,
herein plaintiff Maria C. Roa, did not waive the civil action or reserve her right to institute it,
but intervened through counsel in the prosecution of the offense. After trial, the court on
April 30, 1957 rendered a decision finding the defendant Segunda de la Cruz guilty a slight
slander and sentencing her to pay a fine of P50.00. It, likewise, ordered her to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with costs, but made no award as to
damages.
About a month later, or on May 28, 1957, the offended party Maria C. Roa filed the present
action in the same court below against Segunda de la Cruz and her husband Juan Aguas to
recover moral and exemplary damages. The cause of action was based on the defamatory
remarks which were the subject matter of the criminal action against Segunda de la Cruz. The
aggregate amount sought to be recovered, including attorney’s fees, was P28.000.00.
Instead of filing an answer, defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
grounds that it was barred by prior judgment and that it did not state a cause of action.
Sustaining the motion on the first ground, the court below dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff
in due time filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.

4. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF OFFENDER FOR DAMAGES; FAILURE TO ALLEGE DAMAGES IN THE Article 33 of the new Civil Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT, EFFECT OF. — Even if the complaint or information is silent
as to damages or the intention to prove and claim them, the offender is still liable for them, "Art. 33. In case of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
and the offended has the right to prove and claim for them in the criminal case, unless a entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
waiver or the reserving of the civil action is made. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. ID.; RES JUDICATA; WHEN JUDGMENT IN CRIMINAL ACTION BARS CIVIL ACTION FOR
DAMAGES. — Where, as in the present case, the offended party elected to claim damages Under the above provisions, independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil suit for
arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her appearance or intervention the recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by the injured party. It is
as private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constitutes a bar to the apparent, however, from the use of the words "may be", that the institution of such suit is
subsequent civil action for damages based upon the same cause. optional. (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by J.B.L. Reyes and R. C. Puno, Vol. I, p. 54.) In
other words, the civil liability arising from the crime charged may still be determined in the
6. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT CONCLUSIVE AS TO FUTURE PROCEEDINGS. — Under the principle of criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not
res judicata, that judgment is conclusive as to future proceedings at law not only as to every reserve his right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. 1 (Dionisio v.
matter which was offered and received to sustain the claim or demand, but as to any Alvendia, 102 Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz. [25] 4633.)
admissible matter that could have been offered for that purpose.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that plaintiff Maria C. Roa — upon whose initiative the
criminal action for defamation against the defendant Segunda de la Cruz was filed — did not
DECISION reserve her right to institute an independent civil action. Instead, she chose to intervene in
the criminal proceedings as private prosecutor through counsel employed by her. Such
intervention, as observed by the court below, could only be for the purpose of claiming
23
damages or indemnity, and not to secure the conviction and punishment of the accused In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed. Without
therein as plaintiff now pretends. This must be so because an offended party in a criminal pronouncement as to costs.
case may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense, only if he
has not waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute it, subject, always, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J. B. L.,
to the direction and control of the prosecuting fiscal. (Section 15 in connection with section 4 Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.
of Rule 106, Rules of Court; Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, 94 Phil., 197). The reason of the law in not
permitting the offended party to intervene in the prosecution of the offense if he had waived
or reserved his right to institute the civil action is that by such action her interest in the
criminal case has disappeared. Its prosecution becomes the sole function of the public
prosecutor. (Gorospe, Et Al., v. Gatmaitan, Et Al., 98 Phil., 600; 52 Off. Gaz., [5] 2526.) The
rule, therefore, is that the right of intervention reserved to the injured party is for the sole
purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding
punishment of the accused. (People v. Orais, 65 Phil. 744; People v. Velez, 77 Phil., 1026;
People v. Flores Et. Al., G. R. No. L-7528, December 18, 1957; see also U. S. v. Malabon, 1
Phil., 731; U. S. v. Heery, 25 Phil. 600.)

Plaintiff having elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal
case through her appearance or intervention as private prosecutor, we hold that the final
judgment rendered therein constitutes a bar to the present civil action for damages based
upon the same cause. (See Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., Et Al., 91 Phil., 672; 48 Off. Gaz.,
[7] 2745.)

". . . A judgment upon the merit bars a subsequent suit upon the same cause, brought in a
different form of action, and a party, therefore, cannot by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case escape the operation of the principle that
one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated." (Francisco v. Blas, Et Al., 93
Phil., 1.)

The fact that there is no claim or allegation of damages in the complaint or information is of
no legal consequence. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. (Art. 100,
Revised Penal Code.) It has, therefore, been held that even if the complaint or information is
silent as to damages or the intention to prove and claim them, the offender is still liable for
them, and the offended case, unless a waiver or the reservation of the civil action is made,
(People v. Oraza, 83 Phil., 633; 46 Off. Gaz. Supp. No. 11, p. 86.) As already stated, herein
plaintiff not only did not waive or reserve her right to file a separate civil action but actually
intervened in the criminal action.

The criminal court, it is true, did not enter a judgment for indemnity when it was duty bound
to do so because of the intervention of the offended party. See People v. Ursua, 60 Phil.,
253.) It would appear, however, that plaintiff failed to submit evidence of her damages. For
such failure, she has only herself or her counsel to blame. Of course, she could have still filed
a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to rectify the error. But his she failed to do, thus
allowing the decision to become final and executory. Under the principle of res judicata, that
judgment is conclusive as to future proceedings at law not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter
that could have been offered for that purpose. (Miranda v. Tiangco, Et Al., 96 Phil., 526; 51
Off. Gaz., [3] 1366; NAMARCO v. Judge Macadaeg, 98 Phil., 185; 52 Off. Gaz. 182.)

24
G.R. No. L-71914 January 29, 1986
ZENAIDA CRUZ REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ALICIA SEMPIO-DIY, 'Vacation' Judge of RTC, BRANCH 170, Malabon, Metro
Manila, and SPS. CRISTINA MALICSI and DANILO MALICSI, respondents.
PATAJO, J.:
This is a direct appeal on a question of law from a resolution of the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Metro Manila dated July 30, 1985 dismissing upon motion of the defendant Civil
Case No. 357-MN.
In Criminal Case No. 23633 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, Metro Manila, Cristina
Malicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor. The aggrieved party therein
was Zenaida Cruz Reyes, the herein petitioner. In said case Zenaida Cruz Reyes was
represented by a private prosecutor, Atty. Barayang. The accused pleaded guilty to the
information and was sentenced by the Court to a fine of P50.00. Because of her plea of
guilty, the aggrieved party was unable to present evidence to prove damages against the
accused. Neither was she able to make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action
for damages. Instead, she filed a new action against Cristina Malicsi and her husband with
the Regional Trial Court for damages arising from the defamatory words uttered against her
by Cristina Malicsi which was the subject of the information filed against the latter for in-
triguing against honor. Said case is Civil Case No. 357-MN.
At the pre-trial plaintiff admitted that she was represented by a private prosecutor in the
criminal case against defendant Cristina Malicsi and in said case she did not reserve the right
to file a separate action for damages. She further admitted that the appearance of said
private prosecutor was for the purpose of proving damages against the accused. After said
admission made by plaintiff, the parties agreed to have the Court rule on the question of
whether or not plaintiff by her being represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal case
and her failing to make a reservation in said case to file a separate action was barred from
filing a separate civil action for damages against the accused Cristina Malicsi.
On said issue, the Court a quo ruled in favor of the defendants, relying principally upon Roa
vs. dela Cruz, 107 Phil. 8, and dismissed the case. It said:
"There is no question that in defamation cases (such as the present) as in cases of fraud and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action may be brought by the injured party, and such action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence (Art. 33, New
Civil Code). In such cases, the injured party need not make a reservation in the criminal case
for the filing of the civil action for damages, for the Civil Code already grants or reserves to
him that right, so that his failure to reserve such right in the criminal case does not bar him
from filing a separate civil action for damages (Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113; Garcia v.
Flerido, 52 SCRA 420). This is true even if Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules of Criminal
Procedure in the Revised Rules of Court (the rule applicable herein) required a reservation in
the criminal case, because the Civil Code does not require such reservation, and the Rules of
Court, being merely procedural, can not amend the Civil Code which is substantive in nature
(Mendoza v. Arrieta and Garcia v. Flerido, supra).
There is, however, an exception to the above rule; namely, when the offended party actually
intervenes in the criminal action by appearing therein through a private prosecutor for the
purpose of recovering indemnity for damages, he is deemed to have waived his right to file a
separate civil action for damages if he failed to make a reservation therefor; thus, if the court
did not enter a judgment for civil liability against the accused in the criminal case because the
offended party failed to submit evidence of damages therein and he did not file any motion
for reconsideration or did not appeal from said judgment, the judgment becomes res
judicata, and an independent civil action under Art. 33 of the New Civil Code cannot be
brought by said offended party anymore (Roa v. de la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8; Azucena v.
Potenciano, 5 SCRA 468)."
We, however, believe that there are demonstrable material differences between the facts in
the Roa case and the present case which would make the decision in the Roa case
inapplicable in the present case as precedent. In the Roa case there was a full-blown hearing
where a private prosecutor participated actively and there could, therefore, be no question
that the aggrieved party's participation through the private prosecutor in said case clearly
indicated her intention to have her claim for damages litigated in the criminal action against
the accused. It was only after the trial of the case on the merits that a decision was rendered
finding the accused guilty of slight slander and sentencing her to pay a fine of P50.00 but
making no award of damages in favor of the aggrieved party. The reason for the Court's not
making any award of damages is because of the failure of the aggrieved party to submit
evidence to support her claim for damages. The Court said that by such failure she had only
herself or her counsel to blame. Neither did she file a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Court nor appeal therefrom to rectify the Court's failure to award damages in
her favor. The decision of the Court had, therefore, become final and any action to be filed
by her for damages arising from the same criminal act of the accused would already be
barred on ground of res judicata.
In the present case, however, while it is true that petitioner, the aggrieved party in the
criminal case against private respondent Cristina Malicsi for the crime of intriguing against
honor, was represented by a private prosecutor for the purpose of proving damages, the
unexpected plea of guilt by the accused and her being sentenced immediately to a fine of
P50.00 prevented petitioner from proving her claim for damages and making a reservation to
file a separate civil action. More in point, therefore, is the case of Meneses vs. Luat, 12 SCRA
454, and it is the ruling in the said case rather than the Roa case which is controlling in the
present case. Like in the present case in the Meneses case the aggrieved party was also
represented by a private prosecutor, but the case did not proceed to trial as the accused
upon arraignment pleaded guilty. Distinguishing said case from Roa vs. dela Cruz, the Court
said:
"The issue now before us is whether or not the rule laid down in the Roa case should govern
this one. We are of the opinion that there is a demonstrable material difference between
the circumstances of the two cases. In the first not only was the offended party represented
by a private prosecutor in the criminal action but the action went through trial on the
25
merits. In fact it was the private prosecutor who actually handled the case. He therefore had against private respondents.
sufficient opportunity to claim and prove damages, for which purpose alone, according to the
decision of this Court, has active intervention was allowed. For if that had not been the SO ORDERED.
purpose, or if the offended party had reserved the right to file a separate civil action, such
intervention would not have been justified. Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ. concur.

"In the instant case the criminal action against defendant Luat did not proceed to trial, as he
pleaded guilty upon arraignment. The mere appearance of private counsel in representation
of the offended party did not constitute such active intervention as could only import an
intention to press a claim for damages in the same action. It is as reasonable to indulge the
possibility that the private prosecutors appeared precisely to be able to make a seasonable
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action which, even if unnecessary at the time
would nevertheless have been the prudent and practical thing to do for the purpose of better
protecting the interest of their clients. But as matters turned out, the accused pleaded guilty
upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced. Thereafter there was no chance to enter
such a reservation in their record.

"We do not believe that plaintiffs' substantive right to claim damages should necessarily be
foreclosed by the fact--at best equivocal as to its purpose--that private prosecutors entered
their appearance at the very inception of the proceeding, which was then cut short at that
stage. It cannot be said with any reasonable certainty that plaintiffs had thereby committed
themselves to the submission of their action for damages in that action. The rule laid down
in Roa vs. De la Cruz, supra, does not govern this case. The ends of justice will be better
served if plaintiffs are given their day in court." (pp. 457-458)
Upon authority, therefore, of Meneses vs. Luat, We find and so hold that the mere
appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case against the herein private
respondents did not necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the aggrieved
party as could only import an intention on her part to press her claim for damages in said
criminal case and a waiver of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Because the
accused had pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced, there was no
chance for the aggrieved party to present evidence in support of her claim for damages and
to enter a reservation in the record to file a separate civil action.

Moreover, the failure of petitioner to make a reservation to file a separate civil action did not
foreclose her right to file said separate complaint for damages. Under Article 33 of the Civil
Code there is no requirement that as a condition to the filing of a separate civil action for
damages a reservation to file said civil action be first made in the criminal case and such
reservation is not necessary, the provision of Rule 111, Section 2 notwithstanding. Mendoza
vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, where this Court, quoting from Garcia vs. Flerido, 52 SCRA 420, said:

"x x x Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to x x x Articles 32, 33 and
34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles
were drafted x x x and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in
what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as
an unauthorized amendment of substantive flaw, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code,
which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering respondent Court to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 357-MN, with costs
26
G.R. No. L-37632 July 30, 1982 defined and penalized under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, and appreciating in
his favor the two mitigating circumstances above-mentioned not offset by any aggravating
GREGORIA VDA. DE PAMAN, ROMEO PAMAN, ELISBERTO PAMAN, and CESARIA circumstance, hereby SENTENCES him to an imprisonment of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1)
PAMAN, petitioners, DAY of arresto mayor, to indemnify the heirs of the late Victoriano Paman, namely: Gregoria
vs. Guevara Vda. de Paman and her three children, in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos
HON. ALBERTO V. SEÑERIS, as Judge of CFI, Branch II, Zamboanga City, WESTERN (P12.000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency but which however, shall
MINDANAO LUMBER COMPANY and TEODORO DE LOS SANTOS, respondents. not be more than one (1/3) third of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.

SO ORDERED."[1]
GUERRERO, J.:
On the same day, accused-respondent Teodoro de los Santos commenced his service of
This is a petition for mandamus to order the District Judge of the Court of First Instance of sentence. On August 4, 1972, petitioner Gregoria Vda. de Paman, widow of the victim, filed
Zamboanga City, 16th Judicial District, Branch II, to perform his allegedly ministerial duty to the first motion for execution of the judgment to enforce the civil liability of the P12,000.00
execute the judgment in Criminal Case No. 2953 entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, of the accused-respondent. This was followed on August 28, 1972 by the filing of petitioner
versus Teodoro de los Santos, accused," for Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence In Violation of an ex parte motion for execution of judgment against the accused. In both instances,
of Section 52 of Act 3992, As Amended, in order to enforce the subsidiary liability of Western Mindanao Lumber Company was duly notified.
employer respondent Western Mindanao Lumber Company pursuant to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. On August 31, 1972, respondent Judge issued an order granting the said motion for
execution. However, on September 4, 1972, the Sheriff's Return of Service showed that the
The facts of the case are simple and uncontradicted. accused-respondent Teodoro de los Santos had no property registered in his name.

On May 24, 1961, accused-respondent Teodoro de los Santos was charged by the City Upon discovery that accused-respondent is insolvent, petitioner filed on September 19, 1972,
Attorney of Zamboanga City in the following information: a "Motion for Execution on Subsidiary Liability of Employer Western Mindanao Lumber
Company under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code." Petitioner contended therein that
"The undersigned City Attorney accuses TEODORO DE LOS SANTOS, with HOMICIDE THRU the subsidiary liability of the employer Western Mindanao Lumber Company in the event the
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 52 of ACT 3992 AS AMENDED, committed as accused is insolvent, is executory in nature and there is no need for a separate action or a
follows: further civil case to be filed in the enforcement of the decision aforementioned. On October
11, 1972, petitioner filed a "Supplemental Motion for Execution for Subsidiary Liability of
"That on or about December 21, 1956, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the Employer Under Art. 103 of the Penal Code." Petitioner, thru counsel, cited therein the case
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-mentioned accused, driver of a cargo truck with plate No. of Fernando vs. Franco, 37 SCRA 311, where this Court held that:
T-15341, owned and operated by the Western Mindanao Lumber Co., and without due
precaution, considering the width, grades, curvature, visibility and other conditions of the "It may be stated further that since it was not only in the latter part of October, 1962 that the
road, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, thru his recklessness and lack of decision against the driver attained finality and became executory, had plaintiffs relied on
foresight while driving said cargo truck cause one Victoriano Paman to fall therefrom who suing out a writ of execution against the employer, it could have had until October 1967 at
was riding the said truck and as a consequence, the latter sustained injuries on his person the latest to take such step."
which caused his death. Petitioner concluded that the tenor of the aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary
liability of the employer may be enforced in the same proceeding.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Upon arraignment on June 26, 1972, accused-respondent Teodoro de los Santos entered a On September 8, 1973, respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion for issuance of
plea of guilty. In view of said plea the respondent Judge, Alberto Seneris, rendered a Decision writ of execution against the employer of Teodoro de los Santos. He opined that the alleged
fencing said respondent to suffer an imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day employer not having been notified that its driver was facing a criminal charge, a separate civil
of arresto mayor and to indemnify the heirs of the late Victoriano Paman, namely, the action must be filed. Hence, this Petition for mandamus.
petitioner Gregoria Vda. de Paman and her three children, in the amount of P12,000.00, the
dispositive portion of the Decision reading as follows: This case finds parallelism in a case involving the same respondent Judge, i.e., Lucia S.
Pajarito vs. Hon. Alberto V. Seneris, et al., 87 SCRA 275, where the only issue involved is
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Teodoro de los Santos, by his own admission, whether or not the subsidiary liability established in Article 103 °i the Revised Penal Code
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide as may be enforced in the same criminal case where the award was made, or in a separate civil
action.
27
 Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
As in the aforementioned case, the apparent drawback in the enforcement of the subsidiary
liability in the same criminal proceedings is the lack of due process to the alleged employer. Barredo (Chairman): I concur. Even the information does not allege sufficient facts to make
Western Mindanao Lumber Co. subsidiarily liable.
Net being a party to the case, he is not heard as to whether he is indeed the employer.
Besides, even if the employer-employee relationship is not disputed, still, in order that an
employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it
should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the
employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties, and (3) that he is insolvent. [2]

Against the foregoing considerations, Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides,
however, that "when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately." That means as if two actions are joined in one as twins, each one complete with
the same completeness as any of the two normal persons composing the twins. It means that
the civil action may be tried and prosecuted, with all the ancillary processes provided by
law.[3] Said provision will be rendered meaningless if the subsidiary civil liability is not allowed
to be enforced in the same proceeding.

To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged employer, this Court
directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Señeris(supra) to hear and decide in the same
proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus. It
was explained therein that the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability may
be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which
an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the
execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the
judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power
carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in
the execution.

Moreover, it has been invariably held that a judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant
employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and
the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the
latter's subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount.[4] This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea vs. Halili, 109 Phil. 495 that the
court has no other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in
the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has
been committed in the decision. A separate and independent action is, therefore,
unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim.

WHEREFORE, the order dated September 8, 1973 of respondent Judge is hereby SET ASIDE.
The Court a quo is hereby directed to conduct further proceedings in the same case on
whether the requisite facts to impose subsidiary civil liability on the alleged employer of
Teodoro de los Santos are present. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

28
G.R. No. L-37404 November 18, 1991
EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR. and GRETCHEN OPPENCOJUANGCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GEORGE F. SISON and LUIS R.
MAURICIO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
May a criminal case for libel and an independent civil action for damages arising therefrom,
filed pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, be consolidated for joint trial?
The case which provoked this issue eighteen (18) years ago was then one of first impression.
However, its early resolution did not seem to merit priority from the parties and so it became
one of the many "move in the premises" cases of this Court.
Subsequent events had significantly dimmed the glow of the issue's novelty. In the 1982 case
of Caños vs. Peralta, et al.,[1] this Court enunciated a new doctrine which significantly touched
upon and indirectly, albeit partly, resolved this issue. Then followed amendments to the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, some of which allowed, in certain instances, the consolidation
of the civil suit with the criminal action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the
latter.[2] In a later case, Naguiat vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,[3] decided in 1988,
this Court went further by allowing the consolidation with the criminal action for violation of
a special law of a civil case for specific performance with damages arising from said law. Be
that as it may, there is still the need to meet the issue squarely.
The parties do not dispute the following antecedents:
In the 14 June 1972 issue of the GRAPHIC, a weekly magazine of general circulation in the
Philippines, under the column Social Climbingby one "Conde de Makati," later identified as
George F. Sison, the following item appeared:
"ONCE UPON A time a beautiful Blue Lady (GOC) used to frequent the office of the Honorable
Sir.
Because of her well-known beauty and charm, the frequency of her visits did not pass
unnoticed by our Lady of the House by the Pasig. An investigation by her battery of personal
'spies' revealed that the beautiful Blue Lady was 'following up' her three-million-peso loan
from one of our leading government-lending institutions.
'Ang mahal naman ng kanyang x x x! exclaimed our Lady of the House.
Aba, floating rate yata tayo ngayon. Even my friend Marquesa de Culi-Culi has upped her
price by 50 percent, 'kasi ang mahal na ng bilihin ngayon, kahit bulak at alkohol."
Claiming that the publication alludes to petitioners-spouses, and that it is false, malicious and
constitutes a vicious attack on petitioner-wife's virtue, honor and character as it imputes to
her not only the corrupt and immoral act of "following up" an alleged loan, but also the
commission of corrupt and immoral acts of adultery and/or prostitution, petitioners filed on
11 July 1972 with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon City a
civil action for Damages based on Libel against the Graphic Publishing Co., Inc., as owner; J.
Antonio Araneta, as publisher; Luis R. Mauricio, as general manager and editor; and Conde de
Makati, as writer, of the GRAPHIC magazine. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-16725,
was raffled to Branch XVI of said court. The complaint was amended on 20 September
1972[4] to specifically identify Conde de Makati, herein private respondent George F. Sison.
On 29 December 1972, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed with the above court a criminal
case for libel against defendants Sison, Mauricio and Araneta. [5] The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-2713 and was raffled to Branch V thereof.
On 7 March 1973, after issues in Civil Case No. Q-16725 were joined and the accused in
Criminal Case No. Q-2713 were arraigned, petitioners filed therein separate motions to
consolidate the criminal case with the civil case in Branch XVI alleging that the evidence to be
presented in both would be the same; much valuable time and effort of the court as well as
that of the parties would be saved by such consolidation; and, moreover, Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides, inter alia, that in libel the civil action shall be filed
in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice-versa, provided, however, that
the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.
Only defendants Mauricio and Araneta, now private respondents, filed their opposition to
the motions. They claim that petitioners, having filed a separate civil action, have no legal
standing to intervene in the criminal case; there is no provision in the Rules of Court
authorizing the consolidation of the criminal case with the separate civil action; the rule
contemplates the consolidation of the hearing of two (2) or more cases pending before the
same judge, and not when the cases are before different courts or different branches of the
same court; different rules on the competency of witnesses and the weight of evidence
necessary to make proper findings in the two (2) proceedings always exist; and consolidation
would circumvent the rules giving the prosecution in the criminal action, thru the fiscal,
direction and control over the case, and granting the offended parties the right to intervene
in the criminal prosecution once they opt to pursue a civil action.
On 13 October 1973, then Judge Pacifico de Castro of Branch V of the above court handed
down an Order in Criminal Case No. Q-2713 overruling the opposition, granting the motion to
consolidate, and ordering the transfer of the records of said case to Branch XVI for
consolidation with Civil Case No. Q-16725.[6] In overruling the opposition, the judge held that
the Court may, in appropriate cases, order motu proprio the consolidation of cases as such
power is inherent in the court.[7] The mere absence of any specific rule authorizing the
consolidation of the trial of a criminal and civil case does not necessarily deprive the court of
its inherent power to do so as long as it does not prejudice the parties or place difficulties
during trial, thereby defeating the avowed purpose of consolidation, which is to avoid
unnecessary costs, delay and inconvenience to the parties. The interpretation of the rule as
urged in the opposition was clearly not meant to exclude consolidation of cases pending in
different courts or branches of the same court as long as such branches or courts agree to
the consolidation. Generally, the rules on evidence are the same in all courts and in all trials
and hearings, whether civil or criminal, and the fact that there, nevertheless, would be
different rules governing the competency of witnesses and weight of evidence necessary to
make proper findings in the two (2) cases could not present special difficulties. Furthermore,
29
it is not clear in what way the fiscal would be divested of his control and supervision over the
criminal prosecution.
Mauricio filed a motion to reconsider the Order, which Sison adopted.
In the Order of 10 April 1973, the trial court denied the motion. Mauricio and Sison went to
the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction to seek annulment of the aforesaid Orders of 13 March and 10 April 1973. The
herein petitioners were among the respondents therein. The petition was docketed as C.A.-
G.R. SP-02026-R.
On 25 June 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision[8] granting the petition and
setting aside the challenged Orders on the basis of the following grounds:
"1st. - There is really no law nor (sic) rule that expressly permits consolidation even
quasi-consolidation of joint trial, of a criminaland a civil, case; x x x.
2nd. - Not only this, in cases of defamation, fraud or physical injuries, pursuant to Art. 33 and
Rule 111, Sec. 2, the civil can be filed independently of the criminal which is the case here,
but in that situation, the law and the rules expressly dictate that such civil action,
'shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.'
going to show that the apparent intent of the Law and Rule Maker was to command that
where offended party should choose to file an independent civil action, then said civil action
should proceed entirely separate (sic), independent of and disconnected with, the criminal,
and this can well be invoked to show that the law and the rules would and should be
interpreted not to authorize consolidation;
3rd. - Since Fiscal controls criminal prosecution but complainant plaintiff in civil controls the
civil complaint, it might well happen that Fiscal might insist on proving for prosecution of
criminal, what complainant might refuse to prove for civil, or vice versa, Fiscal might refuse
to present evidence for criminal what complainant would wish to present for civil; and when
it comes to turn (sic) of petitioners to present their evidence, it might well happen that Fiscal
might object and insist in objecting but complainants as plaintiffs, in civil might permit, and
so on, -- this Court can hardly see who should be obeyed as captain in such emergencies;
Therefore, a joint trial of the two cases where filed independently but tried consolidatedly
would be not (sic) a clear and orderly trial; but a confusing and chaotic one;
4th. - Still worse, since petitioners as accused are entitled to keep silent, but as defendants in
civil, may be called upon as hostile witnesses, it might well happen that complainants as
plaintiffs may call them in that capacity, and perhaps petitioners would have no valid ground
to refuse to testify, but it being a joint trial, this Court can hardly see how in such a
possibility, even probability, the Judge can divide his brain, but let it not be forgotten that the
test of sufficiency of proof in both cases unfortunately is different, mere preponderance in
the civil, beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal, and yet, in the final analysis, the
determination must rest in the conscience of trial Judge as Filangieri has written, XXVI
Enciclopedia Juridica Española 399, and conscience is indivisible;
5th. - There further is the point of elementary fair play; since under law, Art. 33 and the
Rules, Rule 111, complainants were free to vindicate their rights by either just intervening in
the criminal case as offended parties, or by filing an independent civil action, and since they
can not and are not permitted, to do both, having made their choice, it would not be very fair
that they should be permitted retrace (sic) their steps and reap the benefit of a joint trial
which they had opted to refuse at the beginning by filing an independent civil action; x x x"[9]
The motion for reconsideration of the decision by respondent Judge de Castro having been
denied by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners filed on 15 September 1973 the instant
petition for the review of the decision. In support thereof, petitioners interposed the
following grounds:
"I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ARTICLE 33 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
AND SECTION 2, RULE 111 OF THE NEW RULES OF COURT PROHIBIT THE CONSOLIDATION,
FOR JOINT TRIAL, OR (SIC) THESE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE (SIC) A JOINT TRIAL OF TWO CASES
WOULD ONLY CAUSE CONFUSION AND CHAOS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT A JOINT TRIAL OF THESE TWO CASES
WOULD PUT THE TRIAL JUDGE IN A PREDICAMENT TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE ACCUSED IN
THE CRIMINAL CASE."[10]
In compliance with the Resolution of 20 September 1973,[11] private respondents Mauricio
and Sison filed their Comment on 4 October 1973.[12] However, instead of opposing the
petition, they manifested that considering the important question of law not yet resolved, it
would be advisable for this Court to give due course to the petition to enable it to pass upon
such a novel question and make an authoritative ruling for the guidance of the bench and the
bar.
This Court gave due course to the petition in the Resolution of 10 October 1973.[13]
On 1 December 1973, petitioners filed their Brief[14] reiterating, as assignments of errors, the
aforementioned grounds. Private respondents filed their Brief on 29 January 1974.[15]
As we stated in the opening paragraph, the core issue presented in this case is whether the
criminal case and the separate and independent civil action to enforce the civil liability arising
from the former, filed pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, may be consolidated for joint
trial. We also pointed out that the issue had been partly resolved by
the Caños and Naguiat cases and the subsequent amendments to the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
In Caños, We affirmed the Order of respondent Judge Peralta of the then Court of First
Instance of Davao del Sur ordering the consolidation of Criminal Case No. 326 and Civil Case
No. 558. The former was for violation of Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 602, as amended, otherwise
30
known as the Minimum Wage Law, for alleged non-payment by Caños of the minimum wage
to her employee, Rolando Apas, filed by the fiscal against the former on 23 December 1971.
The latter was a civil action filed on 4 August 1972 by Apas against Caños for collection of
differential, overtime and termination pay, plus damages. Caños maintained that after the
institution of Criminal Case No. 326, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 558 should be
suspended until final judgment in the criminal action pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b),
Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which read:
"[a] Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but
after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;
[b] After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense
can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found,
until final judgment in the criminal proceedings has been rendered;"
In affirming the challenged consolidation Order, this Court per Justice Escolin held:
"The argument fails to consider the provisions of Article 31 of the Civil Code. Civil Case No.
558 is a separate and distinct action from Criminal Case No. 326. The former is based upon a
contract of services entered into by the parties, not upon the civil liability arising from the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 326, i.e., non-payment of the minimum wage,
punishable under Section 3 (a) of Rep. Act 602, as amended, in relation to Section 15 (a) of
the same Act. Being essentially an action for enforcement of an obligation ex-contractu, the
civil case can proceed independently of the latter, in accordance with Article 31 of the Civil
Code:
'Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.'
But did respondent judge abuse his discretion in ordering the consolidation and joint trial of
the criminal and civil cases? A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried
together where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like
issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has
jurisdiction over the case to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an
undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties (citing 1 CJS, 1347).
Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of
Court:
'Section 1. Consolidation. - When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.'
The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against
oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of
the trial court; in short the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the
parties litigants (citing 1 CJS 1342-1343).
Consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its action in
consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. In the
instant case, respondent judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering the joint trial of the
two cases. There is no showing that such joint trial would prejudice any substantial right of
petitioner. Neither does the latter question the court's jurisdiction to try and decide the two
cases."
In Naguiat, We set aside the 20 March 1985 decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
annulling the Order of Branch LX of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City which decreed
the consolidation of Criminal Case No. 6727 for violation of Section 25, P.D. No. 957 [16] (on
delivery of title of lot or unit upon full payment thereof) which was filed, at Naguiat's
instance, by the fiscal on 13 September 1984 against Manuel Lazatin, president of the Timog-
Silangan Development Corp. (TSDC), and Civil Case No. 4224 in the same court, a complaint
for specific performance with damages filed by Naguiat against TSDC and Lazatin; We then
reinstated said Order. In the civil case, Naguiat prayed for judgment ordering, inter alia, said
defendants to deliver to him the transfer certificates of title to three (3) lots which he had
allegedly paid in full. Both cases were raffled to Branch LX of the above court. The
Intermediate Appellate Court disagreed with the trial court and ordered instead the
suspension of the civil case until final determination of the criminal case, in line with the
spirit of Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. It further disallowed the intervention of
Naguiat in the criminal case. In overruling the Intermediate Appellate Court, We held:
"In the cases at bar, the nature of the issues involved, at least, the factual issues in the civil
and criminal actions are almost identical, i.e., whether or not petitioner had fully paid for the
lots he purchased from the private respondents, so as to entitle him to the delivery of the
certificates of title to said lots. The evidence in both cases, likewise, would virtually be the
same, which are, the Contract to Sell, the letter which contains the conditions for the
purchase of the lots and, to which petitioner allegedly affixed his conformity, the official
receipts for the alleged payments made by the petitioner, and other related documents.
Based on the foregoing, and considering that the criminal action filed is one for violation of a
special law where, irrespective of the motives, mere commission of the act prohibited by said
special law, constitutes the offense, then the intervention of the petitioner's counsel, as
private prosecutor in the criminal action, will not prejudice the substantial rights of the
accused.
The consolidation of the two (2) cases in question, where petitioner's counsel may act as
counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case and private prosecutor in the criminal case, will
instead be conducive to the early termination of the two (2) cases, and will redound to the
benefit and convenience of the parties; as well as to the speedy administration of justice."
The aforesaid Section 3 of Rule 111 was subsequently amended, and is now Section 2
thereof, and reads in full as follows:
"SECTION 2. Institution of separate civil action. - Except in the cases provided for in Section 3
hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action which has been
reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
31
(a) Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action as provided for in the
first paragraph of Section 1 hereof before the filing of the criminal action and the criminal
action is subsequently commenced, the pending civil action shall be suspended, in whatever
stage before final judgment it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal action has
been rendered. However, if no final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in the civil
action, the same may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the criminal action. If the application is granted, the evidence presented and
admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action,
without prejudice to the admission of additional evidence that any party may wish to
present. In case of consolidation, both the criminal and the civil actions shall be tried and
decided jointly.
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. (3a)"
Section 3 of said Rule referred to in the opening paragraph of Section 2 reads as follows:
"SECTION 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action
which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently
of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (2a)"
while the first paragraph of Section 1, referred to in subsection (a) of Section 2, reads:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil action. - When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately,
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. x x x"
From the foregoing, it is clear that the civil action for the recovery of damages arising from a
crime, or ex delicto, may be filed separately from the criminal case either before the
institution of the latter, which may be done without reservation, or after such institution,
provided, however, that a reservation to that effect has been made. If in the meantime the
criminal action is instituted, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be commenced
until final judgment has been rendered in the former. This restriction does not, however,
apply to the cases provided for in the aforecited Section 3. Thus, in the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33 (as in the instant case), 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil action may be
filed even after the institution of the criminal case, provided that prior proper reservation
had been made.
Subsection (a) of Section 2 refers to civil cases filed before the institution of the criminal
cases. Since it makes reference to the first paragraph of Section 1, and the latter necessarily
includes the cases under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code as expressly
recognized in the second paragraph thereof which reads:
"Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused."
it follows without saying that an independent civil action for the recovery of civil liability,
authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code, filed before the institution of
the criminal case, may be consolidated with the latter, subject to the condition that no final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal case. If this is permitted, there is neither rhyme
nor reason why, given the existence of the condition, an independent civil action under any
of the said Articles, but filed after the institution of the criminal case, may not be
consolidated with the latter. This second scenario is equally and logically addressed by the
reasoning behind the provision for the first situation.
That these provisions were incorporated into the Rules after this petition was filed may not
be interposed to deny their retroactive application since procedural laws may be given
retroactive application.[17]
Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court authorizes consolidation of actions
involving common questions of law or fact pending before the court. The purpose or object
of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent
delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court, and save unnecessary
costs or expense; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to
the parties litigants.[18] This provision applies to both civil and criminal
actions. Cañosand Naguiat had removed any doubt on this point.
It is self-evident that Civil Case No. Q-16725 and Criminal Case No. Q-2713 involve common
or identical questions of fact and law, and that they would even have the same witnesses.
These considerations alone justify the exercise by the court of its discretion to consolidate
the cases for joint hearing to attain the salutary purpose of consolidation.
There is yet a further consideration why in the instant case consolidation of Civil Case No. Q-
16725 and Criminal Case No. Q-2713 should be allowed. What is involved is the crime of libel.
As correctly stated by petitioners, per the third paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, the criminal case for libel and the civil action for damages arising
therefrom must be filed in the same court. The pertinent portion thereof reads as follows:
xxx
"The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in
this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. x x x Provided,
further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed
and vice-versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action
for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: x x x"
If the court referred to is a multi-sala court, it may happen, as in this case, that the criminal
and civil actions are raffled or assigned to different salas. In this situation, consolidation of
one with another earlier filed would not only be practical and economical -- it would
subserve the very purpose of the law. Consolidation of cases assigned to different branches
of a court had earlier been recognized. In Raymundo, et al. vs. Felipe, et al.,[19] We held:
"[A]lthough consolidation of several cases involving the same parties and subject-matter is a
matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court, joint hearing becomes a matter of duty
32
if two or more cases are tried before the same judge,
or even if filed with thedifferent branches of the same court of first instance, provided one of
such cases has not been partially tried."

This modified what this Court stated in PAL, et al. vs. Teodoro, et al.,[20] that the provision on
consolidation[21] refers to the consolidation of hearings of two (2) or more cases which are
before the same judge, and not when the cases are pending before different courts or
different branches of the same court.
In view of the foregoing, it would no longer be necessary to consider the other reasons
adduced by respondent Court of Appeals in setting aside the Orders of the trial court. Suffice
it to say that the feared chaos or confusion in procedure is at best speculative and the
possible difficulty the judge may face in the light of the different tests of sufficiency of proof
in each case is unfounded for it fails to consider the instances when the civil aspect is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of 25 June 1973 and
Resolution of 7 August 1973 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-02026-R are hereby
SET ASIDE and the Order of the trial court of Quezon City of 13 March 1973 consolidating for
joint trial Civil Case No. Q-16725 and Criminal Case No. Q-2713, and its Order of 10 April 1973
denying the motion to reconsider the former, are hereby REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

33
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died
on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant
did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The
Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego[1] insists that the appeal
should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on
which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor
General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said
counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia[2] which
held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and,
therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is
rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This
same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his
criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
"Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
'ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;'
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory
construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term 'final judgment.' Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and
executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de
1870 which, in part, recites:
'La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las
pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.'
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 x x x it will be observed employs the term 'sentencia firme.' What is
'sentencia firme' under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
'SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse
utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos
legales concedidos al efecto.'
'Sentencia firme' really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only
when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed 'en
condena determinada;' or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes - 'una
verdad legal.' Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, 'no hay legalmente,
en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase.' And, as Judge
Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, 'there
cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the
civil action might arise exists,' for the simple reason that 'there is no party defendant.' (I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term 'final judgment' is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code.
Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term 'final judgment' in the sense that it is
already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which
states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final 'after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.'
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one
positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means
judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot
be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
34
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this
case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered
must, of necessity, cover 'both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case.' People vs.
Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626,
634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan
observed that as 'the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the
offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability.' I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil
liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as
we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the
anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where
the source thereof - criminal liability - does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et
al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, 'no party can be found and
held criminally liable in a civil suit,' which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the
criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case[3] was adopted by the Supreme Court in
the cases
of People of the Philippines v.Bonifacio Alison, et al.,[4] People of the Philippines v. JaimeJose,
et al.[5] and People of the Philippines v. Satorre[6] by dismissing the appeal in view of the
death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
"The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering
that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and
civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89,
Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and
Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed."
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases
of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar[7] and Lamberto Torrijos v. TheHonorable Cou
rt of Appeals[8] ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether
the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is
extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefor against his estate. It
was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior
to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in
view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
"We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became
operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below,
Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical
injuries, entirely separate and distinct fromthe criminal action.
'ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.'
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be
considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were
terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33
may yet be enforced separately."
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
"x x x xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal
liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only
basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former,
provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not
apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the
crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Italics ours)
xxx xxx x x x."
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was
charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject matter
of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused
herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of
human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused,
notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his
conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the
following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court[9] requires the dismissal
of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment
of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money
may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the
CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the
offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-
appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established
was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on
sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also
extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto.
35
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al.[10] departed from this long-
established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and
convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to
the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was
clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already
extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's
conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is
civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
"The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego
because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23
(should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in
the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal
action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment
in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered
against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on
appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed
although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs.
Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal
case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability,
Article 30 of the Civil Code x x x and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this
Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or
not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said
heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court)."
Succeeding cases[11] raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled
rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is
extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action
impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction
due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the
Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
"When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of."
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego.
Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction
over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What
Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to
demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In
the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case,
the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is
compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action
despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil
liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in the criminal action or in a
separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while
his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
"Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
xxx xxx x x x."
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It
allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action
impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal
proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of
converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action
to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the
filing of criminal proceedings.[12] One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority
for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto,
the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
36
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the
intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant
extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the
criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that
when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal
thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is
dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an
inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the
criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article
30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not
draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,
however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate
civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such
as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution
of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
"Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability
which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable." [13]
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability.
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished
which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the
Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of
money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"'When the action is for the recovery of money' 'and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered
against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on
appeal."
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law,
this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice
Regalado:
"x x x xxx x x x.
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted
together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the then
Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to
exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in the
Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set
aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither
authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted
together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the
summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of
the offender. x x x."
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred
to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was
held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in
relation to Section 5 of Rule 86,[14] are contractual money claims while the claims involved in
civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real
property."[15] Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be
filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments
for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money
claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could
be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money
claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by
filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be
extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused
pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the sameact or omission complained of, he must
subject to Section 1, Rule 111[16] (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a
separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other
37
sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced. therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
must be filed against the executor or administrator[17] of the estate of the accused pursuant above.
to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
"SECTION separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal
1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, 1155[21] of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation
and actions to recover damages for an injuryto person or property, real or personal, may be of right by prescription.[22]
commenced against him."
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala[18] where we held that, in recovering extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of,
damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased
accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment SO ORDERED.
for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims,
we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which have their Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
source in delict or tort. Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., on leave.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate
civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
"the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and onlythe
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability
ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. [19] Article 1157 of
the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law[20]

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) xxx xxx xxx

e) Quasi-delicts
38
[G.R. Nos. 93281-84. November 17, 1994.] ". . . Upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GREGORIO SUMAYA y action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
DALOGDOG, Accused-Appellant. grounded as it is on the criminal."cralaw virtua1aw library

The present case deals with civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the
offenses charged in the criminal cases. The records do not disclose any civil liability of the
SYLLABUS accused-appellant possibly arising from other sources such as contract, quasi-contract, quasi-
delicit or law. Consequently, we see no further need to discuss the merits of the appeal.

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; INDEMNITY FOR RAPE; LIABILITY EXTINGUISHED BY DEATH OF WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Gregorio Sumaya is DISMISSED. This case is declared
ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION. — In the recent ruling laid down in People closed and terminated.
v. Rogelio Bayotas, this Court held: ". . . Upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to SO ORDERED.
stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto
is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal." The present case deals with civil Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the offenses charged in the criminal cases.
The records do not disclose any civil liability of the accused-appellant possibly arising from
other sources such as contract, quasi-contract, quasi-delict or law. Consequently, we see no
further need to discuss the merits of the appeal.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Accused-appellant Gregorio Sumaya y Dalogdog was charged on 30 October 1989 with rape
and attempted rape in four (4) separate informations before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City, Branch 6, 1 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 062298, 2304, 2306, and 2305.

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial on the merits ensued
and was in due course concluded. A decision was rendered finding accused guilty of the
afore-stated charges. From the judgment of conviction, Accused interposed an appeal to this
Court.

During the pendency of the appeal, or on 22 May 1993, Accused-appellant died of cardio-
pulmonary arrest at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm in Zamboanga City, where he was
detained. On 26 July 1993, the Court issued a resolution requiring plaintiff-appellee to file its
comment in connection with the death of Accused-Appellant. In compliance therewith,
plaintiff-appellee filed its comment 2 citing the ruling in People v. Sendaydiego 3 and urging
that while the death of accused-appellant extinguished his criminal liability, the civil liability
remains.

In the recent ruling laid down in People v. Rogelio Bayotas, 4 this Court
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

39
G.R. No. L-53064 September 25, 1980 they contended that even assuming their liability, the lower Court nevertheless committed
an error in holding them jointly and severally liable.
FELIX LANUZO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. On February 20, 1980, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this instance on pure
SY BON PING and SALVADOR MENDOZA, defendants-appellants. questions of law.

We start from the fundamental premise, clearly enunciated as early as the case of Barredo
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
vs. Garcia, et al.,[2] that:
Appeal certified to Us by the Court of Appeals[1] as it involves pure legal questions.
"A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
On November 25, 1969, a Complaint for damages was instituted in the Court of First Instance cuasidelitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may
of Camarines Sur (Civil Case No. 6847) by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping, the owner produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or
and operator of a freight truck bearing Plate No. T-57266, and his driver, Salvador create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the
Mendoza. As alleged therein, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of July 24, 1969, while Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free to choose which remedy to enforce."
Salvador Mendoza was driving the truck along the national highway in the Barrio of San Plaintiff's reservation before the Municipal Court in the criminal case of his right to institute a
Ramon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, he rammed into the civil action separately is quoted hereunder in full:
residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house and store were completely
razed to the ground causing damage to plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff "UNDERSIGNED offended party in the above-entitled case before this Honorable Court
averred that by reason thereof he became destitute as he lost his means of livelihood from respectfully alleges:
the store which used to give him a monthly income of P300.00.
"1. That this action which was commenced by the Chief of Police included in the complaint
The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another action, Criminal Case No. 4250 the claim of the undersigned for civil liability;
for Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence, was pending in the Municipal Court of
Nabua, Camarines Sur, between the same parties for the same cause. Plaintiff opposed the "2. That the undersigned is reserving his right to institute the civil action for damages,
dismissal stressing that he had made an express reservation in the criminal case to institute a docketed as Civil Case No. 6847 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, against
civil action for damages separate and distinct from the criminal suit. accused herein and his employer;

The lower Court denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. "WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that reservation be made of record therein and that
the civil aspect of the above-entitled case be not included herein.
On August 13, 1970, the trial Court rendered a default judgment in plaintiff's favor, the
dispositive portion of which reads: x x x x x."[3]
The terms of plaintiff's reservation clearly and unmistakably make out a case for quasi-
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (a) ordering the defendants to pay jointly and delict. This is also evident from the recitals in plaintiff's Complaint averring the employer-
severally the amount of P13,000.00 as damages, resulting to the loss of the store including employee relationship between the appellants, alleging that damages to the house and store
the merchandise for sale therein, the residential house of mixed materials, furnitures, were caused by the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the truck "recklessly, with gross
clothing and household fixtures; (b) ordering the said defendants to pay jointly and severally negligence and imprudence, without observance of traffic rules and regulations and without
P300.00 monthly from July 24, 1969 which represents plaintiff's monthly income from his regard to the safety of persons and property", and praying that appellants be held jointly and
store until the whole amount of P13,000.00 is fully paid; and (c) for attorney's fees an solidarily liable for damages. These are, basically, what should be alleged in actions based
amount equivalent to 20% of the total amount claimed by the plaintiff, plus the costs of this on quasi-delict.[4]
suit."
Defendants' "Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial and To Set Aside Order of As it is quite apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim for damages on quasi-
Default" was denied. delict, he is not barred from proceeding with this independent civil suit. The institution of a
criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil action based on quasi-
Upon elevation by the defendants of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 48399-R) delict.[5] And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed independently and
they urged that the civil action was prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, section 3, regardless of the result of the criminal case,[6] except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages
providing in part that "after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. [7]
be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." Additionally,
The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which
40
should be suspended after the institution of the criminal action, is that arising from delict,
and not the civil action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

We come now to the subject of liability of the appellants herein. For his own negligence in
recklessly driving the truck owned and operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador
Mendoza, is primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the
liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the
same Code, which explicitly provides:

"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry."
For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his negligence in
the selection and supervision of his employee,[8] he is likewise responsible for the damages
caused by the negligent act of his employee (driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is
primary and solidary.

"x x x What needs only to be alleged under the aforequoted provision (Article 2180, Civil
Code) is that the employee (driver) has, by his negligence (quasi-delict) caused damage to
make the employer, likewise, responsible for the tortious act of the employee, and his
liability is, as earlier observed, primary and solidary"[9]
But although the employer is solidarily liable with the employee for damages, the employer
may demand reimbursement from his employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer
will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim.[10]

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed.

Costs against defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

41
G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987
FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S. GANDIONCO, respondents
PADILLA, J.:
A special civil action for certiorari, with application for injunction, to annul (1) the Order of
the respondent Judge, dated 10 December 1986, ordering petitioner to pay
support pendente lite to private respondent (his wife) and their child, and (2) the Order of
the same respondent Judge, dated 5 August 1987, denying petitioner's motion to suspend
hearings in the action for legal separation filed against him by private respondent as well as
his motion to inhibit respondent Judge from further hearing and trying the case.
On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial District, Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City,
presided over by respondent Judge, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on
the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. This case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 10636. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed
with the Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner
for concubinage, which was docketed on 23 October 1986 as Criminal Case No. 15437-
111. On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite,
pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the
civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December
1986, ordered the payment of support pendentelite.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the
incidents consequent thereto, such as, the application for support pendente lite, should be
suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by the private
respondent. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Art. 111, Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, which states:
"SEC. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. - Whenever the offended party shall have
instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, as
contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be
observed:
(a) After a criminal action has been commenced, the pending civil action arising from the
same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered. x x x"
The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is petitioner's
position that such civil action arises from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action
for concubinage, so that all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended
to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. Authority for this
position is this Court's decision in the case of Jerusalem vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano[1].
Petitioner's contention is not correct.
In Jerusalem, the Court's statement to the effect that suspension of an action for legal
separation would be proper if an allegation of concubinage is made therein, relied solely on
Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of the then provisions of the Rules of Court on criminal procedure, to wit:
"Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. - Except as otherwise provided by
law, the following rules shall be observed:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately;
(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately,
but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;
(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted; and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be
found, until proceeding has been rendered; x x x"(Emphasis supplied)
The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Rules do, that the civil action to
be suspended, with or upon the filing of a criminal action, is one which is "to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense". In other words, in view of the amendment under the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may
proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said
civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the
civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is
one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such
as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and
disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. As correctly
pointed out by the respondent Judge in his Order dated 5 August 1987:
"The unreported case of JERUSALEM vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano, Judge of CFI of Antique, et
al., L-11935, April 24, 1959 (105 Phil. 1277) is not controlling. It applied paragraph C of Sec.
1, of then Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
"After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense
can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until
final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered." (underlining supplied)
The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which refers to
"civil actions to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" as contemplated in the first
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 111 - which is a civil action "for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged". Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c),
Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the same offense."
42
As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but
is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other, within the
contemplation of Articles 97 to 108, of the Civil Code"[2].

Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before
the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal
separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.
Petitioner's assumption is erroneous.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof
by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation[3]. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao[4] has been modified,
as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and
had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the
requirement, under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouse had to be
established by final judgment in a criminal action. That requirement has not been
reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been
uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao[5].
Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as
we find no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering
the same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal sepa-
ration, and granted at the discretion of the judge[6]. If petitioner finds the amount of
support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or
reduce the same[7].
Petitioner lastly seeks to have the respondent Judge disqualified from hearing the case, as
the grant of support pendente lite and the denial of the motion to suspend hearings in the
case, are taken by the petitioner as a disregard of applicable laws and existing doctrines,
thereby showing the respondent judge's alleged manifest partiality to private respondent.
Petitioner's contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions between a judge hearing a
case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground
to disqualify the judge from hearing the case, on the ground of bias and manifest
partiality. This is more so, in this case, where we find the judge's disposition of petitioner's
motions to be sound and well-taken.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

43
G.R. No. L-37652 December 26, 1984
VIRGINIA B. PRADO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HON. RAFAEL SISON, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XXVII, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Whether or not a pending civil suit for annulment of marriage constitutes a prejudicial
question in a Bigamy Case is the issue involved in this Petition for Certiorari & Prohibition.
On August 5, 1971, an Information was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XXVII, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5877 (the Bigamy Case) charging petitioner
Virginia B. Prado with the crime of Bigamy, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 17th day of October 1969, in Saigon, South Vietnam, at the Philippine
Embassy which is an extension of Philippine Sovereignty and therefore within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having been previously legally united in wedlock
with one Arturo R. Espiritu without said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent and second marriage with
one Julio Manalansang.
Contrary to law."[1]
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Philippine Courts have no
jurisdiction over the marriage solemnized in Saigon, as it is outside Philippine territory and
the case does not fall under any of the exceptions enumerated in Article 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, which allow enforcement of criminal laws outside the Philippine
Archipelago.[2] Opposition based on the principle of extraterritoriality was filed by the
prosecution. Dismissal was denied by the Trial Court, which Order was assailed by petitioner
in a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed with this Court in G.R. No. L-36344.[3] We
resolved to dismiss the same "for being premature, an appeal by way of review on certiorari
in due course being the proper remedy".[4]
On July 21, 1973, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, an action for
annulment of her Saigon marriage (Civil Case No. C-2894) contending that her consent
thereto was obtained by means of force and intimidation, and that she never freely
cohabited with her second husband, Julio Manalansang. The case was subsequently
transferred to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Caloocan City, docketed as Family
Case No. 029.
On July 23, 1973, a "Motion to Suspend Trial by Reason of the Existence of Prejudicial
Question" was filed by petitioner in the Bigamy Case. The prosecution opposed the same
maintaining that it was merely a device resorted to by petitioner to delay the disposition of
said criminal case.
Respondent Court denied suspension of trial. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
reiterating her argument that a prejudicial question exists, which must first be resolved as
the same would be determinative of her guilt or innocence. Reconsideration was denied on
September 19, 1973, the Trial Court ruling that the Motion to Suspend was only a scheme to
unduly delay the hearing of the case. Thus, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking
the annulment of said Order.
On November 16, 1973, respondent Court, motu proprio, suspended the proceedings in the
Bigamy Case upon being informed of the pendency of the present Petition before this
Court.[5]
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of
the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the following requisites must be
present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.[6]
The foregoing requisites being present in the case at bar, the suspensive effect of a
prejudicial question comes into play. The Solicitor General's opposition to the suspension of
trial in the Bigamy Case on the allegations that the civil action for annulment was belatedly
filed after petitioner had faced trial in the Bigamy Case and only to stave off prosecution; that
the grounds for annulment of her second marriage are bereft of factual basis and truth in
that petitioner would not have waited for two (2) years from the filing of the bigamy charge,
or for almost four (4) years from the celebration of the second marriage, before filing the
annulment case, if she had valid grounds to annul the same; that she had freely cohabited
with Julio Manalansang for about six (6) months after their marriage; and that even her
mother was present during the marriage ceremony, are all defenses which may be raised in
the Annulment Case, and which must still be proved. Should petitioner be able to establish
that her consent to the second marriage was, indeed, obtained by means of force and inti-
midation, her act of entering into marriage with Julio Manalansang would be involuntary, and
there can be no conviction for the crime of Bigamy.
And while it may be, as contended by the Solicitor General, that the mere filing of an
Annulment Case does not automatically give rise to a prejudicial question as to bar trial of a
Bigamy Case, considering the gravity of the charge, petitioner cannot be deprived of her right
to prove her grounds for annulment, which could well be determinative of her guilt or
innocence. The State is not thereby deprived from proceeding with the criminal case in the
event that the Court decrees against petitioner in the Annulment Case.
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of September 19, 1973 is hereby set aside. As the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5877 had already been suspended, the same shall be
resumed, by the proper Regional Trial Court upon the final determination of Family Case No.
09 of the former Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Caloocan City, if the same has not
yet been terminated, and if the Decision in the latter case should so warrant.
SO ORDERED.
Plana and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., (Chairman), in the result.
Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part.
44
45
[G.R. No. L-22579. February 23, 1968.]
ROLANDO LANDICHO, Petitioner, v. HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for Petitioner.
Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ACTIONS; PROSECUTION FOR BIGAMY; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; WHEN ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE CAN BE CONSIDERED A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A BIGAMY CASE. — The mere
fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy
case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to
warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage
be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be
shown that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by
means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be
involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
2. ID.; ID.; ID; LOWER COURT’S HEARING OF THE CRIMINAL CASE PENDING DECISION ON THE
QUESTION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE TWO MARRIAGES INVOLVED IN THE PENDING CIVIL SUIT,
NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — The situation in the present case is markedly different. At
the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on Feb. 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage
ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse,
not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil
action, filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with
her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation.
Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that
fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriages
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The lower court, therefore, has not abused, much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing
to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question before
the Court is whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the
instance of the second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party
complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a
prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent Judge Relova
answered in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow: On February 27, 1963, petitioner was
charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent
Judge, with the offense of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being
then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe
Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, likewise presided by respondent Judge, by plaintiff Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to
declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of
force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly
bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-
party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse,
praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on
the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear
and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case
pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the
pending civil suit. Respondent Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of
merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which was
likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence, this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.
In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was required to answer
within ten (10) days, with a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him from further
proceeding with the prosecution of the bigamy case. In the meanwhile, before the answer
was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari, the amendment consisting solely in
the inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another Respondent. This Court admitted
such amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.
Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the statement
of facts as above detailed was admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was
filed upon the complaint of the first spouse Elvira Macatangay. It alleged as one of its special
and affirmative defenses that the mere fact that "there are actions to annul the marriages
entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that ‘prejudicial questions’ are
automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for
bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was null
and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome
of the criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as
46
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial question. The above judicial
Therefore, according to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge abused,
declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this Article . . ." 2 much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by
petitioner.
This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of this
Court. In Merced v. Diez, 3 what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued
must be determined before hand in the civil action before the criminal action can proceed." dissolved. With costs.
According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a situation where the issue of the
validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be determined in the civil Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity Angeles, JJ., concur.
of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question, because determination of the
validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the Castro, J., reserves his vote.
criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this Court then that for petitioner
Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted "must first be
declared valid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a
decision in such a case "before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed."cralaw virtua1aw
library

To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza, 4 As explained in the
opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which
arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal . . . The prejudicial question — we
further said — must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the
same must be lodged in another court . . . These requisites are present in the case at bar.
Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner’s
consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that
his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with
which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the
action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner’s guilt or
innocence of the crime of bigamy . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The situation in this case is markedly differently. At the time the petitioner was indicted for
bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted
appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not
petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It
was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the
civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage
with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As
was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts
having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.

Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that
the third-party complaint against the first wife brought almost five months after the
prosecution for bigamy was started could have been inspired by the thought that he could
47
G.R. No. L-63198 June 21, 1990 issued another check dated July 31, 1980 to replace the check dated June 30, 1980. This
second renewal check was presented with the bank but it was dishonored due to lack of
VICENTE S. UMALI, BENJAMIN CALLEJA, JR., ALBERTO L. LEDESMA and EVANGELINE U. funds. So were the checks postdated September 30, 1980 and March 31, 1981. They were
LEDESMA, petitioners, also dishonored upon their presentment for lack of funds. As a consequence of the dishonor
vs. of these checks, the Edano spouses filed a complaint for estafaagainst petitioners. The
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND SPOUSES HONORIO and SOLINA information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal against petitioners on May 21, 1981, and it was
EDANO, respondents. docketed asCriminal Case No. 1423-I. Arraignment was set on September 4, 1981 but
petitioners failed to appear. It was reset to October 5, 1981but this was postponed upon
motion of petitioners.
PADILLA, J.:
This petition seeks the review on certiorari of the decision* dated 23 September 1982 of the On October 14, 1981, OROSEA filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14504, affirming the Orders dated 29 April of Quezon against the Edano spouses, docketed as Civil Case No. 8769, for the
1982 and 24 June 1982 issued in Criminal Case No. 1423-I by the Court of First Instance (CFI) annulment/rescission of the Contract of Sale executed on September 4, 1979 by and
of Zambales, Branch II (now Regional Trial Court, (RTC), Iba, Zambales, Branch LXIX).** The between OROSEA and the Edano spouses covering Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey
respondent court's decision ruled that the question raised in Civil Case No. 8769 pending of Mulanay, and for which the petitioners issued the checks, subject of Criminal Case No.
before the CFI of Quezon, Branch VIII (now RTC, Quezon, 1423-I.
Branch LVII) re: annulment/rescission of the sale[1] is not prejudicial to the issues involved in
said CR No. 1423-I as to warrant the suspension of proceedings in said criminal case. Criminal Case No. 1423-I was again set for arraignment on November 5, 1980. This was post-
poned. With the entry of a new counsel, petitioners filed a motion to quash Criminal Case
The facts material to the present case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: No. 1423-I, on ground of improper venue, but this motion was withdrawn by petitioners
before it could be resolved. The arraignment was again set for January 4, 1982 which was
"x x x Petitioners are the officers of the Orosea Development Corporation, hereinafter
again postponed; then to February 5, 1982, again postponed; then to March 23,
referred to simply as OROSEA. Sometime on September 4, 1979, the petitioners, as officers
1982. However, before March 23, 1982, petitioners filed, in Criminal Case No. 1423-I, a
of OROSEA, purchased from the spouses Honorio and Solina Edano, Lot No. 49 of the
'Motion To Suspend Arraignment and Further Proceedings,' with a 'Supplemental Motion To
Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, Bo. Casay, Mulanay, Province of Quezon, covered by TCT No.
Suspend Proceedings'. This was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon. Resolving the
RT-(T-36471), in the name of spousesEdano, for the sum of P1,036,500.00 payable in four
motion to suspend, respondent Judge issued his orders, now under question, denying the
installments, as follows:
motion."[2]
1st Installment and downpayment - September 28, 1979 P225,000.00
Acting on the "Motion to Suspend Arraignment and Further Proceedings," the Court of First
Instance of Zambales, Branch II, in said CR Case No. 1423-I in its order dated 29 April
2nd Installment - March 31, 1980 271,500.00
1982[3] denied the same for lack of merit; and the motion for reconsideration of said order
3rd Installment - September 30, 1980 270,000.00 was likewise denied in the Order dated 24 June 1982.[4]
A petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-GR SP No. 14504, was then filed by
4th Installment - March 31, 1981 270,000.00 herein petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals. The appellate court, resolving the
said petition, rendered the now assailed decision dated 23 September 1982 affirming the
issuing for this purpose four checks drawn against the Chartered Bank, Manila Branch. The
questioned orders of the trial court and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of
first check for P225,000.00 was honored upon its presentment.
Appeals ruled that, inasmuch as the issues in CV No. 8769 and CR No. 1423-I are completely
different from each other, and that the resolution of one is not necessary for the resolution
By arrangement of the petitioners with the Edano spouses, a deed of absolute sale was
of the other, the issue involved in CV No. 8769 is not a prejudicial question vis-a-vis the issue
executed by the vendors, inspite of the fact that the purchase price has not yet been fully
in CR No. 1423-I so as to warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the latter case, until
paid. Thus, TCT No. (T-36471) was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title was issued
the termination of the civil case. In its resolution dated 3 February 1983, the Court of
in the name of OROSEA. Thereafter, OROSEA secured a loan of P1,000,000.00 from the
Appeals also denied for lack of merit the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said
Philippine Veterans Bank using this property as security.
decision.
When the check for the second installment fell due, petitioners asked, for two times, defer- In this present recourse, the principal issue to be resolved, as in the Court of Appeals, is
ment of its presentation for payment, the first to June 30, 1980, and the second to July 31, whether CV No. 8769 involves a prejudicial question in relation to CR No. 1423-I so as to
1980. In the first deferment petitioners issued a check that matured on June 30, 1980 to require a suspension of proceedings in the latter case, until the civil case is disposed of.
replace the check that matured on March 31, 1980. On the second deferment petitioners
48
We find no merit in the petition. SO ORDERED.
In arguing that the principle of prejudicial question applies in the case at bar, petitioners Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
contend that, since in CV No. 8769 they seek to annul the deed of sale executed in their favor
by the private respondents, on the grounds that the latter committed fraud in
misrepresenting that the land they sold to petitioners is free from all liens and
encumbrances, and that it is not tenanted, when in truth and in fact, as petitioners later
discovered, the land is covered by the land reform program and that vast portions thereof
are timber land, hence, allegedly indisposable public land, therefore, according to
petitioners, CV No. 8769 involves issues, the resolution of which will determine whether or
not petitioners are criminally liable in CR No. 1423-I. They further argue that, if and when the
court hearing CV No. 8769 annuls the subject deed of sale, then, their obligation to pay
private respondents under the said deed would be extinguished, resulting in the dismissal of
CR No. 1423-I.
Petitioners, therefore, in CV No. 8969, in seeking the annulment of the deed of sale on the
ground of fraud or misrepresentation, are in effect saying that said deed is voidable, vitiated
consent being one of the grounds mentioned in Article 1390 [5] of the Civil Code for voiding or
annulling contracts. Indeed the well-settled rule is that a contract where consent is vitiated
is voidable.[6]
It can not be denied, however, that at the time the acts complained of in CR No. 1423-I were
committed, the deed of sale sought to be later annulled in CV No. 8769 was binding upon the
parties thereto, including the petitioners. The two (2) essential elements for a prejudicial
question to exist are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue in the civil action
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. [7]
Given the nature of a prejudicial question, and considering the issues raised in CV No. 8769
and CR No. 1423-I, we agree with the ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that the
resolution of the issues in CV No. 8769 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-I, hence, no prejudicial question is involved between the
said two (2) cases.
As correctly observed by the appellate court, the issue in CR No. 1423-I is whether or not the
petitioners could be found guilty under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22[8] or under Article 315, No.
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.[9]
More specifically, what private respondents complained of in CR No. 1423-I is that the checks
issued by petitioners in their favor were dishonored for lack of funds upon due presentment
to the drawee bank. Undeniably, at the time of said dishonor, petitioners' obligation to pay
private respondents pursuant to the deed of sale, continued to subsist. And because
petitioners' checks were dishonored for lack of funds, petitioners are answerable under the
law for the consequences of their said acts. And even if CV No. 8769 were to be finally
adjudged to the effect that the said deed of sale should be annulled, such declaration would
be of no material importance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of petitioners-
accused in CR No. 1423-I.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated 23 September 1982 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 14504 is hereby AFFIRMED.

49
GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992
JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner,
vs.
MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan
Malapatan, South Cotabato, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
This is still another dispute between brother and sister over a piece of property they
inherited from their parents. The case is complicated by the circumstance that the private
respondent's counsel in this petition is the son of the judge, the other respondent, whose
action is being questioned.
Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private respondent Martin Paras.[*]
On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate estate of
their parents for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years
later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This
was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-
ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City [1] . On the same date,
she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City.[2]
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa
against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato,
presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu proprio issued an
order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that:
x x x after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant, Juliana P. Yap and of the
respondent Martin Paras and his witnesses, the Court holds and maintained (sic) that there is
a prejudicial question to a civil action, which must be ventilated in the proper civil court. In
the case of Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, the Supreme Court had already made a
pronouncement that "a criminal action for Estafa for alleged double sale of property is a
prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged Deed of Sale and defense of the
alleged vendors of forgeries of their signatures to the Deed." [3]
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on April 30, 1991. She then
came to this Court for relief in this special civil action for certiorari.
The Court could have referred this petition to the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent
jurisdiction under BP 129, but decided to resolve the case directly in view of the peculiar
circumstances involved.
The petitioner's contention is that where there is a prejudicial question in a civil case, the
criminal action may not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover, this suspension may
not be done motu proprio by the judge trying the criminal case but only upon petition of the
defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is also stressed that a reversal of the
order of dismissal would not bar the prosecution of the accused under the double jeopardy
rule because he has not yet been arraigned.
The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent Paras who filed the comment in his
behalf is the son and namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is
employed in the Public Attorney's Office. He has made it of record that he was not the
counsel of Paras at the time the questioned order of dismissal was issued by his father. He
thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias against his father.
Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests there may have been a basis for the
order in view of the alleged double sale of the property which was being litigated in the
regional trial court. He concedes, however, that the order may have been premature and
that it could not have been issued motu proprio. Agreeing that double jeopardy would not
attach because of the lack of arraignment, he asks that his Comment be considered a motion
for the suspension of the criminal action on the ground of prejudicial question.
The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that the respondent judge did indeed
commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprioissuing the order of dismissal.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by this Court on July
7,1988, provides as follows:
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the
criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the
same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say the least, in light of the clear
provision of the above-quoted rule. The rule is not even new, being only a rewording of the
original provision in the Rules of Court before they were amended. It plainly says that the
suspension may be made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge alone, and it
also says suspension, and not dismissal. One also wonders if the person who notarized the
disputed second sale, Notary Public Alexander C. Barcelona, might be related to the
respondent judge.
But more important than the preceding considerations is the trial judge's misapprehension of
the concept of a prejudicial question.
Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides:
Section 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court
but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or
50
tribunal.[4] It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.[5]
We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil action, it
must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would
be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused." [6]
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal action,
not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.
The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order does not appear anywhere in the
decision of Ras v. Rasul.[7] Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but also wrongly
applied it. The facts of that case are not analogous to those in the case at bar.
In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land which he later also sold to Martin.
Pichel brought a civil action for nullification of the second sale and asked that the sale made
by Ras in his favor be declared valid. Ras's defense was that he never sold the property to
Pichel and his purported signatures appearing in the first deed of sale were forgeries. Later,
an information for estafa was filed against Ras based on the same double sale that was the
subject of the civil action. Ras filed a "Motion for Suspension of Action" (that is, the criminal
case), claiming that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would necessarily be
determinative of his guilt or innocence.
Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this Court ruled that a suspension of the
criminal action was in order because:
On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against petitioner and in
the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a
prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro Ras' defense (as
defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in
favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witnesses in the criminal case)
is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras'
guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is
void or fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the
offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead)
would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil
action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and spurious.
xxx
The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 73 that he
had never sold the property in litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in
the alleged deed of sale and that of his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore,
necessary that the truth or falsity of such claim be first determined because if his claim is
true, then he did not sell his property twice and no estafa was committed. The question of
nullity of the sale is distinct and separate from the crime of estafa (alleged double sale) but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner
in the criminal action.
In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground that the
defense in the civil case - forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale - had to be threshed
out first. Resolution of that question would necessarily resolve the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. By contrast, there was no motion for suspension in the case at
bar; and no less importantly, the respondent judge had not been informed of the defense
Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the
issue raised in the civil action would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.
It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil action will raise a prejudicial
question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an issue
similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution
should determine whether or not the latter action may proceed.
The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for suspension in accordance with
Rule 111, Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, and even without
the accused indicating his defense in the civil case for the annulment of the second sale,
suggests not only ignorance of the law but also bias on the part of the respondent judge.
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that under the Code of Judicial Conduct,
"a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence" and "should
administer justice impartially." He is hereby reprimanded for his questionable conduct in the
case at bar, with the warning that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order issued by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
dated April 17, 1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the Order dated April 30,
1991, denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case
No. 1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different
judge.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
51
 In his Order of December 12, 1978, the respondent judge saw no prejudicial question and
[G.R. Nos. L-50441-42. September 18, 1980.] accordingly denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.

ALEJANDRO RAS, Petitioner, v. HON. JAINAL D. RASUL, District Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Basilan, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court
but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or
tribunal. 1 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 2

TEEHANKEE, J.: For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of
the criminal action pending the determination of the civil, it must appear not only that the
civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that
This is a petition brought by the petitioner to review and set aside the order of respondent the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of
Judge dated December 12, 1978 in Criminal Case No. 240 of the Court of First Instance of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 3
Basilan denying petitioner’s motion as accused therein to suspend proceedings due to the
existence of a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 73 of the same court. Finding the petition On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against petitioner and in
and the Solicitor General’s concurrence therewith to be meritorious, this Court hereby grants the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a
the petition and accordingly sets aside the questioned order and hereby enjoins the prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro Ras’ defense (as
respondent Judge from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 73 until Civil Case No. 240 defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in
is finally decided and terminated. favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witness in the criminal case) is
based on the very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras’
A chronological statement of the antecedent facts follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is
void or fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the
On or about April 27, 1978, Luis Pichel filed a complaint against petitioner Alejandro Ras and offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead)
a certain Bienvenido Martin before the Court of First Instance of Basilan, docketed therein as would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil
Civil Case No. 73 praying for the nullification of the deed of sale executed by Alejandro Ras in action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and
favor of his co-defendant Bienvenido Martin and for the declaration of the prior deed of sale spurious.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
allegedly executed in his favor by the defendant Alejandro Ras as valid.
The Solicitor General in his comment expressed his concurrence with the petition thus: "The
In their answer, the defendants (the Ras spouses) alleged that they never sold the property petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 73 that he had
to Pichel and that the signatures appearing in the deed of sale in favor of plaintiff Pichel (in never sold the property in litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in the
Civil Case No. 73) were forgeries and that therefore the alleged deed of sale in Pichel’s favor alleged deed of sale and that of his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore,
sought to be declared valid was fictitious and inexistent. necessary that the truth or falsity of such claim be first determined because if his claim is
true, then he did not sell his property twice and no estafa was committed. The question of
While Civil Case No. 73 was being tried before the Court of First Instance of Basilan, the nullity of the sale is distinct and separate from the crime of estafa (alleged double sale) but
Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed on or about September 5, 1978 an Information for Estafa in so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner
the same court against Alejandro Ras arising from the same alleged double sale subject in the criminal action."cralaw virtua1aw library
matter of the civil complaint filed by Luis Pichel. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
240 of the Court of First Instance of Basilan.chanrobles law library : red Wherefore, the Order of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 240 dated December 12,
1978 is hereby set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 16,
On November 6, 1978, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion for Suspension of Action" 1979 is hereby made permanent and respondent judge is enjoined from proceeding with the
in said Criminal Case No. 240 claiming that the same facts and issues were involved in both arraignment and trial of Criminal Case No. 240 until and unless Civil Case No. 73 shall have
the civil and criminal case and that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would been finally decided and terminated adversely against petitioner. No costs.
necessarily be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio Herrera, JJ., concur.
The Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed his opposition on December 4, 1978.

52
53