CONSPIRACY

i
"The crime of conspiracy" remarks Russell, "affords support for any who
advance the proposition that criminal law is an instrument of government." 1
The o p p o r t u n i t y , which the vagueness of this crime can offer, to
governmental oppression has been recognized by an independent judiciary
conscious of the need to preserve the liberty of the subject. As Fitzgerald, J.,
said, "The law of conspiracy is a branch of our jurisprudence to be narrowly
watched, to be zealously regarded and never to be pressed beyond its true
limits." 2 The abuse, of the law of criminal conspiracy in the hands of
Government creates a genuine fear in all minds. Prof. Sayre writes, "A
doctrine so vague in its outlines and uncertain in its fundamental nature as
criminal conspiracy lends no strength or glory to the law; it is a veritable
quicksand of shifting opinion and ill-considered thought." 3 He further
emphasizes that, "it would seem, therefore of transcendent importance that
judges and legal scholars should go to the heart of this matter, and with eyes
resolutely fixed upon justice, should reach some common and definite
understanding of the true nature and precise limits of the elusive law of
criminal conspiracy."4
The*above remarks may also apply with equal emphasis to the law of
criminal conspiracy in India. There is close affinity between the Indian and
the English law of Criminal conspiracy.
As the crimes are on the rise, the law relating to conspiracy has been
revalued and expanded in recent years. 5

II

Conspiracy in common law started its career primarily as a civil injury 6 but

1. Russell on Crimes, vol. 1 (11th Ed.) p. 213.

2. Irish State Trials (1867) quoted in Russell, id. at 216.
3. Sayre: 'Criminal Conspiracy', 35 Harv. L.R. p. 393.
4. Id. at 394.
5. The cases of assassinations of Indira Gandhi, General Vaidya and Rajiv Gandhi had,
in some form or other, element of conspiracy.
6. 28 Edw. 1. C. 10.
CONSPIRACY 165

was later punishable o n an indictment. 7 In its earliest meaning conspiracy

was the agreement of persons w h o combined to carry o n legal proceedings
in a vexations or improper way. 8 The Star C h a m b e r gave it a m o r e concrete
form 9 and the agreement was indictable as a substantive offence even w h e n
n o act was d o n e in pursuance of it. H o w e v e r , the gradual evolution of the
l a w of c o n s p i r a c y , its w i d e n e d scope a n d g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n can be
discerned in close association with the law of principal and accessory. 10 T h e
Star C h a m b e r gave it a m o r e concrete f o r m and such an a g r e e m e n t was
made a substantive offence even w h e n no act was done in pursuance of it. 11
In English law, "if t w o or more persons agree together t o do something
contrary t o law, o r wrongful and harmful towards another person, or t o use
unlawful means in the carrying out of an object not otherwise unlawful, the
persons w h o so agree c o m m i t the crime of conspiracy." 1 2 N o overt act in
pursuance of the conspiracy is necessary, the illegal combination itself being
t h e gist of t h e offence. T h e overt acts w h i c h m a y follow t h e c o n s p i r a c y
form, of themselves, n o part of the conspiracy. 1 3
In Mulcahy v. R.14 the H o u s e of Lords stated, " A conspiracy consists
n o t merely in the intention of t w o or m o r e but in the agreement of t w o or
m o r e t o d o an unlawful act b y unlawful means. So long as such a design
rests in intention only it is only indictable. W h e n t w o agree t o carry it into
effect, t h e v e r y p l o t is an act in itself and t h e act of each of the parties
p r o m i s e against p r o m i s e actus contra actum capable of being enforced if
lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for the use of criminal means."
After the judgment of the H o u s e of Lords in the case of Mulcahy v. 7? 15 , the

7. 33 Edw. 1, C. 2.
8. Stephen, History of Criminal Law, vol. II (1883) p. 227.
9. In Polluter's case (1611) 9 Co. Rep. 55, the criminal aspect of conspiracy was
developed by the Star Chamber. This case forms the source of modern law on
conspiracy.
10. Supra note 1 at 214.
11. Supra note 9.
12. Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd Ed.) vol. 10. p. 310-11. In R. v. Parnell, (1881) 14
Cox. C.C., at p. 513 Fitzgerald, J, stated, "Conspiracy has been aptly described as
divisible under three heads: where the end to be attained is in itself a crime, where
the object is lawful but the means to be resorted to are unlawful, and where the
object is to do injury to a third party or to a class, though if the wrong were effected
by a single individual it would be a wrong but not a crime."
13. (1953) 2 All ER 1067 (1071).
14. (1868) LR 3 HL 306. The House of Lords in Mogul S.S. Co. v. Mcgregor (1892) AC 25
further explained that, an agreement which is immoral or against public policy or in
restraint of trade, or otherwise of such a character that the courts will not enforce it,
is not necessarily a conspiracy. An agreement, to be a conspiracy, must be to do that
which is contrary to or forbidden by law, as to violate a legal right or make use of
unlawful methods, such as fraud or violence, or to do what is criminal.
15. (1868) LR3 HL 306.
166 ESSAYS OF INDIAN PENAL CODE

IPC was amended in 1870 as to insert S. 120-A IPC. Chapter V-A has been
introduced in the code by the Criminal Law Amendment Act (8 of 1913).
The object of the amendment was to prevent the commission of crime by
nipping them in the bud. 16 Apart from conspiracy, there are two more
categories of inchoate offences in common law; attempt and abetment.
However, conspiracy is one of the most complicated laws. 17 The law of
conspiracy, actually, may seem somewhat arbitrary. 18 Glanville Williams
writes:19
If the mere intention of one person to commit a crime is not
criminal, why should the agreement of two people to do it make
it criminal? The only possible reply is that the law (or, if you
prefer, the Establishment) is fearful of numbers, and that the act
of agreeing to offend is regarded as such a decisive step as to
justify its own criminal sanction.
The term conspiracy will include all combinations involving violation of
the private rights which, if done by a single, person would give a civil
though not a criminal remedy against the wrong-doer. 20 However, the
common law of conspiracy has not been altogether uniform. 21 But so far as
the law of present day is concerned the House of Lords has declared (a) that
the gist of conspiracy is the agreement, whether or not the object is attained
(b) that the purpose of making such agreements punishable is to prevent the
commission of the substantive offence before it has even reached the stage
of attempt and (c) that it is all part and parcel of the preservation of the
Queen's peace within the realm.22

16.State ofA.P. v. Cheemalapati Caneswara Rao, AIR1963 SC 1850; (1963) 1 Cri L J 671.
17.PSA Piflai's Criminal Law (9th ed. 2000) p.268.
18.Ibid
19.Glanville Williams, Text book of Criminal Law (2nd ed. First Indian Reprint, 1999) p.
420.
20. Supra note 12 at 505.
21. In R. v. Turner, 13 East, 228 it was held that an indictment will not lie for a
conspiracy to commit a mere civil trespass. But an opposite view was taken in R. v.
Rowlands, 170 B. 671. (See also Quinn v. Leatham,l901 A.C. 495; Mulcahy v. R. 3 H.L.
306; Kromme v. R,. 17 Cox C.C. 492). But the view in Turner's case was re-established
in Mogul S.S. Co. v. Mc gregor 33 Q.B.D. 591. However, Sir Wright held an opinion
that the result of the case law on the subject reveals as a general rule, that a
combination to injure a private person is not criminal unless the means to be
employed are criminal in other words conspiracy as such is not punishable unless it
is conspiracy to commit a crime (Wright, 'Law of Criminal Conspiracies and Agreement')
Harris: Criminal Law (20th ED.) p. 49; See also R. v. Newland, (1953) 37 Cr. App. R.
1541.
22. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (Ed. Turner 17th Ed.) p. 89; See also Board of Trade v.
Owen (1957) 2 WLR 351 at 357.
CONSPIRACY 167

III

Originally the Indian Penal Code made conspiracy punishable only in two
forms viz., conspiracy by way of abetment and conspiracy involved in certain
offences.23 In the former case an act or illegal omission must take place in
pursuance of conspiracy in order to be punishable. The latter is a conspiracy
by implication and the proof of membership is enough to establish the
charge of conspiracy. In abetment, under second clause of S. 107, an act or
illegal omission must take place in pursuance of the conspiracy and a mere
agreement is not enough. 24 The punishment for conspiracy is the same as if
the conspirator had abetted the offence.25 The offences created by Ss. 109
and 120A are quite distinct and where offences are committed by several
persons in pursuance of a conspiracy it is usual to charge with those
offences as well as conspiracy to commit those offences.
However, in 1870 the law of conspiracy was widened by adding, S.121-
A to the Indian Penal Code. 26
A conspiracy to commit an offence under S. 121 Indian Penal Code or
to overawe the government by means of criminal force or the show of
criminal force is punishable. But to constitute a conspiracy in such a case it
is not necessary that any act or illegal omission should have taken place. 27
So far, the law of conspiracy in India required the doing of an overt act
in order to be punishable, except in respect of the offences particularized in
S.121-A Indian Penal Code. However, in 1913 Indian Criminal Law
Amendment Act 28 was passed as an emergent piece of legislation which
gave an extended effect to the law of conspiracy in India, by adding Ch. V-
A (Ss. 120A & 120B Indian Penal Code) to the Penal Code. The necessity to
widen the scope of the law of conspiracy has been explained in the
statement of objects and reasons thus:

23. A person is said to abet the doing of a thing by conspiracy if he engages with one or
more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act
or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the
doing of that thing (S.107, IPC).
24. Pramatha Nath v. Saroj Ranjan, AIR 1962 SC 876.
25. Alimjan Bibi, (1937) 1 Cal 484. Quoted in Ratanlal Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code,
(30th ed. 2004) Wadhwa & Company.
26. Inserted by Act XXVII of 1870; S.4.
27. Sulaiman, CJ in Fhabwala v. Emperor, 1933 A.LJ.799, observed: - In law, the King
never dies; it is enough for the prosecution to prove that there was a conspiracy to
deprive the King Emperor of the Sovereignty of British India. Having regard to S.3
(23) of the General Clauses Act, it is not necessary to prove that the conspirators
were conspiring for such deprivation to take place within the life time of the King
Emperor. Criminal Conspiracy is complete as soon as two or more persons agree to
do or cause to be done an illegal act, or an act which is not illegal by illegal means.
28. Act VIII of 1913.
168 ESSAYS OF INDIAN PENAL CODE

Experience has shown that dangerous conspiracies are entered

into in India, which have for their object aims other than the
commission of the offences specified in S.121-A of the I.P.C.
and that the existing law is inadequate to deal with modern
conditions. The present Bill is designed to assimilate the
provisions of the Indian Penal Code to those of the English Law
with the additional safeguard that, in the case of a conspiracy
other than a conspiracy to commit an offence, some overt act is
necessary to bring the conspiracy within the purview of the
criminal law. The Bill makes criminal conspiracy a substantive
offence...
Thus criminal conspiracy after 1913 has been dealt with in the Penal
Code in the following forms:
(a) where overt act is necessary; and
(b) where overt act is not necessary and an agreement per se is made
punishable.
The former will include cases (i) where two or more persons agree to do
or cause to be done and illegal 29 act excluding the commission of an
offence,30 (ii) where an act which is not illegal is done by illegal means; 31
and (iii) conspiracy by way of abetment. 32
In the latter instance agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a
criminal conspiracy,33 (without proof of any overt act).
Under sub-sections 120-A & 120-B, the IPC encompasses the law of
conspiracy to cover the following:
(i) conspiracy as a substantive offence (chapter V-A : S. 120A & 120B);
(ii) conspiracy as a form of abetment (chapter V : S. 107);
(iii) conspiracy to wage, attempt to or abet war against the Government
of India (chapter V I : S. 121-A);
(iv) involvement in specific offences, as for example assembling for the
purposes of committing dacoity. (chapter - XVII •. Ss. 400-401)
Section 120-A defines criminal conspiracy and S. 120-B provides the
punishment for it. Ss. 120-A & 120-B apply only where there is a conspiracy
between t w o or more persons, i.e., an agreement or meeting of the
minds between them to do an act. The definition of criminal conspiracy in
S. 120-A has been taken from Lord Brampton who defined conspiracy in a

29. The word 'illegal' is applicable to every thing which is an offence or which is
prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action; (S.43 IPC).
30. S. 120-A IPC.
31. Ibid
32. SeeS.107IPC.
33. Proviso to S. 120-A IPC.
CONSPIRACY 169

case in the year 1901. 34 Lord Brampton in Quinn v. Leatham35 defined

conspiracy by holding that, "if two or more persons agree together to do
something contrary to law or wrongful or harmful towards another person
or to use unlawful means in the carrying out of an object not otherwise
unlawful, the persons who so agree commit the crime of conspiracy."All
conspiracies are not, however, criminal conspiracies. 3 6 A criminal
conspiracy as defined in the section is itself a substantive offence. 37 In
Lennart v. Director ofEnforcement the Supreme Court observed:38"
The first of the offence defined in S. 120-A, penal code, which is
itself punishable as a substantive offence is the very agreement
between t w o or more persons to do or cause to be done an
illegal act or a legal act by illegal means subject, however, to the
proviso that where the agreement is not an agreement to commit
an offence the agreement does not amount to a conspiracy
unless it is followed up by an overt act done by one or more
persons in pursuance of such an agreement. There must be a
meeting of the minds in the doing of an illegal act or the doing
of a legal act by illegal means. If in the furtherance of the
conspiracy certain persons are induced to do an unlawful act
without the knowledge of the conspiracy or the plot, they cannot
be held to be conspirators though they may be guilty of an
offence pertaining to the specific unlawful act. The offence of
conspiracy is complete when two or more conspirators have
agreed or cause to be done an act which is itself an offence, in
which case no overt act need be established.

IV

As stated above the inclusion of Chapter V-A in the Penal Code was
designed to assimilate the provisions of English law. However, in the words
of a learned commentator, "The Statement of objects and Reasons appears
in this respect to be inaccurate, since it goes beyond merely assimilating the
criminal law of India so that in force in England."39 Before the enactment
of Ss. 120A & 120B IPC, conspiracy was treated as an abetment. Now it has
been defined separately but major conspiracies shall still continue to be

34. (1901) AC 495.

35. Ibid
36. W.W. Chkaley & V.B. Bakhale, AIR commentaries, The Indian Penal Code 1 (1980) p.
700.
37. AIR 1977 SC 2433 (2436): 1978 Cri LJ 189.
38. AIR 1970 SC 549 : (554, 555): 1970 Cri LJ 707.
iS3L.Id. at 554-555.
39. Gour, The Penal Law (6th Ed.) vol. 1, p.508.
170 ESSAYS OF INDIAN PENAL CODE

punished as abetments. 40 Conspiracy can be considered as volatile entity. It

can be initiated by two or more persons. Subsequently, some more can join
it and similarly some can go out of it. So it is not necessary that a conspiracy
would retain a final character from the beginning to the end. 41 A person
joining the conspiracy need not concert with all, it is enough if he concerts
with one or two. It is not the commission of the offence but just an
agreement which is punishable. In criminal conspiracy as defined* in S. 120A
IPC four ingredients are required: (i) an agreement between persons (ii) to
do an illegal act (iii) to do a legal act by illegal means and (iv) overt act done
in pursuance of conspiracy. In English Law only first three ingredients are
required while under S. 120-A IPC, overt act in furtherance of conspiracy is
also required if the act to be done or cause to be done is not illegal (proviso
to S. 120-A IPC). In Indian Law, a distinction is drawn between an
agreement to commit an offence and an agreement of which either the
object or the methods employed are illegal but do not constitute an offence.
In the case of former, the criminal conspiracy is completed by the act of
agreement, in the case of the latter, there must be some act done by one or
more of the parties to the agreement to effect the object thereof that is
there must be an overt act. In English law the agreement itself is treated as
overt act and no separate overt act is necessary unless the rule is limited by
statute. In Mohd. Khalid v. State ofW.B.41 and DavenderPal Singh v. State of
NCT of Delhi42, the Supreme Court after referring to the American and the
English legal position on the law of conspiracy summarized the broad
essential elements of conspiracy thus: 43a
(a) an object to be accompanied;
(b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object;
(c) an agreement or understanding between two or more accused
persons whereby, they become definitely committed to corporate
for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the
agreement, or by any effectual means; and
(d) in the jurisdiction where the statute requires, an overt act.
The court further held that the Indian law broadly conforms to the
English legal position on the law of criminal conspiracy. Thus the provisions
of Ss. 120 A & 120B IPC have brought the law of conspiracy in India in
tune with the English law by making the overt act unessential when the
conspiracy is to commit any punishable offence. The provisions, in such a
situation do not require that each and every person who is party to the

40. Y.P. Singh, "what is conspiracy" 1997 Cri LJ 93.

41. Ibid.
42. (2002) 7 SCC 334.
43. (2002) 5 SCC 234.
43a. Id. at 265-266.
CONSPIRACY 171

conspiracy must do some overt act towards the fulfillment of the object of
conspiracy the essential ingredients being an agreement between the
conspirators to commit the crime and if these essentials and requirements
are established, the act would fall within the trapping of the provisions
contained in S. 120B.
The use of the word "illegal" in the definition of criminal conspiracy in
S.120-A IPC is extremely comprehensive and would make even a case of
civil trespass indictable, as a criminal conspiracy.44 In State ofMaharashtra v.
Somnath Thapa45 Supreme Court explained the ingredients of conspiracy and
observed: 453
[T]o establish a charge of conspiracy, knowledge about
indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is
necessary. In some cases intent of unlawful use being made of
the goods or services in question may be inferred from the
knowledge itself... Finally when the ultimate offence consists of
a chain of actions, it would not be necessary for the prosecution
to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of
the conspirators had to know of what the collaborator would do,
so long as it is known that the collaborator would put the goods
or services to an unlawful use.
Thus, even knowledge of an illegal act is enough to hold one guilty of
conspiracy. But as per the Ss. 120A and 120B it is the intent by two or more
which is necessary to constitute conspiracy. The law relating to conspiracy
aims at punishing guilty intentions because no overt act is required for the
same. However, it can be inferred that mem rea is not a necessary ingredient
of the charge of conspiracy to commit an offence.

44. (i) See Note of Dissent by Pt. M.M. Malviya, to the Indian Criminal Law
Amendment Bill. (Quoted in Roy, Law Relating to Press and Sedition, pp. 48-50)
(ii) The result of this sweeping enactment is to make a mere breach of contract by
two or more person punishable as a crime. If, for instance a husband and wife
agree to sell their house and then think better of it and refuse to convey they
would be punishable under S. 120-B of the Penal Code though the civil court
may not have enforced a specific performance of the contract. The exception
of English law that wife and husband are treated as one person, is not acceeded
to in this chapter (Gour, supra note 39 at 508). This adds to the absurdity of
Indian Law on conspiracy which is not found in the English law.
(iii) Huda is of the opinion that, "It is not the policy of law to create offences that
cannot ordinarily be proved. There probably would have been no danger and
inconvenience if the law in India were left exactly where it was before the
passing of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1913". (T.L.L. p. 107.).
45. 1996 Cri LJ 2448 : AIR 1996 SC 1744.
45a. Id. at 1749
172 ESSAYS OF INDIAN PENAL CODE

The Supreme Court in State v. Nalini*6 (Rajiv Gandhi Assasination case),

dealt at length the law of conspiracy, reviewed case law and culled out
several principles governing conspiracy. On the night of 21-5-1991 Rajiv
Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India was assassinated by a human
bomb. This incident was a result of conspiracy. Wadhwa, J laid down
following broad principles governing the law of conspiracy:46*
(1) Under S. 120 -A IPC offence of criminal conspiracy is
committed when two or more persons agree to do or cause to be
done an illegal act or legal act by'illegal means. When it is a legal
act by illegal means overt act is necessary. Offence of criminal
conspiracy is an exception to the general law where intent alone
does not constitute a crime. It is intention to commit crime and
joining hands with persons having the same intention. Not only
the intention but there has to be agreement to carry out the
object of the intention, which is an offence... It would not be
enough for the offence of conspiracy when some of the accused
merely entertained a wish, howsoever horrendous it may be, that
offence be committed.
(2) Acts subsequent to the achieving of the object of conspiracy
may tend to prove that a particular accused was party to the
conspiracy. Once the object of conspiracy has been achieved,
any subsequent act, which may be unlawful, would not make the
accused a part of the conspiracy like giving shelter to an
absconder.
(3) Conspiracy is hatched in private or in secrecy. It is rarely
possible to establish a conspiracy by direct evidence. Usually,
both the existence of the conspiracy and its objects have to be
inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused.
(4) Conspirators may, for example be enrolled in a chain - A
enrolling B, B enrolling C, and so on; and all will be members of
a single conspiracy if they so intend and agree, even though each
member knows only the person who enrolled him and the
person whom he enrolls. There may be a kind of umbrella-
spoke enrolment, where the single person at the center does the
enrolling and all the other members are unknown to each other,

46. (1999)5 SCC 253. See also Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State ofMaharashtra, AIR
1965 SC 682; NoorMohd YusufMomin v. State of Maharashtra, (1970)1 SCC 696;
Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi v. State ofMaharashtra,(19S0) 2 SCC 465; Ajay Aggarwal
v. Union of India (1993) 3 SCC 609; R v. Ardalan (1972) 1 WLR 463; Bhagwandas
Keshwani v. State ofRajasthan, (1974) 4 SCC 611; Moijullah v. State ofRajasthan (2004)
2 SCC 90; State ofH.P. v. Jailal, (1999) 7 SCC 280; Sanjeev Kumar v. State ofH.P., AIR
1999 SC 782.
46a. State v. Nalini, id. at 515-518, para 583.
though they know that there are to be other members. These are
theories and in practice it may be difficult to tell which
conspiracy in a particular case falls into which category. It may,
however even overlap. But then there has to be present mutual
interest. Persons may be members of single conspiracy even
though each is ignorant of the identity of many others who may
have diverse roles to play. It is not a part of the crime of
conspiracy that all the conspirators need to agree to play the
same or an active role.
(5) When t w o or more persons agree to commit a crime of
conspiracy, then regardless of making or considering any plans
for its commission, and despite the fact that no step is taken by
any such person to carry out their common purpose, a crime is
committed by each and every one who joins in the agreement.
There has thus to be two conspirators and there may be more
than that. To prove the charge of conspiracy, it is not necessary
that intended crime was committed or not. If committed it may
further help prosecution to prove the charge of conspiracy.
(6) It is not necessary that all conspirators should agree to the
common purpose at the same time. They may join with other
conspirators at any time before the consummation of the
intended objective, and all are equally responsible. What part
each conspirator is to play may not be known to everyone or the
fact as to when a conspirator joined the conspiracy and when he
left.
(7) A charge of conspiracy may prejudice the accused because it
forces them into a joint trial and the court may consider the
entire mass of evidence against every accused. Prosecution has to
produce evidence not only to show that each of the accused has
knowledge of the object of conspiracy but also of the agreement.
In the charge of conspiracy the court has to guard itself against
the danger of unfairness against the accused. Introduction of
evidence against some may result in the conviction of all, which
is to be avoided. By means of evidence in conspiracy, which is
otherwise inadmissible in the trial of any other substantive
offence, prosecution tries to implicate the accused not only in
the conspiracy itself but also in the substantive crime of the
alleged conspirators. There is always difficulty in tracing the
precise contribution of each member of the conspiracy but then
there has to be cogent and convincing evidence against each one
of the accused charged with the offence of conspiracy...
(8) It is the unlawful agreement and not its-accomplishment,
which is the gist or essence of the crime of conspiracy. Offence
174 ESSAYS OF INDIAN PENAL CODE

of criminal conspiracy is complete even though there is no

agreement as to the means by which the purpose is to be
accomplished. It is the unlawful agreement which is the
gravemen of the crime of conspiracy. The unlawful agreement
which amounts to a conspiracy need not be formal or express,
but may be inherent in and inferred from the circumstances,
especially declarations, acts and conduct of the conspirators. The
agreement need not be entered into by all the parties to it at the
same time, but may be reached by successive actions evidencing
their joining of the conspiracy.
(9) It has been said that a criminal conspiracy is a partnership in
crime, and there is in each conspiracy a joint or mutual agency
for the prosecution of a common plan. Thus, if two or more
persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them
pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of
each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This
means that everything said, written or done by any of the
conspirators in execution or in furtherance of the common
purpose is deemed to have been said, done or written by each of
them. And this joint responsibility extends not only to what is
done by any of the conspirators pursuant to the original
agreement but also to collateral acts incidental to and growing
out of the original purpose. A conspirator is not responsible,
however, for acts done by a co-conspirator after termination of
the conspiracy. The joinder of a conspiracy by a new member
does not create a new conspiracy nor does it change the status of
the other conspirators, and the mere fact that conspirators
individually or in groups perform different tasks to a common
end does not split up a conspiracy into several different
conspiracies.
(10) A man may join a conspiracy by word or by deed. However,
criminal responsibility for a conspiracy requires more than a
merely passive attitude towards an existing conspiracy. One who
commits an overt act with knowledge of the conspiracy is guilty.
And one who tacitly consents to the object of a conspiracy and
goes along with other conspirators, actually standing by while the
others put the conspiracy into effect, is guilty though he intends
to take no active part in the crime.
The essence of criminal conspiracy embodied in S. 120A is the unlawful
combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when the combination is
framed. For an offence punishable under S. 120B, the prosecution need not
necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do or cause to be
done an illegal act; the agreement may be proved by necessary implication.
CONSPIRACY 175

The offence of criminal conspiracy has its foundation in an agreement to

commit an offence. A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two
or more but in the agreement of two or more. So long as a design rests in
intention only, it is not indictable.
It is an established rule of the law of conspiracy that there should be at
least t w o p e r s o n s . O n e person alone cannot conspire. 4 7 However,
anomalous results follow from certain cases where either one of the
conspiring parties is incapable of committing the crime or is immune or has
been p a r d o n e d . 4 8 In such cases the desirability of punishing a mere
conspiracy not followed by an overt act may be examined. A person may be
indicted alone for conspiring with persons who are u n k n o w n , dead,
uncaught, incapable of committing the crime or immune or have been
pardoned. 49 The rule does not apply unless one is acquitted. 50
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1977 (English), Section 5(8)
provides that unless the conviction of one of the two conspirators become
inconsistent on acquittal of other, even one of the two conspirators can be
convicted prior to this Act of 1977. The Court held in Faguna Kanta Nath v.
State of Assam51 that a single person could not be convicted if all but one,
have been acquitted or mere in exempted category. In Tapandas v. State of
Bombay52, the Supreme Court held that it is a principle of common sense that
one person alone can never be held guilty of criminal conspiracy for the
simple reason that one cannot conspire with oneself. The Court further laid
down that in Haradhan Chakrabarty v. Union oflndia5^, that "two or more
persons must be parties to such an agreement and one person alone can
never be held guilty of criminal conspiracy..." It also appears reasonable to
hold that these two persons must be natural persons so that there could be
an agreement between two or more minds. Similarly, it appears that there
cannot be any offence of conspiracy if two companies with the self- same

47. Japan Das v.State ofOrissa, AIR 1956 SC 33.

48. It has been held in English law that the personal immunity of one in respect of a
prosecution for crime is a defence to a charge against the other for conspiring with
the former to commit it. See Duguid 75 LJKB 470; Sharp.(1936) 1 All ER 48.
In Bimbadhar Pradhan v. State ofOrissa, AIR 1956 SC 469, one person was convicted
of conspiracy while the other enjoyed immunity on his turning approver though he
was privy to the conspiracy.
49. Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, (2nd ed. 1983) p.420 to 438.
50. Duguid, 1906 WN 100 (CCR); U.S. v. Brown, (1985) F2d 397 (CA), if D is charged
with conspiring with E, and D only is prosecuted because E had a claim of right of
personal exemption by virtue of being the head of a State which gave him a defence,
D may still be convicted of conspiracy, though if D and E had been tried together,
the acquittal of E would necessarily have resulted in the acquittal of D.
51. AIR 1959 SC 673.
52. AIR "1956 SC 33; U.S. v Jackson, (1982) 696, 578 F. 2d.
53. (1990) 2 SCC 143; AIR 1990 SC 1210.
176 ESSAYS OF INDIAN PENAL CODE

'one m a n ' director conspired to do an illegal act. 54 A c o m p a n y can certainly

conspire w i t h t w o or m o r e of its directors. 5 5 It is n o t necessary that each
m e m b e r of a c o n s p i r a c y m u s t k n o w each o t h e r or all t h e details of t h e
conspiracy. 5 6 It is also not necessary that every conspirator must have taken
part in each and every act done in pursuance of conspiracy. 5 7 W h e n one of
the accused died during the pencdency of appeal, c o n v i c t i o n of the o t h e r
u n d e r S. 120B / 468 was held t o be proper. 5 8 W h e r e all the accused except
o n e w e r e acquitted, the S u p r e m e C o u r t o r d e r e d his acquittal also. 3 9 In
Yamuna Singh v. State ofBihar**0 under Ss. 300 and 120 I P C , a professor was
killed under a conspiracy b y some persons in whose premises he was living
because of his reaction against their immoral conduct. T h e conviction of the
a c c u s e d p e r s o n s was u p h e l d o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e of t h e
a p p r o v e r was f o u n d t r u s t w o r t h y a n d was c o r r o b o r a t e d o n m a t e r i a l
p a r t i c u l a r s b y o t h e r witnesses. 6 1 In B. Narsimha Rao v. Govt. of A.P.62
accused - appellant was charged w i t h the c o m m i s s i o n of an offence in a
conspiracy along w i t h seven others. H e alone was convicted for offences
p u n i s h a b l e u n d e r Ss. 120-B, 409 and 4 7 1 , I P C u n d e r section 5(1)(c) and
5(l)(d) read with section 5(2) of the prevention of c o r r u p t i o n Act, 1947. All
the co-accused were acquitted b y the trial court and the high c o u r t . T h e
Supreme C o u r t set aside the conviction of the accused o n the g r o u n d that
there had t o be another with w h o m the accused would get in c o m m u n i o n to
conspire for the commission of an offence.
In Hawala case (CBI v. V C Shukla)^ it was alleged that Jain b r o t h e r s
had bribed politicians from different parties to obtain favours in matters of
certain contracts. T h e Supreme C o u r t after perusal of the material placed
before it held that evidence could not prove that t w o politicians were parties
t o it. This left in the conspiracy only one other p a r t y that is Jain b r o t h e r s .
H e n c e charges of conspiracy were not sustainable. In P VNarasimha Rao v.
StateM m i n o r i t y was t h a t m e m b e r s of P a r l i a m e n t w h o h a d a c c e p t e d
bribe should not be granted i m m u n i t y and can be charged inter alia u n d e r
S. 120-B I P C .

54. Ratanlal Dhirajlal, supra note 25 at 191.

55. Ibid.
56. R.K. Dalmiya,AlK 1962 SC 1821; Yashpal Mittal v. State of Punjab, 1978 C r L J 189.
57. State ofHimacbal Pradesh v. Krisban Lai Pradban), (1987) 2 SCC 17; AIR 1987 SC 773.
58. Narain Lai Nirala v. State ofRajasthan, AIR 1993SC 118.
59. Vinayak v. State ofMaharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1793.
60. AIR 1996 SC 2826.
61. See also XXXIIASIL (1996).
62. AIR 1996 SC 64.
63. AIR 1998 SC 1406.
64. Anand & Agrawal JJ, AIR 1998 SC 2120.
CONSPIRACY 177

T h e gist of the offence of conspiracy is an unlawful agreement between

t w o o r m o r e p e r s o n s . In o t h e r w o r d s , j o i n t evil i n t e n t is necessary t o
constitute the offence. A mere criminal intention formed in a m a n ' s m i n d is
insufficient a n d t h a t stage is never criminally cognisable. " T h e f o r u m of
conscience alone can take notice of such cases but the m u n i c i p a l law can
o n l y deal w i t h m a t t e r s a n d n o t m e r e l y w i t h m i n d save as manifested b y
action Consistency, therefore, required that a mere conspiracy should be
considered a substantive offence only w h e n the object of conspiracy is so
serious as the waging of w a r against the sovereign and other acts of equally
grave n a t u r e , a n d t h a t o t h e r cases of c o n s p i r a c y s h o u l d be d e e m e d an
offence only, w h e n t h e y fall within the definition of abetment." 6 5
T h e e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t of t h e offence of t h e c o n s p i r a c y is t h e
a g r e e m e n t t o c o m m i t an offence. In a case w h e r e t h e a g r e e m e n t is for
accomplishment of an act which b y itself constitutes an offence, t h e n in that
event n o overt act is necessary t o be proved b y the prosecution because in
s u c h a s i t u a t i o n , c r i m i n a l c o n s p i r a c y is established b y p r o v i n g s u c h an
a g r e e m e n t . 6 6 A criminal conspiracy m a y persist as long as the p e r s o n s in
agreement c o n t i n u e t o act in pursuance of the agreement. T h e conspiracy
can be terminated either b y abandonment, accomplishment or detection and
resultant r o u t b y law enforcement. It is a continuing offence. In Mogul S.C.
Co. v. MC Gregor67 it was h e l d that 'an agreement w h i c h is i m m o r a l or

65. Huda, Principles of Criminal Law (T.L.L. p. 106-107). The Supreme Court in a decision
(The State ofAndhra Pradesh v. Subbaiah 1961 (2) SCJ 686 held that where the matter
has gone beyond the stage of mere conspiracy and offences are alleged to have been
actually committed in pursuance thereof the accused can be charged with the specific
offences alleged to have flown out of the conspiracy along with the charge of
conspiracy. The court observed "Conspiracy to commit an offence is itself an
offence and a person can be separately charged with respect to such a conspiracy.
There is no analogy between S. 120-B and S. 109, Indian Penal Code. There may be
an element of abetment in a conspiracy; but conspiracy is something more than an
abetment. Offences created by Ss. 109 and 120-B, Indian Penal Code, are quite
distinct and there is no warrant for limiting the prosecution to only one element of
conspiracy, that is, abetment when the allegation is that what a person did was
something over and above that. Where a number of offences are committed by
several persons did was something over and above that. Where a number of
offences are committed by several persons in pursuance of a conspiracy it is usual to
charge them with those offences as well as with the offences of a conspiracy to
commit those offences. As an instance of this we may refer to the case in S.
Swaminathan v. State ofMadras." (AIR 1957 SC 340).
The court, however, pointed out that it is not desirable to charge the accused persons
with conspiracy with the ulterior object of letting in evidence which would otherwise
be inadmissible and that is undesirable to complicate a trial by introducing a large
number of chargers spread over a long period. But it would only be a question oi
propriety which should be left to the discretion of the trial judge to decide in the
facts and circumstances of the case. [Ed.]
66. See S.C.Biban v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420.
178 ESSAYS OF INDIAN PENAL CODE

against public policy or in restraint of trade, or otherwise of such a character

that the courts will not enforce it, is not necessarily a conspiracy. An
agreement, to be a conspiracy, must be to do that which is contrary to or
forbidden by law, as to violate a legal right or make use of unlawful
m e t h o d s , such as fraud or violence, or to do what is criminal. The
agreement, league or concert is the basis of the offence even though there
must be unity of object or purpose; there may be plurality of means, which
may sometimes be unknown to others. Thus agreement is an integral part of
the offence of criminal conspiracy. 68 In general conspiracy each one is
aware that he has a part to play, though he may not know all its secrets or
the means by which the common purpose is to be accomplished. 69
The end does not justify the means in criminal law. If, therefore, one
conspires with another to employ illegal means to achieve a legal purpose,
one may be convicted of conspiracy.70 In a case where criminal conspiracy
is alleged, the court must inquire whether the two persons are independently
pursuing the same end or they have come together to pursue the unlawful
object. The former does not render them conspirators but the latter does.
For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical manifestation of
agreement is required to be established. The express agreement need not be
proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the
unlawful act is not sufficient. A conspiracy is a continuing offence which
continues to subsist till it is executed or rescinded or frustrated by choice of
necessity. During its subsistence wherever any of the conspirators does an
act or series of acts, he would be held guilty under S. 120-B IPC. 7 1 The
Supreme Court time and again reiterated that it is not necessary that each
conspirator must know all the details of the scheme nor be a participant at
every stage. It is necessary that they should agree for a design or object of
the conspiracy. Conspiracy is conceived as having three elements; (1)
agreement; (2) between two or more persons by whom the agreement is
effected; and (3) a criminal object, which may be either the ultimate aim of
the agreement, or may constitute the means, or one of the means by which
that aim is to be accomplished. It is immaterial whether this is found in the
ultimate objects.72 Coleridge, J in Regina v. Murphy7i observed:73*

67. (1892) AC 25.

68. Quoted in XXXV ASIL (1999) 209.
69. Yash Pal v. State ofPunjab, AIR 1977 SC 2433; Hussain Umar v. Delip Singhji, AIR 1970
SC45.
70. R. C. Dikshit, "Criminal Conspiracy & Indian Penal Law" CBI Bulletin (Aug 1996) p.
4.
71. 2004(3) SCALE 267 at 286.
72. Ajay Aggarwal v. Union ofIndia and Others, JT 1993 (3) SC 203, para 8.
73. (1837)173 ER 502.
73a.K at 508.
CONSPIRACY 179

I am bound to tell you, that although the common design is the

root of the charge, it is not necessary to prove that two parties
came together and actually agreed in terms to have this common
design and to pursue it by common means, and so to carry it into
execution. This is not necessary, because in many cases of the
most clearly established conspiracies there are no means of
proving any such thing and neither common law nor common
sense requires that it should be proved. If you find that these
two persons pursued by their acts the same object, often by the
same means, one performing one part of an act, so as to
complete it, with a view to the attainment of the object which
they were pursuing, you will be at liberty to draw the conclusion
that they have been engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object.
The question you have to ask yourselves is, had they this
common design, and did they pursue it by these common means
the design being unlawful.
The court held that for an offence under S. 120-B IPC, the prosecution
need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do or
cause to be done the illegal act, the agreement may be proved by necessary
implication. 74 Thus, to establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge about
indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is
necessary.75 In State(Delhi Admn) v. V.C.Shukla76 the court observed:
[I]n order to prove a criminal conspiracy which is punishable
under S. 120-B of IPC, there must be direct or circumstantial
evidence to show that there was an agreement between two or
more persons to commit an offence. This clearly envisages that
there must be meeting of minds resulting in an ultimate decision
taken by the conspirators regarding the commission of an
offence. It is true t h a t in most cases it will be difficult to get
direct evidence of an agreement to conspire but a conspiracy can
be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a conclusive
or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more
persons to commit an offence...77
Recently, Supreme Court had occasion to discuss law of conspiracy. In

74. Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (1981) 2
SCC 443.
75. See State ofKerala v. P.Sugathan andAnr., 2000 (8) SCC 203; Devender Pal Singh v. State
ofN.C.T. ofDelhi, 2002 (5) SCC 234.
76. AIR 1980 SC 1382.
77. Id. at 1390, pare 8. See also MS. Reddyv. State Inspector ofPolice A.C.B. Nellore, 1993
Cr LJ 558(AP); Ammuni v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 280; Kuldeep v. State of
Rajasthan, AIR 2000 SC 3649; Khalid v. State, 1990 Cr LJ Raj.
180 ESSAYS OF INDIAN PENAL CODE

Esher Singh v. State ofAndhra Pradesh7* nine persons were alleged to be

responsible for conspiring and kill one Joga Singh. They were charged under
Ss. 120B and 302 of IPC read with S. 3(3) of T A D A and S. 27 of Indian
Arms Act, 1959. The trial court found accused Esher Singh guilty of the
offence punishable under S. 4 of TADA and while further holding that the
other allegations were not established so far as appellant Esher Singh and
o t h e r co-accused were concerned. Esher Singh was convicted and
sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of
Rs. 1,000/- with default stipulation.While Esher Singh questioned the legality
of the conviction and sentence imposed, the State of Andhra Pradesh had
questioned acquittal of accused persons in appeal to the Supreme Court.
The court reiterated the elements of criminal conspiracy and observed:78,1
Law making conspiracy a crime, is designed to curb immoderate
power to do mischief which is gained by a combination of
minds... [P]rosecution need not necessarily prove that the
perpetrators expressly agree to do or cause to be done an illegal
act; the agreement may be proved by necessary
implication.Offence of criminal conspiracy has its foundation in
an agreement to commit an offence.
The court further observed : 78b
The conspiracy arises and the offence is committed as soon as
the agreement is made; and the offence c o n t i n u e s to be
committed so long as the combination persists, that is until the
conspiratorial agreement is terminated by completion of its
performance or by abandonment or frustration or however it
may be.
While interpreting S. 120-B, the court examined whether any act is
required to convict the parties for conspiracy. It declared that mere proof of
agreement between two or more to do an unlawful act for an act by
unlawful means is enough. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very
plot is an act itself and an act of each of the parties, promise against
promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful, punishable if
for a criminal object or for use of criminal means. 79 In case of a criminal
conspiracy, conspirators can be punished for conspiracy though individually
they may not be prosecuted for other substantive offences. A group of
friends went to bar. One of them fired at the bar mate for refusal to serve
drinks. The others stayed at the bar, however, they were unaware of the

78. 2004(3) SCALE 267.

78a./rf. at 282, para 35.
78b. Id. at 283, para 37.
79. Ram Nayak Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3SCC 641. Quoted in XXX IX ASIL (2003).
CONSPIRACY 181

accused carrying a loaded pistol. The court said that this could not
constitute an evidence of conspiracy. 80
Section 120-B provides for the punishment of offence of conspiracy. A
crucial distinction between the two provisions is that while the offence of
criminal conspiracy is complete as soon as the conspirators forge an
agreement to do an illegal act or a legal thing through illegal means, under
the provision of 120-B, even those persons who are not party to the initial
agreement or did not participate in the meeting at the time of the formation
of the agreement, but who subsequently joined the conspiracy at a later
point in time, are made liable for the conspiracy. A conspirator may come
and leave at any time but every such conspirator will be liable for the
subsequent acts of other conspirators. In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of
Biharn was convicted along with other accused with the aid of Section 120-
B. In another case of Nand Kumar v. State of Bihar11 Nand Kumar was alleged
to conspire with other accused to get LIC policies issued to receive
premium commission on the basis of fake and forged documents. However,
no evidence was found to show the knowledge and consent of the accused
for the aforesaid act. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the
other accused.
Thus, conspiracy is an inchoate crime and is punishable primarily
because an agreement to commit a crime is a decisive act, fraught with
potential dangers; but to bring an agreement to commit a civil wrong within
the range of criminal conspiracy is to stretch the rationale of law to the
farthest limit. In its broad reach it can be made to do great evil.

IV

Proof: The proof of this psychological offence is little bit difficult because
the facts to prove this offence lie hidden in human minds and their
expressions are always concealed in cover of darkness or code languages.8-'
Although secrecy is frequently a characteristic of conspiracy, it forms no
essential element of the crime. Hence, it cannot be argued that because
everything was done openly, there could be no conspiracy in the case at
all. 84
The court laid down in clear terms that offence of conspiracy can be
proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence.85 Since conspiracies are
not hatched in the open, by their nature, they are secretly planned. Direct

80. State v. Siddhartb Vasbisth, (alias Manu Sharma), 2001 Cr LJ 2404 pel).
81. AIR 1994 SC 2420.
82. AIR 1992 SC 1939.
83. Supra note 48 at 93.
84. ILR (1974) 1 Cal 599 (654).
85. Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 AC 495; (1900-03) All ER Rep 1 HL.
182 ESSAYS OF INDIAN PENAL CODE

evidence in proof of conspiracy is, therefore, an exception than the rule. So,
the facts about the conspiracy are generally inferred from the circumstances
before, during and after the occurrence. 86
It is not essential for agreement that the members of conspiracy meet
each other or know all the members or even majority of the members to the
conspiracy. It is also not essential that all should know all the details of
conspiracy. As a matter of fact, a criminal conspiracy has to be inferred
from the circumstances and from certain criminal acts of the parties
accused, done in pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose common
between them.
There is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of
conspiracy and that of any other offence, it can be established by direct or
circumstantial evidence.87 The inferences are normally deduced from acts of
parties in pursuance of a purpose in common intention between the
conspirators.88 It was held by the court that to prove conspiracy there must
be evidence direct or circumstantial to show that there was an agreement
between two or more persons to commit an offence.89 Under S. 34 it is
essential that some criminal act should have been done in furtherance of a
common intention of all the accused persons. When dacoity with murder
was committed, the court said that conviction under S.120B rule out the
need for conviction under S.34.90
The circumstances in a case, when taken together on their face
value, should indicate the meeting of the minds between the conspirators
for the intended object of committing an illegal act or an act which is not
illegal by illegal means. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the-
prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused
with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy. It has to be shown
that all means adopted and illegal acts done were in furtherance of the
object of the conspiracy hatched. The circumstances relied for the purposes
of drawing an inference should be prior in point of time than the actual
commission of the offence in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. 91
The conspiracies are not hatched in open, by their nature, they are
secretly planned, they can be proved even by circumstantial evidence, the
lack of direct evidence relating to conspiracy has no consequence. 92 In
Bhagwan Swaroop Lai Bishan Lai v. State of Maharashtra^ it was held that under

86. Quoted in XXX VIIIASIL (2002).

87. See Bhagwan Samp Lai Bishan Lai v. State ofMaharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682.
88. 2004(3) SCALE 267.
89. V.C.Shukla v. State, (Delhi Admn), (1980) 2 SCC 665.
90. Syed Mohd.Owais v. State ofMaharashtra, 2003 Cr LJ 303(Bom).
91. 2004 (3) SCALE 267.
92. See F. K.Chandrasenan v. State ofKerala, AIR 1995 SC 1066.
93. AIR 1965 SC 682.
CONSPIRACY 183

S. 10 of IEA anything said, done or written is a relevant fact or the purpose

of proving the existence of the conspiracy and the conspirators mere
members of the conspiracy. This section introduces 'doctrine of agency'. In
the case of the assassination of the then Prime Minister of India, Smt. Indira
Gandhi, 94 one of the actual killers of the two conspirators were brought to
trial. One was acquitted on the ground that his guilt was not proved. About
Kehar Singh, it was proved that he was having secret talks with one of the
actual killers. The facts were sufficient to constitute zprima facie evidence of
conspiracy within the meaning of Section 10 of IEA. 95 In this connection,
the court observed: 94a
[I]t is interesting to note that in order to prove a conspiracy it
has always been felt that it was not easy to get direct evidence. It
appears that considering this experience about the proof of
conspiracy that S. 10 of Indian Evidence Act was enacted.
It has also been reiterated 96 that the law of criminal conspiracy is an
instrument of the governmental oppression. Needless to say that the
Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1913,97 was passed as an emergent
piece of legislation and this measure was motivated by political
expedience. 9 8 N o efforts were made to deal with the matter in the
ordinary and regular way. It was neither circulated for opinion among
the judicial and executive officers of government nor the representative
public men and bodies were consulted. 99 The result was that a piece of
legislation was hurriedly, enacted and inconsistent and unintelligible
principles of law were put into action. It may be suggested that the sweeping
provision of S.120-A, IPC needs re-examination and irrationality which has
imperceptible crept into the Indian law may require elimination.100 To apply
the law of criminal conspiracy for an agreement to commit torts generally is

94. Kehar Singh v. State ofPunjab, AIR 1988 SC 1883.

94a. Id. at 1903, para 44.
95. Section 10 reads:
Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design - where there
is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together
to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any
one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when
such intention was first entertained by any of them.is a relevant fact as against each
of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well as for the purpose of proving
the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person
was a party to it.
96. See supra note 1.
97. Act VIII of 1913.
98. See statement of Objects & Reasons, Indian Criminal Law amendment Bill, 193.
99. Dissenting note of Pt. M.M. Malviya (See Roy, supra note 25 at 48-50).
100. See supra note 25.
184 ESSAYS OF INDIAN PENAL CODE

not wholesome. 1 0 1 The conspiracy to do an 'illegal act' is uncertain and

covers a wide area with regard to the commission of offences. The law also
needs statutory modification in this respect and its use may be limited to
determinate heads of offences only. 102

101. If deemed necessary it may be applied in cases of specific torts only; such as torts
to commit malicious prosecution, malicious defamation, to procure breach of
contract etc.
102. (a) As has been already provided in S.121-A, I P C
(b) The Draft Code of 1879 in England classified the objects of conspiracy as (1)
treasonable (2) seditious (3) to bring false accusations (4) to pervert justice (5) to
defile women (6) to murder (7) to defraud (8) to commit indictable offences (9) to
prevent by force the collection of rates and taxes.
The above recommendations were adopted in the New Zealand Code. South
Africa is content with a doctrine that limits its conspiracies to commit crimes.