1. Moy Yo Lim Yoo vs Commissioner of Immigration
As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural,
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the
interrogation made in connection with her application for a
temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that
she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that
she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her
great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come
into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one
month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the
amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said
Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on
or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative
might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to
stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January
1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of
the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took
place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that
Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or
Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any
Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She
did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-
law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied
the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau
Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino
citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso
facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of
the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an
alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her
husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien
woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings,
Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the
widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies
during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no
evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.
stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for
naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a
Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship
settled and established so that she may not have to be called
upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter
into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only
to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not
vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition
of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the
situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime
the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a
judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence
it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a
Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya
Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25
January 1962.
N VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the
Court a quo dismissing appellants' petition for injunction is
hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or
his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from
causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the
bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to
have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No
costs.
__________________________________________________
2. Djumantan vs Domingo
Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia
as a contract worker.He then embraced and was converted to
Islam.
He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites.
Banez then returned to the Philippines. Petitioner and her two
children with Banez arrived in Manila as the “guests” of Banez.
The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family
of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability
extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed
an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.” As
“guests,” petitioner and her two children lived in the house of
Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the
Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael discovered
the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a
complaint for “concubinage”, however, subsequently dismissed
for lack of merit. Immigration status of petitioner was changed
from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner
was issued an alien certificate of registration. Banez’ eldest
son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to
CID. Petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on
the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen.
CID disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to
respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines. They revoked the visa previously
granted to her.
Issue
Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of
immigration status from temporary to permanent resident legal.
Ruling
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting
petitioner’s entry into the country and the change of her
immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent
resident. All such privileges were obtained through
misinterpretation.Never was the marriage of petitioner to
Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her
applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent
residency.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens
whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as
absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent
their entry into the country. This right is based on the fact that
since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into
the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple
tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the
government to permit them to stay.
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens
the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent
residency, in the Philippines.The fact of marriage by an alien to
a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the
immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of
aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does
not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse
her from her failure to depart from the country upon the
expiration of her extended stay here as an alien. It is not
mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a
visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no
right to an indefinite stay. an alien allowed to stay temporarily
may apply for a change of status and “may be admitted” as a
permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to
apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a
Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens into the country and their
admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they
are legally married to Filipino citizens.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary
restraining order issued on June 4, 1991 is MADE
PERMANENT.
The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September
27, 1990 revoking the issuance of the permanent resident visa
to petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are
REVERSED.
__________________________________________________
3. In Re: Vicente Ching
In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis
University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he
was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino
citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s
father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino
citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963.
Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one
parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the
foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always
considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public
accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even
served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as
a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have
elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
that under prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of
majority” is construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of
majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964
while the 1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he
was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the
age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General
recommended that the rule be relaxed due to the special
circumstance of Ching.
Issue: whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time
he took the bar examination.
Ruling: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino
citizenship.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the
1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship
was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that
"(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-
five" are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition
by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens.
However, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the
election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as
having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the
citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old
charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter
even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before
the effectivity of the new Constitution.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3),
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that
should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625
did not prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only
provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the
age of majority.” The phrase "reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made within
three (3) years from reaching the age
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of
Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule,
as the period may be extended under certain circumstances, as
when the person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino.
Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-
five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of
C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after
he had reached the age of majority. Ching's election was clearly
beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within
which to exercise the privilege. The special circumstances
invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in
the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a
registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest
in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity
that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when
convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As
such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity
to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden
privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves
to DENY Vicente D. Ching’s application for admission to the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________________________________
4. Mercado vs Manzano
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo
B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent was then
declared the winning candidate; however its proclamation was
suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed
by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the
United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code provides that persons
with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective position.
Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with
the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino
citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a
Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San
Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is
considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did
of not lose his Filipino citizenship. From these facts, respondent
is a dual citizen - both a Filipino and a US citizen.
Issues:
1. Whether dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification
2. Whether Manzano is disqualified to run
Ruling:
1. No. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of
both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of
the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are
citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country
the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the
Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of
another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
volition.
In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but
with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A.
No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual
allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship
do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates
of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that
their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting
laws of different states.
2. No. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship
and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of
such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant
of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On
the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the
Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
__________________________________________________
5. Tecson vs COMELEC
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy on 31 December
2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to
disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of candidacy by
claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his
parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was
an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issues:
1. Whether it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
2. Whether FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Ruling:
1. No.
The Constitutional provision cited reads: "The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The
omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any
tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes
involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse
prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No.
1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential
Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting
the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect
of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the
Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of
the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution
might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the
statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived
under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to
a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an
election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge
the winning candidate from office.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning
the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.
2. Yes.
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election,
and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the
evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is
the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of
Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11,
1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo
Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to
conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of
a person at the time of his death was also his residence before
death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not
substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have
been benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan
Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a
Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20,
1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution
considers as citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers
are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or
not he is legitimate or illegitimate.
 WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson
and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on
Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,)
and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of
jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to
show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No.
04-003.
__________________________________________________
6. Co vs HRET
Facts: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is
whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district
of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for
the private respondent.
Issues:
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear
and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the
exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals
under our constitutional grants of power?
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938])
the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is
beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will
constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture
into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government, It comes in only
when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an
abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution calls for remedial action.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the
Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite
scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their
functions independent organs — independent of Congress and
the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the
Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained originally in the legislature.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private
respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines
from China. Ong Te established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from
the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a
certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was
born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in
the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside
community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and
practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years
passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina
Lao. They got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and
practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private
respondent who was born in 1948.
The CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a
Filipino citizen and he took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to
him.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV
read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the
Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
 4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying
not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February
2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair
position which discriminates against Filipino women.
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural
born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is
the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to
be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of
the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of
Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if
they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen.
Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father
had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that
in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to
require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing
citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since
1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had
been a citizen since he was nine years old.
Election is defined as the exercise of the right of suffrage and
the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act
of election of Philippine citizenship.
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right
of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For
those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there
are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding.
Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election
time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of
similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice
for these persons.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of
respondent Ong. The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of
"residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has
been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under
the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The
absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter
how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of
that person. In other words, domicile is characterized
by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the
domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to
the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned
said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent
owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a
resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of
the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his
parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the
laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co-
heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names
of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any
property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los
Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not
required that a person should have a house in order to
establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he
should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of
a friend or relative.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar.
__________________________________________________
7. Bengzon III vs HRET
Antonio Bengson and Teodoro Cruz were rivals in the 1998
elections in the 2ndDistrict of Pangasinan. They were running
for Congress. Cruz won by a significant margin over the
incumbent Bengson. Bengson then filed a quo
warranto proceeding in the HRET (House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal) alleging that Cruz is not a natural born
citizen, as defined by law; hence he should be disqualified from
holding office. The HRET subsequently declared and affirmed
Cruz as the winner. Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration
alleging that Cruz was indeed born a Filipino and he is defined
under the 1935 Constitution as a natural born citizen. Cruz
however lost his citizenship when he enlisted in the US Army in
1985. He also swore allegiance to the US without consent from
the Philippines. Cruz, on the other hand, argued that he
regained his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of Republic Act No.
2630 which provides that:
Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of
the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of
the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines…
Bengson insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution
expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect such citizenship.
Issue: Whether or not Cruz is a natural-born citizen.
Ruling:
Yes. The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino
citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority,
and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2)
by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship
correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen,
and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth
is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof.9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens “are
those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citezenship.”10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have
become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, or the Revised Naturalization Law.
To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses
all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided
by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2)
years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that
during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or
profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation
of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
Government announced policies.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3)
by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act
No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a
mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino
citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain qualifications17and none of the disqualification
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various
statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion
of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the
United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality.26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz’s case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when
he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States.
However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States,
or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United
States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic
and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term
“natural-born citizen” was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of
the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as
such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does
not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two
categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered
natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born
before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship.
Those “naturalized citizens” were not considered natural-born
obviously because they were not Filipino at birth and had to
perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of
Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution
were likewise not considered natural-born because they also
had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of
Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born.
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not
natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who
are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2)
those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who
is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is natural-born Filipino.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
__________________________________________________
8. Cordoro vs COMELEC
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local
public office because Tambunting lacked the required
citizenship and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino
citizen, Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting
claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines
on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines
on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship
through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December
2000.
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make
any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute
Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino,
Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which
showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an
American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the
US government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him
through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed
Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth.
Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean
that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took
an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Issue: Whether Tambunting is a natural born citizen
Ruling:
Yes. Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino
mother and an American father. Neither does he deny that he
underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for
Relative) because of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting
claims that because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is
both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other
hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that
Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the
circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire
American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130
only served to confirm the American citizenship which
Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau
of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips
where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However,
the same certification showed nine other trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting
possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of
candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting
had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for
public office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine
of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary
act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens
of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers
and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country
such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the
latter’s country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the
Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen
of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given
the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
volition.
Persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship,
it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections En Banc dated 18
August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in EO Case No. 05-17.
__________________________________________________
9. De Guzman vs COMELEC
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG.
Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. Private respondent filed
against petitioner a petition4for disqualification alleging that
petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant
and resident of the United States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized
American. However, he applied for dual citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.5 Upon approval of his application,
he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is
entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is
qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent won as
vice-mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest on grounds of
irregularities and massive cheating.
The COMELEC First Division rendered a resolution disqualifying
petitioner.
Issue: Whether petitioner is disqualified from running for public
office
Ruling:
Yes. petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in
view of his failure to renounce his American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention
of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become
citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are
deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born
citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship upon his
naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case, there
is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on September 6,
2006. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225
imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to seek
elective public office, as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those
who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Contrary to petitioner’s claims, the filing of a certificate of
candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his
foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Our rulings in the
cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the instant
case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.
Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born
Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must:
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-
born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign
country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an
authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioner is
declared DISQUALIFIED from running for Vice-Mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections because of
his failure to renounce his foreign citizenship pursuant to Section
5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
__________________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines vs. Azucena Saavedra
Batu(i)gas (DIGEST)
GR No. 183110
7 October 2013
TOPIC:
Effect of Naturalization on the Wife, Naturalization,
Citizenship
FACTS:
This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the CA,
which affirmed the Decision of the RTC that granted the
Petition for Naturalization of respondent Azucena
Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for
Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur.
She stated that she intends in good faith to become a
citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely
and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly
to China; and that she will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition up
to the time of her naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements had been
complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to
allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in
some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that
Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade to engage
directly or indirectly in the retail trade. The OSG
likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns real
property because aliens are precluded from owning
lands in the country. Finding the grounds relied upon by
the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said
Motion.
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28,
1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has never departed
the Philippines since birth. Azucena can speak English,
Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary,
secondary, and tertiary education were taken in
Philippine schools. After earning a degree in education,
she then practiced her teaching profession in several
different schools in Mindanao.
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago
Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen. They
have five children, all of whom studied in Philippine
public and private schools and are all professionals.
After her stint as a teacher, Azucena and her husband,
as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of
and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra.
As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their joint
annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000- 2002
and from 2004-2005. During their marital union, the
Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio
Lombog, Margosatubig.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the
citizenship requirement as required by law to become a
naturalized citizen of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine
citizenship through either judicial naturalization under
CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic
Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative Naturalization Law of
2000”). A third option, called derivative naturalization,
which is available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which
provides that:
“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married
to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.”
Under this provision, foreign women who are married
to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso
facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for
them to prove that they possess other qualifications for
naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they
have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization.
Records, however, show that in February 1980, Azucena
applied before the then Commission on Immigration
and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien
Certificate of Registration by reason of her marriage to
a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application.
However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of
the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s
husband is a Filipino citizen, as only their marriage
certificate was presented to establish his citizenship. As
the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino
citizenship has been adequately proven. Under judicial
proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate
indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos.
He also submitted voter’s registration, land titles, and
business registrations/licenses, all of which are public
records.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main
objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an
alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among
family members, thus:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished
traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
national treatment of one should be different from that
of the other.
Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial
scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that
privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of
making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of which affirmed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, that granted the Petition for Naturalization,
is hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance with the
period and the requirements under Republic Act No.
530 which supplements the Revised Naturalization Law,
let a Certificate of Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA
SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien
Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.
_____________________________________________
Willie Yu v. Miriam Defensor-Santiago et al.,
Express renunciation or expatriation
Willie Yu v. Miriam Defensor-Santiago et al.,
G.R. No. L-83882
January 24,1989
Facts:
Petitioner Willie Yu is a Portuguese National who
acquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization on
February 10,1978. Despite his naturalization, he applied
for and was issued a renewed Portuguese Passport by
the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in
Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese
passport expired on July 20, 1986. Being a naturalized
Filipino, he signed commercial documents stating his
citizenship as Portuguese without the authentication of
an appropriate Philippine consul. He was then detained
by the CID for obtaining a foreign passport while having
a Filipino citizenship. Yu then filed a petition for habeas
corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988
referred the case to the Court en Banc. The Court en
Banc denied the petition. He then filed a motion for
reconsideration with prayer for restraining order but it
was denied. After denial, he filed a motion for
clarification with prayer for restraining order. On
December 7,1988, the temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) was issued. The respondent filed a motion to lift
the said TRO, contending that Yu was in full knowledge
and Legal capacity when he applied for Philippine
citizenship through naturalization he consequently
recognizes, identifies and agrees to the oath taken
which states to renounce “absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state or sovereignty” and pledged to maintain true faith
and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Hence,
petitioner then knows the limitations or restrictions
once solemnizing said oath and its succeeding
consequences should they be violated.
Issue:
Was the petitioner’s act constituted a renunciation of
his Philippine citizenship?
Ruling:
Yes, considering the facts stated, the court ruled that
the Petitioner’s acts constitute an express renunciation
of his Philippine citizenship through naturalization.
Express naturalization means renunciation made known
distinctly and explicitly, and not that which is implied.
After acquiring Philippine citizenship, with full
knowledge, he resumed his prior status as a Portuguese
citizen by applying for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport and representing himself as a Portuguese in
official and commercial documents. The court found
that such acts are grossly inconsistent with the
maintenance of his Philippine citizenship.
_____________________________________________
REPUBLIC VS DELA ROSA
Posted by kaye lee on 12:16 AM
G.R. No. 104654, 6 June 1994 [Citizenship;
Naturalization; Naturalization Proceedings; C.A. No.
473]
FACTS:
September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition for
naturalization under the Commonwealth Act No. 63
before the RTC Manila.
October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the petition for
hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the
publication of the said order and petition in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for 3
consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should
be at least 6 months before the date of the said hearing.
January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel
the March 16 hearing and move it to January 24, 1992,
citing his intention to run for public office in the May
1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and the
hearing was moved to February 21. No publication or
copy was issued about the order.
February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.
February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed
Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen
of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation
to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to
annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to
nullify the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same
date.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his
citizenship as a Filipino.
RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is
declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the
Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office
and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final
and executory. The proceedings of the trial court was
marred by the following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the
scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the
order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition
itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the
last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance
before the finality of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without
observing the two-year waiting period.
_____________________________________________
Juan Frivaldo vs Commission on Elections
174 SCRA 245 – Law on Public Officers – Citizenship of a
Public Officer
In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon.
Salvador Estuye, President of the League of
Municipalities of Sorsogon, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and
proclamation because apparently, Frivaldo, in 1983, was
naturalized as an American. In his defense, Frivaldo said
that he was forced to be naturalized because the then
President Marcos was after him; but that participating
in the Philippine elections, he has effectively lost his
American citizenship pursuant to American laws. He
also assailed the petition as he claimed that it is in the
nature of a quo warranto which is already filed out of
time, the same not being filed ten days after his
proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly serve as a
governor.
HELD: No. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As
far as Philippine law is concerned, he is not a Filipino.
He lost his citizenship when he declared allegiance to
the United States. Even if he did lose his US citizenship,
that did not restore his being a Filipino because he did
not undergo naturalization or repatriation proceedings.
Neither did his participation in the 1988 elections
restore his Philippine citizenship. At best, he is a
stateless person. He cannot serve as governor when he
owes allegiance to a foreign state. The fact that he was
elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office
and employment only to the citizens of this country.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot
be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application
when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person
seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring
and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
176 SCRA 1 – Law on Public Officers – Election Laws –
Citizenship of a Public Officer – Dual Citizenship – Labo
Doctrine
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of
Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for
quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that
Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he
was naturalized as an Australian after he married an
Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an
Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best
he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that
even if he indeed became an Australian when he
married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost
when his marriage with the Australian was later
declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts
that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of
citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not
frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted
for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second
highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in
the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of
evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as
an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an
Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of
subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance
to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that
he needed an Australian passport to return to the
Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an
immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual
citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost
his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to
Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his
Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To
restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized
or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an
act of Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His
claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome
the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of
Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the
requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously,
would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is
Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside
over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the
Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through
the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be
declared the mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification
because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number
of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy
dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in
the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea
in all republican forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of
the legal votes cast in the election.
_____________________________________________
Case Title: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe- Llamanzares
vs. COMELEC et. al.
Petitioner: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe- Llamanzares
Respondents: COMELEC et. al.
Ponente: Perez, J:
FACTS:
The petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares also known as Grace Poe- Llamanzares
wishes to run as the President of the Republic of the
Philippines. However, petitions were made by Estrella
Elamparo to deny due course or cancel the COC of Poe-
Llamanzares for the reason that the latter is not a
natural-born citizen on the account of the fact that she
is a foundling. In addition, Elamparo stated that Poe-
Llamanzares even assuming that the latter is a natural-
born citizen she has deemed to lost the same when the
she became a naturalized American citizen, according to
Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous
from birth.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?
HELD:
The presumption of a natural-born citizenship of the
foundlings stems from the presumption that their
parents are nationals of the Philippines. Adopting the
legal principles of international laws from 1930 Hague
Convention and the 1961 Convention on stateliness is
rational and reasonable and consistent in the Philippine
Constitution’s regime of Jus saguinis. Moreover, the SC
clearly stated that the COMELEC cannot reverse the
judicial precedent as it was reserved to the court. In line
with this, the Supreme Court ruled that Poe is qualified
to be a candidate for President on May 2016. The court
likewise stated that Poe-Llamanzares, being a foundling
is a natural-born citizen based on 1. Circumstantial
evidence, 2. Legislation and 3. Generally Accepted
principle of other laws.
_____________________________________________
Political Law – Election Laws – Right of Suffrage –
Extension of Voters Registration
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with
other youth movements sought the extension of the
registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The
voters registration has already ended on December 27,
2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be
allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-
Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth
alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were
not able to register and are now disenfranchised.
COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which
provides that no registration shall be conducted 120
days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth
however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act
8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and
stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election
acts including voters registration if the original period is
not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave
abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the
voters registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do
so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA
8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be
conducted within 120 days before the regular election.
The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by
measures like voters registration which is not a mere
statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its
inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for
the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally
important end, that even pre-election activities could
be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a
realistic and orderly manner – one which is not
indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order
of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the
times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s
provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say
that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special
registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if
it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the
other pre-election matters because the additional
voters from the special two day registration will have to
be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to
be inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into
the computerized voter’s list; and then they will have to
reprint the voters information sheet for the update and
distribute it – by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections
would have been overshot because of the lengthy
processes after the special registration. In short, it will
cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the
allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not
sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youth’s pleading was
attached any actual complaint from an individual youth
voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact
that the voters registration has ended on December 27,
2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their
pleading that they are asking an extension because they
failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not
appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not
those who slumber on their rights.
_____________________________________________
Political Law – Election Laws – Absentee Voters Act –
Proclamation of Winners in a National Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer,
questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the
said act on the following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already
considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed
to participate in absentee voting provided he
executes an affidavit stating his intent to return
to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of
the requirement that a voter must be a resident
of the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place where he intends to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding the election;
being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be
exact). If the immigrant does not execute the
affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee
voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It
could not be the intention of Congress to allow
COMELEC to include the proclamation of the
winners in the vice-presidential and presidential
race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power.
The canvassing and proclamation of the
presidential and vice presidential elections is
still lodged in Congress and was in no way
transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA
9189.

2. That the provision allowing the Commission on

Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of
votes and proclamation of winning candidates
for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the
Constitution for it is Congress which is
empowered to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are

correct.

HELD: No.

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee

voters are required to physically reside in the
Philippines within the period required for non-
absentee voters. Further, as understood in
election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident
of his domicile (insofar as election laws is
concerned). The domicile is the place where
one has the intention to return to. Thus, an
immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his
intent to return to the Philippines is considered
a resident of the Philippines for purposes of