Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. v.

NLRC
Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. (BIMCAI) is the union representing the ee’s of
Private Respondent: Concrete Aggregates, Inc.

Facts:
6 Apr 1992 The union picketed several (6) premises of their employer(Bagumbayan and Longos in
Q.C.; Angono and Antipolo in Rizal; San Fernando,Pampanga; and San Pedro Laguna.)
a. The union was protesting : ULP and Union Busting.

8 Apr: Employer FILED: Injunction to stop the illegal strike with the NLRC, alleging among others:
a. The April 6 strike was a Wild-cat strike, in that there was no notice of strike, it did not
comply with the cooling off period, and there was a pending mediation proceeding scheduled on 10
Apr.
b. That during the strike the union impeded the ingress and egress to the premises by setting up
makeshifts, tents, banners, streamers, and other man-made obstructions.
c. That the union had (and still is) doing other illegal acts such as threats,intimidation, and
coercions against persons with lawful business with the employer.

13 Apr NLRC heard the petition ex parte, for failure of the union to appear,NLRC issued a TRO
a. Apparently the union was not notified of the petition, the company misrepresented its address
b. Neither did the union get a copy of the TRO, it only learned of it when it was posted on 15
Apr in the premises of the company

24 Apr the Union in turn FILED: Injunction, to enjoin the company from asking the aid of police and
military to escort scabs (Case really said scabs, but it should probably have been people and vehicles)
from entering the establishment.
The case was heard on April 24 and 30, May 4 and 5, 1992 by respondent Labor Arbiter Enrilo
Peñalosa.

30 Apr the employer filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of Preliminary Injunction alleging: that
the union was still committing illegal acts complained of despite the TRO.
4 Mar : Union was notified of the motion.
a. Next day (5 Mar) the union opposed the motion on the ground that they were never furnished
a copy of the petition for injunction.

5 May: NLRC(Same day that union opposed, just one day after the union was notified): issued the
disputed order, GRANTED Employer’s Preliminary Injunction against the union, based on testimonies,
that:
a. Despite TRO, strike continued
b. By forming a human blockade, the union prevented vehicles from entering the premises
c. By force and intimidation prevented the non striking employees from going to work
d.“Wala kaming pakielem sa TRO ninyo…Bubugbugin namin kayo pagkayo nagpilit”
e. Ramon Bana, Union President: “sisimentuhin naming ang gates ng Concrete Aggregate na kahit ipis
as hindi makakpasok”

Union filed the instant petition for certiorari

Issue:
W/N the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction against the union was proper?
NO. It violated their right to strike, and it did not comply with the LC’s requirements for the issuance
of an injunction.
Held:
1.Phil. History of the right to Strike
a. Justice Puno’s opening statement at the start of the case: The restoration of the right to strike
is the most valuable gain of labor after the EDSA revolution. It is the employee’s sole weapon. In
recognition of its importance, our Consti has accorded this right a distinct status while our laws have
assured that its rightful exercise will not be negated by the issuance of unnecessary injunctions.
b. Industrial Peace Act: congress have statutory recognition to the right to strike.
c. Martial Law: prohibited the right to strike for 14 years
d.1987 Consti: treated labor with a favored eye. For the first time in our history the consti
mandated: Par.2, §9, Art XIII to guarantee the rights of all workers to self-org, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
e. Labor Code, implementing law of the consti provision, provided §218(e)giving specific
requisites for issuance of injunctions. (see LC for full provision)

2. NLRC’s Preliminary injunction was improper. Non-compliance with Art218(3) subpar 4 and 5
a. Affidavits used by the company in proving the continued strike despite the TRO was
controverted by the affiants themselves upon presentation to the labor arbiter.
b. No less than the company’s operations manager, Mr. Mercado, further testified that after the
issuance of the TRO, the barricades were removed.
c. Mr. Mercado and Atty. Jolo(personnel manager) also testified that public authorities charged
to protect the company’s properties were neither unwilling nor unable to furnish adequate protection.
As a matter of fact, police assistance was never requested.

The factual circumstances proven by the evidence show that there was no concurrence of the five (5)
prerequisites mandated by Art. 218 (e) of the Labor Code. Thus there is no justification for the issuance
of the questioned Order of preliminary injunction.

3.Records reveal continuing misuse of unfair strategies by the company to secure the ex-parte TRO.
a. The union was never furnished a copy of the petition for injunction
b. They were denied the right to attend the 13Apr hearing where the TRO was issued

4.Issuance of ex-parte TRO is not per se prohibited BUT it must be clearly justified by considerations
of extreme necessity.
a. Because imprudently issues TRO’s can break the back of employees engaged in a legal strike.
b. The deleterious effects of such a TRO on the rights of striking employees can no longer be
repaired for they defy simple monetization.
c. As such it behooves officers receiving evidence to support ex-parte evidence to take a more
active stance seeing to it that the right to social justice is in no way violated.

5.Nor does the court find baseless the allegation by the union that NLRC had neglected to resolves their
injunction.
a. The company’s prayer for ex-parte TRO was heard and granted on the same day.
b. The company’s petition for preliminary injunction was filed April 30 and was granted less
than a week after May5.
c. On the other hand, the union’s petition has not yet been heard nor decided.
d. The disparate treatment is inexplicable considering the subject matters of their petition are of
similar importance to the parties and to the public.
WHEREFORE GRANTED: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (against striking workers)ANNULED &
SET ASIDE
Further: NLRC is ordered to hear and resolve with deliberate speed union’s petition for injunction filed
on 30 April 1992

Note:
Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. — The Commission shall have the power and authority:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful
acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or
performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any
decision in favor of such party: Provided, That no temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except after hearing
the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a
complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of
fact by the commission, to the effect:

(1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be
continued unless restrained but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account
of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except against the person or persons, association or
organization making the threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or
ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;

(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainants property will follow;

(3) That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by
the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;

(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and

(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainants property are
unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.

Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such manner as the
Commission shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief
Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful have been
threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant's property: