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Army

After Next

Sugg.,doQl from the


Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
October 1996
Up4aled 1 Ma, 1997

,."'ft.Vl..'fl.VY Larry Lynn, Director, DARPA


Dr. David A Whelan, Dir~, Tactical Technology Office, DARPA
. Gully, and 0, · .,-,........

Dr. Joe Braddock Col Roy Alcala, USA(R)


Mr. David Heebner Oen John Poa, USA (R)
Dr. Walt Laberge Oeo Paul Gorman, USA (R)
Mr. Chip Pickett Col Mike Harper, USA (R)
.80 Hal Nel8on, USA (R)
Col Mike Shaler, USA (R)
Col Glenn Snodgrass, USA (R)

MO Ray Pranklin, USMC (R)


LtG Jetry Oranrud, USA (R)
OenAl Oray, USMC (R)
Mr. Dave
. -iiardiSOB
Some Suggestions for Army After Next
v A Paper Version of a Hypertext Report
Background. In May 199,6 Larry Lynn directed the Office of Tactical Technology (TIO),
DARPA, to develop some concepts that might be useful to Commander, TRADOC, as his deputy
chief of staff for doctrine moved ahead with the Army After Next Project. John Gully of Land
Systems, TIO, took the lead, and convened an informal study group, listed on the outside front
cover, that met from time to time throughout the summer. DARPA's PMs were participants, as
were a number of experts from industry and academia. When there was a recognizable thesis, it
was presented to the red team, and adjusted accordingly. In October the results were briefed to the
TRADOC principals, and in November to the TRADOC staff.
Study Guidance. We were tasked (a) to "think out of the box," (b) to present tactical concepts
that would exploit foreseeable technologies, and (c) to portray these in a variety of plausible
politico-military scenarios. After some debate, we proposed to Larry Lynn that we bypass (3): the
tough issues of "plausible scenarios," "peer competitors," "locus of conflict," etc., seemed to us
far less important and far less certain than what we could project as strengths of the United States
20 years hence, and what we could reasonably assume. would then be this country's continued role
in the international order.
Report Format. We adopted the "rolling briefing" procedure familiar to Defense Science Board
studies - iterative improvement and augmentation of a set of charts. We calculated, however, that
an important part of our message was our medium and method: we undertook to build the charts in
hypertext, using the venerable, austere graphic program of that name. Our first step was to layout
the study architecture shown on the chart opposite, which we refer to as the "AAN Map." We
defined three broad areas for inquiry and input:
v Planning (what is the problem, and how should TRADOC think about it?)
Required Capabilities (what should be expected of land forces 20 years from now?)
Enabling Technologies (what can science and engineering do to meet such expectations?)
Within each of these three areas, we built "stacks" of charts to which all participants contributed.
Most transactions to add, modify or subtract from charts were by E-mail. The master set of charts
was maintained on a single 3.5 inch disk «1.4MB), and ultimately was presented to TRADOC via
a computer-driven projector, backed by a disk. DARPA, however, insisted upon paper output, of
which this notebook is a descendant.
This version records what we turned in October 1966. There have been few changes since 1996
beyond correcting spelling errors, eliminating duplication, and 'adding hyperlinks.
- r
' .~
, Salient Concepts. There ~re' two ,dominant themes:
,

Go' with the commercial flow [e.g., Stacks 3, 15, 16]


Focus AAN on 'early entry: project a corps-worth of combat power-:,:cmywhere;in the
world within 72 hours [Stack 8] by (1) re-engineering means..for directand"indirect close-
support fires; (2) adopting new classes of lighter and more capable land'veh~cles and
ubiquitous UAVs; (3) devising new information .systems [Stacks 6,17, 26,21,25]; and (4)
fiNiing fast, high-capacity airlift and sealift so that ·Force XXI remains strategically ~levant '
[Stacks 15,16, 19,23].
:. : :ann iI.:g.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~I:
........................................... ........... ....... Problem? '!! ..... :.. :1':::*::::
.... .

. . . . .............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ......... . ..



,

•••
• •

,

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• , ••••••••••••••••• , •••••••••••••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I
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~o: ~~~~~~~~: oJi//<H>~~~t+~?oi:pi~?J):!::(,.ooooo~~;~~~~~~~too


° Hi
:, u.s. Strengths hi»?1 Marketing AAN I»?I Evaluation
•••••••••••••••••••• ', •• t . •••••••••••••••••• , •••••• , • • ••••••••••••••••••••••••
0:0:0

Required Capabilities
3
81 CONCEPT Conceptual Units
1 °1
8 11 13 .. '
Strategic Mobility Tactical Agility
I

! Superior PeFsonnel

01 Overmatch '11~ Logistic Efficiency 141 Medical Surety


~------------~ ~------------~

: "," .....: .
t t ', .. "
Stack: aproblem?a 7/22/97

Why commit land forces?


IXITo deca- the use of violence forpolitica1 purposes
• Why does US need Land • Evidence U.S. determination
• Enhelll1.en allies
Forces (Army, USMC)? IXITo control territory and people
• Forestall or redress aggression
• Why not rely on precision • Destroy or neutralize hostile forces
• Separate combatants
• Conduct humanitarian operations
weapons delivered by air? IXJTo secure bases for air and sea forces
• Can technology make Land IXITo disaimiDate in usins fuepower
Forces more cost-effective? IXITo win conclusively
• Delay. disrupt. or deceive hostile forces
• Enable decisive fires and dominant maneuver
Inl

Force Generation
Saudi Arabia VS. R VN
• Bvery President. as CommaDder-in-Chief, XVIII AIm ca,.
6OOC·lU
bas ordered laDd forces iDto actioD· llWk 375 0.5 llWk
300CRAF

• ReceDt Presidents have beeD demoDstrably ToCDI


more williDg to commit land forces IIHbcuIa'
USler'r:I1
overseas USAF
1950-1989: 10 major deployments USMC

1990-1997: 27 major deployments


Today: 35,000 troops in 70 couatries
+135
HowitlOft ...............
• D.A. Tht lemy le1meaQ, 1950 MLRS ............. 63 Pauio......14
CoIllCl. JM.lemtdp·. Small Ww 1991 ActH.IOI ......... 227 ATACMS l.achre 11 H.wl......1..
:'11 ..I TOW V.b........ .361

The Anxious AUjlust of 1990 Lessons Learned from August '90


Drawiq die "u. LA die Su.·
6 Iraqi beavy divisions witb + 1000 T -72 MBT • Airlift positioned the deten'eDt force - Aug=airli1't
witbin 200 miles of air aDd seaports of • Fast ports are as important as fast ships. Lead bde of 24th
debarkation in Saudi Arabia Division took more than one week to load.
SWTWTPS
1 Inq iDvadol Kuwait
zt 30 ,. I 2 31 .. • Defense by 82d depended on denies througb salt flats
• , • •I I ! , "
6 NCA dirDc:a dtpIoymau 82d "14th Diy
I la II a Lad airbonIe brip _ deploymnat (sabkhas) and TOW-equipped HMMWVs+ Apacbes
II I 14 IS
12 CloI1n 01 lead brip. - 31Dfllllly bill.
1110 II 12 12 I~ IS
• Political show of unity by Arab Coalition coupled with
.
1 company M551 Sb.ricfan Uthllankl. 1
It., nil
, , ••, • • II I Apache baualloa. 1 baualIon 105I11III bowiln"
13 Lead a.ch brip. ddpl flVm SaftlllDb
show of US resolve gave Saddam Hussein pause
1710hIDiYI.. dbrip.~airtifl
11 F!m ~ 10, .lIip 1IIri_ hom DIejo a.m. • Host-nation supporterucia1: Saudis provided ports. airfields,
1.. 12000 IOldien. 3 b. bci. 9 inhnuy ballalionl cantonments. water. and fuel: more than 20 million gallons
01 Sld Diy In IhnIOr+J bill 10111 per dayl
SIll
11 ht ddpl 0I141b Diy urivo In Ihoalor

Desert Storm Desert Storm


• Army shipped 1.1 million tons dry 500 SIIlp a.oadl
9000 A1rcnIt Loadl
• 600/0 total was ammo, mainly arty
Dlllnred +3,000,000 IaCl
• Army returned 1.6 million tons dry Li,~, lm&lIu,
more 'ael ... mciell1
12,400 tracbd nblcl.. ..bidA
• Not clear what was fired at enemy 114,000 wbMled . .bicI..

• USAF delivered 70,000 tons of 31,000 coasalaen


350,000 lam of ammllllil10D
ordnance; 40 tons of fuel per ton
deUvered

u
7111
Stack: QProblem?Q 7/22197

The Current Division The Make-weights


N 17,000 men (N 2000 tons) • Armored and tracked vehicles (65 % )
N 5,000 vehicles (N1500 tracked) - Tanks, IFV
N over 100,000 tons combat loaded - Artillery
N 2,500 tons per day of all classes of - Engineer vehicles
supply, spares, and consumables - Provisions for sutaininSl same
rrJictr ~ ': I!rn(tbnl " hi h . • Fuel and dry cargo lift fleet (-20% )
:Sr:i!iW!~:::d;;:::':~::' ty" .g .
: ~~~~;~if~l.~~:!::me
• Artillery ammo (-50% resupply)
• Fuel (-25% resupply)
Wli 111111

Possible Technology Interventions


..J. Develop rapidly deployable artillery
..J. Lighten the AFV fleet
..J. Reduce manpower In combat theater
• Deliberately align Army with
commercial thrusts

..J DARPA technology can assist


11111

u
1!\$.~W*P~i9~~1
rethe
Army After Next • AAN must be capable of coping with a broad
.range of threats, ranging fi:om.;
u AAN Is Ioe 2016 (20 years hence)
EC acle~:irmmF()rc'fXXl:6ut'::;'i
- conducting large-scale operations on land to
.- PloitS'legson:sf:le'
contest a foreign aggressor
.... ' ., ,::,:":,::::::~:::!~~::::::,:~::::,:::,";:,,,,~,:;.,:;,::;,::'::;;:.;:;:' ".
cemarative~:arfQmabl¢:jm:d:sr DifjCaDj) 'j: more· 1Q.

.~~~?~~~~:1~mi!lm~1i1lli~~J.IH1~!;li:l;i;~~m;:~~;~::,;,;:;;:;~:i\~ ;:;!:; :::,,' - providing aid to domestic civil authority


• AAN must be configured to fight overseas under a
Structural and doctrinal reforms usefu1, but must
be technoloeically attainable and reasonably unified command within a coalition

affordable
113

• AAN must be importaat to the NCA in all phases


of aay crisis
: Deterreiiu,' :: ::: . :: . :~usiaine~ :OperatlOnSOD Land:
: ~~e~aipt.o~:: :Se~tinB t~e ,c~adi~ons
..Ear.y, ~Iltiy:,. .:':: : :~~c~h~~: eng~8e~ents
Permissive :. :: :Transltion :to peace: :
:: . ,:P~r~i~l~ .:: ::......
::: :~~u~~ ~~. ~~~~a(C?y':' .
. .. - ....... .. ,

• AAN: ready for tbe entire spectrum of conflict


]~~~~I1i~~~~:R.~.~~~:::.:: .~i~~.:Co tin.gencies ..
:Pe~~e~~epi~8: »::::::::::'.: 'Majo(Regional :Contingency
: /P:e.~:isis~~e: ::::: <::::::,:: :td~I~'p'(e ,wars::, ..
<:lr.~~cib)e: : .. ... ..:: :qlob~l :~u. .: . : :
31)

u
Stack: U.S. Strengths

Build On U.S. Supremacy in


Information Technologies
u •
2016 in Business Related to ...
Information technologies Commerce will • Computing
• Space and exosphereoutpace DoD in • Geolocating
• Civil aviation capacity. rate of • Communicating
• Transmodal shipmentchange.AAN • Sensing
• Directed energy must follow that • Cryptography
• Bio-phannaco-technology lead, help shape • Multi-source fusion and filtering
• Microelectrical outcomes
Mechanical Systems 2/11
1/8

Space and Exosphere


Civil Aviation
• Commercial global cellular telephony
• Passenger
- High-capacity terrestrial trunks
- Improved commuter service (VTOL?)
- Ubiquitous broad-band wireless cormectivity
- Wide-body long haul
• Cheap-launch capability - High-speed intercontinental service
- Satellites on demand
• Freight
- In-orbit servicing
- Automated. digitally-managed materiel handling
• Crisis area overwatch - Total asset visibility
- Constant-stare • Automated air traffic control
~/8 - Focused-ear

u Transmodal Shipment
• Most trans-oceanic commerce will be
Directed Energy (DE)
• u.s. has lead from SOl
• DEW bv 2002. RF weapnns by 2001
• Panicle beam weapons by 20161
container-borne • Deployable DE weapon system (forward air
• Fast (,..,35kt) container ships are probable defense) now in development
• Iso-containers are congruent with prime • DE appears apt for AAN
needs of land forces: - Highly discriminate:
- Packaged for strategic mobility • Pfe9ision aim
- TransmodaJ (truck-rail-air-sea) • Tuned power
- Inherent shelter from which to work. in which - Useful in MOSA
to live (cover and concealment) - Logistically superior to missiles
Sill 6111

BIO-PHARMACO-TECHNOLOGY Micro-electric Mechanical Systems


• Phannacologlc syntheses (MEMS)
.. '
• Blo-Cabrlcatlon • Silicon-based, chip-level manufacturing
- Designer microbes for organic
• Throw-away entities
processing and conversions
• Enables:
- Synthetic DNA Cor novel structures
- Networks of very small, taskable machines
e.g., optical data storage - Very small turbo-generators. jet engines
• Blo-mlmetJcs - Self-instrumented structures
- Systems that emulate living organisms - Hyper-portable navigational systems
or organic materials - Cooperative RSTA/C31
New annor, comms, power sources
u
7111 -
Stack: Investment Strategy

• Over the past two decades, the Army


1~~Y!~~~~~#~,~!oli~~~'~ril~:~y.;;*#~~##~~~1
has bought impressive new capabilities
v for mounted warfare, powerful, mobile • Total Army fY 97 TOA is 25~ of DoD's $2448
• Army RDA TOA is 14.495 of DoD's 9573.38
combat support, and extensive combat - USAf 39.395: USN 30.995: 000 15.4CJ5
service support - Army R.DA is dowD 6695 from 1985
t orces ave not een comparab y • Of 000 top 20 modernization programs:
- Army bas only 3 (artillery piece, bel0, tuk)
bn roved. MOUT readiness is low.
- Army programs amount to oDly 7.295 of total
• Cultural imperatives and inertia have - USMC 895: USN 37.595; USAf 36.295
OSD 10.395
created strong propensities for more of
• Army's arty piece is 60 tODS: tank is 71 tODS
same. 1110 2110

OSD, Congress have been buying:


IS;~pPQrtif9fQ'NQSJ
* USAF, USN systems will dominate • OOTW,LIC
• Three broad alternatives • Counters to WM 0
• systems for the lnCormatioD War
- (1) Win over OSD/Congress to Anny logic
• focus of the MODSet of war"
- (2) Subvene OSD with CongresslTransitioners
Iffi:~p,~~~¢.c.t~H
- (3) Anny vision - OSD/Congress' priorities • Acquisition reform
• (1) is on the record unproductive • Indusuy participation
(2) is dubious ethics, shortsighted • Joint and combined forces

(3) works: USAF, USN, USMC fonnula lffb:Aqrpn


3110 4110

u UAAN Investment Strategies~ UAAN Investment Strategiesl


- Accept a differentiated force
- Demonstrate that the Army Is serious *Heavy and light units
- "Open mind, 1111 thlnkln2 out of the box" *Modernized and older unit sets
- Work future back vs. present forward
- Priority for early entry forces
- Bold vs. creeping adjustment
- Seek new allies, especially In business - Seek ec;onomles and emclencles:
- Use simulation to create AAN converts * Smaller, fewer headquarters
- Buy "leaner" and "meaner" and "fewer" * Lean combat support
as opposed to "bigger and more" * Drastically reduced In-theater CSS
6110

IJAAN Investment Strategiesl IAAN Investment Strategiesl


- Leverage Investments by other services
- AAN should seek to InDuence subsidized
* USAF, USN lead In missile technologies Industries
for space, air-to-air, alr-to-~round * Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
* Army missiles should spin-off jlround- * Merchant Marine
to-ground, ground-to-alr versions * Intermodal transportation means
- Communications must clone commercial
- AAN should attempt to adapt for its
* Legacy SINCGARS, MSE won't cut It purposes the results from growing R&D
* Business (and AAN) needs bandwidth (governmental and private) In health
* AAN should shape encryption, weight, care and public safety
?nO Power, field Interfaces 8110

u
Stack: Investment Strategy

RAAN Investment Strategies~ IlAAN Investment Strategiesl


u - AAN should seek new acquisition paths,
such as projects Intermixing Army RDA
• To dominate onset of any prospective war
- Avoid arguments re corps Vs. corps
funds with Industrial m&D, and Inviting - Move to "fustest with the mostest"
Industrial partlclpatlon In the setting - Emphasize Army's proven abilities with allies
of the requirements for new systems • To counter asymmetric threats
- AAN should facilitate Involving the - Umit vulnerability by constraining presence
CINCs of the U&S commands In Its - Minimize materiel positioning in-theater
- Echelon-back: extra-theater or off-shore
modernization decisions
• To align ~ith commercial main thrusts
9110 10110

u
j
Stack: Marketing

IM.,~euag ~AANil

v f~lN~~tjM¥~'~~I~~~~Rrn~'~~~:lN~~()~~n • Coovioce tbe Coogress aod tbe American people


tbat AAN is oecessary aod affordable
- CaD overmatch aay Coe Crom peers to
Force XXI is seen as ""modernizing for yesterday' terrorists
- USAF fighters, sensors, munitions} m od erQJze
. - Evolves from Today's Army tUld Force XXI
- USN arsenal ships for - Steward of traditions, esp~t, etbo.
- USMC Sea Dragon tomorrow • Emphasize (1) early arrival, aDd (2) boosted
situatioaal uoderstaodiog to:
'~~Or
"' ~: roZanoif!
"'''''' '~~'~("']j'u6'On
, PP .q :, NAtO , 1I
"GDP - Deter, paralyze, deceive ~destroy foe
"QvelWhelming" =massive personnel. materiel - Destroy by precise Cires ~ close combat
- Protect Corce by (a> precision CSS: (b)
e~~ip~\i.r~:~~ge:J~~~,", ~t" .lo~, ~9st,P~r. Uniq dispersion: aad (c) bigb Ph ,Pt
lJ)

• Propose modernization consistent with


foregoing. E.g.:
- Aim at a 10 ton AFV vice 40 tons
- Stress deployability, versatility
- Minimize CSS, CS elements
• Conduct exercises to show that AAN:
- Can get to any conflict and win
- Can do so with minimal casualties

u
~
Stack: Development

I Distributed Combat Developments) [ Distributed Combat Developments)


v • Collaborate among the Army's brancbes to design Dew
COAc::epts and materid coUabaratiYdy via:
• Form new alliances
- Leading Edge Services (DARPA/DISA comm)
- With the CINes & components
- NOTES-like interactivity, shared data base
- With other services
- Merge C4I with DIS; adopt HLA for C2
- Internet video, voice, data connections - With DARPA
• Ezplait servic:e-to-service liDts and joiDtlOSD agencies - With Industry
- Evaluate early and often - Wlth~n TRADOC, e.g., with training
- Slmulate fin1. to establish requirements with war- developers
fighters • Tum technology Into AAN capabilities
116 216

AAN Should Seek New Acquisition Paths AAN Should Seek New Acquisition Paths
SugesUoo:
Suggestion:
DARPA propose to USD(A), with nADOC conCW'I'eDce, a
cooperative development project (or exploration of tbe DARPA propose to USD(A). with nADOC conCUrTence, a
concepts for rapidly deployable modernized lU1i11ery - cooperative development project for exploration or conceptS
whlll DARPA refen to a "advanced rtre support system ... for hybrid electric/rossil fuel vehicles:

(1) A DARP A-induary-TRADOC analysis or aita'DaUves (1) A DARP A-iaduary-TRADOC analysis of ai1ernatives

(2) A TRADOC spcmsared STOW sim1l1aticm orreuible (2) A TRADOC sponsored STOW simulation orleasibie
.,uem(I) system(s)

(3) A JCS-spcmsared ATD with protatypes willWl S years (3) A JCS-spoasdted ATD with protatypes within S years
3/6 416

u Four DARPA Initiatives


(w/&Zll OK) A Proposed Outline for Analysis
1. Lead in~ in an assessment of commercial
contributions to military mobility: (1) Is tho I)'stDm tDc:bnic:ally reasiblo? What a~ tho rilks
- 1JuercontiJ1enta1 projection of land power or tho dowIopmoct1 What per unit costs seem
aaaiDablo? What CIIduIoIoJ)' wiD drive c:ost7 effectivenoss?
- Ligbter, mere sustainable overland vehides' (1) In maalUriD. COIUnd effectiveness, what InOaI\mSl or mmt wiU
2. Demonstnl1e low-cost indirect rite ·rockets (boost-glide).' be pcrtincat? To what analyses wiD Che S)'~ havo to mpond?
3. Execute tbe SUO program (3) What CONOPS crdol:trino is portinont? Who is tho proponoct?
- Comms/geoloclltion (or restrictive environments' (4) What 11'0 rho lifo-cydeloaistio implication. of rho I)'um?
- Technology for teanlwork: UAVlwide-aperture (5) What arc rho buman racton implication. -includin.
institutional and unit trainin.?
sensors/recoilless, precision individual weapons I (6) Wblt ronus or limulalion mould bo multllrOd for
combatantS a sensor plarlorms"'" devc1opment'1 For tutin. tho 1)'1tCm? For tninin. and rcadinoss?
4. Define simulative methodology and technology needed to
deJineale joint requiremenlS and prototypes ror 2016+ ,

u
Therefore...
• DARPA Study's findings and recommendations
will ultimately be evaluated against politico-
military scenarios with these measures of
effecti veness:
- more affordable than Force XXI
- significantly more capable
- developmental risk acceptable
• Further~ evaluation will weigh extent to which
u AAN meshes with the capabilites of the other
.
111
serVIces
IAAN M

u
Stack: Concept

AAN Intervenes:
u The Army Aner Next will be ready:
t To project a force more powerful than
a present-day corps as the land
Decisively, Early, Jointly

component of a Joint task force


t Within hours of NCA decision
t Anywhere In the world

tAble to nght on arrival and to sustain


Dominant maneuver
Decisive combat support Time
1112 Emclent combat service support 2112

Why commit land forces?


Conditions of Future Crises IBJ To deta" the use oC violence for political purposes
• People will ngure prominently • Evidence U.S. determination
• Enbearten allies
- Urban warfare most probable IXITo control telTitory and people
- Crowded countrysides also likely • Forestall or redress aggression
• Destroy or neutralize hosUle (orces
- Media omnipresent • Separate combatants
• Condua humanitarian operations
• Opposing force can buy lethal weapons IXJTo seclIre bases (or air and sea Corces
- Chemical, biological, even nuclear
IBJTo disa imin lite in using ftrepower
- Accurate, powerful, long-range missiles
• Enemy can nght as a guerrilla, or terrol"lst IXJTo terminate contlict
• Delay. disrupt. or deceive hostile (orces
• Enable decisive f1re5 and dominant maneuver
4112

u "Fustest with the Mostest"


The Advantage of Early Intervention
Heavy Force Deploys Slowly
• Division large and ship/port dependent
• The ability to Intervene early and -100.00 tons (of which men alone -2000 tons)
-Many movers: 15.000+ soldiers. 5000 veh. 1500 tracks
decisively Is the essence of deterrence -6590 weight in AFV. Arty. Engr tracks
- 20'16 Weight in lift Cor fuel. dry cargo
• To suppress a crisis early saves blood and
• Logistic tail no less onerous
treasure - 2.500 tons per day all classes of supply
• Military capablllty broadens diplomacy -S096 resupply: artillery ammo
-2590 resupply: fuel
• Few crises eventuate In war, but all breed • AAN must derive combat power with:
Less weight arid cube
conOid More efficient soldiers. vehicles . and fires
5112

Foree
on
Land

Current Build-up for Counter-offensive


8/12 AAN Build-up for Counter-offensive
u
7112
Stack: Concept
An Earl .Depto ment:Brlgade:: :: :: :: ... :..
COIl",oUed >,y . ~::::.:;
Strike
u Zone
:~
:n:::~e
-: ;::;::Z01le .. .

10 20 :D
f , ,
~----·I~2i ~----.I
9112· . 0r0=40bAnadQDZoi.. :.
. .... .. . ....... .....
' ',. . ... .
', Km·

One Vision: in 20 Years...


• Combat rorces 33% or current manning
IThe Army After Next I
"Depopulale the zone o/vulnerability..... wUllw.ve to be...
• Firepower 100% that of present force
"Silualional understanding. precision fires .....
Strategically mobile
• Teeth-to--talJ ratio (In-theater) > 1.0 Tactically Agile
"'Less vulnerability to assymetnc counters ... " Overmatching
• Logistics lust-In-time vice lust.ln-case
"Total asset visibilily. precision deli\·ery ..... Logis~caUy Emcient
• Maintenance by need vice schedule Medically Assured
"Detect. remove. replace. as coached.....
• Acquisition fueled by engine of commerce Superlatively Manned
11112 "Market driven. like business... " 12112

u
1
Stack: Strategic Mobility

-Fustest with the Mostest"


Strategically Mobile
u • Able very rapidly to insert effective early-
entry for~es directly into a hostile
one division within one day oC decision
one corps witbin tbree days
• SlplfIoud, ,."... penoaeI OD the polllld
- Bc!aeloa flack cn. css
environment. to stabilize the situation. find - Bz1ea1.....U - oa _ . daIa cIIaUi1n1Iioa
and fix enemy forces, and establish control • Limwr. !DOn ~bl. ftllic1a
• Moclendad aniU"7 'or d_ GppOI1
of territory and population. • a..o- OD USAP aDd USN for air auperlorlt,
• Minimum footprint in the objecti ve area. • Bntad _ g n e 10 oo_rdaJ airlift Yia ChiJ
a....... AYiaIlOD PI", {CRAP.)
• Maximum utilization of commercial • P.rwalft ooDtalaerinlioa
means for both deployment and -eo-ralal Iblpplq
-<>peru. .Ither , _ the ... or uho...
sustainment
• MobU. Offabo... B_ (MOB)
1/4

R.ATIONALE A Distinctive Modus Operandi:


• AAN ClUUlot expect otber services to design and
invest in mobility platforms to project AAN • Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service
- Scarce military airlift. priority to own needs
- Constrained· Amphibious" sealift Support (CSS) mainly from outside theater
• Instead. AAN must be confij{ured to exploit fast using Intercontinental civil air & fast ships,
commercial1ift. prepositioning,and sea-basing MOB, and LOTS
- CRAF: PAX a.od freigbt
- Containerize essentials
• CS entails modernized artillery
- Mobile Offsbore Bases (MOB) • CSS entails extensive "containerization"
- Logistics Over tbe Sbore (LOTS) total asset visibility (T AV), and vigorous
• Hence. split-based operations will be normal Interaction with Intermodal shippers.

u
Overmatching
• Being overpowering in battles
and engagements
• Al ways having the Initiative in
the campaign
• Remaining In control
• Successfully protecting the force
• Leveraging Joint capabilities

Operationally Adroit

• Must dominate variable battle space


+ Speed -act faster than enemy can counter -all
systems -all levels-fires , maneuver, info-strikes
+ Space - variety of terrain, geography, enemy
u +
forces -CONUS to FLOT an~ beyond
Timing -unprecedented simultaneity
• Battle Command less encumbered to
enhance flexibility

Overwhelmingly effective, able to ...


• Exploit enemy weakness and counter strengths
• Act on superiority of Joint forces and Ores
- Allow enemy no sanctuaries
- Discriminate, crippling targeting
• Dominate in infonnation warfare
• Limit own vulnerabilities
- Defenses against WMD, TBM, eM
- Logistic tail outside combat zone
- Strong air defense for deployed forces
• Employ denial and deception, control tempo
IAANMapl
~/{
Why Strudure Around Teams?
Technology for Teamwork • Individuals or pailS unlikely to:
- Provide for close-in situational awareness
• Teams are what count, not individuals
- Cope with medical emergencies
• Integral with teams mus~ be technology:
u - for mobility
- for situational understanding
- Operate continuously
• IF tactically agile. unit/team size:
- Seven (-)for 3600 security, fire and
- for sustainability movement
• All combatants operate in or with air - Fourteen (-) for relentless day/night
or ground vehicles operations
_ Optimize for targeting, controlling fires
• All entities are under constant control
• Reduced tactical presence levers ess
• All entitities are sensor platforms 217
1/7

Our aggregate tactical weakness stems largely Relentless Combat


from tbis ... We bave encouraged tbe man to tbink
• AAN will have technology to fight 24 bours per
creatively as a persoD without stimulating him to
day, day in and day out
act and speak at all times as a member of a team.
• Persistent, bigh tempo operations offer clear
Tbe empbasis sbould be kept eternally on tbe main
advantages over potential Coes, particularly wben
point: Ilulr.(sr.st duty IS ·to l.OID blS. force to otbers! I
couoled with iolormation warfare
• Out-mueuver the Coe ill mind, in time, in space
[Team] unity comes to full cooperation between • But three preconditions must obtain:
each man aDd his neighbor. There is no battle - Sufficient teams/crews to assure proper sleep
streAlth withig tbe compuy or reliment except as - Situational understandiag for guaranteed effect
it derives from tbis basic elemegt withig the
on enemy
smallest componept ..•
- CSS sufficient to sustain the pace
8.L.A.ManIIa11, MNI ~ Fl,., 1947
,17 417

Tactical C 4 I Tactically Agile, able to ...


• Engage relentlessly, day or night
• Low power, cellular, spread spectrum: tbousands • Move at will in three dimeasions
of subscribers witb sbort-burst data, plus a subset • Multiply tbe situational understanding alld
with service Cor imagery aDd data streams as well firepower o,f small teams to:
• RedundaDt Ilets, versatile wave forms adaptllble -Assure cohesion and iateroperation
to circumstance; multi-mode radios -Deter. paralyze and deceive tbe enemy
• Portable base stations Cor cells in combat zone, -Deslroy enemy with discriminate fires
capable oC geo-positioning transmitters, and inter- • Recon figure C4 I at will
acting with GPS aDd INS Cor assured 3D locus -Form a network of networks
• Interfaces with legacy aDd long-haul comms - Broad band cODDectivity to every combatant
• Nenrork reconCigurable at wiJI to reflect cbanging -Interact with aviation aDd AFV
tactical relatiollShips
017

Technology for Teamwork


• A 3D terrai.n data base that can be current and
responsive to each combatant. N. B. delinition
requirements vary by orders of magnitude:

• Ezploit Coward-deployed personnel and vebicles


.s sensor platforms, for acoustic arrays,
distributed MTI
• Position redulltaDtly: OPS,INS,LORAN,cellular
• Tract physiological readiness oC ellcb comblltaDt,
automatic reporting of homeostasis
• Embed AAN TES witbin C 41
7n I ,., .11 , .... >4IP I
Logistically Efficient, able to ...
• Manage via full and continuous asset
v visibility
• Resupply on demand
- Air delivery precise to time and place
- Robotic vehicles
- Minimal stockage, personnel in combat zone
• Maintain on need, vice schedule
- Continuous monitoring by MEMS
- Mentored remove/replace forward
- Seaborne, containerized ess units IAAN MaPJ

Changing the In-Theater Teeth-to-Tall Ratio


• Reduce In-Theater ess to the minimum
• Move from "just-in-case" to "just-in-time"
• Leverage industry
-Regional procurement
- Transmodal transportation
- In! ormatics
• Echelon back - take no one into theater who
u can, using moden communications, function
from olltside
• Maintain on-line logistics data, distributed
to all commanders with need-to-know

u
Training
Personnel Policy Implications • Reconfagure current distinaions:
• AAN will be in a SUIte of OODstant readiness, hence: institutionaJ

u - Conscription offers no support Cor AAN


- Reserves can figure in AAN, but only in roles
for which they can maintain requisite readiness
.-----~
Initial
Entry
P-----~

Training
• AAN combat team manning must be bigbly selective
• Present approaches to recruiting and training must be • AAN Il'aining should look like this:
modified to accommodate:

~
:&
- The requirements high proficiency
within each small team
- The new-old mix of equipment within the System
Army overall Tr ..
115

Training Training
Initial Team. & Initial Team &
Entry System
Entry System
Training Training
Training Training
• Requirements for TRADOC in support of AAN: .
- Training developments ahead of AAN fielding for • Army After Next willlnlin on the equipment in each unit
bom individual and collective training • AAN will have broad recourse to TES of all three types
- Embedded training withln on-coming AAN materiel • AAN will train by ream, with commanders and team
- Training enablers (job aids, devices. simulators, leaders mentoring
simulluions- conscrucUve, vitwal.1ive) • AAN will ~ within the context of each unit's METL
- Ef'feaive, pervasive distance learning mechanisms tasks
and technique

AAN: Rigorously Trained, able to ...


• Conduct STOW -like training anywhere for all

u uaits
- Generate quictly required terrain data
- Develop collective stills, rehearse operations
• Use C41 system to capture data for AAR.
feedback to combat developments process
• Support most individual training in units (as
opposed to scbools or trainin2 centers)
- Use orglUlic communications andlor embedded
training
- Bmploy satellite TV and Internet
• Access TRADOC scbools continuously via DISA

u
5~kt\4-
Medically Assured, able to ... Personnel Status Monllor (PSM)
• Monitor continuously physiologic readiness
• DARPA/AMEDD development to date
of each combatant in zones of high hazard • Vital signs sensors+GPS+computer+radio
- Automatic alann, locus/first aidlevac
u - First line of defense against BW attacks
• Currently <5 pounds. in LBE barness, optimized
to warn of tbe onset of bypotbermia
• Tested b)t Rangers in July 96. found useful ror
- Deploy supplemental sensors of NBC weapons command and control: tracked Ran.gers even wben
• Use telemedicine far-forward swimming river. showed NCOs location each man
• Conforms to DSB vision: a cellular. spread
- Mentor WlSkilled first aidl stabilization
spectrum. LPIILPD communication system on
- Remotely-controlled bio-drug infusion every soldier
- Iso-container-housed field hospitals • Insurance against MIA. and against wasting
- Swift, sure evacuation from theater medics trying to reach corpses

Practice in Combat Casualty Care


• PSM enables distributed interactive simulation (DIS)
·Underwrites medical subsystems for aU forms of
simulation -live, virtual, constructive
• Numbers at patieats. type injuries Oow from
simulation
• Vunal patients realistically train medics. doctors
• Contribute to development of military te1emedicine
• Te1emedical data streams - intelligence data streams

I Tclemec!lc1rM I

u
Transmodal Force Projection
Commercial Overseas Shipping Trends
• Time-sensitive, high-value cargo proVldes 1ID.petus
• Newer container ships will double in size
~BTAVud~Om~~ -- .
• New containers of composites foe mength, lightness
- For air (EM transpacen.tfor TAV,inspettion) CONUS
- For sea (protect items from maker to seller) APO
• Broader use of ROIRO in high-payoff trade
- Self-propelled vehicles
_bY,
. ._1
- Aic-cushioned pallets foe containers
• Hyper-speed ships operating between dedicated poets
• Air cargo fleet expanding (wide bodies. comm C- t 7)
• Air freight providers lead the way:
- Robotic loading
- Pervasive T AV. containerization. inspectability
- Integrated, end-to-eod. information-based system
117 217

Total Asset Visibility CONT AINERIZATION


• JIT logistics entail TA V and extensive containerization
• Continuous control over units. people. and materiel - Military now lags commerce
- Transmodal: functions on land, at sea, in the air -Gap will probably widen
- From CONUS origins to overseas employment • Trends dictated by costs:
- Precise information on locus, condition, custodian - On North Atlantic, shipping is 10-15% of costs
- Rapid adjustment of flow, swift replenishment * Average ship now 2500 TEU (20 ft equiv units)
• Sine qua BOBfor: * Newer ships 5-6000 TEU
- Significantly more rapid force projection - Terminal (port) operations are 85-90% of costs
- Efficient SUO (highly aware, agile tactical elements) * Fastest terminals crane-off 150 containers/he
- Adoption of a distributed indirect fire system * New ships outmode current terminals: - 2 days!
- Saapping just-in-case logistics for just-in-time • Hence, strong incentives for:
- Altering drastically the teeth-to-tail ratio - More durable, lighter containers
- High speed unloading methods
317 417

) ) )
The FastShip Initiative Transmodal Shipping Technology
• Commercial ship trends are generally adverse for AAN: • Containers of composites
- LargB' container carriers needing mega-ports - E.g., thin-shell polycaroonate
- Fewer US flag carriers; current status: * Temile strength 9,000,000 psi
Owner Total US Built Age<16 (US Built Age>6(US Built) * Strength compress, flex - 13,000 psi
* Shear modulus 114,000 psi
ContaInerships usa 6 S 0 (0) 0 (0) * Elasticity modulus 340,000 psi
Pvt 76 37 41 (10) 1 (1)
RO/RO usa 3S 8 S (0) 0 (0) - Less tare, better system conformity
Pvt ~ ~ ~m o~ - Usable as shelters; easy to cover, conceal on land
• Means to loadlunload containers 4 to 6 X faster in port
• F a~hipm is U.S. venture to ship high -payoff containers:
- E.g., ALICON airlifted pallets for containers
- In broad-beam hulls with water-jet propulsion
- Graceful interfaces with trucks, rail cars
- All cargo in-hold, ROIR 0 using air-coshion pallets
• Current thrusts aimed at F astShipm, but:
- At speeds above 35 knots on Noeth Atlantic, Pacific
- Appears useable for conventional ships
- Appears to have military potential:
*1 FceXXI HvyTaskForC8 &2~vSqdoa@38kla
- Adaptab.1e for military requirements in austere ports?
517 * Range 10s0miles pel" clay, or 7300+ miles pel' week, aD weathel" 617

Opportunities for AAN Exploitation


• Explore CRAF support for AAN initiatives
- LIFR, Combat Casualty Support, parachute delivery
- Carbon-winged, up-engmed commercial C-17
• Experiment with new air and sea containers to ascertain:
- Relevance for rapid deployment
- Adapability as in-theater shelters
- Capacity for hardening against ballistic, WMD threats
- Applicability for munitions shipping (e.g., LIFR)
• Cooperate with commercial carriers to develop:
- Interoperability of info management, pallets, containers
- Practical, ~INC-exercised contingency plans
• Adapt commercial systems as primary deployment using:
- Airlift, for the AAN C+ 1 division and the C+3 corps
- Sealift, for sustainment and follow-on echelons
717
ISttategic MobililyllAAN Mapl

) ) )
Civil Reserve Airfleet (Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)]
Fodenl PDA" for StaaA)' RoadiDea
• us government pays airlines to modify planes to
eMainlyPAX meet wartime requirements
• AAN ought soon to become active re CRAF:
e Need to coopt freight/express shippers
- The aircraft built over the next decade will be
e Air-to-air refueling useful those flying in 2016
e For freight aircraft, paradrop doors - Unless incentivized. airlines unlikely to buy:
·Clam-shell doors for rapid load/unload
oxygen bottles for crew very Important
·Provisions for parachuting in flight
e Ought to be possible to design for PAX • In-flight refueling kits
Inbound to theater, casualties outbound • Exterior-load hard points
• Wing-loading for passenger aircraft?
114 • Clam-shell doors, rear loading? 214

[Launch-In-Flight RAH-66]
C-17 Commercial Version
• C-17 requirement from top-down OSD intervention • How about launch-from-internalload
- Neither USAF and USA wanted program via tow-to-night, or parachute-to-night,
- AAN will need more than current program provides
• Planed commercial version scraps military features or paraglide-to-FARRP?
- CRAF could subsidize their retention • AAN should vigorously experiment with
- CRAF could subsidize enhancements
• CRAF could equip with polycarbonate composite wing
intercontinental attacks to control land!

<tbs~:dl_
- Lighter. more efficient. hence extended range -25%
- Stronger. less likely to have stress problems
- Could be equipped with MEMS maintrenance aids
• CRAF could provide modem engines
- Further gains in fuel efficiency. speed. and range
314 • Commercial C-17s could become a mainstay of AAN
strategic
IAANMaPJ

) ) )
Si tuational Awareness
Means, mechanisms and procedures for Situational Awareness/Understanding is
providing every member of any team. at NOT
v every echelon, with access to the
information he or she needs, when they • lnIeUigence :- timely information about the enemy and
tile environment is necessary but not sufficient
need it, and can use it
Situational Understanding • Every team having access to all information: function and
practicality mustgovem informatics design
The ability of a team to use si tuati onal
awareness to advantage, to com prehend • A cbarter for uncoordinated action independent of the
information and to act upon it to execute intent of the commander
the intent of the commander.

VIRTUAL MINEFlELDS ("NO


Informatics for Teamwork OPERATION ZONES")
• An operauonaJ CCII1Dqll UIUI8 .,.DmI cI ayltlmllO amID Iuso InIIIn _lidl
emmy military QPCR:icnl waJld be naIy if1llOl1iblo 10 c:onduc:t
- ZCIleII would bo 111'9' ImU8h II) bo operallOnllly uaful (ea., 2I:bt2CK1~
- ZCIleIIwouId bo mowd rrwnd I region rapdly
• Reconf'lgurable C4I based on intemetted networks - um on 11'1 'adnnoe wamill8' ct 'nonobOlJ' bull
of networks with distributed nodes - mcmy aoti91ty would bo deta:ed. III'seud &nd dllabled (not -.anly
~
• Personnel and equipment monitoring - ZCIleII rmy not be mtll'dy ICIlk proof
• Small unit tactical communications • AppbCltlClll 0I11'Ji., 'no opIntJon 'lDf'td
- dapltbI bslllefitid (0.8. c:NnneI enetr¥ fOI'COI)
• Small/micro RPV' s and robots at small unit level - barriert 10 p!'dIIcl fnendly Of allied mitI
- ccnllllmsntof msnynililllyopnticn
• Imbedded training/learning loop - pe:IOII CIlforallilsnt
- cIEmclrIIu.lJOn d owarwhdmna U.S. mhtal)' ~ power
• Integral jamming. cloaking. deception • Oll'ldcplr8lll challCten saCI
• Asset visibility and monitoring - build ctI • fYSUIllI 01 .,.~ (e·8. ~ .. C2. Jlnrnen. VltQponI)
- -~sel' brcDd ranaeollDChncloav dIrIelopnCIll drcttJ
- trollilCl"riOlJ

c
S.J-~ 18
Med Support In 20 years ..•..
• Combat forces 33% of current manning Future Combat Casualty Care
"Conserve the fighting strength..... • Sit Understanding: forestall, locate casualties
• Flrepower 100% that of present threats - PSM component of C'I

u "Realigned casualty prediction models ... ..


• Teeth-to-tall ratio (In-theater> > 1.0
"Hyper-rapid evac to CONUS or haven .....
- Triage from instant of impairment
• Mentor first-care provider
- Bandwidth as important as bandages
• Stabilize far forward
• Health care as needed vice per capita - Tele-treatment. tele-surgery
"Total health accountability, responsiveness ..... • Evacuate rapidly. preferably to secure haven
• Project care forward vice evac to care - Downsize, harden in-theater med
"Combat telemedicine 10 point o/casualty ..." presence
• Acquisition fueled by civil health-care system • Med-holds In CONUS only
1110 "Demand driven. ex/Jloilil11~ advanced tech ... .. 2110
-All convalescence. rehabilitation

FUNCTIONS ARAPAHO-MED:
Reconfiguring AMEDD Field
.;: ~Wln~ dIs_tlllllian
': ...lcboanIlWIOIIIlkla '
CjIIlIIhJInlItI'8I
Inld prep bltllcC1l:ld
p1IphIc:II=.-
Facilities for Operating at Sea
naI-Um.;11dcrudIGn tnlaplll_cntI
mcaswaaoa 1IIaIa1d dqI/oJ'mcntl
" . __ 0l'aldertlq IUta1d dIIInxSIrtsIlcI

LOCUS
Expertise in botb communities resIdes In CONUS

COMM REQUIREMENTS
Global Sonoll ATM OC·J ,,/ multl·level security

SIlO

ARAPAHO-?v1EO =.~
Concept for
v Container-Based
MASH
Stabilization Enroute to CONUS

(Mobile Army surgiCallm~:


Hospital)
Vmi QUI optnlll:' lit Sell
or (/tplo)'
in conlllint!rS
onllln(/

5110 6110

DARPA Medical Technology


Hyper-fast Medical Evacuation
for Combat Casualty Care
• DelJiz Clipper is commercial venture
• Immediate Casualty Awareness
dealing in critical cargo, key persons
• Could evac from any helipad direct to . - Casualty location. triage. treatment
any tertiary care hospital in CONUS • Accelerated Medical Response
• Max flight time > one hour - Remote surgery. life support. imagery
• 120 feet X 60 tons D<:·,)\ ....\ldJolu.:ll DuuglLS & Ho:ill~
• Enhanced Medical Treatment & Training
• a vii Reserve Rocket llll li.1 -.ell,. modd or DdL"l ClIPI""'"...
... llall. 0II,IUlllOlUI<I-.: ..•15 hdr;
- Combat informatics. trauma simulation
Aeet (CRRoF)? 1,10.17W,~
.. Clown 7 11m .... Pffi'oj"'('h: Smllllon
,\I:,<-J. ~s ~lInk r" .. ·r: J~ Ul'" tnCO.'lII ....;
FY94 FY95 FY 96 FY97 FY98 FV99 TotsJ
13.7 54.7 51.0 29.5 17.6 5.6 172.1
'7110 8110

v
Anti-trauma Bio-Engineering Trauma Hibernon
• High-risk phannocologic syntheses
~Ischemia ....
Energy failure .... ~ .... .... Free radical - molecular modeling. cell-level agents
- program -550 million over 5 years
u Ionic imbalance
." " "
" ~
~ '..
formation
- Use Special Agreements Authority
• Drug-induced tolerance to ischemia despite
exsanguination. tissue hypoxia. and acute
~
systemic shock: remote controlled injection
,. • Prevent irreversible cellular injury. restore
Degradation of homeostasis
• protein p'athways • -Cessation of energy consumption
Membrane ............ Activation of intracellular - Block ceO detractors
nerturbations- - - - -proteases, lipases, nucleases - Stimulate natural defenses
'9110 Iu.s. Strengths I 10110

v
I AAN Modular csfi I AAN Modular CS~
No trucks, no tents, no shelters except
ISO containers • Army's ARAPAHO study of the '80s
demonstrated that personnel and vehicle
Train and fight from containers, at sea
cost avoidance will pay for containerizing.
or on-shore
• Concept has strategic reach, plus tactical
survivability in that containers can be
entrenched.

IArapaho-Med I M.O. IAANMaPi

) ) )
Communications Technology for Teamwork
• Reliable connectivity in restrictive environments Communicate what?
• Able [() operate amid bostile SIGINT Ijamming Voice Calls for fire Intel
• Network widely dispersed teams

u - 70 teams. with 7-14 soldiers per team


- 200 km x 200 km area of operations
Sca1eable to larger areas. more teams
Position
Orders
Telemedicine
Maintenance
PSM data
Resupply

• Interoperable with legacy comm systems. e.g. Data, Voice, Video


SlNCGARS in
EPLRS Built-up areas
Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) Conif'erous fotess
• Field-worthy Triple-canopy j\1ogle
Ligbt-weigbt.low-power drain. user friendly Mountaia
·Affordable «$2000)
115

Coping with Enemy Information Warfare DARPA R&D for Tactical Comms
Current Weakness Required Technology
·Re~ctiveen~onments
Reliability in restriaive Diversity. redundancy
environments • Network ...... Range and bandwidth: LPl. LPDAJ
"malch radio 10 tilepillet''' • MUlti-band sets - Combatant tracking for IFF
Robust. adaptive nets • Ground-based relay improvements
Innovative relays - Better range. operationa1life. survivability
Umited COMSEC New LPlILPD Means - Portability and elISe of deployment
• New waveforms -Affordability
"mIIb! tlJe S{tl101 hnrd (.0 • sprePd spectrum • Pro[()cols
lind or re4d" lnaeasedlvariable bandwidth - Adaptive. dynamic connectivity
Directional/nulling antennae - Variable network control
Power control • Integrated navigational capability
Raoge Novel waveforms. variable - Time of arrival
.. flIiIor tile Det /iJr file Deer! bandwidtb.lUUetUlae - Spread spectrum ranging
3J5

Parallel Channelization

u
LOS Block • Reliable connectivity
I' '" '':';'''~''.:.:.''~' (0 · Low power
'" .... V · Variable channels/link margins
',. ". • No feedback or "handsbake"
,.... - simple
,..... - LPI
, '. - robust
2 - scaleable
• • • • • • • • • • 10 bpa Ordan,locuI
- - - 96111. Volal
_ 12I k.... Vl• .,
"
Multi-channel, all digital transceivers

v
Electric Combat Vehicle (ECV) Electric Combat Vehicle

.__ ... r rL.. ·.~Jl • Welght< 10 tons


• Hybrid electric/fossil fuel

u • Fuel use 25% that of BFV


@ 2X radius, 2X speed
cross country
/' • Acoustic/thermal/visual
I
r signature reduction
.1 • Active armor
• Active suspension
• Electric guns, DEW
• Mated to UAV for R8TA
11\2 21\2

• Hybrid electric. crew of 2 TECH for TEAMWORK: SCOUTER


Air Canlry Ropmcal
• Fly-out infantry support wpn H I mated for
• Slaved UAV
• eo liiiilJiii"-
• Can tow arty/mortar container airmobile scouting
Electric Direct Fire System (EDFS) • Vehicles separate
crew: 2 seated
ECV for Military Operations for ground scouting in line

in Built-up Areas -Helo performs RSTA functions


overwatching ATV ~
• Squad of 7 (two teams)
• Hybrid elearic. crew of 2 -ATV is double-ended, RST A rigged,
• Slaved UAV
• Can tow arty/mortar functions of driving, RST A ops shift
container
SquadPod .,12
front-to-rear for "scoot" . -:-:I~"""
'-1

IIM1P
VI2

TECH for TEAMWORK: SCOUTER I'J:'esmC8r for: AJrborn¢:Dlvlsloill


• ATV, an AECV with
-Two component
u vehicle: robot helo
+
a small, RST A UA V
• ATV mouots direct nre \\
ATV • UA V control by Pilot •
-Crew of two: • Assigned driver 0
Pilot/RST A operator. • Team of four for Opes) 0 I:+- : :lo
• TeamCar tows a mortar pod
scout/driver 0
• Soldiers are parachutists;
- ATV is ultra-lite ECV vehicles are' air-dropped
SliM.,

5112
IIIM.p
0112
I.uN 'I.,!

Status of the "Ground Combat Platfonn"


Army approach: Benefits of Common Chassis Approach
• R&D obJective: a common AFV chassis • Some improvement in strategic mobility
• Commonality of components, stucturesl • Acquisition cost for "family" is reduced
Information systems, malntanance, training • Cost of O&S (operation and sustainment) lower
• Not unlike the Armored Family ofVehldes - Less fuel required (hence less fuel trucks)
program of the '80s - Fewer spares overall
• Plan Is to keep current platforms In service - Simplified training
until R&D bears fruit - Fewer personnel overall
• Army prepared to fund required 0&8 • Lower costs in sustairunent base from privatization
• Current proposed designs: SS ton (perhaps) - acquisition refonn. not modernization
• Desideratum: 40 tons, lower If feasible
71\2 8/12

u
There are Alternatives...
ApprOAch A: Work the present system No Choice Provides Easy Answer
• Much lighter. innovative tracked vehicles
u • TRADOC sets requirement in which force
projection/early entry dominates Approach A: Where will the Army get the money?
• Creative arrangements for shared RDA costs
Approach B' Commercial tracks lack the speed and
Approach B: Coopt commercial designs maneuverability Army seeks. and commercial
• Non-traditional suppliers (Deere. Caterpillar) wheels have failed all Army evaluations
• World-wide spares/maintenance support
• Business likely to respond to either
requirements for tracks or for wheels
9112 10112

BUT •••
• Commerce has proved that large numbers of heavy
vehicles. wheels and tracks can be procured. Suggestion
operated. and sustained well below Army
experience
• Testing by Germans supports 2 and 3 man crews An acqulsltlon reform Initiative to Invite
• Conventional design-weight is driven by armor to Industrial participation In the determination of
protect crew. Surely there is a better answer: requirements for AAN combat vehJcles. ..
- In infonnation system design and
automation
- In active as well as passi ve protection
12112
11112 !Development! IAANMapl

u
Technology for Teamwork MEMS Turbo-generators
ellfabrication of refactory ceramics enables shirt-buuon
• Portable sources of energy are essential for sensors, size gas turbines and generators (-.6cc)

u commWlications. and robots (including flying vehicles)


used in support of small. tactical teams
• Lilbium batteries - currently in vogue - are expensive.
e Power densities (HPlunit volume) - full-size engines
(100 wattslcc )
dangerous. heavy, and difficult to dispose of
• There are several promising designs for fuel ceUs that • Costs could be very low in volume
are likely to supplement balteries in the next decade.
• Beyond fuel cells lie very small engines, mia-o-electric • Ilengines enable:
mechanical systems (MEMS). tbat could furnish tbe - On-person elec1l'Onics
antithesis of lithium batteries: very small. light. cbeap. - IlUAV and fly-out weapons
innocuous sources of mecbanical and elearic energy, - "Refuel·able" power cells
1"

. MEMS .Power ~Engine VS. Conventional

~
e Existing MEMS devices typically .um ~ &ug lkJ.g

'
... .
.. '.
'
have.! to 10 components. and
I-50 b"anSislors
Power(kw)
Aitflow(g/sec)
0.02
0.2
0.1
0.6
50
330
500
2500
Illurbines are an order or
1'·-' .'
tgI .
e
magnitude more complex
Specific Fuel Cons
(kg/hrlkw) 0.45 1 0.282 0.282 0.382
.].- .
'1 " ..
.' . ~
e Problem is fabricating parts

. - design unprecedented
Power/Air Flow
(kw/ttL/sec) 84 l40 lSI 200
., .: ", . - innovative rorming techniques PowerlWt
e MIT expects to bave an operating (twits) 20:1 100:1 5:1
~e~ine by year 2000 @ 20 watts
1 H2 fuel
' -~~~~~~T-T-~
, ." . 1fI. 'UI/I' ... GO \GI- .,. ttl -soi 1GIII 2JP-8
3~ ". ':::-,,; : 'Jt:irt-illIIdInIII~

JlTurbo-generator In BA.S590 1 case

u • 7600 watt-hours with


butane fuel

• Typical consumption:
Por1 25 watts for 300 hours

• 2()()G F exhaust without


forced ventilation (dissipaues
in indies)
Cube 4.4"x2.4S"xS"
• Noise above human bearins
I AImy ~lDa Batlay (-112.0CXJ)

u
s~~~

(Mobile Offshore Base~


• Module 300' wide X 500'lon2
U • 6 modules = C-130 airfield; 10, C-17
• l\1NS signed by CMC, CINCSOC,
CINCACOM and USCINCSO (FY95)
• Costl module .(DARPA estimat~): ·$372M
300'

Outboord (sIde) vIew

[Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS)]


• Landing Ship Quay/Causway (LSQ/C)
- Modified Very Large Crude Carrier
- 15 knot speed
- Ballasted to seafloor otT beach to serve
u as stable pier head, recoverable
- Carries up to 10,000 feet of raised
causeway, cranes, pipelines, conveyor
belt for containers IAAN Maij

• Deployed In 72 hours up to seastate,.........;·5~--.


I SinlcEk

u
Exactly where?
• For land warl'are. GPS - unaided - is an unreliable
INS?
and vulnerable mechanism
• GPS is commercially available to friend and foe:in searching Inertial Navigation Systems can be coupled with GPS

v for a combat edge. land forces need better means for x.y.7.
• GPS is weakest where land forces need it the most: in built-up
but INS sets bave been big. expensive. power-eaterS
inappropriate for small teams. Situation is getting better:
areas. mountains, jungles; with a small. dismounted team;
for Penonnel Status Monitors. J.m .l.22§. ~
• GPS is susceptible to jamming. A 100 wan jammer can deny Weight (Jbs) 47.3 18.0 7.0
signal to commercial setS out to 100 km Volume (inl) 1418 480 100
• Improved GPS is possible: e.g .. more accurate cJocks. beaer Power{wSltS) 141 40 25
antennae, and integration with alternative position-rtXillg MTBF (hI's) 3500 6000 8000
mechanisms such as inertial nav systems. or radio signal Cost ($k) 100 70 15
.r,oeessing. These deserve high place in AAN priorities
:lIS

Synergy via Redundant PLR

JIl

u
CHANDELIER
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
• Small aerial vehicles for RST A ought
overhead
,
• UA V vb1ually-tethored to ECV ,

u to be integral to every tactical team


• Command and control must reside in team
• PoWllred bymlcro-turblues
• Radlo relay. DGPS
• C'Comtant stan" sensar(s) and
I
I
I
• UAV for AAN should be largely robotic. "report cbangt" aJsorithm ,
that is. able to take and keep station with
minimal human intervention from the team
• AAN should actively seek new UA V designs
optimized for small unit operations
lIS 215 area of awanuen

A Spberical UA V
• Geodesic (made of light, stmight sttuclwal elcmeats), beachball-slze
sphere that moves freely in x.y,z - optimized for hover aboyo
small units • Geodesic MEMS-Jet UA V
• At each intcmcc:tion on surface. a MEMS-jct is mounted • SAR, Thermal, MTI (or nth sensor)
normal to surface of sphotc: thrust is metered to position UA V • RadIo relay. DGPSllNS
• Cooperative wbb [CV
• At CCIlter of spbcre is fuel lank and proccssor(s).
SCDSOrs and comms

• Activated set of linear surface clements forms


'IS reflective dish fOJ' RF relay, setlSOa

A "Hummingbird" UA V for MOUT


u

.......
~ Sciaa4Pod 2CV
.
Even In tho Gult...the InteWgenee system eonsls1eatlycame up
Modernized Artillery sbort. AU of cbe range. precision and lethality chat a flrepomr
system brings to tho baulonold eaJUloC be tully uploltod unless the
eyes ortho l)'Stom can Isolate the most lueratlw targets within a
• Long range nres from USAF, USN, sea- largel array. thcn pinpoint lhose larsets wlthla a spate smallor than
based MRLS and ATCMS the IdIllag radius of a weapon. and dolJwr the weapon before tbe

u • Close, responsive Ores from autonomous,


distributed, un-manned Ore units
larget moves or soes to ground.
To lbe Infantryman seeking to kill the enemy. the source of
ordnauee uplodlng 10 his !'ronc is 1rre1eWD1. Be must receive lhe
most olToetlve munition whon und where ho needs II. He musl bo
• Calls-for-Ore optimized for optimum Gble co mix ftrepcmer f'rom Illl soureos and apply aU ftres In
responsiveness sensor IObserver-to-target conem."
In a smllll·seale WIU' or Intorventlon, tempo and speed will dletale
• Cost elTectiveness driven by target-worth that Ughl. highly mobile Infanlry forces mab up tbc majority ~ tho
and tactical urgency as well as Ph and Pk force •..In wars ~ Intervention on the higher end or the seale.
ftnpower must be used lavishly to wID quickly at minimum cost".
The survival or the ground forco will be most dependonl on a
1M M.O. p~w aerial umbnUa... R.1LbM,F..,btl.brrtlldW... 19N

Army Research Laboratory Modernized Artillery


Integrated Soldier Engagement
System Concept
• individual soldier beeomes a node fa • distribaceclfaten&etlw weapon
_sen.
LIPR:
-2 l60ama
15-35 km raqe
I)'Item
• IndlYidaJ soldier Is eqalpped with lire direction l)'Stem eo.. nda: S3t-SU
CoaapcmeataJ
FIre dfredlon IUdt: RDSOrl1lh, & eomputer Caaialen @ PBDBX
Comaaamcaaioa. network wfIJa two naIa
Lcnr__ IIlcBreo1 PI,.
Weapon tor pel'llOllal clef'MIt
Roabu (LIPR)
• Weapon l)'Wteaal cUstribated aroalld battleDeld fa WHpou pods
cltll_. by,.,.,oO .
SudlUllOlloaaogs 10pnol.. locadoaa
Networked wi&lda CoGIrOlled Zo~
Romotelf om placed:
airdrop. robod-. e8J'I'D projecdles, IlPt whldes
• Ownrdainl C4lnetwork
~1I5

Modernized Artillery Containerized Artillery


Light-weight

u
AD AAN"aneaaJ dd,:" I!acb MLRS rippl..
• fu1 oo-.dal 12 rocMU < 1 m1GU1e. Hybrid-Power
CIOGIalDer dd,. willa 1000 bomW.u GO Prime Mover Rocket-powered
6 .... I_ben.
_ _IIIOG .apply.
30 ~ 60 acna a& RIll"
a& laD", up 10 32 bD.
....
~-.
ISSmm projo
'",
aoel ...bld.. for Or, 1_ ATMS m1aJ..
Galbo,. openLIoaa. ....'bD.
6xS Container 5 tons
on rraiJer
III blab-board ..... Slans
MLRS cao ~ oa- .~~~~; Deployable
loaclt. OGIO LeU Wings
Of olber amaU anh

51'5
200lbs

altitude-wav---"
/ point variable Target Containerized Artillery
Flight-Path Payload wi • Flight vehicle design-la-cost $20k
avoids ale 10m RSTA • Uses OFE-155 cargo rounds @ 100X effectiveness

~
PH100Xgun • 30 rei container - batterylS: 2-n rei containers feasible
• Each rocket is independently targeted
Range • Projectile is gas-launched. vertically boosted to 1-3 km

::::::/35_50 kID altirude. glides thru flight to target. then dives


• Velocity 200m/sec. or 2 minutes to fly 24 kin
• Accuracy on target@ 10 meters (OPS+INS)
• Prime mover is bybrid electric vehicle; fuel efficiency
200-30096 belle!' than current vehicles

!ltttL Containerized Artillery


• System air-droppable. deployable in C-130. CH-47. V-22
• Container electric powered. kevlar protected
• liX»iX» rGUDds In ~
7115 8/1' !Developmcn~ ~
Containerized Artillery

~~»-CTt
DARPA has independently evolved a concept for a
" deployable firepower system"
• Small, lightweight, low profile


• High accuracy
• Air droppable
Dismounted MLRS Mu1liple 12OmmMCX'tars
• Major manpower savings
• Remote-colUrOl openu:ion

-
... ,
DmJ
• Capable against multiple target classes t
,
• Production cost comparable to other weapons
• Responsive fires out co - 20 kin
.....
Vertical-launch Mini-missile Vertical-launch Smart Bus
lUll
'OilS fCX' 155mm lU1i1Jery rounds

Containerized Artillery Containerized Artillery


DARPA 'I DrpIo)Q~ Fu.po_~ DARPA'I /JrtpIo)O» F/nIpo_ ~

MLRS Mort.,. M1d-mIllU. WIIIIII SImIn Bus Mjnj-minUe COQCCPl

l
40+~ -lO~ 2'+km 4O+km

-lSOm -100 CD OPS OPS


• Venical-launcb via gas bag
(OP8_)
• -20 km range
DPICM uaiwy uaituy aD 1"1IIm proj
mm. STRlX STRIX BAT
SADARM • Total weigbt < -so kg
96 l·l" 1-6
%3'x5'rt' 6'lr4'x5' • Time of fligbt - 1 minl20 km

"'~q -5~q
I
"'" 12/1'

Containerized ArtiJIery Containerized Artillery


DARPA', DItW~»FiNpollW~ DARPA'llNph~»FirrpD""'~

u M----I-......,;," ! ~ ~\
Smart Bus fer ISS m.m Conamt
·• Verticallauncb (gas bag)
100 lb. warhead , 40. Ion Smart Bus fer ISS mm Costs
Missile Motor SSt
1

range, GPS accuracy
-Unitary. DPICM. 1 ISS projo· $1-5K
SADARM. BAT 48' GPS (w/INS) $It ($ISk)

I
- Max use of existing Missile shell, air bag ~
components $12k($26t)
• Total weigbt<200 kg
• Tune of flight-l min120 Ion

'Sill 1411'

Containerized Artillery
DARPA', ~»F/nIpo_~

"'"

u
TEAM-MEMBER, 2016
Fire & Forget Fly-out Weapon
A Weapoaized Miao-UAV
Escape to ~ -fall

u Plastic tube
launched
~
trajectorY.
Flies level to x,y.(z+lm)
Accelerates to > Mach 1

Discbarges either (I) fieshettes or T~


(2) pepper-Co Launcher establishes
x ,y,z; seeker fIXes shape

110 21.0

R.elational, Forearm Conformal Display


Voice ud ToucIJ ActiYllted
-----------R~~--------- ~7 ,. ,.
,. ,.
..

Situatioaal
Understandiag

Team as Sonic Array ACOUSTIC TECHNOLOGY


Broader lmpliclUions?
HoSlile snipei'\.

u shoots at :) l·· .

1\:::::·····
• PUltl!er dcvolopmcm d acoustic tcchnolOllY and s)lcea would provi~ aew
military oppDltUnitics la wellJlOR' and reconnaissance. E.e.:
- Rccanaaislancc: .C11S0IS
-
T8/ic:clre: UAV in'COWIe1 bla01)' mode
5mad weapons: Anti armcrfanti vehicle
-

. New weapon rypos: anrl-M1iccpe1lmad munitions


-
Batldleldclccopion: noise make!! replicillre weapw fire
-
-
T8Cllcallurpme: sllencea on all wellJlOR'
\ l
• Pqress has already beta ma~ In some systems (0.&., UGS, BA1). Broad
• Cracklthump detected by all application of acoustics could have the (cilawI" impact:
• Automatically sent to comm relay - snscat pctentlal odvelSarics wilh more complexity OIl batleficld
• Relay integrateS, computes azimuth and range - complicate adYolSlII)"s war ptamina and assumploas.
• Displays relatioaal data on forearm leader ( I) - p-ovlde opportunities (or major lurprlse (Lo.. odvolSarie3 may DOl
o
Comm relay • Leader can elect broadcast to aU
immcdu.el)' undelSland how thelr rOtCeS are be1na . .Iced. and tins _
.Iaw CO COUIUr).
~ 1AA.~ "",

u
Technology for Teamwork
Trained & Learning
AAN must aggressively pursue R&D into
• Trained to a high readiness baseline the social and behavioral sciences. and press
• Capable of learning, from that baseline, to forward wi~h training technologies,
rapidly adjust to the envirorunent
• Conduct STOW rehearsals in any location, Recruit
for all combatants, with embedded systems .Classify . Initial
-Select Eo&ry
• TES and AAR capabilities embedded in Training Unit
C41 • Team and
• TRADOC capabilities distributed directly
to operational area
I
--- I ...
System
TraiDiDg

141

Technology for Teamwork


Technology for Teamwork
Initial
Improved Recruiting Systems Entry
Implicit in the AAN concept is fewer, more capable TraiDiDg Unit
soldiers. Hence reauiting. cJasiitying. and se1ecUng Teamaad
l ....
these becomes a high pay-off undertaking. AAN must:
- System
• Meet requirements for technically sophisticated
members of small teams
• Match each soldier's abilities LO his/her job
L -- Training

• Diverse unit eqUipment. in varying stages of moderniUlIion


• Retain apt soldiers and develop them into leaders -lET (institutional training) provides baseline socialization
To do so, AAN must be able to: and core skills
• Measure aptitude with ceruUnty • Unit~. within we context of small team, conveys
-Psychomotor and spatial tests requisite skills and knowledge for proficiency in combat
- Assessments of temperament and interests • TRADOC's role: &raining development, certification,
• AccUtaIeJy predict performance as a team-member dOClrinal and materiel moderDizauon
4'21

Technology for Teamwork Technology for Teamwork


Initial Fou/Jd4red uptJIl elU!8siJlf!
Carefully designed units
.. [)ePe/OpmeJ11
u Eauy
Trainiog

1 ..-
Unit
nI7lJ.IlJJ18
Team and
System
• Organizational design must be proofed in a series of
inc:reasinBly demanding simulations (constructive. virtual
and live)
- E.g., recent experiments in small team design at
.....
I _. Training IDA pointed up need for disciplined understanding
.
• Team training restS on two principles:
of task distribution. sensor managemetU, data flow .
buman interfaces with informllIion systems
- Training can and will be delivered "just in time" - The effort can both advance behavioral understanding
- Training progresses daily, before and during combat and facilitate incorporation ot new insights
·1RADOC must assure availability tor team rrai.Jling of: • AAN unit desigp wiU require extraordinary efforts by Anny
- Enablers (job aids. devices. simulators. simulations) Researcb Institdte (ARI). Walter Reed Army Institute of
- Embedded training in aU combat systems Research (WRAIR). AMC's Soldier Support Command. and
- Robust distance learning systems TRADOC
5121
6121

Simulation in Support of Combat Simulation in Support of Combat


and Training Development and Training Development

ConllruclIV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' ...'a!*lhllCIII


~.!:!.ana jill 1If~_"'c."".W'Ij~
ConIIrucIlY.
Slmutcrlana
(Tc.... I!<.....

YIr1ua1 ,....&-...L.-..L-&...L...I~ "-~;Ibne~


Slmutcr'ana ~ ........-r-..,.........-'T" tallilld-4IYNET,C:CTT.adBUtSI
IIJIII--a

------- ~~.-....~
a.o"""~~---
- - -....•• Llvo
8Imutcrlomi
Sano-=-_~
OI9*';_DI>AP,\ suo ~

- tJI#OtINSIIft_"...,-.
7121 8121
UtUlty of models and simulations The Army Aner Next Individual and small
to address tactlcal echelons unit computer/radio
Vlrt.,.1 LI..
81mu~Uon 81mulatlon

u •• o
o ••
oon
eq.,.d

•• ••
TeMI
InclvlWIl
•• ••
• 000cI1t 0 o.c"•...-.. L-

10121

Prototype approaches to date The vlrtual prototype

I!

I
~&r.
'W;IC: ~ _$;..po_-
_ _ _U..;.po_UIdI
_____S;..pOUIIdt_~--
0If·1iIWIr _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.....;:IO;.;;.:;.powodI=;...

11111 1241

The virtual prototype The functionality gap (It's significant!)


vn.aa _dIoalcibe 4oIq_

u
• VMs row !11k 19e6 ecmpononlJ 10 (Jaf~DaIa
etrUIlt 2016 eJpalMllY. w~. and ~]
SlZt.
• C.n be 'lacUc&tt' cmoIOye¢ • ProvIcing. oapabIlhy • Provlc:lt oapaIIIllylo
- In a 'IIrill)' Of Itt'lJtn to ILIbmlt .lSencIa"d man. multi pl. re~".
- ";lInSlal\a~yo'2D'Olrr"l lire requelS wlh • dlgllDl IImullDneoualy [lnUaaecl ccmllal
fore ..
- In coreunellon WII IIl!pptq)la11
.ntry ..... , . . 811.,., POWor!
"ttllPl'oOM"J • Provldl m.... to opUmla
AmyA/l.,NeXl eOll"08I S\IIIPOII
Iy51I1ftS
InelvlGWll'lmlll unll
- Oy'>alle!yOf~ICIIaIt-IIW1.
Int.maDzallon of remot. . .naor.
subjocIlTlln., expo"'.
Ckct1IcIn ,Inaeased COll'CaI POW«l
matcn.tI' • Provtdlt m.an. to optlmlD
• CII\ be "8lq)lcrecf several tines a IneivIcIUIlllmlll unit
we. we after week Int.m.Datlon of remote II,. .
• IndIvQlSf CO'IlC81Bnl'S ccrnpuIeri IItICI'taHCI cC1ft611 PGIW«I
radio software can De mOdIfIed aI • Provldl m• .,. Cor .nJtanoed
lhafty IIItock ..Uo• •r/lnullI unit
ooorcInatlonl~ ccmc.t~J
1)41 t4ll1

Other knowledge gaps & uncertainties Another dimension of virtual prototyplng


Tbe Ivrtq AIW Nat S&ra"IIa IhnIroamIca
• How do we balanc&'optlmlzo tho utility of 8 smatl
computerhadlo to moot the needs ot:
- Th. Inelvldual aa an INDIVIDUAL
- Th.lnclvIcMll 01 DMEMBER OF A SMALL UNIT
- Th. InelWMII . . . LEADER OF A SMALl. UNIT
- How do we optimize the utility of 8 digital map
for the Individual and lmall unit I_der?
• And beyond tho IncO'JIdual cOlf1)utorlnsdo: CorNIa1
- :';,.rWt!~•• Imll TTP Cor the .mploym.n, of. nre and Type I!urchle Terrain Tllre.. OUppClf1 'requtllGy
Uvt 81ngle lora CollventlOll8l 1 per~e ..
- How do we aubatenUwly re~oe lhe Inello1dual soIeI."1 81rl'lllltlon type Iypte
combat loud?
Vlrtuat Multiple Multiple
- ... and on end on. 81lft1t.don Iype. typn
ClrCll201. 1 pe"w.1I

1541 16121
AAN virtual concept exploratlon
Another dimension of virtual prototyplng
/ItnIJy AtIM NAt DauheIA Urbao Twnla

.
.~ :~(~.I,·:"~...:/.::I:~ ~ ~~~:.:~ ~~:~) ~i}'
. ...,...-. .....
~&naI1
Eltmonl Patal
"." ~

- I
.1)_
'_lIntI
r-

~~~~W1!P - AlmyMCltNed
9.IrT~.EQU~

1'91 t-
. .' ...... D too

... ~. ....

.«-
T_n !IJvcIcn.
~ SlIt 000-txli:1X\ CClmpollOlO tncll.b ...
..r-
NOUT sc. v..,_.u. cn.-Ift -...., ...
Io-

iU"~

=,=".::' ~
~

~
=""'DbQ
~
_OR"*,

A/I7- ...
IJ_... too
too

_
~
.
_
....,~1011

11121 18121

CONCEPT EXPLORATION
.~~
Problem: Force XXI~Heavy Force
• ...... l _
·Sqt.oL_
.A. ·r-leDn
• If objective is to leam from Force XXI in developing
v ',cn.lcow-e AAN, imperative to apply digitizabon to light forces.
• AaI'9ft
'5I*-.tf«HI experiment with netWorking and comms minus Abrams.
Bradley AFV.

Aft« ActIon • Dismounted Banlespace Banle Labonttory(DBBL)


Rwlew
(3~ hours) relatively primitive compared witb Mounted Banlespace
Batde Lab

19121

A suggested approach
D8JJl. "",,'-ZX1.lWlPMDA . . . . .MN

u
.DAllPA_IIIIIO..-(IUO,

-- ----
• DARPA . . . . ,., ......... lrI'O'fIl

---" ---.
~ nw
~ ... ~Ma7 ....... ""
,..Q ""
0-"",-"
.. .ua,WllAIII "'-fIaIIJ
--.
• .,....,htQIr

- - ""-_. --
(}. a
__
~
..... "'-"'-
c..
...
a_ ...........
~-
.... ....
_
ao_

.._- ~
'0
or..-.
loQoL"
(DIU,
00...........,
_XIIIIb_

.
•. . . -. . c~
•111Il00" W_ _ rw.MI,
.ftIDClOICI11tAIIOOI_
---
trpo .. a _
XIIIrD". .
ato'll7

LIt~ _ _ _ IILIIIII

21121
The DARPA SUO Progl'am Extremely High MlssionlBattle and
Engagement Expectations
Visu,UZlclon ~ A banleneld 20 yean In tho
future thlll is different from
any tbat h~ evcr existed
• A synerglstlc system; the
DARPA SUO utlBty or any onc component Is
Program a function or Ihe utllily of all
other components
• Hishly human dependent; tho
most complex c:omponent on
the baulefteld
DARPA 500
PIosr-
Ioe----- :W·30 )'011'1------.4

A Balanced and Judiciously Executed


No One Has Succeeded So Far Modeling and Simulation Program Can
Maximize System Utility And Minimize Risk
• Foree XXI (Oct 96)
- Sitwation Awareness • Facilitate early and continuous common understandlns
works; but not orten of objective s)'Stcm expectations by dowloper and user
- Electronic owrl a15 do not • Eaable detaUed \isuaUzadon of ceebDJcaJ ecatribudons
work to circa lOO6·2016 baltleneld
• Rand (Sep 96) • Support e~ora1ion oI'tec:hrdc:alapproaches wllhln
.----'--"'1.. _ Even multi·tiered RSTA their s)'5te~c coateXl
cannot acquire all targots • Enable simultaneous consideration fA the en~neerln&
- Even witb best RSTA case, enppmem, and misslonJbattle atpeets or the system
advanecd (remoce fins) do
not provide comprehensiw II'S the but trU4M for lno",,;nl ""hI" JOU lU't
lethality at ranp goi", and ""hal 10 "peel "'hen lOU ,., thy.

illustrative SUO Modeling and Simulation Initial Case: Every SoldJer an FO

u Application CDSB Concept Exploration)

• ISSUE:
- Whalls the optimal mix and appUeation fA
teebnologtos to optlndze a small team's employment
or remote ftres to destroy tbe enemy? [NOT nhat Is
the best way to submit tbe existlns request for ltre!)
• SIMULATION::
- VIrtual Coaeopt Exploration Fcc:Wcy
- Men.ln-the-loop: USMC lIeut.nlUtts and Army
c:aptalns
- Environment: 2016

Flndlng 1: Multiple Redundant Intra-team Finding 2: Multiple Redundant Intra-


Engagements battalion Engagements
______~ GO
~_ _ _- - -....1m
._----
G)
Finding 3: Considerable Time Was Wasted Finding 4: Engagement or Subsequent
Adjusting Fires Targets Was Slow (Sequenttal)

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Technical Requirement 1: Develop means to


Finding 5: The Incorporation Of A Mellos- reduce multiple engagements of same target
type Device Enhances Precision,
ICON IMPOSIDONTAR·
But The Combination Is OET WHEN IT IS
INTIRROOARO
Ungainly

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Technical Requirement 2: Develop means to


racllJtate management of multiple requests Technical Requirement 3: Integrate PDAI
Mellos Functions Into Single Device
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Ccmceplual S~m

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How This Insight Was Gained


Possible SUO Implications of DSB Findings
• The by to opdm1zlng at. amploymtnl or remOlt ftm
by smaD units may bo th, tochnologlcal onhancemont
or l'mon ,I,ments ralher IhlU'l ,ach Individual
c:ombalant
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• Inc:reamsg the numbor or requestors Increases the


potential ror simultaneous engaBDmonts of the slUTIe
IlII'gelllDd meaDS must be rOWld to minimize Ihis.
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I nunerslng the I ndlvldual Combatant


Creating the Circa 2006-20.16 Battleneld Afoot Into The Circa 2006-2016 Battlefield

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The AAR: Gaining Common Insight At The AAR: Gaining Common Insight At
The Operational Level The Senior Level
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USERS _ III _ DEVELOPERS _ OTH ER


• lndIqclaal_broatImti • SIbJec:t Maltw EqarU • Rtd r_ coatroDa- USlRS-. '" - DEVELOPERS - OTHER
• 1\mc:donIII_..,.saI1m • S~CIII Gl~ .MN~..a.. • PM. SUO • RAMD
• R.aoc._-a-dIer • ~aUoolII-'" • Sal Dntp1~I1111... • SUO JlRl!eclIIl....., • SUO SiIII~1IIiaa
• R-oc.llreanrdlw ment qIOIialilcl • lndI\ccl&1_balllllll • SUO 00I1D"DCC0n MaIa..-
• Btha\tcnl PJddGllst • Other DARPA
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It's a Collective Processlll


SUO Modeling and Simulation Issues

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AIR CAV ALRY REGIMENT
• Mission: cover deployment of AAN
• Regimental C3 fron1 long-dwell aircraft
• 3 squadrons of three troops each
- Each squadron has F ARRP
- Double manning throughout
• Troop has 4 RAH-66 Comanche, 4 Scouter
vehicles, 1 utility hel" copter
• Strengths (~) Troop 40, Squadron 140,
'Regiment 500-

RAH-66
u Comanche
• Light attack helicopter, IOC 2010
I'ttI

• 20 times more survivable


• 5 times better RST A, Pk , OR rate
Sit Map

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AIRBORNE INFANTRY BRIGADE


• Mission: establish and protect APOD
• Brigade C3 from long-dwell aircraft
• 4 battalions of four companies each
- Each company has 8 TeamCars
- Double manning throughout
- One utility helo per company
• Teams normally assigned Immediate fire
LIFR units; battalion others as GS
• Strength: company 96, battalion 400,
brl~ade 1600 I SII Map I IIntantryAN! IAAN Map!

-0
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MECHANIZED INFANTRY BRIGADE


• Mission: control urban areas
V • Brigade C3 from long-dwell aircraft
• 4 battalions of four companies each
- Per Co, 6 SquadPo~ 2 EDFS ·
- Double manning throughout
• Cos normally' assigned Immediate fire
LIFR·unlts; battalion others as GS
• Strength: company 96, battalion 400,
brigade 1600
1/2

U AIRMOBILE INFANTRY BRIGADE


• Mission: control urban areas
• Brigade C3 from long-dwell aircraft
• 4 battalions of four companies each
• Cos normally' assigned Immediate fire
LIFR units; batta lion others as GS
• Strength: company 70, battalion 210 ;
2 Utility Helo Cos@ 120; Squadron EDFS
@ 120; brigade ~ 1100

2/2 Sit Map I.uN Mapl

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